A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF INDIA

Civil, Military and Social

from

The first Landing of the English,
To the Suppression of the Sepoy Revolt;
including
An Outline of the Early History of Hindoostan

Volume 1

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Preface

In India, the most valuable dependency of the British crown, is also one of the most interesting portions of the globe. Even some of its physical features are on a scale of unparalleled grandeur. The stupendous mountain chain along its northern frontier rising gradually from a plain of inexhaustible fertility, has snowy summits which tower nearly six thousand feet above the loftiest of any other country in either hemisphere; while over the vast expanse of its magnificently diversified surface almost every product possessed of economical value grows indigenously, or having been introduced is cultivated with success. Nor are its moral less remarkable than its physical features. In its rugged recesses and jungly forests various tribes, supposed to represent its aboriginal inhabitants, may still be seen in a state bordering on absolute barbarism. The great bulk of the population, however, consists of a race, or rather aggregation of races, who, though far advanced in civilization, at least in the ordinary sense of the term, since they have for ages lived under regular government, dwelt in large and splendid cities, and carried most of the arts of common life to high perfection, are yet the dupes and slaves of a most childish and galling superstition. That the dominant class, to which all others are subservient, should be full of religious zeal, is nothing more than might have been expected, but a new phase of human nature seems to be presented when those occupying the lower grades of the social scale are seen submitting without a murmur to be lorded over, and treated as mere outcasts whose very touch is pollution. What makes this submission the more extraordinary, is that those who exemplify it are by no means deficient in natural acuteness, and, on the contrary, often give proofs of intellectual culture. Hinduism, though little better than a tissue of obscene and monstrous fancies, not only counts its domination by thousands of years,
but can boast of having had among its votaries, men who, in the ages in which they lived, extended the boundaries of knowledge, and carried some of the abstrusest of the sciences to a height which they had never reached before. This remarkable combination of pure intellect and grovelling superstition, nowhere displayed so strikingly and unequivocally as in India, gives a peculiar value even to that part of its history which, relating only to its social state, is necessarily the least fruitful in stirring incidents.

So long as the leading powers of Europe made India a kind of common battle-field, on which they met to contend for supremacy, no one nation could be said to possess any exclusive or peculiar interest in its affairs; but from the moment when Great Britain stood forth, virtually if not formally recognized as the paramount power, the history of both countries became in a manner identified, and ought therefore to be studied as one great whole. The vast space which separates them is a mere circumstance which, if it have any weight at all, ought rather to increase the interest of the British reader, who is not only introduced to new scenes and new modes of social existence, but follows his countrymen step by step, and sees them in a new sphere displaying the same unrivalled talents, civil and military, the same indomitable courage and perseverance, the same enlightened, humane, and generous spirit, which have placed Great Britain at the head of modern nations, and given her the largest and mightiest empire that the world has yet beheld. While India was placed under a kind of tutelage, and those intrusted with its administration, instead of encouraging, systematically repressed the public curiosity, there was doubtless some excuse for a feeling of apathy in regard to its affairs; but now that the anomalous form of government has been abolished, and the Queen, ruling India in her own name without any adventitious intervention, has called upon her loving subjects to unite with her in developing its resources, as one of the most effectual means of promoting the general welfare of all her dominions, how can the call be properly responded to, unless the actual circumstances of the country, and the whole course of events by which these have been formed—in other words, all the details of its history—are carefully studied?
A subject so important and so attractive as that of India could not fail to engage the pens of many writers, and accordingly a number of works relating to it has appeared, some of them by distinguished men, who bore no unimportant part in many of the transactions which they narrate. To all these works, however, there is one serious objection, which, without impugning their merits, goes to prove that so far from exhausting the subject, they have left important blanks, which deprive them of the character of complete histories. Some of them are professedly confined to particular periods or particular provinces; while others of a more general description either omit part of the earlier history, or after bringing it down as far as was practicable at the time, stop short at the very period when it becomes at once most interesting and most instructive. The present work, which differs from them in plan, and is also intended to be of a more popular character, was undertaken in the belief that if written after due research, in a perspicuous style, and with strict impartiality, it might supply a want which had long been felt, and to which recent events had given much additional urgency. It is, as its name implies, a Comprehensive History of India, beginning with its earliest period, and continued, without the known omission of any transaction of importance, to the present time. In composing it, the author has not trusted to previous compilations, but derived his materials as much as possible from original and official sources. How far he has succeeded, it remains for his readers to decide. The only part of the work on which he ventures to anticipate the judgment of the public is that of the maps, plans, and numerous illustrations, which, independently of their merit as embellishments, bring all the leading topics of the history—its campaigns, its battle-fields, its cities, and other localities, and even its most celebrated personages—immediately before the eye, in a manner which not only does much credit to those employed upon them, but must greatly facilitate the intelligent perusal of the history itself.

LONDON, February, 1862.

1 Maps, plans and illustrations are not incorporated in the present reprint.
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Introduction

LONG after the name of India had become familiar in the earliest seats of civilization in the Mediterranean, little more was known of the country designated by it, than that it was a region of vast extent situated in the far East, near the outermost verge of the known world. From the inhabitants themselves no satisfactory information could be obtained. Accustomed to veil everything in mystery, they divided the terrestrial globe into seven dvipa or islands, each encompassed by its own peculiar ocean; and placing the habitation of the human race in Jambu-dvipa, which is nearest the centre, and consists partly of Meru, a mountain of gold of enormous height, reaching as far beneath as above the surface, appropriated to themselves one of its most highly favoured localities. The notions of the Greeks, though disfigured and obscured by fable, were of a more definite description. Instead of allowing his fancy to run riot, Herodotus diligently consulted the few sources of knowledge within his reach, and honestly communicated the result. According to him, India was, as its name implies, the country drained by the Indus, and consisted of two great divisions—a western, which was included in the Persian empire, and formed the largest, as well as the most productive of the twenty satrapies or provinces into which that empire was then divided; and an eastern, which, stretching beyond the limits supposed to be habitable, terminated in a sandy desert. Crude as these ideas are, so little was done to correct or enlarge them, that when Alexander, during his celebrated expedition, first reached the Indus, he mistook it for the Nile. Fortunately he took the most effectual means to undeceive himself, by fitting out a fleet, and giving the command of it to

1 Gladwin’s Ayeen Akberry, vol. iii. p. 23, et seq., with its curious map, illustrative of Hindoo geography.
2 Herodotus, book iii, pp. 97-106.
Nearuchus, who, after descending the river to its mouth in the ocean, continued his course westwards along the shores of the Arabian Sea, and finally arrived in the Persian Gulf. Alexander, who had accompanied Nearchus in his descent, afterwards accomplished the rest of the distance overland.

Two great routes to India had thus been simultaneously explored. As a natural consequence, regular intercourse with it rapidly increased, and both its figure and dimensions began to be better understood. Ample evidence of this is furnished by the works of Strabo and Ptolemy, and yet it cannot be denied, that with all their industry and sagacity, they have rather distorted than delineated India. The maritime portion, in particular, is miserably curtailed, and its characteristic projection, instead of forming the vertex of a triangle, is converted into the side of a square. It is not difficult to account for this serious blunder, which, indeed, is only one of the many which it was impossible to avoid, so long as the only accounts of the country were derived from travellers who reached it by journeying across inhospitable deserts, or navigators who, in the infancy of their art, effected a long and perilous passage by following the windings of the intervening shores. A great advance was made when the Portuguese doubled the Cape of Good Hope. From that time, the Indian coast became accessible in all directions, and its outline was easily traced. To map out the interior was a work of greater difficulty—a work in which little progress could be made while the struggle for supremacy in the East remained undecided. No sooner, however, were the foundations of our Indian empire securely laid, than the necessity of obtaining a thorough knowledge of its surface was urgently felt. Accordingly, in addition to district surveys, one embracing the country in all its length and breadth has been undertaken at the instance of government, and carried on with all the aids which the refinements of modern science supply. In this way, most of the blanks in Indian geography have been filled up, and a map, not unworthy of the vast and magnificent country which it delineates, is advancing to completion.

1 Forbiger's Handbuch der alten Geographie, particularly the illustrative maps in vol. i.
In the course of the following work the important purposes to which the valuable materials accumulated by these surveys are applicable will often become apparent; but in the meantime it seems impossible to employ them to better account than in furnishing the groundwork of a brief sketch, which, in exhibiting the leading features of the geography of India, will be at once an appropriate introduction and a useful guide to the study of its history.

India, taken in its widest sense as a common name for all the contiguous territories in Asia, which are directly or indirectly subject to British rule, lies between 8° and 37° north latitude, and 66° and 99° east longitude. Within these limits, which extend north and south from the Himalaya to Cape Comorin, and west and east from Afghanistan and Baluchistan to the Burma empire, it covers an area of a million and a half of square miles, and contains one hundred and eighty millions of inhabitants. As these enormous numbers are not easily comprehended, a more definite idea may be formed, by considering that the space is about twelve times, and the population six times greater than those of the British Islands. The portion of these vast dominions lying east of the Bay of Bengal, consisting chiefly of acquisitions from the Burmese, are only politically associated with India; and, having few features in common with it, may for the present be left out of view. The other and far larger portion, to which the name of India is more properly applied, forms one compact whole, and is, for the most part, well defined by natural boundaries. According to a division of ancient date, it consists of Hindustan and the Deccan—the former designation meaning the Land of the Hindu, and the latter the Land of the South. The line of demarcation between the divisions is marked by the Vindhya Mountains, which stretch irregularly across the country from sea to sea, between the mouths of the Indus and the Ganges.

Hindustan, thus defined, includes the whole of India which lies contiguous to other parts of the Asiatic continent, and consists almost entirely of two great river basins—that of the Indus in the west, and that of the Ganges in the east. Both basins have a common and magnificent boundary in the north, where the Himalaya, by far the loftiest mountain system in the
world, with snowy summits which, measured from the level of the sea, have more than five miles of vertical height, diverges as from a central nucleus in opposite directions—on the one hand, sloping north-west, and giving its waters chiefly to the Indus, and on the other, curving round toward the east, and supplying innumerable feeders to the Ganges. The basin of the Indus has its greatest length from north to south, and, with exception of the beautiful valley of Kashmir and of the Punjab, is remarkable for a barrenness, which, in its lower part, becomes so great that cultivation is confined to the breadth of a few miles on either side of the river, while the adjacent country is converted into a desert. This desert, stretching away to the east and north-east for several hundred miles, has its occasional oases, but is, for the most part, a sandy waste, monotonous and dreary in the extreme.

On entering the basin of the Ganges, a striking contrast is presented. On the north side, the Himalaya, descending by a series of magnificent terraces with parallel or intersecting valleys, approaches the edge of an immense plain of surpassing beauty and fertility, sloping gently from west to east, and traversed near its centre by a majestic river. On both sides, chiefly from the Himalaya, but partly also from the Vindhya range, it is joined by numerous tributaries, which so augment its volume that it becomes in a manner encumbered with its spoils, and unable to carry them along in one undivided channel. Accordingly, in the lower part of its course, it throws off numerous branches, which form a kind of network across its delta. A little lower down it communicates with the Brahmaputra, coming from the east, and carrying a volume of water little if at all inferior to its own. The difficulty of discharge is thus greatly increased, and can only be met by an additional number of outlets. In the dry season, these flow within their banks, and have the appearance of independent streams; but when the waters rise, a sudden overflow takes place, and the whole country is covered for many miles around with one vast inundation. A similar result is produced on the lower flats of the Indus; and one consequence is, that both rivers become far less available for navigation than might be supposed from the volumes of water which they carry. The
channels becoming shallow and attenuated in proportion to their number, it is difficult to find any single one which large vessels can safely use.

The two great basins now described do not completely exhaust the whole area included within the Himalaya and the Vindhya range; and therefore it is necessary to mention, that the ramifications of the range cover a considerable tract of great beauty and fertility, which belongs to what has been called Central India, and is drained by the independent basins of the Narmada and the Tapti, which carry its waters west to the Gulf of Cambay.

The Deccan, the other great division of India, is washed by the ocean on all sides but one, and is hence, though not with strict accuracy, usually described as a peninsula. It is in the form of an immense triangle, which rests on the Vindhya range as its base, and terminates in Cape Comorin as its vertex. Of its two sides, one running S.S.E. in an almost unbroken line, faces the Arabian Sea, the other, whose continuity is more broken, lies south-west, and faces the Bay of Bengal. Names so common as not to be unworthy of notice serve to distinguish the lower halves of the sides—that on the west being usually designated as the Malabar, and that on the east as the Coromandel coast.

The structure of the Deccan is very simple. Not far from the opposite extremities of the Vindhya range, whose greatest height is not supposed to exceed 3,000 feet, two mountain chains proceed, and stretch southward in directions nearly parallel to the coasts. That on the west, called the Western Ghats, is continued to Cape Comorin. Its loftiest summits, which are situated between lat. 10° and 15°, rise to about 6,000 feet. Towards the sea, from which it seldom recedes more than forty miles, it is very precipitous; towards the land, which, in many parts, almost equals it in height, its slope is always gradual, and occasionally imperceptible. On both sides it is clothed with magnificent timber, and displays much grand scenery.

The Eastern Ghats is a less elevated and tamer range. Its loftiest summits are not above 3,000 feet, and its distance from the sea is so considerable that the descent is seldom abrupt. In
its course southwards, instead of being continued to the extremity, it stops about midway, and turning gradually south-west, meets with a transverse range called the Nilgiri Hills, which have summits exceeding 7,000 feet, and by which it becomes linked with the Western Ghats. In this way a new triangle, with sides composed of mountain ranges, is formed within that of the Deccan, and incloses an elevated table-land, which has a gradual but continuous slope eastward from the Western Ghats. In this way a new triangle, with sides composed of mountain ranges, is formed within that of the Deccan, and incloses an elevated table-land, which has a gradual but continuous slope eastward from the Western Ghats to the sea. In accordance with this slope, all the rivers of any magnitude—the Mahanadi, the Godaveri, the Krishna, the Pennar, the Pelar, and the Coleroon or Kaveri, carry the drainage to the Bay of Bengal. This table-land cannot boast the fertility of the basin of the Ganges, because, while it is exposed to a more scorching heat, it has no streams fed by perpetual snow. The torrents of rain, however, which periodically descend on the Western Ghats, compensate in some degree for this defect, and provide the means of a system of irrigation, which, carried on by collecting the superfluous water in immense tanks during the rainy season, at one time made many parts of the Deccan proverbial for beauty and productivity. Unfortunately, in too many districts of the country, and more especially in those where native misrule still continues, many of these tanks are in ruins, and sterility has returned.

The geology of India has not been fully investigated, but what is known seems to show that its leading features are less complicated than those of most other countries. All the great mountain ranges are composed of the rocks usually classified as granitic. In the stupendous heights of the Himalaya gneiss is particularly predominant, and is associated with mica-schist, hornblende-schist, chloride-slate, and primitive limestone. In the chains of the peninsula the same rocks prevail—granite in the south-west and south, and sienite in the south-east, covering a considerable portion of the surface, and composing some of the highest peaks. One great exception to this predominance of granite and its accompanying schists is in the southern portion of the Western Ghats, where these rocks disappear beneath the surface, and are overlaid by a peculiar species of iron clay, which, from its being so soft where it lies as to be easily cut by the spade, and hardening on exposure to the air so as to be
fit for building, has received the name of laterite or brick-stone. This mineral, instead of being a mere local deposit, almost assumes the dignity of a distinct formation, continuing with little interruption to the extremity of the continent, and even reappearing beyond it in the Island of Ceylon.

Another great exception to the predominance of granitic rocks is in the upper part of the Western Ghats, and the adjoining ramifications of the Vindhya range. Here basaltic trap, in its various forms of prismatic, columnar, globular, tabular, porphyritic, and amygdaloid, spreads out as an overlying rock, to an extent unequalled, it is believed, in any other part of the world. A very large portion of the table-land of the Deccan is entirely covered by it. Not unfrequently both the trap and the granite pierce the surface abruptly, and rise in precipitous isolated masses of considerable height. Many of these standing out prominently from the surrounding plains and crowned with hill-forts, form the most remarkable features in the landscape.

The more regular strata of the secondary and tertiary periods are largely developed on the lower sides of the Himalaya, and occupy considerable tracts in various other localities. Many of the sandstones and shales of the former period belong to the coal measures; and coal has not only been found at several places, but is actually worked, particularly in the valley of the Damodar in the district of Burdwan, where a coal field with a main seam 9 feet in thickness has been carefully explored, and found to extend over a large area. The proximity of this field to the capital, from which it is about 150 miles north-west, and the facility of carriage by water, and now also by rail, have brought it early into notice; but there cannot be a doubt that there are many other fields equally promising, and, at all events, productive enough to supply the demand about to be created by the establishment of an extensive system of railways.

The tertiary formation appears to obtain its greatest breadth in the north-west, towards Sind and the Punjab, from which, and the mountains of adjacent districts, fossil remains of singular forms and gigantic dimensions have recently been brought to enrich our museums.

It must be admitted that, as a mineral country, India has not yet proved its title to a prominent place. Though in an-
cient times gold was so abundant, that the Indian was the only one of the Persian satrapies which paid its tribute in that precious metal, it has now only a few washings, which are by no means productive. Its diamond mines also, once so famous, have long been exhausted. Besides the coal already mentioned, the only mineral products of much economical value are copper, of which several mines are worked; iron, from which steel of the finest quality is manufactured; nitre, so abundant as to form an important article of export; and salt, said to exist in beds which are inexhaustible.

Of the 28° of north latitude over which India extends, $15\frac{1}{4}°$ are within the tropical, and $12\frac{3}{4}°$ within the temperate zone. Taking this fact only into view, it might be easy to give the theory of its climate; but it would merely be to show how widely in this case, as in many others, theory differs from reality. The position of a country relatively to the equator, simply shows how long and how intensely the sun during its annual revolution will shine upon it, but gives no information as to the modifying causes by which, often far more than by degrees of latitude, its climate is determined. In regard to India these causes are so numerous, and operate so differently in different localities, that it may be truly said to have not one, but many climates. Northwards a few degrees from the tropic, it has a region in which snow and ice are never wanting; westwards, it has a desert with the parched plains and scorching heats of the African Sahara; eastwards, it has a deep alluvial basin overloaded with moisture; and southwards, while the isothermal line, indicating the greatest quantity of mean annual heat on the surface of the globe, crosses it obliquely from the Coromandel to the Malabar coast, the Nilgiri Hills, situated nearly in the same latitude, enjoy the climate of the finest part of the temperate zone. Where so many anomalies exist, it would obviously be impossible to give an adequate description, without entering into numerous complicated details; and therefore the utmost which can here be done is to point out a few features which, though much diversified by circumstances, may be considered characteristic of the climate of India.

The most prominent of these features are heat and humidity—heat produced chiefly by the direct action of the sun's rays,
but intensified in many districts by a low level, a naturally arid soil, and sultry winds from other countries; and humidity, not derived, as in Europe, from moderate showers occurring more or less at all seasons, but the result of rains which occur regularly at stated periods, and are so copious and incessant as often to pour down more water in a month than falls in any part of England in a year. In London, the mean annual temperature is 49.35°; in Calcutta it is 79.37°; in Bombay, 81.9°; in Madras, 84.4°. In order to perceive the full effect of these differences, it is necessary to attend to the annual range of temperature, or the number of degrees between the greatest mean heat and the greatest mean cold. In London, this range amounts to no less than 40.9°, whereas in the above three cities it amounts respectively to no more than 11.9°, 10°, and 7.2°. In other words, heat is far more equally diffused in India than in our own island; and the complete cessation of vegetation which takes place in the latter during the rigour of winter, is totally unknown in the former. An equally striking contrast appears in the degrees of humidity. The average annual fall of rain in England is 32 inches. In Bombay, as large a quantity has been known to fall in twelve days, while the average of the year is about 85 inches. On the Malabar coast and many parts of the Western Ghats, even this quantity is largely exceeded, and the average has been estimated at 136 inches. This, however, is only a local extreme. In Calcutta, the range of the fall is from 50 to 85 inches; and on the Coromandel coast, in the neighbourhood of Madras, the annual average of England is supposed not to be exceeded.

The great agents in regulating the climate of India and fixing its character, are the periodical winds known by the name of monsoons. With the interval of about a month, they divide the year between them—the one blowing regularly from the north-east from October to March, and the other from the south-west from April to September. The north-east monsoon is, strictly speaking, identical with the north-east trade-wind, and would accordingly blow without interruption throughout the year, were it not brought under the influence of a great counteracting cause. This is found on the central plains of Asia, which, becoming immoderately heated while the sun is north of the
equator, rarify the surrounding air, and thereby disturb the atmospheric equilibrium. To restore it, a current of colder air begins to rush in from the Indian Ocean. A kind of struggle takes place—the north-east monsoon endeavouring to maintain its direction, while the new current endeavours to establish its ascendancy. In the struggle, the north-east monsoon is placed at great disadvantage, for at the very time when it is engaged with its opponent, part of its own forces are diverted, and drawn off to the regions where the equilibrium has been disturbed. After a month of warfare, in which all the elements seem to mingle, and thunderstorms and hurricanes rage with the greatest fury, the new current prevails, and becomes established as the south-west monsoon. After blowing for nearly half a year, a new state of the atmosphere is superinduced. The overheated Asiatic plains are cooled down by the sun's departure for the south, the aerial struggle, with its accompanying thunder and hurricanes, is renewed, and in about a month the north-east monsoon, recovering its superiority, begins again to blow.¹

The effects of the monsoons in determining the climate of India are very remarkable. The south-west monsoon, in blowing over the Indian Ocean, becomes surcharged with vapour, which, being suddenly condensed on the heights of the Western Ghats, is discharged in torrents. Thus deprived of its contents as fast as it arrives on the Malabar coast, it blows across the country, and arrives at the Coromandel coast as a dry wind. This coast, accordingly, and the eastern part of the Deccan, generally at this time receive no direct supplies of rain, and become in consequence so parched, that the culture of the ground would become impossible, were it not that most of the rivers, having their sources in the Western Ghats, become filled to overflowing, and thus furnish the means of carrying on an extensive system of irrigation. Beyond the limits of the Western Ghats, the low plains near the mouths of the Indus, and the sandy desert to the east and north, are unable to attract any moisture from the monsoon, which now arrives well charged with water on the heights of the Himalaya. Being here deflected, it descends into the basin of the Ganges, and floods the lower

¹ Maury, *The Sea*, sec. 474 to sec. 479.
plains of Bengal. The south-west monsoon having run its course, the north-east monsoon repeats the process, though on a somewhat minor scale, because the Bay of Bengal, from which the moisture is derived, is of less extent, and therefore unable to supply it so copiously.

The course of the seasons in India will now be easily understood. In the British Islands, and in the temperate zone generally, winter, spring, summer, and autumn succeed each other, and the year performs its round of grateful vicissitudes. In India an entirely different arrangement takes place; and the only seasons which can be properly recognized are the rainy, the cool, and the hot. The boundaries between them are not very exactly defined, because the rains, which may be considered as the commencement of the year, do not begin, even on the same side of the continent, at the same period. On the Malabar coast, for instance, they are retarded in proceeding northwards, and have copiously flooded some districts at least a month before they begin to fall in others. As India lies wholly on the north side of the equator, the cool and the hot seasons should correspond nearly with our own winter and summer; but without entering too much into detail, and specifying the peculiarities of different districts, it is almost impossible to make any statement, in general terms, which would not mislead. The best mode of illustrating the seasons will therefore be to select a particular locality, and give a short description of its year. Calcutta being adopted for this purpose, the cycle will be as follows. After nearly a month of storms, connected with the setting in of the monsoon, the rains commence about the beginning of June, and continue, with occasional short intervals, till the middle of October. A brief stormy period ensues, and then, in November, the air having previously cleared up, the cool season begins. At first the weather is fair and pleasant, and the sky, generally free from clouds, is of a deep blue. In December, fogs become frequent towards evening, and continue unbroken till the morning sun disperses them. Both in this month and in January, the thermometer ranges from 47° to 78°, but the air feels colder than the lower of these numbers might be expected to indicate. Cold but bracing winds from the north and west doubtless contribute to this result. In February, the thermometer
begins to rise, and generally before it closes the hot season has commenced. During the three following months the heat continues to increase, but is greatly relieved by winds and storms till May, when an oppressive stillness prevails, at once unnerving the body and depressing the mind. With this disagreeable month the season closes, and the annual cycle again begins.

In heat and humidity, India possesses the two main agents of luxuriant vegetation. On its lower plains the most valuable plants of the tropics are indigenous or acclimatized, and on its loftier heights forests of the noblest trees, several of them of a peculiar type, furnish inexhaustible supplies of the finest timber, including the teak, which covers the rugged terraces of the Western Ghats. Equally deserving of notice are the magnificent woody amphitheatres which rise successively on the Himalaya, till the limits of the vegetable kingdom are approached. Among the plants which belong exclusively to India, or, while possessed in common with other countries, are so widely diffused over it as to form a leading feature in its botany, are the bamboo, which, though truly a grass, shoots up in one season to the height of 60 feet, and in another becomes so consolidated in its texture as to supply most of the ordinary, and some of the ornamental purposes to which timber is applied; palms in almost endless variety, including the cocoa-nut palm—the most useful of its class—the sago, the areca, and the great fan-palm—a majestic tree, with a leaf of such extraordinary dimensions that a dozen men could take shelter under it; the babal tree, one of the most beautiful and useful of acacias; the sandal-wood tree, valued in the East for the perfume, and in Europe for the dye which it yields; spice-bearing plants and trees, including among others the pepper-vine, which entwines among the cocoas and other palms of the Malabar coast, and forms a considerable article of export; the bread-fruit tree, the banana, and above all the mango, at once the finest and the most widely diffused of all the fruit-trees of which India can boast. Among the cultivated plants which are important as staple articles of food, are rice, maize, wheat, millet, barley, varieties of pulse, yams, sweet potatoes, &c. Among those most deserving of notice, from furnishing the raw materials of manufacture and export, are cotton, flax, hemp, indigo, and various
dyes; cardamoms and other spices, sugar-cane, tobacco, and opium.

The zoology of India is no less rich and varied than its botany. Among quadrupeds the first place is unquestionably due to the elephant, which, besides living wild in herds, has from time immemorial been domesticated, and is usually employed in all labours in which strength and singular sagacity are required. The buffalo and yak have also been domesticated; and the camel is reared in considerable numbers in the west, particularly on the borders of the desert, which it is employed to traverse. Among the animals which have not been subjected to the dominion of man, the most remarkable for size and strength is the one-horned rhinoceros; for ferocity, the tiger, lion, leopard, panther, hyena, and jackal; for forms often humbling to human pride, numerous species of monkeys; and for swiftness, or some other property which singles them out for the chase, the argali, or wild sheep, the wild goat, the wild ass, the bear, the wild boar and wild hog, the chickara, or four-horned antelope, the great rusa stag, nearly as large as a horse, the saumer, or black rusa of Bengal, the hog-deer, the Nepal stag, and many other varieties of the cervine tribe. The birds include several species of the vulture and eagle, wild peacocks, pheasants, and in great profusion cockatoos, parrots, and paroquets, of gorgeous plumage or singular articulating powers. Though not a permanent resident anywhere, the gigantic stork makes its appearance in large flocks during the rains, and renders essential service by destroying snakes and other noxious reptiles, and by plying the trade of scavenger, for which nature evidently intended it. On passing to the lower orders of the animal kingdom, the transition is disagreeable, for it brings us to the hideous alligators, abundant in most streams, and more especially in those of the Indus and Ganges, and to large and venomous snakes which infest both the land and the water, and are so numerous that forty-three varieties, including the deadly cobra de capello, have been described as of common occurrence. Hastening from these to the fishes, both the coasts and the rivers present us with numerous varieties, often in unlimited abundance and excellent for food. As particularly distinguished in the latter respect, it may suffice to notice the leopard-mackerel and the mango fish, the one measuring 3 feet, and the other
occasionally 4 feet in length. Both frequently find a place on the tables of European residents.

The inhabitants of India would next claim attention; but as a full account of them will necessarily be interwoven in the course of the work, it may here suffice to mention that they consist mainly of two great classes—Muhammedans and Hindus. The former, amounting only to about a tenth of the whole population, are far more influential than their numbers imply, because, having been the dominant race before European ascendency was established, they have never entirely lost the wealth and power which this position gave them, and in most native States are under the government of princes of their own faith. The Hindus, though classed under a common name, by no means represent a single race, but exhibit numerous varieties, even in physical form; and, instead of all speaking the same language, have dialects, founded indeed, for the most part, on the Sanskrit, which is no longer spoken, but differing as much from each other as those languages of Europe which have the Latin for their common basis.

In the preceding narrative, attention has been drawn only to the physical geography of India, or to the features which nature herself has indelibly impressed upon it, and the most remarkable objects presented by its mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms. As yet nothing has been said of another department of geography—that which treats of the artificial divisions introduced for administrative purposes, or in consequence of political changes. These, though they necessarily partake of the instability which attaches to all human arrangements, serve many important purposes, and, in fact, furnish the vocabulary which must be used when particular localities are referred to, or the events of which they have been the theatre are described. A thorough knowledge of this vocabulary is only to be obtained by a diligent study of the map; but for ordinary purposes a more cursory knowledge may suffice, at least so far as to prevent the perplexity which might be caused by the frequent use of names of which no previous information had been given. With the view of furnishing such a knowledge, and guarding against this perplexity, a summary of the political geography of India, in accordance with actually subsisting
arrangements, and compressed within the narrowest possible compass, is here subjoined.

At present, not much more than the half of India is in the undivided possession of Great Britain. Two European nations still linger at a few insignificant spots—the Portuguese at Goa on the west coast, and at Diu on the north-west, between the Gulfs of Kutch and Cambay; and the French at Pondicherry and Karikal, on the east coast, at Mahe, on the south-west coast, and at Chandernagore on the Hooghly, above Calcutta. Two native States—Bhutan and Nepal, situated on the southern slopes of the Himalaya—are nominally independent. All the other native States are under a British protectorate of greater or less stringency. Of these States in the upper and inland portion of India, the most extensive are Sindhia's dominions, capital Gwalior, stretching from the Tapti north to the banks of the Chambal; Holkar's dominions, capital Indore, much intersected by those of Sindhia, which bound them on the north; and Rajputana, consisting of a great number of States, which, though individually small, have a large aggregate area, and reach from Sindhia's dominions west to the frontiers of Sind. In the south-west of the same portion of the country, are the Gaikwar's territories, capital Baroda, and the rajahship of Kutch, capital Bhuj. In the Deccan, or southern and maritime portion of India, the most extensive native States are—the Nizam's dominions, capital Hyderabad, area 95,337 square miles, by far the largest territory under any single native chief, consisting of a compact and central portion of the peninsular plateau, bounded north by the Vindhya range, south by the Krishna, east and north-east by the Godaveri, and west by an indefinite line near the last slopes of the Western Ghats; Mysore, the country of the famous Hyder Ali and Tipu Sahib, capital Seringapatam, area 30,886 square miles, consisting of a lofty table-land within the angle which is formed by the junction of the Eastern and Western Ghats; and Travancore, capital Trivendrum, area 4,722 square miles, forming the south-west portion of the extremity of the peninsula.

The whole of the native States and the Portuguese and French possessions have an area of 631,470 square miles, and a population of 49,074,527. The whole of the remainder—area 824,232 square miles, population 130,897,195—is British territory, which
has the seat of its government at Calcutta, the capital of all India, and is comprehended in the presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay.

The presidency of Bengal—area 517,839 miles, population 38,883,337—includes all the British territories within the basins of the Indus and Ganges, with exception of Sind. It also includes Assam and the annexed territories of the Burmese, and the province of Cuttack, extending south to Ganjam on the east coast of the Deccan, where it bounds with what are called the Northern Sarkars, belonging to Madras. Being by far the largest and most populous of the three, the presidency of Bengal is subdivided into Bengal proper and the North-western Provinces, each having its own lieutenant-governor. The line of demarcation between them is nearly in the direction of the meridian of 84°, the whole of the presidency east of that line belonging to the one, and all west of it to the other. Strictly speaking, the North-western Provinces include only the six great divisions of Benares, Allahabad, Agra, Rohilkhand, Meerut, and Delhi. The Punjab and Oudh are thus left out, because, though they are doubtless destined to be formally incorporated with this subdivision, they are still, in consequence of their recent acquisition, under a separate administration.

The presidency of Madras—area 132,096 square miles, population 22,437,297—bounds with that of Bengal, near lat. 18°, and continues south, along the east and south-east coast of the peninsula to Cape Comorin, with no interruption, except from the interposed French districts of Pondicherry and Karikal. At Cape Comorin, it is cut off from the sea by the interjected native States of Travancore and Cochin; but beyond them it again becomes maritime, and continues north along the coast of Malabar, till it meets the presidency of Bombay, near the district of Goa. It has a very irregular shape. At first, when it commences with the Northern Sarkars, it is so hemmed in between the Bay of Bengal and the east frontiers of the Nizam's dominions, that it consists only of a comparatively narrow belt. The same thing happens in the west, where it is similarly hemmed in between the Arabian Gulf and the west frontiers of Mysore. Near the middle, between the mouths of the Krishna and the Pennar, it widens out and stretches so far west between these two native States as to approach the Western Ghats.
Further south, between the city of Madras and Palk's Strait, it extends across the whole peninsula, from sea to sea.

The presidency of Bombay—area 120,065 square miles, population 14,109,067—is, from similar causes, as irregular in shape as the presidency of Madras. Beginning near Goa, it continues northwards in a long and narrow strip, and then widening out, becomes so intermingled with the native States as to make it almost impossible to define its boundaries. Sindh, which has recently been added to it, and forms the three collectorates of Shikarpur, Hyderabad, and Karachi, is by far its most compact province.

The above narrative of the physical and political geography of India seemed necessary in order to furnish information which some might not possess, and remove the indistinct, if not erroneous impressions which it is difficult to avoid, in endeavouring to form an acquaintance with a country so remote, so vast, and so extraordinary. By exhibiting it on a scale so reduced that the mind is neither overpowered by the magnitude, nor perplexed by the variety and singularity of its features, a kind of unity is given to it, and it assumes the appearance of a stage on which great actors are to appear, and wonderful achievements are to be performed. In this way, the history acquires a simplicity which it might not otherwise possess, a deeper interest is felt in the narrative, and the important lessons drawn from it become at once more obvious, intelligible, and impressive.

The History of India embraces three distinct periods—an ancient, a medieval, and a modern. The ancient period, beginning with the earliest authentic accounts, extends to the establishment of a Muhammadans dynasty. The medieval period terminates with the doubling of the Cape of Good Hope, and the consequent discovery of a continuous oceanic route to the East. The modern period, commencing with the great changes introduced by this discovery, is continued down to the present time. The last of these periods, forming the proper subject of the present history, will be treated with a fulness proportioned to its intrinsic importance, and the interest it derives from its intimate connection with British history. The other two could not be omitted without leaving the work incomplete, but being only subordinate, will not occupy more than a few preliminary chapters.
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In tracing the early history of a country, the natural course is to apply to the sources of information which the country itself may be able to furnish. In this respect India might be presumed to be rich. Long before the nations of Western Europe had begun to emerge from barbarism, it was in possession of a language remarkable for the completeness of its grammatical forms, for copiousness, and for the number and variety of the works which had been written in it. Several of these works were of a scientific and metaphysical character, requiring talent of a higher order than would have been necessary for historical compilation; and yet, strange to say, while the more difficult intellectual effort was successfully made, the less difficult, the more useful, and, as one would have, imagined, the more attractive, was so entirely neglected, that with the exception of a work on Kashmir of no very ancient date, the literature of India has failed to furnish a single production to which the name of history can in any proper sense of the term be applied. In dealing with the past, ages are heaped upon ages till the years amount to millions; and endless details are given of gods and demigods, children of the sun and moon, and creatures still more monstrous, combining divine, human, and bestial forms—but men as they really lived; and the events produced by their agency are entirely overlooked, or treated as if they were unfit to be recorded until they had been moulded into some fantastic shape. In short, the Brahmns, the only depositories of learning, abusing their trust, have made everything subservient to an extravagant mythology, obviously designed, and in many respects skilfully framed, to secure their own aggrandizement.
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In the absence of direct information from historical records in India, it is proper before abandoning the search there as hopeless, to inquire whether it may not be possible to discover other native sources from which some amount of authentic information may be obtained indirectly by means of cautious and legitimate deduction. In ancient works, not properly historical, the state of society, and consequent degree of civilization at the period when they were written, are often exhibited, not less accurately, and perhaps far more vividly, than if they had been composed for that special purpose; and hence, provided their date can be fixed with any degree of certainty, much information of an historical nature may be easily and safely extracted from them. Of the writings which thus tend to elucidate the primitive history of India, the most valuable are the collections of ancient hymns and prayers, known by the name of Vedas, and the kind of commentary upon them contained in a compilation, which the translation of Sir William Jones has made familiar to English readers under the title of the Institutes of Manu. The Vedas, four in number, prove by diversities both of style and contents, that they are the productions of different periods, between which a considerable interval must have elapsed. According to the Hindus, they are a little more than 3000 years older than our era, but though this age is short compared with that which figures generally in their chronology, it is doubtless an exaggeration. Mr. Colebrooke, by a very ingenious and convincing process, has cut off sixteen centuries from the Hindu date. Founding on a calendar of antique form by which the Vedas regulate the times of devotional service, he was able to ascertain the exact position of the solstitial points in accordance with which the calendar was regulated; and assuming, as he well might, that the position was not hypothetical, he had only to compare it with the position at present, and calculate how many years must have elapsed in order to produce the difference. The annual precession of the equinoxes is an invariable quantity; and by counting backwards and deducting this quantity successively till the whole amount of difference is exhausted, the true date appears. In this way the completion of the Vedas has been fixed in the

1 Asiatic Researches, vol. viii.
fifteenth century before the Christian era. The Institutes of Manu, referring to the Vedas as productions venerable even then for antiquity, must be much more recent. How much, is the important question; and unfortunately a question which does not admit of a very definite answer. The Institutes themselves give no dates, and any conclusion which can be founded on internal evidence is little better than conjecture. Still, however, though a large margin must be allowed as a kind of debatable ground on which the sticklers for an earlier and a later period may carry on their wordy warfare, there is enough, both in the comparatively pure and primitive form of the religion inculcated, in the sanction of usages which are known to have become obsolete some centuries before the Christian era, and in the omission of religious sects and controversies which would certainly have been mentioned if they had then been in existence, to support the conclusion that the Institutes of Manu must have appeared not later than the fifth, and probably as early as the ninth century B.C. Either period would carry us back to a remote antiquity; for it is always to be remembered, that the laws and manners which the work details, and the corresponding state of society which it implies, did not begin to exist at the time when it was written, but must have preceded it by several ages. Every page of the Institutes, therefore, must be held to furnish indubitable evidence that about 3000 years ago India was nearly as far advanced in civilization as in the present day, containing a dense population, not merely scattered over the country in rural villages, but collected into large towns and cities, extensively engaged in manufactures and trade, and forming a number of independent States. These, under the government of rulers whose despotism was greatly modified by customs and laws, raised large revenues by a complicated system of taxation, brought into the field powerful armies, and executed many stupendous and magnificent works. Among these works are the temples of Elephanta, Salsette, Ajanta, and Ellora, whose testimony, as imperishable as the rocks out of which they have been hewn, tells of an age,
which, though far short of that which was at one time extravagantly assigned, must still in the most ancient be not less than 2000 years.

Another testimony to the antiquity of Indian civilization has been found in its astronomy. This testimony, in consequence of the perverse attempts of some philosophers of the French revolutionary school to confront it with the Sacred Records, for the purpose of bringing them into discredit, was justly subjected to a very rigorous examination, and did not come out of it unscathed. The astronomical tables, because founded on calculations which had been carried backward to a very remote period, were erroneously assumed to exhibit the result of actual observations, and it was gravely maintained that the Hindoo astronomer must have been sitting in his observatory, surrounded by his instruments and patiently committing the results of his observations to writing, nearly 1000 years before Noah entered the ark. As usual in cases of similar extravagance, a reactionary feeling was produced, and many, running to the opposite extreme, insisted that Indian astronomy had no independent existence, and was at best a rude plagiarism from the Chaldeans and the Greeks. More moderate views are now entertained on both sides and those best qualified to judge, agree in holding that, while recorded actual observations by the astronomers of India cannot be carried farther back than the sixth century A.D., their science had probably made some progress 200 years before there was any mention of astronomy in Greece. One of the most pregnant facts on which this conclusion is founded, is the remarkable coincidence between the signs of the zodiac in the Indian and Arab systems—a coincidence which, while it proves that they must have had a common

sufficient to observe here that they belong to two distinct classes, both hewn out of the solid rock, but differing essentially in this respect—that the one class consists of pillared and sculptured caverns, of which only the entrance is visible externally; while the other consists of rock temples, properly so called, because standing visible in the open air, and composed of masses of solid rock, which, fixed immovably in their original site, have been hewn down into the form of temples covered over with sculptures and inscriptions, and accompanied with numerous statues, often of fantastic shapes and colossal dimensions.
origin, cannot be explained without admitting that the Indian system has the better title to be regarded as the original.

While there is thus abundant evidence to show that India must have received its first inhabitants at no distant period after the dispersion of the human race, and become one of the first cradles of civilization, no distinct dates are obtained; and consequently the history of the country cannot be said to begin till we quit its own soil, and apply for information to the writers of the West, who for the most part follow some sort of chronological order, and even when they indulge in fable, have generally some foundation in fact. The first Greek writers who throw any light on the history of India are Herodotus, the father of history, whom immortal work, written in the fifth century B.C., still exists; and Ctesias, who, though he may have been for a short time contemporary with Herodotus, properly belongs to the immediately succeeding century. Among other historical works, he wrote one expressly on India. His opportunities for obtaining materials were considerable. Having been taken prisoner, or been in some other way carried to the Persian capital, he gained the favour of Artaxerxes by his skill as a physician, and lived at his court during the seventeen years preceding B.C. 398. Unfortunately, his work as a whole has perished, but many fragments of it have been preserved, particularly by Diodorus Siculus in his Bibliotheca, which was written in the first years of the Christian era, but possesses far more value as an authority than its date might seem to give it, because it is a compilation, and in many cases apparently an exact transcript, of more ancient writers, whose works are lost. The earliest accounts of India, drawn from the materials furnished by these writers, and especially by the last, are presented with all the gravity of history—a gravity, however, which, when the nature of the details is considered, occasionally becomes ludicrous.

An Egyptian king, whom Diodorus calls Sesoosis and most other writers Sesostris, and who is now generally believed to be identical with Rameses, who belonged to the nineteenth dynasty, came into the world about 1500 B.C., after happy omens which foretold his future greatness. To prepare him for it, his father caused all the male children born in Egypt on the
same day to be brought to court and educated along with him. As they grew up they were trained in all manly exercises, and formed a chosen band, bound to their young prince by the strongest ties of affection, and prepared to follow with unflinching courage and fidelity wherever he might lead. During his father's lifetime he began his military campaigns, and proceeding first into Arabia and then westward into Libya, subdued both. His ambition having been thus inflamed, he had no sooner succeeded to the throne than he resolved on the subjugation of the world. His first step was to conciliate the affections of his subjects—his next to collect an army adequate to the contemplated enterprise. It consisted of 600,000 infantry, 24,000 cavalry, and 27,000 war-chariots. The chief commands were given to the youths who had been brought up with him. The Ethiopians were the first who were made to feel his power. Their country was adjacent to Egypt, and could be reached by a land force, but on turning to the east the necessity of a fleet became apparent. Hitherto the Egyptians had been averse to maritime enterprise, but everything yielded to the energy of Sesostris, who built the first ships of war which Egypt possessed, and ere long had a fleet of 400 sail. He did not allow it to remain idle; but setting out, proceeded down the Arabian Gulf into the main ocean, which then bore the name of the Erythraean Sea, and then coasting along the shores continued his voyage as far as India. He returned, but it was only to recommence his victorious career, and lead a mighty army eastward, not only to the frontiers of India, but beyond the Ganges, and still on till he traversed the whole country and reached a new ocean. On his return, he caused pillars to be erected in various places, with inscriptions attesting his victories, and at the same time lauding the courage or stigmatizing the cowardice of those who had encountered him.

The above narrative, which Diodorus admits to be only the most probable of several contradictory accounts circulated in Egypt, carries some extravagances on the face of it. One of the most palpable of these is the number of the youths who are said to have been born on the same day with Sesostris. When that monarch set out on his Eastern expedition, he must have been on the borders of forty, and yet even then more than 1,700
persons born on the same day were still surviving. Assuming that they were subject to the ordinary law of mortality, their number at forty years of age could not be more than a third of what it was at first. In other words, the number of male children born in Egypt on the same day with Sesostris must have been 5,000, and, consequently, adding female children, the whole number of births must have been 10,000. At the usual rate of increase, this would give Egypt a population bordering upon 40,000,000—a population so enormous as to be utterly incredible. Founding on this discrepancy, and some other objections, which, besides being somewhat hypercritical, are stated more strongly than facts seem to justify, Dr. Robertson, in the first note to his Historical Disquisition concerning Ancient India, labours to prove that the whole account of the expedition of Sesostris to India is fabulous. It ought to be observed, however, that, in this instance, Diodorus does not stand alone. Herodotus, whom Dr. Robertson not very fairly quotes against him, bears strong testimony in his favour, and in fact confirms his statement in all that is essential to it. He distinctly refers both to the maritime and the land expeditions of Sesostris, and though he does not expressly use the word India, he says that in the one Sesostris continued sailing eastward till he came to a sea so shallow as to be no longer navigable, and that in the other he subdued every nation that came in his way, and built pillars of the very kind and for the very purpose mentioned by Diodorus. To reject a statement thus supported, because some flaws may be picked in particular parts of it, is to strike at the foundation of human testimony, and countenance the captious quibbling process under which all ancient history, sacred as well as profane, runs some risk of being converted into a myth. The fair conclusion concerning the Indian expeditions of Sesostris seems to be that they really took place, but that in the accounts given of them, both the means which he employed and the extent of country which he subdued or traversed are exaggerated.

Of another Indian expedition, also mentioned by Diodorus Siculus on the authority of Ctesias, greater doubt may reasonably be entertained, notwithstanding the minuteness with which the details are given. The leader of this expedition was
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the famous Assyrian queen Semiramis. Having learned that India was the greatest and richest country in the world, and was ruled by a powerful monarch called Staurobates, who had innumerable hosts of soldiers, and a great number of elephants trained to war, and so equipped as to inspire terror, she determined to give herself no rest till she had made proof of her prowess against him. She accordingly commenced preparations, and carried them on upon so immense a scale, that though myriads of artificers were employed, three years were spent in completing them. All the country west of the Indus was already subject to her power, but in order to cross that mighty river, an immense number of ships was necessary. In order to provide them, she brought ship-builders from Phoenicia, Syria, and Cyprus. As the banks of the Indus furnished no timber, she was obliged to procure it in the adjacent territory of Bactria, the modern Bokhara. Here she established her building yards, and fitted out her ships in such a manner that she could afterwards transport them piece-meal on the backs of camels, and launch them when they were required. In the number of her troops, which Diodorus, quoting Ctesias as his authority, states at the fabulous number of 3,000,000 infantry, 500,000 cavalry, and 100,000 war-chariots, each provided with a charioteer and carrying a soldier armed with a sword 6 feet long, she considered herself more than a match for Staurobates; but she feared his elephants, and as this was a kind of force in which she had no means of coping with him, she had recourse to a singular stratagem. Having collected 300,000 black cattle, and slaughtered them to feed the countless workmen employed in her vast arsenal in Bactria, she caused skins to be sewed together in such a manner that each, when a camel was placed inside with a man to guide it, bore such a resemblance to an elephant as to be readily mistaken for it. By this device she hoped that the Indians would be terror-struck on seeing themselves opposed to a species of force which they had imagined to be exclusively their own. Meanwhile Staurobates, on his part, had not been idle. Besides a land force scarcely less numerous than that of Semiramis, and headed by a formidable array of elephants, his fleet, composed of 4,000 vessels constructed out of reeds or bamboos, covered
the river. Here the first encounter took place, and a great naval battle was fought. Victory was long undecided, but at length, owing mainly to the superior naval skill of the Phoenician and Cypriot sailors, declared in favour of the warlike queen. Staurobates, with the loss of a large portion of his fleet, and an immense carnage of his soldiers, was obliged to withdraw and leave the passage of the river free. The queen immediately caused a bridge of boats to be constructed, and crossing with her whole army, hastened forward, with the hope of soon completing the conquest which she had so successfully begun. Staurobates, however, had no idea of submission, and stood prepared for her approach. At first, in the general engagement which ensued, the Indians were greatly disconcerted at the appearance of the fictitious elephants, and a kind of panic took place; but the trick which had imposed upon them was soon discovered, and the real elephants advancing to the charge, carried everything before them. It was now the turn of Semiramis to flee. Most of her army perished in the field, or in attempting to regain the right bank of the river. She herself, severely wounded during a personal encounter with Staurobates, made her escape with difficulty with a mere handful of troops, and retiring into the interior with humbled pride, dreamed no more of crowning her fame by the conquest of India.

Notwithstanding the circumstantiality with which the Indian expedition of Semiramis is detailed, it is impossible to doubt that the whole account is highly coloured, and in many parts not less fictitious than her elephants. Of the enormous army which she is said to have collected, Sir Walter Raleigh quaintly and shrewdly observes, that no one place on the earth could have nourished so vast a concourse of living creatures, “had every man and beast but fed on grass.” Similar exaggeration is apparent in other parts of the narrative; and grave doubts have even been raised as to the individual existence of Semiramis, whom some maintain to have been a creation of Assyrian mythology, and others to have been the common name of an Assyrian dynasty. As Ctesias, from whom Diodorus borrowed the account, is said to have extracted it from Persian records, it is not im-

1 Raleigh’s History of the World, p. 125.
probable that its basis of fact has been overlaid with the embellishments which usually adorn a Persian tale.

When India is next brought under notice, the portion of it lying along the right or west bank of the Indus figures as a satrapy or province of the Persian empire. This position it naturally assumed when the Assyrian empire was overthrown by Cyrus the Great. Thus incorporated, it paid nearly a third of the whole tribute which Darius levied from his twenty satrapies, and must, therefore, be presumed to have been the wealthiest and most populous, if not the most extensive of them all. In this fact it is easy to find a more rational account of the curiosity which Darius Hystaspes felt in regard to the Indus, than that which is assigned by Herodotus.¹ According to him, the Persian monarch was merely desirous to know where the river had its mouth, and with this view caused some ships to be fitted out, and gave the command of them to Scylax, a Greek of Caryanda, who, after sailing down the stream to the ocean, turned west, and spent two years and a half in a tedious voyage along the coast. That Darius, when he fitted out the expedition, entertained the thought of enlarging his dominions by new conquests, is confirmed by the statement which Herodotus adds, that immediately after the voyage was completed, he made himself master of the sea and subdued the Indians. These terms, however, are so general, that no definite limits can be assigned to the new territory thus subjected to Persian rule.

Hitherto only a succession of ambitious monarchs has appeared on the scene, and India has become the prey successively of devastating armies from Egypt, Assyria, and Persia. An intercourse of a more peaceful and pleasing description was in the meantime carried on both by land and sea, and an active trade had been established, by which the East and West exchanged their peculiar products against each other, to the great advantage of both. This trade was chiefly in the hands of the Phoenicians, whose capital, Tyre, situated on the shores of the Levant, had in consequence risen to be one of the richest, mightiest, and most splendid cities in the world.² This

¹ Herodotus, b. iv. c. 44.
² Tyre had its original site on the mainland, and stretched along the Syrian coast, from the mouth of the Leontes to the headland of Ras-el-
unexampled prosperity had engendered many vices, and the day of retribution, which prophets had been divinely commissioned to denounce, was fast approaching. While Alexander the Great was making his first campaigns against the Persians, the inhabitants of Tyre had taken part with the latter, and by their maritime superiority, kept the coast of Macedonia and Ain, a distance from north to south of about seven miles. Immediately opposite to the centre of the town, and separated from it by a strait about 1,200 yards or two-thirds of a mile wide, was an island nearly three miles in circuit. It is more than probable, that while the city on the mainland was standing, the island also was partly built upon; but it never became the proper site of the city, which, in contradistinction to Old, was called New Tyre, till the inhabitants, obliged to flee before the countless hosts of Assyrian conquerors, found the necessity of placing the sea between them and their enemies. They accordingly abandoned the mainland and took up their abode on the island, which, under the fostering influence of commerce, soon rose to be one of the finest and wealthiest cities in the world. Such was the Tyre to which Alexander laid siege. On the north and south sides of the island; are two curves which formed harbours, protected by a chain of rocky islets and seawalls or breakwaters from the surges of the Mediterranean and the various prevailing winds. The north harbour was the better and more frequented of the two; but the commerce of Tyre must have required the use of both, and additional facilities were given by a canal which established a navigable communication between them. Alexander having no ships, must have seen at once that there was no possible way of taking a city thus situated, except by making a pathway across the strait. On both shores the water was shallow; and near the centre, where it was deepest, it did not exceed 6 fathoms. With the immense force at his command, there could be no want of labourers, while the materials necessary were within easy reach. The most formidable obstacle to success was in the means of resistance which the inhabitants possessed; and had Tyre been as fortunate as Syracuse, in having an Archimedes, Alexander must have failed. The mound of Alexander, once completed, formed a nucleus to which the waves of the sea and the winds of the desert made constant accretions, and hence, in course of time, the physical features of the locality have undergone a remarkable change. What was once an island is now a peninsula. Other changes have taken place; and there is reason to believe that the island had at one time a larger extent than now appears. In fact, the encroachment of the sea is established by the appearance of walls, which are now covered by a considerable depth of water, but are supposed to have been originally built on the western shore. Of the present condition of Tyre it is unnecessary to say more than that it is little better than a fishing village, composed of wretched hovels huddled together in narrow, crooked, and filthy streets.
Ancient India

Greece in perpetual alarm. Alexander, incensed, turned back from his Persian conquests, and after subduing several of the adjoining cities, laid siege to Tyre. To a mind capable of being repelled by ordinary obstacles, the difficulty of the task would have been a sufficient dissuasive from attempting it. To him it was only an additional incentive, because, if he succeeded, his fame would be the greater. It also appears from a speech which Arrian puts into his mouth,¹ that he was actuated as much by policy as by revenge. While the Tyrians remained independent and maintained a hostile attitude, he could not venture with safety to prosecute the ambitious schemes which he had begun in the East, and was also contemplating in Egypt. Hopeless, therefore, as it might have seemed for a land army to attempt the capture of a great maritime city strongly fortified by art, and rendered still stronger by its natural position on an island, and the possession of a powerful fleet commanding all the approaches to it, he at once commenced operations by constructing a mound, which, after the greatest difficulties had been surmounted, connected the island with the mainland, and formed a highway for the passage of his troops. The result was that, in about seven months, Tyre lay in ruins. It might have risen from them again, for the lucrative trade which it monopolized would soon have made wealth to flow in upon it, and furnished the means of repairing its disaster. The fatal blow which extinguished its greatness was not struck till Alexander, after a successful campaign in Egypt, laid the foundation of Alexandria. The site was so happily chosen that the new city soon became the central emporium of the East and the West. The trade of the world was thus diverted into a new channel, and Phoenician prosperity, once fallen, could not be revived. The downfall of Tyre has been dwelt upon here, both because it was indirectly the means of greatly extending the intercourse with India, and because to it probably is to be ascribed the determination which Alexander now expressed to persevere in his Eastern conquests. While he was engaged in the siege of Tyre, Darius, humbled by his previous defeats, made him the offer of a most advantageous peace, but he haughtily spurned all ideas of

¹ Arrian's Anabasis Alexandri, b. ii. c. 17.
compromise, and plainly told him that his only alternative was unqualified submission, or a decision by the sword. The war thus resumed, so long as it was confined within the limits of Persia, is foreign to our subject, but the course which it subsequently took brings us at once to the most interesting period in the history of ancient India.

After the battle of Arbela, which was fought B.C. 331, and decided the fate of the Persian empire, Darius continued his flight eastwards into Bactria, through a pass in the Elburz Mountains, known to the Greeks by the name of the Caspian Gates. Alexander, following in pursuit, was informed that Bessus, the satrap of Bactria, had not only thrown off all allegiance to the Persian monarch, but had made him his prisoner. With mingled feelings of compassion for the fallen monarch, and indignation at the conduct of the satrap, he quickened his pace, and was flattering himself with the hope of a speedy capture, when he learned that Bessus, to increase his speed, and, at the same time, remove a great obstacle to his ambition, had disencumbered himself of his royal master, and left him on the road, dying of wounds which he had treacherously inflicted. When Alexander reached the spot, Darius was breathing his last.

Determined to punish the atrocity, Alexander lost no time in continuing the pursuit of the perpetrator. A thorough knowledge of the country gave Bessus great advantages, and these he improved to the utmost, by burning and devasting, so as to interpose a desert between him and his pursuer. Fortune seemed to favour his escape, when Alexander was obliged, by a revolt, to retrace his steps. During the winter of B.C. 330, Bessus was, in consequence, left in undisturbed possession of the usurped title of King of Persia. In the following spring, however, the pursuit was resumed, and the criminal having been delivered up by his own associates, paid the forfeit of his crimes by a barbarous mutilation and an excruciating death.

In avenging the death of Darius, Alexander had advanced far to the east, and seen a new world open before him. For a time, however, sensuality seemed to have gained the mastery over him, and many months were wasted in Bactria in drun-
ken and licentious revellings. Ambition did not re-assume its ascendancy till B.C. 327, when he reached the banks of the Indus, and prepared to cross it with an army consisting of 120,000 foot and 15,000 horse. About 70,000 of these were Asiatics. The point at which he first reached the Indus has been made a question; but it is admitted on all hands that he crossed it in the north of the Punjab, where the town of Attock now stands.

Here a bridge of boats had been constructed by Hephaestion and Perdiccas, who had been sent forward with a division of the army for that purpose. When Alexander arrived, the south-west monsoon had set in, and the river was greatly swollen by the rains. Had the passage been opposed, it could scarcely have been forced; but Taxila, the chief whose territories lay on the eastern bank, had hastened to give in his submission, and thus, instead of an enemy, proved a valuable auxiliary. In Taxila, his capital, described as a populous and wealthy city, unequalled by any situated, like itself, between the Indus and its nearest tributary, the Hydaspes or Jhelam, Alexander and his army were hospitably entertained. In return for this hospitality, Taxila received an arbitrary grant of as much adjoining territory as he chose to ask.

If Alexander expected that all the Indian princes would prove as pusillanimous as Taxila, he was soon undeceived. Porus (Puru), a native ruler, whose territories bounded those of Taxila on the east, met a demand for tribute with defiance, and lay with his army on the left bank of the Hydaspes. On reaching the river, Alexander found it running broad, deep, and rapid, and immediately saw that even an undisputed passage could not be effected without a great number of boats. The neighbourhood not furnishing the necessary materials, he caused the boats which he had used on the Indus to be taken to pieces, and transported overland. The more serious obstacle still remained. Porus (Puru) kept strict watch on the bank. His army appears to have been greatly outnumbered by that of Alexander, for the main body consisted of only 30,000 infantry, with an inconsiderable body of cavalry, 200 elephants, and 300 chariots; but placed as he was, numbers counted as nothing against him, since he could easily, with a mere handful of troops, overmatch any number, provided the attempt to
force a passage were made openly. Alexander was too skilful a tactician not to perceive this at a single glance, and had, accordingly, from the very first, determined to trust less to open force than to stratagem. By a series of movements and counter-movements, he distracted the attention of the enemy, and kept him in a state of uncertainty as to the point where the attempt at crossing was likely to be made. Next, by selecting a number of stations along the bank, and making false alarms during the night, he obliged the troops of Porus (Puru) to be always in motion, till nature itself was completely exhausted by want of repose. Lastly, by ordering provisions to be brought in from all quarters, he encouraged the belief that he had abandoned the idea of crossing until the swollen waters had subsided. Under this impression, the vigilance of Porus (Puru) relaxed. Meanwhile, in the course of reconnoitring, Alexander had discovered a spot where the channel was greatly contracted by an island. It was a good way up the stream, and, to lull suspicion, none of his troops were allowed to be seen near it. Craterus was stationed considerably below, with the main body of the army; and Porus (Puru), thinking that there the greatest danger lay, was encamped opposite to him. Alexander selecting a body of chosen troops, amounting to about 6,000 men, quitted the banks of the river and marched back into the interior, as if he had been called away by some sudden emergency. When out of sight he bent gradually round, and in the course of the night arrived on the bank opposite the island. The boats of the Indus were hastily launched, and he was steering his way among the foremost to the opposite bank, when the enemy's sentinels discovered him and gave the alarm. Porus (Puru) first sent forward one of his sons with a small body, but these being speedily routed, he himself, leaving only a few troops to watch the motions of Craterus, hastened to the encounter. It was too late. Alexander, with a large portion of his detachment, had effected a landing, and stood on the bank among marshes, into which the elephants, to which Porus (Puru) mainly trusted, could not venture. He therefore withdrew to the nearest spot of solid ground, and calmly waited Alexander's approach. As this is the first battlefield in which the soldiers of Europe were arrayed against those of India, a deep interest
naturally attaches to all its arrangements, and will justify a fuller detail than might have been necessary under different circumstances.

Porus (Puru) stationed his elephants in front, with an interval of 100 feet between each of them. The infantry were placed in a second line behind the elephants, and in such a way as to fill up the intervals. The two wings consisted of cavalry, and of the chariots ranged on either side beyond them. Alexander commenced the battle by attacking the enemy’s left wing with his cavalry and mounted archers. He had anticipated that this attack would compel the enemy’s right wing to move forward in support of its left, and had ordered that, in that case, a detachment of his cavalry under Coenus should move round to the rear, and thus place the enemy’s cavalry, as it were, between two fires. The result was as he had foreseen; and the enemy’s cavalry was obliged, in order to meet the double attack, to face about and form two fronts. Taking advantage of the partial confusion thus produced, Alexander brought up his phalanx to the charge, and the enemy’s wings, totally unable to sustain it, sought shelter by rushing into the intervals between the elephants. By these powerful animals the fortune of the day seemed for a short time to be retrieved, as they pressed forward and trampled down everything that opposed. The advantage, however, was only momentary. The Macedonians, under thorough discipline, opened their ranks, and then, as the elephants passed, attacked them on flank and rear, shooting down their guides, and inflicting wounds which, without being mortal, so galled them that they became utterly unmanageable. Thus hurried back among the Indian ranks, they produced irremediable confusion. At this critical moment Craterus, who had succeeded in crossing the river, made his appearance. His troops were perfectly fresh, while the Indians, exhausted by fatigue, broken in spirit, and thinned in numbers, had lost all power of resistance. A dreadful slaughter ensued, and Porus (Puru) saw his troops falling by thousands. He still, however, kept the field. During the whole day he had mingled in the thickest of the fight, and performed prodigies of valour. His stature, which was almost gigantic, and the elephant on which he was mounted, made him a
conspicuous object for the Macedonian archers; and he must have fallen early had he not worn a coat of mail which no arrow could pierce. The right shoulder was the only part exposed, and in it he was severely wounded. His determination seemed to be to perish on the spot, for he was left almost alone before his attendants could induce him to mingle with the fugitives. About 12,000 of his troops were slain, and 9,000 taken prisoners. The Macedonian loss was trifling, amounting, at the utmost, according to Diodorus, to 700 infantry and 230 cavalry. According to Arrian, the loss of infantry was only eighty.

Alexander, struck with admiration of the valour which Porus (Puru) had displayed, was anxious to save his life, and sent Taxila after him to endeavour to induce him to surrender. The choice was unfortunate, for the two native chiefs had long been at deadly feud; and Porus (Puru), when overtaken, was so exasperated at the sight of his old enemy, whom he probably also regarded as a main cause of the great disaster which had just befallen him, that he aimed a blow which Taxiles narrowly escaped. A second summons, by a more influential messenger, succeeded, and Porus (Puru), finding escape impossible, yielded himself a prisoner.

In the midst of his misfortunes, Porus (Puru) displayed a manliness and dignity which proved him worthy of a better fate. In one day he had lost his kingdom, and seen three of his sons fall in battle, but he disdained to assume the attitude of a suppliant, and, when Alexander, riding up at the head of his officers, asked how he wished to be treated, simply answered, "Royally." "That," rejoined Alexander, "I shall do for my own sake, but what: am I to do for yours?" "Do just as I have said," was the reply. Sound policy combined with Alexander's natural magnanimity in making him desirous to secure the friendship of such a man. He accordingly heaped favours upon him, not only restoring his former territories, but enlarging them by many new annexations. Porus (Puru) was not ungrateful, and continued faithful to his Macedonian masters.

In commemoration of his victory, Alexander erected a city on the spot, and gave it the name of Nicaea. Another city, which he erected on the site of his encampment on the right
bank of the Hydaspes, he called Bucephala, in honour of his horse Bucephalus, which, after carrying him through all his campaigns, had recently died of old age or in battle. Neither of these cities has since been identified. After reposing for a time in the dominions of Porus (Puru), he again set out, and proceeded north-east into the territory of the Glausae, which is represented as densely peopled and covered with cities, many of them with more than 10,000 inhabitants. The terror of his name had preceded him, and the chiefs hastened to make their submission. It would seem that, before quitting the Hydaspes, his thoughts had been turned homewards; for on finding timber well fitted for the purpose, he caused immense quantities to be cut down and employed in building vessels, with which he proposed, at a later period, to descend the Indus. Meanwhile his ambition urged him forward, and he arrived at the banks of the Acesines or Chenab. Though much broader and more impetuous than the Hydaspes, there was no enemy to dispute the passage, and it was crossed with comparative ease. It seems, however, that though no enemy appeared, the country was in possession of one whose name, somewhat strange to say, was also Porus (Puru). He was not only not related to the Porus (Puru) of whom the above account has been given, but was at open enmity with him, and, probably under the influence of this enmity, had, previously to the battle of the Hydaspes, sent in his submission to Alexander. It appears, however, that the favour into which the other Porus (Puru) had been received had offended or alarmed him; and therefore, on the news of Alexander's approach, instead of waiting either to welcome him as a friend or oppose him as an enemy, he suddenly disappeared, carrying almost all the youth of the country fit for arms along with him. Alexander, offended, endeavoured to overtake him; and in the course of the pursuit arrived at another of the Punjab rivers, called the Hydraotes or Ravi. Before crossing it, he bestowed the territories of the fugitive Porus (Puru) on his more deserving namesake. The passage, which, according to Rennel, took place near Lahore, he appears to have effected without difficulty; but in the country beyond, he found a formidable combination formed to resist him. Three native States, of

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1 Rennel, *Memoir of a Map of Hindustan.*
which that of the Malli was the most powerful, had united their forces against the invader. In the campaign which followed, Alexander was drawn far to the south, where a strong city, which bore the name of Sangala or Sagala was situated, somewhere between Lahore and Multan. Both from the description and the name of the inhabitants, it is conjectured to have been nearer the latter. Resistance in the open field soon proved hopeless; and the confederates, as a last refuge, shut themselves up in Sangala, which occupied a commanding position, and was otherwise as strong as Indian art could make it. Alexander commenced the siege, and carried it on with so much vigour that the place soon fell into his hands. The resistance had exasperated him; and forgetting the magnanimity which he had displayed in the case of Porus, he disgraced himself by a horrible massacre, in which neither age nor sex was spared.

From this atrocity Alexander turned to make new conquests, and reached the banks of the Hyphasis or Beas. Here he was met by an obstacle more formidable than any he had yet encountered. His European troops, worn out with long service, had become impatient; and, when he formally intimated his intention to cross the river, broke out into loud murmurs. In vain he harangued them, and pointed to the country beyond, where new victories and rich spoils awaited them. Their hearts were set on home, and they plainly declared their determination not to proceed. Even Coenus, one of the generals who stood highest in his favour, espoused the cause of the soldiers, and delivered a speech which, if less rhetorical than that of his master, made a deeper impression, and was received with acclamations. For a time Alexander was immovable, and declared that, even if his own countrymen should abandon him, he would place himself at the head of his Asiatic subjects. This, however, was mere bravado; and on finding that his Greeks were not to be worked upon, either by threats or promises, he announced his intention to return.

