Presented to the

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
LIBRARY

by the

ONTARIO LEGISLATIVE
LIBRARY

1980

THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE
EXECUTIVE

THE

STAFFORD LITTLE LECTURES

PUBLISHED BY
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Two Hague Conferences, by JOSEPH H. CHOATE.
Cloth, 124 pp., $1.00 net, by mail $1.06.

Experiments in Government and the Essentials of
the Constitution, by ELIHU ROOT. Cloth, 88 pp.,
$1.00 net, by mail $1.06.

The Independence of the Executive, by GROVER
CLEVELAND. Cloth, 90 pp., $1.00 net, by mail $1.06.

The Government in the Chicago Strike of 1894, by
GROVER CLEVELAND. Cloth, 66 pp., $1.00 net, by mail
$1.06.

The Venezuelan Boundary Controversy, by GROVER
CLEVELAND. Cloth, 130 pp., $1.00 net, by mail $1.06.

Thi> portrait \v;ii
taken h

I Gutekunst.

!><V

THE INDEPENDENCE OF
THE EXECUTIVE

BY

GROVER CLEVELAND

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

PRINCETON !?* H^

LONDON : HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

, t it i »

1913

Copyright, 1913, by
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Published October, 1913

PREFATORY NOTE

President Cleveland first visited Princeton at
the time of the Sesquicentennial Celebration
and made the chief address of that occasion on
October 22, 1896. A few months later he
retired from the Presidency and made Prince-
ton his home for the remaining eleven years of
his life. For the last seven of these years he
served as Trustee of Princeton University and
for the closing four years also acted as Chair-
man of the Committee on the Graduate School
having special charge of the project for the
residential Graduate College. He died on June
24, 1908, and was buried, as he desired, in
his family plot in Princeton. By express pro-
vision of his will the only monument to mark
his grave was to be the simple one which has
already been erected.

Shortly after Mr. Cleveland came to live in
Princeton it was proposed to found a Lecture-
ship on Public Affairs in his honor. In the
iii

iv PREFATORY NOTE

early summer of 1899 Mr. Henry Stafford
Little, an alumnus of the University, endowed
the lectureship and expressed the hope that Mr.
Cleveland would consent to hold it, or at any
rate to be the first incumbent. Mr. Cleveland
was reluctant to undertake any new work at
that time, but on receiving special word from
Mr. .Little, who was then critically ill, agreed
to prepare an address for the next year.

On April 9 and 10, 1900, every seat in
Alexander Hall was taken and there were
throngs standing to hear his two addresses on
"The Independence of the Executive." The
next spring he lectured twice on "The Vene-
zuelan Boundary Question." For the next two
years there were no lectures, and in 1904
Mr. Cleveland read one lecture on "The
Government in the Chicago Strike." He
always had crowded audiences, both for him-
self and the grave importance of the questions
he treated. He was heard with the closest
attention and repeatedly welcomed with affec-
tionate enthusiasm.

Seventeen years ago to the day since Mr.
Cleveland first spoke in Princeton, his Prince-

PREFATORY NOTE v

ton lectures are now republished in expanded
form on the day of the dedication of the
Graduate College he so strongly supported and
did not live to see realized, and also the dedi-
cation day of the Cleveland Memorial Tower,
erected by national subscription and built into
the Graduate College for which he labored.

The lectures here reprinted are disclosures
of the meaning of important happenings in our
national history. They are even more; for
they make clear as light that plain, strict, un-
swerving and unaffected honesty which was
the vigorous central power in Grover Cleve-
land's life. It is well his words should be
heard again at the time we gather to dedicate
his national monument.

ANDREW F. WEST.

The Graduate College

Princeton University

October 22, 1913

THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE
EXECUTIVE

I

In dealing with "The Independence of the
Executive," I shall refer first of all to the
conditions in which the Presidency of the
United States had its origin, and shall after-
ward relate an incident within my own experi-
ence involving the preservation and vindication
of an independent function of this high office.

When our original thirteen States, actuated
by "a decent respect for the opinions of man-
kind," presented to the world the causes which
impelled them to separate from the mother
country and to cast off all allegiance to the
Crown of England, they gave prominence to
the declaration that "the history of the present
King of Great Britain is a history of repeated
injuries and usurpations, all having in direct
object the establishment of an absolute tyranny
over these States." This was followed by an
indictment containing not less than eighteen

2 THE INDEPENDENCE

counts or accusations, all leveled at the King
and the King alone. These were closed or
clenched by this asseveration: "A Prince
whose character is thus marked by every act
which may define a tyrant is unfit to be the
ruler of a free people." In this arraignment
the English Parliament was barely mentioned,
and then only as "others," with whom the King
had conspired by "giving his assent to their
act of pretended legislation," and thus giving
operative force to some of the outrages which
had been put upon the colonies.

It is thus apparent that in the indictment pre-
sented by the thirteen colonies they charged
the King, who in this connection may properly
be considered as the Chief Executive of Great
Britain, with the crimes and offenses which
were their justification for the following
solemn and impressive decree :

We, therefore, the Representatives of the
United States of America, in General Congress
assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the
World for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in
the name and by the authority of the good People
of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare

OF THE EXECUTIVE 3

that these United Colonies are, and of right
ought to be, free and independent States; that
they are absolved from all allegiance to the
British Crown, and that all political connection
between them and the State of Great Britain is,
and ought to be, totally dissolved; and that as
free and independent States they have full power
to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances,
establish commerce, and do all other acts and
things which independent States may of right do.
And for the support of this Declaration, with a
firm reliance on the protection of Divine Provi-
dence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives,
our fortunes, and our sacred honor.

To this irrevocable predicament had the thir-
teen States or colonies been brought by their
resistance to the oppressive exercise of execu-
tive power.

In these circumstances it should not surprise
us to find that when, on the footing of the Dec-
laration of Independence, the first scheme of
government was adopted for the revolted
States, it contained no provision for an execu-
tive officer to whom should be intrusted ad-
ministrative power and duty. Those who had
suffered and rebelled on account of the tyranny

4 THE INDEPENDENCE

of an English King were evidently chary of
subjecting themselves to the chance of a repeti-
tion of their woes through an abuse of the
power that might necessarily devolve upon an
American President

Thus, under the Articles of Confederation,
'The United States of America," without an
executive head as we understand the term,
came to the light; and in its charter of exist-
ence it was declared that "the articles of this
Confederation shall be inviolably observed by
every State, and the Union shall be perpetual."

Let us not harbor too low an opinion of the
Confederation. Under its guidance and direc-
tion the war of the Revolution was fought to
a successful result, and the people of the States
which were parties to it became in fact free
and independent. But the Articles of Con-
federation lacked the power to enforce the
decree they contained of inviolable observance
by every State; and the union, which under
their sanction was to be permanent and last-
ing, early developed symptoms of inevitable
decay.

It thus happened that within ten years after
the date of the Articles of Confederation their

OF THE EXECUTIVE 5

deficiencies had become so manifest that repre-
sentatives of the people were again assembled
in convention to consider the situation and to
devise a plan of government that would form
"a more perfect union" in place of the crum-
bling structure which had so lately been pro-
claimed as perpetual.

The pressing necessity for such action can-
not be more forcibly portrayed than was done
by Mr. Madison when, in a letter written a
short time before the convention, he declared:

Our situation is becoming every day more and
more critical. No money comes into the Federal
treasury ; no respect is paid to the Federal author-
ity; and people of reflection unanimously agree
that the existing Confederacy is tottering to its
foundation. Many individuals of weight, par-
ticularly in the Eastern district, are suspected of
leaning 'towards monarchy. Other individuals
predict a partition of the States into two or more
confederacies.

It was at this time universally conceded that
if success was to follow the experiment of
popular government among the new States, the

6 THE INDEPENDENCE

creation of an Executive branch invested with
power and responsibility would be an abso-
lutely essential factor. Madison, in referring
to the prospective work of the convention, said :

A national executive will also be necessary. I
have scarcely ventured to form my own opinion
yet, either of the manner in which it ought to be
constituted, or of the authorities with which it
ought to be clothed.

We know that every plan of government
proposed or presented to the convention em-
bodied in some form as a prominent feature
the establishment of an effective Executive;
and I think it can be safely said that no sub-
ject was submitted which proved more per-
plexing and troublesome. We ought not to
consider this as unnatural. Many members of
the convention, while obliged to confess that
the fears and prejudices that refused executive
power to the Confederacy had led to the most
unfortunate results, were still confronted with
a remnant of those fears and prejudices, and
were not yet altogether free from the suspicion
that the specter of monarchy might be con-

OF THE EXECUTIVE 7

cealed behind every suggestion of executive
force. Others less timid were nevertheless tre-
mendously embarrassed by a lack of definite
and clear conviction as to the manner of creat-
ing the new office and fixing its limitations.
Still another difficulty, which seems to have
been all-pervading and chronic in the conven-
tion, and which obstinately fastened itself to
the discussion of the subject, was the jealousy
and suspicion existing between the large and
small States. I am afraid, also, that an un-
willingness to trust too much to the people had
its influence in preventing an easy solution of
the executive problem. The first proposal
made in the convention that the President
should be elected by the people was accompan-
ied by an apologetic statement by the member
making the suggestion that he was almost un-
willing to declare the mode of selection he pre-
ferred, "being apprehensive that it might
appear chimerical." Another favored the idea
of popular election, but thought it "impracti-
cable" ; another was not clear that the people
ought to act directly even in the choice of elec-
tors, being, as alleged, "too little informed of
personal characters in large districts, and liable

8 THE INDEPENDENCE

to deception"; and again, it was declared that
"it would be as unnatural to refer the choice
of a proper character for Chief Magistrate to
the people as it would to refer a trial of colors
to a blind man."