Late in the autumn of B.C. 327, he had retraced his steps to the Hydaspes, and found the fleet which he had ordered to be constructed, in readiness to carry him down the stream. The voyage itself was not free from danger; but the greatest risk which Alexander ran, was during one of the frequent
descents which he made on land for the purpose of subjugating the adjoining territories. While storming one of the cities of the Malli, he found himself almost alone on the rampart. He could easily have saved himself by a retrograde movement, but disdaining to have it said that he had turned his back, he leaped inside, and was for a time exposed to the whole fury of the defenders. Having gained a tree and placed his back against it, he made almost superhuman exertions, and kept his opponents at bay till an arrow pierced deep into his shoulder, and he fell down in a swoon. Another moment and his death was inevitable; but the time gained by his defence had been gallantly redeemed by his troops, and several of his officers rushing in, placed their shields around him. The wound, at first deemed mortal, spread grief and consternation among his followers; but the vigour of his constitution and the skill of his physicians prevailed, and he was able ere long to make his appearance amid general rejoicings.

In proceeding down the river, Alexander formed his army into three divisions, two of which marched along the opposite bank, while the third, under his own command, kept the stream. He afterwards despatched Craterus with a third of the army by an inland route across Arachosia and Drangiana to Carmania or Kerman, and proceeded with the remainder down the Indus. On arrival at Pattala, evidently the modern Tatta, situated near the apex of the delta, he remained for some time; and, on departing, sent a body of troops to explore the adjoining country, and afterwards join him at a fixed place of rendezvous. He selected the west branch of the river for the remainder of his voyage, during which his want of pilots and ignorance of navigation exposed him to serious danger. This was not diminished but rather increased on reaching the estuary. Acquainted only with the insignificant tides of the Mediterranean, what was his astonishment and that of his Greeks when they beheld the magnificent tide of the Indian Ocean rushing in, and, in consequence of the sudden contraction of the opposite shores, moving rapidly along in one volume of water several feet high! This singular phenomenon, now well known to mariners by the name of the bore, and common to the Indus with many other rivers similarly situated, produced not only
wonder but terror, because it seemed to portend the destruction of the whole fleet. In point of fact, considerable damage was sustained before the necessary precautions could be taken.

Here Alexander’s maritime adventures ended. The little he had seen of the sea had probably left him no desire to become better acquainted with its dangers. These he left Nearchus to encounter, by giving him the command of the fleet, with injunctions to skirt and explore the shore from the Indus westward. He himself, with the main body of the army, took leave of India for ever by an inland route, which, though he was not aware of the fact, was the more perilous of the two, as it led through the heart of a sandy desert, which stretches, almost without interruption, from the eastern edge of the basin of the Indus across the south of the Asiatic and the north of the African continent to the Atlantic Ocean.

The Indian expedition of Alexander cannot be justified on moral grounds. It was dictated by a wild and ungovernable ambition; and spread misery and death among thousands and tens of thousands who had done nothing to offend him, and were peacefully pursuing their different branches of industry, when he made his appearance among them like a destroying demon. Such exploits, once deemed the only avenues to fame, are now judged more wisely. Still it is impossible to deny that conquerors were often in early times pioneers of civilization, commerce following peacefully along their bloody track, and compensating for their devastation by the blessings which it diffused. Such was certainly the result of the Indian expedition of Alexander; and therefore, while reproving the motives in which it originated, we cannot but rejoice that it was so overruled by Providence as to be productive of most important and valuable results.

The conquests of Alexander were never consolidated, and formed only a nominal Macedonian empire, which fell to pieces on his death, and was partitioned by his officers. The most eastern portion was given to Seleucus Nicator, who established himself in Babylon, and became the founder of the dynasty of the Seleucidae, which lasted for two centuries and a half. In the early part of his reign, the struggles which he had to maintain with powerful competitors, completely engrossed his atten-
tion; but when, by the overthrow of Antigonus, he felt firmly seated on the throne, he appears to have become animated with an ambition to imitate the exploits of Alexander, and carry his arms far to the East. India, indeed, he naturally regarded as forming part of his territory, and, on hearing that the natives had risen in insurrection, killed Alexander’s prefects, and thrown off the Macedonian yoke, he resolved to treat them as rebels. Accordingly, after having made himself master of Bactria, he crossed the Indus, and entered the territories of which Taxila and Porus (Puru) were still rulers. Neither of them disputed his authority, and he continued his progress till he reached the country of the Prasi, over whom Sandracottus had usurped the sovereignty, after he had murdered their lawful king. This usurper, whose identity with Chandragupta, who figures in the traditions and also in a drama of the Hindus, has been established, was of low origin, and, according to Justin,¹ the chief classical authority for all that is known of him, owed his rise to a pretended zeal for liberty. His countrymen, believing him, placed power in his hands, and the first use he made of it was to enslave them.

Unprincipled though Sandracottus had proved himself to be by the mode in which he attained the throne, he soon showed by his talents that he was not unworthy of reigning, and, by force, fear, or persuasion, had extended his dominions on every side, till he was able to bring into the field an army estimated by hundreds of thousands. Such was the enemy with whom Seleucus was about to come into collision. We cannot wonder that the prospect made him pause, and that, more especially on learning how much his presence was required in the West, where new wars were raging, he was glad to propose terms of accommodation. Sandracottus, aware of his advantage, made the most of it; and all that Seleucus obtained was 500 elephants, in return for which he ceded all his Indian territories on both sides of the Indus. As a means of cementing the treaty, Sandracottus married the daughter of Seleucus. The capital of the kingdom of the Prasii, called by classical writers Palibothra, and by the Hindus Patapaliputra, and believed to have stood on or near the site of the modern Patna, formed a quadrangle of vast extent, inclosed by wooden walls loop-holed for arrows.²

¹ Justin, Historiae Philippicae, b. xv, c.4
² Strabo, xiv. 1, 35.
The alliance between Seleucus and Sandracottus was not disturbed; and Megasthenes, who long lived at Palibothra as ambassador from the former, wrote a work which, notwithstanding its excessive leaning to the marvellous, was the great source from which ancient classical writers derived most of what they knew concerning the interior of India. The period of Indian history subsequent to the reign of Seleucus is very imperfectly known. Recently an unexpected light has been thrown upon it by the discovery of large quantities of coins, which show that the western portion of the country continued subject to the Greek kings, who had the seat of their government in Bactria. Considerable progress, also, has been made in deciphering and interpreting certain monumental inscriptions which are written in an unknown alphabet, and, like the Egyptian hieroglyphics, seemed as if they had been designed not so much to inform as to puzzle posterity. The key having at length been found, some valuable information has already been obtained, and more may be expected; but as yet the amount is too scanty to justify any attempt at detail. All that need be said here is, that after several of the Seleucidae, among whom Antiochus the Great is most conspicuous, and several Kings of Bactria, which first became independent under Theodotus about B.C. 260, had held sovereignty to a greater or less extent in India, a horde of Scythians, driven by the Huns from the shores of the Jaxartes, made their appearance about a century before the Christian era, and gained a firm footing in the lower basin of the Indus. Here they formed what has been called the Indo-Scythic province of Sindh, and were endeavouring, against a bold and often successful opposition from the natives, to force their way into the fertile basin of the Ganges, when another horde arrived from Persia about B.C. 26 under the leadership of Yu-chi, who gained for them a temporary ascendency, and became the founder of an Indo-Scythian dynasty. About the same time a native prince called Vikramaditya, who is one of the greatest heroes in Hindu story, established an extensive sovereignty, which had the Narmada for its southern boundary; and at Ujjain, his capital, held a court, remarkable not only for its splendour, but for the number of learned men whom the enlightened liberality of the sovereign had drawn around
him. In Southern India, also, several native sovereignties appear to have been established as early as the Christian era. Among these the most conspicuous are Pandya, which occupied a large tract in the south-west of the peninsula, and one of whose kings, called Pandion, is said by Strabo to have sent an ambassador to the Roman emperor Augustus; and Chola, which, including the Carnatic, extended over a large portion of the south-east of the peninsula, and reached north to the banks of the Godaveri. They are now, however, little better than empty names, as they do not furnish during their long duration any facts so well authenticated as to entitle them to a place in history.

It is somewhat remarkable that the Romans, though they boasted of being the rulers of the world, never possessed an inch of territory in India. On several occasions during their wars in the East, they came into collision with sovereigns whose dominions reached beyond the Indus, but the tide of Roman victory invariably stopped, as if it had met an insuperable barrier, before it reached that celebrated stream. It was not ignorance or indifference that led the Romans thus to contract the limits of their eastern frontier. On the contrary, several of their most popular writers had made them well acquainted with the geography and the leading physical features of India, while many of its peculiar products were exhibited for sale in their marts, and found eager purchasers, often at enormous prices. They must often have longed to be masters of a country which ministered so greatly to their luxury and comfort; and however much they may have wished it to be thought that they could have carried their conquests farther, had they believed that there was anything beyond to tempt their ambition, it is sufficiently obvious that India never felt the terror of their power, merely because inhospitable deserts and warlike nations interposed to place it beyond their reach.

While it is impossible to give the Romans credit for moderation in refraining from any attempt to conquer India, it is pleasing to find in their conduct an illustration of the important fact, that the peaceful intercourse which commerce carries on between distant nations, besides escaping all the horrors which war carries in its train, secures all and more than all the advantages which could have been hoped from the most absolute and
least expensive form of conquest. In Rome and all its dependencies, the rich products of the soil and the looms of India arrived as surely, as abundantly, and as cheaply as they could have done had the whole country from the Himalaya to Cape Comorin been one vast Roman province.

Before leaving ancient India, it will not be out of place to take a survey of the leading routes by which, at this early period, the traffic between the East and West was conducted. Overland the only practicable method of traffic was by means of caravans, which, after quitting the western confines of India, proceeded directly to Bactria. Here the first great halt was made at Balkh, on the southern frontiers, and a great emporium was established. From Bactria the usual line of route was toward Babylon, which, in like manner, became another great emporium. In pursuing this line the shores of the Caspian were nearly approached, and advantage was often taken of it to ship goods, which were carried north to a convenient spot, and then conveyed by land to the Black Sea, by which not only the countries adjacent to the coasts could be supplied, but an easy access could be had through the Dardanelles to the ports of the Mediterranean. From Babylon the route westward led directly to Palmyra, which, in consequence of the mart thus established, overcame all the disadvantages of its situation in the heart of a desert, and became the capital of a powerful and opulent kingdom. From Palmyra the coast of the Levant was reached without much difficulty, and its harbours became places of exchange for the three quarters of the globe, bartering the spices of India and the frankincense of Arabia against the peculiar products both of Europe and Africa. Besides the direct overland route now traced, there were many lines of divergence from what may be called its main trunk. These were chiefly intended to supply the places which lay at a distance on either side of it, and thus furnished the means of transport for a very extensive inland trade.

The overland route, which, but for the camel, would have been altogether impracticable, was necessarily slow, toilsome, and expensive, and was therefore less extensively used than the maritime route, especially after a knowledge of the monsoons in the Indian Ocean had emboldened navigators, even before
the compass was discovered, to launch out into the deep and steer their course directly across from shore to shore. In this way the outward voyage was accomplished by the south-west, and the homeward by the north-east monsoon—the former, consequently, in the summer, and the latter in the winter months. This was a vast improvement on the earlier mode of navigation, but even before it was discovered the trade by sea obtained great importance. Mention has already been made of the Phoenicians, who, by means of it, acquired an opulence which made the merchants of Tyre princes, and a power which it took all the skill, prowess, and perseverance of Alexander the Great to overthrow. As they could not communicate directly with India, and were unwilling to depend for transport on the Egyptians, who might at any time, by declining to perform their part of it, have extinguished the trade, they, by force or negotiation, made themselves masters of some convenient harbours on the Arabian coast, near the entrance of the Red Sea, and, using them as entrepots, formed a communication with Tyre by a land route, of which they had secured the entire control. The distance was still so great as to be very inconvenient; and hence new facilities for the trade were obtained when the Phoenicians took possession of Rhinocolura, the nearest port in the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. It is true that before the goods could reach Tyre a double re-shipment thus became necessary; but the diminished land carriage more than compensated for this disadvantage, and enabled them, by the abundance and cheapness with which they could supply other nations, to establish almost a complete monopoly of the Indian trade.

On the destruction of Tyre and the foundation of Alexandria, the trade with India entered a new channel, in which it continued afterwards to flow for nearly eighteen centuries. Alexander had the merit of selecting this channel, but died too soon to see its advantages realized. So thoroughly, however, had he imparted his ideas to Ptolemy Lagus, that that officer, on becoming master of Egypt, made Alexandria his capital, and provided its harbour with a light-house, in the erection of which so much magnificence and engineering skill were displayed, that it ranked as one of the seven wonders of the world. His views
were followed out by his son and successor, Ptolemy Philadelphus, who, after endeavouring, but without success, to form a canal across the isthmus of Suez, which would have given a continuous water communication to Alexandria, founded the new city of Berenice on the west coast of the Red Sea. From this city a land carriage, not unattended with difficulties, which great exertions were made to surmount, brought the products of India to Coptos. The remaining distance to Alexandria was easily completed by a short canal and the Nile.

Through the channel thus opened, the wealth of India continued to flow into Egypt so long as it remained an independent kingdom. Outward vessels leaving Berenice with such articles of European and African export as were in demand in the East, skirted the Arabian and Persian coasts, taking advantage of such prominent head-lands as enabled them to steer direct without following the windings of the shore, and thus reached the Indian coast near the mouths of the Indus. How far they afterwards proceeded south is not known; but as there was no obstacle in the way, and some of the most prized products of the country lay in that direction, it is to be presumed that, instead of confining themselves to a few isolated spots, they formed a general acquaintance with the whole sea-bord. To secure the command of this lucrative trade, the Egyptian kings maintained a large fleet at sea. which, while it kept down piracy, deterred other nations from entering into competition with them. The nation which could have done so with most effect was Persia, which possessed the obvious and very important advantage of a far shorter sea passage. From the Persian Gulf they could have reached India in about half the time which the Egyptians must have taken. The Persians, however, had long an aversion to maritime enterprise—an aversion so great, that they are said to have erected barriers across the Tigris and Euphrates for the purpose of rendering it impossible. Be this as it may, it seems established that the Indian produce which they obtained for their own use, or the supply of adjacent countries, came mostly overland by the caravans. Another cause of the supineness of the Persians in regard to maritime intercourse with India, may be found in
the erroneous ideas generally entertained respecting the proper limits of the Caspian Sea on the north, and its relative position to the Black Sea. The Caspian was somewhat unaccountably imagined to be a branch of the great Northern Ocean, and it was believed that by means of it a channel of communication might be opened up with Europe, which might thus be made to receive the products of India by a far shorter route than the Indian Ocean, and consequently at a far cheaper rate than they could be furnished by the Egyptians. Ideas of this kind seem to have weighed particularly with some of Alexander’s successors in the East. Seleucus Nicator, the first and one of the ablest of them, is even said to have contemplated a canal which would have joined the Caspian and Black Seas, and thereby secured a monopoly of European and Indian traffic.

After the Romans conquered Egypt and converted it into a province, in B.C. 30, the channels of traffic with the East continued unchanged, while its amount was enormously increased both by land and sea. By the latter, in particular, the traffic received an impulse unfelt before, when a navigator of the name of Hippalus conceived the idea of cutting off nearly a half of the voyage between the Red Sea and India, by abandoning the timid track pursued along the intervening shores, and steering boldly far out of sight of land through the very middle of the ocean. The plan seems so natural, and the considerations which suggested it so obvious, that one finds some difficulty in recognizing Hippalus as the inventor, or in giving him much credit for the invention. He had simply observed the regularity of the monsoons, and concluded that by choosing the proper seasons, the one would carry him out and the other bring him home.

The course of the voyage, and even the time occupied by it, is minutely detailed by the elder Pliny. The cargo destined for India being embarked on the Nile, was conveyed by it and a short canal to Coptos, a distance of 303 miles. At Coptos the land carriage commenced, and was continued 258 miles to Berenice, on the west shore of the Red Sea. From Berenice the vessel started about midsummer, and after a short halt near the Straits of Bal-el-mandeb, took its final departure usually

1 Plinii Historia Naturalis, b. vi. c. 23.
for Musiris on the Malabar coast. The whole time occupied, on an average, from the Mediterranean to India was a little more than three months, or ninety-four days. Of these, the inland navigation to Coptos occupied twelve, the land transport to Berenice twelve, the voyage down the Red Sea thirty, and the voyage across the Indian Ocean forty days. The time occupied by the Red Sea voyage seems out of all proportion to the other, but may be accounted for partly by the difficulty of navigating a sea notorious for baffling winds and storms, and perhaps partly also by delays which may have been occasioned by calling on both sides of the coast for the purpose of completing the cargo. The homeward voyage; commenced early in December, appears to have been the far more tedious of the two.

Though the Persians had failed to take advantage of their maritime proximity to India, the Romans had no sooner carried their eastern frontier to the banks of the Euphrates, than an important trade sprung up in the Persian Gulf, and Indian produce was transported in large quantities up the river, and then west to Palmyra, which reaped the advantage to such an extent that even Rome condescended at one time to court its alliance. After this proud city had declined and was tottering to its fall, the Persian monarchs continued the traffic which had been established, and by means of it enriched themselves at the expense of the Greeks, who had made Constantinople the capital of their empire. As we have now touched on medieval times, it may suffice, in concluding the sketch of ancient India, to mention that the great staples of its trade were then nearly the same as at present, and consisted chiefly of cotton and silk goods, dyes, drugs, spices and aromatics, pearls, diamonds, emeralds, and other precious stones. These were paid chiefly in the precious metals, but partly also in woollen cloth, lead, tin, brass, wine, and a few foreign perfumes. Though a passage in the Institutes of Manu, which refers to sea voyages as well as land journeys, implies that the inhabitants of India had begun at an early period to navigate the ocean, they seem to have confined themselves to coasting, and to have left the external trade entirely in the hands of strangers. This aversion to commit themselves to the open sea had its origin in superstitious fears, which still continue to operate.
Medieval India

MUHAMMADANISM, which had made little progress so long as persuasion only was employed to propagate it, no sooner began to wield the sword than it spread rapidly on every side. Before the death of Muhammad, in 632, it had subdued all Arabia, and made a considerable impression both on Syria and Persia; and under his successors it had, in the course of less than a century, not only consolidated these conquests, but established an empire which stretched continuously from Arabia as a centre, west to the Atlantic, engulfing Spain and threatening the fairest portion of France—north and northeast through Persia, to the vast region which extends between the Oxus and the Jaxartes, from the Caspian to Mount Imaus—and east beyond the banks of the Indus. Its progress in this last direction must now be traced.

As early as the caliphate of Omar, the Arabs, coasting along the shores of the Indian Ocean, had made predatory descents upon Sind, chiefly for the purpose of carrying off the women, whose beauty was in high repute, to adorn the Arabian harems; but no land expedition deserving of notice took place till 664, when part of an Arab force which had penetrated from Merv to Kabul, and gained, it is said, 12,000 converts, was despatched to explore the lower part of the Punjab. This detachment, under the command of Mohalib, who afterwards figured as a warrior in Persia and Arabia, forced its way into Multan, and returned with numerous captives. The next expedition was on a greater scale, and led to more permanent results. An Arab ship had been seized at Dewal, a seaport of Sind. Restitution was demanded, but Raja Dahir, whose territories are said to have included Multan and all Sind, together with some ad-
jacent plains, endeavoured to evade compliance, by pretending that Dewal was not subject to his authority. The Arabs, thus refused redress, determined to compel it, and, with this view, sent a body consisting only of 1,000 infantry and 300 horse. It was altogether inadequate, and perished. Exasperated at the failure, Hejaj, governor of Bussorah in 711, despatched a regular force of 6,000 men, under the command of his nephew Muhammad Qasim, who, though only a youth of twenty, possessed great military talents, and after surmounting all difficulties, encamped under the walls of Dewal. The siege commenced with an attack on a celebrated pagoda contiguous to the town, and enclosed by a high wall of hewn stone. In addition to the Brahmins who usually occupied it, it had a strong garrison of Rajputs. The defence was resolute, and might have been successful, had not Qasim learned that the safety of the place was conceived to depend on a flag which was flying from a tower. Acting on this information, he directed all his engines against the flag, and had no sooner struck it down, than the resistance became so feeble as to make his entrance easy. With barbarous fanaticism he circumcised all the Brahmins, as a first step to their conversion, and on finding it ineffectual, put all the males above seventeen to death, and made slaves of the women and children. The capture of Dewal itself soon followed, and Qasim continued his victorious progress, taking in succession, Nerun (the modern Hyderabad), Sehwan, and a fortress called Salim. A more formidable resistance was, however, in preparation; and the arrival of the raja's eldest son at the head of a strong force, reduced him to the necessity of acting on the defensive. This continued, till the arrival of 2,000 Persian horse gave him once more the superiority; and he began to advance on Alor, the capital, which was situated in the north of Sind, near the modern Bukkur.

The raja himself being now, as it were, brought to bay, determined to make a final stroke for his kingdom, and appeared at the head of an army of 50,000 men. Qasim again stood on the defensive, and skilfully compensated for inferiority of numbers by the strength of his position. The raja, advancing boldly to the attack, was wounded by an arrow, and at the same time the elephant on which he was mounted, being struck by a
fireball, rushed off in terror and plunged with him into the river. The occurrence completely disconcerted the Indians; and though Dahir mounted a horse, and displayed both skill and courage in endeavouring to rally them, it was too late. The fortune of the day was decided, and his gallant effort to retrieve it only cost him his life.

The remains of the Indian army took refuge in the city of Brahmanabad. Qasim advanced against it, and met a resistance which probably he had not anticipated. The raja's widow heroically assumed the defence, and made it good while provisions lasted. When they failed, and resistance in consequence became hopeless, she erected a funeral pile, and committed herself and children to the flames. Many of the garrison, equally prepared for death, met it by throwing open the gates and rushing out to perish by the swords of the besiegers. Those who remained had no better fate. On the assault, all in arms were slaughtered; the rest were carried into bondage. Qasim, in pursuing his conquests, took Multan without resistance, and became master of all the territories which had belonged to Raja Dahir.

It would seem that, beside the children who perished with their mother in Brahmanabad, the raja had two daughters possessed of great personal attractions. They were among the captives; and seeming fit to grace the caliph's harem, were accordingly conveyed to Damascus, which was at this time the capital of the caliphate. On their arrival, Walid, the caliph, whose curiosity had been excited, ordered the elder to be brought to him. On entering, she burst into tears, exclaiming, "How can I be worthy of your notice, after having been dishonoured by Qasim?" Walid, consulting only his indignation, sent orders forthwith to sew up Qasim in a raw hide, and send him forward. When the body arrived, it was produced to the raja's daughter, who, overjoyed, exclaimed, "Now I am satisfied; Qasim was innocent of the crime I imputed to him, but he was the ruin of my family, and I have had my revenge."

After Qasim's death in 714, the Arabs made no new conquests in India. Even those which he had effected were maintained only till the downfall of the Ommeiad dynasty in 750, when the Hindus rose in insurrection, and recovered all that had been wrested from them.
Reference has been made to the Arab conquest of the territory between the Oxus and the Jaxartes. From its position it is usually called by classical writers Transoxiana, and by Arab writers Mawar ul Nahr, words literally meaning beyond the river. Its inhabitants were mostly Persians, living in fixed habitations, and nomadic Tartars, the latter forming apparently the great majority. This territory, which the Arabs first entered in 706, and overran in the course of the eight following years, became finally disovered from their empire about 820, and was ruled successively by the Tahirites till 872, the Sofarides till 892, and the Somanis till 1004. The last dynasty becomes interesting, because during it, and owing to one of its princes, the house of Ghazni, which plays a most important part in the history of India, was founded.

Alptegin, the founder of the house of Ghazni, was originally a Turki slave to Abdul Malik, the fifth prince of Somani line, and had no higher office than that of amusing his master by tumbling and tricks of legerdemain. He was capable, however, of much better, and gradually rose to be governor of Khorasan. On the death of Abdul Malik, in 961, he lost the favour of his successor, Mansur, by recommending that another member of the family should be selected for the throne, was deprived of his government, and ran great risk of losing both his liberty and his life. After a variety of narrow escapes, in which he displayed much courage and military talent, he found an asylum with a body of faithful followers at Ghazni, among the mountains of Soliman. Here he declared his independence; and succeeded in maintaining it till his death, in 976. He was succeeded by Sabuktigin, who, like himself, had been originally a Turki slave, but had risen so much in his favour that he gave him his daughter in marriage, and made him his heir.

Sabuktigin's future sovereignty is said to have been early foretold. One day, while a private horseman, he hunted down a fawn and was carrying it off, when he looked behind and saw its mother following with such signs of distress, that he was moved with compassion and set the fawn at liberty. The joy and apparent gratitude expressed by the mother made so strong an impression upon him, that when he went to sleep it became the subject of a dream, in which Muhammad appeared to him,
and announced that as a reward for his humanity he was destined to be a king. The prediction if it was made, had no sooner been fulfilled, than an event took place which threatened to render it fruitless. The inhabitants on the left bank of the Indus had for nearly three centuries been living in the enjoyment of their recovered independence; but they knew enough of the cruelty and oppression which their forefathers had endured while subjected to an Arab yoke, and were naturally filled with alarm when they saw a new Muhammadan kingdom established on their frontiers. It therefore seemed to them good policy not to wait till the threatened calamity overtook them, but to endeavour by anticipating to prevent it. The initiative in this bold enterprise was undertaken by Raja Jaipal, who ruled over a large extent of territory, and kept his court at Lahore. Crossing the Indus, he advanced till he came up with the troops of Subuktigin, who commanded in person, and was accompanied by his son, who, then only a boy, gave proof of the talents which afterwards made him celebrated under the name of Sultan Mahmud. After some time spent in skirmishing, the armies were on the eve of fighting a great battle, when a fearful storm of wind, thunder, and hail occurred. Both armies suffered greatly, but not to the same extent. The troops of Ghazni soon recovered from the disaster, whereas those of Hindustan, being at once less hardy and more superstitious, were so dispirited that Jaipal was glad to propose terms of accommodation. Mahmud stood out, and would be satisfied with nothing short of a decisive victory; but his father, more prudent and moderate, was satisfied with a present payment in elephants and gold, and the promise of a certain amount of annual tribute. Jaipal returned humiliated to Lahore, and endeavoured to hide his shame by breaking his promise. When the messengers of Sabuktigin arrived to receive the tribute, he not only refused it, but threw them into prison.

Warlike preparations on a grander scale than before again commenced. Sabuktigin advanced to take revenge; and Jaipal, aware how much he had done to provoke it, endeavoured to ward it off by means of a confederacy, in which, in addition to other rajas of less importance, he was joined by those of Delhi, Ajmer, Kalinjar, and Kanouj. Thus supported, he advanced at
the head of an army composed of an innumerable host of foot and 100,000 horse. In his Oriental phraseology Ferishta says,¹ that when Subuktigin ascended a hill to view the forces of Jaipal, they “appeared in extent like the boundless ocean, and in number like the ants or locusts of the wilderness;” but instead of being dismayed at his vast inferiority in point of numbers, “he considered himself as a wolf about to attack a flock of sheep.” So confident, indeed, was he, that, disdaining to act on the defensive, he commenced the attack by singling out a certain point in the enemy’s line, and charging it by successive squadrons of 500 men. When in this way he had thrown it into disorder, he made a general assault, and carried everything before him. The Hindus, panic-struck, thought only of flight, and suffered immense slaughter. The Indian camp yielded a rich plunder. The more permanent results of the victory were, that Subuktigin was acknowledged king of all the territory west of the Nilab or Upper Indus, and sent one of his officers with 10,000 horse to govern Peshawar.

Subuktigin died in 997, after a reign of twenty years distinguished by prudence, equity, and moderation. His death was sudden, but during his last moments he named his son Ismael his heir. He appears, indeed, to have had a better title than Mahmud, who, though elder, was illegitimate. Ultimately, however, after a war of succession, in which Ismael was worsted and imprisoned for life, Mahmud, assuming the title of sultan, which, though well known in Arabia, had not previously been borne by any prince of Turkish origin, seated himself firmly on his father’s throne.

Mahmud was of an athletic form, but was strongly marked with the smallpox, and so deficient in personal beauty, that one day, on beholding himself in a glass, he exclaimed, “The sight of a king should brighten the eyes of the beholders, but nature has been so unkind to me that my appearance is positively forbidding.” This defect probably made him less disposed to indulge in youthful pleasures, and concurred with his natural temper in inducing him to seek fame by military exploits. He has already been seen urging his father to reject the terms of accommodation offered by Raja Jaipal, and we are therefore

¹ Brigg’s Ferishta, vol. i. p. 18.
prepared to see him enter on a career of Indian conquest. At first a series of struggles, which ended in the extinction of the Somani dynasty, engrossed his attention, but no sooner were these settled than he turned his eye to India. His first expedition took place in 1001, when, at Peshawar with only 10,000 chosen horse, he encountered his old enemy Raja Jaipal at the head of 12,000 horse, 30,000 foot, and 300 elephants. The field was keenly contested, but at last Jaipal, with fifteen of his chiefs, was taken prisoner. Mahmud, whose avarice was at last equal to his ambition, was able to gratify both passions by the victory, which, in addition to its fame, yielded him a rich spoil, partly in Jaipal's jewelled necklaces, one of which was valued at 180,000 dinars, or about £81,000. The value of the spoil was largely increased by the large ransom which he obtained for the prisoners. Jaipal did not long avail himself of his freedom. Dispirited by his two defeats, or, it is said, disqualified by them, according to a Hindu custom, from any longer reigning, he resigned the crown to his son, and placing himself on a funeral pile, set fire to it with his own hands.

In 1004, on failure of the tribute promised by the Hindus, Sultan Mahmud again set out, and passing through the province of Multan arrived at a city called Bhatia. Its position is not ascertained; but it was surrounded by a very high wall and a deep and broad ditch, and belonged to a Raja Vijay Rai, who, trusting both to its fortifications and the difficult nature of the surrounding country, was not afraid to measure his strength against that of the sultan. He had so skilfully seized the strong posts, that for three days he not only kept the Muhammadans at bay, but inflicted on them such severe losses that they were on the point of abandoning the enterprise. In this emergency, Sultan Mahmud displayed his wonted inflexibility of purpose, and in announcing his intention to lead the main attack in person, added, "To-day I have devoted myself to conquest or death." Both armies, indeed, had worked themselves up to the highest pitch of enthusiasm; Vijay Rai, on his side, performing religious services by which he was believed by his followers to have propitiated the gods; while the sultan, after turning his face to Mecca, and prostrating himself in sight of his troops, started suddenly up, exclaiming, "Advance!
advance our prayers have found favour with God!" An obstinate struggle took place, but Muhammadan prowess prevailed, and the Indians were pursued to the gates of the town. Here, though a stand of a few days took place, resistance was found to be hopeless; and the raja being overtaken during an attempt to lead off his troops by night, only escaped imprisonment by rushing on his own sword. Two hundred and eighty elephants, numerous captains, and a large spoil were taken in Bhatia, which with its dependencies was annexed to Ghazni.

Mahmud's next Indian expedition took place in 1005. Its main object was to chastise Abul Fatteh Lodi, the chief of Multan, who, though a Mussulman, had thrown off his allegiance and leagued with Anangapal, the son and successor of the unfortunate Raja Jaipal. Not deterred by his father's fate, Anangapal encountered Mahmud near Peshawar, and sustained a defeat which compelled him to take refuge in Kashmir. The victorious sultan continued his march to Multan, and obtained the submission of its chief. He would doubtless have exacted more rigorous terms than submission, and also made Anangapal feel the full weight of his vengeance, had he not been under the necessity of hastening home to repel the formidable invasion of a Tartar prince of the name of Elik Khan, who had hoped to make an easy conquest of Khorasan while the Ghazni forces were beyond the Indus. He had miscalculated; and on the sultan's arrival, was obliged, after a signal defeat, to recross the Oxus with only a few attendants. On this occasion the sultan's victory was greatly aided by 500 elephants which he had brought from India. The Tartar horses would not face them; and the soldiers, who had never seen them before, were overawed by their huge bulk and strange appearance, especially after they had seen the one on which the sultan himself was mounted seize Elik Khan's standard-bearer and toss him into the air with his trunk.

Anangapal's escape was only temporary, for Mahmud was no sooner rid of the Tartar invader than he hastened back to India at the head of a formidable army. Anangapal meanwhile, anticipating the return of the sultan, had made exertions, and succeeded in forming a powerful coalition of rajas against the
common enemy of their freedom and their faith. Their united forces brought into the Punjab a larger army than had ever been seen in it before. Even the sultan seemed to hesitate; and instead of advancing with the headlong courage which he usually displayed, began to entrench himself in the vicinity of Peshawar. This sign of weakness added greatly to the strength of the confederates, who were daily joined by new auxiliaries, and received large supplies of money from all quarters, even the Hindu women selling their jewels and melting down the gold of their other ornaments to assist in what was regarded as a holy war.

Mahmud kept within his entrenchments, well aware that if they were attacked, his position would give him a decided advantage; and that if the Indians, through fear of this, refrained from attacking, their immense tumultuary force could not be long kept together. The first skirmishes were not to his advantage, for the Gukkurs, and other mountaineer tribes, rushing impetuously among the Mahummadan cavalry, made such dexterous use of their swords and knives that horse and riders tumbled to the ground, and, to the number of several thousands, were despatched in a twinkling.\(^1\) Mahmud still

\(^1\) The Gukkurs, Guckers, Gakkars, Guikkers, or Kahkarees (for the name is spelled in all these different ways, and not always in the same way by the same author), are first mentioned in the history of the Arab conquests in India, as forming a league with the Afghans, and, in union with them, wresting a tract of territory from the Raja of Lahore. Their exploit mentioned in the text seems to indicate that, as their mode of warfare bore a considerable resemblance to that for which the Gorkhas of Nepal have recently distinguished themselves, they may have had a common origin. This, however, is improbable, as their localities are very remote from each other. The Gukkurs, according to Elphinstone (\textit{Kabul, Introduction}, vol. i, p. 100) “once possessed the whole country between the Indus and the Hydaspes (Jhelum), but have been driven out by the Sikhs.” In his map, they are represented as occupying a considerable tract of the Punjab east of the town of Attock, in the direction of Kashmir. On his homeward journey he passed through their country, in consequence of a letter of invitation which he received from the sultan, accompanied by a vast quantity of grapes, which there grow wild. Shortly after passing Rawalpindi, he made a circuit of about forty miles, and saw “the ruins of some Gucker towns destroyed by the Sikhs, and those of some others, still more ancient, which had suffered the same fate from the Mussulmans.” The only other information he gives
remained motionless, watching his opportunity. It came at last. Anangapal’s elephant, galled by the arrows and frightened by the fireballs, turned round and hurried him off the field. The Hindus, thinking themselves deserted by their general, slackened their resistance, and finally turned their backs. No time was given them to rally, and ere long 20,000 lay dead upon the field. The rest were so completely dispersed that Mahmud had nothing more to do than gather the fruits of his victory. The one most gratifying to his avaricious temper was the capture of the fortified temple of Nagarcote, situated on one of the lower ranges of the Himalaya. It owed its sanctity to a natural flame which issued from the ground; and, from the veneration in which it was held, as well as the strength of its position, was not only rich in votive offerings, but was the common depository of the wealth of the adjacent country. To assist in respecting them is, that they “have still a high military reputation.” Ferishta, in narrating the exploit of the Gukurs in their encounter with Mahmud, says, that they “repulsed his light troops, and followed them so closely, that no less than 30,000 Gukurs, with their heads and feet bare, and armed with various weapons, penetrated into the Muhammadans lines, when a dreadful carnage ensued, and 5,000 Muhammadan in a few minutes were slain.” Price, in his Chronological Retrospect, or Memoirs of the Principal Events in Mahommedan History, vol. ii. p. 284, while professedly borrowing from Ferishta, improves upon his narrative, apparently for the purpose of making it still more graphic, and says, “In spite of the circumspection of Mahmud, and in the heat of the action, a body of 1,000 Kahkares or Guikkers, bareheaded and bare-footed, variously and strangely armed, passed the entrenchments on both flanks: and falling in with astonishing fury among the cavalry, proceeded with the desperation of savages, and with their swords and knives, to cut down and maim both the horse and his rider, until almost in the twinkling of an eye, between 3,000 and 4,000 men had fallen victims to the rage of these infuriated maniacs.” That they had the cunning and vindictiveness of savages will become apparent in the course of the narrative, from an assassination which some of them committed under singular circumstances; but that they were under regular government, and ruled by princes who occupied no mean place among their contemporaries, may be inferred from the fact that they were recognized by the title of sultan, and that the daughter of one of them was considered a fit match for the celebrated Jelal-u-din, son of the King of Kharism, and the only prince in whom Ghenghis Khan found a formidable opponent.—See Briggs's Ferishta, vol. iv, pp. 415-418.
the recent struggle, its garrison had been withdrawn, and when Sultan Mahmud arrived before it, he was met only by a crowd of defenceless Brahmans clamorously imploring mercy. The inventory of its treasures was, according to Ferishta, 700,000 golden dinars, 700 maunds of gold and silver plate, 200 maunds of pure gold in ingots, 2,000 maunds of unwrought silver, and 20 maunds of pearls, corals, diamonds, and rubies. The value must have been fabulous, and justifies Ferishta’s assertion, that it was greater than ever was collected before into any royal treasury. The sultan, on his return to Ghazni, gave a triumphal banquet, which was spread out on a spacious plain, and lasted three days. The spoils of India, exhibited on thrones of gold, and tables of gold and silver, made a display rivalling the utmost that has been told of Oriental wealth and splendour. Mahmud forgot his avarice on the occasion; and while myriads of spectators were luxuriously feasted, splendid presents were bestowed on merit, and liberal alms given to the poor.

The beginning of the year 1010 was employed by Sultan Mahmud in the conquest of Ghor, situated among the branches of the Hindu Kush east of Herat, but before the year closed he is again found pursuing his conquests in India. For some succeeding years, his operations there were somewhat desultory and interrupted by an important expedition to Transoxiana, during which he extended his west frontier to the Caspian; but in 1017, determined no longer to confine himself to the Punjab, he set out at the head of an army of 100,000 foot and 20,000 horse, for the purpose of penetrating into the basin of the Ganges, and thus opening up a way into the very heart of Hindustan. Marching from Peshawar, he kept close to the mountains till he passed the Jamuna, and then turning suddenly south, made his unexpected appearance before Kanouj. This great capital, the raja of which, for some reason not well explained, took precedence of all the other Rajas of Hindustan, is acknowledged by all writers, Hindu and Muhammadan, to have been the largest and most magnificent of Indian cities,

1 The value of the golden dinar is about 9s. sterling. The Indian maund weighs 80, and the Persian only 11 lbs. The latter seems to be the one which is here intended.
but it is unnecessary to give any description of it at present, as Mahmud, delighted with the abject submission of the raja, who came out with his family and threw himself upon his mercy, left it uninjured, after a short stay of three days. He next bent his steps towards Mathura, one of the most famous seats of Hindu superstition. The treatment it experienced was very different from that of Kanouj. During twenty days of plunder, Muhammadan fanaticism and licentiousness had their full swing, and every kind of outrage on humanity was perpetrated. In the midst of these horrors, Mahmud, while struck with the magnificence of the buildings, divided his thoughts between them and the immense sums which it must have cost to erect them, and wrote to the governor of Ghazni a letter, of which the following very characteristic passage has been preserved:—“Here there are a thousand edifices as firm as the faith of the faithful, most of them marble, besides innumerable temples; nor is it likely that this city has attained its present condition but at the expense of many millions of dinars; nor could such another be constructed under a period of two centuries.” After leaving Mathura, Mahmud stormed several other towns, laid waste a large extent of country, and then returned to Ghazni, with an incalculable amount of spoil and above 5,000 captives.

Of the two next Indian expeditions of Sultan Mahmud, which took place respectively in 1022 and 1023, the second only is deserving of notice, because during it a Muhammadan garrison was, for the first time, permanently stationed beyond the Indus. This unenviable distinction belongs to the city of Lahore, whose raja, Jaipal II, the successor of Anangapal, after submitting to Mahmud and living for some time on friendly terms with him, was tempted in an evil hour to throw off his allegiance. The result, which might easily have been foreseen, was the loss of all his territories, which were forthwith annexed to Ghazni.

We have now arrived at Sultan Mahmud’s last expedition to India. It is generally reckoned as his twelfth, and has made

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1 This once magnificent city has long since fallen to decay. Its ruins are now surrounded with jungle, and once formed a place of retreat for desperadoes of all kinds.

2 Brigg’s Ferishta, vol. i, p. 58.
more noise than all the rest, though its political results were not important. Its destined goal was Somnath, one of the most celebrated seats of Hindu superstition, situated near the shore of the Arabian Sea, in the south of the peninsula of Gujarat. To this expedition, fanaticism and the love of plunder appear to have been the actuating motives. The way from Ghazni to Somnath lay for hundreds of miles through a parched sandy desert. The army, whose numbers are not stated, set out in September, 1024, and reached Multan in October. For transport, 20,000 camels had been provided; and as the soldiers had moreover been ordered to carry as large a supply as possible of provisions, water, and forage, the difficulties of the desert were surmounted without any serious disaster, and the expedition made its appearance in the cultivated country around Ajmer. The Hindus, though aware of the threatened attack upon their temple, had calculated on a different route, and were, in consequence, so totally unprepared for resistance, that their only safety was in flight. The usual devastation followed, and the city of Ajmer was given up to plunder. Continuing his progress, Mahmud entered Gujarat, and arrived at Anhulwara, its capital. He might easily have made himself master of it, for the raja had fled; but he was intent on higher game, and refused to be turned aside from it. At length Somnath was reached: It was situated on a peninsula, which a fortified isthmus connected with the mainland. Here he was met by a herald, who defied him in the name of the god, and menaced him with destruction. Mahmud only answered with a shower of arrows, and cleared the walls of defenders, who hastened to the idol to prostrate themselves before it and implore its help. Meantime the besiegers advanced, and had nearly effected an entrance, when the defenders returned and fought so furiously, that their enemies, unable to make good a footing, were forced to retire. The next day the attack was repeated, and assumed the form of a general assault, but the result was the same. The third day opened still more propitiously for the defenders, for several native chiefs having united their forces, had advanced to the rescue. The attack could not be continued till this new enemy was disposed of. The battle which ensued was furiously contested, and seemed at one time about
to be decided in favour of the Hindus by the sudden arrival of the Raja of Anhulwara with a large body of fresh troops. The Muhammadans, who had previously been unable to do more than maintain their ground, now began to waver, and a general route was imminent, when the sultan, recurring to a device which had succeeded with him on other occasions, prostrated himself in presence of his army, and then, as if confident that his prayer had been heard, leaped to his horse, raised the war cry, and rushed into the thickest of the fight. His troops, ashamed not to follow where such a master would lead, followed close upon his track, and bore down all before them. The critical moment was passed, and they had gained a complete victory. No further attempt was made to defend the temple, and the defenders, to the number of 4,000, took to their boats. Mahmud, in the course of his plunderings, had seen the interior of many Hindu temples, but the magnificence of Somnath was so surpassing that it filled him with wonder. The interior, whose lofty roof was supported by fifty-six pillars curiously carved and glittering with precious stones, received its light, not from the sun, but from a lamp which was suspended in its centre by a golden chain. The real object of worship at Somnath was simply a cylinder of stone, but Ferishta takes no notice of it, and says that the idol, 15 feet in height, but six of them sunk beneath the surface, stood opposite the entrance. Mahmud at once ordered its destruction, but hesitated when the Brahmins threw themselves at his feet imploring him to spare it, and offering an immense ransom. After a momentary pause, exclaiming that he would rather be known as a breaker than as a seller of idols, he struck the idol with his mace. His followers instantly followed up the blow, till the idol broke asunder. It was hollow, and disclosed diamonds and other jewels of immense value hidden within it. Mahmud was equally surprised and delighted. The treasure obtained far exceeded the amount of ransom which the priests had offered, and was regarded by him and his followers as a gift from the Prophet in return for the zeal which they had displayed in his cause.

Two pieces of the idol were sent to Mecca and Medina, and two to Ghazni. One of the latter was in the palace and another at the grand mosque in the sixteenth century, when Ferishta
wrote his history. It is somewhat remarkable that he says nothing of the gates of the temple, which, according to a prevalent tradition, were also carried to Ghazni, and ultimately formed one of the trophies placed on Sultan Mahmud's tomb. The silence of Ferishta throws considerable doubt on the authenticity of the tradition; for the gates should have been there in his time, and if there, he certainly would have mentioned them. Be this as it may, the tradition was so firmly believed, that when the British army finally quitted Kabul, in 1842, the gates were brought away in triumph, and Lord Ellenborough, then Governor-general of India, made them the subject of a very pompous, unchristian, and impolitic proclamation.  

Mahmud, on his return, stopped for some time at Anhulwara, with which, as well as the surrounding country, he was so much pleased that he is said to have had some thoughts of adopting it as a new capital. Many other magnificent projects passed through his mind, but they all vanished in smoke, and he contented himself with setting up a new raja in Gujarat. The person selected was an anchoret of the ancient royal stock, and seems to have recommended himself to Mahmud as the person most likely to yield him implicit submission. Another member of the royal stock thought himself better entitled to the rajaship, and, to prevent a disputed succession, his person was secured. When Mahmud was leaving Gujarat, the anchoret raja requested that his competitor might be delivered up to him; and, on the assurance that his life would be spared, the request was granted. The hypocrite kept his promise to the ear. He was too holy a man to be guilty of shedding the blood of any living creature. He only dug a hole, in which he meant to have immured his prisoner, and regaled his ear with his groans. By a whirl of fortune the position of the parties was reversed; and

1 Ferguson, in his Hand-Book of Architecture, says that these gates are not of sandal wood, but of the wood of the deodar pine tree; therefore the tradition of their having been the gates of the temple at Somnath is wrong. The decorations bear no resemblance to Hindu work; and as the ornaments are similar to those of the mosque of Ebn Touloun at Cairo, they show the same data of construction, and that the like ornamentation was used at the extreme ends of the Moslem empire.
the anchoret, deposed from his rajaship, was consigned to the hole, while the throne was occupied by his intended victim.

Though Mahmud had made his first passage across the desert without loss, he was less fortunate in returning. He had employed Hindu guides, who kept the army wandering for three days and nights over desolate tracts, where neither forage nor water could be found. Numbers of the troops died raving mad, from the intolerable heat and thirst. Mahmud, suspecting that the guides had not erred, but led him wilfully astray, put one of them to the torture, and wrung from him a confession that he was one of the priests of Somnath, and had sought, by misleading the army, to insure its destruction, and thereby obtain a rich revenge.

On the homeward march, Mahmud was greatly harassed by a tribe of Jats, who are described as occupying a district intersected by rivers, which form numerous islands. He determined to chastise them; and with this view took up a position at Multan, where he ordered 1,400 boats to be built, and armed with iron spikes projecting from the bows and sides, to secure them against being boarded, as the Jats were particularly dexterous at this species of warfare. A series of naval engagements were fought in the neighbourhood of the locality where Alexander equipped his fleet thirteen centuries before. After a desperate struggle the Jats were overpowered, and those who had not fallen in battle were carried off into slavery.

Mahmud returned in triumph to Ghazni, but had ceased to be capable of enjoying it, for he was suffering under an excruciating disease, which carried him off, April 29, 1030, in the sixty-third year of his age, and the thirty-fifth of his reign. Two days before his death, he ordered all the gold and precious stones which he possessed to be placed before him. He wept with regret to think how soon he must part with them for ever; but he had not the heart to bestow any of them as farewell presents, and simply caused them to be taken back to the treasury. The next day he ordered a review of the army, and, seated on his travelling throne, saw all his elephants, camels, horses, and chariots pass before him. He feasted his eyes, but could not satisfy his heart, and once more burst into tears. The day after, he lay on his bed a lifeless corpse, and an impressive example of the vanity of human wishes.
Avarice, which was one of his ruling passions, is generally supposed to be incompatible with true greatness; and yet it is impossible to deny that Sultan Mahmud, the founder of the Muhammadan Indian empire, possessed in a high degree many of the qualities which have procured for other sovereigns the name of Great. He gained signal victories, made conquests; and by the ability of his government retained them, adorned his capital with magnificent buildings, and kept a splendid court, to which he attracted many of the most distinguished writers of his time. He must thus have been a munificent patron of literature and art, though one of the greatest blots on his reputation was his treatment of Ferdusi. That celebrated poet long lived at his court, and was commissioned to write a poem, for which he was promised at the rate of a dinar a line. There can be no doubt that a golden dinar was understood; but Mahmud, on making payment, had the meanness to take advantage of the ambiguity in the term, and gave only silver. Ferdusi quitted the court in disgust, and took his revenge by launching at its sovereign a stinging satire. Mahmud was magnanimous enough not only to forgive him, but to endeavour to make amends for the past, by sending him a rich present. It was, unfortunately, too late, for while Mahmud's messenger entered at one door, Ferdusi was being carried out on his bier at another.

Mahmud does not figure as a legislator, but several anecdotes are told, which show that he had a high sense of justice, and occasionally made great sacrifices of personal feeling in administering it. One of these anecdotes will bear repetition. An inhabitant of Ghazni, unhappy in a handsome wife, complained to the king that one of his courtiers, who had conceived a passion for her, took forcible possession of his house every night, and turned him into the street, where he was obliged to remain till the intruder chose to take his departure. He had sought redress from the proper judges, and failed to obtain it. The sultan, indignant, ordered the man to say nothing, but to hasten back to him the first time the gross outrage was repeated. He had not long to wait. The sultan, on being informed, wrapped a loose cloak about him, and was conducted to the house. On entering the chamber he found the guilty parties asleep. A light was burning. He extinguished it; and then, going up to the bed,
cut off the adulterer's head at a stroke. This done, he called for a light, and on examining the features of the adulterer, threw himself prostrate on the ground, and gave utterance to his joy in thanks-giving. The audacious manner in which the offence was committed had convinced him that the offender must be one of his sons, or near relatives. He had extinguished the light lest natural affection might stay his hand from doing justice; and now that it was done, he was rejoiced to find that his suspicions were unfounded, and that he had not been under the necessity of staining his hands with the blood of one of the members of his own family.

Sultan Mahmud left a will appointing his son Muhammad his successor. Another son, Masud, Muhammad's twin brother, but born some hours later, conceived he had as good a title. Both sons were absent at the time of their father's death, but Muhammad, on his arrival in Ghazni, was crowned. Masud, however, was the favourite both of soldiers and people, and the household troops marched off in a body to join him. A large force, headed by an Indian chief, and composed principally of Hindu cavalry, was sent in pursuit, but in the encounter which took place, the king's party was defeated. Meanwhile Masud was hastening on to assert his claim, and was met by the household troops at Nishapur. Before actually appealing to arms, he offered to divide the empire, by retaining merely the portions which he had himself conquered. The only condition he added was, that in the *Khutba* or public prayer for the sovereign, his name should be read first within his own dominions. Muhammad refused to consent; and a civil war broke out, which terminated in his overthrow and capture. According to the barbarous practice of the times, he was deprived of sight, and imprisoned. Masud mounted the throne. He was remarkable for personal strength. Ferishta says (vol. i. p. 98), that "his arrow, after piercing the strongest mail, penetrated the hide of an elephant; and his iron mace was so ponderous, that no man of his time could raise it with one hand." He was also distinguished by valour and liberality, and not unfrequently offended his father by his bold and independent bearing.

The transactions of Masud's reign are not important. Of those relating to India, with which here we have alone to do,
the first deserving of notice is an expedition to that country in 1033. He took the route for Sursuti, situated among the hills of Kashmir, and on arriving at it, summoned the garrison. It offered to submit, and he was disposed to grant easy terms, till he learned that some Muhammadan merchants had been seized, and were then captives in the fort. Enraged at the information, he caused the ditch to be filled up with sugarcanes from the adjoining plantations, planted scaling ladders, and took the place by storm. The garrison to a man were put to the sword, and all the women and children were enslaved.

In 1036, when a new palace was finished at Ghazni, containing a golden throne, studded with jewels, and surmounted with a canopy, in which was a golden crown, seventy maunds in weight, suspended by a golden chain, and glistening with jewels, Masud again set out for India, mainly with the view of reducing the fort of Hansi, the ancient capital of Sewalik. The Indians believed it impregnable; and were confirmed in this belief by their soothsayers, who assured them that it was not destined ever to fall into Muhammadan hands. The result falsified their predictions, for in the course of six days it was taken by storm. The treasure found in it was immense. Masud next proceeded to Sonepat, which he found abandoned. Leaving an officer in charge of it, he retraced his steps, taking possession of all the countries he had left in his rear, and arrived at Lahore, the government of which he conferred on his son Madud.

Masud on his return found full occupation in repelling the Seljuks, who, after passing to the left bank of the Jaxartes, and residing for some time in Transoxiana, had settled and acquired considerable influence in Khorasan. While they professed the utmost submission to his authority, they were constantly warring with his lieutenants and ravaging his territories. At length, in 1039, Tughril Beg, a celebrated Seljuk warrior, mustered so strongly, that Masud found it necessary to take the field in person. The decisive battle was fought at Zendecan, near Merv, and ended in consequence of the desertion of his Turkish followers, in Masud's complete defeat. After endeavouring to collect the wreck of his army, he returned to Ghazni. Here new troubles awaited him; and, unable to repress the mutinous spirit of his troops, he began to look to India as
a place of refuge, and finally withdrew to it in the hope of being able to retrieve his affairs. Anarchy now reigned uncontrolled in his capital. No sooner had he crossed the Indus than his own guards attempted to plunder the treasury; a general insurrection of the army immediately followed, and Masud, being formally deposed, his brother Muhammad, whom he had kept in prison, was restored. A sovereign deprived of sight was totally unfitted to rule in such troublous times, and he devolved the administration on his son Ahmed, one of whose first acts was to put Masud to death in 1040.

Madud, son of Masud, had, as we have seen, been appointed governor of Lahore, but was at Balkh when his father was murdered. Without losing a moment he hastened east with his army, and crushed his rivals. Ghazni still lay open to the inroads of the Seljuks, but these formidable intruders had turned their attention more to the west, and Madud, who had married Tughril Beg's grand-daughter, both maintained himself in Ghazni and recovered Transoxiana. In India advantage was taken of his absence and the Raja of Delhi, working on the feelings of the Hindus roused them to unwonted exertions. At the head of a powerful army he recovered Nagarcote, overran great part of the Punjab, and laid siege to Lahore, which, however, made good its defence. Madud, meanwhile, was unable personally to interfere; and died in 1049, without again visiting India.

He left an infant son, who was murdered by his uncle Abdul Hassan. A series of usurpations, usually effected by great crimes, now took place, and no name of note occurs till 1098, when Masud II. ascended the throne. During the sixteen years of his reign, which ended with his death in 1114, he distinguished himself more as a legislator than a warrior, though his generals carried his arms beyond the Ganges. For some years his court resided at Lahore.

On the death of Masud II, another usurpation took place in the person of his son Arslan, who, to secure the throne, imprisoned his brothers. The unnatural act did not avail him; and he was, in his turn, deposed by Behram, the only brother who had escaped imprisonment. Behram's reign, which lasted thirty-four years, was not more long than brilliant, and he might have transmitted his power unimpaired, had he not been
guilty of a crime which brought its punishment along with it, and led to the extinction of the Ghazni dynasty. It will be necessary to go back a few years in order to explain the circumstances.

The territory of Ghur, situated, as has already been mentioned, among the northern ramifications of the Hindu Kush, is regarded by the Afghans as their original seat. At a comparatively early period it was invaded by the Arabs, and a large portion of its inhabitants embraced Muhammadanism. When the Arab dynasties were overthrown, it resumed its independence, and preserved it even while Sultan Mahmud was extending his conquests on every side. Two generations after, it was treacherously seized by Madud, and became a dependency of Ghazni. It was still, however, governed by its own princes, who lived almost on terms of equality with the Sultans of Ghazni. One of these princes, called Qutub-ud-din Sur, had married a daughter of Sultan Behram. This affinity might have been supposed to bring the houses of Ghazni and Ghur into the most friendly relations. It turned out otherwise. Differences arose; and Behram, having obtained possession of the person of his son-in-law, sullied the reputation which he had acquired for justice and humanity by poisoning him, or putting him to an open death. Qutub-ud-din Sur had two brothers, Seif-ud-din and Ala-ud-din. They at once flew to arms to avenge his death; and, advancing upon Ghazni, obliged Behram to seek an asylum among the mountains of Kerman.

Seif-ud-din, the elder brother, established himself in Ghazni, and sent back most of his army, under Ala-ud-din, to Feruz Coh, his former capital. He thought he had gained the affections of the inhabitants, and only learned his mistake when it was too late to remedy it. A strong attachment was still felt to the dynasty to which Ghazni owed all its prosperity and its splendour; and, as soon as the winter had set in so severely as to prevent all communication with Ghur, Behram made his appearance at the head of an army. Seif-ud-din, totally unprepared, was about to retire, when treacherous promises of support from the inhabitants induced him to march out and risk a battle. It was no sooner commenced than the greater part of his troops passed over to his enemy. For a time he was
able, by the aid of a small body of his own people who re-
mained stanch, to maintain an unequal contest, but was at
length wounded, overpowered, and taken prisoner. Behram,
instead of availing himself of the opportunity to wipe off the
stain which he had brought on his reputation by the murder
of the eldest brother, acted still more atrociously. Seif-ud-din,
after being ignominiously paraded round the city, and
subjected to every species of indignity, was put to death by
torture.

Ala-ud-din, the third brother, still remained, and set out
burning for vengeance. In his eagerness, his preparations were
imperfect; and Behram, either in insult or because the blood
already shed had satiated him, made an offer of peace. It was
indignantly rejected, and the battle immediately began to rage.
Behram’s superiority of numbers made the issue for some time
doubtful, but at last, when left almost alone, the turned his back
and fled from the field.

The victor immediately advanced on Ghazni, which could
offer no resistance. Its doom was sealed. For three or seven
days (for accounts vary) fire and sword continued the work of
destruction, and all the proud monuments which attested the
power, wealth, and splendour of the Ghaznivide kings were
laid in ruins. Behram hastened to seek an asylum in India,
but died before he had found it. His son Khosru was more
fortunate, and reached Lahore, where he was received with
acclamations, and fixed the seat of his government. He reigned
till 1160, and was succeeded by his son Khosru Malik, at whose
death, in 1186, the last wreck of the Ghaznivide empire passed
to the house of Ghur, and the Ghaznivide dynasty became
extinct.

The two last reigns have anticipated the course of the narra-
tive. In order to resume it, it is necessary to return to
Ala-ud-din, and trace the history of the house of Ghur through
him and his successors.

After the signal vengeance taken for the murder of his two
brothers, Ala-ud-din acted as if the heroic part of his life had
been played out; and, retiring to the old Ghurite capital of
Feruz Coh, he followed his natural bent by giving himself up
to pleasure. He found it even more perilous than war would
have been, for the Seljuks, under Sultan Sanjar, during an invasion of Ghur and Ghazni, made him prisoner. He was soon, however, set at liberty, and reinstated in his dominions, which he held for four years, till his death in 1156. Shortly before, he had imprisoned his two nephews, Ghyas-ud-din and Shahab-ud-din, with the view of securing the succession to Seif-ud-din, his son; but this young prince set them at liberty, and replaced them in their governments. His confidence was not misplaced, but he had reigned little more than a year when he fell by the hand of an assassin. He was succeeded, in 1157, by the above cousins, who ruled jointly and, contrary to the general rule in such cases, harmoniously. Ghyas-ud-din superintended the territories in the west—Shahab-ud-din gave his attention to the east; and, from consolidating the Muhammadan power there, has sometimes been thought to have a better title even than Sultan Mahmud, to be regarded as the true founder of the Muhammadan empire in India.

In 1176, he took the town of Ooch, situated at the point where the rivers of the Punjnad, united into one stream under the name of the Punjnad, join the left bank of the Indus. In 1178 he undertook an expedition to Gujarat, but it proved disastrous. His next expedition, after he had marched twice to Lahore, and obliged Khosru Malik, the last of the Ghaznivides, to submit to a disadvantageous treaty, and give his son as a hostage, was to Sind. Having completely overrun it, he once more attacked Khosru Malik. This prince, assuming the courage of despair, made an alliance with the Gukkurs, and opened the campaign with the capture of one of his enemy’s strongest forts. Shahab-ud-din, under the pretext that he was about to march for Khorasan, where affairs had assumed an alarming appearance, increased his army, and at the same time made overtures of peace to Khosru Malik, sending back his son, whom he held as a hostage, in proof of his sincerity. The stratagem succeeded. Khosru Malik, thrown completely off his guard, set out to welcome his returning son, and was surprised by Shahab-ud-din, who surrounded his camp with a strong body of cavalry, and took him prisoner. The last of the Ghaznivides and his family were sent to Ghyas-ud-din, who imprisoned them in a castle. Here, after a long confinement, they were all put to death.
Shahab-ud-din, being thus left in India without a Muhammadan rival, determined to extend his conquests. It is probable he did not anticipate much difficulty, as his army, drawn from the warlike province of the west, must have been considered more than a match for any that the Hindus could oppose to it. The struggle, however, was severe. Several of the Indian rajas successfully maintained their ground, while few of them yielded without a manful resistance.

In this war of independence the Rajputs particularly distinguished themselves. Belonging to the military class in the original Hindu system, they were born soldiers, and lived under a kind of military feudal system, not unlike that of the clans in the Highlands of Scotland and some other countries. While each chief had his hereditary territory, all the chiefs held under the raja as their common head, and were thus in the position most favourable for united action and individual exertion. At the same time they laboured under some disadvantages. Living almost secluded, they had a simplicity of manners little fitted to protect them against political wiles, and an indolence and love of freedom which made it difficult to keep them under regular discipline.

Near the time of Shahab-ud-din,® Hindustan was mainly composed of four leading sovereignties—Delhi, Kanouj, Ajmer, and Kalinjar. On a failure of heirs in the third, the heir-apparent of the first had been adopted, and thus Delhi and Ajmer were united under one head. This arrangement had given great offence to the Raja of Kalinjar, who thought he ought to have been preferred in the adoption; and thus, when cordial union among the rajas constituted their only safety, considerable disunion prevailed. The disunion, thus dangerous to them, was most opportune for Shahab-ud-din, who, taking advantage of it, made his first attack on the newly amalgamated, but by no means firmly cemented rajahships of Delhi and Ajmer. It commenced in 1911, with the capture of Bhatinda. He placed a garrison in it; but had scarcely left when he learned that the Raja of Delhi, at the head of a powerful confederacy, was

1 Ferishta gives his full name as Moiz-u-din Muhammad Ghoory, and speaks of him under the name of Muhammad Ghoory, not as joint sovereign, but only as the general of Ghyas-ud-din.
advancing against it with an army of 200,000 horse and 3,000 elephants. In retracing his steps to relieve the garrison, he was met by the enemy on the banks of the Sursuti, about eighty miles from Delhi. He immediately joined battle, but with forces so inferior that both wings, being outflanked, bent backwards till they met in the rear, and gave his army the form of a circle. While standing within its centre, affairs looked so desperate that he was advised to provide for his safety. This so enraged him that he cut down the messenger sent with the advice, and rushed into the enemy’s lines, making terrible slaughter. The Raja of Delhi, observing where he smote, drove his elephant right against him; but Shahab saw his intention in time to frustrate it, and struck a blow with his lance which knocked out a number of his teeth. The raja returned the thrust by letting fly an arrow, which pierced Shahab’s right arm. He was on the point of falling, when one of his faithful attendants leaped up behind him and bore him off the field, which his army had now almost wholly deserted. Having recovered of his wound at Lahore, he returned to Ghur, and disgraced the officers to whose desertion he attributed his discomfiture, compelling them to walk round the city with horses’ mouth-bags, filled with barley, about their necks.

After a year, spent partly in pleasure and festivity, and partly in preparation for a new campaign, Shahab set out from Ghazni at the head of 120,000 chosen horse, and took the road to India without disclosing his intentions. At Peshawar, an aged sage, prostrating himself before him, said:—“O king, we trust in thy conduct and wisdom, but as yet thy design has been a subject of much speculation among us.” Shahab replied—“Know, old man, that since the time of my defeat in Hindustan I have never slumbered in ease, nor waked but in sorrow and anxiety; I have, therefore, determined, with this army to recover my lost honour from those idolaters, or die in the attempt.”

On arriving at Lahore, he sent an ambassador to Ajmer, offering, as the only alternative, war or conversion. The raja returned an indignant answer, and immediately applied for succour to all the neighbouring princes. It was readily granted; and an army equal to that which had recently given them the victory again encamped on the same field. In this army, were
150 Rajput princes, "who had sworn by the water of the Ganges that they would conquer their enemies or die martyrs to their faith." While the camps were separated by the Sursuty, the Indian princes sent a message to Shahab, warning him of his fate if he persisted, but at the same time offering to allow him to retreat in safety. He was so humble in his answer that they at once attributed it to fear, and, in the midst of their joy, gave themselves up to revelry. Shahab, in anticipation of the effect which his message would produce, prepared for a surprise; and, by the early dawn, having forded the river, was in the camp of the Indians before they had the least notice of his approach. Notwithstanding the confusion, they managed to bring their line into tolerable order, and had continued the contest till near sunset, when Shahab, placing himself at the head of 12,000 chosen horsemen, covered with steel armour, made a furious charge, which carried the day. The Indians were panic-struck, and the Muhammadans had nothing to do but slaughter them. Many rajas fell on the field; the Raja of Delhi and Ajmer was taken prisoner, and afterwards put to death in cold blood. The immediate results of the victory were the surrender of the forts Sursuty, Samana, Koram, and Hansi, and the capture of Ajmer, where all in arms were put to the sword, and the rest reserved for slavery.

Shahab next turned his arms towards Delhi, but was propitiated by presents. On his return to Ghazni, he marched north to the Sewalik Mountains, plundering and destroying wherever he went. After he had reached home, Aibak, the officer whom he had left with a strong detachment in Koram, took the fort of Meerut and the city of Delhi. In the latter, in 1193, he fixed the seat of his government, and compelled the surrounding districts to embrace Muhammadanism. We shall afterwards see him make a prominent figure in Indian affairs.

The restless spirit of Shahab would not allow him to remain long at Ghazni, and he is soon again found in India. His proceedings were not unimportant, but the personal share which he had in them is almost lost sight of in consequence of the prominence given to Aibak, whom he had now made Viceroy of India, and to whom his future military achievements in this country are mainly ascribed. During this visit to
his Indian dominions, he defeated the Raja of Kanouj and Benares, took the fort of Asni, where the raja had laid up his treasure; and afterwards, entering the city of Benares, broke the idols in more than a thousand temples. After his return to Ghazni, laden with spoil, his conquests and victories were continued by Aibak, who, in 1194, defeated and slew the Raja of Hemraj, and took revenge in the capital of Gujarat for the defeat which his master had there sustained.

In 1195 Shahab, returning once more to Hindustan, took Byana, and sent the new governor whom he appointed against Gwalior, which yielded only after a long siege. The following year is chiefly—remarkable for a defeat which Aibak sustained in Rajputana—a defeat so severe that he was compelled to shut himself up in the fort of Ajmer. Having again recruited his strength he assumed the offensive, reduced the capital of Gujarat, with all its dependencies, and took the forts of Kallinjar, Kalpi, and Budaun.

During these events, Shahab received intelligence of the death of his brother Ghyas-ud-din, and returned to Ghazni, where he was crowned sole sovereign. When he attained this additional elevation, his good fortune seemed to forsake him. During a struggle with the King of Kharism, he sustained a defeat which cost him the loss of all his elephants and treasure, and so complete an annihilation of a noble army that he was left with scarcely a hundred men. On escaping from the field of battle, he shut himself up in a fort, but had no means of sustaining a siege, and was not suffered to return to his dominions till he had paid a large ransom to the Khan of Samarkand. On arriving at Ghazni, he found it in possession of one of his own officers, who would not allow him to enter; and he was, in consequence, obliged to continue his route to Multan. Having here been reinforced, he returned to Ghazni, and regained possession. Meanwhile, the Gukkurs had been laying waste the country around Lahore. They continued to ravage with impunity, for Shahab’s disasters left him without the means of chastising them, till a treaty which he had concluded with the King of Kharism left him fully at leisure to bring all his forces into the field against them. He accordingly again set out for India, and placed the Gukkurs between two
fires, engaging them on the west, while Aibak marched against them from the east. Lahore, which had fallen into their hands, was rescued, and their plundering hordes were entirely dispersed. It would seem, however, that they, not long after, again collected in great numbers at the foot of the mountains of Sewalik, carried on an exterminating war against the Muhammadans, on whom they exercised unheard-of cruelties, and cut off the communication between the provinces of Peshawar and Multan. Their incursions continued till their king, who had been made captive, consented to embrace Muhammadanism. On being sent home, he had so much influence with his people, that many of them, to whom religion appears to have been very much a matter of indifference, were easily induced to adopt his new creed. Many others, not so easily persuaded, yielded to force, and Islamism became the prevailing religion of the mountaineers both east and west of the Indus.

The affairs of India being settled, Shahab, in the end of 1205, set out from Lahore to return to Ghazni. He was meditating an expedition beyond the Oxus, and had given orders to throw a bridge across it, and collect an army on its banks. Meanwhile he had only advanced on his homeward journey as far as the Indus. A body of twenty Gukkurs, who had lost some of their relatives during the war, and had entered into a conspiracy to avenge their death by assassinating him, had been tracking his footsteps, and watching their opportunity. Owing to the excessive heat, he had ordered the screens which surrounded the royal tents in the form of a square to be struck, in order to obtain a freer circulation of air. The Gukkur conspirators had thus obtained a view of the interior so far as to know the position of Shahab’s private apartment. In the dead of the night they crept stealthily up to the tent door. He was asleep, fanned by two slaves, and before any alarm could be given they had done the bloody deed so effectually, that his lifeless body lay pierced with twenty-two wounds.

This tragical termination of Shahab’s eventful life took place on the 14th of March, 1206. His reign, including that of the joint sovereignty with his brother, lasted thirty-two years. The succession was disputed. The chiefs of Ghur claimed it for Baha-ud-din, who was Shahab’s cousin, and had been appointed
by him governor of Bamian; the vizier and officers of the Turkish mercenaries supported the claim of Shahab's nephew, the son of his brother Ghyas-ud-din. The claimants, however, had comparatively little interest in the decision, for Shahab's death was the signal for internal commotions, which were shortly followed by the dismemberment of his dominions. His nephew Mahmud was indeed proclaimed king, and held a nominal supremacy; but the real power was in the hands of two individuals—Yildiz at Ghazni, and Aibak, or, as he is often called, Qutub-ud-din, in India. It is with the latter that we have now to do; for under him India, dismembered from the governments beyond the Indus, assumed the form of a distinct and independent kingdom. As the first heads of this kingdom were originally slaves, their dynasty is known as that of the Slave Kings.
A I B A K had been carried off in infancy, and was brought to Nishapur, where a wealthy citizen purchased him, and spent some pains on his education. On the citizen's death, he was sold to a merchant, who presented him to Shahab-ud-din. With the prince he became so great a favourite that he was taken into his confidence, and lived with him as a friend. His fidelity and military talents made him at once his royal master's most trusted and most successful general, and he was ultimately dignified with the title of Viceroy of India. In this character, he fixed his government at Delhi, which thus began the course of prosperity which it was destined to run under Muhammadan rule. The longer, and by far the more brilliant part of Aibak's career was finished before he became independent, for he afterwards reigned only four years, and died in 1210. He had displayed considerable tact in strengthening his position by affinity. He himself married the daughter of Yildiz, who ruled supreme in Ghazni; his sister he gave in marriage to Nasir-ud-din Qabachi, who held a delegated sovereignty in Sind; and his daughter he gave in marriage to Iltutmish, who, though purchased with his money, held the first place in his esteem, and possessed talents which ultimately made him his successor.

Aibak's affinity with Yildiz did not produce the cordiality which might have been anticipated. They not only quarrelled, but proceeded to open war, and carried it on with a virulence which brought each of them alternately to the brink of ruin. Nasir-ud-din never thought of disputing Aibak's authority; and so long as his brother-in-law lived, was perfectly satisfied with a delegated sovereignty. He was not disposed, however, to
yield the same deference to Iltutmish, and made himself independent ruler of Multan and Sind.

Shortly after Iltutmish had secured his position as Aibak's successor, the whole of Asia was thrown into consternation by the appearance of Chinghiz Khan. Originally a petty Mughul chief, he had become the acknowledged sovereign of all Tartary, and, at the head of its countless hordes, burst through its mountain passes with irresistible fury. The Sultan of Kharism, at whom the first blow was struck, deserved it for the treachery and barbarity of which he had been guilty, in murdering the ambassadors of Chinghiz; and the penalty was not more than the crime, when he fled to die broken-hearted on a solitary island of the Caspian. His son Jalal-ud-din bore up more manfully; but victory after victory seemed to have no power either to intimidate or weaken his fearful adversary, and he only saved himself by swimming the Indus, while the enemy's arrows showered thick around him. The Mughuls threatening to cross the river in pursuit, he continued his flight to Delhi. Iltutmish, to whom he here applied for an asylum, feared to expose himself to Mughul vengeance, and gave an answer with which Jalal-ud-din was so dissatisfied, that he made a party for himself, and, in alliance with the Gukkurs, roamed the country, plundering and devastating, and even making himself master of Sind, while Nasir-ud-din Qabachi was glad to take refuge in Multan. To all appearance he might have made good his footing, if he had not been lured away by a brighter prospect, which seemed opening in Persia. Before he quitted Sind a detachment of the Mughul army crossed the Indus, and commenced their barbarous warfare; but want of provisions compelled them to depart, after slaughtering 10,000 Indian prisoners. Nasir-ud-din, who had repulsed the Mughul detachment when it laid siege to Multan, was less fortunate when he was attacked a second time by Iltutmish. After retreating to Bukkur, he had, with the view of proceeding to Sind, embarked with all his family on the Indus, when a sudden squall upset the boat, and all on board perished. This tragical event happened in 1225.

1 Silver coin of Chinghiz Khan; weight, 47 grains. From Thomas's Coins of the Kings of Ghuzni.
Iltutmish was thus rid of a formidable competitor, and obtained a large accession of territory. Another competitor, however, remained, in the person of Bakhtiar Khilji, the governor of Bihar and Bengal. He had been mainly instrumental in conquering these provinces; and though he was contented to hold them under Aibak, one of whose sisters he had married, he had no idea of acknowledging any supremacy in Iltutmish. The latter, after persuasion failed, had recourse to force, and Bakhtiar was not only worsted, but lost his life.

Iltutmish, throned in his capital at Delhi, now swayed his sceptre over all the territories which the Muhammedans had conquered in India. They were large enough and rich enough to satisfy any reasonable ambition, but he was still bent on conquests, which, being wholly his own, might form the most solid basis of his fame. Six years, from 1226 to 1232, were spent in executing these ambitious schemes; and in the end, after the conquest of Malwa, with its famous capital Ujjain, had been completed, all Hindustan proper, with a few isolated and unimportant exceptions, did homage to Iltutmish. The additional greatness thus conferred on him was not enjoyed long, for he died four years after, in April, 1236. It may be mentioned, as a proof of the anxiety which the Muhammedans of India still felt to keep up their connection with the central authority of Islamism in the west, that Iltutmish, in the course of his reign, received his investiture from the Caliph of Baghdad.

Rukn-ud-din, the son and successor of Iltutmish, was a very unworthy representative of his talents. While his court was thronged with musicians, dancing women, and buffoons, he was too indolent and effeminate to support the cares of government, and devolved them on his mother, who was ambitious enough to undertake the task, but performed it so capriciously and tyrannically, that a rebellion broke out, and, at the end of seven months, Rukn-ud-din was deposed to make way for his sister, who assumed the title of Sultana Raziyya. She was not new to government, for her father, when absent on his campaigns, intrusted her with the administration in preference to his sons. According to Ferishta, "Raziyya Begum was endowed with every princely virtue; and those who scru-
tinize her actions most severely, will find in her no fault but that she was a woman."

The circumstances under which she assumed the government were difficult. The two most powerful parties in the state were cordially united in deposing her brother, but only one of them concurred in her elevation. The malcontent faction, headed by the Wazir of the two previous reigns, at once appealed to the sword, and, appearing before Delhi, defeated an army which was advancing to its relief. But though Raziyya was weak in arms, she was powerful in intrigue, and succeeded so well in sowing dissensions, that the confederacy formed against her melted away of its own accord. Equal skill and success marked her internal administration. Seated daily on her throne, she was accessible to all, gave a patient ear to complaints, redressed grievances, reformed abuses, and dispensed justice firmly and impartially. Unfortunately, she had one failing which affected her reputation, and lowered her in the estimation of her subjects. She showed a strong and undisguised favour for her master of the horse, whom, though originally an Abyssinian slave, she raised above all her other nobility, by appointing him commander-in-chief. It does not seem that her honour was compromised; for the utmost said against her in this respect is, that she allowed him to lift her up when she mounted on horseback. It was enough, however, to excite a rebellion, and make it successful. After a short struggle, the Abyssinian was murdered, and Sultana Raziyya was deposed. She was confided to the charge of a Turki chief called Altuniya, who had been the leader in the rebellion. Here her blandishments again availed her, and she so won upon Altuniya that he fell desperately in love with her, married her, and attempted to restore her to the throne. At the head of an army, she advanced to Delhi, fought two bloody battles, lost them, and was taken prisoner with her husband. Both were put to death. She had reigned three years and a half.

In 1239, when Raziyya was deposed, her brother Muiz-ud-din Bahram was placed on the throne. He was altogether unworthy of it; and endeavoured to rid himself of the importunities of those to whom he owed his elevation, by treachery and assassination. He was imprisoned and put to death after he had
reigned little more than two years. The only event of importance in his reign was an irruption of the Mughuls into the Punjab. Another reign, equally short and worthless, followed. The ruler was Ala-ud-din Masud, a son of Rukn-ud-din. His crimes were soon terminated by a violent death. During his reign two irruptions of the Mughuls took place; the one into the north-west, and the other by a route which they had not previously attempted—through Tibet into Bengal.

Nasir-ud-din Mahmud, grandson of Iltutmish, after a short interval, was raised to the throne in 1246. He was of retired and studious habits, and rid himself of the cares of government by devolving them on his Wazir Ghiyas-ud-din Balban. The Mughuls were now the great enemies to be feared. The provinces of Herat, Balkh, Kandahar, Kabul, and Ghazni were in their possession; and as India was constantly threatened by them, it was necessary to keep up a standing army along the frontier. Several of the earlier years of this reign were employed in suppressing disturbances which had arisen, chiefly in Multan and the Punjab generally. The events of the latter years are, generally, unimportant. In 1259, the Rajputs of Meerut, having risen in insurrection, the Wazir Balban led an army against them; and, having obliged them to take refuge among the mountainous districts, continued for four months to ravage the country by fire and sword. The barbarities thus committed, however, made the Rajputs desperate, and they rushed down with all their forces into the plain, attacking the Mohammedans so suddenly and fiercely that Balban had great difficulty in keeping his men together. Superior discipline finally prevailed, and the Rajputs were driven back to their fastnesses with great slaughter. Above 10,000 fell on the field; 200 chiefs, taken prisoners, were put to death; and the great body of their followers were condemned to slavery. Shortly before this formidable outbreak, an ambassador arrived at Delhi from Hulaku, King of Persia, and grandson of Chinghiz Khan. On his approach, the Wazir went out in state to meet him, with a train of 50,000 foreign horse, then in the service of the Delhi government, 2,000 elephants, and 3,000 carriages of fireworks. What these last were is uncertain. They may have been merely for display, but more probably
consisted of the Greek fire, with which the Muhammedans, even of the far east, were then well acquainted. A series of reviews and sham fights were performed; and the ambassador was then led through the city to the palace, where everything was arranged for his reception in the most gorgeous style. Among those who graced the ceremony, and stood next the throne, were many tributary Indian princes. There were present, also, no fewer than twenty-five princes of Irak-Ajemi, Khorasan, and Transoxiana, who had sought protection at Delhi from the devastating hordes of Chinghiz Khan.

Nasir-ud-din died of a lingering disease in 1266, after a reign of twenty years. He makes little figure on the page of history; and was, both by nature and habit, far better adapted for a private than for a public station. Though of royal parentage, he had acquired parsimonious habits, and lived in the utmost simplicity. When imprisoned in early life, he maintained himself by the labours of his pen; and, when seated on the throne, he made it his daily practice to write as much as would suffice to purchase his food. Ferishta's account of his domestic arrangements is curious:—"Contrary to the custom of other princes, he kept no concubines. He had but one wife, whom he obliged to do every homely part of housewifery. When she complained one day, that she had burned her fingers in baking his bread, and desired he would allow a maid to assist her, he rejected her request, saying that he was only a trustee for the state, and was determined not to burden it with needless expenses. He therefore exhorted her to persevere in her duty with patience, and God would reward her on the day of judgment."

Ghiyas-ud-din Balban, usually called by European writers Balin, had long been virtual, and on his master's death, became actual sovereign. He was the son of a powerful Turki chief, but, when a youth, had been carried off by the Mughuls and sold to a merchant, who took him to Baghdad. Here he was bought by an inhabitant of Bussorah, who, on learning that he belonged to the same tribe as Iltutmish, took him to Delhi, when that monarch paid for him so liberally that his previous master returned with an independent fortune.

His first employment was as falconer, because he was particularly skilful in the art of hawking; but, by the influence of a
brother, whom he found living in high favour at court, he obtained a higher position and became a noble. In the reign of Rukn-ud-din, he commanded in the Punjab. On receiving an order to return, he refused to place himself in the power of that worthless tyrant, who, he learned, had a design upon his life. He therefore took the only alternative that remained, and declared himself independent. When the Sultana Raziyya mounted the throne, he joined the confederacy which marched to Delhi to depose her, and was taken prisoner. After a time he effected his escape, and became a leading supporter of Bahram, during whose reign he held the government of Hansi and Rewari, and distinguished himself in suppressing the insurrections in Meerut. In the reign of Ala-ud-din Masud, he held the office of Amir Hajib; and at last, as has been seen, exercised all the powers of sovereign, though nominally only the Wazir of Nasir-ud-din.

Balban began his reign with some acts of what he deemed necessary severity; and having thus made his position secure, acquired a high reputation for justice and wisdom. He was a liberal rewarder of merit, and a rigid corrector of crime; but he seems to have attached more importance to birth than might have been expected in so wise a man; and, in particular, made a rule never to appoint any Hindu to a place of trust and power. His patronage of literature brought some of the most distinguished writers of the period to his court, which, if we may credit Ferishta, was the most polite and magnificent in the world. His example found many imitators in the capital; and, while a society of learned men met at the house of a prince called Khan Shahid, another society, of a more miscellaneous but not less attractive description, as it consisted of musicians, dancers, actors, and kissagoes or story-tellers, met at the house of the king’s second son. Various other societies, for similar purposes, were formed in every quarter of Delhi. Not merely the literary tastes of the king, but his love of show was sedulously imitated; and splendid palaces, equipages, and liveries became quite a rage among the courtiers.

Ferishta warms as he describes the pomp and state with which the monarch surrounded himself, and proceeds as follows:—“So imposing were the ceremonies of introduction to
the royal presence, that none could approach the throne without a mixture of awe and admiration. Nor was Ghiyas-ud-din Balban less splendid in his processions. His state elephants were covered with purple and gold trappings. His horse-guards, consisting of 1,000 Tartars, appeared in glittering armour, mounted on the finest steeds of Persia and Arabia, with silver bits, and housings of rich embroidery. Five hundred chosen foot, in rich liveries, with drawn swords, preceded him, proclaiming his approach and clearing the way. His nobles followed according to their rank, with their various equipages and attendants."

It is not unworthy of notice, that Balban took a very marked interest in what is now known as the temperance cause. An officer of rank, son of the keeper of the royal wardrobe, and governor of the province of Budaun, had, while in a state of drunkenness, slain one of his personal dependants, and, on the complaint of the widow, was sent for, tried, and beaten to death in presence of the whole court. Another high officer, the governor of Oudh, who had been guilty of the same crime under the influence of intoxication, received a public whipping of 500 lashes, and was given over as a slave to the widow of the man he had killed. These are not to be regarded as solitary instances of rigid justice, but rather part of a general system adopted for the purpose of putting down drunkenness. In the following statement of Ferishta, there is something very like an enactment of the Maine-law:—"Ghiyas-ud-din Balban in his youth was addicted to the use of wine, but on his accession to the throne he became a great enemy to the luxury, prohibiting the use and manufacture of fermented liquors throughout his dominions, under the severest penalties."

Though fond of splendour, and by no means niggardly, Balban seems sometimes to have been seized with fits of economy. During one of these, he caused a list of all the veterans who had served in the preceding reigns to be made out, and settled half-pay, with exemption from active duty, on all who were reported as worn out. The arrangement, though one which the most enlightened states of modern times have adopted, gave great dissatisfaction; and the veterans induced a magistrate of Delhi, venerable for years and character, and
high in favour, to represent their case to the king. He accordingly went the next day to court, and, while standing in the presence, put on a face of great dejection. The king observing it, inquired the cause: “I was just thinking,” replied the magistrate, “that if, in the presence of God, all the old men were rejected, what would become of me.” The device succeeded, and the veterans were again placed on full pay.

In the year 1270 the king’s nephew, Sher Khan, died. He was governor of Lahore, Multan, Sirhind, Bhatinda, &c., and all the districts exposed to Mughul incursions. These restless depredators immediately made their appearance. It seems that several of the subordinate governors were in league with them; and owing to this cause, as well as to mutual jealousies and dissensions in other quarters, the Mughuls made such head that Balban was obliged to appoint his eldest son, Prince Mahmud, viceroy of the frontier provinces. At the same time he caused him to be proclaimed his successor.

The Mughuls had hitherto been the only enemy against whom it was thought necessary to provide, but in 1279 a formidable insurrection broke out in a different quarter. During a serious illness, which led to a rumour that Balban had died, Tughrit Khan, the governor of Bengal, who had been guilty of some irregularities, for which he feared he might be called to account, not only revolted, but, assuming the scarlet canopy along with other insignia of royalty, declared himself King of Bengal. Balban immediately gave the government of Bengal to the governor of Oudh, Aliptigin, entitled Amir Khan, and surnamed the Hairy. At the same time, he sent several generals with a large army to his assistance. Aliptigin, thus reinforced, crossed the Gogra, and Tughril Khan advanced to meet him. This he did with the more confidence, because he was aware that many of the Turki chiefs in Aliptigin’s army had been gained by his largesses. The consequence was that the royal army sustained a total overthrow. When the news reached Balban, he bit his own flesh with vexation, hung Aliptigin at the gate of Oudh, and sent Malik Tirmuni Turk with another army against the rebel. Not more successful than his predecessor, he was defeated, lost all his baggage, and with it the public treasure.

Balban now set out in person, crossed the Ganges without waiting for the dry season, and proceeded to Bengal by forced
marches. The state of the river and roads, however, occasioned so much delay, that Tughrul Khan had time to collect a large army, though it did not seem to have been large enough to justify the risk of an encounter in the open field. He therefore evacuated Bengal with all his elephants, treasure, and effects; intending to keep out of sight till the king should return to his capital. This scheme he followed out with so much dexterity, that Balban, following close upon the route which he was understood to have taken, could not obtain a trace of him for several days. At last Malik Muqaddir, the governor of Kole, being out with a small reconnoitring party, saw some bullocks with pack-saddles. The drivers were seized, but in answer to all inquiries, obstinately pretended ignorance, till the head of one of them was struck off, when the rest fell on their faces and confessed that they had just left Tughrul Khan's camp, which was four miles farther on. Malik going forward climbed a rising ground, from which he saw the whole encampment spread over a plain, with the elephants and cavalry picketed, and everything in apparent security. Having fixed his eye on Tughrul's tents, situated near the centre of the camp, he determined on a very daring enterprise. Advancing with the forty men he had with him at full speed, he was allowed to enter the camp, because it was never doubted that he belonged to it. He made directly for headquarters, and ordering his men to draw their swords, rushed into the tent of audience, shouting "Victory to Sultan Balban!"

Tughrul thought he had been surprised by the royal army, and leaped from his throne to make way to the rear. Finding a horse without a saddle, he mounted it, and fled in the direction of the river. Malik, having caught sight of him, pursued, and shot him with an arrow while he was in the act of swimming the stream. Tughrul fell from his horse, and was seized by Malik, who dragged him out by the hair, and cut off his head, leaving the body to be carried down the stream. He had just time to hide the head in the sand when some of Tughrul's people came up. They found Malik bathing, and never suspecting how matters stood, left him after asking a few questions. The confusion produced by the supposed surprise spread into a general panic, and the whole camp dispersed, every one thinking only of his own safety. Malik ever after bore the surname of Tughrul Kush, or the Slayer of Tughrul.
Balban arrived next day, and finding that no enemy remained, returned to execute vengeance on the rebel's family, every member of which he put to death. Before returning from this expedition, on which he is said to have spent three years, he appointed his son, Bughra Khan, King of Bengal, and gave him all the spoils of Tughril, except the elephants and treasure, which he removed to Delhi. As soon as Prince Mahmud heard of his father's arrival, he hastened from Multan to visit him, and was received with the greatest affection. The two were almost inseparable; but they had not been three months together when an event occurred which was to part them for ever. The Mughuls had invaded Multan. The prince made all haste to oppose them, and Balban, now on the borders of eighty, bitterly felt the pang of separation. His presentiment probably was that he himself was about to be gathered to his fathers, and that the prince would survive him. Accordingly he spent much of the last interview in counselling him as to the conduct he should pursue when on the throne. The counsels were wise, and the prince, who had given great promise, would doubtless have acted upon them if the succession had opened to him. It was otherwise determined. As soon as the prince arrived in Multan, he attacked the Mughuls, recovered all the territories which they had seized, and expelled them with great slaughter. These Mughuls were subjects of Timur Khan, of the house of Chinghiz Khan; and though not unknown to fame, a very different person from the still more famous Timur or Tamerlane, who did not make his appearance till a century after. The present Timur ruled the eastern provinces of Persia, from Khorasan to the Indus, and with the view of avenging the expulsion of his Mughuls, appeared next year in Hindustan, at the head of 20,000 chosen horse. After ravaging the country around Lahore, he advanced in the direction of Multan. Prince Mahmud hastened to meet him. A river lay between them, and might easily have been converted into an inseparable barrier against the further progress of the Mughuls, but the prince disdained to avail himself of this advantage, and left the passage free. After Timur had crossed, the armies drew up and a great battle was fought. Both leaders distinguished themselves; but after contesting the victory for three hours, the
Mughuls were obliged to flee, and the Indians followed hotly in pursuit. Prince Mahmud, worn out with fatigue, halted on the banks of a stream to quench his thirst. He had only 500 attendants, and was spied by a Mughul chief, who lay concealed in an adjoining wood with 2,000 horse. The prince had barely time to mount before the Mughuls were upon him. With his small band he thrice heroically repulsed his assailants; but at last, overpowered by numbers, he fell mortally wounded, and almost instantly expired. His troops, who had gone in pursuit of the flying enemy, on returning with the shouts of victory, found their prince weltering in his blood. The voice of triumph was immediately turned to wailing, and every eye was in tears. The dismal news broke the old king's heart, and he only lingered on, wishing for death to release him.

When he found his end approaching, he recalled his son, Bughra Khan, from Bengal, and nominated him his successor. He only stipulated that he should appoint a deputy in Bengal, and remain with him at Delhi till his death. This event not happening so soon as Bughra Khan expected, he was unnatural enough to become impatient, and depart for Bengal without announcing his intention. Balban, both grieved and indignant, sent for his grandson, Kai Khusrai, Prince Mahmud's son, from Multan, settled the succession on him, and a few days after, expired, in 1286. He had reigned with great success for twenty-one years. Though all the officers of the court had sworn to give effect to Balban's will, no sooner was he dead than the chief magistrate of Delhi, who had always been at variance with Kai Khusrai's father, exerted his influence against the young prince with such effect, that he was set aside to make way for his cousin, Kaiqubad, the son of Bughra Khan. Kai Khusrai, glad to escape with his life, returned to his government.

Kaiqubad, on mounting the throne in his eighteenth year, assumed the title of Muiz-ud-din. He was remarkably handsome in person, affable in his manners, mild in temper, of a literary taste, and well informed. Unfortunately he became too soon his own master; and on breaking loose from the tight rein which his father had kept upon him, he passed to the opposite extreme, and became a debauchee. His example was soon followed by
his courtiers, and once more, to borrow the description of Ferishta, "every shady grove was filled with women and parties of pleasure, and every street rung with riot and tumult; even the magistrates were seen drunk in public, and music was heard in every house." At Kilokhri, on the banks of the Jamuna, he fitted up a palace where he might revel undisturbed amidst his only companions—singers, players, musicians, and buffoons.

Nizam-ud-din, the chief secretary of Kaiqubad, seeing how completely his master was engrossed by pleasure, conceived the idea of usurping the throne; and having no scruples as to the means, began by endeavouring to remove what he conceived to be the greatest obstacle. This was Kai Khusrai, who had gone to Ghazni, and solicited Timur Khan, the Mughul viceroy, to aid him with troops for the purpose of driving Kaiqubad from the throne, which, by the will of his grandfather Balban, belonged of right to himself. He failed in the attempt, but returned, notwithstanding, to his government. Either thinking that his attempt was unknown, or hoping that it had been forgiven, he was enticed to pay a visit to Delhi, and before he reached it, was waylaid and murdered by the hired assassins of Nizam-ud-din. The next part of the plot was to procure the disgrace of Kaiqubad's Wazir, and cut off all the old servants of the late King Balban. They disappeared one after another by some kind of mysterious agency, and a general feeling of dismay was produced. Nizam-ud-din, the real instigator, though not the actual perpetrator of the murders, was not even suspected.

Though the Mughuls on the other side of the Indus were constantly crossing it, and making predatory incursions into India, it is a remarkable fact that vast numbers of their countrymen had voluntarily enlisted in the army of Delhi as soldiers of fortune, and were even understood to have done good and faithful service. Nizam-ud-din, anxious to get quit of the Mughul mercenaries—who, he feared, might refuse to be the instruments of his designs—took advantage of a recent Mughul incursion, to persuade Kaiqubad that it was impolitic to retain them, as in the event of a general invasion, they would certainly join their countrymen. It was therefore resolved to get quit of them by any means, however atrocious. The plan adopted was to assemble the Mughul chiefs, and massacre them by the
guards. Even all other officers who had any connection with
them were first imprisoned, and then sent off to distant gar-
risons. While Nizam-ud-din was thus clearing away all real or
imaginary obstacles, his wife was equally busy in the seraglio,
and had all its inmates at her devotion.

Bughra Khan, Kaiqubad's father, who had hitherto, been
contented with Bengal, hearing of the state of affairs at Delhi,
wrote to warn his son of his danger. No attention was paid to
his advice; and Bughra Khan, seeing the crisis approaching,
determined to anticipate it, by marching with a large army
upon Delhi. Kaiqubad advanced with a still larger army to
oppose his progress. The father, feeling his inferiority, proposed
negotiation, but the son assumed a haughty tone, and would
appeal to nothing but the sword. Before matters were allowed
to come to this extremity, Bughra Khan made a last effort, and
wrote a letter in the most tender and affectionate terms,
begging he might be blessed with one sight of his son. Kaiqubad
was melted, and a reconciliation took place, the ultimate effect
of which was, that Nizam-ud-din saw all his treacherous designs
frustrated, and was shortly after cut off by poison.

For a time Kaiqubad seemed about to reform; but he had no
decision of character, and his old habits returning, new factions
were formed, and a kind of anarchy prevailed. To increase the
confusion, his dissipation undermined his constitution, and he
became paralytic. Every noble now began to intrigue for power,
and two great parties were formed—the one headed by a
Khilji of the name of Malik Jalal-ud-din Firuz, and the other
by two high court officers, who, more loyally disposed, wished
to secure the crown to Kaiqubad's only son, Prince Kaynmars,
an infant of three years of age. The Khiljis, almost to a man,
took part with their countryman; the Mughuls were equally
unanimous in favour of the prince, whom they carried off from
the harem, for the purpose of seating him upon the throne. It
was not yet vacant, for Kaiqubad, though on a sick-bed, might
continue for a time to linger on. This was a state of uncertainty
which the contending parties could not endure; and after
mutual attempts at assassination, the emissaries of Jalal-ud-din,
having forced their way into the palace of Kilokhri, where they
found Kaiqubad lying in a dying state, deserted by all his attend-
ants, they beat out his brains with bludgeons, rolled up the
body in the bed-clothes, and threw it out of the window into
the river. The young prince was shortly after put to death; and
Jalal-ud-din having been proclaimed king, became the founder
of the Khilji dynasty. This revolution happened in 1288.

Jalal-ud-din Firuz had reached the age of seventy when he
usurped the throne. The footsteps to it he had stained with
blood, but after he was seated, either remorse or policy induced
him to become humane. Having no great confidence in the
people of Delhi, he fixed his residence at Kilokhri, which he
fortified, and also adorned with fine gardens and terraced
walls along the river. Numerous other buildings rapidly sprung
up; and Kilokhri, having thus assumed the appearance of a city,
was known for a time by the name of New Delhi. The year
after Jalal-ud-din's usurpation, a competitor for the crown
appeared in the person of Malik Juhu, one of the late Balban's
nephews, instigated chiefly by Amir Ali, governor of Oudh.
After an obstinate engagement, Juhu was defeated, and Amir
Ali and several other leaders were taken prisoners. They were
immediately sent off to Kilokhri; but Jalal-ud-din, as soon as
he saw them, ordered them to be unbound, and gave them a
free pardon, while quoting a verse of which the purport is—
"Evil for evil is easily returned, but he only is great who
returns good for evil." The Khilji chiefs could not understand
this humanity, which they condemned as at variance with
sound policy. "At all events," they observed, "the rebels should
be deprived of sight, to deter them from further mischief, and
as an example to others. If this was not done, treason would
soon raise its head in every quarter of the empire." The king
answered, "What you say is certainly according to the ordinary
rules of policy; but, my friends, I am now old, and I wish to
go down to the grave without shedding more blood."

It is refreshing to be able to turn aside from the massacres
which we have in the course of the narrative been compelled to
witness, and listen to sentiments partaking so much of the spirit
of Christianity. It seems, however, that the Khiljis were not
altogether wrong, for the king's lenity was often mistaken, and
the hope of impunity produced numerous disorders. "The streets
and highways", says Ferishta, "were infested by thieves and
banditti. House-breaking, robbery, murder, and every species of crime was committed by many who adopted them as a means of subsistence. Insurrections prevailed in every province; numerous gangs of freebooters interrupted commerce, and even common intercourse. Add to this, the king's governors neglected to render any account either of their revenues or their administration."

Crime, thus encouraged, did not stop short of treason, and two plots were formed against the king's life. One, in which some Khilji chiefs were the conspirators, was no sooner detected than forgiven; the other, which was headed by a celebrated dervesh, called Siddi Mulla, was visited more severely. This dervesh, originally from Persia, after visiting various countries in the west, arrived at Delhi, where his reputation for sanctity, joined to the liberality of his alms, made him a great favourite, especially with the populace, who were constantly crowded around his gates. For a time he appeared to have no higher aspiration than popularity; but at last, ambition took possession of his soul, and an intriguer, to whom he had given his confidence, persuaded him that the people looked on him as sent from God to deliver the kingdom from Khilji misrule, and bless Hindustan with a wise and just government.

The throne having thus become his object, he determined to take the nearest road to it, and sent two of his followers to assassinate the king as he was proceeding to the public mosque. One of the two, however, was seized with remorse, and disclosed the plot. Siddi Mulla and his confidential intriguer were apprehended; but as they persisted in their innocence, and no witness appeared against them, it was determined to have recourse to the fiery ordeal, that they might purge themselves of their guilt. Everything was ready, and the accused having said their prayers, were about to plunge into the fire, when Jalalud-din, who had come to witness the ceremony, stopped them, and turning to his ministers, put the question, "Is it lawful to try Mussulmans by the fiery ordeal?" They unanimously answered that the practice was heathenish, and contrary to the Muhammedan law as well as to reason, inasmuch as it was the nature of fire to consume, paying no respect to the righteous more than to the wicked. Siddi Mulla was ordered to prison,
but was barbarously murdered before he reached it. This murder was associated in the minds of the populace with a series of public calamities which ensued, and particularly with two—the one a dreadful famine in the course of the same year (1291), and the other a Mughul invasion in the year following.

The invading force, headed by a kinsman of Hulaku Khan, Chinghiz Khan’s grandson, consisted of 100,000 horse. Jalal-ud-din collected his army, and advanced against them. For five days the armies lay in sight of each other, with a stream between them. On the sixth morning, as if by mutual consent, they drew up on an extensive plain, to fight a pitched battle. After an obstinate conflict, the Mughuls were defeated. It is probable that the victory was not decisive, for Jalal-ud-din gave the Mughuls free permission to withdraw from his dominions, and exchanged presents with them in token of amity. On this occasion, Hughly Khan, a grandson of Chinghiz Khan, aware that he had little chance of rising among the numerous relations of that warrior who were still alive, induced 3,000 of his countrymen to remain in the service of Jalal-ud-din, who gave him his daughter in marriage.

In 1293 Ala-ud-din, the king’s nephew, who had previously been governor of Kara, obtained in addition to it the government of Oudh, and began to entertain schemes of conquest, with a view to ultimate independence. One of his expeditions is interesting as the first which the Muhammedans made to the Deccan. It was directed against Rama Deva, Raja of Devagiri or Daulatabad, who is described as possessing the wealth of a long line of kings. Ala-ud-din, after reaching the Deccan frontier, pressed forward towards the capital. The raja happened to be absent, and hastened home in great alarm. Having suddenly collected a force, composed chiefly of citizens and domestics, he encountered the Muhammedans about four miles from the city; but, though he behaved gallantly, was easily repulsed, and driven back into the fort. Its ditch, which is now one of the most remarkable sights of the Deccan, the scarp being in many places 100 feet, excavated in the solid rock, was not then in existence, and the chief defence was a bare wall. The city was taken at once, and pillaged. Many of the inhabitants, after heavy contributions had been levied from them, were cruelly tortured.
for the discovery of their property. The fort still held out, but Rama Deva began to despond, as the Muhammedans had given out that their present force was only the advanced guard of the King of Delhi's army. He therefore offered a large ransom; which Ala-ud-din, who had begun to feel the difficulties of his position in the centre of a hostile country, was fain to accept.

The terms had just been concluded when Sankar Deva, the raja's eldest son, was seen advancing with a numerous army. His father sent a message to him, intimating that peace was concluded, and ordering him to desist from hostilities. The youth refused, and sent messengers to Ala-ud-din with a letter, in which he said, "If you have any love for life, and desire safety, restore what you have plundered, and proceed quietly homeward, rejoicing at your happy escape." The Muhammedan indignation was so roused that the messengers, after having their faces blackened with soot, were hooted out of the camp.

Ala-ud-din immediately moved out to meet the approaching enemy, leaving only Malik Nasrat, with 1,000 horse, to invest the fort and prevent a sally. In the contest which ensued, the Muhammedans were overpowered by numbers, and falling back on all sides, when the sudden arrival of Malik Nasrat, who had left his station at the fort without orders, changed the fortune of the day. The Hindus, supposing that the royal army, of which they had heard so much, was actually arrived, were seized with a panic, and fled in all directions. Ala-ud-din returned to the fort, the besiegers of which were now pressed for provisions, it having been ascertained that a great number of bags, supposed to contain grain, were filled with salt. Rama Deva was obliged to submit to any terms; and Ala-ud-din, besides obtaining the cession of Ellichpur and its dependencies, retired with an immense ransom. He had many difficulties to contend with, as his route lay through the hostile and powerful kingdoms of Malwa, Gundwana, and Khandesh; but he surmounted them all, and arrived safely at Kara, where, from the interruption of the communications, nothing had been heard of him for several months.

Jalal-ud-din, on hearing of the immense booty which his nephew was bringing with him, was overjoyed, because he had no doubt that the greater part of it would go to enrich the
royal treasury at Delhi. His more sagacious servants thought otherwise, and hinted that Ala-ud-din had ultimate designs of a treasonable nature, and would use the booty as a means of accomplishing them. The king refused to entertain suspicions which might prove unfounded; and, on receiving a letter from his nephew, couched in the most submissive terms, felt only anxious to assure him of his continued favour.

Meanwhile, the crisis was approaching. Partly by flattering letters from Kara, and partly by the treacherous advice of counsellors at Delhi, the king was inveigled into the fatal resolution of paying a visit to his nephew in 1295. When the royal canopy appeared in sight, Ala-ud-din drew out his troops under pretence of doing honour to his majesty, and sent his brother Almas Beg forward to arrange for his reception. Almas was deep in the plot, and artfully suggested that if the king advanced with a large retinue, Ala-ud-din, who feared he had incurred the royal displeasure, might be alarmed. So plausible was the tongue of Almas Beg, that the king embarked in his own solitary barge with only a few select attendants, and, as if this had not been enough, ordered them to unbuckle their armour, and lay their swords aside. In this defenceless state, he reached the landing-place, and ordered his attendants to halt, while he walked forward to meet his nephew, who advanced alone, and threw himself prostrate at his feet. The old king raised him up, embraced him, and, tapping him familiarly on the cheek, exclaimed, "How could you be suspicious of me, who have brought you up from your childhood, and cherished you with a fatherly affection, holding you dearer in my sight, if possible, than my own offspring?" This kind-hearted appeal was answered by the nephew by a signal to his soldiers, one of whom made a cut with his sword, and wounded Jalal-ud-din in the shoulder. He immediately ran to regain his barge, crying, "Ah! thou villain, Ala-ud-din!" but, before he reached it, was overtaken by another of the soldiers, who threw him on the ground, and cut off his head, which was fixed on a spear, and carried in triumph through the camp. The wretch whose sword completed the bloody deed is said to have suffered a thousand deaths in imagination before he died. He became mad, and expired, screaming incessantly that Jalal-ud-din Firuz was cutting off his
head. This reign is full of incident, but lasted only for the comparatively short period of seven years.

When tidings of Jalal-ud-din's murder reached Delhi, the queen-dowager, of her own accord, without consulting the chiefs, placed her youngest son, Prince Kuddur Khan, a mere boy, on the throne. The real heir was Arkali Khan, then governor of Multan. He had all the qualities of a king, but the queen's proceedings disconcerted him, and he resolved, in the meantime, to take no active steps to secure his right. Ala-ud-din, when he atrociously murdered his uncle, aimed not at the throne of Delhi, but at the establishment of a new independent kingdom. However, on learning the state of matters, he began to entertain higher aspirations; and, in spite of the rainy season, set out at once for the capital. There was nothing to oppose his progress; and the queen-mother, with her son, having fled with the treasure to Multan, he made a triumphal entry into the city in the end of 1296.

Ala-ud-din began his reign with splendid shows and festivities, by which he dazzled the populace, and made them forget, or overlook, the enormity which had placed him on the throne. At the same time, he conciliated the great by titles, and the venal and avaricious by gifts. The army, also, having been gained by six months' pay, he turned his thoughts to the rival claimants in Multan, and sent thither his brother, Aluf Khan, at the head of 40,000 horse. The citizens, to save themselves, betrayed the princes, and delivered up Arkali Khan and Kuddur Khan, on an assurance that the lives of both would be spared. It is almost needless to say that the promise was not kept. While the princes were being conveyed to Delhi, a messenger arrived with orders from Ala-ud-din, that they should be deprived of sight. After this barbarous deed was done, they were imprisoned in the fort of Hansi, and shortly after assassinated.

In 1296, after Ala-ud-din had finished the first year of his reign, the startling intelligence arrived that Amir Daud, King of Transoxiana, had prepared an army of 100,000 Mughuls, with a design to conquer the Punjab and Sind, and was actually on the way, carrying everything before him with fire and sword. Aluf Kharr was sent against them; and, after a bloody conflict on the plains of Lahore, defeated them with the loss of 12,000 men.
Some days after, the numerous prisoners, not excepting the women and children, found in the Mughul camp, were inhumanly butchered.

In the beginning of the following year, Aluf Khan and the Wazir Nusrat Khan, were sent to reduce Gujarat. On their approach to the capital, the Raja Rai Karan escaped into the territories of Rama Deva, Raja of Devagiri, in the Deccan, but not without the capture of his wives, children, elephants, baggage, and treasure. Nusrat Khan then proceeded with part of the army to Cambay, which, being a rich country full of merchants, yielded a prodigious booty. With this, the whole troops were returning to Delhi, when the two generals, by demanding a fifth of the spoil in addition to the shares which they had already obtained, caused a widespread mutiny, especially among the Mughul mercenaries: Aluf Khan narrowly escaped with his life. His nephew, who was sleeping in his tent, was mistaken for him by the mutineers, and murdered. When the army reached Delhi; Ala-ud-din gratified his passion by taking into his harem Kamala Devi, one of the captive wives of the Raja of Gujarat, so celebrated for beauty, wit, and accomplishments, that she was styled the "Flower of India"—and his blood-thirsty revenge, by an indiscriminate massacre of all the families of those who had been concerned in the late mutiny.

About this time, another great invasion of the Mughuls took place, under Kutlugh Khan, son of the Amir Daud, who had led the former expedition. Their army consisted of 200,000 horse, and contemplated nothing less than the entire conquest of Hindustan. Kutlugh Khan, after crossing the Indus, proceeded direct for Delhi, and encamped, without opposition, on the banks of the Jamuna. Zafar Khan, the chief secretary and governor of the adjoining provinces, gradually retired as the Mughuls advanced. The inhabitants, fleeing in dismay, crowded into the capital; and the supply of provisions being cut off, while the consumption was immensely increased, famine began to rage. Dismay and despair were painted on every countenance. In this emergency, Ala-ud-din called a council of nobles, but, on finding them opposed to action, took his own way, and determined to attack the enemy. With this view, he marched
out by the Budaun gate with 300,000 horse and 2,700 elephants, and, proceeding into the plains beyond the suburbs, drew up in order of battle. Here, too, Kutlugh Khan drew up to receive him. Two such armies had not mustered in Hindustan since the Muhammedans appeared in it.

The right wing of the Delhi army was commanded by Zafar Khan, considered the greatest general of the age, and the left by Aluf Khan. Ala-ud-din took post in the centre, with 12,000 volunteers, mostly of noble family, and headed by the Wazir, Nusrat Khan. The choicest of the elephants occupied a line in front, and a body of chosen cavalry guarded the rear. Zafar Khan began the battle by impetuously charging the enemy's left, which he bore away before him, breaking up the line by his elephants, and thus committing dreadful slaughter. The enemy's left flank, thus turned back, was driven upon his centre, and considerable confusion ensued. Ala-ud-din, seeing this, ordered Aluf Khan to advance, but he, dissatisfied because the place of honour had been given to Zafar Khan, of whose fame he was envious, meanly kept aloof, and left his rival to follow up his advantage as he could. This he did almost heedlessly, continuing the pursuit for many miles. A Mughul chief, whose toman, or division of 10,000 horse, had not been engaged, seeing Zafar Khan unsupported, resolved to attack him; and, at the same time, sent information to Kutlugh Khan, who hastened forward with another toman. Zafar Khan was consequently attacked in front and rear. Thus placed, he saw his danger; but as it was too late to retreat, he drew up his forces, in number not half those of the enemy, in two squadrons, and continued the unequal conflict. The leg of his horse having been cut through by a sabre, he fell to the ground, but rose instantly, seized a bow and quiver, and, being a dexterous archer, dealt death around him. Most of his soldiers were now slain or dispersed, and Kutlugh Khan—who, from admiration of his valour, would have saved him—called upon him to surrender, but he persisted in discharging his arrows, and refused quarter. On this, the Mughul attempted to take him alive, but it could not be done, and he was at last cut in pieces.

Notwithstanding this advantage, the Mughuls did not venture to continue the contest; and, abandoning all hopes of
success, evacuated India as fast as they could. Their departure was celebrated at Delhi with great rejoicing.

Ala-ud-din, in consequence of the success which had attended his arms, became so elated, that he began to entertain some extraordinary projects. One of them was to imitate Muhammad, and become, like him, the founder of a new religion; another, to leave a viceroy in India, and set out, in the manner of Alexander the Great, to conquer the world. While meditating such schemes, he was so illiterate, that he could neither read nor write. The only part which he executed, was to assume the title, and issue coinage impressed with the name of Alexander II. A more practicable course of action was adopted in 1299, when he resolved to attempt new conquests in India. With this view, he sent his brother, Aluf Khan, and the Wazir, Nusrat Khan, on an expedition against the Raja of Ranthambhar, or Rintimbore, a strong fortress in the Rajput state of Jaipur. Nusrat Khan, going too near to the wall, was killed by a stone thrown from an engine. The raja, Hamir Deva, immediately marched out from the fort, and, placing himself at the head of a large army, hastily collected, drove Aluf Khan back with great loss.

Ala-ud-din, informed of the defeat, resolved to take the field in person. On the way, he one day engaged in hunting, and having wandered far from the camp, spent the night in a forest, with only a few attendants. Ruku Khan, his nephew and brother-in-law, tempted by the opportunity, thought he could not do better than gain the throne in the same way as Ala-ud-din had done, by assassinating his predecessor. Accordingly, having communicated his design to some Mughuls, on whose co-operation and fidelity he could rely, he rode up at sunrise to the place where the king was, and discharged a flight of arrows. Two of them took effect, and he fell, apparently dead. Ruku Khan drew his sword to cut off his head; but, as the deed seemed already effectually done, and time was precious, he desisted, and, hastening to the camp, was proclaimed king.

Ala-ud-din's wounds were not mortal; and he was able, after they were bound up, to reach the camp, where, to the astonishment of all, he suddenly appeared on an eminence. Ruku Khan was holding his court when the astounding news
reached him, and only had time to mount his horse and flee. A party sent in pursuit, speedily overtook him, and, returning with his head, laid it at the feet of the king, who shortly after continued his march to Ranthambhar, and renewed the siege. The place was obstinately defended; and, after standing out a whole year, was only taken at last by stratagem. Hamir Deva, his family, and the garrison were put to the sword. It seems that the raja’s minister had turned traitor, and gone over to the Muhammedans with a strong party during the siege. He no doubt anticipated a splendid reward; but met the fate he deserved, when, with all his followers, he was ordered to execution. Ala-ud-din justified the sentence by observing, that “those who have betrayed their natural sovereign will never be true to another.”

Ala-ud-din, alarmed at the frequency of conspiracies against his life, became anxious to adopt some effectual means of preventing their recurrence. With this view, he summoned his nobles, and commanded them to give their opinions without reserve. They spoke more freely than might have been expected; and mentioned, among other causes of treason, his own inattention to business, and the consequent difficulty of obtaining redress of grievances—the prevalence of intoxication—the power of aristocratical families in connection with the abuse of patronage—and the unequal division of property. The opinion thus given made a deep impression upon him, and he immediately began to act upon it, though in a manner which left as much room for censure as for approbation. He first applied himself to reform the administration of justice, and made strict inquiry into the private as well as public characters of all officials. He next adopted a kind of universal spy system, by which he obtained a knowledge of all that was said or done in families of distinction in the capital, or throughout the country. Crime, also, was so rigorously punished, that robbery and theft, formerly common, became almost unknown; “the traveller slept secure on the highway, and the merchant carried his commodities in safety, from the Sea of Bengal to the Mountains of Kabul, and from Telengana to Kashmir.” These are Ferishta’s words; but the description must be taken with considerable allowance, as a portion of the territories within these
limits was not yet under the jurisdiction of the King of Delhi. To repress drunkenness, he issued an edict similar to that of Balban, making the use of wine and strong liquors a capital offence. To prove his sincerity and determination on the subject, he emptied his own cellars into the streets, and was imitated in this respect to such an extent, by all classes of people, that for several days the common sewers ran wine.

As too often happens under despotisms, the radical reforms of Ala-ud-din degenerated into unmitigated tyranny and rapacity. As a means of keeping the nobility in check, he enacted that they should be incapable of contracting marriage without the previous consent of the crown, and prohibited them from holding private meetings, or engaging in political discussions. To such a length was this prohibition carried, that no man durst entertain his friends without a written permission from the Wazir. His rapacity he gratified by seizing the private property and confiscating the estates of Mussulmans and Hindus, without distinction, and cutting down the salaries of public offices, till they were filled only by needy men, ready to act as his servile instruments. Nor did he confine himself to officials; for all classes and employments were subjected to minute and vexatious regulations. His views in regard to ecclesiastical matters are evinced by a common saying attributed to him, "that religion had no connection with civil government, but was only the business, or rather the amusement of private life."

In 1303, Ala-ud-din having set out to attack the strong fort of Chitor, in Rajputana, Turghai Khan, a Mughul chief, took advantage of his absence, to prepare a new expedition into Hindustan. He accordingly entered it at the head of twelve tomans of horse (120,000); and, proceeding directly towards Delhi, encamped on the banks of the Jamuna. Ala-ud-din, having been made aware of his intention, had hastened home by forced marches, and arrived before him. He was unable, however, to take the open field, as great part of his army had been left behind. All he could do was to entrench himself on a plain beyond the suburbs, where he remained two months; while the Mughul, in possession of the surrounding country, cut off all supplies, and plundered up to the very
suburbs of the capital. From some cause never understood, and therefore ascribed to the miraculous intervention of a saint, the Mughuls were one night seized with a panic, and never halted till they had regained their own country.

The extreme danger which he thus so singularly escaped, convinced Ala-ud-din of the necessity of greatly increasing his forces, but the expense seemed beyond his means. Large as his treasures and revenues were, he found that he could not support an army, on the scale proposed, for more than six years. Retrenchment then became the order of the day, and many curious plans were devised for that purpose. His first resolution was, to lower the pay, but as, according to the custom of that period, the soldiers furnished their own horses, arms, and provisions, a reduced pay was impossible, unless these articles also were lowered in price. This, therefore, was the course which Ala-ud-din resolved to pursue. By an edict to be strictly enforced throughout the empire, he fixed the price of every article of consumption or use, grain of every kind, horses, asses, camels, oxen and cows, sheep and goats, cloths coarse and fine, ghee or clarified butter, salt, sugar and sugar-candy, onions, and garlic. The treasury even opened a loan to furnish merchants with ready money, with which they could import manufactured goods from the cheaper markets of adjoining countries. It is said that a court favourite proposed, by way of joke, to fix a price for prostitution. "Very well," said the king, "that shall be fixed also," and three classes, with fixed prices for each, were actually formed. Such is a sample of Ala-ud-din's scheme of finance.

About 1304, after a new irruption of Mughuls had been chastised, Ein-ul-Mulk was sent to make the conquest of Malwa. The raja met him with 40,000 horse and 100,000 foot; but was defeated, and his capital, Ujjain, with other cities, were taken. The news gave so much joy, that the capital was illuminated for seven days. Amid the general rejoicings, there was one poor raja who sat solitary in his prison, mourning. This was the Raja of Chitor, Rana Ratan Singh, who, ever since the capture of his fort, had been kept in close confinement at Delhi. An insulting offer of liberty had, indeed, been made him. He had a daughter celebrated for her beauty and
accomplishments, and Ala-ud-din was willing to give him his release, provided she would become an inmate of his harem. It is said that he consented; perhaps he only seemed to consent. Be this as it may, he sent for his daughter, but his family determined sooner to poison her, than subject her to the degradation intended. The princess took the matter into her own hands; and adopted a scheme which, happily, proved successful in both saving her own honour and procuring her father's freedom.

Every arrangement having been made for the proposed exchange, she wrote to say that on a certain day she would arrive at Delhi with her attendants. A royal passport was immediately sent her, and her cavalcade, proceeding by slow marches, reached the capital as the evening closed. By the king's special orders the litters were carried directly into the prison, without being subjected to any inspection. The princess was not there, but in her stead several trusty dependants of her family completely armed, who, as soon as they were admitted within the prison, cut down the sentinels, and set the raja free. He made his escape to the hills, from which he continued to make frequent descents, and avenge himself on the Muhammadans for the insults and sufferings which he had endured.

In 1305, the Mughuls again, under the leadership of an officer of the name of Aibak Khan, crossed the Indus, and after ravaging Multan, proceeded to Sewalik. Ghazi Beg Tughluk, aware of the route by which they would return, placed himself in ambush near the banks of the Indus, and rushing out suddenly, defeated the invaders with great slaughter. Seeing their return cut off, the survivors had no alternative but to return into the desert. It was the hot season, and, in a short time, out of 57,000 cavalry, and camp followers who outnumbered them, only 3,000 remained alive. When taken to Delhi, they were trodden to death by elephants, and a pillar was raised before the Budaun gate with their skulls. Another invasion shortly after having met with no better success, the Mughuls were so discouraged, as well as exhausted, that they not only desisted for many years from entering Hindustan, but found themselves placed on the defensive; Ghazi Beg Tughluk
scarcely allowing a season to pass in which he did not cross to the west bank of the Indus, and plunder the provinces of Kabul, Ghazni, and Kandahar.

Ala-ud-din, now rid of his most formidable enemies, had time to resume his conquests in the Deccan; and with this view despatched Malik Kafur, who had been originally purchased as a slave, with an army against Rama Deva, Raja of Devagiri, who had neglected for three years to pay his stipulated tribute. The army, when it set out, mustered 100,000 horse, and was reinforced on the way by the troops of the governors of Malwa and Gujarat, Malik Kafur, after encamping on the frontiers of the Deccan, was so strenuously opposed, that for a time he made little progress, and had nothing to plume himself upon except the capture of a daughter of the beautiful Kamala Devi, who, from being the wife of a Hindu raja, as already mentioned, had become the favourite of the Delhi harem. The daughter had a similar fate, for she was on the way to become the bride of a raja when she was captured; and afterwards, on being brought to Delhi, was married to Khizr Khan, Ala-ud-din’s son.

On a second expedition to the Deccan, in 1309, Malik Kafur proceeded by way of Devagiri towards Warangal, a place of great strength. After appearing at Indore, about ninety miles north of Hyderabad, and causing great consternation among the inhabitants, who had never seen the Muhammedans before, he sat down before Warangal, which made a valiant defence, but was ultimately taken by assault. In the following year he proceeded still further south, reached the Malabar coast, and then, turning inland, continued his victorious career to the frontiers of Mysore. Much of his time was employed in plundering the temples, and the spoil which he brought back to Delhi was enormous. It is curious that silver is not mentioned as forming any part of it. Gold, indeed, seems to have been the precious metal chiefly used at this time in India, as coin, ornament, or plate.

Ala-ud-din had now reached the zenith of his power. Though he had been guilty of many crimes, fortune had never ceased to favour him, and his territories had extended on every side, till they assumed the magnitude and splendour of an empire.
The period of decline, however, had now arrived. Malik Kafur who possessed his utmost confidence, and used it for the promotion of his treasonable designs, disgusted the nobles, and spread discontent among the people. His own health, too, undermined by intemperance and vicious indulgence, gave way; and his family, to whose training he had never attended, entirely neglected him, and spent their time in revelry. His principal wife, Malika Jehan, was equally indifferent; and he found himself in the midst of a palace, glittering with gold and jewels, destitute of every domestic comfort. He made his complaints to Malik Kafur, who turned them to good account, by insinuating that the queen and her sons Khizr Khan and Shadi Khan, together with his brother Aluf Khan, had entered into a conspiracy against his life. The brother was accordingly seized and put to death, while the queen and her sons were imprisoned.

During these domestic calamities, the flames of insurrection burst forth in various quarters. Gujarat took the lead, and defeated the general sent against it with great slaughter. The Rajputs of Chitor, rising against their Muhammedan officers, hurled them from the walls, and resumed their independence; while Harpal Deva, the son-in-law of Rama Deva, stirred up the Deccan, and expelled several of the Muhammedan garrisons. The tidings made Ala-ud-din mad with rage, and so increased his illness, that it took a fatal form, and carried him off in 1316, after a reign of twenty years. It is doubtful if his death was natural, for the subsequent conduct of his worthless favourite, Malik Kafur, tends to confirm the suspicion that poison was employed.

The day after the death, Malik Kafur produced a will, said to be spurious, by which the late king gave the crown to Prince Umar Khan, his youngest son, and made Malik regent during his minority. The young prince, then in his seventh year, was placed upon the throne, while Malik used him as a tool, and proceeded to carry out his own schemes. One of his first acts was to put out the eyes of Khizr Khan and Shadi Khan, and increase the rigour of the sultana's confinement. Another act, somewhat singular, as he was an eunuch, was to marry the young king's mother, who had ranked as Ala-ud-
Mubarak's reign, which lasted four years, is a mere tissue of vices and crimes. The officer who had saved his life, and been the main instrument of his elevation, was put to death, merely because it was said that he presumed upon his services. After this most ungrateful act, he began to show some little activity; and, besides sending Ein-ul-Mulk, a general of great abilities, into Gujarat, proceeded in person into the Deccan, and recovered the country of the Mahrattas. On returning, he sent his favourite, Malik Khusrow, to whom he had given the ensigns of royalty, as far as the Malabar coast. Here he remained about a year, and acquired immense wealth by plunder. His ambition being thus excited, he proposed to make himself sovereign of the Deccan. With this view, he endeavoured to gain over the chief officers of his army. He did not succeed; and a formal charge of treason was made against him to the king, who was, however, so blinded in his favour, that he punished his accusers, and trusted him still more than before.

Mubarak no sooner found himself in quiet possession of Gujarat, the Deccan, and most parts of Northern India; than the little activity which he had begun to display ceased, and he gave himself up to unbounded and shameless excesses. Indecencies which cannot be mentioned, were his daily amusements. Universal discontent and disgust were in consequence excited; but the first attempt on his life was made by his favourite, Khusrow. He had been repeatedly warned that a conspiracy was being hatched, and the proofs of it were so evident, that it had become the common talk. Still, his infatuation was continued; and he was not roused from it till the conspirators
were actually on the stairs of the palace. He endeavoured to make his escape by a private passage; but Khusraw, who knew of it, intercepted him, and a deadly struggle took place. Mubarak, being the stronger of the two, threw Khusraw on the ground, but could not disentangle himself from his grasp, as his hair was twisted in his enemy’s hand. The other conspirators had thus time to come up, and Mubarak’s head was severed from his body by a scimitar.

Khusraw was not allowed long to profit by his crime. He, indeed, ascended the throne in 1321, under the title of Nasir-ud-din, but a confederation of the nobility was immediately formed against him. It was headed by Ghazi Beg Tughluk, who had acquired great renown by his expedition against the Mughuls. In the battle which ensued, Khusraw was defeated, captured, and slain; and Ghazi Beg Tughluk, with some degree of reluctance, mounted the throne amid universal acclamations. The people saluted him Shah Jehan, “The King of the Universe;” but he assumed the more modest title of Ghiyas-ud-din, “The Aid of Religion.”

Ghiyas-ud-din Tughluk reigned little more than four years. He owed his crown to his fame as a warrior, and secured it by the better fame of a wise and just ruler. The incidents of his reign are few. One of the most important was the siege of Warangal, which had thrown off the Mohammedan yoke, and resumed its independence. Prince Aluf Khan, the king’s eldest son, conducted the siege; the Raja Luddur Deva the defence. Both sides greatly exerted themselves, and the losses were severe, particularly on the part of the besiegers, who not only failed to make a practicable breach, but, in consequence of the hot winds and severe weather, were seized with a malignant distemper, which daily swept off hundreds. The survivors, completely dispirited, were anxious to return home; and sinister rumours, circulated by the disaffected, caused general consternation, under the influence of which, a number of officers moved off suddenly during the night, with all their followers. Aluf Khan, thus deserted, had no alternative but to raise the siege. In the haste and disorder of his retreat, he was pursued by the enemy with great slaughter. The officers who deserted suffered equally. One died in a Hindu prison, another was cut off by the Mahrattas, and
their whole baggage was captured. One of the rumours which had been circulated, was the death of the king. The authors of the rumour having been discovered, were condemned to be buried alive, the king jocularly but barbarously remarking, "that as they had buried him alive in jest, he would bury them alive in earnest." A new army having been collected, Aluf Khan renewed the siege of Warangal, and obliged it to surrender. The news were celebrated with great rejoicings in the new citadel of Delhi, which had just been finished, and had received the name of Tughlakabad.

In 1325 Ghiyas-ud-din Tughluq, after a journey to Bengal to inquire into complaints made against the governors in that quarter, reached Afghanpur on his return. His son Aluf Khan, who had previously arrived with the nobles of the court to offer their congratulations, had hastily erected a wooden building for his reception. Here a splendid entertainment had been given; and the king, having ordered his equipage, was in the act of quitting the building to continue his journey, when the roof suddenly gave way and crushed him, with five of his attendants, in the ruins. The cause has been variously explained. Most attribute it to accident: some even to design. One author, not satisfied with either explanation, offers one of his own, and asserts, "that the building had been raised by magic, and the instant the magical charm which upheld it was dissolved, it fell."

Aluf Khan, the late king's eldest son, succeeded, under the title of Muhammad Tughluq. He is said to have been the most learned, eloquent, and accomplished prince of his time. He was well versed in history, having a memory so retentive that every date or event of which he once read, remained treasured up in it; wrote good poetry; and had made logic, mathematics, astronomy, and medicine his special study. The philosophy of the Greek schools was well known to him. With all these literary accomplishments, he was a skilful and valiant warrior, and thus united qualities so opposite that his contemporaries describe him as one of the wonders of the age. They also extol him for his piety, which he evinced by a careful observance of the rites enjoined, and strict abstinence from drunkenness and other vices forbidden by the Koran. This is the fair side of his charac-
for it had also its darker features. He was stern, cruel, and vindictive. As Ferishtā expresses it, "So little did he hesitate to spill the blood of God's creatures, that when anything occurred which excited him to that horrid extremity, one might have supposed his object was to extinguish the human species altogether."

In 1327 the Mughuls, who had ceased their incursions for many years, resumed them; and a celebrated leader, called Toormooshreen Khan, belonging to the tribe of Chaghatai, made his appearance in Hindustan at the head of a vast army. Province after province was overrun, and he advanced rapidly towards Delhi. Muhammad Tughluk, unable to meet him in the field, saved his capital by the fatal and humiliating expedient of buying him off by a ransom so large as to be almost equal to the price of his kingdom. The Mughul withdrew by way of Gujarat and Sind, but plundered both, and carried off an immense number of captives.

To compensate for what he had thus lost, Muhammad turned his eyes to the Deccan, the greater part of which he is said to have as effectually incorporated with his dominions as the villages in the vicinity of Delhi. All these conquests, however, were destined to be wrested from him in consequence of his grinding taxation, cruelty, and inordinate ambition. So heavy were the duties rigorously levied on the necessities of life, that the industrious, having no security that they would be permitted to reap the fruits, ceased to labour. The farmers, flying to the woods, lived by rapine; and the fields remaining uncultivated, whole provinces were desolated by famine. The currency, too, was tampered with; and Muhammad struck a copper coin, which, because his name was impressed upon it, he ordered to be received at an extravagant imaginary value. This idea, he is said by Ferishta, to have borrowed "from a Chinese custom of issuing paper on the emperor's credit, with the royal seal appended, in lieu of ready money." He shrewdly adds:—"The great calamity consequent upon this debasement of the coin, arose from the known instability of the government. Public credit could not long subsist in a state so liable to revolutions as Hindustan; for how could the people in the remote provinces receive for money the base representative of a treasury that so often changed its master?"
In the midst of the discontent and ruin produced by these wretched financial devices, Muhammad conceived the idea of enriching himself by the conquest of the empire of China. As a first step to the realization of this idea, he despatched his nephew Khusrav Malik, at the head of 100,000 horse, to subdue Nepal, and the mountainous region on both sides of the Himalaya, as far as the Chinese frontiers. This done, he was to follow in person. In vain did his more sagacious and faithful counsellors assure him that the whole scheme was visionary. He had made up his mind, and was not to be dissuaded.

Khusrav Malik made his way with great difficulty across the mountains, building forts as he proceeded, in order to secure the road. On arriving, in 1337, at the Chinese boundary with forces fearfully reduced, he found himself in front of a numerous army prepared to oppose his further progress. The sight struck the Indian army with dismay, and a precipitate retreat was commenced. The Chinese followed closely, while the mountaineers occupied the passes in the rear and plundered the baggage. For seven days the Indians remained in this perilous position, suffering all the horrors of famine. At length the rain began to fall in torrents. The first effect was to oblige the Chinese to retire to a greater distance, and Khusrav began to conceive hopes of making good his retreat. He was soon undeceived. The low grounds became inundated, while the mountains continued impervious. The result is easily told. The whole army melted away, and scarcely a man returned to relate the particulars.

One of the king's nephews, who was called Khurshasip, and held a government in the Deccan, was tempted by the general discontent which prevailed to aspire to the throne; and in 1338 openly raised the standard of revolt. He at first gained some advantages, but was afterwards captured and carried to Delhi, where he was flayed alive, and then paraded a horrid spectacle around the city, the executioner going before and proclaiming aloud, "Thus shall all traitors to their king perish."

Before this rebellion was suppressed, the king had taken the field in person, and fixed his headquarters at Devagiri. Its situation and strength so pleased him that he determined to make it his capital. His resolution once announced was inflexible, and
orders were forthwith issued that Delhi should be evacuated, and all its inhabitants, men, women, and children, with all their property, should migrate to Devagiri, the name of which was changed to Daulatabad. The abandonment of Delhi, which was styled, in the hyperbolical style of the East, "The Envy of the World," was productive of great misery and discontent, and Muhammad began to feel that the change of capital was an exploit which even all his energy and despotism could hardly accomplish. Having been led in the course of an expedition to the proximity of the old capital, those of his army who originally belonged to it, were seized with such a longing to return, that they deserted in great numbers and took refuge in the woods, determined to remain till the rest of the army should have left. The numbers of the troops were so thinned by this desertion, that the king had no alternative but to fix his residence at Delhi, and thus lure the deserters back. His original purpose, however, was not abandoned; and at the end of two years he carried off the whole of the inhabitants a second time to the Deccan, "leaving the noble metropolis of Delhi a resort for owls, and a dwelling-place for the beasts of the desert." Before he left, he was guilty of barbarities which are almost incredible. On one occasion, having set out with an immense hunting party, on arriving at the district of Behram, he made the startling announcement that he had come to hunt not beasts but men, and began to massacre the inhabitants. He completed the barbarity by carrying back some thousands of the heads of the slain to Delhi, and hanging them over the city walls.

These atrocities were more than human nature could endure, and rebellion, on a greater or less scale, broke out in every quarter—in Bengal, on the Malabar coast, and even in the new capital, Daulatabad. These two last rebellions seem to have somewhat cooled the king's partiality for the Deccan; and free permission was given to those whom he had forced to migrate, to return to Delhi. Thousands made the attempt; but a general famine was then raging, and while many perished by the way, many more reached their beloved Delhi, only to die in it. The most formidable insurrection of all broke out in the south. It was the result of a confederacy formed for the
express purpose of extirpating the Muhammedans from the Deccan. The principal leaders were Krishna Naig, son of Luddur Deva, who lived near Warangal, and Belal Deva, Raja of the Carnatic. So extensive and so successful was the confederacy, that, in a short time, Daulatabad was the only place within the Deccan which the Muhammedans could call their own. Ultimately, however, a considerable portion of the lost territory was recovered, and the whole Deccan was divided, as before, into four Muhammedan provinces. Though scarcely a month now passed without a revolt, and everything seemed ripe for a general revolution, Muhammad Tughluk kept his throne, and at last descended to the grave by a death which was not violent, and yet cannot well be called natural. He had ordered a large number of boats to be collected at Tatta, and proceeded thither across the Indus, to chastise the Sumara Prince of Sind, who had given protection to Malik Toghan, when heading a formidable revolt of Mughul mercenaries in Gujarat. When within sixty miles of Tatta, he was seized with fever, attributed by his physicians to a surfeit of fish. The symptoms were favourable, but his restless spirit would not allow him to remain to complete his recovery, and a fatal relapse ensued. His death took place in 1351, after a reign of twenty-seven years.