A plan was first adopted by the convention
which provided for the selection of the Presi-
dent by the Congress, or, as it was then called,
by the National Legislature. Various other
plans were proposed, but only to be summarily
rejected in favor of that which the convention
had apparently irrevocably decided upon.
There were, however, among the members,
some who, notwithstanding the action taken,
lost no opportunity to advocate, with energy
and sound reasons, the substitution of a mode
of electing the President more in keeping with
the character of the office and the genius of a
popular government. This fortunate persis-
tence resulted in the reopening of the subject
and its reference, very late in the sessions of
the convention, to a committee who reported
in favor of a procedure for the choice of the
Executive substantially identical with that now
in force; and this was adopted by the conven-
tion almost unanimously.

OF THE EXECUTIVE 9

This imperfect review of the incidents that
led up to the establishment of the office of
President, and its rescue from dangers which
surrounded its beginning, if not otherwise use-
ful, ought certainly to suggest congratulatory
and grateful reflections. The proposition that
the selection of a President should rest entirely
with the Congress, which came so near adop-
tion, must, I think, appear to us as something
absolutely startling; and we may well be sur-
prised that it was ever favorably considered by
the convention.

In the scheme of our national Government
the Presidency, is preeminently the people's
office. Of course, all offices created by the
Constitution, and all governmental agencies
existing under its sanction, must be recognized,
in a sense, as the offices and agencies of the
people — considered either as an aggregation
constituting the national body politic, or some
of its divisions. When, however, I now speak
of the Presidency as being preeminently the
people's office, I mean that it is especially the
office related to the people as individuals, in no
general, local, or other combination, but stand-1
ing on the firm footing of manhood and Ameri-

I0 THE INDEPENDENCE

can citizenship. The Congress may enact
laws; but they are inert and vain without ex-
ecutive impulse. The Federal courts adjudi-
cate upon the rights of the citizen when their
aid is invoked. But under the constitutional
mandate that the President "shall take care
that the laws be faithfully executed," every
citizen, in the day or in the night, at home or
abroad, is constantly within the protection and
restraint of the Executive power — none so
lowly as to be beneath its scrupulous care, and
none so great and powerful as to be beyond its
restraining force.

In view of this constant touch and the rela-
tionship thus existing between the citizen and
the Executive, it would seem that these consid-
erations alone supplied sufficient reason why
his selection should rest upon the direct and
independent expression of the people's choice.
This reason is reinforced by the fact that inas-
much as Senators are elected by the State
legislatures, Representatives in Congress by
the votes of districts or States, and judges are
appointed by the President, it is only in the se-
lection of the President that the body of the
American people can by any possibility act to-

OF THE EXECUTIVE n

gether and directly in the equipment of their
national Government. Without at least this
much of participation in that equipment, we
could hardly expect that a ruinous discontent
and revolt could be long suppressed among a
people who had been promised a popular and
representative government.

I do not mean to be understood as conceding
that the selection of a President through elec-
tors chosen by the people of the several States,
according to our present plan, perfectly meets
the case as I have stated it. On the contrary,
it has always seemed to me that this plan is
weakened by an unfortunate infirmity. Though
the people in each State are permitted to vote
directly for electors, who shall give voice to the
popular preference of the State in the choice of
President, the voters throughout the nation
may be so distributed, and the majorities given
for electors in the different States may be
such, that a minority of all the voters in the
land can determine, and in some cases actually
have determined, who the President should be.
I believe a way should be devised to prevent
such a result.

It seems almost ungracious, however, to

12 THE INDEPENDENCE

find fault with our present method of electing
a President when we recall the alternative
from which we escaped, through the final ac-
tion of the convention which framed the Con-
stitution.

It is nevertheless a curious fact that the plan
at first adopted, vesting in Congress the presi-
dential election, was utterly inconsistent with
the opinion of those most prominent in the
convention, as well as of all thoughtful and
patriotic Americans who watched for a happy
result from its deliberations, that the corner-
stone of the new Government should be a dis-
tinct division of powers and functions among
the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
branches, with the independence of each amply
secured. Whatever may have been the real
reasons for giving the choice of the President
to Congress, I am sure those which were an-
nounced in the convention do not satisfy us in
this day and generation that such an ar-
rangement would have secured either the
separateness or independence of the Executive
department. I am glad to believe this to be so
palpable as to make it unnecessary for me to
suggest other objections, which might subject

OF THE EXECUTIVE 13

me to the suspicion of questioning the wisdom
or invariably safe motives of Congress in this
relation. It is much more agreeable to
acknowledge gratefully that a danger was
avoided, and a method finally adopted for the
selection of the Executive head of the Gov-
ernment which was undoubtedly the best within
the reach of the convention.

The Constitution formed by this convention
has been justly extolled by informed and lib-
erty-loving men throughout the world. The
statesman who, above all his contemporaries of
the past century, was best able to pass judg-
ment on its merits formulated an unchallenged
verdict when he declared that "the American
Constitution is the most wonderful work ever
struck off at a given time by the brain and
purpose of man."

We dwell with becoming pride upon the in-
tellectual greatness of the men who composed
the convention which created this Constitution.
They were indeed great; but the happy result
of their labor would not have been saved to
us and to humanity if to intellectual greatness
there had not been added patriotism, patience,
and, last but by no means least, forbearing

I4 THE INDEPENDENCE

tact. To these traits are we especially indebted
for the creation of an Executive department,
limited against every possible danger of usur-
pation or tyranny, but, at the same time,
strong and independent within its limitations.
The Constitution declares: "The executive
power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America," and this is fol-
lowed by a recital of the specific and distinctly
declared duties with which he is charged, and
the powers with which he is invested. The
members of the convention were not willing,
however, that the executive power which they
had vested in the President should be cramped
and embarrassed by any implication that a
specific statement of certain granted powers
and duties excluded all other executive func-
tions ; nor were they apparently willing that the
claim of such exclusion should have counte-
nance in the strict meaning which might be
given to the words "executive power." There-
fore we find that the Constitution supplements
a recital of the specific powers and duties of
the President with this impressive and con-
clusive additional requirement : "He shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed."

OF THE EXECUTIVE 15

This I conceive to be equivalent to a grant of
all the power necessary to the performance of
his duty in the faithful execution of the laws.
The form of Constitution first proposed to
the convention provided that the President
elect, before entering upon the duties of his
office, should take an oath, simply declaring:
"I will faithfully execute the office of Presi-
dent of the United States." To this brief and
very general obligation there were added by
the convention the following words : "and will
to the best of my judgment and power pre-
serve, protect, and defend the Constitution of
the United States." Finally, the "Committee
on Style," appointed by the convention, appar-
ently to arrange the order of the provisions
agreed upon, and to suggest the language in
which they would be best expressed, reported
in favor of an oath in these terms: "I will
faithfully execute the office of President of
the United States, and will to the best of my
ability preserve, protect, and defend the Con-
stitution of the United States"; and this
form was adopted by the convention without
discussion, and continues to this day as the
form of obligation which binds the con-

16 THE INDEPENDENCE

science of every incumbent of our Chief
Magistracy.

It is therefore apparent that as the Consti-
tution, in addition to its specification of espe-
cial duties and powers devolving upon the
President, provides that "he shall take care
that the laws be faithfully executed," and as
this was evidently intended as a general devo-
lution of power and imposition of obligation
in respect to any condition that might arise
relating to the execution of the laws, so it is
likewise apparent that the convention was not
content to rest the sworn obligation of the
President solely upon his covenant to "faith-
fully execute the office of President of the
United States," but added thereto the mandate
that he should preserve, protect, and defend
the Constitution, to the best of his judgment
and power, or, as it was afterward expressed,
to the best of his ability. Thus is our Presi-
dent solemnly required not only to exercise
every power attached to his office, to the end
that the laws may be faithfully executed, and
not only to render obedience to the demands
of the fundamental law and executive duty,
but to exert all his official strength and author-

OF THE EXECUTIVE 17

ity for the preservation, protection, and de-
fense of the Constitution.

I have thus far presented considerations
which while they have to do with my topic
are only preliminary to its more especial and
distinct discussion. In furtherance of this dis-
cussion it now becomes necessary to quote from
the Constitution the following clause found
among its specification of presidential duty
and authority :

And he shall nominate, and by and with the
advice of the Senate shall appoint ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, judges of the
Supreme Court, and all other officers of the
United States whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be estab-
lished by law.

This clause was the subject of a prolonged
and thorough debate in Congress which oc-
curred in the year 1789 and during the first
session of that body assembled under the new
Constitution.

II

The question discussed involved distinctly
and solely the independent power of the Presi-
dent under the Constitution to remove an offi-
cer- appointed by him by and with the advice
of the Senate. The discussion arose upon a
bill then before the Congress, providing for
the organization of the State Department,
which contained a provision that the head of
the department to be created should be remov-
able from office by the President This was
opposed by a considerable number on the
ground that as the Senate cooperated in the
appointment, it should also be consulted in the
matter of removal ; it was urged by others that
the power of removal in such cases was already
vested in the President by the Constitution,
and that the provision was therefore unneces-
sary; and it was also contended that the ques-
tion whether the Constitution permitted such
removal or not should be left untouched by
legislative action, and be determined by the
courts.