After a short struggle, in which a reputed son of the late king, a mere child, was put forward and immediately set aside, his cousin Firuz, known by the title of Firuz Tughluk, mounted the throne. Considering the troubled state of the country, two of the most remarkable facts of his reign are, its length of thirty-eight years, and its termination, by a peaceful death, at the age of ninety. The empire of Delhi, however, was evidently in a rapid state of decline. The Deccan could hardly be said to be incorporated with it; and Bengal was so completely dis-served that in 1356 Firuz consented to receive an ambassador from its king, with proposals of peace; and thus virtually; if not formally, acknowledged it as an independent kingdom. Both Bengal and the Deccan, however, still continued to pay a small tribute. Though Firuz does not figure as a warrior, he obtained a high name for wise legislation, and a large number of public works, in which, while magnificence was not forgot-
ten, utility was specially consulted. One of these works, in which 50,000 labourers were employed, was a canal, intended to connect the Sursuty or Sursa, a small tributary of the Sutlej, with a small stream, called the Sulima or Khanpur, and thereby obtain a perennial stream to flow through Sirhind and Munsurpur. The canal, if ever completed, no longer exists; but it deserves notice for the remarkable fact, that in the digging of it, about five centuries ago, fossil remains of a gigantic size were discovered and attracted much attention. It is not easy to say to what animals they belonged; but Ferishta, adopting the opinion which appears to have been formed at the time of the discovery, says they were the bones of elephants and men; and adds, “the bones of the human forearm measured three gaz (5 feet 2 inches); some of the bones were petrified, as some retained the appearance of bone.”

Among the other works of Firuz are enumerated—40 mosques, 30 colleges, 20 palaces, 100 hospitals, 100 caravanserais, 100 public baths, 150 bridges, 50 dams across rivers, and 30 reservoirs or lakes for irrigation. He appears to have been sufficiently conscious of his good deeds; and rather pharisaically caused some of them to be inscribed on the mosque of Firuzabad, a city which he had built in the vicinity of Delhi. The following may be taken as a sample—“It has been usual in former times to spill Muhammedan blood on trivial occasions; and, for small crimes, to mutilate and torture them, by cutting off the hands and feet, and noses and ears, by putting out eyes, by pulverizing the bones of the living criminal with mallets, by burning the body with fire, by crucifixion, and by nailing the hands and feet; by flaying alive, by the operation of hamstringing, and by cutting human beings to pieces. God, in his infinite goodness, having been pleased to confer on me—the power, has also inspired me with the disposition to put an end to these practices.”

Ghiyas-ud-din, whom his grandfather Firuz had associated with him in the government a year before he died, now became sole sovereign, but proved utterly unworthy of reigning, and within six months was assassinated. A contest for the succession took place: between Abu Baqr, a grandson, and Muhammad, a son of the late Firuz. The former had been placed on the throne by the assassins of Ghiyas-ud-din; but in
the course of eighteen months the latter displaced him, and assumed the title of Nasir-ud-din Muhammad Tughluk. He died in 1394, after a reign of six years and seven months, entirely barren of great events, and fruitful only in intestine dissensions; and was succeeded by his son Humayun, who assumed the name of Sikandar, and died suddenly, in the course of forty-five days. These constant changes threw everything into disorder, and a kind of anarchy ensued; each chief who thought himself strong enough making no scruple of throwing off his allegiance, and declaring himself independent. In Delhi alone there were two parties, each with a separate king, the one occupying Delhi proper, and the other Firuzabad. A third party, occupying the citadel, professed neutrality, but this only meant that they were endeavouring to hold the balance, with the view of ultimately selling themselves to the most advantage. Civil war thus raged in the very heart of the city, and the streets frequently ran with blood.

During this confusion, intelligence arrived, in 1396, that Prince Pir Muhammed Jehangir, grandson of the celebrated Timur or Tamerlane, had crossed the Indus by a bridge of boats, and laid siege to Ooch. The governor of Multan was preparing for the relief of it when Pir Muhammed, anticipating his movements, arrived, just in time to surprise the Multanis immediately after they had crossed the Beas. Their show of resistance was useless; and most of those who escaped the sword perished in the river. A few made good their retreat to Multan, but the victor was close at their heels, and the governor, Sarang Khan, had barely time to retire into the fort. After a siege of six months, want of provisions obliged him to surrender at discretion. The presence of such an enemy as Pir Muhammed Jehangir was a dire calamity. How fearfully must the calamity have been increased when he proved to be only the forerunner of his grandfather. The event is of sufficient importance to demand a new chapter.
Invasion of Timur

TIMUR, or Timur Beg, usually called by the Asiatics Amir Timur, and by Europeans Tamerlane, or Tamerlan, evidently a corruption for Timur Leng, or Lame Timur, an epithet applied to him on account of a certain degree of lameness, was born about 1336, in a village in the vicinity of Samarqand. According to some, he was only the son of a herdsman; but a more probable account is, that he was the son or grandson of a Tartar or Mughul chief. He himself traced his descent from Chinghiz Khan. On the downfall of the Mughul dynasty of Chaghatai, he managed to obtain the supremacy, and made Samarqand his capital. Possessing the ambition as well as the talents of a conqueror, he had overrun Persia, and extended his dominions over Central Asia, from the wall of China west to the frontiers of Europe, and even beyond, to Moscow. He was not yet satisfied; and in 1398, when his age must have exceeded sixty, he made his appearance on the west bank of the Indus, at the head of a mighty host. The convulsed state of the country promising an easy conquest, and the immense plunder which would necessarily follow, were his great inducements. His grandson had, as we have seen, been sent before, apparently to feel the way. He himself now crossed the river, and commenced a course of almost unparalleled massacre and devastation. Having arrived at the junction of the Chenab and Ravi, where the town and strong fort of Tulumba are situated, he crossed by a bridge; and, entering the town, plundered it, and slaughtered the inhabitants without mercy. The fort was too strong to be taken by assault. He therefore left it, and proceeded to a town called Shahnowaz, where, finding more grain than his own troops required, he caused the rest to be
burned. On crossing the Beas, he entered a rich and plentiful country. Meanwhile, his grandson, Pir Muhammed Jehangir, had met with more obstruction. After taking Multan, the rainy season commenced, and so many of the cavalry encamped in the open country were destroyed, that he was under the necessity of lodging his whole army within the walls. Here he became so completely hemmed in and cut off from supplies, that he was in the greatest danger of losing his whole army, when Tamerlane, after sending forward a detachment of 30,000 select horse, joined him with his whole army.

Tamerlane now marched to Bhatnir, which was crowded with people flying in terror from the surrounding districts. On his approach half of them were driven out of the town, and obliged to take shelter under the walls. After a short resistance from the governor, he forced his entrance, and committed so many cruelties that the garrison, seeing the fate which awaited them, killed their wives and children in despair, set fire to the place, and, rushing out, sold their lives as dearly as they could, by killing some thousands of the Mughuls. Tamerlane, in revenge, laid Bhatnir in ashes, after causing every soul in it to be massacred. Sursuti, Fatehabad, Rajpur, and other towns, were subjected to similar barbarities. These however, were merely preludes to a more general extermination.

Tamerlane's great object was Delhi, towards which he kept steadily advancing. Having at length advanced opposite to it, he crossed the river with only 700 horse, to reconnoitre. Muhammad Tughluk, then the pageant King of Delhi, and his minister, Sultu Iqbal Khan, tempted by the smallness of his attendants, sallied out with 5,000 horse, and twenty-seven elephants. Notwithstanding their superiority in numbers, the Delhi troops were repulsed. A vast number of prisoners were in the Mughul camp, and some of them, on seeing Tamerlane attacked at a disadvantage, could not refrain from expressing their joy. The circumstance being reported to this cruel barbarian, he took his revenge by ordering that all the prisoners above the age of fifteen should be put to the sword. In this horrid massacre, nearly 100,000 men, almost all Hindus, are said to have perished.

Having now forded the river with his whole army, Tamerlane encamped on the plain of Firuzabad. The King of Delhi and
his minister again risked the encounter, but with the same result as before. The elephants, on which they mainly trusted, being, at the first charge, deprived of most of their drivers, turned back, and spread confusion in their own ranks. Tamerlane gave no time to rally; and, following the fugitives up to the very gates of Delhi, there fixed his headquarters. Consternation now spread over the city; and the king, instead of attempting to allay it, thought only of his own safety, and fled in the direction of Gujarat. All idea of resistance being abandoned, the chief men of the city, crowding to the camp, made their submission, and Tamerlane was formally proclaimed emperor. A heavy contribution having been ordered, some difficulty was found in levying it. On this pretext, a body of soldiers were sent into the city, and immediately commenced an indiscriminate plunder. It had continued for five days before Tamerlane was even aware of it. He had remained outside in the camp to celebrate a festival in honour of his victory, and the first intimation of the proceedings in Delhi was given him when he saw it in flames; for the Hindus, in despair, had murdered their wives and children, set fire to their houses, and then rushed out to perish by the sword. A general massacre ensued, and some streets became impassable from heaps of dead. The amount of plunder was beyond calculation. Tamerlane remained at Delhi fifteen days, and then commenced his return home, carrying with him, as part of his own share of the spoil, 120 elephants, twelve rhinoceroses, and a great number of curious animals belonging to a menagerie which Firuz Tughluk had formed. He is also said to have been so much struck with admiration at the mosque which that monarch had built, and on the walls of which he had inscribed the history of his reign, that he took back the architects and masons to Samarqand to build one on a similar plan.

He first halted at Panipat, and sent a detachment to besiege Meerut. The garrison, confiding in its strength, ridiculed the very idea of capture, and insultingy reminded the officer of the defeat which another Mughul general had sustained before it. The officer, without attempting anything, returned to Tamerlane, who forthwith appeared in person, and commenced running mines with such rapidity that his ultimate success was
certain. The process, however, seemed too slow to his Mughuls, who, having filled up the ditch, applied their scaling-ladders and grappling-irons to the walls, carried the place by assault, and put every soul within it to the sword. The mines employed by Tamerlane in this and many other sieges, were not intended to be filled with gunpowder, as in modern warfare, but merely to sap the foundations of the walls, which, while the process was being carried on, were supported by wooden frames. When the process was finished, the wooden frames were set on fire, and the walls, thus left without support, necessarily tumbled. In this instance the Mughul conqueror, to wreak his vengeance more effectually, completed his mines after the place had been taken without them, and thus entirely destroyed its defences.

In continuing his march, Tamerlane skirted the mountains of Sewalik, crossed the Ganges, and laid waste the whole country with fire and sword along its banks up to the point where it bursts from its rocky gorges. He afterwards repassed the river, and ultimately reached Samarqand by way of Kabul. Before he left, a Gukkur chief, taking advantage of his absence, got possession of Lahore, and refused to acknowledge his authority. He therefore sent a detachment against that city, which fell in a few days. While he halted at Jammu, Khizr Khan, who had submitted to him and become a favourite, was appointed by him viceroy of Multan, Lahore, and Dipalpur.

For two months after Tamerlane's departure, Delhi was a prey to anarchy, and was at the same time ravaged by pestilence and famine. After a series of sanguinary struggles, Mullu Iqbal Khan, the old Muhammedan Wazir, gained the ascendancy, and something like regular government was re-established. This return to order induced many of the inhabitants who had fled to return; and the city, which had recently been a smoking ruin, began to recover. In addition to a small district around the city, Mullu Iqbal obtained possession of the Doab, or the tract lying between the Jamuna and Ganges. This was now all that remained of what had recently been a great empire. All the other provinces were seized by the governors, who continued to hold them in their own names as independent kingdoms.

Mullu Iqbal Khan was not contented that Delhi should be thus shorn of its greatness. He added considerably to its territory
by successful attacks on neighbouring governors; and made affairs to assume an appearance so promising that the ex-king, Mahmud Tughluk, who had found an asylum first at Gujarat, and then at Malwa, was induced, by his invitation, to return in 1401. Mullu Iqbal, however, still continued to retain the sovereign power in his own hands; and Mahmud, feeling ill at ease, was provided for by being put in possession of Kanauj. Mullu Iqbal, having thus got quit of him, appears soon to have forgotten all the deference which he used to show him; for, in 1404, after a victory which filled him with ambitious longings, he did not hesitate to lead an army against his old sovereign. Mahmud shut himself up in Kanauj; and Mullu, unable to reduce it, raised the siege. He shortly after turned his arms against Khizr Khan, but his good fortune forsook him, and he was defeated and slain in 1405.

On this event, the officers who had been left in Delhi gave an invitation to Mahmud Tughluk, who, leaving Kanauj, came with a small retinue, and was re-seated on his throne. Mahmud had neither the sense nor courage necessary to maintain his positions; and after various vicissitudes, shut himself up in Firuzabad, where he was besieged by Khizr Khan, who was, however, obliged to raise the siege from want of forage and provisions. The release was only temporary, for having obtained supplies, he immediately returned. Meanwhile, Mahmud had removed to Siri, the old citadel of Delhi. A similar cause obliged Khizr Khan to retire as before; but the deliverance proved as fatal to Mahmud as the capture of the citadel would have been. The transition from fear to joy, and immoderate exertion during a hunting excursion, brought on a fever, of which he died in 1412. With him ended the race of Turks, the adopted slaves of Sultan Shahab-ud-din Ghori. His inglorious and disastrous reign had lasted, with interruptions, twenty years. The nobles immediately placed an Afghan, of the name of Daulut Khan Lodi, on the throne. He held it nominally for fifteen months, and was then deposed by Khizr Khan, in 1416.

Khizr Khan had gained the favour of Tamerlane, and been appointed, as already mentioned, governor of Lahore, Multan, and Dipalpur. Hence, though on the deposition of Daulat Khan Lodi, he assumed the reins of government at Delhi, he
refused to appropriate regal titles, affecting to regard himself as only the deputy of Tamerlane, in whose name money was coined, and the Khutba was read. Even after Tamerlane’s death, the same policy induced Khizr Khan to acknowledge the supremacy of his successor, Shahrokh Mirza, and even send tribute occasionally to Samarqand. His reign or regency, which was terminated by his death in 1421, after it had lasted little more than seven years, presents few important events; but his conduct contrasts favourably with that of his predecessors, and the inhabitants of Delhi showed their respect for his memory by wearing black, their garb of mourning, during three days.

Mubarak, Khizr Khan’s eldest son, succeeded him, in virtue of a nomination by his father, when he felt his end approaching. His first military operations were carried on in the Punjab, where he succeeded, but not without difficulty, in suppressing a serious insurrection. The rebel, Jusrut Gukkur, though repeatedly defeated, managed always to escape, and to appear unexpectedly in some other quarter as strong as ever. He even succeeded in creating a diversion in his favour by forming an alliance with Amir Sheikh Ali, a Mughul chief in the service of Shahrokh Mirza, governor of Kabul, and inducing him to make an incursion into Sind. The King of Malwa, taking advantage of these disturbances, invested Gwalior, in the hope of adding it to his dominions. Mubarak’s attention was thus fully occupied; and his whole reign of thirteen years furnishes nothing more important than a succession of revolts. His temper, said to have been so equable that he never spoke in anger during his life, was probably ill fitted for the times in which he lived. A conspiracy, in which some of his own family were implicated, was formed against him, and he was basely assassinated in the new city of Delhi, while at worship in a mosque.

Prince Muhammad, Mubarak’s son, though not one of the actual perpetrators of his father’s murder, was perfectly cognizant of it, and endeavoured to turn it to account by immediately mounting the throne. His first act was to proclaim his own shame and guilt, by rewarding the conspirators. The appointment of the ringleader, Sarvar-ul-mulk, to the office of Wazir, produced general indignation; and a confederacy was formed, which soon broke out into open rebellion. The
malcontents marched at once upon Delhi; and Muhammad, seeing that his Wazir was chiefly aimed at, thought he might save himself by abandoning him to his fate. The Wazir, however, was too crafty to be thus caught; and no sooner learned that the king was in communication with his enemies, than he formed a band of assassins, and broke into the palace in order to murder his master. He, too, had been put on his guard, and had laid a trap for the Wazir, who fell into it and was cut to pieces.

Muhammad, now apparently on good terms with the confederates who had laid siege to Delhi, thought himself safe; and, throwing off all restraint, spent his time in sensual indulgence. The administration of affairs, thus neglected, fell into disorder; discontent prevailed, and an insurrection broke out in Multan among the Afghans. Buhlul Lodi, who had placed himself at their head, had previously usurped the government of Sirhind, and now made himself master of Lahore, Dipalpur, and all the country as far south as Panipat. Buhlul, unable to cope with the royal army which was sent against him, was driven into the hills, and, abandoning open force, determined to try the effect of intrigue. This he managed so dexterously that the king, on his suggestion, put one of his ablest and most faithful servants to death; and then, in order to suppress the disturbances which this imbecile and iniquitous act had produced, had recourse to Buhlul for assistance. The crafty Afghan at once obeyed the summons, and marched to Delhi with 20,000 horsemen arrayed in armour. Though this reinforcement made the royal army superior to that of the insurgents, he refused to take the field, and, like a coward, shut himself up in his palace. The brunt of the action which ensued fell upon Buhlul, who acquitted himself manfully; and, in consequence, rose into such favour that Muhammad adopted him as his son. Matters seemed now ripe for the execution of the schemes which Buhlul had all along contemplated. He accordingly strengthened his army by numerous bodies of Afghans, and, throwing off the mask, marched upon Delhi. The siege which he commenced proved more formidable than he had anticipated, and he determined to wait a little longer. Meantime the weak and dissolute Muhammad was permitted, notwithstanding
Invasion of Timur

his crime of parricide, to die a natural death, in 1445, after a reign of twelve years.

Ala-ud-din, Muhammad’s son, mounted the throne, and immediately received the homage of all the chiefs except Buhlul, who was probably not unwilling to provoke a contest in which he felt confident that he would prove the victor. Ala-ud-din was too powerless or too mean-spirited to resent the insult, and soon fell into general contempt, the people not hesitating to say openly that he was a weaker man than his father. The kingdom of Delhi now possessed scarcely a shadow of its former greatness; for the whole that could be considered as properly belonging to it was the city of Delhi and a small tract in its vicinity. All the rest of Hindustan was broken up into separate principalities. The Deccan, Gujarat, Malwa, Jaunpur, and Bengal had each its independent king; while all the other territories, though nominally subordinate to Delhi, were in the hands of chiefs equally independent. At the head of these was, as has been already seen, Buhlul Lodi, whose designs on the capital had been repeatedly declared by overt acts, and were only postponed to a fitting opportunity. This opportunity soon arrived.

Ala-ud-din had early taken a great fancy for Budaun, where he had spent some time in building pleasure-houses and laying out gardens. He thought that its air agreed better with his health than Delhi, and wished to make it his residence. The remonstrances of his Wazir, who showed him the danger, dissuaded him for a time; but crafty courtiers, having succeeded in bringing the Wazir into disgrace, he immediately proceeded to follow out his own wishes, regardless of the consequences, and set off to enjoy himself at Budaun, leaving a deputy to act for him at Delhi. The Wazir, though disgraced, was still alive. The very thought made him uneasy; and some of his counsellors, taking advantage of the feeling, persuaded him that his best policy would be to take the Wazir’s life. The order to that effect was accordingly given; but the Wazir was put on his guard, and made his escape to Delhi, where he had influence enough to obtain possession of all the royal effects. The king was urged to hasten back to his capital and strike a decisive blow, but he only made frivolous excuses for delay. One day it was the weather, which made it disagreeable to travel; another
day it was the stars, which pronounced it unlucky. The Wazir made better use of the time, and invited Buhlul Lodi to assume the government. Buhlul set out at once, but gave a new specimen of his Afghan craft by writing to Ala-ud-din that his only object in going was to expel the Wazir. This was too much even for the imbecile monarch to believe; and he voluntarily took the step to which he saw he would soon be forced, by formally abdicating the throne in Buhlul's favour, on condition of being permitted to reside quietly at Budaun. Here the remainder of his life, extending to nearly twenty-eight years, was spent. He had previously reigned seven years at Delhi.

Buhlul, the founder of the Lodi Afghan dynasty, began his reign in 1450. The circumstances of his birth were extraordinary, and being interpreted to portend his future greatness, very probably contributed to realize it. Before he was born his mother was killed by the fall of her house. Her husband, Malik Kali, governor of a district in Sirhind, immediately ordered her body to be opened, and, strange to say, the life of the infant was saved. His uncle, Malik Sultan, who had been appointed governor of Sirhind with the title of Islam Khan, rewarded his valour by giving him his daughter in marriage, and making him his heir, to the exclusion of his own full-grown sons. Islam Khan had usually retained 12,000 Afghans, mostly of his own tribe, in his service. The greater part of these joined Buhlul. The King of Delhi had his suspicions roused as to the ultimate objects of the Afghans; and, by inducing Jasrat Gukkur to take the field against them, drove them to the hills. Here Buhlul headed them, made many predatory incursions, and, by the liberality with which he divided the spoil, attracted great numbers to his standard. The Wazir, Hissam Khan, whom the king sent against him, was signally defeated. The result, as has been already related, was that Buhlul found means to ingratiate himself with the king, was adopted as his son, and at last succeeded in displacing Mubarak, who retired into private life, and went to reside, despised or forgotten, at his favourite residence of Budaun.

After Buhlul succeeded, he continued for a time to treat the Wazir, to whom he was mainly indebted for his elevation, with great respect; but afterwards, thinking he presumed too
much on what he had done, he caused some of his servants to seize him. The Wazir, though not aware of the offence which he had given, expected nothing but death; but Buhlul told him that, in gratitude for past services, he had a security for his life; the only thing necessary now was, that he should cease to meddle with public affairs, and spend the rest of his life in retirement. In 1451, during an absence of Buhlul in Multan, a formidable insurrection broke out, headed by Mahmud Shah Sharqi, King of Jaunpur, who advanced with a large army, and laid siege to Delhi. Buhlul returned with precipitation; and, by putting down the rebellion, placed his power on a firmer basis than before.

The kingdom of Delhi, contracted in extent as it then was, could not satisfy the ambition of Buhlul, who no sooner found himself firmly seated than he began to think of new conquests. He was not very successful; for he was obliged to make a treaty which bound him to limit his possession to the territories which had belonged to Delhi in the time of Mubarak. His most formidable enemies were the different members of the Sharqi family. Among them, Husain Shah Sharqi took the lead. At one time he advanced against Delhi with 100,000 horse and 1,000 elephants; at another he obliged him to make a treaty, by which he relinquished all right to any territory east of the Ganges. Ultimately, however, Buhlul gained so many decided advantages, that a great part of the Sharqi territory was incorporated with his own.

Buhlul, when he mounted the throne, had a family of nine sons. As he advanced in years, and felt the cares of government weighing heavily upon him, he adopted the very injudicious measure of partitioning his territory among them. In this way the amalgamation of the conquests, which had been the great object of his life, was completely frustrated. Shortly after making this arrangement he was seized with illness, and died in 1488, after a reign of nearly thirty-nine years.

He had previously declared that his son Nizam Khan, to whom he had allotted Delhi and several districts in the Doab, should be his successor. He was not the lawful heir; for the eldest son of Buhlul, though dead, had left a son, whose title, according to the ordinary rules of succession, was certainly preferable. Nizam Khan owed this preference to the influence
of his mother, the daughter of a goldsmith, whose beauty had given her the first place in the harem. After a short contest, all opposition to the appointment ceased, and he assumed the title of Sikandar. His reign, which lasted twenty-eight years, was peaceful, at least compared with that of his predecessors; and he is described as remarkable alike for the comeliness of his person and the excellence of his character. In general, justice was administered impartially, but some remarkable instances of intolerance have left a stain on his reputation. One of these deserves to be recorded.

About 1499, a Brahmin of the name of Budhun, an inhabitant of a village near Lucknow, being upbraided by some Muhammedans on account of his faith, defended himself by maintaining “that the religions, both of the Muslims and Hindus, if acted on with sincerity, were equally acceptable to God.” He argued the point so ingeniously that considerable attention was excited, and the subject was publicly discussed before the Qazis of Lucknow. These judges did not agree in their conclusion; and the governor, as the best way of settling the matter, sent the Brahmin and all the other parties to Sambhal, where the court then happened to be. The king, who was well informed on religious subjects, and was fond of hearing them discussed, ordered the most learned of his subjects to assemble and debate with the Brahmin. At the very outset of the proceeding there was thus a considerable want of fairness, as the Brahmin was unsupported, while no fewer than nine of the ablest Muhammedan doctors were arrayed against him. The result was that the chosen nine found themselves perfectly in the right, and the Brahmin altogether in the wrong. As a natural consequence, they were rewarded with gifts; and it would have been well if these had satisfied them, and they had allowed their opponent to go his way. A very different course was followed. The Brahmin, in maintaining that the Hindu faith was entitled to rank on a footing of equality with the Muhammedan, was held to have insulted the Prophet; and the only alternative left was to turn Muhammedan or suffer death. He preferred the latter, and was accordingly executed.

The king appears to have been as fond of judicial as of religious questions, and often sat in person in the courts of law. Some of the decisions which he pronounced are celebrated.
Two brothers, private soldiers, had, among other booty obtained during a siege, become possessed of two large rubies of different shapes. One of the brothers having determined to quit the service and return to his family at Delhi, the other intrusted him with his share of the plunder, including one of the rubies, and told him to deliver it to his wife. The soldier who had continued to serve, on returning after the war was ended, asked his wife for the ruby, and was told that she had never seen it. The brother, on the contrary, declared that he had delivered it; and when the case was brought before the court, produced a number of witnesses who swore that they had seen him deliver it. The judge, acting on this testimony, decided against the woman, telling her to go home and give the ruby to her husband. Her home was thus rendered so uncomfortable that, as a last resource, she laid her complaint before the king. He listened patiently to her statement, and then summoned all the parties before him. The witnesses repeated their evidence; and, in order to strengthen it, affirmed that they perfectly recollected the size and shape of the ruby, which they had seen given. On this the witnesses were separated, and a piece of wax being given to each of them, as well as to each of the soldiers, they were told to mould it into the form of the gem. On examination, the models of the soldiers agreed, but that of all the others differed. The king drew the inference that the soldiers alone had seen the ruby, and the witnesses had been suborned to perjure themselves. It is added that a confession to this effect was afterwards extorted from them.

Sikandar was succeeded in 1517 by his son Ibrahim. Under his grandfather and father, the Afghans had regarded themselves as a dominant race, and their chiefs, besides monopolizing all the great offices of the state, sat in the royal presence, while all others were constrained to stand. Ibrahim accordingly gave them mortal offence, when, at the commencement of his reign, he announced his determination to make no distinction between his officers, and said publicly, that "kings should have no relations nor clansmen." He was soon made to feel the weight of their indignation. They did not, indeed; attempt to dethrone him; but endeavoured to partition his territories by placing his brother, Jalal Khan, on the throne of Jaunpur. Jalal accordingly assumed the title of king, appointed his own Wazir,
and was acknowledged by all the officers of the eastern provinces. The Afghan chiefs soon began to discover that the revenge which they had taken told as much against themselves as against Ibrahim. They and their followers formed a small minority of the population, and nothing but perfect union could enable them to maintain their ascendancy. Influenced by this consideration, they would fain have retraced their steps, but Jalal Khan had no idea of resigning his newly-acquired honour's, and a civil war ensued. In the end, Ibrahim, having regained the confidence of the Afghan chiefs, crushed the rebellion of Jalal Khan, who, having fallen into his brother's hands, was by his private orders assassinated.

This rebellion was no sooner suppressed than another, still more formidable, broke out. Islam Khan, brother of Fateh Khan, whom Jalal had made his Wazir, believing that Ibrahim had vowed the ruin of his family, availed himself of his influence as governor of Kara, to form a strong party, and immediately raised the standard of revolt. The first detachment sent against him fell into an ambuscade, and suffered a very severe loss. The insurgents, in consequence, advanced, flushed with victory, and so reinforced that they mustered 40,000 cavalry, 500 elephants, and a large body of infantry. The armies arrived in sight of each other, but, instead of fighting, came to a parley, on the suggestion of Sheikh Raju Bokhari, a man in universal esteem for his reputed sanctity. Terms of accommodation were proposed and agreed to; but the king was only playing a part. He had sent orders to the collector of Ghazipur, and the governor of Oudh, to advance, and his object was to keep the insurgents amused till he should be able to overpower them. They discovered their error when it was too late; and having no alternative but to flee or fight on unequal terms, chose the latter. The issue was not long doubtful. After a resistance, dictated rather by despair than by any hope of victory, they fled in all directions.

Ibrahim now thought himself secure; but he had only obtained a short respite. Bahadur Khan, on the death of his father, who was governor of Bihar, immediately declared himself independent, and assumed the title of king. Numerous discontented chiefs joined him; and, at the head of 100,000 horse, he made himself master of all the country as far as Sambhal,
defeating the Delhi army in several engagements. A still more
fatal step was taken by Daulat Khan Lodi, the governor of Lahore. 
He had at first taken part with the king, but became alarmed at
the repeated instances of his perfidy. Not seeing any security
for his family in any terms of accommodation which Ibrahim
might be induced to grant, and conscious, at the same time, of
his inability to meet him in the open field, he entered into a
communication with Babar, who was then reigning in Kabul.
That prince had long kept his eye fixed on Hindustan, which,
as a direct descendant of Tamerlane, he regarded as part of his
inheritance. Nothing, therefore, could be more in accordance
with his wishes than Daulat Khan’s invitation. He was well acqui-
ainted with the convulsed state of the country; for at this very
time Ala-ud-din, the brother of Ibrahim, was living in exile at
his court. Before taking the field in person, Babar sent forward
this prince, who was immediately joined by Daulat Khan. Many
other officers of distinction also rallied around his standard, and
he continued his march towards Delhi, with the intention of
laying siege to it. His army mustered 40,000 horse. Ibrahim
went out to oppose him, but suffered himself to be surprised in
the night, and, after a tumultuous conflict, found, when the
day dawned, that most of his officers had deserted to the enemy.
The troops, however, had remained faithful, and an opportunity
of regaining more than he had lost immediately presented itself.
The troops of Ala-ud-din, thinking they had secured the
victory, had dispersed to plunder. Ibrahim, before they were
aware, was on them with his elephants and as many of his
soldiers as he had rallied, and drove them from the field with
great slaughter. Ala-ud-din, giving up all for lost, made a
precipitate retreat to the Punjab, and Ibrahim once more en-
tered Delhi in triumph. It was of short duration; for the only
effect of Ala-ud-din’s discomfiture was to bring Babar across
the Indus in the end of 1525. As the details must be left for
another chapter, it is sufficient here to mention the result. The
kings met in the beginning of the following year, on the plain
of Panipat, and a sanguinary battle was fought, which termin-
nated the life of Ibrahim, and extinguished the Lodi Afghan
dynasty. On its ruins the far more celebrated dynasty of the
Great Mughul was erected.
Babar and Humayun

Babar was the sixth in descent from Tamerlane. His grandfather, Abu Said Mirza, left eleven sons, among whom his extensive dominions were divided. Omar Sheikh Mirza, the fourth son, was for some time governor of Kabul, but was transferred to Ferghana, situated on the upper course of the Jaxartes. This province, of which he was in possession when Abu Said died, was afterwards held by him as an independent sovereignty. He had married the sister of Mahmud Khan, a descendant of Chaghatai Khan, and through him connected with Chinghiz Khan. Babar was her son, and was, consequently, by the mother's side, a Mughul. It is somewhat singular that, in his own Memoirs, he always speaks with contempt of the Mughul race, though the dynasty which he was about to establish in India was destined to take its name from it. The explanation is, that the title Great Mughul was not chosen by him, but was applied, in accordance with the Hindu custom of giving the name of Mughuls to all the Muhammedans of the north-west, with the single exception of the Afghans. When his father died, Babar was only twelve years of age. He was thus deprived of his natural protector before he could be expected to be able to act for himself. To add to the misfortune, his uncles, who ought to have befriended him, were ungenerous enough to resent a quarrel which they had had with the father, on the son. But Babar had talents equal to the difficulties of his position. On learning his father's death, he took immediate steps to secure the succession. As the eldest son, he had the best title to it, and there was no room for dispute. It was necessary, however, to consult his uncle, Sultan Ahmed Mirza, ruler of Samarqand and Bokhara, to whom the supremacy belonged;
and Babar sent an embassy to him, to say, "It is plain you must place one of your servants in the command of this country; I am at once your son and your servant; if you appoint me, your purpose will be answered in the most satisfactory manner." This honest but plain dealing gave dissatisfaction, and a hostile answer was returned. The uncle was, in fact, already on the march, determined to complete the conquest which he had begun while Babar’s father was alive, and make himself sole master of Ferghana. On this occasion fortune favoured the friendless youth. In crossing a river, the bridge, which was crowded with his uncle’s troops, gave way, and great numbers of men, horses and camels perished. This was regarded as ominous particularly as a defeat had been sustained at the same spot three or four years before. The army, in consequence, became panic-struck, and showed the utmost reluctance to advance. While they were hesitating, the horses were seized with a fatal disease, and Babar’s army made its appearance. All these circumstances made the invaders disposed to listen to terms of accommodation, and patch up a hasty peace, when a resolute advance of a few miles would probably have put them in possession of Indijan, Babar’s capital.

No sooner was this danger escaped, than another, of an equally formidable nature, threatened him. The Sultan Mahmud Khan made his appearance in the north, and laid siege to Babar’s fortress of Akhsi. After repeated assaults, which were repulsed with great valour, he abandoned the attempt as hopeless, and made the best of his way home. A third enemy advanced from the east, plundering and devastating as he came. He was, however, still more easily disposed of than the others, having brought himself into a position out of which, if full advantage had been taken, he could not have extricated himself. Babar, thus freed from the perils which had environed him, turned his leisure to good account, and made many important internal improvements.

He had hitherto been contented to act on the defensive, but in 1495 he found himself strong enough to change his tactics, and attempt the conquest of Khojend. It had at one time belonged to his father, and on this ground he thought himself entitled to take it if he could. The task proved easier
than he anticipated, and he gained possession of it almost without resistance. His next attempt was on Uratuppa; but as the inhabitants had carried home all their grain and provender, thus making it impossible for him to obtain supplies, and as the winter was about to set in, he was obliged to retreat. In 1496, the succession to Samarqand having been disputed, three different claimants appeared, and invaded the country in three different directions. Babar was one of them; but as none of them was able to establish an ascendancy, they all three retired. In the following year Babar renewed the attempt, and conducted his operations with so much skill and valour, that, before the year expired, both the city and territory of Samarqand were in his possession. He was accordingly crowned, and acknowledged by most of the nobles; but as the city had capitulated, and he was anxious to conciliate the inhabitants, he forbade all plunder. The troops were grievously disappointed, and began to disperse. Others, not satisfied with this, went off in a body, and offered their services to Jehangir Mirza, Babar's brother, who was treacherous enough to listen to their overtures, and seize on Indijan, one of the leading districts of Ferghana.

As this time, when all the talents which Babar possessed would scarcely have sufficed, he was seized with a dangerous illness, and found his affairs on the verge of ruin. Samarqand was held by a most precarious tenure; and it was obvious that the moment he ceased to overawe it by his personal presence, he would lose it altogether. He resolved, notwithstanding, to make this sacrifice; for his paternal dominions were dearer to him than any new conquest, however valuable, and he could not brook the idea of having them dismembered by the perfidy of a brother. He accordingly set out towards Indijan, but he arrived only in time enough to learn that the officers to whom the defence of it was intrusted, had been induced, by a rumour of his death, to surrender, and that Jehangir had actually mounted the throne. Both Samarqand and Indijan were thus lost. Babar was now in the utmost distress, and applied for aid to his maternal uncle, Sultan Mahmud Khan. His brother Jehangir applied at the same time, and Mahmud, unwilling to interfere in the quarrels of his nephews, gave no assistance to either. Ultimately, however, he departed so far from this reso-
lution as to take open part with Babar, who, after various vicissitudes, recovered his paternal kingdom in 1499. He even set out to attempt the recovery of Samarqand, but was only on the way when he received the mortifying intelligence that the Uzbeks had anticipated him, and made themselves masters both of Samarqand and Bokhara. The consequence was, that he was not only frustrated in the hope of taking Samarqand, but again lost Ferghana, which had been overrun in his absence.

His only resource was to betake himself to the mountains, and wait there till fortune should again smile upon him. While almost disconsolate at the disasters which had befallen him, he lay down in a grove to sleep, and dreamed that Abdullah, a darvesh of great repute, called at his house. He invited him to sit down, and ordered a table-cloth to be spread for him; but the darvesh, apparently offended, rose to go away. While Babar endeavoured to detain him, the darvesh took hold of his arm, and lifted him up towards the sky. The dream is neither striking nor significant; but Babar and his followers regarded it as a promise of future good fortune, and determined, in consequence, to make another attempt on Samarqand.

The capture of the city was one of the exploits on which Babar particularly plumed himself, and he dwells on it with evident exultation in his Memoirs. Here, however, only the leading facts can be mentioned. His small party mustered only 320 men, and yet with these he succeeded in making himself master of a large capital, occupied by warlike Uzbeks, whom Shaibani Khan, a veteran general of high reputation, commanded. Having secretly arrived in the vicinity at midnight, he sent forward eighty of his party to a low part of the wall, which they immediately scaled by means of a grappling-robe. Going afterwards round, they surprised and overpowered the guard in charge of one of the gates, opened it, and let in Babar with the 240 who were with him. They immediately rushed along the streets, proclaiming Babar's name as they passed. It carried a charm with it to the ears of many of the inhabitants, who immediately rallied around him, while the Uzbeks ran confusedly from place to place, ignorant both of the position and numbers of their assailants. When the alarm reached the headquarters, Shaibani Khan, who occupied the fort with
7,000 men, set out with a small body to reconnoitre, and on finding that Babar had gained some thousands of the inhabitants, who were rending the air with acclamations, was so frightened that he took the opposite gate, and fled towards Bokhara. Babar obtained quiet possession.

Babar was aware that the victory was only half won so long as the Uzbeks maintained their footing in the country, and he laboured to unite the neighbouring chiefs in a general coalition for the purpose of expelling them. Owing to dissensions and jealousies, his exertions were unavailing, and he was left to fight single-handed with his formidable foes. They proved more than a match for him; and he sustained a defeat which obliged him to shut himself up within the walls. Here he defended himself till he suffered all the horrors of famine, and saw no resource but to take advantage of the night, and escape with about 100 faithful attendants. This flight took place in the beginning of 1501, and he was once more a homeless wanderer. He found an asylum with his uncle, Sultan Mahmud Khan, who gave him the town of Aratiba for his residence. Here his relentless enemy, Shaibani Khan, found him out, and he removed to Tashkend, where he remained for some time in a state of despondency. At length an opening appeared in his hereditary kingdom, and by the aid of his two uncles he obtained possession of Akhsi, one of its strongest forts. It was only a gleam of sunshine before the coming storm. Shaibani Khan again appeared, and conquered as before. In addition to his own misfortune, Babar had the misery to see his uncles involved in his fate. They were both taken prisoners, and released only at the expense of their kingdoms. Sultan Mahmud Khan was unable to bear up under the stroke, and his health began to decline. One of his friends, hinting that Shaibani Khan had poisoned him, offered some tiriak of Khutta, a medicine which was then in high repute as an antidote. The sultan replied, "Yes! Shaibani Khan has poisoned me indeed! He has taken away my kingdom, which it is not in the power of your tiriak of Khutta to restore."

Babar had at one time some thoughts of trying his fortune in China. His own country, at all events, seemed shut against him, and he quitted it for ever. But he had no intention of
closing his career. Though he had seen much of the world, and experienced many reverses, he had only attained the age when most men begin to make their appearance in the public stage of life. He was little more than twenty, and was borne up by the belief, which conscious talent and great natural buoyancy of spirits suggested, that some great destiny awaited him. In 1504 he took the direction of the east, where he saw no field of enterprise so promising as Kabul, which had fallen into a state of anarchy. It had once been ruled by his father, and subsequently by his uncle, Ulugh Beg, who had died in 1501, leaving an infant son. The minister took the whole government into his own hands, but soon disgusted the nobles, and was assassinated. Great convulsions followed, and Kabul became a common prey to dissensions within, and invasion from without. A foreign usurper was on the throne when Babar arrived. He found little difficulty in displacing him; and though his cousin, the above son of Ulugh Beg, was still alive, he regarded the kingdom as a lawful conquest, and ruled it in his own name. His ambition was not yet satisfied, and, taking advantage of favourable circumstances, he made himself master of Kandahar. It would seem that at this period his thoughts were turned to Hindustan, and the invasion of it was openly talked of and discussed in his court. Various circumstances, however, concurred to postpone any actual preparations.

The earliest of these was the appearance of the restless and implacable Shaibani Khan, who drove Babar from Kandahar, and re-seated the former ruler. Shaibani Khan, having ultimately met his master in Shah Ismail Sufi of Persia, was defeated and slain. Babar immediately proposed an alliance with the Shah, by whose aid he hoped to regain his former dominions. Nor was he disappointed. With an army of 60,000 horse, partly furnished by the Persian monarch, he took Khunduz, subdued Bokhara, and in 1511 was seated for the third time on the throne of Samarqand. Here he fixed his residence, and left Kabul to be governed under him by his brother, Nasir Mirza. This return of prosperity was short-lived; for he was immediately engaged in a series of sanguinary struggles with the Uzbeks. These were generally to his disadvantage; and in 1518 he
arrived, shorn of all his new conquests, to resume the government of Kabul. His brother Nasir Mirza returned to his government of Ghazni.

Babar had now been nearly twenty years King of Kabul, and during that long period had often turned a wistful eye to India. Other objects of ambition had repeatedly started up and tempted him to try his fortune in the west; but the difficulties had proved insurmountable, and the conviction had been forced upon him, that if his name was to descend to posterity as a great conqueror and mighty monarch, the east was the quarter in which he must gain his laurels. The times were favourable. The throne of Delhi had been occupied by a series of Afghan chiefs, who had never gained the affections of the people, and ruled only by the sword. While thus requiring all the aid which union could give, interminable feuds prevailed, and the succession was regulated not so much by the ordinary rules of relationship, as by court intrigue, faction, and assassination. Under this wretched system the kingdom had been broken up into fragments, and Delhi exhibited merely a shadow of its former greatness. It was impossible not to perceive that a country thus ruled, and acknowledged at the same time to be one of the grandest, fairest, and richest regions of the globe, presented facilities and attractions to the conqueror far greater than the west could furnish; and the only wonder is, that a prince so talented and so ambitious as Babar should have remained so long on its frontiers without making an actual inroad into it.

Babar's first Indian campaign took place in 1519. On that occasion, after overrunning the territory between Kabul and the Indus, he crossed over into the Punjab, and advanced as far as Bhira. From this place he sent a message to Ibrahim Lodi, the King of Delhi, reminding him that the Punjab had been frequently possessed by the house of Tamerlane, and demanding that to him, as a branch of that house, it should be voluntarily resigned, unless he was prepared to see the war carried farther into India. In this campaign he reached the Chenab, and then returned to Kabul. His second Indian campaign was made in the course of the same year. His main object was to reduce Lahore, but after reaching Peshawar,
and advancing to the Indus, intelligence of an invasion of Budukshan by the King of Kashgar compelled him to return. He marched a third time against India in 1520, and had reached Sialkot when he learned that his presence was immediately required to defend his capital against an invasion from Kandahar. He had not only repulsed the invader, but pursued him to Kandahar, and captured it, when, in 1524, Daulat Khan sent the tempting invitation formerly mentioned. In compliance with it, Babar advanced to the neighbourhood of Lahore, which he entered in triumph, after gaining a signal victory. Daulat Khan having afterwards turned against him, he found his prospects of success so seriously affected, that he rested satisfied with appointing governors over the districts which he had conquered, and again returned home.

Ala-ud-din Lodi, the brother of Ibrahim Lodi, King of Delhi, had been left in command of the Kabul forces, and for a time was so successful, that he pushed forward to the vicinity of Delhi. Here he seemed to have gained a victory, till his own carelessness and the want of discipline turned it into a complete defeat, and obliged him to retire precipitately into the Punjab. Babar, on hearing of the disaster, immediately bestirred himself, and made his appearance in India. This was his fifth, and proved his most decisive Indian campaign.

His force was comparatively small. After crossing the Indus on the 15th of December, 1525, he mustered it, and found that he had only 10,000 chosen horse. At Sialkot, however, he was joined by Ala-ud-din, and thus obtained a considerable reinforcement. The first appearance of opposition was on the part of Daulat Khan, and his son Ghazi Khan, who had again espoused the cause of the King of Delhi, and were encamped on the banks of the Ravi, near Lahore, with an army of 40,000. They were afraid to risk an action, and, as Babar advanced, retreated—the former to Malwat, and the latter to the hills. Babar immediately invested Malwat, and obliged it to capitulate in a few days. On this occasion he generously forgave Daulat Khan, and exerted himself in restraining the rapacity of his troops, who, as soon as the gates were opened, broke in, and commenced an indiscriminate plunder. Rushing in among them, he at great personal risk rescued a lady belonging to Daulat Khan's family,
whom a ruffian had seized, and saved a fine library which had been collected by Ghazi Khan, who was a poet and a man of learning.

The dissensions which prevailed at Delhi, and the invitations which he received from the malcontents, induced him to advance without delay. He experienced little serious opposition till Ibrahim himself advanced to meet him, at the head of 10,000 horse and 1,000 elephants. Babar's army was not a fifth of this number; but every man in it was a soldier highly disciplined, attached to his chief, and resolved to conquer or die; whereas the Delhi force was a heterogeneous mass, composed of the most discordant materials. The result was not long doubtful, and Ibrahim himself was among the slain. This battle, which was fought on the 20th of April, 1526, decided the fate of Hindustan. Babar did not fail to make the most of his victory. He immediately despatched his son Humayun to occupy Agra, and another detachment to march rapidly on Delhi, while he followed with the main body. His entrance was unopposed, and he took formal possession as sovereign. The fort of Agra offered some resistance; but the terror of the Mughul arms was so general, that the Rajputs who defended it offered to capitulate. Instead of levying a ransom from individuals, Babar consented to accept of a diamond, weighing 672 carats, which he presented to his son Humayun. On entering the Delhi treasury, he appears to have been astonished at the amount, and immediately began to distribute it with the greatest profusion, as if he had imagined it inexhaustible. Not satisfied with making rich presents to all his chiefs, and even to the merchants who followed his camp, he made large donations to holy places in various countries, and caused a sharokh to be given to every man, woman, and child in the kingdom of Kabul, without distinction of slave or free. The gift to each was rather less than a shilling, but the aggregate sum must have been enormous. His prodigality on this occasion procured him the nickname of "Callender," after a religious order whose rule is to make no provision for the morrow.

Had Babar been intending, like Tamerlane, to quit India, this squandering of the treasury might easily have been explained, and even justified, on grounds of policy; but the folly of
the proceeding seems extreme, when it is considered that he from the first regarded it as a permanent conquest, and determined to make Delhi his future capital. The question had undergone formal discussion after the capture, and many of his most experienced officers, contrasting the smallness of his army with the threatening appearance which the Afghans still continued to present in various quarters, were urgent for his return to Kabul, or at least retreat to the Punjab; but he at once put an end to all their remonstrances, by exclaiming, “What would all the Muhammedan kings in the world say of a monarch whom the fear of death obliged to abandon such a kingdom!”

The idea of departure being abandoned, it required all Babar’s skill and energy to make good his position. Several Afghan competitors connected with the late royal family were set up against him, and sanguinary battles were fought, generally, however, to his advantage. As a necessary consequence, his cause advanced, while that of his enemies rapidly declined; and many who had stood aloof, with the intention of ultimately joining the winning side, made their submission. But his greatest dangers were not in the field; for those who feared to encounter him there, did not scruple at any means which promised to be successful. One of the most flagrant attempts made on his life was by the mother of Ibrahim Lodi, the late sovereign. She had become his captive, and he had treated her with great respect and kindness; but the destruction which he had brought on his family was not to be forgiven, and she bribed Babar’s taster and cook to poison some hare-soup intended for him. He actually partook of it, but the poisoning having been overdone, affected the taste, and he desisted in time to save his life.

Babar was still in the full vigour of life, and might, in the course of nature, have been expected to have a long career before him; but he had crowded the events of a lifetime into a comparatively short period, and began to exhibit symptoms of a premature old age. Fever after fever attacked him; and, beginning to feel his end approaching, he sent for his son Humayun, and appointed him his successor. A few months after, on the 24th of December, 1530, he breathed his last. He had reigned thirty-eight years, but of these only five were spent on
the throne of Delhi. Considering the shortness of the period, it is wonderful how much had been accomplished in it. Not only had Afghan insurrections been put down, and the whole Muhammedan population reconciled to the new dynasty, but great battles had been fought, and great victories gained over insurgent Hindus. After Mewar, Malwa, and Mewat had been subdued, Bihar, on both sides of the Ganges, was overrun, and the King of Bengal barely saved his independence by submitting to an ignominious peace. The throne of the Great Mughul was thus not only set up, but seemed to be firmly established.

The love of nature, which Babar retained in all its freshness to the very last, and of which many touching instances are recorded by himself, appeared in his selection of a final resting-place. It was in the vicinity of Kabul, on the banks of a clear running stream, at the foot of a hill commanding a noble prospect. There his tomb still stands, and in front of it a small but chaste mosque of white marble. His character is best learned from his Memoirs or Autobiography, in which his opinions and feelings are candidly expressed, and a full insight is given into the conduct both of the monarch and the man. Few lives so full of vicissitudes and temptations would bear to be so minutely investigated, and suffer so little from the investigation. Take him all in all, in his varied and seldom combined capacities as a writer, a soldier, and a ruler; it must be admitted that his proper place is among the greatest men whom the East has produced. It is almost needless to say that both his public and his private life exhibit blemishes. Among those of the former description may be mentioned his folly in squandering the treasure found in Delhi; and among those of the latter, his bacchanalian habits, which he is said not to have abandoned till they had made serious inroads on his constitution.

Babar left four sons. The second, Kamran, who at the time of his father's death was governor of Kabul and Kandahar, not only retained possession of them, but made good a claim to the Punjab. The two youngest sons were at first contented to hold governments in India under Humayun, who, as eldest son, and by Babar's special appointment, mounted the throne of Delhi. He soon found it anything but a bed of roses. The cession of the Punjab to Kamran, without any effort to preserve
it, was a kind of premium offered to aggression, which was accordingly attempted in various quarters. The first contest was with Bahadur Shah, King of Gujarat, who had rendered himself formidable by the annexation of Malwa, and the establishment of his supremacy over several adjoining territories. The ostensible cause of quarrel was the protection given by Bahadur Shah to Muhammad Zaman Mirza, who had taken refuge with him after a rebellion against his brother-in-law, Humayun, had failed. During a series of struggles, with various alternations of success, Bahadur first lost, and then recovered his kingdom.

The next formidable opponent who appeared was Sher Khan Sur, who had made himself master both of Bihar and Bengal. Humayun advanced against him from Agra, and arrived with a powerful army before the fort of Chunar, near Benaras, in the beginning of 1538. Sher Khan had been taken somewhat by surprise, and as his object, therefore, was to gain time, he left Chunar strongly garrisoned and retired farther into the interior. Humayun did not venture to advance while the enemy possessed such a place in his rear, and resolved to lay siege to it. He was thus detained for several months, and only succeeded at last because the provisions of the garrison were exhausted. This siege derives importance from the regular manner in which it was conducted, and the great use made of gunpowder and artillery, both by besiegers and besieged.

Humayun now advanced along the Ganges, but Sher Khan continued to pursue his tactics of not risking a general engagement, and only offering such resistance as might suffice to protract the advance. Humayun ought now to have become perfectly aware of the trap which was laid for him, and been satisfied to select some strong position, at least till the rainy season was over. Instead of this, he found himself in the lower basin of the Ganges when its whole delta was flooded, and every brook had swollen into an impassable torrent. Meanwhile Sher Khan, by a dexterous movement, placed himself in his rear, and cut off his retreat. The King of Delhi was at last alive to his perilous condition, and endeavoured to elude his enemy by preparing boats to cross over to the other side of the Ganges. While thus occupied, he allowed himself to be completely
surprised, and had barely time to mount his horse and make for the river. He immediately plunged in, but his steed, after bearing him nobly for a while, sunk exhausted. His fate would have been the same, had not a water-carrier, who was crossing, by the aid of the water-skin, which he had inflated for that purpose, seized him before he sunk, and carried him to the opposite bank. He reached Agra in the end of June, 1539, but his whole army had perished, and his queen was Sher Khan's captive.

Humayun made the best use of his escape; and, by the aid of his brothers, Kamran and Hindal, who, after taking very suspicious measures, had become cordially united with him, kept the enemy at bay. By the spring of 1540 he thought himself strong enough for a new campaign. The armies came in sight of each other, and continued for some time manoeuvring, till Humayun, alarmed at some symptoms of desertion, determined to risk a general engagement. It proved disastrous; and in the flight which ensued, his escape was as extraordinary as before. His horse was wounded, and he was on the point of being killed or taken, when he found an elephant, mounted it, and hastened to the Ganges. The driver hesitated to swim the river, and gave place to an eunuch who undertook the task. He reached the opposite bank in safety, but, on account of its height, could not land, till two soldiers who happened to be present joined their turbans, and throwing one end to him, drew him up. His situation was now hopeless; and he had only time to remove his family and his treasure from Agra and Delhi, and hasten off with them to Lahore. Here his reception was not very gracious, as his brother Kamran feared he might prove a dangerous competitor, and was also preparing to make his peace with Sher Khan, by ceding the Punjab to him.

Humayun, thus abandoned by his brother, turned his thoughts to Sind, and endeavoured, partly by persuasion and partly by force, to obtain possession of it. He failed; and then threw himself on the protection of the Raja of Marwar. To accomplish this he was obliged to cross the desert, and even there had the mortification to perceive that the raja was only meditating how he might best deliver him to his enemies. Flight into the desert was again his only resource. While wandering here, encumbered with the women of his family, a body of horse was seen
approaching. They were headed by the son of the Raja of Marwar. Nothing short of death or captivity was foreboded; but after a great show of hostility, the raja's son apparently relented, furnished them with water, and allowed them to proceed. The horrors of the desert were still before them; and at last Humayun, with only seven attendants, reached Amarkot. Here he was not only hospitably entertained, but furnished with the means of making a second attempt upon Sind. It might have succeeded, but the raja who accompanied him, indignant at obtaining no redress for an insult which he had received, suddenly withdrew with all his Hindu followers. His position was now desperate, and he was only too glad to make an arrangement which permitted him to withdraw from Sind and set out for Kandahar. This province belonged to Kamran, and was then held for him by one of his younger brothers. Humayun, travelling with his wife and an infant child, afterwards the celebrated Emperor Akbar, had arrived within 130 miles of his destination, when one of his old adherents rode hastily up, and gave him the startling intelligence that his brother Mirza Askari was at hand, with the intention of making him prisoner. He had only time to mount the queen behind him, and take to flight. The infant could not be thus carried, and fell, with his attendants, into the hands of his uncle. Humayun continued his flight with a few followers till he arrived within the Persian dominions. He was sent to Herat to await the Shah's orders.

Sher Khan, on Humayun's flight, made a kind of triumphant progress, and was soon in possession of all the territories which had acknowledged the authority of the King of Delhi. His reign, or usurpation as it is sometimes called, though his title was at least as good as Babar's, had been commenced in 1540. During the three following years he made himself master of Malwa, Marwar, and Mewar, and was carrying on the siege of Kallinjar, in 1545, when he was killed by the explosion of a powder magazine. His eldest son, Adil Khan, had previously been recognized by him as his successor; but the feebleness of his character induced the chiefs to set him aside, and give the throne to his brother, Jalal Khan, who assumed the title of Salim Shah. His reign, which lasted nine years, during which several important internal improvements were made, and
public works erected, was on the whole peaceful. He left a son of the age of twelve, but he was murdered by his uncle, Muhammad Khan, who usurped the throne, and is known by the title of Adili. His conduct on the throne was such as might have been expected after the atrocity by which he had gained it, and he made himself universally odious by his follies and iniquities. For a time, however, the abilities of Hemu, a Hindu of low origin, to whom he had committed the government, kept him on his seat; and he pursued a course of utter lawlessness, first squandering his treasury, and then indiscriminately confiscating the property of his subjects, in order to procure the means of indulging in his extravagances and low debaucherries. After he had narrowly escaped 'the dagger of an assassin, a confederacy was formed against him. It failed in the first instance, but other revolts were successful; and Ibrahim Sur, making himself master of Delhi and Agra, Adili was left in possession only of the eastern provinces. Ibrahim, having in his turn been driven out of Delhi and Agra by Sikandar Sur, who had proclaimed himself King of the Punjab, endeavoured to compensate himself by wresting some more territory from Adili, but was repulsed by Hemu. This success did not at all improve his condition, for intelligence immediately arrived that Bengal and Malwa had both revolted, and that Humayun, who had returned, had defeated Sikandar, and was once more seated in Delhi. This last intelligence proved the most fatal of all; for though Humayun soon died, his son Akbar succeeded, and brought the Mughul empire to its highest pitch of glory. Adili was maintained for some time by Hemu; but on that Hindu's death his success was at an end, and he lost his life fighting in Bengal.

Humayun's reception by Shah Tamasp, the second of the Safavi or Sufi Kings of Persia, had been on the whole favourable, though accompanied with many mortifying circumstances. Before he could obtain any assistance, he was obliged to cede the province of Kandahar, and adopt the Shifte, form of Muhammadanism. After these concessions, he was furnished with a body of 14,000 horse, under the command of the Shah's son, Morad Mirza. His own followers mustered only about 700. He first proceeded against Kandahar, which he reached in
March, 1545. It was in possession of Mirza Askari, as governor of his other brother, Kamran. The siege was immediately commenced, but proceeded languidly for five months, at the end of which desertion and famine obliged Mirza Askari to surrender. Humayun, probably soured by misfortune, forgot the humanity which had formed the best feature in his character; and, disregarding the promise of pardon which he had given, subjected his brother to the most contumelious treatment, and then kept him nearly three years as a prisoner in chains. He also violated his agreement with the Shah, by keeping Kandahar to himself, and maltreating his Persian auxiliaries.

From Kandahar he proceeded against Kabul, and expelled Kamran, who was obliged to take refuge in Sind. The capture was the more gratifying that it enabled him to recover his son Akbar, now a child of about three years of age. After a time Kamran returned, and a series of struggles took place, during which the greatest barbarities were perpetrated on both sides; and Akbar, who had again fallen into the enemy’s hands, escaped almost miraculously, after his uncle had, with savage cruelty, exposed him to the full fire of his father’s cannon. Kamran was ultimately defeated and obliged again to flee; but by the aid of the Uzbeks, obtained possession of Budukshan. Thither Humayun followed. He was victorious, and returned in triumph to Kabul in the end of 1548. His affairs now assumed so promising an appearance that he began to talk of attempting the conquest of Transoxiana; but his bad fortune returned, and in a battle with Kamran, who had once more taken the field, he sustained a total defeat. On this occasion he made another of his remarkable escapes. A soldier had wounded him, and was about to repeat the blow, when he was so confounded by the sternness with which Humayun exclaimed, “Wretch! how dare you?” that he dropped his arm and let him escape. He fled with only eleven attendants, while Akbar again fell into his uncle’s hands. Another turn in the wheel of fortune placed Humayun in the ascendent, and Kamran became his prisoner. The manner in which he disposed of him is a great blot on his memory. At first he gave him a most friendly reception, seated him on his right hand, feasted him, shared half of his slice of water-melon with him, and spent the evening with him in
“jollity and carousing.” In the morning his peremptory orders were to put out his brother’s eyes. They were executed, Kamran exclaiming during the agony of the torture, “O Lord, my God! whatever sins I have committed have been amply punished in this world; have compassion on me in the next.” He died soon after at Mecca, where he had wished to end his days.

In the meantime circumstances in India had become favourable, and Humayun, setting out from Kabul in January, 1555, at the head of 15,000 horse, invaded the Punjab and took Lahore. After some delay he continued his march, obliged Sikandar Shah to take refuge among the lower ranges of the Himalaya, and made himself master of Delhi and Agra. He had thus regained possession of his capital and a portion of his original territories, but was not destined long to enjoy them. His life had been the sport of fortune—his death was to resemble it. He had only been six months in Delhi, and was one day, after a walk on the terrace of his library, descending by the stair which was placed on the outside, and consisted of narrow steps, guarded only by a parapet about a foot high. Hearing the call to prayer from the minaret, he stopped, as is usual, repeated his creed, and sat down to wait till the muezzin had made his round. In rising, his staff by which he was supporting himself slipped, and he fell headlong over the parapet. He was taken up insensible, and died four days after, on the 25th of January, 1556, at the age of fifty-one. He had commenced his reign twenty-five years before, but sixteen of these had been spent in exile from his capital.

As Humayun’s reign reached to the middle of the sixteenth century, it may be considered as forming the link between medieval and modern India. It will be proper, therefore, before continuing the narrative, to take a survey of the political condition of India at this period.

In the reign of Muhammad Tughluk, which commenced in 1325, almost the whole of India proper—understanding by that name both Hindustan and the Deccan—was subject to Muhammedan sway. The chief territories not thus subject were a long narrow tract in the south-west of the peninsula, the kingdom of Orissa, consisting of an unexplored and densely wooded region, stretching for about 500 miles along the coast.
from the Ganges to the Godavari, with a medium width of about 350 miles; and Rajputana in the north-west, consisting of a number of independent chieftainships, of which the limits cannot easily be assigned, as they were constantly changing in their dimensions, according as the Muhammedan invaders or the native chiefs gained the ascendancy. Before the termination of Mahammad Tughluk's reign, in 1351, the extent of his dominions had shrunk exceedingly, in consequence of his misgovernment. In 1340 Bengal threw off its yoke, and became an independent kingdom; in 1344, the example was imitated by the Rajas of Telengana and Carnatic, the former recovering his capital of Warangal, and the latter establishing a new capital at Vijayanagar, on the Tungabhadra; while the Muhammedans were obliged to rest satisfied with a frontier which extended no farther south than the banks of the Krishna, and no farther east than the meridian of Hyderabad. In 1347, a Hindu movement on a still more extended scale took place, and the Muhammedans were driven across the Narmada. Hassan Gangu, the head of this last movement, founded in the Deccan the extensive kingdom of Bahmani, which continued to subsist for 170 years. While the Hindu rajas remained united, the Muhammedans strove in vain to regain what they had lost, and made scarcely any impression, but when they began again to indulge in internal dissensions, the Muhammedans, again extended their conquests, subdued Warangal, and obtained possession of the country between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra.

In Hindustan and the adjoining territories, various kingdoms independent of Delhi were established. Among these, one of the most extensive and durable was Gujarat, which, instead of being confined to the territory which bore that name, extended over Malwa, which was twice conquered, and finally annexed to it. The Rajputs of Mewar also repeatedly bent before it, and Khandesh acknowledged its supremacy. Humayun occupied it for a short time, but it soon recovered itself, and was independent at the accession of his son Akbar. Malwa, before it fell under the power of Gujarat, had long maintained a separate independence, and for some time was under the domination of a Hindu, who, though not the nominal, was virtually the real sovereign, and filled all the highest offices with his own countrymen. Bengal has been already mentioned; and, besides it, Khandesh, Jaunpur, Sind, and Multan were all
independent at Akbar’s succession. Of the Rajput states, the most important which were independent at the same period, are Mewar, ruled by the Ranas of Udaipur, though at one time reduced to a kind of vassalage under Gujarat—Marwar, held by the Rathors, who, after being driven out of Kanauj, where they had early established themselves, retired to the desert between the table-land and the Indus, subdued the Jats, the original inhabitants, and extended their dominion over a large territory, throwing off a younger branch, which afterwards formed the separate state of Bikaner—Jaisalmer, where the Bhattis had made their settlement in the western part of the desert, at so early a period that their history is lost in fable—and Amber, or Jaipur, possessed by the tribe of Cachwaha, who do not figure much in early times, but have a proof of their importance in the fact that Akbar married their raja’s daughter. Besides these are many minor states in the desert and along the east of the table-land. In the north, along the slopes of the Himalaya, from Kashmir east to the highlands which overlook the delta of the Ganges, all the petty states were ruled by their own independent sovereigns.

Such was the state of matters when Akbar came to the throne in 1556. His long and prosperous reign forms a new era in the history of India. It is of importance, however, to remember that before it commenced, another event, in which the future destiny of India was more deeply involved, had occurred. The route to the East by the Cape of Good Hope had been discovered more than half a century before; and the Portuguese had set the first example of those European settlements which, imitated and improved upon, were afterwards to expand, under British energy and prowess, into a magnificent empire. To this great event, therefore, were we now to give our first attention, we should only be following the order of time, but some advantages in respect of arrangement will be gained by continuing the thread of Muhammedan narrative unbroken to the conclusion of Akbar’s reign. The empire of the Great Mughul, almost extinguished during the misfortunes of Humayun, will thus be seen not only re-established, but raised to a degree of splendour which it never attained before; and it will, in consequence, be unnecessary, in tracing European progress, to be constantly turning aside in order to contemplate the internal changes which were at the same time taking place.
AKBAR might be called a child of the desert, having been born at Amarkot, on the edge of it, on the 14th of October, 1542, after his parents, with a few followers, had traversed it as homeless wanderers, under almost unparalleled privations. Before he was a year old he became a captive in the hands of an uncle with whom his father was at war; and, while still a mere child, was barbarously placed in the most exposed position on the ramparts of Kabul, which was besieged, in the malicious expectation that some ball from the cannon of the besiegers would deprive him of life. His captivity was afterwards repeatedly renewed; but, as if he had been reserved for something great, he passed unharmed in the midst of danger, and made many hair-breadth escapes. If anything had been wanting to confirm the belief that a high destiny awaited him, it would have been found in the remarkable talents which he began, at an early age, to display. Such were the expectations which he had excited, and the confidence reposed in him, that he was sent into the Punjab in the command of an army, and gained distinction on the field of battle. At this time he must have been a mere boy, for when his father died he was only in his fourteenth year. When the melancholy tidings reached him he was absent on this command. The necessary steps were immediately taken, and he was forthwith proclaimed as lawful possessor of the throne. There was no rival in his own family to dispute it with him; but in Bairam Khan, a Turkman who had stood high in his father's confidence, and also been his own tutor, he found a minister who seemed determined to leave him little more than a nominal sovereignty. Bairam's talents were of the highest order; and he probably retained the power not for
any treasonable purpose, but merely because he had persuaded himself that the interest of his youthful sovereign would thereby be most effectually promoted.

Akbar was not the kind of person to be long kept in leading-strings, though he had prudence enough not to take any decisive step for the purpose of escaping from thraldom till he was sure that he would be able to give effect to it. At first, therefore, he left Bairam undisturbed, and readily consented to all the measures which he recommended. It is probable that in this way he was a considerable gainer; for Bairam's experience was great, and must have done, much to extricate Akbar from the difficulties which encompassed him at the very outset of his reign. In the Punjab, Sikandar Sur still kept his ground, and declared his determination to be satisfied with nothing short of the throne of Delhi; in Kabul, Mirza Suleman of Budukshan had made a sudden irruption, and made himself absolute master; and from an opposite direction, Hemu, the talented Hindu minister of the usurper Adili, was advancing towards Agra at the head of a powerful army. Against the last, as the most pressing danger, Bairam and his young sovereign immediately took the field. It was almost too late; for the Mughul generals had sustained a severe defeat, and Hemu had, in consequence, not only captured Agra, but forced his entrance into Delhi.

The contest now about to be waged wore a very ominous aspect for Akbar. His army at the utmost mustered only 20,000 horse, while that of the enemy exceeded 100,000. No wonder that many of the officers urged an instant retreat in the direction of Kabul. The minister and his sovereign stood alone when they resolved to risk the encounter. Some addition was made to Akbar's force by the arrival of soldiers who had belonged to the defeated detachments, but when the armies met his was still far inferior in numbers. The decisive battle was fought near Panipat, on the 5th of November, 1556. Hemu began the action with his elephants, and pushed forward with them into Akbar's very centre; but these powerful and unwieldy animals acted as they almost invariably did when their first charge failed to produce a general panic. Furiously attacked on all sides by the Mughuls, who galled them with lances, arrows, and javelins, they became unruly, and carried confusion into their own
ranks. The day was thus quickly decided in Akbar's favour; but
Hemu, mounted on an elephant of prodigious size, still bravely
continued the action, at the head of 4,000 horse. An arrow
pierced his eye and he sunk senseless into his howdah. A few
moments after, having come to himself, he plucked out the
arrow, which is said to have brought the eye out along with
it; and in the midst of this agony had the energy and presence
of mind to attempt his escape by breaking through the enemy's
line. He deserved to succeed, but unhappily failed, and was
taken prisoner. On being brought back, Bairam Khan urged
Akbar to gain the envied title of Ghazi, or Champion of the
Faith, by killing him with his own hand. He had too much
spirit to do the executioner's office. It would have been pleasing
to add that he went a step farther, and magnanimously
interposed his sovereign authority to save the Hindu's life.
Unfortunately, he left him to the will of Bairam Khan, who cut
off his head at a stroke.

Immediately after the victory Akbar marched upon Delhi,
and entered it without opposition. He had not remained long
when his presence was imperatively required in the Punjab.
Sikandar Shah, after defeating one of his generals, and obliging
him to take refuge in Lahore, had advanced to Kalanore. On
Akbar's approach he retired to Mankote, and shut himself up
in it. The siege was immediately commenced, and had lasted six
months, when Sikandar Shah, who had been severely wounded,
offered to capitulate. The terms bound him to evacuate the
fort, and give his son as an hostage for his future behaviour.
Akbar was happy to be thus rid of his most formidable opponent
in India.

Bairam Khan, instead of gradually retiring from power as
his sovereign became more capable of exercising it, began to
presume more than ever on his services; and, as if Akbar's con-
sent had not been worth the asking, proceeded of his own
accord to pass sentence of death and banishment on individuals
whom he regarded as his private enemies. One of the persons
whom he banished was Mulla Pir Muhammad, the king's own
preceptor; and, as if to make the act more galling, he at once
filled up the office which he had thus rendered vacant by
appointing another preceptor in his stead. Akbar was greatly
incensed, and immediately prepared to adopt a measure which it is probable he had long meditated.

Having gone on a hunting party in the beginning of 1560, he received, or pretended to have received, a message from Delhi that his mother was extremely ill, and wished to see him. Immediately on arriving he issued a proclamation, announcing that he had taken the government into his own hands, and that in future no orders but those issued by his authority were to be obeyed. Bairam at once saw what was intended, and endeavoured to avert his downfall, by sending two of his principal friends to make his submission in the humblest terms. Akbar refused to see them, and shortly after imprisoned them. The disgraced minister soon found how little he could trust to those who had profited most by his prosperity, and saw himself rapidly deserted. Various schemes passed through his mind. At one time he thought of proceeding to Malwa and setting up an independent sovereignty; at another, of making this experiment in Bengal, where it might be easy to expel the Afghans. The prospect, in either case, did not seem very hopeful; and at last, as if he had abandoned all treasonable designs, he set out for Gujarat with the avowed intention of taking shipping and making a pilgrimage to Mecca. Having halted at Nagore, in the hope that the king’s resentment might be withdrawn, he was deeply mortified on receiving a message which dismissed him from office, and ordered him to continue his pilgrimage without delay. The message is said to have been in the following terms:—“Till now our mind has been taken up with our education and the amusements of youth, and it was our royal will that you should regulate the affairs of our empire. But it being our intention henceforward to govern our people by our own judgment, let our well-wisher withdraw from all worldly concerns; and, retiring to Mecca, far removed from the toils of public life, spend the rest of his days in prayer.”

It seems that Bairam Khan had been travelling with all the insignia of office; for, on receiving this message, he returned his state elephants, banners, and drums, and set out, shorn of his public honours, for Gujarat. Suddenly a new thought seemed to have struck him, for, on arriving at Bikaner, he stopped short and retraced his steps to Nagore. Here he began to collect
troops, and gave such decided evidence of treasonable intentions, that Akbar sent a body of troops against him. As they approached he retired into the Punjab, and openly raised the standard of revolt. He even fought one battle, but lost it, and retired into the mountains of Sewalik. Here the hopelessness of his cause, and perhaps also remorse for having engaged in it, combined in determining him to throw himself on Akbar’s mercy. He was at once forgiven; and some of the leading officers of the court were sent to receive him, and conduct him into the presence with every mark of distinction. On entering the court he hung his turban round his neck; and, advancing rapidly, threw himself in tears at the foot of the throne. Akbar, giving him his hand, caused him to rise, and placed him in his former station at the head of the nobles. A splendid dress was then given him; and the king, addressing him, offered him the choice of a place at court, a provincial government, or liberty to continue his pilgrimage with an escort suitable to his rank. Bairam preferred the last, and set out for Mecca with a large retinue and an annual pension of about £ 5,000. After reaching Gujarat, he halted in the suburbs of Patan, and turned aside to visit a celebrated spot, called Sahasnak, from the thousand temples in its vicinity. Having hired a boat and a band of musicians, he spent all night on the lake in company with his friends. As he was returning in the morning he was accosted by an Afghan, who, pretending to embrace him, drew a dagger and pierced him to the heart. It was an act of revenge for the death of his father, who had fallen in battle by Bairam’s sword.

Akbar soon showed that, in taking the government into his own hand, he had not presumed too much on his own talents. While success almost invariably attended his arms, his internal measures exhibited a model of liberal and enlightened administration. When he succeeded he possessed little more than the territory around Delhi and Agra, together with an imperfect and precarious hold of the Punjab. During Bairam’s regency Ajmer was added to his dominions without a contest, the strong fort of Gwalior was captured, and the Afghans were driven as far east as Jaunpur, after being dispossessed of Lucknow and a large tract of country on the Ganges. In 1560, shortly after the
dismissal of Bairam Khan, Akbar, from a desire perhaps to signalize his full assumption of the reins of government, resolved to attempt the conquest of Malwa, and with that view despatched an army under the command of Adam Khan Atka. The principality was then in the possession of Baz Bahadur, who kept his court at Sarangpur; where he had become so much the slave of indolence and pleasure, that the Mughuls were within twenty miles of his capital before he could be roused to action. Even then his resistance was feeble; and his troops having been routed at the first onset, he fled for Burhanpur, leaving his property and family behind. These immediately fell into the hands of Adam Khan. He at once disposed of them as if he had been absolute master, sending only a few elephants to Akbar, who was so much dissatisfied that he set out without delay to call him to account. Adam Khan, if he really entertained treasonable designs, found them completely frustrated by Akbar's expedition, and hastened to make his peace. He had previously, by the indulgence of unbridled passion, been the cause of an affecting catastrophe.

One of the inmates of the harem was a Hindu of surpassing beauty, highly accomplished, and celebrated as a poetess. After endeavouring in vain to resist the importunities and violence of Adam Khan, she pretended to yield, and fixed the hour of meeting. When he arrived, it was only to behold her corpse. Immediately after the appointment she had retired to her chamber, put on her most splendid dress, sprinkled the richest perfumes, and taken poison. Her attendants, seeing her lie down on her couch and cover her face with her mantle, thought she had fallen asleep, and did not become aware of the real fact till, on the Khan's approach, they attempted to waken her.

Akbar returned to Agra, and shortly after made Muhammad Khan Atka, governor of the Punjab, his prime minister, and conferred the government of Malwa on his old preceptor, Pir Muhammad Khan, whom Bairam Khan had, in a fit of jealousy, driven into exile. In 1561, while on a visit to a celebrated shrine in Ajmer, Akbar married the daughter of Puranmal, Raja of Jaipur, and enrolled both the raja and his son among the nobles of his court. This is said to be the first instance in which a Hindu chief was ennobled or placed in any position
of high trust under the government of the Great Mughul. Akbar, before quitting Ajmer, despatched Mirza Shurf-ud-din Hussain to invest the fort of Merta, belonging to Maldo, Raja of Marwar; and then set out for Agra with such expedition that, by taking only six attendants, and travelling without interruption, he performed the distance of above 200 miles in three days.

The siege of Merta proved more difficult than had been anticipated. Two of the principal Rajput chiefs of Marwar had thrown themselves into it, and conducted the defence with so much skill and valour that the Mirza’s operations, though carried on with great vigour, were completely baffled. After carrying mines under one of the bastions, and making a practicable breach, he advanced to the assault, but was repulsed. In the morning, when he was preparing to renew the assault, he found that in the course of the night the breach had been built up. Some months had thus passed away when want of provisions compelled the garrison to capitulate. Favourable terms were given; but one of the rajas disdaining to accept of them, collected 500 of his followers, and, after burning whatever they could not take with them, rushed out and cut their way through the enemy. About half the number succeeded; the rest perished.

The war with Baz Bahadur, in Malwa, still continued, though he was at last so closely pressed that he was obliged to seek a refuge at Burhanpur, within the limits of Khandesh. Still, however, he had no thoughts of peace, and not only kept the country in a constant state of ferment and alarm by frequent incursions, but by means of an alliance with the rulers of Khandesh and Berar, was enabled to take the field with so powerful an army that the Mughuls were obliged to retreat before it. Pir Muhammad Khan fell back on Bizigur; when, contrary to the advice of his officers, he resolved to risk an engagement. He was defeated, and lost his life in attempting to cross the Narmada; while Baz Bahadur continued the pursuit as far as Agra, and once more became master of all Malwa in 1561. His triumph was short-lived, for the governor of Kalpi, being appointed to the command, expelled him a second time, and obliged him to flee to the mountains.
One of the greatest difficulties with which Akbar had to contend, arose from rivalry and strife among his leading officers. Muhammad Khan Atka, who had been appointed minister at Delhi with the title of Shahab-ud-din, was high in favour at court. For this he was hated by Adam Khan Khoka, who endeavoured to undermine him; and for this purpose had recourse to intrigues, which only issued in his own disgrace. He determined on revenge; and one day, while the minister was sitting in the hall of audience reading the Qur'an, entered and saluted him. The minister continued, as was usual in such circumstances, to read on without taking any notice of his entrance, and Adam Khan, whether from momentary impulse or premeditation, drew his dagger and stabbed him to the heart. Akbar was sleeping in one of the inner apartments, and, hearing the noise and ascertaining the cause, rushed out in his sleeping dress. There lay the minister weltering in his blood, while the murderer stood, as if stupefied by his own atrocity, on an adjoining terrace. Akbar's first impulse was to draw his sword and put him to death, but, recollecting himself, he returned the sword to its scabbard. Adam Khan took advantage of the interval to clasp the king's hand and beg for mercy; but he shook him off in disgust, and ordered his attendants to do summary justice by flinging him over the parapet.

About this time Akbar himself narrowly escaped assassination. A famous chief of Turkistan, called Mirze Shurf-ud-din Hussain, arriving from Lahore at Agra, was received at court with great distinction; but shortly after, being suspected of treasonable designs fled to Ajmer and went into rebellion. On the advance of the royal army he retreated to the frontiers of Gujarat. One of his retainers, who happened to be in the neighbourhood of Delhi when the royal retinue was passing along the road, joined it; and, looking upwards, fixed an arrow in his bow and pointed it towards the sky, as if he were going to shoot at some object in the air. The attendants, thinking he was aiming at a bird, did not interfere, and he had time to lower the bow and lodge the arrow deep in the flesh of Akbar's shoulder. The assassin was immediately cut to pieces, and the arrow was with some difficulty extracted. The
wound, though deep, did not prove serious, and healed over in about ten days.

Shortly after Akbar set out from Agra on a hunting excursion. This was his ostensible object, but his real design was to nip in the bud an insurrection which was meditated, by Abdullah Khan Uzbek, the governor of Malwa. He accordingly turned suddenly aside, and, in spite of the rainy season, made an incursion into that province. He had only reached Ujjain when Abdullah Khan, taking guilt to himself, marched off with his forces and treasures for Gujarat. Akbar chivalrously pursued with a small body of horse, but met with so much opposition that he was obliged to fall back on Mandu. The annoyance caused by this Uzbek was said to have given Akbar a rooted dislike to the whole race; and it was generally rumoured that he meant to seize and imprison all the Uzbek chiefs. The consequence was a general Uzbek revolt. In a short time the insurgents mustered 40,000 horse, with which they ravaged the territories of Berar and Jaunpur. One of the leaders of the revolt was Asaf Khan Heroi, governor of Kara. Shortly after his appointment he obtained permission to subdue a country called Garah, which was at the time governed by Durgavati, a rani or Hindu queen, as celebrated for beauty as for ability. The aggression appears to have been unprincipled, for the only reason assigned for it is that Asaf Khan had heard of the riches of Garah. After several predatory excursions he invaded it with a force of about 6,000 horse and infantry. The queen opposed him with an army of 8,000 horse and foot, and 1,500 elephants. The battle was sanguinary and well contested, till the queen, who was mounted on an elephant, was struck by an arrow in the eye and disabled from giving orders. Determined not to fall into the hands of the enemy, she plucked a dagger from the girdle of her elephant driver and stabbed herself. Her capital was immediately taken by storm, and her infant son trampled to death. Asaf Khan obtained an immense booty in gold and jewels, but sent only a small part to the royal treasury, and was thus able, on joining the revolt, to add largely to its pecuniary resources.

Akbar, finding that little progress was made by his officers in suppressing the revolt, determined to take the field in person.
A fever, with which he was seized, obliged him to return to Agra, where he remained till April, 1566, and then resumed the campaign. Taking a select body of horse, he proceeded by a forced march toward Lucknow, in the hope of surprising Sikandar Khan; but that rebel chief, having received warning, evacuated the place and joined his confederates. Several of these, worked upon by emissaries from Akbar, who always displayed great dexterity in breaking up any confederacy formed against him, abandoned the cause as hopeless, and made their submission; but a formidable opposition was still offered by Bahadur Khan Sistani, who, after crossing the Jamuna and raising disturbances in the Doab, encountered the royalist general, Mir Moiz-ul-Mulk, in the open field. The royalists were at first successful; and, in the full confidence of victory, commenced the pursuit without observing any order. Bahadur Khan immediately seized the advantage, and changed his defeat into a victory, so complete that Akbar's first tidings of the result were received from Mir Moiz himself, who never halted in his flight till he joined him at Kanauj, with the wreck of his army.

The loss was greatly aggravated by its indirect effects—some of the confederates, who had made their submission, conceiving new hopes, and again joining the revolt. Among these was Khan Zaman, who immediately occupied Ghazipur and the adjoining country. Akbar set out against him with all expedition, but Bahadur Khan, taking advantage of his absence, advanced to Jaunpur and captured it by escalade. This disaster seeming the more serious of the two, Akbar retraced his steps, and, by the junction of forces from the loyal provinces, was soon at the head of an army strong enough to crush the rebellion. Bahadur Khan accordingly evacuated Jaunpur and fled toward Benaras, from which he sent an offer of submission. The offer was accepted; for all Akbar's leanings were to the generous side, but on this occasion his leniency was carried to an extreme. When the king, after having given his royal word of pardon, ordered him and his brother Khan Zaman to appear at court, the latter answered "that shame for his past offences alone prevented him from appearing in the presence, till time should have convinced his majesty of his loyalty; but that
when the king should return to Agra, both he and his brother Bahadur Khan would, at a future time, pay their respects." There was no sincerity in these words, for the brothers were only endeavouring to gain time, and took the first opportunity of revolting and seizing upon Garah.

The next quarter to which Akbar's attention was specially called was Kabul. It was in the hands of his half-brother, Muhammad Hakim Mirza, who was threatened by Suleman Mirza, chief of Budukshan, and sent a message to Akbar, earnestly soliciting his aid. A strong reinforcement was accordingly sent; but before it arrived the struggle was over. Suleman Mirza had made good his threat by attacking Kabul, and Muhammad Hakim Mirza had been compelled to evacuate it. In his retreat he took the direction of the Indus, and was, ungrateful enough to endeavour to compensate himself for the loss of Kabul by seizing upon Lahore. This he was more readily tempted to do, because he believed that Akbar's hands were fully occupied in the eastern provinces by the Uzbeks. The attempt upon Lahore was made; and, though it failed, appearances were so alarming that Akbar postponed a projected expedition against the Uzbeks in the Doab, and in November, 1566, directed his march into the Punjab. In the dead of the night Muhammad Hakim Mirza was awakened by the noise of drums and trumpets; and, calling to ask what it meant, was told that the citizens of Lahore were manifesting their joy at the intelligence they had received of Akbar's approach. Without waiting to learn more, he mounted his steed in the utmost alarm, and, taking his cavalry along with him, was off on the instant for Kabul. Fortune was far more favourable to him than he deserved; for on arriving he found that his enemy, Suleman Mirza, had retired to Budukshan for the winter, leaving Kabul very imperfectly defended. The consequence was, that he recovered it as quickly as he had lost it.

The absence of Akbar in the Punjab was no sooner known to the Uzbeks than they put themselves in motion, took Kanauj and Oudh, and extended their conquests in all directions. He therefore hastened back to Agra, and having collected his troops, set out for Jaunpur. Khan Zaman Khan, when this startling intelligence reached him, was engaged in laying siege
to the fort of Shirgur. He immediately raised it, and, with his brother Bahadur Khan Sistani, who was besieging Kara, crossed the Ganges in full retreat to Malwa, intending either to join some insurgents who had appeared in that province, or to form an alliance with the kings of the Deccan. Akbar, fully alive to the magnitude of the danger which thus threatened, determined, if possible, to overtake him. Such was his haste that, on arriving at the ferry of Manipur, and finding no boats in readiness, he mounted his elephant and plunged into the stream. One hundred of his body-guard imitated his example; and though the water was then high, they all reached the opposite bank in safety. At the head of this small party Akbar proceeded, and had actually come in sight of the enemy's camp before he was reinforced by the garrison from Kara.

The enemy, never imagining that Akbar would venture to cross without his army, felt perfectly secure, and had accordingly passed the night in festivity. They were first brought to their senses by the ominous sound of the royal nakara, or kettle-drum. Though completely surprised, they were so superior in numbers that the contest was for some time doubtful, and Akbar was in great personal danger; but his elephants, advancing rapidly into the midst of the confused mass, left the enemy no time to rally. Khan Zaman, while endeavouring to extract an arrow which had wounded him, fell with his horse, and was trampled to death by an elephant. His brother, Bahadur Khan, was taken prisoner; and on being brought before the king, who asked him what injury he had sustained to justify him in again drawing the sword, simply replied, "Praise be to God that he has rescued me once more to see your majesty's countenance." This impudent hypocrisy had saved him on a former occasion, but it now proved unavailing; for some of the officers, afraid perhaps of a renewal of the king's ill-judged leniency, put him to death without orders. The revolt of the Uzbeks being now considered at an end, Akbar returned to Agra in July, 1567.

Akbar next marched against Rana Udai Singh, who had hitherto refused to acknowledge the Mughul supremacy. He immediately directed his steps against Chitor, in Rajputana. The Rana quitted it before his arrival, and retired into the mountains, but left it amply provisioned and strongly garrisoned
by 8,000 Rajputs. It was immediately invested by Akbar, whose approaches are said to have been made in the most scientific manner, in the mode recommended by Vauban, and practised by the best engineers of modern times. After arriving near the walls by means of zigzag trenches and stuffed gabions, two mines were carried under bastions, filled with gunpowder, and fired. The storming party advanced, and, finding a practicable breach, divided, with the view of entering both breaches at once. From some cause only one of the mines had exploded, and the second division was close upon the other when the second explosion took place, and 500 of the Mughuls were blown into the air. The consequence was, that both attacks failed.

Akbar's spirit generally rose with the difficulties he encountered, and he immediately began to run new mines and carry on other works. One evening while they were in progress, he perceived Jagmul, the governor, superintending the repair of the breaches by torch-light. Seizing a matchlock from one of his attendants, he fired with so sure an aim as to lodge the ball in Jagmul's forehead. The garrison were at once seized with despair, and erecting a funeral pile for the dead body of their chief, burned their wives and children along with it. Akbar, aware of what was going on, ordered his men forward to the breaches under the cover of night. Not a soul appeared, and they entered the fort without opposition. The Rajputs had retired to their temples, and there, disdaining to accept of quarter, perished to a man.

Akbar's children had hitherto died; but in 1569, shortly after he had made a pilgrimage to a celebrated shrine at Ajmer, and paid a visit to Sheikh Salim Chishti, in the village of Sikari, his favourite sultana gave birth to his son Salim. In the following year another son, whom he called Murad, was born to him. As both births had taken place in the village of Sikari, he regarded it as a particularly propitious spot, and selected it as the site of a city, which at a later period received the name of Fatehpur.

Gujarat had long been torn by intestine factions, and also become a common asylum for all the chiefs who had risen in rebellion against Akbar's government. Having therefore resolved to march against it in person, he set out in September, 1572. Patan and Ahmedabad fell into his hands without a blow. At
Baroach and Surat matters wore a more threatening appearance, Ibrahim Hussain Mirza being near the one, and his brother Muhammad Hussain Mirza near the other, each at the head of an independent army. On Akbar's approach towards Baroach, Ibrahim suddenly quitted the place, and set out by a circuitous route to reach the Punjab, where he hoped to raise an insurrection. Akbar, informed of his intention, immediately adopted one of those chivalric resolutions which, notwithstanding the success which usually attended them, cannot be justified against the charge of rashness. It was nine o'clock at night when he heard of Ibrahim's departure. Immediately, taking only a small body of horse, he hastened off to intercept his retreat. On reaching the Mhendri, which runs by the town of Surtal, he found his party reduced to forty troopers, and saw Ibrahim on the opposite bank with 1,000. At this moment Akbar was joined by seventy additional troopers. He expected more, but refused to wait for them; and crossing the river, he advanced to the charge. Many acts of individual heroism were performed, particularly by some Hindu rajas, who, proud of the confidence which Akbar had placed in them, were eager to justify it; but none behaved more chivalrously than the king himself, who repeatedly engaged the bravest of his enemies single-handed, and charged right against Ibrahim, who, shunning the encounter, only saved himself by the fleetness of his horse.

Satisfied with this achievement, Akbar, instead of attempting to pursue the fleeing enemy, waited till his army arrived, and then proceeded to lay siege to Surat. A valiant resistance was at first threatened; but as soon as the batteries were ready to open, the inhabitants surrendered. Meanwhile Ibrahim Hussain Mirza carried out his scheme of attempting an insurrection in the Punjab. On learning his arrival, Hussain Kuli Khan, Akbar's general, who was besieging Nagarkot, immediately raised the siege and pursued him through the Punjab to Tatta on the Indus. He probably thought that he had made his escape, or believed Kuli Khan to be more distant than he was, for instead of continuing his flight, he set out on a hunting excursion. On his return he found his camp stormed, and his brother Masud Hussain a prisoner. He resolved to retrieve the day or perish, and made many desperate onsets; but being repulsed at
every point, desisted, and fled to Multan. Here, after being severely wounded and taken prisoner by a Baluchi, he was delivered up to the governor of Multan, who shortly after beheaded him. His head was sent to Agra, and by Akbar’s order placed above one of its gates.

In July, 1573, the affairs of Gujarat were again thrown into disorder by the union of one of its former chiefs with Muhammad Hussain Mirza. These confederates, after overrunning several districts, felt strong enough to attempt the siege of Ahmedabad. The presence of Akbar seemed absolutely necessary, but a formidable obstacle was in the way. The rainy season had commenced, and the march of a large army was impracticable. In these circumstances, he made one of those decisive movements for which he had become famous. Sending off a body of 2,000 chosen horse, he followed rapidly with a retinue of 300 persons, chiefly nobles, mounted on camels and accompanied by led horses. Having come up with the main body at Patan, he found that his whole force mustered 3,000. Without halting he set forward for Ahmedabad, while a swift messenger hastened before to make the garrison aware of his approach. The enemy first learned it by the sound of his drum; and though astonished above measure, prepared for action. Leaving 5,000 horse to watch the gates and prevent a sally, Muhammad set out with 7,000 horse. Akbar at first waited in the expectation that the garrison would join him, but on learning that this was not to be expected, he crossed the river and drew up on the plain. The battle was fiercely contested, and was not decided till the king, with his body-guard of 100 men, made an attack in flank on Muhammad, who, losing all presence of mind, turned his back and fled. The rout now became general. Muhammad, wounded in the face and mounted on a horse which had also been wounded, attempted to leap a hedge, but both fell, and he was made prisoner. Several persons laying claim to the honour of the capture, Akbar put the question to himself—“Who took you?” Muhammad, holding down his head, replied, “Nobody. The curse of ingratitude overtook me.” He spoke truth, and paid the penalty; for before Akbar had given any orders respecting him, Raja Rai Singh, in whose charge he had been left, put him to death. The siege of
Ahmedabad was immediately raised, and Akbar entered it in triumph.

In the course of this year Daud Khan, son of Suleman Kirani, ruler of Bengal, took up arms. Munim Khan, sent by Akbar against him, defeated him in several actions, and compelled him to sign a treaty. Akbar, disliking the terms, refused to ratify it, and insisted that Daud Khan should either he expelled or obliged to pay tribute. He promised the latter, but it was merely to gain time; and as soon as he thought himself strong enough, he resumed hostilities. Munim Khan again defeated him, took his fleet of boats, and, after crossing the Ganges, laid siege to Patna. Akbar, thinking his presence required, left Agra in the middle of the rains, and set out with as many troops as could be embarked in 1,000 boats. On arriving within a few miles of Patna he had the satisfaction to learn that, in consequence of Munim's success, it was on the point of being evacuated. Hajipur, on the opposite side of the Ganges, also yielded without resistance. Daud Khan, thus defeated at all points, wished to make terms; but Akbar insisted on his unconditional submission, at the same time observing to his messenger, "Tell Daud Khan I have a thousand men in my army as good as he, and if he is disposed to put the point to issue in single combat, I will myself meet him." Daud Khan had no idea of this manner of settling the contest, and made a precipitate retreat to Bengal. In the pursuit 400 of his elephants were taken. Akbar now returned to Agra; and Munim Khan, continuing to prosecute the subjugation of Bengal, obliged Daud Khan to take refuge in Orissa. Ultimately he was overtaken on the shores of the Bay of Bengal, and obliged to submit. The terms were that he should relinquish all pretensions to Bengal and Bihar, but retain Orissa and Cuttack. Munim Khan was appointed governor of Bengal, and removed the seat of government from Khowaspur Tanda to Gaur, which had been the capital till it was abandoned on account of its insalubrity. He had better have left matters as he found them, for he soon fell a victim to the climate, and was succeeded by Hussain Kuli Khan, a Turkman, who bore the title of Khan Jehan.

Before Hussain Kuli Khan had taken actual possession of his government, Daud Khan, having leauged with several Afghan
chiefs, appeared at the head of 50,000 horse, and re-took the greater part of Bengal. His possession, however, was only momentary; for, in a battle fought shortly after, he was defeated, taken prisoner, and put to death. The insurrection was still headed by some Afghan chiefs, and several sanguinary battles were fought; but ultimately the Mughuls proved everywhere triumphant. The fort of Rhotas, in Bihar, which had long held out, was obliged to surrender; and Bengal and Bihar were formally incorporated with the empire of the Great Mughul, though they both continued to be, from time to time, the seats of formidable insurrections. These had hitherto for the most part originated with Afghans, who had fled thither when the Afghan dynasty was driven from the throne of Delhi; but when their hostility had ceased to be formidable, the Mughul chiefs themselves began to give considerable trouble, first quarrelling with Akbar’s financial arrangements, and then making open war by appearing in the field in 1579, with an army of 30,000 men. After an intestine war, which the Afghans again endeavoured to turn to account, tranquillity was restored.

While Akbar’s officers were thus occupied in Bengal, he was himself obliged to march to the north-western provinces, in consequence of a new attempt by his half-brother, Muhammad Hakim Mirza, to make himself master of part of the Punjab. Muhammad had advanced as far as Lahore and laid siege to it, when the arrival of Akbar at Sirhind disconcerted all his schemes, and he hastened back to Kabul. He had so often before escaped in the same way, that Akbar determined not to let him off so easily; and after crossing the Indus, continued his march upon Kabul itself, which he entered in triumph in 1579. Muhammad was now at his mercy; but, on making his submission, received more favourable terms than he deserved, and was left in possession of his capital, while the royal army set out on its return. On this occasion Akbar built the fort of Attock; a short time after he built the fort of Allahabad, at the junction of the Jamuna and Ganges.

After Muzaffar Shah, the former ruler of Gujarat, had been forced to abdicate, he was taken to Agra, and so far ingratiated himself with Akbar that he was presented with an extensive domain, and allowed to reside upon it. He seemed satisfied; but
in 1581, when new troubles arose in Gujarat, he was worked upon by some of the insurgents, and suddenly quitted Hindustan for the purpose of attempting to recover his lost throne. Thus headed, the insurrection soon became formidable, and the royal generals were obliged to retreat northwards to Patan, leaving Muzaffar in possession of Ahmedabad, Baroach, and nearly the whole of the province. An army, sent under Mirza Khan, son of the late Bairam Khan, recovered a large portion of what had been lost; but Muzaffar, retiring into the more inaccessible parts of the peninsula, maintained himself in a kind of independence for several years.

In 1585, Muhammad Hakim Mirza having died, Akbar immediately set out to take possession of Kabul. In this he found no difficulty; but he immediately after undertook another task, which brought him into collision with tribes of a more warlike character than he had previously encountered, and called for his utmost skill and prowess. Kashmir, with its beautiful valley, tempted his ambition, and he resolved to make a conquest of it. The circumstances were favourable; for dissensions had broken out in the reigning family, and the whole kingdom was torn asunder by contending factions. But the facilities for conquest thus afforded were greatly counteracted by the physical features of the country. It lies embosomed among lofty mountain chains, and is accessible only through perilous passes. At first Akbar, then at Attock, was contented to send forward a detachment of his army. It succeeded in penetrating through a pass which had not been guarded; but a threatened want of provisions, and the sudden setting in of winter with a heavy fall of snow, so intimidated the officers in command that they hastily concluded a treaty by which Kashmir nominally acknowledged the Mughul supremacy, but was left, in every other respect, in full possession of its former independence.

This treaty was utterly at variance with Akbar's views; and he therefore not only refused to ratify it, but, in the following year (1587), sent a second invading army, the commander of which, by dexterously availing himself of the intestine dissensions, was admitted within the passes without a struggle, and afterwards made an easy conquest. The king, having been
captured, was enrolled among the nobles of Delhi, and sent to live on a domain assigned him in Bihar. Kashmir, robbed of its independence, which it had maintained for nearly 1,000 years, became merely a Mughul province.

The struggles in this quarter were not yet over; for Akbar's ambition extended to the subjugation, not merely of Kashmir, but of the Afghan mountain districts which encircle the plain of Peshawar. The most powerful of the Afghan tribes in this direction were the Yusufzyes or Eusofzeis, who possessed the northern part of the Peshawar plain, and the mountain terraces which rise above it and stretch back to the snowy ridges of the Hindu Kush. The Mughul army employed in the expedition against this Afghan tribe was commanded by Zein Khan Koka, who allowed himself to be completely defeated, and had great difficulty in reaching the royal camp at Attock. Raja Birbal, a special favourite of Akbar, perished on this occasion; and the monarch had thus to endure, not merely the mortification of defeat, but the deep grief, which he could not but feel, at the loss of one of his most valued friends. The Yusufzyes, having failed to improve their victory, were ultimately obliged to make some sort of submission, which appears to have been more formal than real. The Roshnyes or Rushenias, another of the mountain tribes, headed by a leader of the name of Jelala, made a still more valiant defence, but were also at last obliged to submit.

While this Afghan contest was being waged, Akbar was extending and consolidating his empire in other directions. Taking advantage of dissensions in Sind, he in 1591 sent Mirza Khan with an invading army from Lahore, to enter it from the north, and lay siege to the fort of Sehwan. Mirza Jani Beg, then ruling in Sind, advanced with a numerous army and a train of artillery. After arriving within twelve miles of the Mughul camp, he sent forward 100 boats filled with artillery-men and archers, to make an attack. Mirza Khan had only twenty-five boats at command; but, taking advantage of the night, came upon the enemy by surprise, and compelled him to a precipitate flight. Mirza Jani Beg became, in future, more cautious; and having brought down his whole fleet, landed on a swampy ground, which, at high water, became inaccessible. Here he successfully resisted all attempts to dislodge him; and at the
same time, while he kept his own communications open, so interrupted those of the Mughuls, that they were unable to obtain the necessary supplies. In these circumstances, Mirza Khan had no alternative but to divide his army, taking part of it to Tatta, while the remainder continued the siege. Mirza Jani Beg, thus tempted to assume the offensive, lost the advantages of his position, and was finally caught in a trap, which compelled him to accept of any terms of peace that the Mughuls chose to dictate. His kingdom became a Mughul province, and he himself exchanged his position as a king for that of an officer in the Mughul service. In this war he is said to have employed some Portuguese soldiers, and to have had 200 natives dressed as Europeans. These may be regarded as the first Sepoys in India.

It has been mentioned how Humayun, Akbar's father, after obtaining military aid from the Shah of Persia, on condition of making the conquest of Kandahar, and ceding it to that monarch, refused to fulfil his agreement, and kept the conquest to himself. Internal troubles prevented the Shah from resenting the injustice at the time; but the circumstances afterwards became favourable, and Kandahar passed to Persia shortly after Akbar's accession. It remained in this position till 1594, when Akbar, turning the Persian dissensions to account, was able to make himself master both of the town and territory without being obliged to strike a blow, the Persian prince who held the fort being contented to exchange his possession for the government of Multan and a command in the Mughul army.

In the whole of India north of the Narmada, Mughul supremacy was now completely established. It was otherwise in the Deccan; and to it, therefore, Akbar's attention was now earnestly turned. In 1586 he had availed himself of an opportunity to interfere in the internal concerns of Ahmednagar; and had endeavoured, though without success, to aid a claimant in obtaining the throne. In 1590 he had recourse to a much more formal proceeding, and sent ambassadors to four different courts—Asir and Burhanpur, Ahmednagar, Bijapur, and Bhagnagar, the modern Hyderabad—demanding an acknowledgment of his supremacy. When a common refusal was given, he only received the answer which he had anticipated, and for which he was prepared. For the avowed purpose of reducing
them to subjection; Mirza Khan was immediately sent south with an army. He proceeded first to Mandu. Meanwhile a messenger had arrived from Burhan, King of Ahmednagar, who had lived for some time in exile at Akbar's court, announcing his entire submission. His death having taken place shortly after, in 1594, and his son and successor having fallen in battle, a disputed succession took place, and the minister, who favoured the claim of a boy of the name of Ahmed, applied for assistance to Akbar's son, Prince Murad Mirza, then in Gujarat. The prince, by his father's orders, immediately put his army in motion and marched for the Deccan, taking the direction of Ahmednagar.

The minister, Mian Munja, who called in this foreign aid, had repented of the step, and therefore prepared to meet the prince as if he had come not as an ally, but as an enemy. Having provisioned and otherwise prepared for the defence of Ahmednagar, he gave the command of it to the Princess Chand Bibi, who had been queen and dowager-regent of the neighbouring kingdom of Bijapur, and marched toward the Bijapur frontier with the remainder of the army. Prince Murad Mirza and Mirza Khan having united their forces, met the altered circumstances by laying aside their ostensible character as auxiliaries, and assuming that of principals in the war.

Chand Bibi, equally prepared to act her part, and when the Mughuls opened the siege of Ahmednagar, made a most resolute defence, counterworking their mines, superintending the repairing of breaches, and often making her appearance, sword in hand, to animate the garrison when their spirits began to fail. Not contented with thus resisting in the fort, she entered into correspondence with the neighbouring kings; and, by vivid description of the common danger by which they were threatened, succeeded in forming a confederacy which levied a powerful army for the purpose of advancing to her relief. The Mughuls, anxious to effect a capture before this army could arrive, fired their mines, which blew up about eighty feet of the wall, and threw the garrison into such consternation that they would have given up the place had not Chand Bibi, appearing among them with a veil on her face and a naked sword in her hand, animated them to new exertions. She caused guns
to be brought to bear on the assailants, and stones to be hurled upon them, so that the ditch was filled with their dead. During the night she stood by the breach, superintending the workmen, and did not depart till she had seen it built up to such a height as to be no longer practicable. It was now the turn of the Mughuls to be disheartened; and Prince Murad was glad to conclude a peace which left Ahmednagar and its dependencies entire in the hands of its native sovereign, and only required him to renounce some obsolete or unavailable claim on the throne of Berar.

No sooner was this treaty ratified than the dissensions among the princes of the Deccan, which had only been suspended by a common danger, again broke out. Among other follies, they voluntarily assumed the offensive against the Great Mughul; and, in the very face of their recent engagement, marched a hostile force into Berar. Akbar had thus only too good ground for interfering; and he accordingly resolved, in 1599, to take the field in person. One cause of this resolution is said to have been the desire to divert his thoughts, and lighten the grief which he felt for the loss of his second son, Prince Murad, who had died of a sudden illness. Another cause weighing heavily upon him was the misconduct of his eldest son, Prince Salim. He had formally appointed him his successor, and treated him with the utmost indulgence, but met with a most ungrateful return. The prince had become the slave of intoxication, and under its influence was hurried into several crimes. One of these was treason, which he carried so far that it had assumed the form of open revolt, from which, however, second and better thoughts induced him to desist. Another crime which stains his memory, is the share he had in the murder of Abulfazal, who had long been his father's favourite minister, and is still celebrated as the historian of his reign. Abulfazal was returning from the Deccan when he fell into an ambuscade, which Nara Singh Deo, Raja of Orcha, in Bundelkhand, had laid for him, at the instigation of Prince Salim, and fell fighting valiantly. Had Akbar been aware of the share which his son had in this atrocity, he would probably have taken effectual steps to disinherit him; since, without this additional aggravation, the tidings so affected him that he wept bitterly, and passed two days and nights without sleep.
This first paroxysm over, he vowed revenge, and took it by inflicting on Nara Singh Deo and all his race severities of which his reign happily affords few examples. In the south Akbar's usual good fortune had attended him; his arms, though not uniformly, were so generally successful, that most of the princes hastened to make their submission; and he returned to Agra in 1602, so satisfied with the result, that in a proclamation which he issued, he assumed, in addition to his other titles, that of Prince of the Deccan. While thus at the head of a mighty empire, of which he had himself been the main architect, and surrounded by a magnificence which few if any sovereigns have ever equalled, Akbar, in his declining years, was far from happy. He had scarcely ceased to mourn for his second son, when his third son, Prince Daniel, whose marriage in 1604 he had celebrated with great festivities, died within a twelvemonth, the victim of his own drunken habits. But his sorrow for the dead members of his family was not so distressing as the shame and agony produced by the misconduct of the living. Salim, his only surviving son and destined successor, after a promise of reform, had sunk deeper than ever in his vicious courses, acting habitually with the caprice of a madman and the cruelty of a tyrant. A quarrel with his own son Khusrav had such an effect on that youth's mother, that she destroyed herself by poison. Akbar, who had through life manifested the greatest decision, seems now to have hesitated as to his future arrangements. He shuddered at the thought of being succeeded by Salim, and yet in Khusrav, Salim's eldest son, he beheld the very passions which disgraced Salim himself. There was a third son, Khurram. He had entwined himself around the heart of his grandfather, but the fearful consequences of disputed succession appear to have deterred him from making any destination in his favour. Amid these distressing trials and perplexities, his health began visibly to give way, and after an illness, during the last ten days of which he was confined to bed, and employed much of his time in giving good counsels to his son, he expired on the 13th of October, 1605. Of the sixty-four years of his life, fifty-one had been spent on the throne. He was buried near Agra, in a tomb consisting of a solid pyramid, surrounded by cloisters, galleries, and domes, and of such
immense dimensions, that for a year or two after the conquest of the surrounding territory by the British, a whole European regiment of dragoons was quartered in it.

Akbar is described as of a manly, athletic, and handsome form, fair complexion, pleasing features, and captivating manners. In early life his tastes were somewhat epicurean, and he indulged in wine; in his latter years he was abstemious, both in meat and drink. He had no vindictiveness in his nature; and, however much he might have been provoked, was always ready to extend pardon to every one who asked it. His courage was so decided as often to amount to rashness; and the chivalrous prevailed so much in his temper, that he often underwent great toils and exposed himself to great perils, from a mere love of adventure. His intellect, though not of the first order, was remarkably acute, and nothing pleased him more than discussions of a metaphysical and puzzling nature. When not actually engaged in these discussions, he delighted to be present at them as a listener; and amused himself with the wranglings of philosophical or religious sects, whose leaders he on various occasions summoned to court for this very purpose. One of the most remarkable of these discussions took place when he had held a meeting of Muhammedan doctors and Portuguese missionaries, and deluded the latter by pretending to have some idea of becoming a Christian convert. The truth seems to be, that he had few serious convictions of any kind, and employed his acuteness, not so much for the purpose of discovering, as of evading truth.

In private life he was a kind and indulgent parent, and a generous, warm-hearted, and strongly attached friend. Indeed, it may be truly said, that the only real griefs which he suffered through life had their source in these two relations. As a military commander, he takes high rank. He did not fight many great battles, but often, after some of his ablest officers had fought and lost them, he no sooner made his appearance in the field than fortune, which had forsaken them, seemed to return, and defeat was converted into victory. In the cabinet he was still more successful than in the field; and possessed in the highest degree the art of winning the affections of all with whom he came in contact, and rendering their varied talents and influence
subservient to the advancement of his service. For the first time Mohammedans and Hindus were seen, during his reign, working harmoniously together, while holding places of honour and trust near the throne.

Akbar's best fame is founded on his internal administration, into which so many important improvements were introduced, that it would be difficult to enumerate them. Suffice it here to say, that in every department of the state, business was conducted on rational, liberal, and tolerant principles; justice was administered impartially among all classes of subjects, without reference to birth or religious profession; and the revenue was raised in the manner supposed to be most equitable and least oppressive. Having first fixed a uniform standard of measurement, he carefully ascertained the extent and relative productiveness of each landed tenement, and then fairly apportioned the amount of taxation which each ought to bear. In this way there was little room for favouritism; and a burden which, while it lay equally upon all, was not excessive in its amount, was borne easily and without grudging.

In connection with Akbar's revenue system may be mentioned his administrative divisions of the empire into provinces or subahs, each of which was governed by a head officer called a subahdar, whose powers were equivalent to those of a viceroy, all authority, civil as well as military, within the province being vested in him. Subordinate to the subahdar, though appointed not by him, but by the king, was an officer, with the title of dewan or diwan, who had the superintendence of all matters of revenue and finance. The subahs, originally fifteen, were, in consequence of additional conquests, raised to eighteen. Of these twelve were in Hindustan and six in the Deccan.

Among the enactments of Akbar which deserve notice for their human and liberal spirit, and at the same time throw some reflection on the tardy legislation of the British government on the same subjects, are his prohibition of the burning of Hindu widows against their will, and his permitting them to marry again, though the Hindu law expressly forbids it. The same humane and liberal spirit appears in his prohibition of Jizya or capitation tax on infidels, which had placed an enormous, irresponsible, and much-abused power in the hands
of fanatical Muhammedans; and in the abolition of the practice of making slaves of prisoners taken in war—a practice under the cover of which not only the wives and children captured in camps or fortified places, but the peaceable inhabitants of any hostile country, were seized and carried off into slavery. These enactments gave grievous offence—those affecting the Hindus being odious to the Brahmmins, and those which laid restraints on the Muhammedans being seized upon by the Mulas, and urged as a proof that Akbar himself was an infidel. A still stronger proof was supposed to be found in a matter of court etiquette, on which Akbar seems to have insisted with more pertinacity than is easily reconcilable with his usual moderation. He had a ‘dislike to the beard, and would scarcely admit a person who wore it to his presence. Unfortunately his feeling in this respect was in direct opposition to an injunction of the Qoran; and several of the more zealous Muhammedan chiefs chose rather to forgo the honours and pleasures of the court than conform to a regulation, the observance of which seemed incompatible with orthodoxy.

Among the public works executed during the reign of Akbar, are the walls and citadels of Agra and Allahabad; the foundation of the city of Fatehpur on the site of the village of Sikri, for which, as the birth-place of two of his sons, he had conceived a strong partiality; the splendid palace erected in that city for his own residence, and near it a mosque remarkable for the beauty and majestic proportions of its architecture; and the white marble mosque and palace of Agra, in both of which simplicity and elegance are happily combined. Another work of Akbar, though not strictly of a public nature, is the tomb of his father Humayun at Delhi. Its commanding position, its magnitude and solidity, and its stupendous dome of white marble, have long made it celebrated as one of the greatest of his structures; while a new interest has recently been given to it as the scene of the capture of the last and, all things considered, the most worthless representative of the Great Mughul—the present (January, 1858) so-called King of Delhi. It would be unpardonable, in referring to the performances of Akbar's reign, not to mention another work which, though of a very different nature from any of the above, might have shed
greater lustre on his reign than the most celebrated of them. This work was a translation of the gospels into Persian. It was undertaken by Akbar's special directions, and intrusted to a Portuguese missionary, who, unfortunately, instead of executing it faithfully, committed what is called a pious fraud, and produced a spurious translation, disfigured and adulterated by lying Popish legends. The sad consequence is, that a work which, issued under the auspices of the Great Mughul, might have given a knowledge of pure Christianity in influential quarters which could not otherwise be reached, has only had the effect of presenting it under a debased and polluted form.
Advent of the Europeans

IN THE time of the Roman emperor Justinian, when the Persians, by establishing a monopoly of the Indian trade along the route which led most directly to Constantinople, had raised the price of silk enormously in that luxurious capital, the opportune arrival of two Persian monks dissipated the alarm which had begun to prevail, by showing how an adequate supply might be obtained at home. In the course of their labours as Christian missionaries, they had penetrated into China, and become acquainted with the whole process of the silk manufacture; from its commencement in the rearing of silk-worms, to its termination in the finished product. Their information attracted general attention; and the emperor, fully alive to its importance, determined immediately to act upon it. With this view the monks, under his auspices, paid a second visit to China, and returned with a supply of the eggs of the silk-worm, concealed in the hollow of a cane. The worms hatched from these eggs being carefully reared, multiplied so rapidly that in a short time Greece, Sicily, and Italy were both producing raw silk, and manufacturing it on an extensive scale. One branch of the Indian trade was thus in some degree superseded, but the others which remained were still sufficient to create a large demand, and excite to strenuous exertions for the purpose of supplying it. In this way the ancient channels of intercourse were again partially opened, and Indian products were beginning to flow into Europe by the inland and maritime routes which have been already described, when new obstacles of a very formidable character were suddenly interposed.

The Muhammedan imposture, after spreading like wild-fire over the whole of Arabia, continued its conquests in all directions,
And soon placed both Persia and Egypt under the absolute control of its fanatical adherents. The fierce animosities thus engendered, left no room for friendly intercourse between those who regarded Muhammad as a prophet, and those who knew him to be an impostor. Exterminating warfare alone was thought of, and continued to rage with the utmost fury. In these circumstances, as the demand for Eastern products, originally confined to the more wealthy, had become generally diffused among all classes the only alternative was to endeavour to obtain them by a channel which lay so far to the north as to run little risk of being interfered with by Muhammedan fanaticism. Mention was formerly made of the commercial route, which after crossing the Indus continued west, and then sent a branch north to the Caspian. This route, with a slight modification, was now adopted as the safest and most practicable, and continued for a long period to be the main trunk by which the commerce between Europe and the more remote regions of Asia was maintained. Two lines of caravans, the one from the western frontiers of China, and the other from the western frontiers of India, met at a common point of the Amu or Oxus, where that stream first became available for transport. The goods by both lines were here embarked; being carried down the stream into Lake Aral, they were again conveyed by land carriage to the Caspian, and thence by water to the mouth of the Kur, and up the stream as far as navigable. Another land conveyance brought them to the Phasis, down which they were transported into the Black Sea, and thence to Constantinople, which thus became a great commercial emporium. At a later period a direct caravan route brought the products of the East to Astrakhan, from which they were conveyed either down the Volga into the Caspian, thereafter to follow the same route as before, or by land to the Don, and thence to the Sea of Azof.

This route, with all its obvious disadvantages, was the best which Europe possessed for more than two centuries. The caliphs would not have been unwilling to renew the ancient channels of commerce. They were perfectly aware of the riches which would thus be poured into their treasury; and were politic enough to keep their fanaticism in check when it could not be indulged without sacrificing their pecuniary interests.
Accordingly, even while the Indian trade was confined almost entirely to their own subjects, they carefully endeavoured to extend it, both by affording it new facilities at home, and encouraging the exploration of foreign countries. In this way, at an early period, the caliphs of Baghdad had provided a new emporium for the trade of the Persian Gulf, by founding the port and city of Bussorah, at the junction of the Euphrates and Tigris; and both from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea numerous voyages were made to both sides of the peninsula of India, to Ceylon, to Malacca, and to the shores of countries lying far beyond it. By means of these voyages all the valued productions of the East Indies arrived in their ports, and found ready purchasers in merchants, who carried them for distribution into the interior.

The friendly intercourse between Christian and Muhammedan nations seemed on the point of being renewed, at least commercially, when the preaching of Peter the Hermit set all Europe into a flame, and myriads of Crusaders hastened from every quarter to wrest the holy sepulchre from the hands of infidels. War accordingly began again to rage with new fury; and the exasperation which had been gradually softened by time, became more bitter and universal than it had ever been before. All idea of peaceful trade was now necessarily abandoned; and yet, perhaps, at no period did the trade of the West make more rapid progress than during the Crusades. The armies destined for these celebrated expeditions never could have reached the East without the aid of the Genoese, the Pisans, and the Venetians, whose fleets accompanying them in their march along the nearest shores, supplied them both with provisions and the means of transport. In return for these services they naturally shared in the success of those whom they had assisted, and, when valuable harbours fell into the hands of the Crusaders, obtained many important privileges.

The maritime states of Italy, while thus ostensibly engaged in a common cause, were by no means prepared to admit that they had a common interest, and were hence disposed to act towards each other on the narrowest and most illiberal principles. The old maxim, that the commercial prosperity of a state was best promoted by depressing the trade of its neighbour,
though now exploded, was then universally received; and in acting upon it, there was no injustice or perfidy of which the rival Italian republics scrupled to be guilty when it seemed possible in this way to establish a maritime ascendancy. One remarkable illustration of this fact was given in 1204, when the Venetians induced the leaders of the fourth crusade to turn aside from their avowed object of warring with infidels in order to wrest Constantinople from the hands of a monarch, who, whatever his demerits might be, was by profession Christian. A variety of motives may have influenced the Crusaders in taking this unwarrantable step; but the subsequent conduct of the Venetians leaves no room to doubt that their only object was selfish aggrandizement. After Constantinople had been stormed and plundered, the dominions which had belonged to the Greek emperor were partitioned among his unprincipled conquerors; and while an Earl of Flanders was placed upon his throne, the Venetians obtained a chain of settlements which stretched from the Dardanelles to the Adriatic, and made them virtually masters of the navigation and trade of the Levant. In Constantinople, which, from the cause already mentioned, had long rivalled Alexandria as an emporium for the traffic between Europe and India, they obtained exclusive privileges, which made it impossible for any maritime state to compete with them, and furnished them with the means of lord ing over all their rivals.

The ungenerous course pursued by the Venetians had undoubtedly the effect of greatly extending their trade generally, and of giving them an almost exclusive monopoly of that large portion of the Indian trade which had its centre in Constantinople. The superiority they had thus acquired remained with them for rather more than half a century; and the injustice to which they owed it seemed almost to be forgotten, when the day of retribution arrived, and their own tactics were successfully employed against them. The Greeks had never been reconciled to the Latin yoke, which had been fraudulently imposed upon them, and were therefore prepared to avail themselves of the first favourable opportunity of shaking it off. Had they been left to their own resources they could scarcely have hoped for success, but they had powerful auxiliaries in the Genoese, who were anima-
ted at once by a feeling of revenge for the injustice which they had suffered, and a desire to become masters of a traffic, the possession of which had given the Venetians an immense superiority over all their rivals. The terms of alliance between the Greeks and the Genoese were easily settled. The former were again to be ruled by their own dynasty, and the latter were to supplant the Venetians in all their exclusive privileges. Both objects were accomplished. A Greek emperor once more mounted the throne of Constantinople, and the Genoese, in addition to other important privileges, took formal possession of the suburb of Pera, subject only to the condition of holding it as a fief of the empire.

It was now the turn of the Venetians to be depressed; while the Genoese, not contented with their supremacy in the harbour of Constantinople, extended it to the Black Sea, where, by erecting forts on various points of the coast, and particularly on commanding positions in the Crimea and within the Sea of Azof, they secured a monopoly of the extensive and lucrative trade carried on with the East by way of the Caspian. In virtue of this monopoly Genoa became for a time the greatest commercial power in Europe. The Venetians at first attempted to compete with the Genoese, even in the harbour of Constantinople, but soon found the terms so unequal, in consequence of being burdened with heavy duties, from which their rivals were exempted, that they abandoned the struggle as hopeless. Their only alternative now was to resign the Indian trade altogether, or endeavour to re-open its ancient channels. In preferring the latter, they were met at the very outset by deep-rooted prejudices, which made it unlawful and even impious to enter into alliances of any kind with Muhammedan rulers; but no sooner were these prejudices overcome than the remainder of the task was comparatively easy. With the sanction of the Pope himself, who on this occasion, as on many others, allowed the supposed impiety to be committed in consideration of the profit anticipated from it, a commercial treaty was concluded with the Sultan of Egypt. It contemplated the carrying on of the Eastern traffic both by the overland route across Syria, and by the way of the Red Sea. With this view the Venetian senate was empowered to appoint two consuls,
with mercantile jurisdiction, the one to reside at Damascus and the other at Alexandria. Both of these cities were accordingly resorted to by Venetian merchants and artisans; while at Beirut, as the port of the former, and in the harbour of the latter, mercantile vessels bearing the Venetian flag far outnumbered those of all other countries. The Genoese, contented with their undisputed monopoly at Constantinople, seem not at this time to have made any attempt to share in the advantages which the Egyptian sultans had conferred on the Venetians; but the Florentines, after they had, by the conquest of Pisa, in 1405, acquired the seaport of Leghorn, turned their attention to the Indian trade, and succeeded, in 1425, in concluding a treaty which placed them on the same footing as the Venetians in respect of commercial privilege. The earnest attempts thus made to share in the trade to the East Indies, would of themselves lead to the conclusion that a taste for the products of the regions included under that general name must no longer have been confined, as at first, to a few countries on the eastern part of the Mediterranean, but must have spread far west and north, so as to include a large portion of Europe. The fact was really so; and there is not much difficulty in accounting for it. Many of the most distinguished leaders of the Crusades, with their followers, came from those quarters; and on their return brought home with them new ideas and new wants. To their astonishment they had found that in several points, usually considered as tests of civilization, they were far surpassed by the infidels whom they had been accustomed to regard as mere barbarians. Galled by their inferiority in these respects, they had little difficulty in learning to surmount it; and imbibed tastes and formed habits which they could not indulge in the absence of Eastern products. The demand naturally produced a supply; and Italian ships, freighted with these products, were frequently seen in the English Channel, in the German Ocean, and even within the Baltic. In course of time the maritime spirit of the North was completely roused; and its merchants, instead of waiting for Italian visits, sent their own vessels into the Mediterranean, and there became purchasers of Indian produce at second hand from the Florentines, Venetians, and Genoese. In this traffic the lead
was taken by the cities of the Hanseatic League, and particularly by Bruges, which in consequence became one of the most populous and flourishing marts in Northern Europe.

The Genoese were still in possession of their monopoly in 1453, when an event occurred which abruptly terminated it, and was followed by a series of disasters which ultimately annihilated their maritime greatness. This event was the capture of Constantinople, and the extinction of the Greek empire, by the Turks under Muhammed II. They made an effort to escape the destruction which threatened them, by attempting to form a commercial treaty with the Mameluke Sultans of Egypt; but the monopoly which they had held at Constantinople under the Greek emperors, placed them in a false position, and the negotiation proved fruitless. The Venetians, accordingly, were once more in the ascendent. Their most formidable rival had been obliged to resign the contest; and they began to run a new course of prosperity, to which, as far as human foresight reached, no limit could be assigned. At this period of unexampled prosperity Venice was tottering to her fall.

The revival of learning and the discovery of printing had at once awakened a spirit of inquiry, and furnished the most effectual means of diffusing it. In all departments of literature and science rapid progress was made; and discoveries leading to practical results in some of the most important arts of life, were constantly rewarding the diligent inquirer, and stimulating others to follow in his footsteps. Among the arts thus improved was navigation. Hitherto, when the shore was lost sight of, there had been no means of directing the course of a vessel at sea; and the utmost which the boldest and most experienced navigator attempted, was to steer from headland to headland without hugging the intervening shore, or to take advantage of a wind which blew regularly like the monsoons of the Indian Ocean, and thus use it according to the direction from which it blew for traversing a wide expanse of sea on an outward or a homeward voyage. When the compass was discovered, the greatest obstacle to a voyage out of sight of land was at once removed; and there was even less danger in launching out on the wide ocean than in following the windings of the coast, exposed to rocks and shoals, and the many dangers of a lee shore.
Among the first who proposed to turn the use of the compass to practical account in the discovery of new lands, was the celebrated Christopher Columbus. He had become satisfied, both on scientific grounds and from the accounts of travellers, particularly those of Marco Polo, that as the continent of Asia extended much further eastward than had been generally imagined, it would be possible to arrive at the East Indies by sailing west across the Atlantic. The immense importance of such a passage, once proved to be practicable, was perfectly obvious. It would at once dispense with the tedious and expensive overland routes by which the produce of the East was then brought to Europe, and transfer the most valuable traffic with which the world was yet acquainted, from the hands of infidels to those of Christians. These were the grand objects at which Columbus aimed; but so much were his views in advance of his age, that many years passed away before he could induce any European state to incur the expense which would be necessary in order to realize them. Spain at last undertook the task, and was rewarded with the discovery of a New World. This was more than even Columbus had anticipated. Though his geographical ideas were far more accurate than those of his contemporaries, he had greatly underrated the magnitude of the globe; and hence, imagining that the land which he first reached belonged to Asia, he gave it the name of West Indies. In this name he informs us of the goal after which he had been striving, and which he was so confident of having actually attained, that for a time he would scarcely believe the evidence of his senses, and insisted that everything which he saw was Indian. The delusion under which Columbus thus laboured is a striking proof of the general interest which was now felt in regard to India, and of the eager longings of the maritime states of Europe to obtain a share in its trade, without being fettered by the monopolies which the Muhammedans and Venetians had established in the Levant.

Though Columbus failed to discover an oceanic route to India, he clearly pointed out the direction in which it lay. It was previously known that the Atlantic was bounded on the east by the continents of Europe and Africa, and he had now proved that an equally insurmountable barrier bounded it on
the west. The conclusion, therefore, was obvious, that if India was accessible from Europe by a continuous sea voyage, it could only be by tracing one or other of these continents to its terminations, and then sailing round it. In accordance with this conclusion, four lines of passage presented themselves as possible—a north-west, a north-east, a south-west, and a south-east. The three first were subsequently attempted; but the last, which was certainly the most promising, is the only one with which we have now to do.

As early as 1415, more than twenty years before Columbus was born, Prince Henry, fourth son of John I, King of Portugal, after distinguishing himself at the capture of Ceuta, on the coast of Africa, returned with a determination to devote himself to maritime discovery, by employing navigators to trace the western coast of that continent, and thereby perhaps solve the great problem of a practicable route to the East Indies, by sailing round its southern extremity. He had all the talent and scientific acquirement necessary, in order to qualify him for superintending the great task thus undertaken, and gave a striking proof of his inflexibility of purpose by withdrawing from court, and fixing his residence in the seaport of Sagres, not far from Cape St. Vincent. Here he erected an observatory, and established a school of navigation for the training of youth, whom he might afterwards employ on voyages of discovery. He was not destined to solve the grand problem; but before his death, in 1463, had paved the way for it, by fitting out expeditions, which, leaving Cape Non (so called because no previous navigator had passed it) far behind, discovered Madeira and the Cape Verd Islands, and penetrated as far south as Sierra Leone.

The spirit ofenterprise which Prince Henry had fostered was not allowed to expire with him; and under Alonso V, who was then reigning, the African coast was explored almost to the equator. John II, the son and successor of Alonso, continuing the progress of discovery, was so convinced that India would ultimately be reached, that, in 1484, he took a step which, though of an extraordinary nature, appears to have been dictated by sound and far-sighted policy. Great exertions had been made by the government of Portugal in fitting out expeditions for maritime
discovery; and now, when they seemed about to be crowned with success, the danger was, that other states might step in and insist on sharing in the fruits. As the best means of preventing this, he sent ambassadors to several of the leading European courts, and offered them the alternative of either uniting with him, and furnishing men and money to assist in the conquests which he was contemplating, on the understanding, that a fair proportion of the benefit would be awarded them, or leave him to proceed as hitherto, on his own entire responsibility, and of course, in common fairness, for his own exclusive benefit.

This attempt to form what may be called a joint-stock company, in which kings were to be the only shareholders, failed. All the crowned heads applied to, declined to entertain the proposal; and John took the additional precaution of calling in the aid of the Pope, who, in the plenitude of an arrogant power, then undisputed, but soon after to be shaken to its very foundations, drew an imaginary line from north to south, by which he divided the world into two equal halves, and decreed that discoveries of new countries made from west to east should only be competent, and should belong exclusively to the Portuguese. It seems not to have occurred either to the king or the Pope that discoveries made from east to west might be carried so far as to make this grant futile, and convert it into a great bone of contention.

From this period the King of Portugal assumed the additional title of Lord of Guinea, and evinced a determination to turn his grant to the best account. Besides fitting out an expedition, under Diego Cam, who, in 1484, reached 22° of south latitude, and must consequently have been within 12° of the southern extremity of the African continent, he sent two messengers overland with instructions to discover the country of Prester John, then believed to be a great reality, though since ascertained to have had only a fabulous existence. They were also, to ascertain whence the drugs and spices came which the Venetians traded in, and whether there was any sailing from the south of Africa to India. One of these messengers, Pedro de Covillam, succeeded in reaching India, and obtained much important information; but before the letter conveying it reached Portugal, the great problem had been solved by Bartolommeo
Diaz, who had sailed south with three ships in 1486. After reaching a higher southern latitude than any previous navigator, a storm arose which drove him out to sea. His direction under such circumstances could not be accurately ascertained, but he knew it to be southerly. After tossing about for thirteen days, and suffering much by a sudden transition of the temperature from hot to cold, he attempted, when the storm abated, to regain the land by steering eastward. He reached it; but, to his great astonishment, discovered that the land which, when he quitted it, lay on his left hand, nearly due north and south, was now stretching east and west, and trending north-east. The cause was too apparent to leave any room for doubt. He had been carried round the southern extremity of Africa, and was now on its south-eastern coast. He was most anxious to prosecute this auspicious commencement, but his crews refused to follow him, and he was obliged to turn his face homewards. He was so far rewarded, for a few days brought him in sight of the magnificent promontory in which Africa terminates. The weather he had met with, and, perhaps, also a painful remembrance of the conduct of his crews in forcing him to return, determined him to give it the name of Cabo de Todos los Tormentos, or Cape of Storms, but the king, on his return, thinking this name ominous, chose one much more appropriate, and, in allusion to the great promise which the doubling of the promontory held out, called it Cabo de Buena Esperanza, or Cape of Good Hope.

It is singular that, though John survived this discovery nine years, he made no attempt to follow it up. One cause of the indifference thus manifested may have been the mortification which he felt at the still more brilliant success which Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain had achieved by the employment of Christoper Columbus. This renowned navigator, returning from his discovery of a New World, arrived in the Tagus in 1493. Before applying to Spain, he had offered his services to Portugal, and been refused. What would John not now have given to be able to recall that refusal? It was too late; but he had counsellors base enough to suggest that the remedy was still in his own hands. He had only to assassinate Columbus, and take possession of his papers; his discovery would thus die with him. Happily for his own fame he spurned the infamous sug-
gestion; and Columbus, after a becoming reception, not less honourable to the giver than it must have been gratifying to the receiver, continued his triumphant progress to the court of Spain.

John was succeeded in 1495 by his cousin Emanuel, who was thoroughly imbued with the spirit of enterprise which had animated his predecessors. Timid counsellors were not wanting who advised him to rest satisfied with the discoveries already made, and not run the risk of impoverishing his hereditary dominions by expensive expeditions, of which it was impossible to foresee the final result; but his resolution had been formed, and there could be no doubt what it was, when he was seen, in the third year of his reign, fitting out a new expedition for the avowed purpose of not only doubling the Cape of Good Hope, but afterwards continuing the voyage without intermission till the coast of India was reached. In this expedition, which consisted of three small ships, carrying 160 men, Bartolommeo Diaz held only a subordinate station. Nor had he even the satisfaction of seeing his discovery prosecuted by others; for, on arriving at the fort of El Mina, he was sent back to Portugal, and not long after his return perished at sea.

The command of the expedition, thus rather ungenerously withheld from Diaz, was conferred on Vasco de Gama, a gentleman of the royal household, who had previously done good service at sea, and, by his subsequent conduct, justified the choice which had been made of him. After a pompous ceremonial, more in accordance with the great object contemplated by the expedition than with the very inadequate means furnished for its accomplishment, the three small ships left the port of Belem, on Saturday, the 8th of July, 1497. They were accompanied by a small bark carrying provisions, and a caravel, of which Diaz was captain. Off the Canaries the vessels encountered a storm, which separated them, but they met again at Cape Verd, which had been fixed as the place of rendezvous. Having next day anchored at Santa Maria, on the African coast, they repaired their damages, and took in water. Diaz, proceeding no farther, returned homewards; the other vessels pursued their voyage. Another storm, still more violent than the former, overtook them; and they had almost given up all hope of weathering it, when it abated, and they took shelter in a bay,
to which they gave the name of Santa Elena. Vasco de Gama attempted to hold communication with the natives, but met with an inhospitable reception, which left him no inclination to prolong his stay. He set sail again on the 16th of November, having already been more than four months at sea; and two days after came within sight of the Cape of Good Hope, which, after tacking about in consequence of baffling winds, they doubled on the 20th of November, amid the sound of music and general rejoicing.

They were now fairly launched on the Indian Ocean, but instead of steering right across it, continued for a time to follow the coast, making careful observations, and daily discovering some new object to excite their wonder. On Christmas, 1497, they saw land, which, in honour of the day, they called Tierra de Natal; and which, still retaining its name, promises to rise into importance as a British colony. The next land visited belonged to the Kaffres, with whom they had much friendly intercourse.

In proceeding farther north, the expedition was much impeded by currents, which induced De Gama to give the name of Cabo de Corrientes to a prominent headland, and to keep far out to sea in order to avoid the risk of being embayed. Owing to this, Sofala, which was then the great emporium of this part of Africa, was passed without being seen. The natives appeared now to be more civilized than those who had previously been seen, and instead of the timid and suspicious looks which others had manifested, made themselves as familiar with the Portuguese as if they had been old acquaintances. As their language was not understood, the conversation by signs was necessarily confined within very narrow limits, but enough was communicated to satisfy Vasco de Gama that they were accustomed to mingle with people in a still more advanced state of civilization. Two chiefs in particular, who paid him a visit in their own boats, gave him to understand that they had seen ships as large as those of the Portuguese; and after they had returned to the shore, sent two pieces of calico on board for sale. This cloth, which it is almost needless to mention, takes its usual name, from the town of Calicut, excited a particular interest in the Portuguese, because supposing it, perhaps erroneously, to be
the product of that city, it was the first specimen of Indian manufacture which they had met with in their voyage. It was regarded as an omen of future success in their great undertaking, and hence Vasco de Gama gave to the stream, at the mouth of which these transactions took place, the name of *Rio de Buenos Sinays*, or River of Good Signs.

Having again set sail on the 24th of February, 1498, the vessels continued their voyage along the coast through the channel of Mozambique, and on arriving opposite to the town of that name, were hailed by a number of little boats, the crews of which made signs to stay for them. The vessels cast anchor, and the boatmen, without showing the least fear, leaped at once aboard, made themselves perfectly at home, ate and drank freely, and conversed in Arabic with one of the crew who understood that language. The intercourse at first promised to be very friendly, but on its being discovered by the Sheikh or chief, that the Portuguese were not, as he had originally supposed, Turks and Muhammedans, but Christians, his manner suddenly changed, and all his seeming friendship was at an end. Ultimately open hostilities were declared, and the Portuguese avenged themselves by bombarding and destroying the town of Mozambique.

The vessels again weighing anchor, continued their course northwards, and arrived at the island of Mombasa, with a town of same name. Here the seeming friendship of the Murs proved as false as that of the inhabitants of Mozambique; and Vasco de Gama, believing, on the confession of two Murs, whom he barbarously put to the torture by dropping hot bacon upon their flesh, that a plot had been formed for his destruction, hastened his departure, and did not again halt till he arrived off Melinda, which delighted the Portuguese, as it reminded them more of home than any African city they had yet seen. It was seated on the level part of a rocky shore, amid plantations of palms and orchards of orange and other fruit trees, covered a large space, and consisted of houses built of stone, three stories high, and with terraced roofs.