OF THE EXECUTIVE 19

Those insisting upon retaining in the bill the
clause permitting removal by the President
alone, claimed that such legislation would re-
move all doubt on the subject, though they
asserted that the absolute investiture 'of all ex-
ecutive power in the President, reinforced by
the constitutional command that he should take
care that the laws be faithfully executed, justi-
fied their position that the power already ex-
isted, especially in the absence of any adverse
expression in the Constitution. They also in-
sisted that the removal of subordinate officers
was an act so executive in its character, and
so intimately related to the faithful execution
of the laws, that it was clearly among the
President's constitutional prerogatives, and that
if it was not sufficiently declared in the Con-
stitution, the omission should be supplied by
the legislation proposed.

In support of these positions it was said that
the participation of the Senate in the removal
of executive officers would be a dangerous step
toward breaking down the partitions between
the different departments of the Government
which had been carefully erected, and were re-
garded by every statesman of that time as ab-

20 THE INDEPENDENCE

solutely essential to our national existence ; and
stress was laid upon the unhappy condition that
would arise in case a removal desired by the
President should be refused by the Senate, and
he thus should be left, still charged with the
responsibility of the faithful execution of the
laws, while deprived of the loyalty and con-
stancy of his subordinates and assistants, who,
if resentful of his efforts for their removal,
would lack devotion to his work, and who,
having learned to rely upon another branch of
the Government for their retention, would be
invited to defiant insubordination.

At the time of this discussion the proceed-
ings of the Senate took place behind closed
doors, and its debates were not published, but
its determinations upon such questions as came
before it were made public.

The proceedings of the other branch of the
Congress, however, were open, and we are per-
mitted through their publication to follow the
very interesting discussion of the question re-
ferred to in the House of Representatives.

The membership of that body included a
number of those who had been members of
the Constitutional Convention, and who, fresh

OF THE EXECUTIVE 21

from its deliberations, were necessarily some-
what familiar with its purposes and intent.
Mr. Madison was there, who had as much to
do as any other man with the inauguration of
the convention and its successful conclusion.
He was not only especially prominent in its
deliberations, but increased his familiarity with
its pervading spirit and disposition by keeping
a careful record of its proceedings. In speak-
ing of his reasons for keeping this record he
says:

The curiosity I had felt during my researches
into the history of the most distinguished con-
federacies, particularly those of antiquity, and
the deficiency I found in the means of satisfying
it, more especially in what related to the process,
the principles, the reasons and the anticipations
which prevailed in the formation of them, deter-
mined me to preserve as far as I could an exact
account of what might pass in the convention
while executing its trust, with the magnitude of
which I was duly impressed, as I was by the
gratification promised to future curiosity, by an
authentic exhibition of the objects, the opinions
and the reasonings from which a new system of
government was to receive its peculiar structure

22 THE INDEPENDENCE

and organization. Nor was I unaware of the
value of such a contribution to the fund of ma-
terials for the history of a Constitution on which
would be staked the happiness of a people great
in its infancy and possibly the cause of liberty
throughout the world.

This important debate also gains great sig-
nificance from the fact that it occurred within
two years after the completion of the Constitu-
tion, and before political rancor or the tempta-
tions of partizan zeal had intervened to vex
our congressional counsels.

It must be conceded, I think, that all the
accompanying circumstances gave tremendous
weight and authority to this first legislative
construction of the Constitution in the first ses-
sion of the first House of Representatives, and
that these circumstances fully warranted Mr.
Madison's declaration during the debate:

I feel the importance of the question, and know
that our decision will involve the decision of all
similar cases. The decision that is at this time
made will become the permanent exposition of
the Constitution, and on a permanent exposition

OF THE EXECUTIVE 23

of the Constitution will depend the genius and
character of the whole Government.

The discussion developed the fact that from
the first a decided majority were of the opinion
that the Executive should have power of
independent removal, whether already derived
from the Constitution or to be conferred by
supplementary legislation. It will be recalled
that the debate arose upon the clause in a pend-
ing bill providing that the officer therein named
should "be removable by the President," and
that some of the members of the House, hold-
ing that such power of removal was plainly
granted to the Constitution, insisted that it
would be useless and improper to assume to
confer it by legislative enactment. Though a
motion to strike from the bill the clause ob-
jected to had been negatived by a large ma-
jority, it was afterward proposed, in deference
to the opinions of those who suggested that the
House should go no further than to give a
legislative construction to the Constitution in
favor of executive removal, that in lieu of
the words contained in the bill, indicating a
grant of the power, there should be inserted

24 THE INDEPENDENCE

a provision for a new appointment in case
of a vacancy occurring in the following
manner :

Whenever the said principal officer shall be
removed from office by the President of the
United States, or in any other case of vacancy.

This was universally acknowledged to be a
distinct and unequivocal declaration that, un-
der the Constitution, the right of removal was
conferred upon the President; and those sup-
porting that proposition voted in favor of the
change, which was adopted by a decisive ma-
jority. The bill thus completed was sent to the
Senate, where, if there was opposition to it on
the ground that it contained a provision in de-
rogation of senatorial right, it did not avail;
for the bill was passed by that body, though
grudgingly, and, as has been disclosed, only
by the vote of the Vice-President, upon an
equal division of the Senate. It may not be
amiss to mention, as adding significance to the
concurrence of the House and the Senate in the
meaning and effect of the clause pertaining to
removal as embodied in this bill, that during

OF THE EXECUTIVE 25

that same session two other bills creating the
•Treasury Department and the War Depart-
ment, containing precisely the same provision,
were passed by both Houses.

I hope I shall be deemed fully justified in de-
tailing at some length the circumstances that
led up to a legislative construction of the Con-
stitution, as authoritative as any surroundings
could possibly make it, in favor of the con-
stitutional right of the President to remove
Federal officials without the participation or
interference of the Senate.

This was in 1789. In 1886, ninety-seven
years afterward, this question was again raised
in a sharp contention between the Senate and
the President. In the meantime, as was quite
natural perhaps, partizanship had grown more
pronounced and bitter, and it was at that par-
ticular time by no means softened by the fact
that the party that had become habituated to
power by twenty-four years of substantial con-
trol of the Government, was obliged, on the
4th of March, 1885, to make way in the execu-
tive office for a President elected by the oppo-
site party. He came into office fully pledged
to the letter of Civil Service reform ; and pass-

26 THE INDEPENDENCE

ing beyond the letter of the law on that subject,
he had said :

There is a class of government positions which
are not within the letter of the Civil Service
statute, but which are so disconnected with the
policy of an administration, that the removal
therefrom of present incumbents, in my opinion,
should not be made during the terms for which
they were appointed, solely on partizan grounds,
and for the purpose of putting in their places
those who are in political accord with the appoint-
ing power.

The meaning of this statement is, that while,
among the officers not affected by the Civil
Service law, there are those whose duties are
so related to the enforcement of the political
policy of an administration that they should be
in full accord with it, there are others whose
duties are not so related, and who simply per-
form executive work; and these, though be-
yond the protection of Civil Service legislation,
should not be removed merely for the purpose
of rewarding the party friends of the Presi-
dent, by putting them in the positions thus
made vacant. An adherence to this rule, based

OF THE EXECUTIVE 27

upon the spirit instead of the letter of Civil
Service reform, I believe established a prece-
dent, which has since operated to check whole-
sale removals solely for political reasons.

The declaration which I have quoted was,
however, immediately followed by an import-
ant qualification, in these terms:

But many men holding such positions have for-
feited all just claim to retention, because they
have used their places for party purposes, in
disregard of their duty to the .people; and be-
cause, instead of being decent public servants,
they have proved themselves offensive partizans
and unscrupulous manipulators of local party
management.

These pledges were not made without a full
appreciation of the difficulties and perplexities
that would follow in their train. It was an-
ticipated that party associates would expect,
notwithstanding Executive pledges made in ad-
vance, that there would be a speedy and liberal
distribution among them of the offices from
which they had been inexorably excluded for
nearly a quarter of a century. It was plainly

28 THE INDEPENDENCE

seen that many party friends would be disap-
pointed, that personal friends would be alien-
ated, and that the charge of ingratitude, the
most distressing and painful of all accusations,
would find abundant voice. Nor were the diffi-
culties overlooked that would sometimes accom-
pany a consistent and just attempt to determine
the cases in which incumbents in office had
forfeited their claim to retention. That such
cases were numerous, no one with the slightest
claim to sincerity could for a moment deny.

With all these things in full view, and with
an alternative of escape in sight through an
evasion of pledges, it was stubbornly deter-
mined by the new Executive that the practical
enforcement of the principle involved was
worth all the sacrifices which were anticipated.
And while it was not expected that the Senate,
which was the only stronghold left to the party
politically opposed to the President, would con-
tribute an ugly dispute to a situation already
sufficiently troublesome, I am in a position to
say that even such a contingency, if early made
manifest, would have been contemplated with
all possible fortitude.

The Tenure of Office act, it will be remem-

OF THE EXECUTIVE 29

bered, was passed in 1867 for the express pur-
pose of preventing removals from office by
President Johnson, between whom and the
Congress a quarrel at that time raged, so bitter
that it was regarded by sober and thoughtful
men as a national affliction, if not a scandal.

An amusing story is told of a legislator who,
endeavoring to persuade a friend and colleague
to aid him in the passage of a certain measure
in which he was personally interested, met the
remark that his bill was unconstitutional with
the exclamation, "What does the Constitution
amount to between friends ?" It would be un-
seemly to suggest that in the heat of strife the
majority in Congress had deliberately deter-
mined to pass an unconstitutional law, but they
evidently had reached the point where they
considered that what seemed to them the pub-
lic interest and safety justified them, whatever
the risk might be, in setting aside the congres-
sional construction given to the Constitution
seventy-eight years before.