At first the inhabitants, who were probably acquainted with the transactions at Mozambique and Mombasa, kept aloof, but a good understanding was eventually established; and the
king, though a Muhammedan, so far forgot his prejudices that he afforded the Portuguese every facility for obtaining provisions, and even made a formal visit in his barge.

It was now unnecessary for the Portuguese to continue their course along the African coast. Their object had been to obtain such information as might enable them to proceed with safety across the ocean towards India. Melinda furnished them with all that they required. Four ships from India were then lying in its harbour, and little difficulty was found in obtaining a pilot capable of acting as their guide. This pilot, named Melemo Kana, was a native of Gujarat, and had a thorough knowledge of his profession. The compass, charts, and quadrants were quite familiar to him; and an astrolable shown him seemed so inferior to other instruments which he had seen used for the same purpose, that he scarcely condescended to notice it.

Before leaving Melinda, De Gama was visited by persons belonging to the Indian ships. He imagined them to be Christians, because on coming aboard they prostrated themselves before an image of the Virgin, probably mistaking it for one of their own idols; but it is plain, from the description given of them, that they were Hindus. They were clothed in long gowns of white calico, wore their hair, which was long like that of women, plaited under their turbans, and ate no beef.

The expedition sailed from Melinda on Tuesday, the 22nd April, 1498, and after a prosperous voyage of twenty-three days, saw India, on Friday, the 17th of May. They were off the Malabar coast, which was at the distance of eight leagues, and rose high and bold from the sea. Their destination was Calicut, and as they were considerably north of it, they changed their course to south-east. On the 20th they beheld, to their unspeakable delight, the lofty wooded terraces rising behind that city, and shortly after cast anchor about two leagues below it.

Calicut, situated on the open beach, without roadstead or harbour, though partially protected by a rocky bank, inside of which small vessels lie tolerably sheltered, was then the capital of a Hindu sovereign, who, under the title of Samiry or Zamorin, ruled a considerable extent of country in the south-west of the peninsula. This title is probably the corruption of Tamuri, the name of a raja on whom, according to popular tradition, a
prince called Cheruman, after dividing his territories among his other chieftains, had nothing more remaining to bestow than his sword, "with all the territory in which a cock crowing at a small temple here could be heard." The territory thus assigned took, from the singular nature of the grant, the name of Colico-du, or the Cock-crowing, which in course of time was metamorphosed into Calicut. This account may be set aside as fabulous; but it is certain that in whatever way the original nucleus of the territory was acquired, the sword of Cheruman proved the most valuable part of his bequest, and enabled Tamuri to place himself at the head of all his brother chieftains, and transmit his power to a series of successors. One of these had been converted to Muhammedanism by some pilgrims who had been wrecked on his coast while proceeding to visit Adam’s Peak in Ceylon; and, with the zeal of a new convert, set out on a pilgrimage to Mecca. He never returned; but the favour shown to Muhammedans during his reign, and the encouragement which, in consequence of his recommendation, they received from his successor, had induced them to settle in great numbers, and enabled them to acquire much influence in Cranganore, Calicut, and the surrounding districts. Such was the state of matters when the Portuguese arrived, and it is necessary to attend to it, as furnishing a key to many subsequent proceedings.

De Gama having anchored, as already mentioned, was immediately visited by some small fishing-boats, and under their guidance sailed as near to Calicut as the depth of water would allow. He had brought several criminals from Portugal, whose sentence had been remitted in consideration of the danger to which they were to be exposed by being sent ashore to hold intercourse with the natives, under circumstances too hazardous to justify the employment of any of the crew. One of these criminals was accordingly despatched along with the fishermen, in order that the reception given him might enable De Gama to shape his future course. He was immediately surrounded by a crowd whose curiosity could hardly be satisfied, though it was more import-

unate than rude. As his ignorance of the language made it useless to ask him any questions, they took him to the house of two Murs, one of whom, called Monzaide—who, from being a native of Tunis, knew him to be Portuguese—gave utterance to his astonishment by exclaiming in Spanish, "The devil take you! What brought you hither?" After some explanations, Monzaide went off with him to the ships, and on approaching De Gama, cried aloud in Spanish, "Good luck! good luck! Many rubies, many emeralds! Thou art bound to give God thanks for having brought thee where there are all sorts of spices and precious stones, with all the riches of the world." De Gama and his crew were so surprised and affected at meeting with one who could speak their language so far from home, that they wept for joy.

Having learned from Monzaide that the Zamorin was then at Ponani, a village at the mouth of a river of same name, about thirty-six miles south from Calicut, De Gama immediately announced his arrival, intimating at the same time that he was the bearer of a letter to him from his master the King of Portugal, a Christian prince. The Zamorin, in answer, bade him welcome, and sent a pilot to conduct the ships to a safer anchorage, near a village called Pandarane. He accepted of the services of the pilot, but demurred at first to avail himself of an invitation by the kotwal or chief magistrate, to go ashore and proceed by land to Calicut. On second thoughts, however, he became convinced that this was a risk which he ought to run; and while his brother Paul, who commanded one of the ships, and the other officers, reminded him of the danger to be apprehended, not so much from the natives, whom they insisted on regarding as Christians, as from the Murs, whose deadly enmity they had already experienced on the African coast, he announced his determination, let what would betide him, to go ashore and leave no means untried to settle a treaty of commerce and perpetual amity.

On the 28th of May, after leaving orders that in the even of any accident befalling him, the vessels were to return home with the news of his discovery, he set out in his boat, attended by twelve of his company, with flags waving and trumpets sounding. The kotwal was waiting to receive him with 200 nairs, understood to be the nobility of the country, and a large
promiscuous assemblage. Two palanquins had been provided, one for De Gama and another for the cotwal; the rest of the attendants followed on foot. During the journey they paid a visit to a temple built of freestone, covered with tiles, and as large as a great monastery. In front of it stood a pillar as high as the mast of a ship, made of wire, with a weather-cock on the top, and over the entrance hung seven bells. The interior was full of images; and these, as well as some of the ceremonies, confirming the Portuguese in their previous belief that the natives were Christians, they began to pay their devotions. The dimness of the light did not allow them to see the kind of figures they were worshipping, but on looking around they discerned monstrous shapes on the walls, some with great teeth sticking an inch out of their mouth, others with four arms and such frightful faces, that one of the Portuguese, on beholding one of them, before which he was making his genuflexion, exclaimed, "If this be the devil, it is God I worship." On approaching the city the multitude became immense, and the cotwal halted at the house of his brother, who was waiting, along with a number of nairs, to conduct De Gama with all the pomp of an ambassador into the royal presence. Though almost stifled by the press, he was so much gratified that he could not help observing to those around him, "They little think in Portugal what honour is done us here."

The palace, at which they arrived an hour before sunset, had a handsome appearance, and was surrounded by trees, and gardens adorned with fountains. It was entered by a series of five inclosures, each having its own separate gate; and such was the eagerness of the populace to squeeze themselves in, that several were crushed to death. At the grand entrance De Gama was received by the chief minister and high-priest, a little old man, who, after embracing him, took him with his attendants into the presence. The hall of audience was set round with seats, rising as in a theatre; the floor was carpeted with green velvet, and the walls hung round with silks of diverse colours. At the head of the hall the Zamorin lay reclined on a kind of sofa, with a covering of white silk wrought with gold, and a rich canopy overhead. He was a large, stout man, of dark complexion, advanced in years, and with something majestic in his
appearance. He wore a short coat of fine calico, adorned with branches and roses of beaten gold; the buttons were large pearls. Another piece of white calico reached to his knees. A kind of mitre, glittering with pearls and precious stones, covered his head; his ears were strung with jewels of the same kind; and both his fingers and toes were loaded with diamond rings. His arms and legs, left naked, were adorned with gold bracelets. Near him stood two gold basons and a gold fountain; the one basin contained betel and areca nut, which was handed him by an attendant, the other received it when chewed; the fountain supplied water to rinse his mouth.

After De Gama entered and made his obeisance according to the custom of the country, by bowing his body three times and lifting up his hands, the Zamorin looked kindly at him, recognized him by a scarcely perceptible inclination of the head, and ordered him by signs to advance and sit down near him. The attendants being admitted, took their seats opposite, and were regaled with fruits. On calling for water to drink, a golden cup with a spout was brought, but they were told that it was considered bad manners to touch the vessel with their lips. The awkwardness of the Portuguese, who, in attempting to drink by the spout, either choked themselves with the water or spilled it upon their clothes, gave much amusement to the court. De Gama having been asked by the Zamorin to open his business, gave him to understand that the custom of princes in Europe was to hear ambassadors in the presence of only a few of their chief counsellors. The suggestion was immediately adopted, and the audience took place in another apartment similar to the former, where only De Gama and another Portuguese, who acted as his interpreter, on the one side, and the Zamorin, his chief minister, the comptroller of his household, and his betel-server on the other, were present. When asked whence he came, and with what object, De Gama answered that he was an ambassador of the King of Portugal, the greatest prince in all the West, who, having heard that there were Christian princes in the Indies, of whom the King of Calicut was the chief, had sent an ambassador to conclude a treaty of trade and friendship with him. He added, that for sixty years the King of Portugal and his predecessors had been endeavouring
to discover India by sea, and had at length succeeded for the first time. In anticipation of this success, the king, his master, had intrusted him with two letters, the delivery of which, as it was now late, he would, with the zamorin's permission, defer till to-morrow. De Gama had reason to think he had made a favourable impression, as the Zamorin repeated his welcome, made inquiries as to the distance to Portugal, and the time occupied by the voyage, and declared his willingness not only to recognize the King of Portugal as his friend and brother, but to send an ambassador to his court.

De Gama, after passing the night with his attendants in a lodging specially provided for them, began next morning to prepare a present for the zamorin. He was not well supplied for that purpose; but after selecting four pieces of scarlet, six hats, four branches of coral, six almasars, a parcel of brass, a chest of sugar, two barrels of oil and two of honey, sent for the royal factor and cotwal to ask their opinion. On looking at the articles they burst into a laugh, and told him that the poorest merchant who came to the port made a better present. A kind of altercation arose, and at last the factor and cotwal departed, after taking his promise that he would not visit the king till they returned to go with him. He waited the whole day, but they never appeared. On the day following, when they arrived, and he complained of their behaviour, they made light of it and began to talk indifferently of other matters. The fact was that they had been gained by the Murs, who, fearing that their interests might be seriously affected by the opening up of a new trade with Europe, and the consequent decline of that which had hitherto been carried on by the Red Sea, were determined to leave no means untried to frustrate the object of the Portuguese expedition.

When De Gama went to the palace to pay the visit which, according to appointment, should have been paid a day sooner, the effect of the Murish intrigue was very apparent. He was kept waiting for three hours; and when at last admitted, was told angrily by the zamorin that he had waited for him all the day before. He was then asked how it was that, if he came from so great and rich a prince as he represented his king to be, he brought no present with him, though in every
embassy of friendship that must be regarded as a necessary credential. De Gama made the best excuse possible in the circumstances, by referring to the uncertain issue of his voyage, which made it imprudent to provide a present which there might be no opportunity of delivering, and promising that if he lived to carry home the news of his discovery, a suitable present would certainly arrive. The Zamorin, not yet satisfied, observed, "I hear you have a St. Mary in gold, and desire I may have that." De Gama, taken somewhat aback at this demand, replied that the image was not gold, but only wood gilded; and as he attributed his preservation at sea to its influence, he must be excused for not parting with it. The Zamorin, quitting the subject, asked for the two letters, which indeed contained only the same thing in duplicate, the one written in Portuguese and the other in Arabic. The latter, interpreted by Monzaide, was in purport as follows:—"As soon as it was known to the King of Portugal that the King of Calicut, one of the mightiest princes of all the Indies, was a Christian, he was desirous to cultivate a trade and friendship with him, for the conveniency of lading spices in his ports; for which, in exchange, the commodities of Portugal should be sent, or else gold and silver, in case his majesty chose the same; referring it to the general, his ambassador, to make a further report." This letter, and the noble bearing of Vasco de Gama, who throughout the interview behaved in a manner becoming the high character which he claimed, disabused the mind of the Zamorin of the impression received of him through the intrigues of the Murs, who had sedulously circulated a rumour that he was no ambassador, but merely a pirate. He therefore conversed with him in the most friendly manner, and gave him full liberty to bring any merchandise he had with him ashore and dispose of it to the best advantage.

The next day, the 31st of May, De Gama prepared to return to his ships, and was actually on the way to Pandarane, when the Murs, fearing that if he once got away he would not again return, induced the cotwal, by a large bribe, to hasten after and detain him, so as to afford them an opportunity of disposing of him summarily. The cotwal accordingly set out in pursuit, and found De Gama hastening on considerably in advance of his
attendants. The cotwal rallied him on his haste, and asked him if he was running away. He answered, "Yes; I am running away from the heat;" and continued his journey, the cotwal keeping close by him till he reached the village. It was sunset before his men came up, but he called immediately for a boat. The cotwal at first endeavoured to dissuade him, but finding him resolute, pretended to send for the boatmen, while at the same time he sent another message, ordering them to keep out of the way. The consequence was that no boat appeared, and there was no alternative but to pass the night on shore.

In the morning matters assumed a still more threatening appearance. The cotwal, instead of bringing a boat, told him to order his ships nearer shore, and on his refusal, threw off all disguise, telling him that as he would not do what he was ordered he should not go on board. De Gama was thus to all intents a prisoner. The doors of his lodging were shut, and several nairs with drawn swords kept guard within. Coello meantime had come with his boats within a short distance of the shore; and, fortunately, by communicating with one of De Gama's sailors, who had been left outside, was apprised of his situation. The cotwal, while he still detained him, seemed afraid to proceed to violent extremes; and after finding that he could not lure the vessels into the harbour, so as to give the Murs an opportunity of destroying them, changed his tactics and asked only that the merchandise should be sent ashore. His object apparently was to appropriate it to himself; and as De Gama's presence interfered with this object, he was easily induced, as soon as the merchandise arrived, to allow him to depart.

De Gama, once free of the cotwal and his associates, determined not again to place himself in their power, but took care by his factor, Diego Diaz, brother of the more celebrated Bartolommeo, who first doubled the Cape, to acquaint the Zamorin with the unworthy treatment to which he had been subjected. The Zamorin seemed much incensed, and promised both to punish the offenders and send merchants to purchase the goods. He could scarcely have been sincere, for the insolence of the Murs increased; and the goods, which they took every opportunity to depreciate, found few purchasers. A kind of traffic, however, was established; and after permission was
given to remove the goods from Pandarane to Calicut, as a more suitable market, much friendly intercourse took place between the Portuguese and the natives. They were not destined, however, to part so amicably.

More than two months had elapsed since the arrival of the Portuguese vessels, and as the north-east monsoon, on which they depended for their return homewards, was about to set in, De Gama, on the 10th of August, sent Diego Diaz to the zamorin with a present of scarfs, silks, coral, and other things, and a notification of his intention to depart. He was obliged to wait four days for admission, and was then received with a frowning countenance. The Zamorin's mind had been completely poisoned; and he regarded the Portuguese either as pirates, who had come for plunder, or spies, who, after acquainting themselves with the country, intended to return with a fleet sufficient to invade it. Accordingly a guard was set over the house which the Portuguese had used for a factory, preventing all egress; and a proclamation issued prohibiting all intercourse with the Portuguese ships.

De Gama, on learning what had happened, was much incensed, but determined to proceed warily, and employ craft against craft. Two days after the proclamation, four lads arrived in an almadia, with precious stones for sale. They were suspected to be spies; but De Gama spoke to them as if he were entirely ignorant of what had taken place in Calicut, and allowed them to depart, in the hope that their return would induce other persons of more consequence to pay him a visit. Nor was he mistaken. For the zamorin, convinced by De Gama's conduct that he was ignorant of the detention of his factor Diaz, and his secretary Braga, who were both in the factory when the guard was set over it, sent people on board to keep him amused till he should be able to effect the destruction of his ships by preparing a fleet in his own ports, or bringing one from Mecca for that purpose. De Gama kept his own counsel, till one day when six of the principal inhabitants arrived with fifteen attendants. He immediately seized them, and sent a letter ashore, demanding his factor and secretary in exchange. After some parleying, Diaz and Braga were sent aboard, and the principal inhabitants, who were nairs, were returned. The
Attendants, however, were detained, on the plea that some of the Portuguese merchandise was still unaccounted for. This was mere pretence on De Gama's part, for he had already determined to carry off the poor natives to Portugal, and exhibit them as the vouchers of his discovery. Immediately after making this announcement to those who had been sent for the natives, and desiring them to inform the zamorin that he would shortly return and give him full means of judging whether the Christians were thieves, as the Murs had persuaded him, he weighed anchor and set sail on his homeward voyage.

Two days after their departure, when the ships were lying becalmed a league from Calicut, the zamorin's fleet of forty vessels was seen approaching, full of soldiers. Their object was obvious; but the Portuguese, by means of their ordnance, managed to keep them at bay till a gale fortunately sprung up, and they got clear off, though not without being pursued for an hour and a half. De Gama, for a short time, kept near the coast; and when within twelve leagues of Goa, received the alarming intelligence that the whole coast was in motion, and that in all its harbours vessels were being fitted out for the purpose of intercepting him. Longer delay, therefore, seemed dangerous, and he at once put out to sea. The voyage home was tedious and disastrous; but ultimately Belem was reached in September, 1499, after an absence of two years and two months. Of the original crew, only fifty returned alive. The news of their arrival was hailed with extraordinary demonstrations of joy throughout the kingdom; and De Gama, after being conducted into Lisbon in triumphal procession, was raised to new honours and liberally pensioned. So elated was King Emanuel with the success of the expedition, that he forthwith added to his titles that of Lord of the Conquest and Navigation of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia, and the Indies.

No time was lost in fitting out a new expedition on a more extended scale. It consisted of thirteen vessels, containing 1,200 men, and sailed from Belem on the 9th of March, 1500, under the command of Pedro Alvarez Cabral. Among the captains were Bartolommeo Diaz, the discoverer of the Cape of Good Hope, and his brother, Diego Diaz, who had been factor to Vasco de Gama. The Canaries were seen on the 18th; but from
them the course was so far westward that the first land they reached was a new continent, the discovery of which, though little importance appears to have been attached to it at the time, ultimately proved the most valuable acquisition made by the crown of Portugal. It was Brazil. The expedition again sailed on the 2nd of May for the Cape of Good Hope, but was thrown into considerable alarm by the appearance of a comet, which continued to increase for ten days, and shone so brightly as to be visible both day and night. The disasters, of which it was dreaded as the forerunner, seemed to be realized by the bursting of a storm with such suddenness and fury that, before the sails could be furled, four of the vessels, one of them commanded by Bartolommeo Diaz, sunk, with every soul on board, and the others were so shattered and filled with water that, had not their sails been so torn as to leave nothing but bare poles, they must certainly have foundered.

Dreadful as the storm was, it was ultimately weathered, and Cabral found, on its abating, that the Cape of Good Hope was already doubled. Continuing along the south-east coast of Africa, he fell in with two vessels at anchor near Sofala. They took fright and made for the shore, but were pursued and overtaken. They proved to be Murish vessels bound for Melinda. As the Portuguese were on friendly terms with its chief, Cabral was sorry for what had happened, more especially as the most valuable part of the cargo consisted of gold, which, during the terror of the flight, had been thrown overboard. On expressing his regret, the Murish captain gravely asked whether he had not some wizard with him, who might conjure it up from the bottom of the sea. At Melinda, where the chief proved as friendly as before, Cabral was furnished with two Gujarat pilots. Under their guidance he made a prosperous voyage across the Indian Ocean, and cast anchor within a league of Calicut on the 13th of September.

Shortly after his arrival several nairs came on board, bringing the Zamorin’s welcome, and making great offers of friendship. Cabral was thus induced to take his ships nearer the city, and sent ashore four natives whom Vasco de Gama had carried off. He afterwards sent a messenger, intimating that he came from Portugal purely to settle trade and friendship;
but, taught by De Gama's experience, he refused to land till hostages were given. This demand produced some delay and altercation, but at last six of the principal natives arrived, and Cabral ventured ashore. The interview took place in a pavilion, erected on purpose, near the water-edge. The zamorin, dressed nearly as when De Gama visited him, dazzled all eyes with the size and brilliancy of the diamonds, rubies, sapphires, and pearls, which studded his girdle, and hung from his ears, or covered his fingers and toes. His chair of state and palanquin, all of gold and silver, curiously wrought, glistened with precious stones; and, among other articles composed of the precious metals, were three gold and seventeen silver trumpets, and various silver lamps, and censers smoking with perfumes. Cabral, after delivering his credentials, and stating the desire of the King of Portugal to enjoy the Zamorin's friendship, and establish at Calicut a factory, which should be supplied with all kinds of European goods, and take spices in exchange, or pay for them in ready money, caused the present to be brought in. It consisted of a wrought silver basin gilt, a fountain of the same, a silver cup with a gilt cover, two cushions of cloth of gold, and two of crimson velvet, a cloth of state of the same velvet stripped and bound with gold lace, and two rich pieces of arras.

So far all things had gone on smoothly; but beneath this seeming friendship mutual distrust was at work, preparing for a final rupture. First, the hostages, on learning that Cabral was preparing to return, began to suspect that they might be detained altogether, and endeavoured to escape by leaping into the sea. Some succeeded, while those re-captured were treated with some degree of harshness. Before the misunderstanding thus occasioned was completely cleared up, Cabral proposed to send a message to the Zamorin, to ask whether he was willing to finish the agreement which he had begun. So strong was the conviction among the Portuguese that this message would only make matters worse, that Francisco Correa was the only man in the fleet bold enough to volunteer to carry it. Contrary to expectation, Correa met with a friendly reception, and completed an arrangement by which a regular Portuguese factory was established in Calicut, under the charge of his brother, Aryes Correa. This factor seems to have been very indifferently qualified for
his office; and allowed himself to be imposed upon at all hands, and more especially by the Murs, who had never ceased their intrigues from the first moment when the Portuguese made their appearance. At their instigation some hostile manifestations were made, particularly by Khoja Comireci, the admiral of Calicut; and appearances became so alarming that Cabral deemed it necessary to quit the harbour, and stood out to sea. The zamorin expressed deep and apparently sincere regret at the cause of Cabral’s removal, and showed a willingness to take whatever steps might be necessary to restore confidence. He gave orders to prevent the interference of the Murs, removed an officer whom he had placed in the factory, and substituted another, who, he thought, would be more acceptable. He even took the still more decided step of removing the factory from a locality which gave the Murs too great control over it, and gave the Portuguese a perpetual grant of a new house more conveniently situated near the sea-shore. The good effect of these measures was soon visible; and the Portuguese walked the streets of Calicut as safely, and as free from molestation, as if they had been in Lisbon.

The Murs, whose resources in intrigue were inexhaustible, determined to break up this understanding, and tried to effect it by a rather singular expedient. Availing themselves of the vindictive feelings of the officer who had been removed from the Portuguese factory, they employed him to persuade Correia that Cabral could not confer a greater service on the Zamorin than to capture a large ship, which was bound from Ceylon to Cambay or Gujarat, with elephants. One of these animals, which the Zamorin coveted, had been refused; and as he had thus been unable to obtain it by fair means, he would be very glad to obtain it anyhow. The Murs calculated that the master of the vessel, whom they had put on his guard, would be more than a match for the Portuguese admiral, and, at all events, that the Portuguese, by attacking a vessel with which they had no proper ground of quarrel, would justify the reputation which they had given them as mere depredators. Cabral fell too easily into the snare thus laid for him; but, after discovering the trick, made the best reparation he could, by restoring the vessel to its owners.
The Murs, disappointed in their object, resumed their former practices, and threw many obstructions in the way of the Portuguese; who, in consequence, saw the time for their departure approaching while their ships remained unladen. Cabral complained to the Zamorin, and was authorized to search the vessels of the Murs and take whatever spices were found in them, only paying the original cost prices. The Murs were too numerous and influential to be thus summarily dealt with; and on one of their ships being seized, obtained permission from the fickle Zamorin to retaliate. They took measures accordingly; and having excited a riot, stormed the Portuguese factory. Many of the inmates, and among others Ayres Correa, the principal factor, lost their lives.

Cabral, not having received any apology for this outrage from the zamorin, determined to take his own method of revenge, without giving himself any concern as to the lawfulness of the means. On a sudden, without note of warning, he made a furious onset on ten large ships which were lying in the harbour; and after a contest, during which 600 of the Murs and natives perished, gained possession of the cargoes and set the ships on fire. Not satisfied with this, he opened his fire upon the town. Many of its public buildings were destroyed, and the inhabitants, becoming crowded in their flight, fell in great numbers. The Zamorin himself made a narrow escape, as one of his nairs, who was immediately behind him, was struck down by a cannon-ball.

Peace was now out of the question, and open war was declared. The Portuguese, however, had no idea of abandoning their Indian traffic; and on being dispossessed of one factory, immediately looked out for another. Farther south than Calicut, and bounding with it, was the kingdom or raja-ship of Cochin. It recognized the supremacy of Calicut, but had often aspired to independence, and was therefore easily induced to listen to proposals of amity from the Portuguese. The power of these new visitors had been signally displayed in their recent contest with the Zamorin; and the King of Cochin could scarcely doubt that, were their powerful aid secured, the yoke of Calicut might soon be shaken off. Accordingly, when Cabral appeared off the coast, and stated his desire to make the town
and harbour of Cochin the seat of Portuguese commerce, the terms were easily arranged. The raja, whose name was Truimpara or Triumpara, at once agreed to give hostages as a security that the Portuguese should not be treacherously dealt with when ashore, only stipulating that the two nairs whom he sent for the purpose should be changed daily, as they could not eat on shipboard without becoming unfit for the royal presence, or, in other words, losing caste.

The harbour of Cochin, forming one of a series of lagoons which here line the coast, and have occasional openings by which ships can enter, was far superior to that of Calicut; and the Portuguese saw reason to congratulate themselves on their change of locality; but recent experience made them cautious, and all that Cabral at first ventured to do was to land a factor of the name of Gonzalo Gil Barbosa, a clerk, an interpreter, and four criminals whom he had brought from Portugal, who were to act as servants. Their reception was very gracious; but the court presented none of the dazzling state conspicuous at Calicut. It soon appeared, however, that it possessed more valuable qualities. For every promise made was fulfilled to the letter; and the lading of the Portuguese vessels with the spices which the country produced in abundance, was accomplished without delay. This difference of treatment was probably owing, not so much to the personal qualities of the sovereigns of Calicut and Cochin, as to their relative positions—the former considering himself strong enough to make his will law, and, if so disposed, to play the tyrant, while the latter, writhing under a galling yoke, was convinced that his best chance of escaping it was to throw himself into the hands of the Portuguese. This feeling of a common interest and a common danger naturally smoothed down many difficulties, and made friendship, when once established, firm and lasting.

The impression which the Portuguese had produced, both by the terror of their arms and the extent of their commercial transactions, was strikingly evinced by the anxiety which several native states now manifested to secure their alliance. From the chiefs of two of these—Cananore, situated considerably north of Calicut, and Coulan, or rather Quilon, situated considerably south of Cochin, in the state of Travancore—
messengers arrived to invite the Portuguese to their harbours, promising them spices on cheaper terms than they could be obtained at Cochin. Cabral was, of course, inclined to open communications in as many quarters as possible, with a view to subsequent traffic; but at the time it was impossible to do more than promise a future visit, as he had more serious work on hand. Just as he was completing his cargo, a formidable fleet, composed of twenty-five large ships, and many smaller vessels, appeared off the coast. It was said to have 15,000 soldiers on board, and to be destined to avenge the injuries inflicted on Calicut. This information was furnished by the Raja of Cochin, who proved his fidelity to his new allies by offering them all the assistance in his power; but Cabral, thanking him for the offer, felt confident that he would prove more than a match for them single-handed. It would seem, however, that this confidence was somewhat shaken, for after some manoeuvring with the view of bringing the enemy to action, he suddenly changed his mind, and sailed away in such haste, that he did not even take time to restore the hostages whom he had received from the raja. To increase the ignominy of the flight, he was pursued a whole day by the Calicut fleet. When it left him at night he appears to have availed himself of the darkness to regain the Malabar coast, and anchored in front of Cananore, where he took in 400 quintals of cinnamon. The raja was so friendly that, supposing the want of money to be the reason why he did not take more, he offered him any additional quantity on credit; and showed how anxious he was to cultivate the Portuguese alliance, by actually sending an ambassador with Cabral to Europe for that purpose. Nothing of much interest occurred on the homeward voyage, and Cabral arrived in Lisbon on the 31st of July, 1501. Of the ships which originally formed the expedition only six returned.

Before Cabral's arrival a third Portuguese expedition was on its way to India. It had sailed in March, and consisted only of three ships and a caravel, with 400 men, under the command of an experienced seaman of the name of Juan de Nueva. His instructions, proceeding on the assumption that Cabral had established factories at Sofala and at Calicut, were to leave two of the vessels with their cargoes at the former, and proceed with the two others to the latter town. As a
precautionary measure the expedition was to call at San Blas, situated east of the Cape of Good Hope, and wait ten days to give an opportunity of meeting with any of Cabral’s ships which might be on their way home. Here they found a letter which had been left for them, detailing the events which had taken place at Calicut and Cochin. In consequence of this information, Juan de Nueva deemed it imprudent to separate his vessels, and proceeded with the whole for India, arriving in November at Anchediva, a small island on the coast south of Goa. Shortly after he anchored off Cananore, the raja of which was very urgent that he should lade there; but anxiety to learn the state of matters at the factory induced him to decline and hasten on to Cochin.

On arriving, he learned that the raja, though greatly offended with Cabral for leaving without notice and carrying off his hostages, had proved a faithful ally, and given full protection to all the members of the factory; but that the Murs had carried their hostility so far as on one occasion to set fire to it, and in various ways, by depreciating the value of their merchandise, had prejudiced the native traders against them to such a degree, that they refused to part with their spices except for ready money. As this was a commodity with which Juan de Nueva was very scantily provided, he immediately returned to Cananore, where the raja dealt with him much more liberally, and furnished him with 1,000 quintals of pepper, 50 of ginger, and 450 of cinnamon, together with some cotton cloth, to be paid out of the proceeds of the goods which he had lodged for sale in a Portuguese factory established there. While occupied with these commercial transactions, Juan de Nueva received intelligence that a large fleet belonging to the zamorin was on the way to attack him. The raja who sent the intelligence advised him to land his men and ordnance, and make an entrenchment on shore, as the only effectual means of defence. He was not so easily intimidated; and, on the next day, when 100 vessels were seen entering the bay, he advanced to meet them, and poured in his shot with such good effect, that the Zamorin’s commander hung out a flag of truce, and, after a parley, agreed to quit the bay, and made the best of his way back to Calicut. This failure made
such an impression on the zamorin that he proposed terms of accommodation. Juan de Nueva, probably feeling that his powers were not sufficient for transacting business of so much importance, set sail for Europe. His homeward voyage was prosperous, and he arrived safely with all his ships.

The accounts brought home by Cabral satisfied the King of Portugal that he must either fit out his expeditions on a scale of greater magnitude, or desist from the attempt to establish a trade in the East. The latter alternative was not to be thought of; for even under the most adverse circumstances the profit had counterbalanced the loss. It was therefore determined that the next expedition would be more adequate to the objects contemplated. These were not merely to overawe any of the native Indian princes who might be disposed to be hostile, but to chastise the insolence of the Murs by attacking their trade in its principal seat. Accordingly, the expedition now fitted out consisted in all of twenty ships. The command, at first offered to Cabral, was ultimately given to Vasco de Gama, who was to proceed directly to India with ten ships; while his brother, Stephen de Gama, and Vicente Sodre, were each to have the command of a squadron of five, and clear the sea of Murs, the one by scouring the Malabar coast, and the other by cruizing off the entrance to the Red Sea.

Vasco de Gama, honoured with the title of Admiral of the Eastern Seas, set sail with Vicente Sodre on the 3rd of March, 1502, before Juan de Nueva’s return; Stephen de Gama did not leave before the 1st of May. Having doubled the Cape of Good Hope, and sailed up the east coast of Africa, for the purpose of establishing factories at Sofala and Mozambique, Vasco de Gama, after waiting till he was joined by his brother, continued his course across the Indian Ocean, and had arrived within sight of Mount Dilly, a little north of Cananore, when he fell in with a large ship belonging to the Sultan of Egypt. It was richly laden, and had on board many Muhammedans of rank and wealth, bound on a pilgrimage to Mecca. He immediately attacked it, and captured it after a vigorous resistance. To his disgrace he made an atrocious use of his victory. Going on board, he called the principal passengers before him, and ordered them to produce whatever property they had in money
or in goods. They declared that most of both had been left in Calicut; but on his throwing one of them bound hand and foot into the sea, and threatening to treat all the others in the same way, they became terrified, and yielded to his demand. He had thus secured a rich prize by questionable means, and ought at all events to have been satisfied with it. Instead of this he acted as if he had thrown aside every feeling of humanity, and resolved to play the barbarian, not for the profit, but merely for the pleasure it afforded. After dividing the plunder among his crews, and removing all the children to his own ship, in order to fulfil a vow which bound him to make monks of all the males he should thus capture, he forced all the passengers and crew of the Murish vessel below, and, having nailed down the hatches upon them, told his brother to set it on fire. The fiendish order was executed; but the unhappy victims, rendered desperate, made such human efforts, and having broken open the hatches, succeeded in quenching the flames. Had they been the guiltiest wretches possible, instead of being for the most part inoffensive pilgrims, they had now surely done enough to save their lives. But no. Their destruction had been ordered and Vasco de Gama was not to be satisfied with less. Stephen, who proved himself no unwilling instrument in his brother's hands, was told to board, and made the attempt, but met with such a reception from the Muhammedans, when they saw that no mercy was to be expected, as compelled him to retire. Had De Gama been acting under a sudden burst of passion, he had now full time to cool, for night came on, and nothing more could be done till morning. When he rose, it was only to repeat his inhuman order: the vessel was again boarded and set on fire, and 300 persons, of whom thirty were women, were burned to beath, or drowned, or slaughtered. Of all who were in the vessel when the capture was made, not a soul escaped except the children, whom this bloody baptism initiated into the Romish faith.

After this infamous transaction one almost shudders to mention the name of Vasco de Gama, but the course of the narrative cannot in the meantime proceed without him. In his next proceeding; the caution which he used, when he thought it possible that his own life might be in danger, contrasts strangely
with the recklessness he showed when iniquitously disposing of the lives of others. Having anchored off Cananore, he desired an interview with the raja; but as the captivity he had suffered at Calicut on his first voyage seemed still uppermost in his mind, he adopted the device of having a wooden bridge, which projected a considerable way into the water. At the end of this bridge, which was covered with carpets, a pavilion was reared to form the hall of audience. The raja made his appearance first, attended by 10,000 nairs, and advanced to the pavilion amid the beating of drums and flourish of trumpets. De Gama came accompanied by all his boats, adorned with flags, and took his place in the pavilion, under a salute of artillery. The result of the interview was a treaty of amity, and the establishment of a Portuguese factory at Cananore.

From Cananore De Gama continued his course to Calicut, and, making his appearance unexpectedly in the roads, captured several small boats, containing about fifty natives. Whatever just cause of quarrel he may have had with the zamorin, these poor creatures were not implicated, and yet, on not obtaining redress for the destruction of the Portuguese factory, and the loss of lives occasioned by it, he hung them up at the yard-arm, and, after they were dead, cut off their arms and feet, and caused them to be carried ashore, with a message to the zamorin, that similar treatment was in reserve for himself for his repeated breaches of faith. To show that he was in earnest, he ordered three ships to stand in as near as possible to the town, and open their fire upon it. The royal palace was one of the many buildings thus demolished. Without waiting to ascertain the effect, he left Vicente Sodre with a squadron to scour the coast and destroy the Murish trade, and set sail for Cochin. Here matters were easily re-established on their former friendly footing, mutual presents were exchanged, and a commercial treaty of a more formal nature than that previously existing was concluded.

The next proceeding of the zamorin was very inexcusable, and, indeed, looks as if he had determined to put himself entirely in the wrong. Hearing that De Gama was lading at Cochin, he sent a messenger, inviting him to Calicut, and promising that everything would be arranged to his entire satis-
faction. This was rather a slender foundation on which to negotiate; but peace with Calicut was felt to be so desirable that De Gama determined to make one effort more to secure it, and set out alone, leaving all his other ships behind. The temptation was too strong for the fickle and tortuous court of Calicut; and De Gama, instead of the friendly reception which he had anticipated, was set upon by a large fleet of small vessels, and very narrowly escaped being made prisoner. Further negotiation was of course impossible, though he ought certainly to have disdained to take the petty revenge of putting the Zamorin's messenger to death.

The details of the conflicts which ensued possess little interest. In one of them De Gama, after putting to flight a large number of small vessels, captured two large Murish ships, which proved valuable prizes, both of them being richly laden, while on board one of them was an image of gold of thirty pounds weight, with emeralds for its eyes, a robe curiously wrought and set with precious stones for its covering and on its breast a large ruby. Having again visited Cananore, and united with its raja and that of Cochin in forming a kind of triple alliance, for mutual defence, De Gama, leaving Vicente Sodre with his squadron, sailed for Europe on the 20th of December, 1503, but did not reach Portugal till the following September. He had again proved himself an able navigator; but his proceedings had rather tarnished than increased his fame. His sovereign, however, was satisfied; and rewarded him with the title of Count of Videgueira.

Before De Gama departed, the Raja of Cochin had made him aware of threatening messages which he had received from the zamorin. The peril to which a faithful ally was thus exposed, entitled his case to a more careful consideration than it received, and he was left exposed to the full fury of the zamorin's revenge. Nor was it long before it overtook him. De Gama's departure was too favourable an opportunity to be lost, and hostile preparations on a most formidable scale were immediately commenced. In the vicinity of Ponany, about sixteen leagues north of Cochin, 50,000 men were assembled. Before commencing operations the zamorin asked nothing more than the surrender of the Portuguese who had fixed their residence in Cochin. The population were urgent that the demand should
be complied with, but the raja stood firm, and, though his force was comparatively insignificant, advanced to the encounter. The contest, however, was too unequal; and he was driven from post to post, till he was at last obliged to abandon his capital, and seek an asylum in the island of Vaipi, or Vipeen, in its vicinity.

While in this extremity he received no support from Vicente Sodre, who kept cruizing about making captures, but on some shallow pretext or other refused to give any direct assistance. Powerful aid, however, was approaching. Nine ships had sailed from Lisbon, in three equal squadrons, under the respective commands of Alonso or Alfonso Albuquerque, Francisco Albuquerque, and Antonio Saldanha. The last was to cruize in the mouth of the Red Sea; the others were to proceed directly to India. Francisco Albuquerque arrived first, and with a considerable addition to his squadron, in consequence of having fallen in with some of the ships belonging to Vicente Sodre. This powerful reinforcement completely changed the aspect of affairs, and the zamorin was defeated at every point. Triumpara, in the joy of his heart, not only conferred new privileges on the Portuguese, but gave them permission to build a fort.

On the arrival of Alfonso Albuquerque new energy was thrown into the Portuguese operations, and many successful expeditions were made both by land and sea. The effect of these was manifested in various ways. In the south Coulan, or Quilon, then under female government, made a voluntary offer to lade two ships, and consent to the establishment of a factory; while the zamorin, dispirited by a series of disastrous defeats, was compelled to sue for peace. It was granted, but on terms so disadvantageous, that he availed himself of the first pretext for a rupture, and was soon again at open war. For some reason not explained the two Albuquerques, at this very time, when their presence seemed more necessary than ever, set sail for Europe, leaving only Duarte Pacheco with the ship which he commanded, two caravels, and 110 men, for the defence of Cochin. Francisco Albuquerque appears to have perished in a storm, for he was never more heard of; Alfonso, reserved for greater things, arrived in safety, bringing with him for the king forty pounds of pearls, a diamond of remarkable size, and two horses, a Persian and an Arab, the first of the kind which were imported into Portugal.
The Zamorin had become convinced that he would never be able single-handed to overcome the Portuguese, and therefore, in again preparing to take the field, made it his first business to strengthen himself by entering into a coalition with neighbouring states. In this he found little difficulty, for the Portuguese were not only viewed with jealousy as strangers, but had pursued a very reckless course at sea, attacking and making prizes of all vessels of whatever country, whenever they found any pretext for stigmatizing them by the name of Murs. We have already met with instances of this kind candidly confessed, or rather complacently dwelt upon by themselves; and, it can scarcely be doubted that the instances which they have not recorded were still more numerous. Be this as it may, the coalition soon assumed a very formidable appearance; and while a numerous fleet, provided with nearly 400 cannons, prepared to bombard Cochin from the sea, an army, estimated at 50,000, began to approach it by land.

Triumphara was dismayed, and apparently with good reason, for not only was the enemy in overwhelming force, but his subjects, under the influence of terror, began to desert. The only person whose courage remained unshaken was the Portuguese captain, Duarte Pacheco, who, when the raja came to him in the greatest alarm, and spoke of surrender, scouted the idea, assuring him that a valiant defence would certainly prove successful. This was no empty boast. Pacheco made all his arrangements with so much skill, and carried them out with so much resolution, that the confederates were ultimately obliged to retire with a severe loss. Attempts were repeatedly made to renew the attack, but the result was always the same; and the Zamorin with his allies had the mortification of seeing all their efforts baffled by a mere handful of Europeans. Seldom has there been a more striking example of what one daring spirit can accomplish than was furnished by Pacheco in this struggle. In the course of it the Zamorin had lost 18,000 men, and was now so humbled as gladly to accept of terms of peace from his own tributary Raja of Cochin. As we shall not again meet with Pacheco, we may here conclude his history. It is a melancholy one. A fleet of thirteen ships, of larger dimensions than had ever before been built in Portugal, having arrived under the
command of Lope Soarez, Pacheco, though treated with merited distinction, was superseded, and invested with the government of El Mina, on the west coast of Africa. Here it was thought that his private fortune, to which he was too heroically disposed to give much attention, would be improved. This object was entirely defeated by a violent faction, which first thwarted his measures, and then had the audacity to seize his person on a false charge, and send him home in chains. After languishing for a time in prison he obtained an honourable acquittal, but it was too late. The ungrateful return for his distinguished services had broken his heart, and he died either in prison or shortly after he was released from it.

Lope Soarez, soon after his arrival, moved up to Calicut, and was met by a messenger from the Zamorin, who was now willing to comply with every demand made upon him except one. This was to deliver up an European, a native of Milan, who had entered his service, and taught him the art of casting cannon, along with other important naval and military improvements. To his honour the Zamorin demurred to the delivery of an individual whose only offence was the ability and fidelity with which he had served him. Soarez, unable or unwilling to appreciate the honour and justice of the Zamorin's refusal, immediately bombarded the town, and laid the greater part of it in ashes. This work of destruction accomplished, he immediately proceeded to another, and treated the town of Cranganore, which had adhered to the Zamorin, in the same way. His next exploit began more ominously, but ended still more triumphantly. In sailing north from Cranganore to attack Ponany, he was met by the Zamorin's fleet, and driven into a bay. Here he found himself in imminent peril; for in addition to the fleet before which he had been obliged to retire, seventeen large Murish ships, well provided with cannon, and carrying 4,000 men, were waiting to receive him. A fierce conflict ensued; but ultimately, with a very trifling loss to the Portuguese, all the ships of the enemy with their rich lading were destroyed. Soarez, thinking he had now done enough to justify his return, left four ships at the fort of Cochin, and set sail for Europe with the remainder. His arrival at Lisbon, on the 22nd of July, 1506, was gladly welcomed, as no richer cargo in goods and prizes had ever returned from the East.
The next Indian armament fitted out by Portugal was on a more magnificent scale than any which preceded it. It consisted of twenty-two ships, carrying, in addition to the crew, 1,500 fighting men, and was placed under the command of Don Francisco Almeida, who bore for the first time the proud title of Viceroy of India. His arrival in India took place in 1507. The first land reached was the island of Anchediva, where, as it occupied a commanding position on the coast, and had become a common station for Portuguese vessels, he built a fort. On arriving at Cochin, where he intended to have rewarded Triumphara, the old and faithful ally of the Portuguese, with a crown of gold, set with jewels, which he had brought from Portugal for the purpose, he was astonished to find that he had retired from the world, to spend the remainder of his days as a solitary devotee. His nephew was reigning in his stead, and received the crown from the hands of Almeida during a pompous ceremonial. It is probable that he did not understand all that was meant by it, for from that day he was to be regarded, not as an independent sovereign, but a vassal holding his crown during the pleasure of the Portuguese.

Before Almeida arrived, the Zamorin had once more placed all his fortunes on a venture; and, as if fully aware that the struggle in which he was about to engage would prove decisive of his fate, left no means unemployed to insure success. At this time a powerful dynasty was reigning in the Deccan over territories which included a considerable tract of sea-coast, from Goa northwards, while the kingdom of Gujarat or Cambaya had risen to be a great naval power. Both of these states had been wantonly attacked by the Portuguese, and their commerce had suffered severely before they were aware of having done anything to provoke hostility. Naturally exasperated, they entered with readiness into a combination intended to banish the Portuguese for ever from the Eastern seas. Even with these auxiliaries the zamorin did not feel secure. He therefore extended his views much further, and entered into communication with the Sultan of Egypt.

The Mameluke sultan at once responded to the call thus made upon him, and the more readily that his attention had previously been drawn to the subject from another quarter.
The success of the Portuguese in the East was already telling powerfully against the lucrative trade which the Venetians had long been accustomed to regard as their special monopoly. Goods brought into the Levant, either overland or by way of Alexandria, had so heavy a burden of transport and taxation to bear, that they could not possibly compete with the comparatively inexpensive process of a single voyage, however long, from the port of lading to the port of delivery. The Venetians thus found themselves undersold in every European market, and became perfectly aware that they must either destroy the Portuguese trade or be destroyed by it. Their first endeavour was to work upon the fears of the King of Portugal and the Pope, by instigating the sultan to send a threatening letter to Lisbon and Rome, intimating that if the Portuguese did not forthwith relinquish the new course of navigation, by which they had penetrated into the Indian Ocean, and cease from encroaching on a commerce which had been carried on from time immemorial between Asia and his dominions, he would put to death all the Christians in Egypt, Syria, and Palestine, burn their churches, and demolish the holy sepulchre itself.

This menace having failed to produce the effect anticipated, the Venetians did not scruple to urge the sultan to take the remedy into his own hands, and, in accordance with the invitation given by the zamorin, become a powerful auxiliary in the crusade against the Portuguese. There was only one difficulty. The Egyptian fleet in its actual state was overmatched by that of Portugal. If the war was undertaken, the first thing necessary would be to build a new fleet. Egypt had no proper timber for the purpose. How, then, was it to be obtained? The Venetians were not to be balked of their object by such an obstacle. Had they not whole forests of naval timber in Dalmatia? and having gone so far, why need they scruple to place them at the disposal of the sultan, who, after hewing down as much as he required, might easily transport it by a well known route to the Red Sea? Such was the plan actually adopted; and Europe saw the maritime power which had taken a prominent part in the crusade of Christian princes against Muhammedans, as zealously engaged in promoting a Muhammedan crusade against Christians.
By these extraordinary means a fleet of twelve ships of war having been built and fully equipped, set sail for the Indian coast in 1507. It carried 1,500 men, and was commanded by an experienced officer, whom Ferishta calls Amir Hussain, and the Portuguese Mir Hashim. It sailed first to Gujarat, where Mullik Eiaz, admiral of Mahmud Shah I, who was then reigning sovereign of that kingdom, was prepared to join it with a squadron which would more than double its numbers and strength. Almeida seems not to have been aware of the danger which threatened him till he was almost overtaken by it. His tactics obviously should have been to attack the Turkish fleet on its passage. In this way it might not have been difficult for him to beat his enemies in detail. He may have been prevented by obstacles of which we are not aware; for after he had resolved to pursue this obvious course it was found to be too late. His son Lorenzo, whom he had despatched with eleven sails to intercept the sultan's fleet, having been detained, first off Cananore, where he attacked and, with scarcely any loss, destroyed a native squadron far larger than his own, and afterwards at Anchediva, where sixty Murish and native vessels had made an attempt on the fort, arrived in the harbour of Choul, or Chowul, about twenty-three miles south of Bombay, just in time to see the Egyptian admiral enter it. A fierce conflict immediately ensued, and was continued without any decided advantage till night separated the combatants. Next day an immense preponderance was given to Amir Hussain by the arrival of Mullik Eiaz with the Gujarat fleet. Lorenzo, still undismayed, immediately renewed the battle, but found the Egyptian admiral a much more formidable antagonist than he had been accustomed to deal with. After another day's fighting had left the victory undecided, the Portuguese ships were so much shattered that it was determined by a council of war to take advantage of the night and effect a retreat.

Lorenzo, who had previously incurred his father's displeasure, by declining on one occasion to force the fleet of the Zamorin to action, was very reluctant to take a step which would justly be considered as an acknowledgment of defeat, and continued to linger on till the day began to dawn. He had by this time consented to retreat, and several of his vessels had set sail.
Unfortunately when he began to follow, his ship grounded, and after some ineffectual efforts to tow it off, the rest of the squadron continued their flight, and left him to his fate. He might have escaped in his boat, but at once made up his mind to sell his life as dearly as possible, and die at his post. The enemy at first attempted to board, but was so bravely resisted, that he adopted the more cautious method of keeping at a distance and pouring in his shot. Lorenzo, having been struck by a ball, which broke his thigh, ordered himself to be placed against the mainmast, and there remained, encouraging his men, till another ball broke his back and killed him. The ship shortly after sunk. Of its crew of 100 men only nineteen escaped. According to Fariay Sousa, the whole loss of the Portuguese amounted only to eighty-one men, while the enemy lost 600. The Muhammedan account given by Ferishta is very different. After mentioning that the Portuguese flag-ship, valued at a crore of rupees (a million sterling), was sunk, and every man on board perished, he adds, that the Muhammedan fleet returned victoriously; for although 400 Turks were honoured with the crown of martyrdom, no fewer than 3,000 or 4,000 Portuguese infidels were at the same time sent to the infernal regions.
The Portuguese in the East

The Portuguese were now fully committed to their career of conquest, and successive armaments, on a grand scale, quitted Lisbon for the East. One of these, under Tristan da Cunha, consisted of thirteen vessels, and 1,300 fighting men. Another, of twelve vessels, sailed under the command of Alfonso Albuquerque, who, after performing several exploits on the African coast, and taking effectual measures to cripple the trade from India by the Red Sea, continued along the coast of Arabia, and entered the Persian Gulf, determined to strike a still more fatal blow. There the Muhammedan traffic with India was still active. Albuquerque, in whom great military and political talents were combined, at once perceived how an effectual interdict might be laid upon it. The only thing necessary for this purpose was to make himself master of the city of Ormuz, situated on an island in the mouth of the gulf. In this way he could completely command the passage, and place the trade at his mercy. After the capture of Muscat, and several other places of minor importance, he proceeded to the execution of his grand enterprise. His design had been penetrated; and instead of being able to take the city by surprise, as he had anticipated, he found it defended by a fleet of 400 vessels, sixty of them of large size, and by an army of 30,000 men. To show how far he was from being dismayed at these preparations, he immediately advanced into the harbour, and anchored among five of the largest ships, firing his cannon as if in defiance. After waiting for a message from the king, but receiving none, he sent him his ultimatum, which, considering the relative position of the parties, was certainly of a very extraordinary and arrogant description. It was to the effect
that he had come with orders to take the King of Ormuz under his protection, on the condition of paying a reasonable tribute to Portugal, or to treat him as an enemy by declaring war against him.

There was little room to doubt which of the alternatives, thus arbitrarily placed before him, the sovereign of Ormuz would accept, but as his fortifications were not yet completed, it was important to gain time; and solely with that view, instead of sending a resolute defiance, he entered into negotiation. Albuquerque saw what was intended, and at once brought matters to a point, by telling the messenger that when he next came, it must be with either an acceptance of peace, or a declaration of war. There had never been any room for choice, and the message accordingly was, that Ormuz was in use not to pay, but to receive tribute. Albuquerque lost not a moment in commencing a cannonade which must have caused fearful slaughter, as not only were the walls, shore, and vessels crowded with combatants, but even the tops of the houses were covered with spectators. The Persians, in the meantime, were not idle, and made two furious onsets; but neither in weapons nor discipline could they cope with the Portuguese, and the sea is said to have been coloured with their blood. With the loss of only ten men, Albuquerque burned, sunk, or otherwise destroyed all the ships of Ormuz, and received a flag of truce with an offer to comply with all his demands. The terms were, the annual payment of about £2,000 as tribute to the King of Portugal, and ground on which to build a fort. No sooner were the terms arranged, than the fort was immediately commenced, and carried on with such rapidity, as to assume shape in the course of a few days.

Khoja Attar, who governed Ormuz in the name of Saifaddin, who was a minor, had no sooner made the arrangement than he repented of it. From the destruction which Albuquerque had caused, he had formed an extravagant idea of the force under his command; and was astonished above measure, on learning that it did not muster above 460 men. He therefore prepared anew for hostilities, and dexterously availed himself of a mutinous feeling among the inferior Portuguese commanders, to escape the consequences. Albuquerque, after venting
his rage by some very barbarous proceedings, was obliged to
depart and spend the winter at Socotra, which had become a
Portuguese conquest. Having again returned, he gave formal
notice of his arrival to the government of Ormuz, and was
immediately informed that the tribute stipulated would be
paid, but that he would not be permitted to build the fort.
He would fain have resumed the siege, but more important
interests required his presence in India. He had been appoint-
ed viceroy.

Almeida, in the midst of his preparations to avenge the
death of his son, received the mortifying intelligence that he
had been superseded in his government. Obedience to the
royal mandate was, of course, his duty; but both revenge and
ambition pointed to an opposite course, and he determined to
follow it at all hazards. On the pretext that the public interest
would not allow him, in present circumstances, to demit his
authority, he refused to resign the insignia of office; and leaving
Albuquerque, who was in no condition to force him, to devour
his disappointment as he could, set out without him at the
head of a powerful armament. While proceeding northwards
along the coast, in search of the combined Egyptian and
Gujarat fleets, he stopped at Anchediva, and there received
information which determined him to make the important
commercial city of Dabul, situated on the coast about half-way
between Goa and Bombay, the first object of attack. It belonged
to a king of the Deccan, who had joined the Zamorin's confed-
eration, and assisted him with ships. In Almeida's view this
was sufficient to justify any severity; and, without any note of
warning, he suddenly commenced his attack both by sea and
land, and never desisted till he had laid Dabul in ashes. An
immense plunder might have been obtained; but fearing the
effect upon his troops, he chose rather to burn than to preserve
the booty.

From this achievement, which certainly added little to his
laurels, Almeida proceeded to Diu, finely and strongly situated
on an island of the same name, on the southern shore of the
peninsula of Gujarat. Here he found Amir Hussian and Mullik
Eiaz, with their fleets. Had they remained in their position
under the batteries of Diu, as the Gujarat admiral strongly
urged, Almeida, if he had ventured an attack at all, must have made it under great disadvantage; but the Egyptian admiral, who was naturally of a chivalrous temper, and perhaps also rendered over-confident by his recent success, when Lorenzo was slain, disdained to be cooped up in a harbour, when he could meet his enemy in the open sea, and sailed out, displaying more valour than discretion. The conflict, after raging furiously for some time, terminated in a glorious victory gained by the Portuguese, who, however, converted it into an indelible disgrace, by an atrocious massacre. Several days after the battle was fought, and they had sailed away for Cananore, they murdered all their prisoners in cold blood. There is no possible excuse for the atrocity; and the only explanation given is that Almeida's revenge could not otherwise be satiated. The defeat had so dispirited Mullik Eiaz that he made overtures of peace. They were readily listened to; and he might have obtained advantageous terms, if he would have stooped to the meanness of delivering up his Egyptian colleague. As much to his honour as to the disgrace of the Portuguese for making such a demand, he at once gave it a peremptory refusal.

Almeida, having returned to Cochin, was again pressed by Albuquerque to resign the viceroyship, which he had persisted in holding, in defiance of the mandate of his sovereign. So far from complying, he took the extraordinary step of seizing the person of his competitor, and sending him as a prisoner to the fort of Cananore. He would probably have completed the treasonable course to which he was now committed, by declaring himself independent, had not the opportune arrival of Don Fernando Coutinho, with a large fleet and extraordinary powers, enabled him to act with effect as a mediator. The result was, that Almeida abandoned all idea of resistance, and, resigning the insignia of office, took his departure for Europe. Before leaving, a native conjuror had told him that he was not destined to pass the Cape of Good Hope. He had passed it, however, and had begun to make merry with the prediction, when an event took place which terminated his career somewhat ignobly. The three ships he had with him anchored in Saldanha Bay, a little north of the Cape, and sent ashore a watering-party. One of the ex-viceroy's servants insulted one
of the natives, and was roughly handled by them in return. Almeida, contrary to his wish and better judgment, was induced to take part in this petty squabble, and having gone ashore, was returning with the cattle carried off in a foray, when the natives, who had been lying in ambush, rushed out upon him. They were armed only with pointed stakes, but these they used so effectually, that fifty of the Portuguese soon lay dead at their feet. Among them was the ex-viceroy himself; mortally wounded by a thrust which pierced his throat.

Albuquerque, now fully installed as viceroy, was bent on following out his career of conquest, and sailed for Calicut, before which he appeared on the 2nd of January, 1510, with thirty vessels and 1,800 men, together with a number of natives who followed in boats, allured by the hope of plunder. Coutinho had arrived from Europe with an earnest longing for Eastern renown; and now that the opportunity offered, he had set his heart on signalizing himself as the captor of the royal palace. Albuquerque indulged him by giving him the command of 800 men, after administering all the cautions which his superior talents and experience suggested. Unfortunately Coutinho thought only of his prize, and rushed forward as if he had been running a race rather than fighting a battle. Never looking behind him, he forced his way to the palace, and set about installing himself in it, for the purpose of celebrating his triumph. His infatuation was soon perceived by the native troops, who took advantage of it so silently and effectually, that Coutinho did not awake to a sense of his peril, till he found himself hemmed in by thousands of natives, and deprived of every outlet. Albuquerque, in exerting himself for his relief, was so severely wounded in the head by a stone, and in the throat by a dart, that he was borne senseless to the shore. Coutinho, and several young nobles from Lisbon, fell in the palace fighting desperately; and the whole detachment would have perished to a man, had not a large body of reserve arrived and obliged the enemy to retire. Notwithstanding this disastrous retreat, the inhabitants suffered much more severely than the Portuguese, and saw the greater part of their city laid in ruins.

Ormuz was the next place to which Albuquerque turned his attention. He had there been baffled by the supineness or
treachery of his officers, particularly Lope de Soarez and Juan de Nueva, and obliged, in consequence, to leave one of the main avenues of Muhammedan trade still open. He accordingly began to make such preparations for a new attack upon it as must have proved successful, when his attention was attracted to another quarter, and he resolved to employ his armament against Goa. This town which, from having afterwards become the seat of Portuguese government in the East, makes some figure in history, was finely situated on an island at the mouth of an estuary, forming one of the very few good harbours which occur on the western coast of the Indian peninsula. At this time (1510) it was included in the territories of one of the kings of the Deccan, who had his capital at Bijapur, and is usually called by Portuguese writers Sabay or Savay, though his proper name or title was Yusuf Adil Shah. He had recently wrested it from the Raja of Onore. The grounds of Albuquerque's quarrel with Yusuf are not very apparent; and it is probable that he did not deem it necessary either to allege or invent any. His only object was to extend the Portuguese rule; and if he could succeed, he regarded it as scarcely worth while to inquire whether the means which he employed could be justified. One inducement may have been, that, as a new conquest, Yusuf's possession of Goa must have been somewhat insecure. Another inducement was, that the Raja of Onore, the legitimate owner, was ready to assist to the utmost in recapturing it. He found a third auxiliary capable of rendering still more effectual assistance in Timoja, who figures sometimes as Raja of Canara, a district which was bounded by Goa on the north, and sometimes simply as a privateer, roaming the seas with a powerful fleet, and living by plunder.

Thus assisted, Albuquerque made his appearance off the coast in the beginning of 1510. At first anticipating a valiant resistance, he sent his nephew along with Timoja to take soundings. They discovered a fort which was well provided with guns, and defended by 400 men, and not only had the hardihood to attack, but the good fortune to capture it. These seemed a most auspicious commencement, and proved only the first of a series of fortunate events which followed rapidly, and put Albuquerque in possession of this most important locality,
before he was required to strike a blow. According to the Portuguese accounts, some conjuror or fakir, whose predictions were implicitly believed, had announced that Goa was destined shortly to become subject to foreigners. On the faith of this prediction, the inhabitants thought it a stroke of good policy, instead of enduring the miseries of a siege which must ultimately be successful, to make a voluntary surrender. Accordingly, to the great but most agreeable surprise of Albuquerque, he was received ashore by the population as if he had been their native prince, conducted in state to the gate, when he received the keys, and thereafter put in possession of the palace. The Muhammedan account says nothing of the conjuror; and with far greater probability represents the capture as the necessary result of a surprise. The fort captured by Timoja and Albuquerque's nephew may have given them complete command of the city, and thus rendered defence impossible.

At this time, however, it was lost almost as early as it had been gained. Yusuf Adil Shah having died, was succeeded by his son Ismael Adil Shah, who, about four months after the hasty surrender of Goa, collected an army estimated at 60,000. Kumal Khan, the general to whom this army was intrusted, suddenly made his appearance, and conducted the siege with so much ability, that Albuquerque, after twenty days, finding his communication with the fleet seriously threatened, was glad to evacuate the place. But he had no idea of finally abandoning so valuable a prize. In the course of the same year, having collected all his forces, including several additional ships which had arrived from Portugal, he set sail from Cananore with a fleet of twenty-three ships, and 1,500 fighting men. After landing at Onore, to assist at the celebration of Timoja's marriage with the daughter of a native queen, he hastened off to Goa, and, anchoring before it a second time, immediately prepared for the assault. It took place before daybreak, and with such success, that the Portuguese entered the city along with those of the defenders who had been stationed outside. For a time every inch of ground within the city was disputed, and more especially at the palace the fight was furiously renewed, till the defenders, fearing that their retreat to the mainland might be cut off, quitted the place in the utmost confusion. The enemy
lost 6,000; the Portuguese only fifty. Not one Mur was left alive; but the natives were treated with great moderation. Besides recovering their property, they had the satisfaction of being placed under the government of their countryman Timoja, who ruled more equitably than might have been anticipated from his predatory habits. Before departing, Albuquerque declared his intention to make Goa the capital of Portuguese India.

The remaining exploits of Albuquerque, though they had not India for their theatre, are so intimately connected with its history, that a short account of them is here subjoined. After returning to Cochin he began to prepare another armament, and gave out that it was destined to act against Aden, which was then, as it is now, the key to the navigation of the Red Sea. The importance of the object was sufficient to justify all the preparations which he was making; but while pretending to look to the west, his eye was fixed in an opposite direction. The city of Malacca, situated on the peninsula of the same name, had long been the most important emporium of the rich countries lying further east than India. The Murs were still carrying on a lucrative traffic in that quarter; and by means of it were almost able to compensate themselves for all the losses which they had sustained from the Portuguese. This consideration was of itself sufficient to determine Albuquerque to undertake the important expedition which he was now meditating, though the direct benefits which his own country might expect to derive from it were of themselves a sufficient inducement.

On the 2nd of May, 1511, Albuquerque set sail from Cochin with nineteen ships and 1,400 fighting men. Of these, however, 600 were natives of India. Malacca was at this time under the government of a king of the name of Muhammad, who had treacherously imprisoned a number of Portuguese, commanded by an officer called Diego Lopez de Siqueira. To avenge this outrage was the ostensible object of Albuquerque's expedition. It was one of the boldest he had ever undertaken; as the city itself is said to have contained 100,000 inhabitants, and was now defended by 30,000 soldiers, and 8,000 cannon. With all these means of defence, Muhammad, aware of the kind of enemy he had to deal with, did not feel secure, and sent a messenger to the viceroy to intimate that, if he came for merchandise, it
was ready at his command. Albuquerque replied that the merchandise he required was some Portuguese left there by Siqueira, and that on the delivery of them he would be prepared to say what more he wanted. After some parleying, the captives were delivered, and Albuquerque sent his ultimatum. It demanded compensation for the outrage, and for the expenses incurred in obtaining redress, and a site for the erection of a Portuguese fort. This last proposal the king refused to entertain, and Albuquerque immediately prepared to compel him. The Malays are said to have fought well, but it is difficult to believe it; for with all the aid which they could derive from artillery, poisoned arrows, poisoned thorns, and mines of gunpowder laid in the streets, their tens of thousands gave way before a mere handful of Portuguese, and the viceroy took triumphant possession of the city. While here he both received and sent several embassies; among the latter, one to Siam, and another to Pegu. He also sent out several navigators on exploring expeditions. One of these is said to have been commanded by Magalhaens, to whom it suggested the idea of his subsequent celebrated circumnavigation.

On the voyage home, Albuquerque lost his finest ship, which was nearly cut across the keel on a sharp rock off the coast of Sumatra. In this perilous position he was obliged to pass the night; and when the morning dawned, was seen performing an act of humanity and heroism, by sheltering with his arms a young girl whom he had saved in the midst of the confusion. When he arrived in India, he found that advantage had been taken of his absence. Adel Khan had resumed the siege of Goa with an army of 20,000 men, and the Zamorin was again in arms. Goa was easily relieved; and the zamorin, despairing of success, retired from the contest. The subversion of the Mameluke dynasty in Egypt had deprived him of any further assistance from Amir Hussain, and on looking round he saw no quarter to which he could appeal for new aid. According to Ferishta, this humbling conviction so completely overwhelmed him, that his health gave way, and he died of a broken heart.

The attack on Aden, which Albuquerque meditated, had been postponed to that of Malacca, but by no means abandoned. Accordingly, on the 18th of February, 1513, he appeared before
it with a fleet of twenty sail, having on board 1,700 Portuguese, and 800 natives of India. He lost no time in landing, and hastened forward, in the hope that, by applying scaling-ladders to the walls, he might gain possession of the place. He had underrated its strength, and the valour of its defenders, and was obliged to retire with a loss too severe to leave him any inclination to renew the attempt. He compensated himself in some degree by entering the Red Sea, which then, for the first time, saw an European vessel on its bosom, and made several valuable prizes. After remaining for some time at the island of Kamaran, he returned and again looked in upon Aden, but found that in the interval its fortifications had been so much improved that it would have been madness to attack it. He therefore passed on, and continued his voyage to India. On reaching Gujarat he made an ineffectual application for permission to build a fort at Diu, but did not attempt to enforce it, as he was intent on another project, on which his heart had long been set, and all the more earnestly that his attempts to accomplish it had hitherto been frustrated. This project was the command of the Persian Gulf by the capture of Ormuz. His third attempt upon it was made in March, 1514. The circumstances were opportune; and when he demanded permission to complete the fort, the governor, though disposed to resist, felt he had not the means, and was obliged to comply. The name of Albuquerque was now famous all over the East; and even Ismael, the founder of the famous Persian dynasty of Sufi, sent him an ambassador with valuable presents, and concluded a treaty with him. Before leaving Ormuz, Albuquerque not only finished his fort, but succeeded in inducing or forcing the king to lodge all his cannon within it. In this way Portuguese supremacy was completely established.

Under Albuquerque the Portuguese power extended more widely, and was more firmly seated, than before or since. It cannot, however, be with any propriety styled an empire, as it was not composed of contiguous territories, but rather consisted of a vast number of isolated forts, scattered over an immense extent of coast, and situated at wide distances from each other. The sites were for the most part admirably chosen, and gave a complete control over all the great maritime thoroughfares from the
East Indies to Europe. In some respects this mode of rule has its advantages over territorial possession. It is more easily acquired, and admits of being maintained at a cheaper rate; but its stability is very precarious. The moment the command at sea is lost, it is necessarily extinguished. This, however, was an event of which, during Albuquerque's regency, there were no symptoms; and the fact that they began to be manifested not long after he disappeared from the scene, serves to impress us with a higher idea of the wisdom and vigour of his government. When his countrymen hailed him as "Great," all impartial observers of his exploits were ready to echo their acclamations. His greatness, however, was now drawing to a close.