The law passed in 1867 was exceedingly
radical, and in effect distinctly purported to
confer upon the Senate the power of prevent-
ing the removal of officers without the consent

3o THE INDEPENDENCE

of that body. It was provided that during a
recess of the Senate an officer might be sus-
pended only in case it was shown by evidence
satisfactory to the President, that the incum-
bent was guilty of misconduct in office or
crime, or when for any reason he should be-
come incapable or legally disqualified to per-
form his duties; and that within twenty days
after the beginning of the next session of the
Senate, the President should report to that
body such suspension, with the evidence and
reasons for his action in the case, and the name
of the person designated by the President to
perform temporarily the duties of the office.
Then follows this provision:

And if the Senate shall concur in such suspen-
sion and advise and consent to the removal of
such officer, they shall so certify to the President,
who may thereupon remove said officer, and by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate
appoint another person to such office. But if
the Senate shall refuse to concur in such suspen-
sion, such officer so suspended shall forthwith
resume the functions of his office.

On the 5th of April, 1869, a month and a

OF THE EXECUTIVE 31

day after President Johnson was succeeded in
the Presidency by General Grant, that part of
the act of 1867 above referred to, having
answered the purpose for which it was passed,
was repealed, and other legislation was enacted
in its place. It was provided in the new statute
that the President might "in his discretion,"
during the recess of that body, suspend officials
until the end of the next session of the Senate,
and designate suitable persons to perform the
duties of such suspended officer in the mean-
time; and that such designated persons should
be subject to removal in the discretion of the
President by the designation of others. The
following, in regard to the effect of such sus-
pension, was inserted in lieu of the provision
on that subject in the law of 1867 which I
have quoted:

And it shall be the duty of the President within
thirty days after the commencement of each
session of the Senate, except for any office which
in his opinion ought not to be filled, to nominate
persons to fill all vacancies in office which existed
at the meeting of the Senate, whether temporarily
filled or not, and also in the place of all officers

32 THE INDEPENDENCE

suspended ; and if the Senate, during such session,
shall refuse to advise and consent to an appoint-
ment in the place of any suspended officer, then,
and not otherwise, the President shall nominate
another person as soon as practicable to said
session of the Senate for said office.

This was the condition of the so-called ten-
ure of office legislation when a Democratic
President was inaugurated and placed in ex-
pected cooperation with a Republican majority
in the Senate — well drilled, well organized,
with partizanship enough at least to insure
against indifference to party advantage, and
perhaps .with here and there a trace of post-
election irritation.

Whatever may be said as to the constitution-
ality of the Tenure of Office laws of 1867 and
1869, certainly the latter statute did not seem,
in outside appearance, to be charged with ex-
plosive material that endangered Executive
prerogative. It grew out of a bill for the ab-
solute and unconditional repeal of the law of
1867 relating to removals and suspensions.
This bill originated in the House of Represen-
tatives, and passed that body so nearly unani-

OF THE EXECUTIVE 33

mously that only sixteen votes were recorded
against it. In the Senate, however, amend-
ments were proposed, which being rejected by
the House, a committee of conference was ap-
pointed to adjust, by compromise if possible,
the controversy between the two bodies. This
resulted in an agreement by the committee
upon the provisions of the law of 1869, as a
settlement of the difficulty. In the debate in
the House of Representatives on the report of
the committee, great uncertainty and differ-
ences of opinion were developed as to its mean-
ing and effect. Even the House conferees
differed in their explanation of it. Members
were assured that the proposed modifications
of the law of 1867, if adopted, would amount
to its complete repeal ; and it was also asserted
with equal confidence that some of its objec-
tionable limitations upon executive authority
would still remain in force. In this state of
confusion and doubt the House of Representa-
tives, which a few days before had passed a
measure for unconditional repeal, with only
sixteen votes against it, adopted the report of
the conference committee with sixty-seven
votes in the negative.

,

34 THE INDEPENDENCE

So far as removals following suspensions
are concerned, the language of the law of 1869
certainly seems to justify the understanding
that in this particular it virtually repealed the
existing statute.

The provision permitting the President to
suspend only on certain specified grounds was
so. changed as to allow him to make such sus-
pensions "in his discretion." The require-
ments that the President should report to the
Senate "the evidence and reasons for his ac-
tion in the case," and making the advice and
consent of the Senate necessary to the removal
of a suspended officer, were entirely eliminated ;
and in lieu of the provision in the law of 1867
that "if the Senate shall refuse to concur in
such suspension, such officer so suspended shall
forthwith resume the functions of his office,"
the law of 1869, after requiring the President
to send to the Senate nominations to fill the
place of officers who had been "in his discre-
tion" suspended, declared "that if the Senate,
during such session, shall refuse to advise and
consent to an appointment in the place of any
suspended officer," — that is, shall refuse to
confirm the person appointed by the President

OF THE EXECUTIVE 35

in place of the officer suspended, — not that
"such officer so suspended shall resume the
functions of his office," but that "then, and not
otherwise, the President shall nominate an-
other person as soon as practicable to said ses-
sion of the Senate for said office."

It seems to me that the gist of the whole
matter is contained in a comparison of these
two provisions. Under the law of 1867 the
incumbent is only conditionally suspended, still
having the right to resume his office in case the
Senate refuses to concur in the suspension ; but
under the law of 1869 the Senate had no con-
cern with the suspension of the incumbent, nor
with the discretion vested in the President in
reference thereto by the express language of
the statute; and the suspended incumbent was
beyond official resuscitation. Instead of the
least intimation that in any event he might
"resume the functions of his office," as pro-
vided in the law of 1867, it is especially de-
clared that in case the Senate shall refuse to
advise and consent to the appointment of the
particular person nominated by the President
in place of the suspended official, he shall nomi-
nate another person to the Senate for such

36 THE INDEPENDENCE

office. Thus the party suspended seems to be
eliminated from consideration, the Senate is
relegated to its constitutional rights of con-
firming or rejecting nominations as it sees fit,
and the President is reinstated in his un-
doubted constitutional power of removal
through the form of suspension.

. In addition to what is apparent from a com-
parison of these two statutes, it may not be
improper to glance at certain phases of execu-
tive and senatorial action since the passage of
the law of 1869 as bearing upon the theory
that, so far as it dealt with suspensions and
their effect, if it did not amount to a repeal of
the law of 1867, it at least extinguished all
its harmful vitality as a limitation of executive
prerogative. It has been stated, apparently by
authority, that President Grant within seven
weeks after his inauguration on the 4th of
March, 1869, sen^ to the Senate six hundred
and eighty cases of removals or suspensions,
all of which I assume were entirely proper and
justifiable. I cannot tell how many of the cases
thus submitted to the Senate were suspensions,
nor how many of them purported to be remov-
als; nor do I know how many nominations of

OF THE EXECUTIVE 37

new officers accompanying them were con-
firmed. It appears that ninety-seven of them
were withdrawn before they were acted upon
by the Senate; and inasmuch as the law of 1867
was in force during four of the seven weeks
within which these removals and suspensions
were submitted, it is barely possible that these
withdrawals were made during the four weeks
when the law of 1867 was operative, to await
a more convenient season under the law of
1869. Attention should be here called, how-
ever, to the dissatisfaction of President Grant,
early in his incumbency, with the complexion
of the situation, even under the repealing and
amendatory law of 1869. In his first annual
message to the Congress in December, 1869,
he complained of that statute as "being incon-
sistent with a faithful and efficient administra-
tion of the Government/' and recommended its
repeal. Perhaps he was led to apprehend that
the Senate would claim under its provisions the
power to prevent the President from putting
out of office an undesirable official by suspen-
sion. This is indicated by the following sen-
tence in his message: "What faith can an
Executive put in officials forced upon him, and

38 THE INDEPENDENCE

those, too, whom he has suspended for rea-
son?" Or it may be possible that he did not
then appreciate how accommodatingly the law
might be construed or enforced when the Presi-
dent and Senate were in political accord. How-
ever these things may be, it is important to
observe, in considering the light in which the
law of 1869 came to be regarded by both the
Executive and the Senate, that President Grant
did not deem it necessary afterward to renew
his recommendation for its repeal, and that at
no time since its enactment has its existence
been permitted to embarrass executive action
prior to the inauguration of a President po-
litically opposed to the majority in the Senate.
The review which I have thus made of the
creation of our national Executive office, and
of certain events and incidents which inter-
preted its powers and functions, leads me now
to a detailed account of the incident mentioned
by me at the beginning as related to the general
subject under discussion and in which I was
personally concerned. But before proceeding
further, I desire to say that any allusion I may
have made, or may hereafter make, recogniz-
ing the existence of partizanship in certain

OF THE EXECUTIVE 39

quarters does not arise from a spirit of com-
plaint or condemnation. I intend no more by
such allusions than to explain and illustrate the
matters with which I have to deal by surround-
ing conditions and circumstances. I fully ap-
preciate the fact that partizanship follows party
organization, that it is apt to be unduly de-
veloped in all parties, and that it often hampers
the best aspirations and purposes of public life;
but I hope I have reached a condition when I
can recall such adverse partizanship as may
have entered into past conflicts and perplexi-
ties, without misleading irritation or prejudice.

Ill

Immediately after the change of adminis-
tration in 1885, the pressure began for the
ousting of Republican office-holders and the
substitution of Democrats in their places.
While I claim to have earned a position which
entitles me to resent the accusation that I
either openly or covertly favor swift official
decapitation for partizan purposes, I have no
sympathy with the intolerant people who, with-
out the least appreciation of the meaning of
party work and service, superciliously affect to
despise all those who apply for office as they
would those guilty of a flagrant misdemeanor.
It will indeed be a happy day when the ascen-
dancy of party principles, and the attainment
of wholesome administration, will be univer-
sally regarded as sufficient rewards of individ-
ual and legitimate party service. Much has
already been accomplished in the direction of
closing the door of partizanship as an entrance
to public employment; and though this branch
of effort in the public interest may well be still

OF THE EXECUTIVE 41

further extended, such extension certainly
should be supplemented by earnest and persua-
sive attempts to correct among our people
long-cherished notions concerning the ends
that should be sought through political activity,
and by efforts to uproot pernicious and office-
rewarding political methods. I am not sure
that any satisfactory progress can be made to-
ward these results, until our good men with
unanimity cease regarding politics as neces-
sarily debasing, and by active participation
shall displace the selfish and unworthy who,
when uninterrupted, control party operations.
In the meantime, why should we indiscrimi-
nately hate those who seek office? They may
not have entirely emancipated themselves from
the belief that the offices should pass with party
victory; but even if this is charged against
them, it can surely be said that in all other
respects they are in many instances as honest,
as capable, and as intelligent as any of us.
There may be reasons and considerations which
properly defeat their aspirations, but their ap-
plications are not always disgraceful. I have
an idea that sometimes the greatest difference
between them and those who needlessly abuse

42 THE INDEPENDENCE

them and gloat over their discomfiture, con-
sists in the fact that the office-seekers desire
office, and their critics, being more profitably
employed, do not. I feel constrained to say
this much by way of defending, or at least ex-
cusing, many belonging to a numerous contin-
gent of citizens, who, after the 4th of March,
1885, made large drafts upon my time, vitality,
and patience; and I feel bound to say that in
view of their frequent disappointments, and
the difficulty they found in appreciating the
validity of the reasons given for refusing their
applications, they accepted the situation with
as much good nature and contentment as could
possibly have been anticipated. It must be re-
membered that they and their party associates
had been banished from Federal office-holding
for twenty-four years.

I have no disposition to evade the fact that
suspensions of officials holding presidential
commissions began promptly and were quite
vigorously continued; but I confidently claim
that every suspension made was with honest
intent and, I believe, in accordance with the
requirements of good administration and con-
sistent with prior executive pledges. Some of

OF THE EXECUTIVE 43

these officials held by tenures unlimited as to
their duration. Among these were certain in-
ternal-revenue officers who, it seemed to me,
in analogy with others doing similar work but
having a limited tenure, ought to consider a
like limited period of incumbency their proper
term of office; and there were also consular
officials and others attached to the foreign ser-
vice who, I believe it was then generally under-
stood, should be politically in accord with the
administration.

By far the greater number of suspensions,
however, were made on account of gross and
indecent partizan conduct on the part of the
incumbents. The preceding presidential cam-
paign, it will be recalled, was exceedingly bit-
ter, and governmental officials then in place
were apparently so confident of the continued
supremacy of their party that some of them
made no pretense of decent behavior. In nu-
merous instances the post-offices were made
headquarters for local party committees and
organizations and the centers of partizan
scheming. Party literature favorable to the
postmasters' party, that never passed regularly
through the mails, was distributed through the

44 THE INDEPENDENCE

post-offices as an item of party service, and
matter of a political character, passing through
the mails in the usual course and addressed to
patrons belonging to the opposite party, was
withheld; disgusting and irritating placards
were prominently displayed in many post-
offices, and the attention of Democratic inquir-
ers for mail matter was tauntingly directed to
them by the postmaster; and in various other
ways postmasters and similar officials annoyed
and vexed those holding opposite political opin-
ions, who, in common with all having business
at public offices, were entitled to considerate
and obliging treatment. In some quarters
official incumbents neglected public duty to do
political work, and especially in Southern
States they frequently were not only inordi-
nately active in questionable political work, but
sought to do party service by secret and sinis-
ter manipulation of colored voters, and by
other practices inviting avoidable and danger-
ous collisions between the white and colored
population.

I mention these things in order that what I
shall say later may be better understood. I by
no means attempt to describe all the wrong-

OF THE EXECUTIVE 45

doing which formed the basis of many of the
suspensions of officials that followed the inau-
guration of the new administration. I merely
mention some of the accusations which I recall
as having been frequently made, by way of il-
lustrating in a general way certain phases of
pernicious partizanship that seemed to me to
deserve prompt and decisive treatment. Some
suspensions, however, were made on proof of
downright official malfeasance. Complaints
against office-holders based on personal trans-
gression or partizan misconduct were usually
made to the Executive and to the heads of de-
partments by means of letters, ordinarily per-
sonal and confidential, and also often by means
of verbal communications. Whatever papers,
letters, or documents were received on the sub-
ject, either by the President or by any head of
department, were, for convenience of reference,
placed together on department files. These
complaints were carefully examined; many
were cast aside as frivolous or lacking sup-
port, while others, deemed of sufficient gravity
and adequately established, resulted in the sus-
pension of the accused officials.

Suspensions instead of immediate removals

46 THE INDEPENDENCE

were resorted to, because under the law then
existing it appeared to be the only way that
during a recess of the Senate an offending of-
ficial could be ousted from his office, and his
successor installed pending his nomination to
the Senate at its next session. Though, as we
have already seen, the law permitted suspen-
sions by the President "in his discretion," I
considered myself restrained by the pledges I
had made availing myself of the discretion
thus granted without reasons, and felt bound to
make suspensions of officials having a definite
term to serve, only for adequate cause.

It will be observed further on that no resis-
tance was then made to the laws pertaining to
executive removals • and suspensions, on the
ground of their unconstitutionally ; but I have
never believed that either the law of 1867 or
the law of 1869, when construed as permitting
interference with the freedom of the President
in making removals, would survive a judicial
test of its constitutionality.

Within thirty days after the Senate met in
December, 1885, the nominations of the per-
sons who had been designated to succeed offi-
cials suspended during the vacation were sent

OF THE EXECUTIVE 47

to that body for confirmation, pursuant to ex-
isting statutes.

It was charged against me by the leader of
the majority in the Senate that these nomina-
tions of every kind and description, represent-
ing the suspensions made within ten months
succeeding the 4th of March, 1885, numbered
six hundred and forty-three. I have not veri-
fied this statement, but I shall assume that
it is correct. Among the officials suspended
there were two hundred and seventy-eight post-
masters, twenty-eight district attorneys, and
twenty-four marshals, and among those who
held offices with no specified term there were
sixty-one internal-revenue officers and sixty-
five consuls and other persons attached to the
foreign service.

It was stated on the floor of the Senate, after
it had been in session for three months, that
of the nominations submitted to that body to
fill the places of suspended officials fifteen had
been confirmed and two rejected.

Quite early in the session frequent requests
in writing began to issue from the different
committees of the Senate to which these nomi-
nations were referred, directed to the heads of

48 THE INDEPENDENCE

the several departments having supervision of
the offices to which the nominations related,
asking the reasons for the suspension of offi-
cers whose places it was proposed to fill by
means of the nominations submitted, and for
all papers on file in their departments which
showed the reasons for such suspensions.
These requests foreshadowed what the sena-
torial construction of the law of 1869 might
be, and indicated that the Senate, notwithstand-
ing constitutional limitations, and even in the
face of the repeal of the statutory provision
giving it the right to pass upon suspensions
by the President, was still inclined to insist, di-
rectly or indirectly, upon that right. These re-
quests, as I have said, emanated from commit-
tees of the Senate, and were addressed to the
heads of departments. As long as such re-
quests were made by committees I had no op-
portunity to discuss the questions growing out
of such requests with the Senate itself, or to
make known directly to that body the position
on this subject which I felt bound to assert.
Therefore the replies made to committees by
the different heads of departments stated that
by direction of the President they declined fur-

OF THE EXECUTIVE 49

nishing the reasons and papers so requested, on
the ground that the public interest would not be
thereby promoted, or on the ground that such
reasons and papers related to a purely execu-
tive act. Whatever language was used in these
replies, they conveyed the information that the
President had directed a denial of the requests
made, because in his opinion the Senate could
have no proper concern with the information
sought to be obtained.

It may not be amiss to mention here that
while this was the position assumed by the
Executive in relation to suspensions, all the in-
formation of any description in the possession
of the Executive or in any of the departments,
which would aid in determining the character
and fitness of those nominated in place of sus-
pended officials, was cheerfully and promptly
furnished to the Senate or its committees when
requested.

In considering the requests made for the
transmission of the reasons for suspensions,
and the papers relating thereto, I could not
avoid the conviction that a compliance with
such requests would be to that extent a failure
to protect and defend the Constitution, as well

50 THE INDEPENDENCE

as a wrong to the great office I held in trust
for the people, and which I was bound to trans-
mit unimpaired to my successors; nor could I
be unmindful of a tendency in some quarters
to encroach upon executive functions, or of
the eagerness with which executive concession
would be seized upon as establishing precedent.
The nominations sent to the Senate remained
neglected in the committees to which they had
been referred; the requests of the committees
for reasons and papers touching suspensions
were still refused, and it became daily more
apparent that a sharp contest was impending.
In this condition of affairs it was plainly in-
timated by members of the majority in the
Senate that if all charges against suspended
officials were abandoned and their suspensions
based entirely upon the ground that the spoils
belonged to the victors, confirmations would
follow. This, of course, from my standpoint,
would have been untruthful and dishonest; but
the suggestion indicated that in the minds of
some Senators, at least, there was a determina-
tion to gain a partizan advantage by discredit-
ing the professions of the President, who, for
the time, represented the party they opposed.