While at Ormuz he had suffered much from sickness, and the symptoms had become sufficiently serious to make him hasten his departure. There was no reason, however, to suspect a fatal termination. He had only passed his sixtieth year, and seemed unbroken in constitution. In truth, it was not disease but grief that killed him. It is said that he had applied to his sovereign for the title of Duke of Goa. His enemies took advantage of the circumstance to insinuate that he was cherishing schemes of ambition, and had manifested, by the arrogance of his application, the treasonable purpose which he had at heart. Once Duke of Goa, he would establish himself in that Eastern metropolis, and rule the whole East as absolute master. There was little plausibility in these insinuations; but there was enough to form the groundwork of a successful court intrigue. Albuquerque, while oppressed by sickness, was yet dreaming of a ducal title, when he received the mortifying intelligence that the only reward which he was to obtain for all his services was a summary dismissal. He was no longer viceroy; and as if this was not enough, he had been superseded to make way for his mortal enemy, Lope Soarez. The shock was more than he could bear; and when the vessel in which he sailed arrived off Goa, he was in a dying state. On the first news of his dismissal, he is said to have exclaimed, "See how it is! Love to my fellow-men has brought me into bad odour with the king, and love to the king into bad odour with my fellow-men. To the grave, then, old man, for it is now high time: to the grave!" One of his last acts was to write a touching letter to King Emanuel, in
which, recommending his son to his protection, he says: "I bequeath to him my property, which is of small amount; but I also leave him the obligation which my services impose, and this is great. In regard to the affairs of India, they will speak for him and for me." It was thought he might be able to reach Goa, but death advanced with such rapid strides, that he breathed his last almost immediately after the vessel had crossed the bar, on the 16th of December, 1515. He was buried with great pomp at Goa; but in accordance with a request in his will, his remains, in 1566, were transported to Lisbon.

After the death of Albuquerque, the Portuguese power began visibly to decline. "Up to this time," says Faria y Sousa, "the gentlemen had followed the dictates of true honour, esteeming their arms the greatest riches; from this time forward, they so wholly gave themselves up to trading, that those who ought to have been captains became merchants." There was, in short, a general and eager scramble for riches, from the highest to the lowest class of officials; and public was held subordinate and made subservient to private interest. The very first proceedings of Soarez gave evidence of his incapacity. He had brought with him a fleet of thirteen sail, and, having increased it by reinforceements to twenty-seven sail, proceeded, in accordance with the orders which he had received at Lisbon, on an expedition to the Red Sea, with the view of encountering a large fleet which the Sultan of Egypt was said to be fitting out at Suez. On arriving off Aden, he found a large breach in the fortifications, in consequence of a siege which it had lately sustained; and so conscious was the governor of its defenceless condition, that he actually made Soarez an offer of the keys. The compliments with which they were offered were so soothing to his vanity, that he returned the keys thus tendered, and desired the governor to keep them for him till his return, as he was at present on an expedition which admitted of no delay. He accordingly entered the Red Sea, and, after cruising about to no purpose, retraced his steps to Aden, and was very much astonished when, on announcing his arrival to the complimentary governor, he received, instead of the keys, a proud defiance to come and take them. The explanation was soon given. The walls, which were defenceless on his former visit, had, in
the interval, been thoroughly repaired. A bold stroke might yet have put him in possession of the place, but Soarez was not the man to make it; and he moved off to attempt some petty capture. Even this was not permitted him, for nearly a third of his fleet was destroyed in a storm, and he hastened back to Goa with the remainder.

The native princes, who had been overawed by Albuquerque, were not slow to discover the character of his successor, and take advantage of it. Both Goa and Malacca were seriously threatened, though as much of ancient discipline still remained to ward off the danger. The only occurrences to compensate for these disasters were the submission of the King of Ceylon, who, in 1517, agreed to become tributary to Portugal, and allow a fort to be built at Colombo; and the successful voyage of Fernando Perez de Andrada, who, in the same year, penetrated to Canton, and laid the foundation of a lucrative trade.

Diego Lopez de Sequeira, who succeeded Soarez, was a man of a similar temper, and instead of doing anything to retrieve the honour of the Portuguese arms, tarnished them still further by a dastardly retreat from Diu, after appearing before it with one of the largest armaments which had ever sailed under Portuguese colours in the Indian Ocean. He had in all forty ships, manned by 3,000 Portuguese, and 800 natives. On his arrival, on the 9th of February, 1521, he sent a messenger to Mullik Eiaz, with the old request for permission to build a fort, and a menace, that if it were refused, he would force it. The Gujarat admiral told him to do his worst; and must have been as much pleased as surprised when, instead of being attacked in the style of which Almeida and Albuquerque had given examples, he saw the Portuguese fleet weigh anchor, and gradually disappear from the coast. The fortifications, it seems, had been strengthened; and Lopez, after endeavouring to shelter himself by calling a council of war, which sanctioned his cowardice, decided that the attack was too hazardous to be attempted.

This disgraceful retreat was not lost upon the native princes, and in the course of the same year the Portuguese saw several formidable combinations formed against them. Mullik Eiaz deemed it unnecessary any longer to seek the protection of his
batteries at Diu, and, sailing out, converted the Portuguese retreat into a flight, taking one of their ships and dispersing the rest. Not satisfied with this success, he continued his course to Choul, where the Portuguese were engaged in building a factory, again defeated them, and remained off the port for twenty days, cutting off all communication between the factory and the Portuguese fleet, which kept hovering outside, without offering battle, or attempting to force a passage. In proportion as Portuguese pusillanimity increased, their assailants became emboldened, and Adil Khan, in 1522, made his appearance once more in the vicinity of Goa. The city was too well fortified to run much risk, but all the adjoining territory was occupied, and once more acknowledged the supremacy of the King of Bijapur.

In 1527 the hopes of the Portuguese were much revived by a decisive victory gained at Choul over the Gujarat fleet, which consisted of eighty-three vessels. Of these, seventy-three were burned, destroyed, or driven ashore. Hector de Silveira, the victor, following his advantage, proceeded up to the head of the bay, where Bombay now stands, to Tannah, and then northwards to Bassein, levying contributions from both places, and compelling both to become tributary. Three years after, his brother, Antonio de Silveira, with a fleet of fifty-one vessels, crossed the bar of the river Tapti, and, forcing his way up to Surat, sacked and burned it. In the following year Daman, a large town situated on the same coast, shared the same fate.

These, however, were only desultory attacks, preparatory to a great effort about to be made for the capture of Diu. The King of Portugal, irritated at having been so often baffled in his attempts to take it, sent out peremptory orders to obtain possession of it on any terms! The preparations were on a scale far exceeding in magnitude anything that the Portuguese had ever before attempted. The expedition had its rendezvous in Bombay harbour, where it mustered 400 vessels of all descriptions, having on board 22,200 men. Of these, 3,600 soldiers and 1,400 sailors were Europeans. On the 16th February, 1531, the expedition, commanded by Nunno de Cunha, governor of India, arrived off Diu. Nine days before, it had attacked the town and island of Bet, or Beyt, which lies not far from the
south side of the entrance to the Gulf of Cutch, and was strongly fortified both by nature and art. It was taken with a loss of 18,000 men and sixty cannon to the enemy, and with the loss of only twelve men to the Portuguese. The victory, however, great as it seemed, was in fact a disaster. Among the twelve slain was Hector de Silveira, the hero of the fleet; while the time lost was so diligently improved by the enemy, that Diu was rendered all but impregnable. The defence was conducted by Mustapha Khan, an European Turk, with so much courage and ability, that all the efforts of the besiegers proved fruitless, and they found it necessary, at the end of a month, to retire. According to the Portuguese accounts, the strength of the place was the sole cause of failure; but the Muhammedan historians add that the immediate cause of raising the siege was the approach of Bahadur Shah, then ruler of Gujarat, at the head of a formidable army. This so frightened the Portuguese, that they made a precipitate retreat, leaving their guns behind them. One of these is said to have been "the largest ever before seen in India, and required a machine to be constructed for conveying it to Champanere." The Portuguese, to avenge themselves for their defeat, burned a great number of towns upon the coast and committed fearful devastation.

Notwithstanding their discomfiture, the Portuguese had not abandoned the hope of being yet able to make themselves masters of Diu. If direct force failed, policy might yet succeed. Chand Khan, a brother of Bahadur, was at first set up as a competitor for the throne, and when this failed, a league was formed with Humayun, King of Delhi, who, regarding Bahadur as a revolted vassal, had invaded Gujarat. Bahadur, thus pressed on all sides, was obliged to make his choice between submission to the King of Delhi, and submission to the Portuguese. He preferred the latter; and accordingly, in 1534, concluded a treaty by which he ceded Bassein, which was thenceforth to be the only port at which vessels sailing from India were to pay duties and take out clearances. He further engaged not to assist the Turkish fleets in the Indian seas.

This treaty gave him only a very partial relief. It made the Portuguese his friends, but made him more obnoxious than ever to the King of Delhi, who, following up the advantages
which he had gained, obliged him to take refuge in Diu. Here, as the assistance of the Portuguese was indispensable to him, he was obliged to purchase it by giving them permission to build a fortified factory. As the work proceeded Bahadur became more and more uneasy, and besides entering into communication with the Turks, is said to have formed a plot for the destruction of his Portuguese allies. The statements on the subject by the Portuguese and the Muhammedans vary so much, that it is difficult to pronounce between them. The probability is, that both parties were anxious to be quit of each other, and that thus there were plots and counter-plots. All that can now be considered certain is, that a fray commenced, and that Bahadur, who was on a visit to the Portuguese admiral, having fallen or leaped into the sea, a Portuguese sailor threw a boarding-pike at him, which pierced his skull, and killed him on the spot. Were the question to be decided on the principle of *cui bono*, the decision would necessarily be given against the Portuguese; for while Bahadur lost his life, they gained the island of Diu.

They had not been long in possession when an attempt was made to wrest it from them. It has been mentioned that when Bahadur repented of his concession to the Portuguese, he applied for aid to the Turks. Suleman the Magnificent was then upon the throne of Constantinople. The application therefore could not have been made under more favourable circumstances. Suleman was a great and a successful warrior, and his imagination fired at the idea of establishing an additional empire in the East. Before any steps were taken, the news of Bahadur's death arrived, but this only confirmed the determination to fit out an armament on such a scale as would insure the conquest of Diu. For this purpose instructions were given to Suleman, the Egyptian pacha, to commence preparations immediately in the port of Suez. There a fleet of seventy-six galleys, having 7,000 Turkish soldiers on board, was forthwith equipped; and, sailing under the command of the pacha, arrived off Diu in the beginning of September, 1537.

Though the danger had been foreseen, the Portuguese councils were at this time so dilatory and distracted, that no adequate preparations were made to meet it. The government of
India had just been conferred on Garcia de Noronha, and the time which ought to have been devoted to the supply of Diu with everything necessary to its defence was spent in petty squabbles between the old governor and the new. The consequence was, that when the Turkish fleet arrived, the garrison consisted only of about 600 men, many of them sickly. Nor was this the worst. Both ammunition and provisions were so deficient, that nothing could save the place from capture if the siege was persisted in or relief did not arrive. Nor was the Turkish the only armament which the Portuguese had to fear. A Gujarat army, estimated at 20,000 men, was in the vicinity, ready to co-operate with the besiegers.

Such was the apparently desperate state of matters when the governor, Antonio de Silveira, unable to maintain a footing in the town, shut himself up in the fort. In himself, however, he was equal to a host, possessing not only military talents of the highest order, but also the rare gift of infusing his own heroic spirit into all who were under his command. Not only was every soldier within the garrison prepared to do his duty, but the women, forgetting the feebleness of their sex, fearlessly encountered every danger, and worked with their own hands in repairing the walls as they crumbled beneath the powerful Turkish artillery. It is told of one lady, Anna Fernandez, wife of a physician, that by night she viewed all the posts, and during the assaults stood by encouraging the soldiers. She even saw her own son struck down by a cannon-ball, but, instead of giving way to the agony she must have felt, drew his body aside, returned to her post, and only after the assault had been repulsed went to bury him.

It was impossible, however, that the defence could last much longer. Every new assault thinned the numbers of the garrison, and scarcely as many remained as could make even a show of resistance, when a breach was made. The governor saw nothing before him but death or surrender, and was giving way to the gloomiest forebodings, when, to his unspeakable delight, the siege was raised. The Turkish commander, when dispirited by the failure of one of his greatest efforts, received the startling intelligence that a Powerful Portuguese fleet was at hand; and, without staying to ascertain its accuracy, made off with the
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utmost precipitation. It turned out to be a false rumour, invented and circulated, strange to say, by Khoja Zofar, a renegade Turk, of Italian origin, who commanded the Gujarat forces. His pride had been repeatedly offended by the arrogance of Suleman Pacha; and he had, moreover, ascertained that the Turks were determined, if they gained the place, to retain it as a permanent possession. There was thus only a choice of masters; and as the Portuguese seemed the more tolerable of the two, Zofar had given them the preference.

After Khoja Zofar had rid himself of his Turkish allies by this stratagem, he entered into friendly communications with the Portuguese, but at the same time took several steps, which convinced them that enmity was rankling at his heart. He was in the highest possible favour with the King of Gujarat; and feeling satisfied that that sovereign's complete ascendency in the peninsula would best secure his own aggrandizement, was prepared to adopt any means, however unscrupulous, that promised to expel the Portuguese. His first attempt was an infamous plot, in which he endeavoured to poison the water of an immense cistern which supplied the garrison, and to set fire to the magazine. When this plot failed, he attempted to build a wall which would have completely isolated the fort from the town. The Portuguese objected; and the foundation for a quarrel being thus laid, he had no sooner completed his preparations, in 1545, than he made an open declaration of war.

Mascarenhas, the commander of Diu, made the best arrangements possible in the circumstances; but his means being inadequate, he lost no time in acquainting Juan de Castro of his danger. Zofar, at the same time, aware of his advantage, resolved to assault the place before succour could arrive. With this view he prepared an immense floating battery, and, filling it with heavy artillery, caused it to be steered opposite to the sebastion, in the hope of making such a breach in it as would give him access into the fort. It proved a very clumsy device, for before he could bring it to bear the garrison made a night attack upon it, and, setting fire to it, belowered it into the air. Zofar's next plan was to complete the wall already mentioned, and to mount it with cannon, which kept up an incessant and crushing fire on the fort. One of the pieces of ordnance was of
extraordinary size, and being managed by an expert French renegade, did considerable damage. Every shot from it is said to have shook the island, and made pieces of the fort to fly. Happily for the besieged, one of their shot killed the Frenchman, and the gunner who succeeded him managed so awkwardly that his great gun did more harm to his own party than to the Portuguese. While the siege was thus proceeding, the King of Gujarat arrived. It seems that Zofar had become so confident of success, that he had invited him to come and witness it. It proved hotter work than he had anticipated; and the pusillanimous prince was so terrified by a chance ball which lighted on his tent and killed one of his attendants, that he fled, and never looked behind him till he was far on the way back to his capital. A still more fortunate shot killed Zofar himself. This gave the exhausted garrison some respite; but it was of short duration, for Roumi Khan, Zofar’s son, succeeded him, and, not satisfied with the slow process which had hitherto been pursued, made a general assault. It failed, but scarcely a day passed without some new attempt to force an entrance into the place.

The siege had now lasted several months, while the preparations at Goa proved so dilatory, that the only relief sent to the garrison consisted of two insignificant detachments, the one commanded by Fernando de Castro, the governor’s son, and the other by Don Alvaro. The latter consisted of 400 men, and brought supplies of ammunition and provision, when they were just on the point of being exhausted. The Portuguese were so elated that they disdained to be cooped up any longer in the fort, and almost compelled Mascarenhas against his better judgment to lead them out. They paid dearly for their rashness, and retreated with such precipitation, that they had the greatest difficulty in preventing the enemy from entering the fort along with them. Among the slain was the governor’s own son.

This domestic misfortune seems to have had the effect of hastening De Castro’s departure from Goa. What the cause of delay was is not explained; but it gives a poor idea of his energy and resources to learn, that at the end of eight months, while one of the most important stations which the Portuguese possessed in the East, and the acquisition of which had cost them more
than any other, was in the most imminent danger, his preparations were for the first time considered to be complete. His fleet, which consisted of ninety-three sail, lost some time in committing barbarities at various localities on the coast, but at last, in 1545, was observed from Diu. The result was not long doubtful. After relieving the garrison, De Castro marched out at the head of his troops and gained a signal victory. The fall of the town followed of course, and the Portuguese acted, as they almost invariably did on such occasions, by indulging in horrid atrocities. "The women escaped not the fate of the men, and children were slain at their mothers' breasts."

The victory which De-Castro had gained was not very remarkable. His troops bore a considerable proportion to those of the enemy, and with the superiority of discipline which they possessed, it would have been disgraceful to him not to have succeeded. But the Portuguese, in consequence of the decline of their power, had for several years before enjoyed few opportunities of celebrating a victory, and therefore entered readily into the feelings of the governor, who thought himself entitled to be received, at Goa with all the magnificence of a Roman triumph. The gates and streets were hung with silk, all places resounded with music and salvos of cannon, and vessels gaily adorned covered the harbour. The governor on arriving at the gate, under a rich canopy, was presented with a crown of laurel, with which he encircled his head, and a branch of it which he carried in his hand; in front walked one Friar Anthony, with a crucifix, as he had borne it in the sight, and beside him an officer bearing the royal standard; behind was Jazar Khan, a Murish chief, followed by 600 captives in chains. The governor walked on leaves of gold and silver, and rich silks, the ladies from the windows throwing flowers upon him, and sprinkling him with sweet water. On reading the account of this pompous procession, Catherine, Queen of Portugal, shrewdly remarked, that "De Castro had overcome like a Christian and triumphed like a heathen." He did not long survive his triumph; and was on his death-bed when the honours sent out from Portugal to reward his victory were announced to him at Goa. He must have been a vain man, but this failing was compensated by many good qualities. He was so zealous for the public service,
that grief for the miserable condition into which it had fallen is said to have broken his heart; and he gave the best proof of his honesty by dying in extreme poverty. One of his last acts was to make a formal protest, which he desired to be recorded, to the effect that "he had never made use of the king's nor any other man's money, nor driven any trade to increase his own stock."

The practices of which he thus solemnly declared his innocence, undoubtedly prevailed to a great extent among the Portuguese officials, and go far to account for the rapidity with which Portugal fell from the high place which she once held in the East. From time to time, however, she seemed to resume her ancient spirit, and showed how much she might still have been able to accomplish, had men of spirit and integrity, instead of mere court intriguers, been placed at the helm of affairs.

In 1570, when Luis de Ataida was viceroy, one of the most formidable combinations into which the native princes had ever entered, was triumphantly defeated. It was headed by the Deccan Kings of Ahmednagar and Bijapur, and a new Zamorin, who, undeterred by the fate of his predecessor, was bent on recovering all that had been wrested from him. Their common object was to expel the Portuguese from the country, but each had his own separate grievance; and hence, though the attack was simultaneous, it was made at three important stations—by the King of Ahmednagar, at Choul—by the Zamorin, at Chale, where a fort had been erected which overawed his capital at Calicut—and by the King of Bijapur, at Goa. The last, as in every respect the most memorable, is the only one to which it is necessary here to advert.

Ali Adil Shah, who was then sovereign of Bijapur, having assembled an army of 100,000 foot and 35,000 horse, 2,140 elephants and 350 pieces of cannon, suddenly descended from one of the passes of the Western Ghats into the Concan, and then, turning south, marched without opposition upon Goa. No preparations had been made for this formidable attack; and the governor, onmustering his European troops, found that they did not exceed 700. Besides these he had about 1,300 monks, whose zeal and fanaticism compensated in some degree for their want of discipline, and a considerable number of
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natives, on whom no great confidence could be placed. His great security was in his insular position, which, so long as he held the command at sea, made it impossible for the enemy to attempt an approach on any side but the one which lay nearest to the mainland. Against this side, accordingly, Ali Adil Shah directed all his efforts, and with such overpowering numbers and perseverance, that 5,000 men succeeded in passing over into the island. It was only a temporary success; for the Portuguese, aware that if they made good their footing the place must surrender, mustered all their strength, and by one great effort, in which the most heroic valour was displayed, cut their assailants to pieces, or drove them into the sea. Ali Adil Shah had no heart to renew the combat; and, after lingering for a short time, took his final departure. More than 12,000 of his troops had perished. The attacks of Choul and Chale were equally unsuccessful. New lustre was thus added to the Portuguese arms; and many who looked only at the surface imagined that their power had never been established on a firmer basis. Those who looked deeper could not but see that the whole fabric was undermined and threatening ruin.

It would be out of place here to examine in detail the various causes to which the overthrow of Portuguese supremacy in the East is attributable. A few, however, may be briefly mentioned. One of the most obvious is the comparative indifference of the Portuguese themselves. When they first doubled the Cape of Good Hope, India was the great goal for which they were striving, and all the exertions of which they were capable were exclusively devoted to it. By the discovery of Brazil a new interest was created, and gradually became the more absorbing because the more lucrative of the two. A small state like Portugal was unable to superintend the affairs of two mighty empires, situated at the opposite extremities of the globe; and experience seems to have proved that in giving the preference to the American continent she made the wiser choice. Both empires, indeed, are now lost to her; but in that of the West her own race of kings still sits enthroned.

Another cause of Portuguese decline in the East may be found in the state of European politics. In 1580, after the short and inglorious reign of Henry the Cardinal, Portugal lost her
national independence, and became subject to the bigoted and tyrannical rule of Philip II of Spain. She was thus obliged to follow in the wake of her more powerful neighbour, and see all her interests sacrificed in the prosecution of objects from which she could not possibly reap any advantage. While her domestic interests were sacrificed, it is not to be supposed that those of her colonies were duly attended to. In connection with the degrading bondage to which Portugal was thus reduced, we see a third cause of rapid decay in the hostility which Philip's arrogance provoked in other European states. The United Provinces of Holland, after throwing off his yoke, continued at open war with him, and saw no quarter in which they could so effectually resent the wrongs, and indemnify themselves for the losses they had suffered, as in the East. To the same quarter the eyes of the English had long been turned; and after they had triumphed gloriously over the Armada, which was to have enslaved them by a double yoke of the most intolerable description—the yoke of Spain and the yoke of Rome, all the friendly or prudential considerations which had prevented them from claiming a share in the Portuguese Indian monopoly ceased to have any weight, and their determination to establish an independent traffic in the East was openly avowed. Thus, at the very moment when Portugal was scarcely able to maintain her position, even had she been left alone to deal with native powers after her own fashion, she saw herself brought face to face with two most formidable competitors. To these we now turn.
H E N R Y VII of England had the reputation of being one of the most enlightened monarchs of his age, and in him, accordingly, Columbus hoped to find a patron at once able to appreciate his grand scheme of discovery, and disposed to advance the funds necessary for carrying it into effect. Unfortunately Henry, with all his talents, was of a penurious, avaricious temper, and remained so long in suspense between the advantages to be gained by the enterprise if it should succeed, and the pecuniary loss to which it would subject him if it should prove a failure, that he lost the opportunity, and only signified his intention to accept the services of the great Genoese navigator when it was no longer possible for him to obtain them. Before Bartolommeó Columbus could return to announce the success of his mission to England, the discovery of the New World had already been achieved, and his illustrious brother was prosecuting a second voyage.

The disappointment which Henry felt appears in the readiness with which he entered into a rival scheme of maritime discovery. A Venetian of the name of John Cabot, or Giovanni Caboto, had been settled for some time at Bristol, and to him and his three sons, Ludovico, Sebastiano, and Sanzio, the English monarch, on the 5th of March, 1496, granted a charter, empowering them, in the most unlimited terms, to make voyages of discovery in his name. There was no great liberality in the grant, for it cost him nothing; and while he refused to bear any part of the expense, he was niggardly enough to stipulate for a fifth of the whole profit. Simply for the privilege of sailing under the English flag, and becoming governors under the English crown of any lands which might be discovered, they
were to bear the whole loss, and in the event of profit allow another to share it with them. It gives a high idea of the spirit of maritime enterprise in England at this period, that even when subjected to such rigorous terms, a Venetian stranger, and his three sons, were able to fit out five vessels for an experimental voyage to the West.

As a mercantile speculation the voyage entirely failed; but by the discovery of Newfoundland and of the west coast of North America, a foundation was laid for the series of colonies or plantations which, under the united influences of freedom and commerce, have made the language and not a few of the most valued institutions of England triumphant in the western world. The accounts of the early proceedings of the Cabots are so indistinct, that it is difficult to say whether one or two voyages were made. If, as seems most probable, there were two, the latter, which took place in 1498, was commanded by Sebastian, whose fame as a navigator ultimately threw that of his father and brothers into the shade. At this time, however, the encouragement he received was so small, that he quitted the service of England for that of Spain, which showed the high sense entertained of his merits by giving him a seat in the council of the Indies.

About the same time when England was attempting, though with slow and faltering steps, to follow Columbus in his career of discovery, Portugal was not so entirely absorbed in the prosecution of discoveries in the direction of Africa as to be insensible to the vast changes which might be anticipated from the discovery of a western world. If, according to the idea then generally entertained by geographers, the northern extremity of America formed a rocky headland, with an open sea beyond it, then all the efforts which Portugal had made to discover a passage to India by the south-east must prove in a great measure abortive, because a much nearer passage would enable the maritime nations of Western Europe to secure all the advantages for which she had been striving. This was a danger too obvious and imminent to be overlooked; and therefore the Portuguese no sooner were acquainted with the discovery of the New World, than they determined on an exploratory voyage to the north-west, for the purpose of ascertaining whether such
a practicable passage existed, and if it did, of securing a monopoly of it on the ground of priority of discovery.

The only Portuguese navigators whose names figure in the voyages undertaken with this view, were a father and three sons, belonging to the illustrious house of Cortereal. Of the father, John Vaz Cortereal, scarcely anything is known, and hence, probably because fiction has been employed as a substitute for fact, it has been confidently maintained that he reached the shores of Newfoundland even before Columbus made his first voyage. The proceedings of his son Gaspar are better authenticated. In 1500, having been furnished by King Emanuel with two ships, he touched, first at Terceira, one of the Azores, and then sailed north-west, in the hope of finding an open ocean, by which he could penetrate directly to India. Having reached land in the parallel of 50°, he pursued his course northwards along the coast. Both from its position, and the description given of it, it must have formed part of Labrador, which, accordingly, in the earliest maps, bears not this name, but that of Corterealis. He advanced to latitude 60°, but being deterred by the rigour of the climate and floating mountains of ice from proceeding farther, he seized fifty-seven of the natives, and carried them off to Portugal, where, to his disgrace and that of his sovereign, they appear to have been employed as slaves. He arrived at Lisbon on the 8th of October, 1501, and immediately resolved on another voyage. Early in spring, having completed his preparations, he again set sail with his two vessels, and steered directly for the most northerly point he had previously reached. So far the voyage was prosperous; but immediately after, a violent storm, in a sea covered with icebergs, obliged the vessels to separate. That in which Gaspar sailed was never heard of.

As soon as tidings of the disaster reached Lisbon, a younger brother, of the name of Miguel, hastily fitted out three vessels, and set sail, with the double object of searching for the missing ship, and following up the course of discovery which Gaspar had began. On arriving at that arm of the Atlantic which branches off between the coasts of Greenland and Labrador, the vessels parted company, in order that each might explore a separate entrance. The expedient seemed judicious, but the
result proved disastrous. Only two of the vessels returned to Portugal: in the third Miguel appears to have met the same fate as Gaspar. A third brother, Vasco Eanes, inspired by the heroic spirit of his family, volunteered to head a new expedition; but the king, thinking that enough had already been sacrificed in enterprises the success of which seemed now more than problematical, refused his consent, and the Portuguese desisted from any further attempt to discover a north-west passage to India.

Shortly after the accession of Henry VIII to the throne of England an attempt was made to revive the spirit of maritime enterprise, which his father during the latter years of his life had allowed to languish, but other occupations more congenial to his taste, though less conducive to his honour, soon began to engross Henry’s attention, and during his long reign English maritime discovery presents an almost continuous blank. The only important exception is an expedition to the north-west in 1517. Sebastian Cabot had probably expected that Spain, to which he had transferred his services, would employ them in an endeavour to ascertain the practicability of a north-west passage. If this was his hope, it was disappointed; for the magnificent territories which Spain was acquiring in the more genial latitude of Mexico, and the immense wealth which had in consequence began to flow into her treasury, left her little inclination to prosecute a hazardous and doubtful enterprise in the frozen regions of the North. Cabot, however, having gained his earliest laurels in this field, was determined not to abandon it, and returned to England, where he had the satisfaction to learn that his services, again volunteered, were accepted. He was confident of success; and after entering Hudson’s Bay, considered himself on the fair way to Cataia, or China, to which, according to his own strong expression, he “both could and would have gone,” when the opposition of Sir Thomas Peart, under whom, a Vice-Admiral of England, he held only a subordinate command, and a failure of courage on the part of his crew, obliged him to return.

The failure of this expedition seemed to justify Henry in the apathy he had previously manifested, and ten additional years had passed away, when his attention was once more called to
the subject by an English merchant of the name of Robert Thorne, who, after a long residence at Seville, had finally settled in London. This gentleman, while in Spain, had formed a close connection with Sebastian Cabot, and become thoroughly imbued with his ideas as to the practicability of reaching the East Indies by some northern outlet from the Atlantic. Seeing how completely the subject had fallen into abeyance, he presented a memorial to the king, in which, after adverting to the natural desire which all princes have to extend their dominions, and which Henry himself had evinced by his recent expedition to France, he thus proceeds:

"Now I, considering this your noble courage and desire, and also perceiving that your grace may, at your pleasure, to your greater glory, by a godly meane, with little cost, peril, or labour to your grace, or any of your subjects, amplifie and inrich this your sayd realme, I know it is my bounden duety to manifest this secret unto your grace, which hitherto, as I suppose, hath beene hid; which is, that with a small number of ships there may be discovered divers new lands and kingdomes, in which without doubt your grace shall winne perpetual glory; and your subjects infinite profite."

The so-called "secret," thus announced rather more pompously than the comparatively trite ideas composing it seem to justify, was simply the possibility of reaching the East by a voyage northwards. The memorial accordingly thus continues:

"There is left one way to discover, which is into the Northe; for that of the foure partes of the worlde, three partes are discovered by other princes. For out of Spaine they have discovered all the Indies and Seas Occidentall, and out of Portingall all the Indies and Seas Orientall; so that by this part of the Orient and Occident they have encompassed the worlde."

The North being thus the only field of maritime discovery not foreclosed, the memorial, after adducing several pithy reasons why Henry should immediately occupy it, enters into an explanation of the different courses which vessels fitted out for discovery might take, and the results that might be anticipated. The first object, of course, is to pass the pole; but of this, though really the crowning difficulty, Mr. Thorne makes light, and then proceeds:
"If they will go toward the Orient, they shall enjoy the region of all the Tartarians that extend toward the mid-day, and from thence they may goe and proceed to the land of the Chinas, and from thence to the land of Cathaio Orientall, which is of all the maine land most Orientall that can be reckoned from our habitation. And if from thence they doe continue their navigation, following the coasts that returne toward the Occident, they shall fall in with Malaca, and so with all the Indies which we call Orientall, and following the way may returne hither by the Cape of Buona Speransa; and thus they shall compass the whole worlde. And if they will take their course after they be past the Pole toward the Occident, they shall goe to the backe side of the New found land, which of late was discovered by your grace's subjects, untill they come to the backe side and South Seas of the Indies Occidentall. And so continuing their voyage, they may returne through the Streight of Magellan to this countrey; and so they compass also the world by this way. And if they goe the thirde way, and after they be past the Pole, goe right toward the Pole Antartique, and then decline toward the lands and islands situated between the Tropikes and under the Equinoctiall, without doubt they shall find there the richest lands and islands of the world, of golde, precious stones, balmes, spices, and other things that we here esteeme most; which come out of strange countries, and may returne the same way." The conclusion is:—"By this it appeareth, your grace hath not onely a great advantage of the riches, but also your subjects shall not travell half of the way that other doe which go round about as aforesayd."

This memorial, though containing little that is new and much that is erroneous, seemed worthy of quotation, both because it gives a good account of the views entertained by the best geographers of the period, and because it appears to have had the effect of bestirring Henry to make a final effort of maritime discovery. As it led to no important results, and the accounts of it are scanty in the extreme, it is unnecessary to notice it further. In similar silence lies buried another expedition, undertaken, a few years after, at the expense, not of the crown, but of a wealthy inhabitant of London, who gave it an appearance so attractive that the youths of family and fortune were induced
to embark along with him. Neither he nor his associates were well qualified for the task which they had undertaken; and disaster followed disaster till famine reduced them to the dire necessity of cannibalism. They were preparing to cast lots for the next victim, when the capture of a French vessel furnished a small remnant with provisions and the means of regaining their native land.

On the accession of Edward VI, in 1547, an era more favourable to maritime enterprise was anticipated, and would doubtless have been realized had his life been prolonged. Sebastian Cabot, as ardent and sanguine as ever, had arrived; and the youthful monarch, smitten with kindred enthusiasm, had appointed him grand-pilot of England, with a liberal salary. Under the stimulus thus applied, a new scheme of discovery was soon arranged and zealously supported by London merchants, “men of great wisdom and gravity.” Robert Thorne, in the memorial above quoted, had pointed out three different directions in which experimental voyages might be made. Hitherto only one of them had been tried, but the results were most discouraging; and it was therefore resolved that the next voyage should change the direction, and endeavour to discover a passage to the Indies by the north-east.

The requisite funds, amounting to £6,000, were raised in shares of £25 each, apportioned among the members of a kind of joint-stock company formed for the purpose. With this sum three vessels were built, and fitted up in a style with which Sebastian Cabot, who was governor of the company, and undertook the management of its nautical affairs, was so well pleased as to declare that “the like was never in any realm seen used or known.” The chief command was given to Sir Hugh Willoughby, who sailed in the principal vessel. Under him, and in command of the second vessel, was Richard Chancellor. Besides a series of instructions drawn up by Cabot for the guidance of the officers and crew, the expedition was furnished by King Edward with a letter addressed to all “kings, princes, rulers, judges, and governors of the earth,” requesting them “to permit unto these our servants free passage by your regions and dominions, for they shall not touch anything of yours unwilling unto you,” and promising “by the God of all things that are contained in
heaven, earth, and the sea, and by the life and tranquillity of our kingdoms, that we will with like humanity accept your servants if at any time they shall come to our kingdoms." On the 10th May, 1553, the three vessels dropped down to Greenwich, where the court and a vast assemblage from all quarters witnessed their departure amid salvos of artillery and the shouting of the mariners, "in such sort that the sky rang with the noise thereof."

After leaving the river, the vessels were detained on the Essex coast till the 23rd, when, the winds becoming favourable, they began their course across the German Ocean. On the 14th of July they had reached lat. 68° among the islands of the Norway coast, and not long after came within sight of the North Cape. Their intention was to remain together; but in the event of their being obliged to part company, Wardhuys, in Finmark, was appointed as the port of rendezvous. The contingency thus provided for happened sooner than any had anticipated, and with very fatal results. Shortly after passing the cape, the weather became so stormy that the vessels were forced out to sea, and driven at the mercy of the winds. Willoughby, whose skill and caution seem not to have been equal to his courage, carried so much sail that Chancellor was unable to keep up with him, and never saw him more. His fate remained unknown till some Russian sailors discovered two tall vessels frozen in on the coast of Lapland. On entering them, they found the lifeless bodies of Willoughby and his companions. Along with the journal of the voyage was a note, showing, by its date, that the crews were alive in January, 1554. They had reached the coast of Nova Zembla without being able to land upon it, and then penetrated still deeper into the abysses of the Arctic Ocean. Convinced at last of their mistake, they retraced their steps, and in returning westward unfortunately missed the opening of the White Sea, within which they might have found a sheltered anchorage. On reaching the coast beyond, they had resolved to make it their winter-quarters, intending to prosecute their voyage in the ensuing spring. Before it arrived the intense cold had frozen them to death.

Chancellor was more fortunate. By keeping near the coast he had reached Wardhuys without much difficulty; and after
waiting seven days in the hope that the other vessels might arrive, continued his course "till he came at last to the place where he found no night at all, but a continued light and brightness of the sun, shining clearly upon the great and mighty sea." Ultimately he was carried into the White Sea, and anchored in the harbour of Archangel. On learning that it formed part of the vast dominions of the Czar of Muscovy, he determined on visiting his capital of Moscow; and by means of the letter which he carried from his sovereign, and his own address, obtained such a favourable reception from the reigning sovereign, Ivan Vasilovitsch, as enabled him to lay the foundation of the Muscovy or Russian Company on very advantageous terms. The important traffic secured by this company withdrew attention, for a time, from the north-east passage; and many were even so sanguine as to imagine that by this company alone it might be possible to establish an intercourse with India, by which the necessity of any other passage would be in a great measure superseded.

The plan was to make Archangel the starting point, and then, striking the Volga where it first becomes navigable, sail down into the Caspian, and thus form a communication with the ancient overland routes from the East. Journeys, with a view to the establishment of this communication, were actually undertaken, and several of the travellers employed penetrated far into the interior of Asia. The whole scheme, however, was a delusion. The Venetians, when in complete command of the overland traffic by much shorter and more convenient routes, had been driven from all the leading markets of Europe by the Portuguese. How, then, could the Russian Company hope to compete with them, when, in addition to the carriage paid by the Venetians, they were burdened with at least 2,000 miles of expensive transport, part of it over an ocean always dangerous, and during half the year rendered inaccessible by mountains of ice?

These considerations soon opened men's eyes to the hopelessness of establishing a profitable traffic with India by the way of the White Sea, and the exploration of the north-east and north-west passages was resumed more ardently than ever. The latter passage, indeed, continued to be explored long after the
impossibility of using it as an ocean thoroughfare to the East was universally recognized; and even in our own times, in the formidable task of exploring this passage, some of our most distinguished British navigators have earned their best laurels, and some of them, too, have unhappily perished. The north-east passage, which at one time seemed the more hopeful of the two, was sooner abandoned, but not before the utmost skill and hardihood both of British and Dutch seamen had been expended upon it in vain. Some of their attempts, considered as preliminary steps in the process which eventually brought them into direct collision with the Portuguese, are here entitled to at least a passing notice.

About the time when the Muscovy-Indian scheme proved abortive, some accurate knowledge was obtained of the great Asiatic rivers, the Obe and Yenisei, and Gerard Mercator, the celebrated cosmographer, when consulted on the subject, gave it as his opinion that at no great distance beyond the point which navigators had already reached, a great headland, then supposed to form the north-east extremity of Asia, would be found. This headland once passed, nothing more was necessary than to turn south, and steer directly for Japan and China. This was an enormous blunder, for it cut off, at one sweep, more than a fourth of the whole circumference of the globe; but it is only fair to Mercator to observe, that it was not so much his blunder as the common blunder of the time, for all his contemporaries shared it with him.

In accordance with Mercator's opinion, the great problem of a north-east passage to India now seemed on the eve of receiving a favourable solution. In 1580, two English vessels, under the command of Arthur Pet and Charles Jackman, sailed for Wardhuys, which they reached on the 23rd of June. A few days after, they continued their voyage eastward, and on approaching Nova Zembla narrowly escaped being embedded in a field of ice. After disentangling themselves by taking a very circuitous route, they proceeded along an open passage, and had the mortification to discover, that it formed a kind of cul de sac, from which they had no possible outlet except by retracing their steps. This accomplished, they had a most favourable mind, but found it impossible to avail themselves of it in
consequence of enormous icebergs which blocked up the course, leaving no space between, and along which they could not steer without risking almost certain destruction. Thus obstructed, and obliged, as they piously express it, to wait with patience, "abiding the Lord's leisure," they did not arrive at Vaigatz Straits till the middle of August. It was consequently too late to advance further eastward, and the expedition returned without having added one particle to the information previously possessed. The English, having found more necessary and hopeful employment in another quarter, desisted for many years from all further attempts to discover a north-east passage. The task, however, instead of being abandoned, was only transferred to new hands.

The United Provinces, after a long, arduous, and noble struggle, had achieved their independence, and rid themselves for ever of the galling yoke of Spain. Even while groaning under that yoke, the untiring industry of the population, and the narrow scope for exercising it in a country hemmed in on all sides, and constantly threatened by the sea, had turned their attention chiefly to commerce. On the broad expanse of the ocean they found their true thoroughfare, and gradually rose to a foremost place among the maritime nations of Europe. Their own consumption was not great, but their vessels were found in all seas acting as common carriers for other nations. In this way they had obtained a large share in the Indian trade, which had its emporium at Lisbon, to which the goods were brought from the East by the Portuguese, and from which they were afterwards diffused over Europe. At the very time when the Dutch secured, the Portuguese were deprived of their independence, Philip II of Spain having usurped the crown of Portugal, and incorporated its dominions with his own. Lisbon having, in consequence, fallen into the hands of their vindictive enemy, the Dutch were, in 1584, completely excluded from it. The injury thus inflicted on their trade was at first severely felt, but the only effect was to inspire them with a determination not to rest till they had succeeded in establishing a direct communication with the East. The route by the Cape of Good Hope was now well known; and as all the Portuguese possessions had fallen under the power of their declared enemy,
they could have no scruple in attacking them. In the first instance, however, they imitated the example of the English, and endeavoured to discover an independent route by the north-east.

The first expedition, undertaken by a private company, with the sanction but without any direct assistance from the States, consisted of four vessels, under the command of William Barentz. They sailed from the Texel on the 5th of June, 1594, and on approaching Nova Zembla separated, two of the vessels taking the old route toward Vaigatz Straits, while the other two, under the command of Barentz, adopted the bolder course of sailing northwards, with the view of keeping clear of the masses of ice which clustered round the island. Barentz does not seem to have justified his high reputation as a seaman. By the 1st of August he had not advanced beyond the north extremity of Nova Zembla, in lat. 77°, and then deterred by the violence of the wind and the large masses of floating ice, prematurely determined to return. The other detachment was more persevering. After working their way through Vaigatz Straits, and succeeding, with much difficulty, in sailing round some immense icebergs which had threatened to bar their future progress, the two vessels arrived at a blue open sea, and saw the coast trending rapidly southwards. It was only the Gulf of Obe; but, led astray by Mercator's blunder, they believed that they had doubled the north extremity of Asia, and consequently discovered the passage of which they were in search. It might have been expected, that instead of resting satisfied with this conviction they would have endeavoured to make assurance doubly sure, and prevented the possibility of mistake by advancing some hundred leagues into the sea, which, if their opinion had been correct, would have carried them directly to Japan. Instead of this they immediately retraced their steps, and having again joined Barentz on the coast of Russian Lapland, arrived in the Texel on the 10th of September.

The tidings which they brought diffused universal joy; and the States-general, no longer satisfied with giving a bare sanction, took the lead, in 1595, in fitting out a new expedition on a more extensive scale. It consisted of six vessels, intended not
merely to explore, but to commence the traffic which, according to the general belief, was about to be permanently established, and pour the wealth of the East into the ports of Holland. Such being the expectation, the arrangements were adapted to it; and the vessels, instead of being constructed as before to bear the rude shocks of the polar ice, were framed in the manner best adapted for the rich cargoes of merchandise with which they were laden. The very idea of such an expedition had originated in a gross error; but, as if this had not been sufficient, the period of sailing was protracted to the 2nd of June, when nearly two months of the season most favourable for a northern voyage were already past. The vessels never got farther than the eastern entrance of the Straits of Vaigatz. When they reached it, they were met by immense bodies of floating ice, against which they struggled manfully till the end of September. Then at last the conviction forced itself upon them that they were labouring in vain, and that nothing more remained than to turn their face homewards.

Not one of the results so confidently anticipated had been obtained. In proportion to the extravagance of the expectation was the bitterness of the disappointment. The States-general at once disconnected themselves with the project, and deemed it sufficient to hold out a pecuniary reward to any individual or association who should first succeed in effecting the passage which they had themselves attempted in vain. The town of Amsterdam at once took up the gauntlet which the government had thus in a manner thrown down; and wisely, in the meantime, renouncing all idea of traffic, fitted out two vessels solely for exploration. The command of the one was given to William Barentz, whose previous voyage had already been mentioned; and of the other to John Corneliz Ryp. As some security against that longing for home, under the influence of which the previous expeditions were supposed to have returned prematurely, all the individuals belonging to the expedition were unmarried.

The vessels sailed on the 10th of May, 1596; and, in order to avoid the dangers of the coast, sailed nearly due north. Currents and easterly winds carried them so far west that they came in sight of the Shetland Isles on the 22nd. Here the commanders, who appear to have had equal powers, differed
in opinion. Barentz wished to tack about, and steer due east; while Ryp, who argued that in this way they would only become entangled, like previous expeditions, among the floating icebergs of the Vaigatz Straits, insisted on sailing N.N.E. His opinion prevailed. They were soon in the depths of the Arctic Ocean, and after a dangerous and dreary navigation, constantly obstructed by fields of ice, reached the coast of Spitzbergen, in lat. 80°. They now changed their course, and, sailing south, arrived at Bear Island, which they had previously passed. Here the captains again differed in opinion; and, as on this occasion neither would yield, the vessels parted company. Ryp proceeded north, with the view of following the east coast of Spitzbergen, and was ultimately obliged to retrace his steps without doing anything which his contemporaries deemed worthy of being recorded. Barentz sailed E.S.E., and met with a series of adventures which, though they form a most interesting narrative, would here be out of place, as they throw no new light on the attempted north-east passage to India. Suffice it to say, that, after wintering on the shore of Nova Zembla, he was obliged, in the June of the following year, to leave his ship embedded in the ice, and set out, with the survivors of his crew, to make the voyage homewards in two small boats. Anxiety, fatigue, and the severities of the climate had destroyed his health, and he died by the way. His companions, after enduring almost unparalleled hardships, reached Kola, where, to their astonishment and delight, they found the other vessel from which they had been so long parted, and proceeded in it to Amsterdam.

The existence of a north-east passage was now virtually disproved; and though subsequent explorations took place, particularly by the celebrated navigator, Henry Hudson, who was employed for this purpose on one occasion by the English, and on another by the Dutch, it is unnecessary to trace them. All reasonable men were now satisfied that no north-east passage to India, practically available for the ordinary purposes of commerce, existed; and the only choice now remaining was between the old beaten track of the Portuguese by the Cape of Good Hope, and a south-west passage by the southern extremity of the American continent. Of the latter passage a brief account must now be given.
The practicability of a south-west passage to the East was proved at a comparatively early period. Fernando de Magellan, or more properly Magalhaens, a native of Portugal, after serving five years in the East under Albuquerque, and distinguishing himself at the taking of Malacca, being dissatisfied with the niggardly manner in which his services had been rewarded, made an offer of them to the Emperor Charles V. They were accepted; and he immediately presented the project of a voyage, by which he proposed to reach the East Indies by sailing south-west. The great object of attraction in that quarter was the Moluccas, which grew the finest spices. These were then in such high and general request, that there was no branch of the Portuguese trade of which a share was more eagerly coveted. There was one great obstacle in the way. The Pope had divided the world into two halves. How could Charles, as a professed champion of the church, appropriate any portion of the half which his holiness had given to the Portuguese? The true way of loosing the knot was to cut it, and to maintain that, in this instance, as in many others, the Pope had ignorantly and arrogantly made free with a property which did not belong to him. The time for such a solution of the difficulty was rapidly approaching, but it had not yet arrived; and Magalhaens undertook to rid Charles of his scruples by proving that the Moluccas were not in the Portuguese but in the Spanish half. He was wrong in fact, but correct according to the idea then entertained of the dimensions of the globe. It is probable, however, that the emperor was not difficult to satisfy, as he afterwards showed, on many occasions, how easily he could dispose of Papal claims when they interfered with any of his favourite political objects. Be this as it may, Magalhaens obtained his wish.

On the 20th of September, 1519, he sailed from Sanlucar in command of five ships and 236 men. On the 12th of January, 1520, he reached the mouth of the La Plata, where he was detained for some time by a mutiny of his men, who deemed it degradation to obey one whom they stigmatized as a renegade Portuguese. By prudence and resolution he regained his ascendancy; and towards the end of October began to enter the strait which has since borne his name. On the 27th of November he
obtained his first view of the Pacific, and, steering directly across it, missed all the islands by which it is studded, and again saw land for the first time on the 6th of March, 1521, when he came in view of the islands which, from the thievish practices of the inhabitants, were named the Ladrones. Continuing onwards, he arrived at the archipelago of St. Lazarus, afterwards called the Philippines, in honour of Philip II. While here, he induced the chief of the island of Zebu to make a profession of Christianity, and become tributary to the King of Spain, on condition of being assisted in his war with the chief of the island of Matan. In fulfilling this condition, Magalhaens unfortunately lost his life on the 26th of April, 1521. The circumnavigation which he had so far successfully accomplished, was completed by Sebastian del Cano, who succeeded him in the command, and arrived at Sanlucar on the 22nd of September, 1522, by doubling the Cape of Good Hope from the eastward.

Magalhaens' voyage gave proof of two important facts—first, that there was no physical impossibility of reaching the East Indies by sailing west; and, secondly, that, under ordinary circumstances, this route never could become the ocean thoroughfare from Europe. It might be used for special purposes, but being far more circuitous, was also necessarily both more tedious and more expensive. Further notice of it would hence be unnecessary, were it not that an adventitious interest has been given to it as the route which first led the British to the East, and furnished the information which determined them not to rest satisfied till they had obtained a direct share in its traffic. Two of the voyages are, on this account, well entitled to special mention—the one by Sir Francis Drake, and the other by Mr. Thomas Cavendish.

After the accession of Queen Elizabeth, in 1558, and the decided refusal of her hand when impertinently asked by Philip II, the friendly relations between England and Spain were entirely at an end; and though hostilities were not openly declared, it was perfectly understood that, at least on the part of Spain, they were only delayed in order that the preparations for carrying them on with effect might be rendered more complete. It is not surprising that, under these circumstances,
frequent renencounters took place; and the natives of either country, whenever favourable opportunities occurred, made no scruples of treating those of the other as open enemies. In this kind of irregular, predatory warfare, Francis Drake, who, originally of obscure parentage from the vicinity of Tavistock, in Devonshire, had won a high name for valour and seamanship, particularly distinguished himself: He had made two successful cruises against the Spaniards, and acquired so much wealth that he was able, in 1577, to fit out a fleet of five small vessels, with an aggregate crew of 164 men. The largest vessel, commanded by himself, did not exceed 100 tons; the smallest was only 15 tons. With these he set sail from Plymouth on the 13th of December, 1577, and steered directly across the Atlantic. On the 20th of August, 1578, he arrived in the Straits of Magalhaens, passed them, and then continued his course northwards along the west coast of America till he had reached 48° N latitude. He had probably proceeded thus far in the hope of discovering some opening by which he might again pass into the Atlantic. Disappointed in this expectation, he retraced his steps for about 10°, and then, with the only vessel now remaining of his original five, shot boldly across the Pacific. On the 29th of September, 1579, he came in sight of the Moluccas. On the 4th of November he cast anchor at Ternate. He afterwards wound his way westward among the islands of the Indian Archipelago, doubled the Cape of Good Hope, and, on the 26th of September, 1580, cast anchor again in the harbour of Plymouth.

It is presumed, that when Drake set out he had an understanding with the government, but it was not deemed politic to acknowledge it. His proceedings, as war had not been declared, were certainly of a piratical character; and when the Spanish court complained of them, it was easier to disavow his authority than to apologize for his conduct. The nation, however, was so much elated by his achievements, and the determination to profit by the information which he had brought home was so unanimous, that Queen Elizabeth, after standing aloof for some time, threw aside all reserve, publicly visited him on board his ship at Deptford, and attested her approbation of his conduct by conferring upon him the honour of knighthood.
A few years later, Sir Francis Drake again awakened the public mind to the importance of the trade with India by the capture of a Portuguese carrack, whose cargo of almost fabulous value inflamed the imagination, while its papers and journals furnished most important information as to the means by which a direct trade with India might be most easily established, and most successfully carried on.

In 1586, about two years before Drake had made this capture, Mr. Thomas Cavendish commenced the other voyage by the Straits of Magalhaens above referred to. His fleet of three ships, fitted out at his own expense, was manned by 126 officers and sailors, several of whom had accompanied Drake when he circumnavigated the globe. The expedition sailed on the 21st of July; and, following the course which Drake had taken, proceeded through the Straits of Magalhaens, skirted the west coast of America, making many rich captures, and committing much unjustifiable devastation; and then steered across the Pacific for the Ladrones, which were reached on the 3rd of January, 1587. The future course of the voyage is thus summed up by Cavendish himself. In a letter to Lord Hunsdon, lord-chamberlain, dated 9th September, 1588, he says,—

"I am humbly to desire your honour to make knowen unto her majesty the desire I have had to doe her majesty service in the performance of this voyage. And as it hath pleased God to give her the victory over part of her enemies, so I trust yer long to see her overthrove them all. For the places of their wealth, whereby they have maintained and made their warres, are now perfectly discovered; and if it please her majesty, with a very smal power she may take the spoile of them all. It hath pleased the Almighty to suffer me to circompasse the whole globe of the worlde, entering in at the Streight of Magellan, and returning by the Cape of Buena Esperanca. In which voyage I have either discovered or brought certain intelligence of all the rich places of the world that ever were knowen or discovered by any Christian. I navigated amongst the coast of Chili, Peru, and Nueva Espanna, where I made great spoiles; I burnt and sunk nineteen sails of ships, small and great. All the villages and townes that ever I landed at I burnt and spoiled; and had I not bene discovered upon the coast I had taken great quantitie of treasure."
The matter of most profit unto me was a great ship of the king's which I took at California, which ship came from the Philippinas, being one of the richest of merchandise that ever passed those seas; as the king's register and merchants' accounts did shew; for it did amount in value to—in Mexico to be solde. Which goods (for that my ships were not able to conteine the least part of them) I was inforced to set on fire. From the Cape of California, being the uttermost part of all Nueva Espanna, I navigated to the islands of the Philippinas, hard upon the coast of China; of which country I have brought such intelligence as hath not been heard of in these parts. The statelyness and riches of which countrey I feare to make report of, least I should not be credited: for if I had not known sufficiently the incomparable wealth of that countrey, I should have bene as incredulous thereof as others will be that have not had the like experience. I sailed along the island of the Malucos, where among some of the heathen people I was well intreated, where our countrey men may have trade as freely as the Portugals if they will themselves. From thence I passed by the Cape of Buena Esperanca, and found out by the way homeward the island of St. Helena, where the Portugals use to relieve themselves; and from that island God hath suffered me to return into England. All which services, with myself, I humbly prostrate at her majestie's feet, desiring the Almighty long to continue her reigne among us; for at this day she is the most famous and victorious prince that liveth in the world." In returning homewards, the Cape of Good Hope was doubled on the 16th of March, 1588; and Plymouth harbour was reached, after a prosperous voyage, on the 9th of September.

While the information thus flowing in from successful navigators was paving the way for the establishment of direct traffic with the East Indies, other incidents were contributing powerfully to the same end. Notice has been repeatedly taken of the important Indian trade which had been carried on, almost from time immemorial, by the way of the Levant. For many centuries the English had been contented to receive their supplies of Indian produce at second hand from some one or other of the Italian maritime cities; but latterly, particularly after the accession of Queen Elizabeth, they had agents of their
own in the different ports of the Levant, and thus procured the means of carrying on an active and lucrative trade in their own vessels. When this trade had acquired such extent and consistency as to entitle it to be regarded as a national interest, the queen entered into a commercial treaty with Turkey, securing for her subjects all the advantages which other nations enjoyed; and immediately thereafter, in 1581, granted a charter of exclusive privileges to a mercantile association which assumed the name of the Levant Company. This company, not satisfied with confining its connections to the ports of the Levant, extended them far into the interior, and sent out many agents, whose journals and travels furnished, from time to time, valuable information with regard to Indian traffic.

It has sometimes been alleged that the immediate occasion of the formation of the Levant Company, was the loss of a vessel laden with Indian produce on the Goodwin Sands. The argosy which is referred to, and is thought to have derived the name, common to all vessels of its class, from the town of Ragusa, in Dalmatia, belonged to the Venetians, and sufficed to carry, at a single voyage, as much Indian produce as supplied the demand of the kingdom of England for a whole year. The wreck of this vessel proved so disastrous, that the Venetians ceased thenceforth to pay their annual visit. The English, thus cut off from the supply on which they had been accustomed to depend, had no alternative but to send for the goods which they could not otherwise obtain; and hence the formation of the Levant Company. Such is the theory propounded; and, in accordance with it, it is added that the same circumstance which led to the formation of the Levant Company, suggested to Shakespeare the idea of the Merchant of Venice.

The loss of an argosy on the Goodwin Sands, about ten years before the date usually assigned to the first representation of Shakespeare's immortal play, is a well-authenticated fact; and he speaks with all the truth of history when he says (act ii. scene 8):

"I reasoned with a Frenchman yesterday,
Who told me, in the narrow seas that part
The French and English, there miscarried
A vessel of our country, richly fraught."
And again (act iii. scene 1):

"The Goodwins, I think they call the place; a very dangerous flat."

Unfortunately, however, for the theory, it is impossible to connect the loss of the argosy with the foundation of the Levant Company without committing a palpable anachronism. The charter of the company was granted in 1581; the argosy was not lost till 1587. If the Venetians sent no more argosies after this date, the fact was probably owing, not to any horror of "the narrow seas that part the French and English," for they were well inured to brave far greater dangers, but to their inability to derive any profit from a traffic which could never have been very lucrative after the Portuguese had fairly entered the European market, and in which they had recently been brought into competition with a native company powerful in itself, and enjoying the special favour of the crown. The retirement of the Venetians was only one of the signs from which a sagacious merchant might have inferred that the Indian trade had deserted its ancient channels, and that England had become too well acquainted with its nature, and too much alive to its importance, to allow it to be any longer monopolized by Spaniards and Portuguese claiming the monopoly on the ground, not so much of priority of discovery, as of a brutum fulmen issued by the execrable Pope, Alexander VI.

Queen Elizabeth had early struck at the root of all claims to monopolize the navigation of the ocean by declaring, in answer to the complaints of the Spanish ambassador against the English for navigating the Indian seas, "that the ocean was free to all, forasmuch, as neither nature nor regard of public use do permit the exclusive possession thereof;" and again, "that as to Drake sailing on the Indian seas, it was as lawful for her subjects to do so as for the Spaniards; since the sea and air are common to all men." This latter declaration was made in 1580; and evidence was soon given that, instead of being maintained merely as an abstract principle, the justice of which could not be disputed, it was henceforth to be carried into practical operation. In the third volume of Hackluyt, pp. 754-757, there is a paper dated 9th April, 1582, and entitled, "Instructions given by the right honourable the Lordes of the Counsell to Mr. Edward Fenton, Esquire, for the order to be
observed in the voyage recommended to him for the East Indies and Cathay."

It appears from these "Instructions," which are twenty-four in number, that the direct, and, indeed, the exclusive route, intended for this voyage to "the East Indies and Cathay," was by the Cape of Good Hope. The ninth Instruction is as follows:—

"You shall use all diligence possible to depart from Southampton with your sayd ships and vessels before the last of this present moneth of Aprill, and so goe on your course by Cape de Buena Esperanca, not passing by the Streight of Magellan either going or returning, except upon great occasion incident that shall bee thought otherwise good to you, by the advise and consent of your sayd assistants, or foure of them at the least." The tenth Instruction, following out the same route, says, "You shall not passe to the northeastward of the 40 degree of latitude at the most, but shall take your right course to the isles of the Mulucos, for the better discovery of the north-west passage, if without hinderance of your trade; and within the same degree you can get any knowledge touching that passage, whereof you shall do wel to be inquisitive, as occasion in this sort may serve."

It does not exactly appear to what extent government had furnished the means of this voyage, but the language employed clearly implies that the lords of council possessed the entire control over it. Thus, at the very outset, they say (Instructions 1, 2, 3):—

"First, you shall enter as captaine-generall into the charge and government of these shippes, the Beare gallion, the Edward Bonaventure, the barke Francis, and the small frigate, or pinnesse. Item, you shall appoint, for the furnishing of the vessels, in the whole to the number of 200 able persons,acompting in that number the gentlemen and their men, the ministers, chirurgians, factors, &c., which sayd number is no way to be exceeded, whereof as many as may be to be sea-men; and shall distribute them into every vessels, as by advise here before your going shall be thought meete. Item, for the more and better circumspect execution, and determination in any weightie causes incident in this voyage, we will that you shall take unto you or assistants, Captaine Hawkins, Captaine Ward," and six other
persons named, "with whom you shall consult and confer in all causes, matters, and actions of importance, not provided for in these Instructions, touching this service now in hand. And in all such matters so handled, argued, and debated, we thinke that convenyent always to be executed which you shall think meetest, with the assent also of any four of them, the matter having bene debated and so assented unto in the presence of your said assistants."

The sixth Instruction proceeds in the same peremptory style:—

"Item, you shall not remoove Captaine William Hawkins, your lieutenant; Master-captaine Luke Ward, your vice-admiral, or captaine of the Edward Bonaventure; nor Captaine Carlile from his charge by land, whom we will not to refuse any such service as shall be appointed to him by the generall and the councill; nor any captaine of other vessels from these charges, but upon just cause duly prooved, and by consent of your assistants, or of four of them at the least."

From the appointment of a military officer, of course having soldiers under him, and in regard to whom it is added (Instruction 23), "in all occasions and enterprises that may fall out to bee upon the lande, wee will that Captaine Carlile shall have the generall and chief charge thereof," it might be supposed that the government had undertaken the entire responsibility of the expedition. This impression is strengthened by Instruction 24, which shows that chaplains had been appointed by public authority. With reference to them, it is said:—

"And to the end God may blesse this voyage with happie and prosperous successe; you shall have an especiall care to see that reverence and respect bee had to the ministers appointed to accompanie you in this voyage as appertaineth to their place and calling; and to see such good order as by them shall be set downe for reformation of life and manners duly obeyed and performed, by causing the transgressours and contemners of the same to be severely punished; and the ministers to remove sometime from one vessell to another."

It is plain, however, from other Instructions, that the expedition partook of the character of a mercantile adventure. Thus it is said (Instruction 8):—

"You shall make a just and true inventorie, in every ship and vessell appointed for this voyage, of all the tackle, munition, and
furniture belonging to them, at their setting forth hence, and of all the provisions whatsoever; and one copy thereof under your hand, and under the hands of your vice-admirall and lieutenant, to be delivered to the Earle of Leicester, and the other to the governour of the companie for them, before your departure hence; and the like to be done at your returne home of all things then remaining in the sayd ships and vessels, with a true certificate how and by what means any parcel of the same shall have bene spent or lost."

The mercantile character is still more fully brought out both by incidental mention of merchants and factors in various passages, and particularly in the following Instructions, in which equity, sound policy, and worldly prudence are so happily combined, that they seem not unworthy of being quoted entire:—

"12. Item, we do straightly enjoin you, and consequently all the rest employed in this voyage in any wise, and as you and they will answer the contrary at your coming home by the lawes of this realme, that neither going, tarrying abroad, nor returning, you doe spoyle or take anything from any of the queen's majestie's friends or allies, or any Christians, without paying justly for the same; nor that you use any manner of violence or force against any such, except in your owne defence, if you shall be set upon, or otherwise be forced for your owne safeguard to do it.

"13. Item, wee will that you deale altogether in this voyage like good and honest merchants, trafficking and exchanging ware for ware, with all courtesie, to the nations you shall deale with, as well Ethniks as others; and for that cause you shall instruct all those that shall goe with you, that whencesoever you, or any of you, shall happen to come in any place to conference with the people of those parts, that in all your doings and theirs, you and they so behave yourselves towards the sayd people as may rather procure their friendship and good liking toward you by courtesie than to turne them to offence or misliking; and especially you shall have great care of the performance of your word and promise to them.

"14. Item, wee will, that by the advise of your assistants, in places where you and they shall thinke most fit, you settl, if
you can, a beginning of a further trade to be had hereafter; and from such places doe bring over with you some fewe men and women if you may; and do also leave some one or two, or more, as to you and your assistants shall seem convenient, of our nation with them for pledges, and to learn the tongue and secrets of the countreys, having diligent care, that, in delivering and taking of hostages, you deliver not personages of more value then you receive, but rather deliver meane persons under colour of men of value, as the infidels do for the most part use. Provided that you stay not longer to make continuance of further trade, then shall be expedient for good exchange of the wares presently carried with you.

"15. Item, you shall have care, and give generall warning, that no person, of what calling soever hee be, shall take up or keepe to himself or his private use, any stone, pearle, golde, silver, or other matter of commoditie to be had or found in places where you shall come; but he, the said person, so seased of such stone, pearle, golde, silver, or other matter of commoditie, shall with all, speede, or so soone as he can, detect the same, and make deliverie thereof to your selfe, or your vice-admirall, or lieutenant, and the factor appointed for this voyage, upon paine of forfeiture of all the recompense he is to have for his service in this voyage by share or otherwise; and further, to receive such punishment as to you and your assistants, or the more part of them, shall seeme good, and otherwise to be punished here at his returne, if according to the qualitie of his offence it shall be thought needful.

"16. Item, if the captaines, merchants, or any other, shall have any apparell, jewels, chaines, armour, or any other thing whatsoever, which may be desired in countreys where they shall traffique, that it shall not be lawful for them, or any of them, to traffique or sell any thing thereof for their private accompt; but the same shall be prized by the most part of those that shall be in commission in the places where the same may be so required, rated at such value as it may bee reasonably worth in England; and then solde to the profite of the whole voyage, and to goe as in adventure for those to whom it doeth appertaine."

This voyage, as the first in which a direct attempt was made by any European power to break up the Portuguese monopoly
of navigation by the Cape of Good Hope, naturally excites a deep interest; and hence even the instructions to its commander, from the insight they give into the motives with which the voyage was undertaken, deserve all the space which has above been allotted to them. The voyage itself ought, of course, to have been still more interesting; but unfortunately the account of it written by Luke Ward, the vice-admiral, is meagre in the extreme, and does little more than establish the fact that it proved a complete failure. The good sense apparent in drawing up the instructions does not appear to have been employed in making the appointments; and the expedition had not proceeded far on its way when Fenton, who commanded it, appears to have betrayed, if not incompetency, at least indecision.

The four vessels, consisting of the Beare, which changed its name to the Leicester, the Edward Bonaventure, the Francis, and the Elizabeth, sailed on the 1st of May, but spent a whole month before they finally quitted the English coast, and launched out to sea. In the beginning of August, they reached the coast of Guinea; and then the commander, instead of deciding on his own responsibility as to the propriety of taking in water, deemed it necessary to summon a formal meeting of his assistants, or council, and submit two points for decision—first, whether they ought to water at all; and, secondly, assuming this was resolved upon, at what place? These points, it seems, occasioned long debates; and while all unanimously approved of watering, only a majority agreed in thinking that it ought to be at Sierra Leone. They accordingly proceeded for this locality, but had gone so far out of their reckoning that they were several days in finding it; and the council was again summoned to decide, after long debate, in what direction they ought to steer.

After leaving Sierra Leone, they appear to have acted as if they had thrown their instructions overboard; for they are afterwards found far south, on the coast of Brazil, not considering, in terms of their instructions, how they might best double the Cape of Good Hope, but debating on the expediency or inexpediency of passing the Straits of Magalhaens, though this was the direction which they had been expressly forbidden to take. It seems, however, that they would have taken it, had they not feared an encounter with the Spaniards.
On this ground alone they abandoned the idea of prosecuting their voyage, and had determined to retrace their steps, when the vessels were obliged to part company. The Bonaventure was the only one which reached England; and this it did by sailing northwards to St. Vincent, and then across the Atlantic. The blundering manner in which the expedition had been conducted, may perhaps explain the silence which has been kept respecting it; and yet it undoubtedly entitles England to claim the high honour of having been the first European state which entered into competition with the Portuguese on their peculiar line of traffic, and sent a regular expedition for the purpose of trading with the East by the way of the Cape of Good Hope. The failure of the expedition was not owing to its projectors; and, however much it is to be lamented, cannot derogate from their merit in having both devised the expedition, and liberally furnished it with everything deemed necessary to insure its success.