OF THE EXECUTIVE 51

This manifestly could be thoroughly done by
inducing him to turn his back upon the pledges
he had made, and to admit, for the sake of
peace, that his action arose solely from a de-
sire to put his party friends in place.

Up to this stage of the controversy, not one
of the many requests made for the reasons of
suspensions or for the papers relating to them
had been sent from the Senate itself; nor had
any of them been addressed to the President.
It may seem not only strange that, in the ex-
isting circumstances, the Senate should have
so long kept in the background, but more
strange that the Executive, constituting a co-
ordinate branch of the Government, and hav-
ing such exclusive concern in the pending
differences, should have been so completely ig-
nored. I cannot think it uncharitable to sug-
gest in explanation that as long as these
requests and refusals were confined to Senate
committees and heads of departments, a public
communication stating the position of the
President in the controversy would probably be
avoided; and that, as was subsequently made
more apparent, there was an intent, in address-
ing requests to the heads of departments, to

52 THE INDEPENDENCE

lay a foundation for the contention that not
only the Senate but its committees had a
right to control these heads of departments'
as against the President in matters relating to
executive duty.

On the 1 7th of July, 1885, during the recess
of the Senate, one George M. Duskin was sus-
pended from the office of District Attorney for
the Southern District of Alabama, and John
D. Burnett was designated as his successor.
The latter at once took possession of the office,
and entered upon the discharge of its duties ;
and on the I4th of December, 1885, the Senate
having in the meantime convened in regular
session, the nomination of Burnett was sent to
that body for confirmation. This nomination,
pursuant to the rules and customs of the Sen-
ate, was referred to its Committee on the Ju-
diciary. On the 26th of December, that
committee then having the nomination under
consideration, one of its members addressed a
communication to the Attorney-General of the
United States, requesting him, "on behalf of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate
and by its direction," to send to such member
of the committee all papers and information in

OF THE EXECUTIVE 53

the possession of the Department of Justice
touching the nomination of Burnett, "also all
papers and information touching the suspen-
sion and proposed removal from office of
George M. Duskin." On the nth of January,
1886, the Attorney-General responded to this
request in these terms :

The Attorney-General states that he sends here-
with all papers, etc., touching the nomination
referred to; and in reference to the papers touch-
ing the suspension of Duskin from office, he has
as yet received no direction from the President
in relation to their transmission.

At this point it seems to have been decided
for the first time that the Senate itself should
enter upon the scene as interrogator. It was
not determined, however, to invite the Presi-
dent to answer this new interrogator, either
for the protection and defense of his high office
or in self-vindication. It appears to have been
also decided at this time to give another form
to the effort the Senate itself was to undertake
to secure the "papers and information" which
its Committee had been unable to secure. In

54 THE INDEPENDENCE

pursuance of this plan the following resolution
was adopted by the Senate in executive session
on the 25th of January, 1886:

Resolved, That the Attorney-General of the
United States be, and he hereby is, directed to
transmit to the Senate copies of all documents
and papers that have been filed in the Department
of Justice since the 1st day of January, A.D. 1885,
in relation to the conduct of the office of District
Attorney of the United States for the Southern
District of Alabama.

The language of this resolution is more
adroit than ingenuous. While appearing rea-
sonable and fair upon its face, and presenting
no indication that it in any way related to a
case of suspension, it quickly assumes its real
complexion when examined in the light of its
surroundings. The requests previously made
on behalf of Senate committees had ripened in-
to a "demand" by the Senate itself. Herein
is found support for the suggestion I have
made, that from the beginning there might
have been an intent on the part of the Senate
to claim that the heads of departments, who

OF THE EXECUTIVE 55

are members of the President's Cabinet and
his trusted associates and advisers, owed
greater obedience to the Senate than to their
executive chief in affairs which he and they
regarded as exclusively within executive func-
tions. As to the real meaning and purpose of
the resolution, a glance at its accompanying
conditions and the incidents preceding it makes
manifest the insufficiency of its disguise. This
resolution was adopted by the Senate in ex-
ecutive session, where the entire senatorial
business done is the consideration of treaties
and the confirmation of nominations for office.
At the time of its adoption Duskin had been
suspended for more than six months, his suc-
cessor had for that length of time been in
actual possession of the office, and this suc-
cessor's nomination was then before the Sen-
ate in executive session for confirmation. The
demand was for copies of documents and
papers in relation to the conduct of the office
filed since January i, 1885, thus covering a
period of incumbency almost equally divided
between the suspended officer and the person
nominated to succeed him. The documents
and papers demanded could not have been of

56 THE INDEPENDENCE

any possible use to the Senate in executive ses-
sion, except as they had a bearing either upon
the suspension of the one or the nomination
of the other. But as we have already seen, the
Attorney-General had previously sent to a
committee of the Senate all the papers he had
in his custody in any way relating to the nomi-
nation and the fitness of the nominee, whether
such papers had reference to the conduct of
the office or otherwise. Excluding, therefore,
such documents and papers embraced in the
demand as related to the pending nomination,
and which had already been transmitted, it
was plain that there was nothing left with the
Attorney-General that could be included in the
demand of the Senate in its executive session
except what had reference to the conduct of
the previous incumbent and his suspension. It
is important to recall in this connection the
fact that this subtle demand of the Senate for
papers relating "to the conduct of the office"
followed closely upon a failure to obtain "all
papers and information" touching said sus-
pension, in response to a plain and blunt re-
quest specifying precisely what was desired.

IV

I have referred to these matters because it
seems to me they indicate the animus and in-
tent which characterized the first stages of a
discussion that involved the rights and func-
tions of the Executive branch of the Govern-
ment. It was perfectly apparent that the issue
was between the President and the Senate, and
that the question constituting that issue was
whether or not the Executive was invested
with the right and power to suspend officials
without the interference of the Senate or any
accountability to that body for the reasons of
his action. It was also manifest if it was de-
sired to deal with this issue directly and fairly,
disembarrassed by any finesse for position, it
could at any time have been easily done, if
only one of the many requests for reasons for
suspensions, which were sent by committees of
the Senate to heads of departments, had been
sent by the Senate itself to the President.

Within three days after the passage by the

58 THE INDEPENDENCE

Senate, in executive session, of the resolution
directing the Attorney-General to transmit to
that body the documents and papers on file re-
lating to the management and conduct of the
office from which Mr. Duskin had been re-
moved, and to which Mr. Burnett had been
nominated, the Attorney-General replied there-
to as follows :

In response to the said resolution, the President
of the United States directs me to say that the
papers that were in this department relating to
the fitness of John D. Burnett, recently nominated
to said office, having already been sent to the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and the papers
and documents which are mentioned in the said
resolution, and still remaining in the custody of
this department, having exclusive reference to the
suspension by the President of George M.
Duskin, the late incumbent of the office of Dis-
trict Attorney for the Southern District of
Alabama, it is not considered that the public
interests will be promoted by a compliance with
said resolution and the transmission of the
papers and documents therein mentioned to the
Senate in executive session.

OF THE EXECUTIVE 59

This response of the Attorney-General was
referred to the Senate Committee on the Ju-
diciary. Early in February, 1886, a majority
of the committee made a report to the Senate,
in which it seems to have been claimed that all
papers — whatever may be their personal, pri-
vate, or confidential character — if placed on
file, or, in other words, if deposited in the office
of the head of a department, became thereupon
official papers, and that the Senate had there-
fore a right to their transmittal when they had
reference to the conduct of a suspended official,
and when that body had under advisement the
confirmation of his proposed successor. Much
stress was laid upon the professions made by
the President of his adherence to Civil Service
reform methods, and it was broadly hinted
that, in the face of six hundred and forty-
three suspensions from office, these profes-
sions could hardly be sincere. Instances were
cited in which papers and information had
been demanded and furnished in previous ad-
ministrations, and these were claimed to be
precedents in favor of the position assumed by
the majority of the committee. Almost at the
outset of the report it was declared :

60 THE INDEPENDENCE

The important question, then, is whether it is
within the constitutional competence of either
House of Congress to have access to the official
papers and documents in the various public
offices of the United States, created by laws
enacted by themselves.

In conclusion, the majority recommended
the adoption by the Senate of the following
resolutions :

Resolved, That the Senate hereby expresses its
condemnation of the refusal of the Attorney-
General, under whatever influence, to send to the
Senate copies of papers called for by its resolution
of the 25th of January and set forth in the re-
port of the Committee on the Judiciary, as in vio-
lation of his official duty and subversive of the
fundamental principles of the Government, and
of a good administration thereof.

Resolved, That it is under these circumstances
the duty of the Senate to refuse its advice and
consent to proposed removals of officers, the docu-
ments and papers in reference to the supposed
official or personal misconduct of whom are with-
held by the Executive or any head of a depart-
ment when deemed necessary by the Senate and
called for in considering the matter.

OF THE EXECUTIVE 6l

Resolved, That the provision of Section 1754
of the Revised Statutes, declaring that persons
honorably discharged from the military or naval
service by reason of disability resulting from
wounds or sickness incurred in the line of duty
shall be preferred for appointment to civil offices
provided they are found to possess the business
capacity necessary for the proper discharge of
the duties of such offices, ought to be faithfully
and fully put in execution, and that to remove or
to propose to remove any such soldier whose faith-
fulness, competency, and character are above re-
proach, and to give place to another who has not
rendered such service, is a violation of the spirit
of the law and of the practical gratitude the peo-
ple and the Government of the United States owe
to the defenders of constitutional liberty and the
integrity of the Government.

The first of these resolutions contains
charges which, if true, should clearly furnish
grounds for the impeachment of the Attorney-
General — if not the President under whose
"influence" he concededly refused to submit
the papers demanded by the Senate. A public
officer whose acts are "in violation of his
official duty and subversive of the fundamental

62 THE INDEPENDENCE

principles of the Government, and of a good
administration thereof," can scarcely add any-
thing to his predicament of guilt.

The second resolution has the merit of hon-
esty in confessing that the intent and object of
the demand upon the Attorney-General was to
secure the demanded papers and documents for
the purpose of passing upon the President's
reasons for suspension. Beyond this, the de-
claration it contains, that it was the "duty of
the Senate to refuse its advice and consent to
proposed removals of officers" when the papers
and documents relating to their "supposed of-
ficial or personal misconduct" were withheld,
certainly obliged the Senate, if the resolution
should be adopted, and if the good faith of
that body in the controversy should be as-
sumed, to reject or ignore all nominations
made to succeed suspended officers unless the
documents and papers upon which the suspen-
sion was based were furnished and the Senate
was thus given an opportunity to review and
reverse or confirm the President's executive
act, resting, by the very terms of existing law,
"in his discretion."

The third resolution is grandly phrased,

OF THE EXECUTIVE 63

and its sentiment is patriotic, noble, and in-
spiriting. Inasmuch, however, as the removal
of veteran soldiers from office did not seem to
assume any considerable prominence in the
arraignment of the administration, the object
of the resolution is slightly obscure, unless, as
was not unusual in those days, the cause of
the old soldier was impressed into the service
of the controversy for purposes of general
utility.

A minority report was subsequently submit-
ted, signed by all the Democratic members of
the committee, in which the allegations of the
majority report were sharply controverted. It
was therein positively asserted that no instance
could be found in the practice of the Govern-
ment whose similarity in its essential features
entitled it to citation as an authoritative prece-
dent ; and that neither the Constitution nor the
existing law afforded any justification for the
action of the Senate in the promises.

These two reports, of course, furnished
abundant points of controversy. About the
time of their submission, moreover, another
document was addressed to the Senate, which,
whatever else may be said of it, seems to have

64 THE INDEPENDENCE

contributed considerably to the spirit and ani-
mation of the discussion that ensued. This
was a message from the President, in which
his position concerning the matter in dispute
was defined. In this communication the com-
plete and absolute responsibility of the Presi-
dent for all suspensions and the fact that the
Executive had been afforded no opportunity to
speak for himself was stated in the following
terms :

Though these suspensions are my executive acts
based upon considerations addressed to me alone,
and for which I am wholly responsible, I have
had no invitation from the Senate to state the
position which I have felt constrained to assume
in relation to the same, or to interpret for myself
my acts and motives in the premises. In this
condition of affairs I have forborne addressing
the Senate upon the subject, lest I might be ac-
cused of thrusting myself unbidden upon the
attention of that body.

This statement was accompanied by the ex-
pression of a hope that the misapprehension
of the Executive position, indicated in the ma-
jority report just presented and published,

OF THE EXECUTIVE 65

might excuse his then submitting a communi-
cation. He commented upon the statement in
the report that "the important question, then,
is whether it is within the constitutional com-
petence of either House of Congress to have
access to the official papers and documents in
the various public offices of the United States,
created by laws enacted by themselves," by
suggesting that though public officials of the
United States might be created by laws enacted
by the two Houses of Congress, this fact did
not necessarily subject their offices to congres-
sional control, but, on the contrary, that "these
instrumentalities were created for the benefit
of the people, and to answer the general pur-
poses of government under the Constitution
and the laws ; and that they are unencumbered
by any lien in favor of either branch of Con-
gress growing out of their construction, and
unembarrassed by any obligation to the Sen-
ate as the price of their creation." While not
conceding that the Senate had in any case the
right to review Executive action in suspending
officials, the President disclaimed any inten-
tion to withhold official papers and documents
when requested; and as to such papers and

66 THE INDEPENDENCE

documents, he expressed his willingness, be-
cause they were official, to continue, as he had
theretofore done in all cases, to lay them before
the Senate without inquiry as to the use to be
made of them, and relying upon the Senate for
their legitimate utilization. The proposition
was expressly denied, however, that papers and
documents inherently private or confidential,
addressed to the President or a head of depart-
ment, having reference to an act so entirely
executive in its nature as the suspension of an
official, and which was by the Constitution
as well as by existing law placed within the
discretion of the President, were changed in
their nature and instantly became official when
placed for convenience or for other reasons in
the custody of a public department. The con-
tention of the President was thus stated :

There is no mysterious power of transmuta-
tion in departmental custody, nor is there magic
in the undefined and sacred solemnity of depart-
mental files. If the presence of these papers in
the public office is a stumbling-block in the way of
the performance of senatorial duty, it can be
easily removed.

OF THE EXECUTIVE 67

The Senate's purposes were characterized in
the message as follows :

The requests and demands which by the score
have for nearly three months been presented to
the different departments of the Government,
whatever may be their form, have but one com-
plexion. They assume the right of the Senate to
sit in judgment upon the exercise of my exclusive
discretion and Executive function, for which I
am solely responsible to the people from whom I
have so lately received the sacred trust of office.
My oath to support and defend the Constitution,
my duty to the people who have chosen me to
execute the powers of their great office and not
relinquish them, and my duty to the chief magis-
tracy which I must preserve unimpaired in all its
dignity and vigor, compel me to refuse compliance
with these demands.

This was immediately supplemented by the
following concession of the independent and
unlimited power of the Senate in the matter of
confirmation :

To the end that the service may be improved,
the Senate is invited to the fullest scrutiny of

68 THE INDEPENDENCE

the persons submitted to them for public office, in
recognition of the constitutional power of that
body to advise and consent to their appointment.
I shall continue, as I have thus far done, to fur-
nish, at the request of the confirming body, all the
information I possess touching the fitness of the
nominees placed before them for their action,
both when they are proposed to fill vacancies and
to take the place of suspended officials. Upon a
refusal to confirm, I shall not assume the right to
ask the reasons for the action of the Senate nor
question its determination. I cannot think that
anything more is required to secure worthy in-
cumbents in public office than a careful and inde-
pendent discharge of our respective duties within
their well-defined limits.

As it was hardly concealed that by no means
the least important senatorial purpose in the
pending controversy was to discredit the Civil
Service reform pledges and professions of the
Executive, this issue was thus distinctly in-
vited at the close of the message :

Every pledge I have made by which I have
placed a limitation upon my exercise of executive
power has been faithfully redeemed. Of course

OF THE EXECUTIVE 69

the pretense is not put forth that no mistakes have
been committed; but not a suspension has been
made except it appeared to my satisfaction that
the public welfare would be promoted thereby.
Many applications for suspension have been de-
nied, and an adherence to the rule laid down to
govern my action as to such suspensions has
caused much irritation and impatience on the part
of those who have insisted upon more changes in
the offices.

The pledges I have made were made to the peo-
ple, and to them I am responsible for the manner
in which they have been redeemed. I am not
responsible to the Senate, and I am unwilling to
submit my actions and official conduct to them for
j udgment.

There are no grounds for an allegation that the
fear of being found false to my professions influ-
ences me in declining to submit to the demands
of the Senate. I have not constantly refused to
suspend officials and thus incurred the displeasure
of political friends, and yet wilfully broken faith
with the people, for the sake of being false to
them.

Neither the discontent of party friends nor the
allurements, constantly offered, of confirmation
of appointees conditioned upon the avowal that
suspensions have been made on party grounds

70 THE INDEPENDENCE

alone, nor the threat proposed in the resolutions
now before the Senate that no confirmation
will be made unless the demands of that body
be complied with, are sufficient to discourage
or deter me from following in the way which
I am convinced leads to better government for
the people.

The temper and disposition of the Senate
may be correctly judged, I think, from the re-
marks made upon the presentation of this mes-
sage by the chairman of the Committee on the
Judiciary and the acknowledged leader of the
majority. On a formal motion that the mes-
sage be printed and lie upon the table, he
moved as an amendment that it be referred to
the committee of which he was chairman, and
said:

I merely wish to remark, in moving to refer
this document to the Committee on the Judi-
ciary, that it very vividly brought to my mind
the communications of King Charles I to the
Parliament, telling them what, in conducting
their affairs, they ought to do and ought not to
do; and I think I am safe in saying that it is
the first time in the history of the republican

OF THE EXECUTIVE 71

United States that any President of the United
States has undertaken to interfere with the de-
liberations of either House of Congress on ques-
tions pending before them, otherwise than by
messages on the state of the Union which the
Constitution commands him to make from time
to time. This message is devoted simply to a
question for the Senate itself, in regard to itself,
that it has under consideration. That is its singu-
larity. I think it will strike reflecting people in
this country as somewhat extraordinary — if in
this day of reform anything at all can be thought
extraordinary.

King Charles I fared badly at the hands of
the Parliament; but it was most reassuring to
know that, after all said and done, the Senate
of the United States was not a bloodthirsty
body, and that the chairman of its Committee
on the Judiciary was one of the most court-
eous and amiable of men — at least when out-
side of the Senate.

The debate upon the questions presented by
the report and resolutions recommended by the
majority of the committee, and by the minority
report and the presidential message, occupied
almost exclusively the sessions of the Senate

72 THE INDEPENDENCE

for over two weeks. More than twenty-five
Senators participated, and the discussion cov-
ered such a wide range of argument that all
considerations relevant to the subject, and some
not clearly related to it, seem to have been pre-
sented. At the close of the debate, the reso-
lution condemning the Attorney-General for
withholding the papers and documents which
the Senate had demanded was passed by thirty-
two votes in the affirmative and twenty-five in
the negative; the next resolution, declaring it
to be the duty of the Senate to refuse its advice
and consent to proposed removals of officers
when papers and documents in reference to
their alleged misconduct were withheld, was
adopted by a majority of only a single vote;
and the proclamation contained in the third
resolution, setting forth the obligations of the
Government and its people to the veterans of
the civil war, was unanimously approved, ex-
cept for one dissenting voice.

The controversy thus closed arose from the
professed anxiety of the majority in the Senate
to guard the interests of an official who was
suspended from office in July, 1885, and who
was still claimed to be in a condition of sus-

OF THE EXECUTIVE 73

pension. In point of fact, however, that of-
ficial's term of office expired by limitation on
the 20th of December, 1885. — before the de-
mand for papers and documents relating to his
conduct in office was made, before the resolu-
tions and reports of the Committee on the
Judiciary were presented, and before the com-
mencement of the long discussion in defense of
the right of a suspended incumbent. This situ-
ation escaped notice in Executive quarters, be-
cause the appointee to succeed the suspended
officer having been actually installed and in the
discharge of the duties of the position for more
than six months, and his nomination having
been sent to the Senate very soon after the be-
ginning of its session, the situation or duration
of the former incumbent's term was not kept
in mind. The expiration of his term was,
however, distinctly alleged in the Senate on
the second day of the discussion, and by the
first speaker in opposition to the majority re-
port. The question of suspension or removal
was therefore eliminated from the case and the
discussion as related to the person suspended
continued as a sort of post-mortem proceeding.
Shortly after the resolutions of the committee

74 THE INDEPENDENCE

were passed, the same person who superseded
the suspended and defunct officer was again
nominated to succeed him by reason of the ex-
piration of his term; and this nomination was
confirmed.

At last, after stormy weather, Duskin, the
suspended, and Burnett, his successor, were at
rest. The earnest contention that beat about
their names ceased, and no shout of triumph
disturbed the supervening quiet.

I have thus attempted, after fourteen years of
absolute calm, to recount the prominent details
of the strife; and I hope that interest in the
subject is still sufficient to justify me in a fur-
ther brief reference to some features of the
dispute and certain incidents that followed it,
which may aid to a better appreciation of its
true character and motive.

Of the elaborate speeches made in support
of the resolutions and the committee's majority
report, seven dealt more or less prominently
with the President's Civil Service reform pro-
fessions and his pledges against the removal of
officials on purely partizan grounds. It seems
to have been assumed that these pledges had
been violated. At any rate, without any evi-
dence worthy of the name, charges of such
violation ranged all the way from genteel in-
sinuation to savage accusation. Senators who
would have stoutly refused to vote for the
spoils system broadly intimated or openly de-
clared that if suspensions had been made con-

76 THE INDEPENDENCE

fessedly on partizan grounds they would have
interposed no opposition. The majority seem
to have especially admired and applauded the
antics of one of their number, who, in intervals
of lurid and indiscriminate vituperation, glee-
fully mingled ridicule for Civil Service reform
with praise of the forbidding genius of parti-
zan spoils. In view of these deliverances and
as bearing upon their relevancy, as well as in-
dicating their purpose, let me again suggest
that the issue involved in the discussion as se-
lected by the majority of the Committee on the
Judiciary, and distinctly declared in their re-
port, was whether, as a matter of right, or, as
the report expresses it, as within "constitu-
tional competence," either House of Congress
should "have access to the official papers and
documents in the various public offices of the
United States, created by laws enacted by them-
selves." It will be readily seen that if the
question was one of senatorial right, the Presi-
dent's Civil Service reform pledges had no
honest or legitimate place in the discussion.

The debate and the adoption of the resolu-
tions reported by the committee caused no
surrender of the Executive position. Never-

OF THE EXECUTIVE 77

theless, confirmations of those nominated in
place of suspended officers soon began, and I
cannot recall any further embarrassment or
difficulty on that score. I ought to add, how-
ever, that in many cases, at least, these confir-
mations were accompanied by reports from the
committee to which they had been referred,
stating that the late incumbent had been sus-
pended for "political reasons," or on' account
of "offensive partizanship," or for a like rea-
son, differently expressed, and that nothing
was alleged against them affecting their per-
sonal character. If the terms thus used by the
committee in designating causes for suspen-
sion mean that the persons suspended were
guilty of offensive partizanship or political of-
fenses, as distinguished from personal offenses
and moral or official delinquencies, I am satis-
fied with the statement. And here it occurs
to me to suggest that if offenses and moral or
official delinquencies, not partizan in their
nature, had existed, they would have been
subjects for official inspection and report, and
such reports, being official documents, would
have been submitted to the committee or to the
Senate, according to custom, and would have

78 THE INDEPENDENCE

told their own story and excluded committee
comment.

It is worth recalling, when referring to com-
mittee reports on nomination, that they belong
to the executive business of the Senate, and
are, therefore, among the secrets of that body.
Those I have mentioned, nevertheless, were
by special order made public, and published in
the proceedings of the Senate in open session.
This extraordinary, if not unprecedented, ac-
tion, following long after the conclusion of the
dispute, easily interprets its own intent, and re-
moves all covering from a design to accomplish
partizan advantage. The declaration of the
resolutions that it was the duty of the Senate
"to refuse its advice and consent to the pro-
posed removal of officers" when the papers and
documents relating to their supposed miscon-
duct were withheld, was abandoned, and the
irrevocable removal of such officers by confir-
mation of their successors was entered upon,
with or without the much-desired papers and
documents, and was supplemented by the pub-
lication of committee reports, from which the
secrecy of the executive session had been re-
moved, to the end that, pursuant to a fixed

OF THE EXECUTIVE 79

determination, an unfavorable senatorial in-
terpretation might be publicly given to the
President's action in making suspensions.

I desire to call attention to one other inci-
dent connected with the occurrences already
narrated. On the I4th of December, 1885, —
prior to the first request or demand upon any
executive department relating to suspensions,
and of course before any controversy upon the
subject arose, — a bill was introduced in the
Senate by one of the most distinguished and
able members of the majority in that body, and
also a member of its Committee on the Judi-
ciary, for the total and complete repeal of the
law of 1869, which, it will be remembered, fur-
nished the basis for the contention we have
considered. This repealing bill was referred
to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
where it slumbered until the 2ist of June,
1886, — nearly three months after the close of
the contention, — when it was returned to the
Senate with a favorable report, the chairman
of the committee alone dissenting. When the
bill was presented for discussion, the Senator
who introduced it explained its object as fol-
lows:

80 THE INDEPENDENCE

This bill repeals what is left of what is called
the Tenure of Office act, passed under the ad-
ministration of Andrew Jackson, and as a part
of the contest with that President. It leaves
the law as it was from the beginning of the
Government until that time, and it repeals the
provision which authorizes the suspension of
civil officers and requires the submission of that
suspension to the Senate.

On a later day, in discussing the bill, he said,
after referring to the early date of its introduc-
tion:

It did not seem to me to be quite becoming to
ask the Senate to deal with this general question
while the question which arose between the
President and the Senate as to the interpretation
and administration of the existing law was pend-
ing. I thought as a party man that I had hardly
the right to interfere with the matter which was
under the special charge of my honorable
friend from Vermont, by challenging a debate
upon the general subject from a different point
of view. This question has subsided and is
past, and it seems to me now proper to ask the
Senate to vote upon the question whether it

OF THE EXECUTIVE 8l

will return to the ancient policy of the Govern-
ment, to the rule of public conduct which existed
from 1789 until 1867, and which has practi-
cally existed, notwithstanding the condition of
the statute-book, since the accession to power of
General Grant on the 4th of March, 1869.

The personnel of the committee which re-
ported favorably upon this repealing bill had
not been changed since all the members of it
politically affiliating with the majority in the
Senate joined in recommending the accusatory
report and resolutions, which, when adopted,
after sharp and irritating discussion, caused
the question between the President and the
Senate, in the language of the introducer of
the repealing bill, to "subside."

This repealing act passed the Senate on the
1 7th of December, 1886, by thirty affirmative
votes against twenty-two in the negative. A
short time afterward it passed in the House of
Representatives by a majority of one hundred
and five.

Thus was an unpleasant controversy happily
followed by an expurgation of the last pretense
of statutory sanction to an encroachment upon

n* %

';*>""& »3

82 THE INDEPENDENCE

constitutional Executive prerogatives, and thus
was a time-honored interpretation of the Con-
stitution restored to us. The President, freed
from the Senate's claim of tutelage, became
again the independent agent of the people, rep-
resenting a coordinate branch of their Gov-
ernment, charged with responsibilities which,
under his oath, he ought not to avoid or divide
with others, and invested with powers, not to
be surrendered, but to be used, under the guid-
ance of patriotic intention and an unclouded
conscience.

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UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY

JK

736

063

1913

Cleveland, Grover, Pres. TJ.S

The independence of the
Executive