Nine years passed away before any expedition intended to reach the East by the Cape quitted the shores of England. This apparent supineness, however, must be imputed, not to indifference to the object or despair of being able to accomplish it, but to political causes. Philip II of Spain was engaged in fitting out his boasted Armada, and Queen Elizabeth, in her heroic efforts to defeat him, could not spare a single seaman; but no sooner was the battle of national independence fought and won, than the determination to establish a trade in the East was resumed. Accordingly, in October, 1589, the very year after the invincible Armada was discomfited, a body of English merchants presented a memorial to the lords in council, in which, after a rapid survey of the Portuguese settlements in the East, for the purpose of showing that, in the countries bordering on the Indian and China seas, there were many ports in which a trade in English manufactures and Eastern produce might be advantageously established, they prayed for permission to fit out three ships and three pinnaces to be employed in this trade, with the queen's license and protection, and subject to no other condition than the payment of the usual customs on their return.

Before presenting this petition, the memorialists had felt so confident of success that they had actually obtained, or at least
bargained for, possession of the vessels which they meant to employ: these are hence mentioned in the memorial by their names as the Royal Merchant, the Susan, and the Edward Bonaventure. These names are of some consequence, as, in the absence of any direct information as to the answer given to the memorial by the lords of council, we are enabled to infer that it was favourable from the fact that, in April, 1591, less than eighteen months from the date of the application, three ships, of which two were the same as those named, sailed on this very voyage.

As in the former case the accounts are very imperfect, and do little more than prove that a second failure, though not so complete as before, was experienced. The leading ship, the Penelope, was commanded by George Raymond, the Royal Merchant by Abraham Kendal, and the Edward Bonaventure by James Lancaster. They sailed from Plymouth on the 10th of April, reached the Canaries by the 25th, were off Cape Blanco on the 2nd of May, passed the tropic of Cancer on the 5th, and continued with a fair wind at north-east till the 13th, when they were within 8° of the equator. Here they encountered a gale which obliged them to lie off and on in the sea till the 6th of June, when they passed the line. They had previously captured a Portuguese caravel, bound from Lisbon to Brazil, and loaded chiefly with wine, oil, olives, and divers necessaries. These last are said to have proved better to them than gold, as many of the crew had previously fallen sick.

An E.S.E. wind prevailing, carried them far west till within 100 leagues of the coast of Brazil. They had reached 26° south latitude, when the wind, veering round to the north, enabled them to steer for the Cape of Good Hope, which they saw for the first time on the 28th of July. Being prevented by contrary winds from doubling it, they cast anchor on the 1st of August in Saldanha Bay. Here, as the number of hands had been reduced by death, and many, from having been attacked with scurvy, had become inefficient, it was deemed expedient to send back the Royal Merchant with the sick, and continue the voyage only with the Penelope and the Edward. On reaching Cape Corrientes, on the east coast of Africa, near the tropic of Capricorn, a hurricane arose, during which the vessels parted company. The Penelope was never afterwards heard of; but Lancaster, who continues the account, persevered in the voyage. After coasting
northward, and losing a large part of his crew by an attack of the Murs, who came suddenly upon them while procuring water, they sailed directly for Cape Comorin, where they meant to cruise with a view to intercept and capture the richly laden vessels from the Indian peninsula, Ceylon, Malacca, the Moluccas, and Japan. The south-west monsoon having set in, they found great difficulty in doubling the Cape, but at length succeeded in May, 1592. Six days after, they arrived at the Nicobar Islands; and then, after plying off and on the coast of Sumatra, proceeded to the coast of Malacca, where they determined to pass what Lancaster calls the winter, meaning thereby the rainy season. They were now reduced to thirty-three persons in all; but, towards the end of August, having espied three vessels, each of about seventy tons, they were bold enough to attack and capture the whole of them. Two of them they released because they were the property of merchants in Pegu; but the third, which they understood to belong "to certain Portuguese Jesuits, and a biscuit-baker of the same nation," was considered lawful prize. Its cargo of pepper was transferred to the Edward.

They next sailed for the Straits of Malacca, still bent on privateering, and made two important captures, the one a Portuguese ship of 250 tons, laden with rice from Negapatam to Malacca, and the other a Malacca ship of 700 tons, that came from Goa. The latter carried fifteen brass cannon, and had on board 300 men, women, and children, but made scarcely any defence against Lancaster's mere handful. She was laden chiefly with wine and European goods, but had no treasure; and thus proving not so rich a prize as was anticipated, was sent adrift after the choicest goods had been taken out. The alarm of their presence being now spread, they deemed it dangerous to remain longer in this locality, and returned to the Nicobar Islands.

On the 21st of November they departed for the island of Ceylon, and, anchoring at the Point de Galle, waited in the hope of intercepting the Portuguese fleets from Bengal, Pegu, and Tenasserim. Owing, doubtless, to the irregular and predatory life which the crew had for some time been leading, a mutinous spirit began to appear; and advantage was taken of
Lancaster's sickness to announce their determination that they would stay no longer, but take their direct course for England. There was no means of preventing them from doing as they pleased; and the vessel having weighed anchor, set sail homewards, returning as it had come by the Cape of Good Hope. Here the weather was so stormy that four weeks were spent in doubling the Cape. In April they arrived at St. Helena. On leaving it they were carried westward to the coast of Brazil, and kept wandering for a time under great hardships, first in the Gulf of Paria, and afterward among the West India Islands. The crew, having thrown off all subordination, did as they pleased. At last, on the 15th of November, 1593, while the captain and sixteen of the crew were ashore searching for provisions, the carpenter cut the ship's cable, and she drifted away with only five men and a boy in her. Lancaster and his people separated into parties, as the only means of obtaining even a scanty sustenance. Ultimately, he and six others got off in a French vessel, which took them to St. Domingo. Here, leaving the rest to follow, he embarked with his lieutenant in another French vessel for Dieppe. Having reached it in safety, he crossed over to Rye, where he landed, 24th May, 1594. He had been absent three years and six weeks.

The Dutch, though they did not attempt the passage by the Cape of Good Hope so early as the English, appear to have been more careful in preparing for it, and were accordingly rewarded with more abundant success. Their first voyage, undertaken by a number of merchants, who had assumed the name of the Company for Distant Countries, sailed from the Texel on the 2nd of April, 1595. The expedition consisted of four vessels—the *Maurice*, of 400 tons, carrying twenty cannon and eighty-four men; the *Holland*, nearly of the same size and strength as the *Maurice*; the *Amsterdam*, of about 200 tons, carrying sixteen cannon and fifty-nine men; and a pinnace, of about 30 tons, carrying eight cannon and twenty men. The command of the vessels was given to captains of high naval reputation; but the general commercial superintendence was intrusted to Cornelius Houtmann, at whose suggestion, and on whose information, the voyage is said to have been undertaken. He had spent some time in Lisbon acquainting himself with the nature
of the Portuguese traffic to the East; and, in the course of his inquiries, had incurred the suspicion of the Portuguese government, who imposed a heavy fine upon him, and imprisoned him till it should be paid. He had no means of doing so; but, having managed to communicate with some merchants of Amsterdam, induced them to pay the fine and obtain his release, in consideration of the valuable information which he would be able to communicate.

On the 19th of April, the four vessels reached the Canaries, and on the 14th of June they crossed the line. They had previously fallen in with several Portuguese vessels, which they might have taken as lawful prizes; but, with a moderation in which much good policy was combined, they met and parted like friends. They now began to long anxiously for land, as the crews were suffering much by scurvy, and reached it on the 4th of August. They had passed the Cape of Good Hope without seeing it, and had anchored in a bay called the Aguada de San Bras, situated about forty-five leagues beyond it. After some intercourse with the natives, they continued their voyage on the 11th of August, but were again obliged, by the ravages of scurvy, to seek refreshments on the coast of Madagascar. They had some difficulty in obtaining them; and, in the meantime, were so reduced by sickness, that they could scarcely muster twenty men fit for service, while they had actually lost seventy. Having somewhat recovered by means of the fruit and fresh provisions which they obtained ashore, they again set sail on the 14th of December; and, after various adventures not possessed of much interest, directed their course towards the southern islands of the Maldive group. They were thus carried beyond the Indian peninsula, and first saw land on the 1st of June, 1596. They were off the coast of Sumatra. Continuing southwards, they arrived, on the 11th, at the entrance of the Straits of Sunda, and proceeding through them, much impeded by contrary winds and currents, arrived at Bantam, on the north-west extremity of Java.

On their arrival they were visited by six Portuguese, with their slaves, who assumed the character of deputies, sent by the governor and people of Bantam to ascertain the object of their visit. The previous navigators from England, particularly
Cavendish and Lancaster, had spread great alarm; but the Dutch endeavoured to dissipate all fear, by declaring that commerce was their only object. Under this impression a friendly intercourse commenced, and a full cargo of pepper, at a very moderate rate, might easily have been obtained; but Houtmann, determined to do everything at the cheapest, was induced to wait for the new crop, which was represented to him as so very abundant, that it would be obtained at almost nominal prices. This injudicious delay gave the Portuguese time to prepare a series of intrigues, by means of which the good understanding with the natives was on the point of being broken up. Ultimately, however, a treaty, offensive and defensive, was formed with the natives, though no sufficient evidence was given, that whatever friendship the Portuguese might pretend, nothing but enmity in every form, secret or open, was to be expected from them. The immediate consequence of the treaty was the establishment of a Dutch factory at Bantam.

Houtmann, still continuing to wait for the anticipated reduction in the price of pepper, began to dispose of his merchandise, to be paid for in pepper, at the price which it should bear when the new crop should be delivered. On these terms he found ready purchasers in the governor and several of the other officials of the town. Meanwhile, the Portuguese continued their intrigues, and very plausibly maintained, that the irrational course which Houtmann was pursuing, could only be accounted for by assuming that commerce was only a pretext, and that his real object was to make himself thoroughly acquainted with the locality, with the view of afterwards returning and taking forcible possession of it. The effect of these insinuations soon became apparent. A pilot, who had all along manifested great friendship for the Dutch, was barbarously assassinated, and the pepper due on the purchases which had been made was not delivered. The Dutch, after uttering vain complaints, had recourse to menaces. These were not lost upon the inhabitants, who immediately took all possible precautions. All the Java vessels in the harbour cut their cables, and ran ashore. At the same time, the Dutch were startled by the alarming intelligence that a large fleet, destined to act against them, was being prepared in a neighbouring harbour.
Houtmann, though thus put upon his guard, had the rashness to go ashore with only seven attendants, and pay a visit to the governor. The result which might have been foreseen immediately followed; and the whole party, as soon as they entered the palace, were arrested. The Dutch immediately attempted reprisals, by seizing the governor’s interpreter and a number of his slaves. Houtmann’s position was now precarious in the extreme; and he only saved himself from the death with which he was threatened, by sending a letter to the fleet, ordering the interpreter to be delivered up. Five of his companions were accordingly released, and an appearance of trade was resumed, though he himself still remained in captivity.

It was impossible that matters could long remain in this position; and it was therefore formally resolved, at a council held on board the Maurice, to intimate to the governor, that if the captain, Houtmann, and all his people, with everything belonging to them, were not delivered on the following day, the utmost force which they possessed would forthwith be employed to obtain redress. No answer having been returned by mid-day, the four vessels drew near the town, and anchored in three fathoms. On the first news of this proceeding, the governor, in a rage, ordered the arrest of every Dutchman in the factory. They were all carried off, Houtmann along with them, to the place of public execution; and nothing but excruciating deaths were looked for, when the governor, who had begun to calculate the consequences, recoiled from them, and proposed negotiation. It was so spun out that the Dutch once more lost patience and commenced hostilities, in which their superiority soon became so apparent, that the governor saw the necessity of yielding. Many delays were still interposed, but ultimately an arrangement was come to, by which the Dutch agreed to pay a considerable sum of money for the damage they had caused, and Houtmann and his companions regained their freedom.

Friendship seemed about to be re-established, when a Portuguese deputy arrived from Malacca with a large present to the governor, and the promise of one still more valuable, provided he would shut the port against all commerce with the Dutch. The bribe was too tempting to be resisted; and an order was issued by the governor which left no doubt as to his
hostile intentions. Houtmann, convinced that negotiation was now useless, hastened to remove with all his people and their effects. Immediately after, it was decided by a council held on board the Maurice, to give full scope to their resentment and take a signal revenge. Second thoughts proved better, and reflecting that nothing could be gained, and much might be lost by the indiscriminate carnage which they had contemplated, they weighed anchor, and proceeded eastward along the coast of Java. After a fearful encounter with the natives, in which many lives were lost on both sides, and all hopes of establishing a friendly intercourse were destroyed, the vessels quitted the north-west coast, and sailed north to the isle of Lubok, which they reached on the 9th of December. They now changed their course to west, but, on the 25th, after they had beaten about, obstructed by contrary winds and currents, they were astonished to find themselves still within sight of the island. Here, as they had only ninety-four men remaining, many of them unfit for service, it was resolved to abandon the Amsterdam, which had become so leaky that she could with difficulty be kept afloat.

On the 12th of January, 1597, anchor was again weighed, and the vessels proceeded for the eastern extremity of Java. On the 18th they came in sight of an active volcano, and, a few days after, entered the strait which separates Java from Bali. After some friendly intercourse with the inhabitants of the latter island, they turned their face homewards on the 26th of February, and began to steer for the Cape of Good Hope. Their vessels, as already mentioned, had been reduced to three; and of the 249 men who had quitted Holland, only eighty-nine now survived. Besides these, however, they had with them two negroes taken up on the coast of Madagascar, a Chinese, two Malabars, a native of Java, and a pilot, who was said to be originally from Gujarat, and had volunteered to make the voyage to Europe. Sailing by the south of Java, the coast of Natal was reached on the 24th of April, St. Helena on the 25th of May, the island of Ascension on the 2nd of June, the Azores on the 12th of July, the English Channel on the 5th, and the port of Amsterdam on the 14th of August.

Though the results of Houtmann's voyage were by no means brilliant, his arrival was hailed with loud acclamations. He had successfully performed a voyage in which the English
had twice failed, and made it plain that, with due circumspection, a direct and lucrative trade with the East, by the way of the Cape of Good Hope, might easily be established. The Portuguese would doubtless throw every possible obstacle in the way; but their power of mischief was greatly abridged by the loss of their independence, and more was to be hoped from the victories which might be gained over them, than feared from the injuries which they might be able to inflict. The native powers, too, had evidently no love for the Portuguese, of whose tyranny and bigotry they had too good reason to complain, and were disposed to form friendly connections with any foreigners by whom the Portuguese supremacy might be undermined or finally overthrown. Even the returns by Houtmann's voyage, though obtained under the most unfavourable circumstances, nearly covered the expense; and there was therefore every reason to hope, that in proportion as the navigation and the nature of the trade came to be better understood, great profits would be regularly realized.

Influenced by these and similar considerations, Houtmann's return was no sooner announced, than all the principal ports of Holland were eager to share in the new Indian traffic; and various companies, having that object in view, were formed. As before, the Company for Distant Countries, which had sent out Houtmann, took the lead, and made all haste to fit out four ships. Other four were fitted out by a rival company. The leading merchants in both, afraid of the injury which they might inflict on each other, by appearing in the Indian market as competitors, proposed and effected an amalgamation. The eight vessels thus fitted out at the expense of private individuals, but provided with cannon by the government, sailed in 1598. Four of them made a voyage remarkable for its rapidity at that early period, and in the course of fifteen months returned from Bantam with a valuable cargo of pepper; the other four occupied more time, but appear to have turned it to good account; and after visiting Amboyna, Banda, and Ternate, came home laden with rich spices, which yielded an immense profit. During another voyage, fitted out by Middelburg merchants, also in 1598, Houtmann, who had been intrusted with the command, was again unfortunate, and lost his life by an act of gross treachery on the part of the King of Acheen, in the island of Sumatra.
The Dutch East India trade might now be considered as fairly established. It had originated in private enterprise, and had the times been peaceful, might have been successfully carried on by the same means; but the Spaniards and Portuguese having left no doubt of their determination to cling to their monopoly at all hazards, it became necessary for the Dutch to provide themselves with the means of repelling force by force. At first the States-general contented themselves with granting the necessary authority for this purpose; but it soon appeared that separate companies, pursuing different, and it might be also adverse interests, could not well co-operate in repelling a common foe. In these circumstances, two courses lay open to the government. It might adhere to the system generally followed in Europe, and, while permitting individuals or associations full freedom of trade in every region of the East, provide for their protection against foreign enemies by stationing ships of war in every quarter where danger was apprehended; or it might, by uniting all private associations into one great and exclusive company, enable it to acquire sufficient strength not only to maintain its ground against all who might assail it, but even to become in its turn the aggressor and make new conquests. The latter was the plan adopted; and on the 20th of March, 1602, a general charter was granted, incorporating the different companies into one great association, and conferring upon it the exclusive privilege of trade to the East. The plan, whatever be its merits or demerits, was not original, for the model had been furnished fifteen months before in a charter granted with a similar object by the crown of England. To this charter, and the preparatory measures taken to procure it, we must now turn.

If those who took the lead in the expeditions of Fenton and Lancaster had been deterred by their failure from persevering in the attempt to establish a direct trade with India, they must have been ashamed of their pusillanimity when they became acquainted with the success of the Dutch; and at all events must have felt the necessity of immediately bestirring themselves if they were not prepared to allow a rival nation to forestall them in what was then universally, though not very accurately, regarded as the most lucrative market in the world. The proceedings thus originated must be reserved for the next chapter.
East India Charter

In September, 1599, doubtless after many preliminary conferences, an association of merchant adventurers was formed in London for the purpose of prosecuting a voyage to the East Indies. At first, though a permanent company was evidently contemplated, only a single voyage was proposed. Accordingly, their contract simply purports to be “The names of suche persons as have written with there owne handes, to venter in the pretended vriage to the Easte Indias (the whiche it maie please the Lorde to prosper) and the somes that they will adventure, the xxij September, 1599.” The aggregate sum amounted to £30,133,6s. 8d., and represented 101 adventures or shares, varying in amount from £100 to £3,000.

At the first general meeting, held two days after the date of the contract, it was resolved to petition the queen for her royal assent to a project “intended for the honour of their native country and the advancement of trade and merchandize within the realm of England; and to set forth a voyage to the East Indies and other islands and countries thereabouts.” On the following day, when the fifteen committee men, or directors, to whom the management had been intrusted, held their first meeting, the petition was read and approved. After stating that “divers merchants, induced by the successe of the viage performed by the Duche nacion, and being informed that the Dutchemen prepare for a new viage, and to that ende have bought divers ships here, in Englande, were stirred with noe lesse affeccion to advaunce the trade of their native countrie, than the Duche merchaunts were to benefite theire commonweal the, and upon that affeccion have resolved to make a viage to the East Indias,” they pray to be incorporated into a company,
"for that the trade of the Indies being so remote could not be traded on but on a jointe and united stocke." They also prayed to be permitted to export foreign coin, or, in the event of a deficiency, to have bullion coined for them at the queen's mint; and, lastly, to be exempted for several years, as the Dutch merchants were, from payment of export or import duties.

On the 16th of October, the queen having signified her approbation of the voyage, the committee were exerting themselves to obtain permission for the vessels to proceed on their voyage without further delay, when an insurmountable obstacle arose from an unexpected quarter. Spain had suffered so much during her late wars that she began to feel the necessity of peace. Philip II; too, whose bigotry and ambition were the great obstacles to it, had been called to his account; and negotiations were commenced under circumstances which promised a favourable result. Were anything wanting to prove that England was sincere in the matter, it might be found in the retrograde step which government took in regard to the projected voyage to India. Its approbation had been formally declared; and yet, under the impression that the voyage might give umbrage to Spain, that approbation was expressly withdrawn. The committee of adventurers, fearing such a result, presented a long and elaborate memorial, in which they endeavoured to show, by a careful statement of all the localities in which the Spaniards could, with any show of reason, claim an exclusive right of trade, that the projected voyage would be so conducted as not to interfere in the least with the progress of the pending negotiations; but the lords of council answered that "it was more beneficial for the generall state of merchandize to enterayne a peace, then that the same should be hindred by the standing with the Spanische commissioners, for the mayntayning of this trade, to foregoe the opportunety of the concluding of the peace." To this answer no effectual reply could be made; and the adventurers, "fearing lest, after they were drawen into a charg, they shold be required to desist their viage, did proceede noe further in the matter for this yere, but did enter into the preparacion of a viage the next yere followinge."

The memorial above referred to, furnishing an excellent summary of the grounds on which the adventurers claimed and
ultimately obtained permission to establish an East Indian trade, possesses, independent of its interest as an historical document, intrinsic merits which justify a very liberal quotation. It is entitled, “Certayne Reasons why the English Merchants may trade into the East Indies, especially to such rich kingdoms and dominions as are not subjecte to the King of Spayne and Portugal; together with the true limits of the Portugals’ conquest and jurisdiction in those Oriental parts;” and proceeds as follows:

“Whereas, right honorable, upon a treatie of peace betweene the crownes of England and Spayne like to ensue, that is not to be doubted, but that greate exception will bee taken agaynst the intended voyage of her majestie’s subjects into the East Indies, by the Cape of Buena Speranca; therefore the adventurers in the sayd intended voyage most humbly crave, at your honors’ hands, to take perfecte knowledge of these fewe considerations underwritten.

“First, they desire that it wold please your honors to urge the commissioners of the Spanishe peace to put downe under their hands, the names of all such islands, cities, townes, places, castels, and fortresses, as they are actually, at this present, possessed of, from the sayd Cape of Buena Speranca, along the cost of Africa, on the cost of Arabia, in the East Indies, the Malucos, and other Oriental parts of the world: which, if they may bee drawne truly and fauthfully to put downe, so that wee cannot be able, manifestly, to prove the contrarie, then wil wee be content, in noe sort, to disturbe nor molest them, wheresoever they are alreadie commanders and in actual authoritie.

“Secondly, if they wil not, by any meanes, bee drawne to this themselves, then wee, for your lordshippes’ perfect instruction in this behalfe, wil take the paynes to doe it for them. That may please your honors, therefore, to understand, that these bee al the islands, cities, townes, places, castles and fortresses, whereof they be, at this present, actual commanders, beyond the Cape of Buena Speranca, eastward.”

After a list of Spanish and Portuguese possessions, arranged according to their positions “On the Coste of Africa,” “In the Mouth of the Persian Golfe,” and “From the Persian Golfe
along the Coste of India, southward,” the memorial proceeds:

“Thirdly, All the places which are under their governement and commaund being thus exactly and truely put downe, and wee being able to avouch it to be so, by many evident and invincible proofes, and some eye-witnesses, if need require: that there remayneth that all the rest rich kingdoms and islands of the East, which are in number very many, are out of their power and jurisdiction, and free for any other princes or people of the world to repayre unto, whome’ the soveraigne lords and governors of those territories wil bee willing to admitte into their dominions—a chiefe parte whereof are these here ensuinge.” Here follows a catalogue under the title of “The names of the chiefe knowne islands and kingdoms beyond the Cape of Buena Speranca, wholly out of the dominion of the Portugalls and Spaniards, in the east, south-east, and north-east parts of the world.”

As this catalogue furnishes, in the very terms employed, a vivid idea of the brilliant results anticipated from the establishment of an East India trade, it is here subjoined verbatim:

“The Isle of Madagascar, or San Lorens, upon the backside of Africa—The kingdoms of Oriza, Bengala, and Aracan, on the Gulfe of Bengala—The rich and mightie kingdome of Pegu—The kingdome of Juncalaon—The kingdome of Siam—The kingdome of Camboia—The kingdome of Canchinchina—The most mighty and welthy empire of China—The rich and goulden island of Sumatra—The whole islands of Java Major, Java Minor, and Baly—The large and rich islands of Borneo, Celebes, Gilolo, and Os Papuas—The long tracte of Nova Guinea and the Isles of Solomon—The rich and innumerable islands of Malucos and the Spicerie, except the two small isles of Tidore and Amboyno, where the Portugals have only two small forts—The large islands of Mindinas and Calamines—The goulden islands of the greate and smal Lequeos—The manifold and populos sylver islands of the Japones—The country of Coray newly discovered to the north-east.”

Immediately after this catalogue, the memorial reiterates the statement that “in all these, and infinite places more, abounding with greate welthe and riches, the Portugales and Spaniards have not any castle, forte, blockhouse, or commaundement,”
and appeals in proof of it to numerous authorities, consisting of
"Portugalle authors printed and written," "Spanish authors
printed in Spayne," "Italiens," "Englishmen," and "Hollan-
ders." The last two, which alone now possess much interest,
include under the former head—"Sir Francis Drak's men yet
living, and his own writing printed," "Mr. Thomas Candishe's
Companye, yet living, and his writings printed," "Mr. Ralph
Fitch[e]'s Travayles through most of the Portugal Indies, in
print," and "Mr. James Lancaster's and his Companye's voyage
as farre as Malacca, printed;" and under the latter head—
"John Huygen de Linschoten's worke, which lived above seven
yerés in India," "The first voyage of the Hollanders to Java
and Baly, in printe," "The second voyage to Java, in Dutch
and English," "The testimonie of William Pers, Englishman,
with them in the sayd voyage," and "The third returne of the
Hollanders from the East Indies this yere." After this array
of authorities, the memorialists, confident that they had triumph-
antly established their case, continue thus:—

"Fourthly, let these shewe any juste and laweful reasons,
voyd of affection and partialitie, why they should barre her
majestie, and all other Christian princes and states, of the use
of the vaste, wyde, and infinitely open ocean sea, and of access
to the territories and dominions of so many free princes, kings,
and potentates in the East, in whose dominions they have noe
more soveraign command or authoritie, then wee, or any
Christians whosoever."

The point thus argued could not be rationally contested, and
yet it was quite clear that the Spaniards would not consent to
yield it. They claimed in virtue of a Papal grant, which had
arrogantly bestowed upon them exclusive right to all new lands
which might be discovered either in the East or West; and
hence, until this claim was set aside, or voluntarily relinquished,
the memorialists, in so far as the question lay between them and
such claimants, were doing little better than beating the air
when they argued that every locality not actually occupied by
the Spaniards and Portuguese was open to all the world. To
every such argument of the memorialists, their opponents were
always ready to answer, "We claim not merely what we occupy,
but the whole that we have discovered, or may yet be discov-
ered in those regions." A claim so extravagant could not be acquiesced in by any Protestant government; but Queen Elizabeth, though she had doubtless determined that the maritime enterprise of her subjects should have full scope in the East, dealt with the memorial in the cautious spirit in which she usually acted, and before deciding, caused a report to be made upon it by the celebrated Fulke Greville, afterwards Lord Brooke. In this report, which was made to Sir Francis Walsingham, who had requested "the names of such kings as are absolute in the East, and either have warr or traffique with the Kinge of Spaine," Greville enters very fully into detail, commencing rather superfluously on the coast of Barbary, and proceeding first south to the Cape of Good Hope, and then north to the mouth of the Red Sea. It is here only that his report begins to bear properly upon our subject. Though he acknowledges it to be merely a compilation from two or three authors, "having neither meanes nor tyme to seake other helpe," it is well entitled, notwithstanding several geographical blunders, to more than a passing notice. After tracing the east African coast as far as the Cape of Gardafuy, he thus proceeds:

"At the said cape the Portugalls yeerly lye in wayte for the Turkish shippes, which adventure to traffique without their licence, houldinge themselves the only commaunders of these seas. From the cape to the mouth of the Red Sea are also many small dominions of white Mahometans, rich in gould, sylver, ivory, and all kynd of victualls: and behind thes cuntries, in the mayne, lyeth the great empire of Prester John, to whom the Portugalls (as some write) doe yeerly send eight shippes, laden with all kynde of merchandise, and also furnish themselves with many sayllers out of his coast townes in the Red Sea. In the bottom of this sea, at a place called Sues, the Turckes build gallies which scour all that coast, as far as Melinde, and everie yeere annoy the Portugalls exceedinge much. Beyond the Red Sea, Arabia Faelix is governed by manie sultans of greate and absolute power, both by sea and land; uppon the pointe thereof standeth the riche and stronge cittie Aden, wher both Indians, Persians, Ethiopians, Turkes, and Portugals, have exceedinge greate traffique. Beyond the Gulf of Persia that kinge possesseth all the coast, and hath great
traffique with the Portugals, with pearles, carpetts, and other rich commodities. The ile of Ormus lyeth in the mouth of this golf, and is subject to the Persians, but so that the Portugals hath a forte in it, and ther is the staple of al India, Arabia, Persia, and Turkie, whither Christian merchants do also resort, from Aleppo and Tripolis, twyse in the year."

Continuing eastward he arrives at India, of which he says:—

"Beyond the Persian lieth the kingdome of Cambaia, which is the fruitfullest of all India, and hath exceedinge great traffique: the Portugals possesse ther the towne of Dieu, scituate in an iland in the mouth of the Indus, wher he hath great trade with the Cambaians, and all other nations in these partes. Next is the cuntrie of the Malabars, who are the best souldiers of India, and greatest enemies of the Portugals: it was once an entyer empier, now divided into many kingdoms; part is subject to the Queen of Baticola, who selleth great store of pepper to the Portugals, at a towne called Onor, which they hould in her state: the rest of Malabar is divided into fuye kingdoms, Cochin, Chananor, Choule, Coulon, and Calechut; the last was the greatest, but, by the assistance of the Portugals, Cochin hath now prevailed above him. Beyond the Malabars is the kingdome of Narsinga, wher the Portugals also traffique: then the kingdome of Orixen and Bengalen by the ryver Ganges, as also of Aracan, Pegu, Tanassaria and Queda."

The latter part of the report is less carefully drawn up, and commits the egregious blunder of confounding Taprobana, or Ceylon, with Sumatra. It continues thus:—

"The iland of Sumatra or Taprobuna is possessed by many kinges, enemies to the Portugals; the cheif is the King of Dachem, who besieged them in Malacca, and with his gallies stopped the passage of victualls and traffique from China, Japan, and Molucco, till, by a mayne fleete, the coast was cleared. The Kinge of Spaigne, in regarde of the importance of this passage, hath often resolved to conquer Sumatra, but nothinge is done. The Kinges of Acheyn and Tor are, in lyke sorte, enemies to the Portugals. The Philippanes belonged to the crowne of China, but, abandoned by him, were possessed by the Spaniards, who have traffique ther with the merchants of China, which yeerly bring to them above twenty shippes, laden
with all manner of wares, which they carry into New Spaine and Mexico. They traffique also with the Chinois at Mackau, and Japan. And, lastlie, at Goa, there is great resort of all nations, from Arabia, Armenia, Persia, Cambaia, Bengal, Pegu, Siam, Malacca, Java, Molucca, and China, and the Portugals suffer them all to lyve ther, after their owne manners and religions; only for matter of justice they are ruled by the Portugall law. In the yeere 1584, many ambassadors came to Goa from Persia, Cambaia, and the Malabars, and concluded peace with the Portugals; 1586, the Arabians slew above 800 Portugals."

This report is dated the 10th of March, in the year 1599, according to the old, but 1600 according to the present mode of reckoning, and must have had a favourable effect, as the queen's approbation of the projected voyage was shortly after signified; and a general meeting of the adventurers was held at Founders' Hall, on the 23rd of September, when it was resolved "that they would goe forwards with the voyage." The management was intrusted to seventeen directors, or, as they were then called, committees, who met for the first time on the very same day, and two days after made a purchase of the ship Susan for the sum of £1,600. The economical spirit in which the purchase was made appears in a stipulation by which the sellers agreed to take her back at half-price on her return. The next day (26th) the purchase of two other ships, the Hector and Ascension, was agreed to; and a call was made upon the subscribers for payment of a third of the whole stock on or before the 30th. On this day a draft of the patent of privileges, or charter, to be submitted to the crown, was read and approved. It had been prepared by a Mr. Altham, who received a fee of £4.

In the course of these preparations, the directors were somewhat startled by an application from the Lord-treasure Burleigh, recommending the employment of Sir Edward Michelborne in the voyage. The ground of the application is not stated, but various circumstances lead to the conclusion that the possession of court favour was Sir Edward's highest qualification. The directors were only petitioning for their charter, and must have been perfectly aware of the risk they ran in refusing to comply with the wishes of such a statesman as Lord Burleigh. It says much both for their firmness and
their prudence, that they managed to place their objection to his lordship's nominee not on personal but on public grounds, declaring their resolution "not to employ any gentleman in any place of charge," and requesting "that they might be allowed to sort their business with men of their own quality, lest the suspicion of the employment of gentlemen being taken hold upon by the generalitie, do drive a great number of the adventurers to withdraw their contributions."

Were the words gentleman and gentlemen here employed in the sense which is now usually attached to them, the answer would not only afford what Mr. Mill thinks he finds in it, "a curious specimen of the mode of thinking of the times," but indicate a narrowness and illiberality of mind sufficient to prove that the directors were unworthy of the honourable office with which they had been intrusted. It is impossible to believe, that in laying the foundations of a company in which one of the leading objects contemplated was, to use their own expression, "the honor of their native countrie," they intended to lay it down as a general and inflexible rule, that a man, however well qualified he might be in other respects—however skilful as a seaman—however expert as an accountant—however shrewd and experienced as a merchant—was to be deemed unfit for employment "in any place of charge," if he happened to have been born of a good family, and to possess the manners and accomplishments which entitled him to move in the first circles of society. However strange the language may sound, its meaning evidently went no further than this, that in making their appointments the directors would be guided solely by professional ability, and were determined to have nothing to do with those who, pluming themselves on being gentlemen and nothing more, would only draw the profit, without performing the duties of any office to which they might be appointed.

Though the charter was not yet granted, the directors, having now no doubt of obtaining it, proceeded with their arrangements. The purchase of three vessels has already been mentioned. On the 5th of October, a fourth, called the Malice Scourge, and double the size of any of the others, was purchased from the Earl of Cumberland, after some higgling, for £3,700. To these purchases that of a pinnace was added; and the whole expedi-
tion, as then projected, stood thus:—The *Malice Scourge*, whose name was subsequently changed to that of the *Red Dragon*, 200 men, 600 tons; the *Hector*, 100 men, 300 tons; the *Ascension*, 80 men, 260 tons; the *Susan*, 80 men, 240 tons; and a pinnace, 40 men, 100 tons—in all, 500 men and 1,500 tons. The investment, consisting of iron (wrought and unwrought), tin, lead, 80 pieces of broadcloths of all colours, 80 pieces of Devonshire kerseys, and 100 pieces of Norwich stuffs, with smaller articles chiefly for presents, was computed at £4,545; and the provisions for a twenty months' voyage at £6,600, 4s. 10d. The remainder of the original subscription of £30,130, 6s. 8d., under deduction of the purchase and equipment of the vessels and other payments, was to be taken out in bullion. These calculations could only be considered conjectural, and afterwards, as will be seen, underwent considerable modifications.

On the 30th of October, the same day on which the charter was sent to the attorney-general for his opinion, a general meeting of the adventurers was held, and the important resolution was adopted of increasing the number of directors from fifteen to twenty-four. That number was accordingly elected, and their names, along with that of Alderman Thomas Smith, who had the honour of being the first governor appointed, were ordered to be inserted in the anticipated charter. Another resolution was that each adventurer should pay up his subscription. On this subject Bruce, whose *Annals of the East India Company* furnish the only printed information, makes statements which are very obscure, and apparently irreconcilable. In one passage (vol. i. p. 130) he says, "It is remarkable that these payments were made by the whole of the adventurers, with the exception of four only, who withdrew their subscriptions." Immediately after he speaks of "the funds of the society being thus provided for;" and yet he afterwards quotes from the minutes of another meeting of the adventurers, "summoned on the 8th of December, to make up the fund with which the voyage was to be fitted out," and at which "it was agreed that the whole of the sum subscribed by the adventurers should be paid in by the 13th of that month; and declared, as the ships were now ready to proceed to sea, that such of the subscribers as should not, at the preceding date, have paid in their proportions, should be
held to be liable for any losses that might happen in consequence of the stipulated subscription not having been made good by them." These statements cannot easily be reconciled. If all the original subscriptions, with the exception of four only, were paid up, how could it be necessary to hold out a general menace threatening all defaulters with actions of damages? The most probable explanation is, that after the original list of 101 subscriptions was completed, other parties had been tempted, by the near prospect of obtaining a charter on advantageous terms, to come forward and put down their names. It is almost certain that something of this kind must have been done, since the number of persons actually incorporated by the charter is not confined to those of the original list, but amounts in all to 218.

Among other arrangements made previous to the date of the charter, may be mentioned the appointments of Captain James Lancaster to the Red Dragon, with the title of general or admiral of the fleet, and of Captain John Davis to the second command, with the title of pilot-major. Both of these officers had previously made the voyage: the one under Captain Raymond, in the unfortunate expedition which has already been described; and the other in 1598, as a pilot, in the employment of the Dutch. The terms of agreement with the former are not mentioned; but those with the latter deserve notice, in furnishing a good idea of the spirit in which the voyage was undertaken, and of the hopes entertained as to its success. The terms were £100 wages, £200 on credit as an adventure, and a commission on the profit, rated alternatively at £500, £1,000, £1,500, or £2,000, according as the clear returns on the capital should yield two for one, three for one, four for one, or five for one. The leading object in this arrangement was to give Captain Davis a personal interest in the success of the voyage. The same object was kept steadily in view in arranging with all other parties. Thus the factors or supercargoes, thirty-six in number, were arranged in four different classes: of which the first received £100 wages, and £200 advanced as an adventure; the second £50 wages, and £100 adventure; the third £30 wages, and £50 adventure; and the fourth £20 wages, and £40 adventure. Even the common seamen were treated on the same principle,
and received four months, pay, of which the half only was paid as wages, while the other half was advanced as an adventure.

The charter was granted on the last day of the sixteenth century, 31st December, 1600. Like all deeds of the same kind, it is spun out to such a length by verbiage and vain tautology, as to occupy twenty-six pages of a printed quarto volume. It is, of course, impossible to give it at length. Fortunately it is also unnecessary, as everything of importance in it may be compressed within comparatively narrow limits.

Proceeding in the queen's name in the form of letters-patent, addressed "to all our officers, ministers, and subjects, and to all other people, as well within this our realm of England as elsewhere," it begins with stating that "Our most dear and loving cousin, George, Earl of Cumberland, and our well-beloved subjects, Sir John Hart, of London, knight, Sir John Spencer, of London, knight, Sir Edward Michelborne, knight, William Cavendish, esquire," nine aldermen of London, and other individuals specially named, amounting in all to 218, have "been petitioners unto us for our royal assent and licence," that they, "at their own adventures, costs, and charges, as well as for the honour of our realm of England, as for the increase of our navigation, and advancement of trade of merchandize, within our said realm, and the dominions of the same, might adventure and set forth one or more voyages, with convenient number of ships and pinnaces, by way of traffic and merchandize to the East Indies, in the countries and parts of Asia and Africa, and to as many of the islands, ports and cities, towns and places, thereabouts, as where trade and traffick may by all likelihood be discovered, established, or had; divers of which countries, and many of the islands, cities, and ports thereof, have long since been discovered by others of our subjects, albeit not frequented in trade of merchandize."

In accordance with this petition, her majesty, "greatly tendering the honour of our nation, the wealth of our people, and the encouragement of them, and others of our loving subjects in their good enterprises, for the increase of our navigation, and the advancement of lawful traffic, to the benefit of our commonwealth," constitutes the petitioners a "body corporate and politic, in deed and in name, by the name of The Governor and
Company of the Merchants of London, trading into the East Indies," empowering them and their successors, in that name and capacity, to possess or dispose of land, tenements, and hereditaments, to have a common seal, to sue and be sued; and, in general "to do and execute all and singular other things by the same name," as fully and freely as "any other our liege people."

The charter then goes on to prescribe the mode of management of the affairs of the company, fixing it in a governor, and twenty-four other members called committees, who are to have "the direction of the voyages of or for the said company, and the provision of the shipping and merchandizes thereto belonging, and also the sale of all merchandizes returned in the voyages;" and, in general, "the managing and handling of all other things belonging to the said company." Thomas Smith, alderman of the city of London, is nominated as the "first and present governor," and twenty-four other members as the "first and present committees" of the company; but as these nominations were to continue in force only for a year from the date of the charter, the mode of electing their successors in office is next pointed out. For this purpose the company, or a majority of those "present at any public assembly, commonly called the court, holden for the said company," the governor always being one, are empowered to elect a deputy to act in the governor's absence; and thereafter, "every year on the first day of July, or at any time within six days after that day, to assemble and meet together in some convenient place," and, while so assembled, to elect a governor and twenty-four committees for the ensuing year. In the event of the death or deprivation by misconduct of any of the persons thus elected, the company, again met in court, are authorized to supply the vacancies thus occurring, but only for the time of office which remained unexpired. Not only the officials thus elected were to swear "well and truly" to execute the offices committed to them, but "as well every one above named to be of the said company or fellowship, as all others to be hereafter admitted, or free of the said company, to take a corporal oath before the governor of the said company, or his deputy for the time being, to such effect, as by the said governor and company, or the more part of them, in any public court to be held for the said company, shall be in reasonable manner set down and
devised, before they shall be allowed or admitted to trade or traffick as a freeman of the said company."

In this last quotation the important point of membership is incidentally alluded to. A more explicit statement occurs in a subsequent clause, in which "all that are or shall be of the said company," and all their sons, "at their several ages of one and twenty years or upwards," and all their "apprentices, factors, or servants," "which shall hereafter be employed by the said governor and company, in the trade of merchandize of or to the East Indies," are empowered freely to traffic during the period and within the limits assigned to the company. The period is restricted to "fifteen years," with the promise of an extension to other fifteen, if asked by the company and approved by the crown, but the charter might be recalled at any time after a notice of two years.

The space over which the company might trade is of enormous extent; and, though spoken of under the general name of the East Indies, is more particularly described as including "the countries and parts of Asia and Africa," and "all the islands, ports, havens, cities, creeks, towns, and places of Asia, Africa, and America, or any of them beyond the Cape of Bona Esperanza to the Streights of Magellan, where any trade or traffick of merchandize may be used or had." Within these limits the company are empowered to traffic freely "by seas, in and by such ways and passages already found out and discovered, or which shall hereafter be found out and discovered, as they shall esteem and take to be fittest;" the only restriction being, that "the same trade be not undertaken nor addressed to any country, island, port, haven, city, creek, town, or place, already in the lawful and actual possession of any such Christian prince or state, as at this present is or shall hereafter be in league or amity" with the British crown, and "who doth not or will not accept of such trade, but doth overtly declare and publish the same, to be utterly against his or their goodwill and liking."

The more effectually to carry on this trade, the company are authorized to meet from time to time, and make "such and so many reasonable laws, constitutions, orders, and ordinances," as may seem "necessary and convenient" for the good government
of the company, and of all their factors, masters, mariners, and other officers; and for the better advancement and continuance of the trade; and not only to make such laws, but to enforce the observance of them by inflicting upon offenders “pains, punishments, and penalties, by imprisonment of body, or by fines and amercements, or by all or any of them,” it being, however, always understood that “the said laws, orders, constitutions, orders and ordinances be reasonable, and not contrary or repugnant to the laws, statutes, or customs” of the realm.

The privilege of trade within the limits above described is declared to belong exclusively to the company; and all subjects of the English crown, “of what degree or quality soever they be,” are strictly forbidden, “by virtue of our prerogative royal, which we will not in that behalf have argued or brought in question,” to “visit, haunt, frequent or trade, traffick or adventure, by way of merchandize, into or from any of the said East Indies, or into or from any the islands, ports, havens, cities, towns, or places aforesaid,”—every person or persons presuming to traffic in defiance of this prohibition “shall incur our indignation, and the forfeiture and loss of the goods, merchandizes, and other things whatsoever, which so shall be brought into this realm of England, or any of the dominions of the same, contrary to our said prohibition, or the purport or true meaning of these presents, as also of the ship and ships with the furniture thereof.” One-half of the forfeitures thus incurred is reserved to the crown; the other half is granted to the company. The offenders are, moreover, “for their said contempt, to suffer imprisonment during our pleasure, and such other punishment as to us, our heirs or successors, for so high a contempt, shall seem meet and convenient, and not to be in any wise delivered until they and every of them shall become bound to pay unto the said governor for the time being, the sum of £1,000 at the least” not to repeat the offence.

These severe enactments against interlopers strikingly contrast with the large discretion given to the company, who, in addition to an exclusive right of traffic carefully guarded against encroachment, are empowered, “for the better encouragement of merchants, strangers, or others, to bring in commodities to our realm,” and “for any consideration or benefit
to be taken to their own use," to "give license to any person or persons to sail, trade, or traffick into or from the said East Indies." To enhance the value of this large discretionary power, the queen gratuitously binds herself, her heirs and successors, not to grant license of trading within the limits of the charter to any person whatever "without the consent" of the company.

On the ground that the company "have not yet experienced of the kinds of commodities and merchandizes which are or will be vendible" in the East Indies, "and therefore shall be driven to carry to those parts, in their voyages outward, divers and sundry commodities which are likely to be returned again" into the realm, the exports of their four first voyages are declared "free of custom, subsidy, or poundage, or any other duties or payments." On imports, during the whole period of the charter, credit of six months on the one half, and of twelve months on the other half, of the duties exigible, is to be allowed after sufficient security for ultimate payment has been given; and because the company "are like to bring to this our realm a much greater quantity of foreign commodities" than can be required for home consumption, the duties which might have been exigible on the export of such commodities as are afterwards reshipped for transport to other countries are to be remitted, provided the reshipment take place in English bottoms, and not later than thirteen months from the date of import. The only other privilege necessary to be mentioned is the permission annually to export the sum of £30,000 in bullion or coin, of which at least £6,000 should previously be coined at the royal mint. This permission—which, owing to the crude ideas then generally entertained on the subject of the currency, was probably regarded at the time as the least defensible of all—was granted only on the express proviso, that after the first voyage a sum at least equal to that exported should previously have been imported.

Though the original adventurers contemplated trading on a joint-stock, and several parts of the charter seem framed on the understanding that this original intention was to be carried out, the subject remains involved in the greatest obscurity. The words joint stock do not once occur in the charter; and there is
nothing in any part of it to indicate that the 218 individuals to whom the charter was granted possessed any higher qualification than that of having signed the petition on which it proceeded. It is known that 101 individuals or firms became bound by their subscriptions to adventure on an experimental voyage, sums which, in the great majority of cases, amounted to £200 each, and formed an aggregate of £30,133, 6s. 8d.; but whether these were the only sums subscribed at the date of the charter, or whether all the new parties who concurred in petitioning the crown had previously qualified themselves for membership by subscribing, are points which it is impossible to decide with any degree of certainty. The only clause in the charter which bears on these points is one which makes it optional for the company to disfranchise those members who should fail against a certain day to pay up their subscriptions. The clause is as follows:

"Provided always that if any of the persons before named and appointed by these presents, to be free of the said Company of Merchants of London, trading into the East Indies, shall not before the going forth of the fleet appointed for this first voyage, from the port of London, bring in and deliver to the treasurer or treasurers appointed, or which, within the space of twenty days from the date hereof, shall be appointed by the said governor and company, or the more part of them, to receive the contributions and adventures, set down by the several adventurers in this last and present voyage, now in hand to be set forth, such sums of money, as have been, by any of the said persons by these presents nominated to be of the said company, expressed, set down, and written in a book for that purpose, and left in the hands of the said Thomas Smith, governor of the said company, or of the said Paul Banning, alderman of London, and subscribed with the names of the same adventurers, under their hands, and agreed upon to be adventure in the said first voyage, that then, it shall be lawful for the said governor and company, or the more part of them, whereof the said governor or his deputy to be one, at any their general court, or general assembly, to remove, disfranchise, and displace him or them, at their wills and pleasures."

In order to facilitate communication and friendly intercourse with the countries which might be visited during the first
voyage under the charter, the commander was furnished with duplicate letters, in which the queen addressed their supposed sovereigns in the following terms:—

"Elizabethe, by the grace of God, Queene of England, Fraunce, and Ireland, Defender of the Faithe, &c.,—To the greate and mightie King of—, our lovinge Brother, greetinge:

"Whereas Almighty God, in his infinite wisdome and providence, haith so disposed of his blessings, and of all the good things of this world, which are created and ordained for the use of man, that howesoever they be brought forthe, and do either originallie growe, and are gathered, or otherwise composed and made, some in one countrie, and some in another, yet they are, by the industrie of man, directed by the hand of God, dispersed and sent out into all the partes of the world, that thereby his wonderfull bountie in his creatures may appeare unto all nacions, his Divine Majestie havinge so ordyned, that no one place should enjoy (as the native commodities thereof) all things apperteyninge to man's use, but that one countrie should have nede of another, and out of the aboundance of the fruits which some region enjoyeth, that the necessities or wants of another should be supplied, by which meanes, men of severall and farr remote countries have commerce and traffique, one with another, and by their enterchange of commodities are linked togeather in amytie and friendship:

"This consideration, most noble king, togeather with the honorable report of your majestie, for the well enterteyninge of strangers which visitt your countrie in love and peace (with lawful traffique of merchaundizinge) have moved us to geave licence to divers of our subjects, who have bene stirred upp with a desire (by a long and daungerous navigacion) to finde out and visitt your territories and dominions, beinge famous in theise partes of the world, and to offer you commerce and traffique, in buyinge and enterchaunginge of commodities with our people, accordinge to the course of merchaunts; of which commerce and interchanging, yf your majestie shall accept, and shall receive and entetayne our merchaunts with favour, accordinge to that hope which hath encouraged them to attempt so long and daungerous a voiadge, you shall finde them a people, in their dealinge and conversacion, of that justice and
civilitie, that you shall not mislike of their repaire to your dominions, and uppon further conference and inquisicion had with them, both of there kindes of merchaundize broughte in their shippes, and of other necessarie commodities which our domminions may afforthe, it may appeare to your majestie that, by their meanes, you may be furnished, in their next retourne into your portes, in better sort then you have bene heretofore supplied, ether by the Spanyard or Portugale, who, of all other nacion in these partes of Europe, have onlie hetherto frequented your countries with trade of merchaundize, and have bene the onlie impediments, both to our subjects, and diverse other merchaunts in the partes of Europe, that they have not hitherto visited your countrie with trade, whilst the said Portugales pretended themselves to be the soveraigne lordes and princes of all your territories, and gave it out that they held your nacion and people as subjects to them, and, in their stiles and titles, do write themselves Kings of the East Indies:

"And yf your majestie shall, in your princelie favour, accept, with good liking, this first repaire of our merchaunts unto your countrie, resortinge thether in peaceable traffique, and shall entertaine this their first voyaige, as an introduction to a further continewaunce of friendshipe betweene your majestie and us, for commerce and intercourse betweene your subjects and ours, wee have geaven order to this, our principall merchaunt (yf your majestie shall be pleased therwith) to leave in your countrie some such of our said merchaunts as he shall make choice of, to reside in your domminons, under your princelie and safe protecion, untill the retourne of another fleete, which wee shall send unto you, who may, in the meane tyme, learne the language of your countrie, and applie their behavior, as it may best sorte, to converse with your majestie's subjects, to the end that amitie and friendship beinge entertained and begun, the same may the better be continewed, when our people shall be instructed how to direct themselves accordinge to the fashions of your countrie.

"And becawse, in the consideracion of the enteretteyninge of amytie and friendship, and in the establishinge of an intercourse to be continewed betweene us, ther may be required, on your majestie's behaulfe, such promise or capitulaciones to be performed
by us, which wee cannot, in theise our lettres, take knowledge of, wee therefore pray your majestie to geave eare therein unto this bearer, and to geave him creditt, in whatsoever he shall promise or undertake in our name, concerninge our amitye and entercourse, which promise, wee (for our parte), in the word of a prince, will see performed, and wil be readie gratefullie to requite anie love, kindness, or favour, that our said subjects shall receive at your majestie's handes; prayinge your majestie that, for our better satisfacion of your kinde acceptaunce of this our love and amytie offered your highenes, you would, by this bearer, give testymonie thereof, by your princelie lettres, directed unto us, in which wee shall receive very great contentement. And thus," &c.
BOOK II
1

Roe's Embassy

The interest which naturally attaches to the first voyage under an East India charter, will justify a larger detail than would be due to the incidents themselves, which are comparatively uninteresting. The Red Dragon, Hector, Ascension, and Susan, already mentioned, together with the Guest, of 130 tons, added as a victualler, left Woolwich on the 13th of February, 1601, but were so long detained by contrary winds and the completion of arrangements at Dartmouth, that they were not able to quit the English coast till the 22nd of April, when they sailed for the Canaries. While off the coast of Guinea they fell in with a Portuguese ship, outward bound, and took and plundered her. Having afterwards unloaded the Guest of the victuals which they had been unable to take on board when they sailed from England, they dismantled her, broke down her upper works for firewood, and left her a floating hulk. During their long delay in the English Channel, they had lost the opportunity of making a quick voyage; and began to suffer from scurvy, which prevailed to such an extent, that some of the vessels had not hands enough to manage them, and the merchants on board were obliged to act as common seamen. On the 9th of September they reached Saldanha Bay, where the sick rapidly recovered; the previous mortality, however, had been so great, that the number of deaths amounted to 105, or more than a fifth of the whole crews. On Sunday, the 1st of November, the Cape was doubled; and they proceeded northwards along the east coast of Madagascar, where a new attack of scurvy again proved very fatal, and obliged them to spend some time on shore in the Bay of Antongil. On continuing their voyage across the Indian Ocean, they arrived, on the 9th
of May, 1602, at the Nicobar Islands, without having seen any part of the continent of India. After a short stay they set sail for the island of Sumatra; and, on the 6th of June, cast anchor in the road of Acheen, on the north-west extremity of that island. Here they found about eighteen vessels from Bengal, Malabar, Gujarat, and other quarters, and were visited by two Dutch merchants, who had been left to learn the language and manners of the country. Everything gave indication of a hospitable reception; and a deputation was immediately sent ashore, to announce that the commander of the fleet was bearer of a letter from the most famous Queen of England to the most worthy King of Acheen and Sumatra. The day after his arrival, Lancaster himself went ashore, and, having been conducted with great ceremony to the king's presence, delivered his letter, and along with it a present of considerable value.

The interview was of the most amicable nature; and ultimately a treaty was formed, in which the leading privileges obtained by the English were, perfect freedom of trade, protection to life and property, the power of administering justice among their own countrymen according to English law, and full liberty of conscience. But while the natives displayed this friendly spirit, all the proceedings of the English were watched with the utmost jealousy by a third party. The Portuguese had an ambassador at Acheen, and it soon became apparent that he was determined to leave no means untried to prevent the establishment of a trade, which he naturally regarded as an unjustifiable invasion of the Portuguese monopoly. Attempts to prejudice the king having failed, he determined on open hostility, and with that view despatched messengers to Malacca, to inform the authorities in the Portuguese settlement there of the arrival of the English ships, and urge the necessity of immediately sending a sufficient force to capture them. Fortunately his plans were discovered; and his messengers having been apprehended, the Portuguese in Malacca were not even made aware that the English had arrived.

Lancaster determined to turn this ignorance to good account; and, leaving the Susan, which had been sent round to Priaman, on the south coast of the island, to take in a cargo of pepper, set out with his other three vessels, and a Dutch ship of about
200 tons, which had obtained permission to join him, on a privateering cruise to the Straits of Malacca. Such an expedition was certainly little in accordance with the purely mercantile spirit in which the voyage had been professedly undertaken, and goes far to justify the account given by Sir William Monson, who says, in his Naval Tracts,¹ that Lancaster’s “employment was as well to take by violence as to trade by sufferance;” and adds that this was “unworthy the name of an honest design, for the hands of merchants should not be stained or polluted with theft, for in such case all people would have liberty to do the like upon them.” The English commander was not restrained by any scruples of this nature, and, when a large Portuguese ship made her appearance, somewhat grotesquely expressed his thankfulness to Providence for having thus furnished him with the means of lading his ships, and supplying all his other wants. Though the ship was of 900 tons burden, and had above 600 persons on board, the capture was easily effected. It proved a carrack, bound for Malacca, from St. Thome, a Portuguese factory on the Coromandel coast, and so fully freighted that Lancaster, after occupying all the vacant room in his own vessels with calicoes, pintados, and other merchandise, was puzzled how to dispose of the residue, which would have sufficed to lade as many more ships if he had had them. Ultimately he resolved to return to Acheen, where he ingratiated himself still further with the king by liberal presents of the prize goods, and deposited what he could not take with him, to await the arrival of a new fleet from England.

On leaving Acheen on the 9th of November, the Ascension, in which all the pepper, cinnamon, and cloves which had previously been purchased, were loaded, was despatched for England. The Dragon and Hector continued their course in an opposite direction along the south coast of Sumatra to Priaman, where the Susan was found taking in her cargo. Leaving her with orders to sail homewards as soon as it was completed, Lancaster proceeded with the other two vessels through the Straits of Sunda, and, on the 16th of December, arrived in the road of Bantam, on the north-west extremity of the island of Java. Here, after the delivery of the queen’s letter and a handsome present,

¹ Churchill’s Voyages, vol. iii, p. 231.
his reception was as favourable as it had been at Acheen; and he found no difficulty in disposing of his prize goods to such advantage, that he had soon sold more than would pay for the lading of both the ships. By the 10th of February full cargoes of pepper were taken in; and on the 20th, after a regular factory had been established at Bantam, and a pinnace despatched to the Moluccas, for the purpose of attempting to secure a trade which might be available to the next ships from England, he took his final departure.

The voyage home was very stormy; and the Dragon, in particular, having lost her rudder, became so unmanageable, that Lancaster privately gave orders to the Hector, which had hitherto kept by him, to continue her voyage and leave him to his fate. It must be confessed, that in taking this step he displayed singular resolution and devotedness. At the time when he gave what he believed to be his final orders to the captain of the Hector, he hastily addressed a letter to his employers in the following terms:—

“Right Worshipful,—What hath passed in this voyage, and what trades I have settled for this Company, and what other events have befallen us, you shall understand by the bearers hereof, to whom (as occasion hath happened) I must refer you. I will strive with all diligence to save my ship and her goods, as you may perceive by the course I take in venturing my own life, and those that are with me. I cannot tell where you should look for me, if you send out any pinnace to seek me, because I live at the devotion of the winds and seas. And thus fare you well; desiring God to send us a merry meeting in this world, if it be his good will and pleasure.—Your loving Friend,

"James Lancaster."

The captain of the Hector, unwilling to leave his commander in desperate circumstances, still managed to keep him in sight; and ultimately, after redoubling the Cape of Good Hope during the storm without seeing it, both vessels reached St. Helena. Three months after, on the 11th of September, 1603, they cast anchor in the Downs, The Ascension and Susan had previously arrived; and thus, though numbers of the crews had perished, all the vessels and their cargoes returned safe.
Both as a first experiment under the charter, and in a pecuniary view, the voyage was eminently successful. Two factories at important stations had been established under the most favourable circumstances; and the clear profits, estimated at ninety-five per cent, were nearly as large as the whole capital adventured. It ought to be observed, however, that these profits cannot properly be considered mercantile, as a large portion of them had been obtained, not by legitimate trading, but in the course of a predatory cruise.

Before Lancaster returned Queen Elizabeth had paid the debt of nature; but the deep interest which she took in the proceedings of the Company had previously been manifested by a letter, in which she remonstrated with them for having allowed a second year to pass without entering into a new subscription; and plainly hinted, that "in not following up the business in the manner the Dutch did, it seemed as if little regard was entertained either for her majesty's honour, or the honour of the country." Strange to say, the remonstrance proved unavailing, and no preparations were made for a second voyage till the success of the first was actually ascertained.

In the second voyage the same vessels were employed as in the first, but the commands were different—Captain Henry Middleton sailing in the Red Dragon as admiral, and Captain Sufflet in the Hector as vice-admiral. The subscription, which appears to have been mainly advanced by the same parties as before, since both voyages were afterwards entered in one account, amounted to £60,450. Of this sum, the repair, equipment, and provision of the vessels absorbed no less than £48,140, whereas the amount carried out in goods was only £1,142; the remainder was bullion. The very paltry sum allowed for goods may perhaps be accounted for by the large quantity of Portuguese prize goods which Lancaster had left for future sale in the factories of Acheen and Bantam.

The vessels left Gravesend on the 25th of March, 1604; and by this early departure avoiding the blunder by which they had formerly lost the proper season, arrived safely in Bantam Road on the 20th of December following. Here they found six ships and three or four pinnaces belonging to the Dutch, with whom for a time a friendly intercourse was kept up, the Dutch admiral
dining aboard the Dragon. At Bantam this intercourse remained undisturbed; and the Hector and Susan having completed their cargoes about the middle of February, 1605, set sail for England. The Red Dragon and Ascension proceeded for the Moluccas, from which the Dutch were then endeavouring to expel the Portuguese. In this having so far succeeded as to compel the surrender of the castle of Amboyna, the Dutch immediately altered their tone to the English, and formally debarred them from trading to that island. On general principles, there is good ground for disputing the exclusive title which the Dutch thus assumed; but it seems impossible to deny that the Company were not the proper parties to call it in question, as they were expressly prohibited, by a clause in their charter, from attempting to establish a trade at any place in the actual possession of any friendly Christian power which should openly object to it. But there were other islands of the Molucca group, to which, as the Dutch could not pretend to be in possession of them, the objection could not apply; and the English vessels were only exercising a right which undoubtedly belonged to them, when they endeavoured to carry on a traffic with Ternate, Tidore, and Banda. Circumstances, however, were unpropitious; and the Dutch, when they did not dare to use force, scrupled not to avail themselves of intrigue and misrepresentation, which were almost equally effectual in securing the great object of their ambition—a complete monopoly of the spice trade.

The Red Dragon and Ascension, after remaining for some time in the Moluccas, though not in company, met again in the road of Bantam, from which they sailed for Europe on the 6th of October, 1605. The Susan, which had sailed some time before, was never heard of; but the other three vessels, the Red Dragon, Hector, and Ascension, after rendezvousing in Saldanha Bay, proceeded home in company, and cast anchor in the Downs on the 6th of May, 1606. Notwithstanding the loss of the Susan the returns were favourable; and the two voyages, thrown, as already mentioned, into one account, nearly doubled the capital which had been adventured in them. It is still necessary, however, in calculating the profit, to remember that a considerable portion of it was derived not from trade, but from privateering; and that the ninety-five per cent said to have been returned was
not realized in one year, but after a series of years, partly occupied with the voyages, and partly spun out in long credits allowed to purchasers.

In 1604, shortly after the vessels had sailed on their second voyage, King James I granted a license to Sir Edward Michelborne, whose recommendation by Lord Burleigh for employment by the Company has been already mentioned, to trade to "Cathaia, China, Japan, Corea, and Cambaya, &c." These countries, though the Company had not yet visited them, are within the limits of their charter, and the license was therefore an interference with the rights conferred by it. It was not, however, so indefensible as it is usually represented. Sir Edward was a member of the Company, and was therefore entitled to the full use of all the privileges which they enjoyed. The intention, no doubt, was that a joint stock should have been established, but the attempt had as yet failed; and the voyages hitherto made, though carried on in the name of the Company, were truly for the benefit only of individual adventurers. In these circumstances, it might have been made a question whether every member was not entitled to claim a similar privilege in his own name, and for his own behoof. Even assuming that the affirmative of this question could not be maintained, another important consideration remains behind. The crown only renounced the right of granting a license "without the consent" of the Company; and before it can be said, with Bruce, that "this license was a direct violation of the exclusive privileges granted by Queen Elizabeth to the London East India Company," it must be shown not only that the license was given, but that the Company refused to consent. The probability is that they were not consulted on the subject; but, knowing that they had the power of objecting, if, from prudential considerations, they refrained from exercising it, they foreclosed themselves, and were not afterwards entitled to complain. The charter might be withdrawn at any time after two years' notice; and it is not to be presumed that the Company would have ventured, by withholding their consent, to oppose any of the wishes or even whims of the crown, and thereby imperilled their very existence. However, the Company may have felt they acted wisely in refraining from remonstrance, and allowing Sir Edward...
Michelborne to make the most of his license. Though he covered his design with the name of trade, his whole conduct showed that his only object was to enrich himself by privateering. In this he so signally failed as to give the Company the best security that no such licenses would again be granted.

The third voyage— undertaken on a subscription of £53,500, of which £28,560 was expended in equipping three ships, the *Dragon*, the *Hector*, and the *Consent*; £7,280 on goods, and £17,600 in bullion—sailed in 1607, under the command of Captain Keeling. The *Consent*, a ship of 115 tons burden, commanded by Captain David Middleton, was first despatched, and made the voyage by herself without afterwards joining her companions. Weighing anchor from Tilbury Hope on the 12th of March, she made a prosperous voyage to the Cape of Good Hope, which was doubled on the 30th of July, and reached Bantam Road on the 14th of November. Having here landed the iron and lead which formed the cargo, refitted the ship, and taken in some goods for barter, Captain Middleton sailed for the Moluccas, which he reached in the beginning of January, 1608. After experiencing considerable, obstruction from the Portuguese, who, as a condition of trading, insisted that he should join them in their hostilities against the Dutch, he set sail without having obtained a cargo, but had the good fortune, while off the island of Boutong, near the south-east extremity of the Celebes, to fall in with a Java junk laden with cloves from Amboyna. The master of the junk offered his whole cargo for sale, and Middleton purchased for £2,948, 15s., a quantity which was afterwards sold in England for £36,287. The object of his voyage having been thus accomplished, he hastened back to the factory at Bantam, landed the supercargoes who had accompanied him to the Moluccas, and then set sail for England, which he reached in December.

The *Dragon* and *Hector*, the one commanded by Captain Keeling as admiral, and the other by Captain Hawkins, quitted the Downs on the 1st of April, 1607, and encountering very tempestuous weather, during which many of the crew became diseased, took shelter in Sierra Leone, doubtful whether to prosecute the voyage or retrace their steps to England. The bolder course was ultimately adopted; and, after doubling the Cape, the voyage was continued northwards
along the east coast of Africa as far as the island of Socotra, where 2,400 lbs. of aloes were purchased at the rate of 5 lbs. for a dollar. The two ships afterwards separated, Captain Hawkins proceeding directly to Surat with the Hector, which was thus the first vessel of the Company that anchored in a port of the continent of India; while Captain Keeling, in the Dragon, pursued the track taken by his predecessors, and after calling at Priaman in Sumatra, and taking in some pepper, passed the Straits of Sunda, and anchored in the road of Bantam on the 5th of October. It had been resolved that the Dragon, in consequence of her unsatisfactory condition, should forthwith be despatched to England with the cargo which had been procured; but before she sailed a vessel hove in sight, and proved to be the Hector. She had been rather unfortunate, for the Portuguese had attacked her, captured eighteen of her crew, including some of the factors, and seized her goods to the value of 9,000 dollars. Captain Hawkins, however, had found the prospect of opening a trade at Surat so promising that he had preferred to remain ashore, and send forward the vessel under the command of his first officer. The arrangement was so far opportune that Captain Keeling, who, by the departure of the Dragon, might have been left without a command, immediately assumed the command of the Hector, and proceeded with her, on the 1st of January, 1609, for the Moluccas.

The Dutch were now carrying on their trade with great spirit, and made no secret of their determination, as soon as they should establish their supremacy in the Spice Islands, to exclude all others from trading to them. Captain Keeling, in his single vessel, found it impossible to resist their arbitrary proceedings, and was obliged to carry on a precarious trade under a kind of ignominious sufferance. He succeeded, however, in obtaining a cargo of pepper, cloves, and nutmegs, and, returning to Bantam, prepared for the homeward voyage. Before departing, he placed the factory there upon a more regular footing than before. The salaries allowed strikingly illustrate the economical and even sordid spirit in which the Company made their first arrangements. Augustine Spalding, the factor, received £50 a-year. The other officials were paid monthly, as follows:—Francis Kelly, surgeon, £2, 5s. John Parsons, 30s.
Robert O'Neal, 29s.; Augustine Adwell, 24s.; Etheldred Lampre and William Driver, 20s. each; William Wilson, 22s.; William Lamwell and Philip Badnedg, 16s. each; Francisco Domingo, 12s.; Juan Seram and Adrian, 10s. each. The Hector reached the Downs in safety on the 9th of May, 1610. Before she arrived, two other voyages had been fitted out. The one, which is ranked as the fourth of the Company, had a subscription of £33,000, and was confined to two vessels, the Ascension and the Union. It proved a total loss, the former vessel having been cast away in the Gulf of Cambay while attempting to make for Surat; and the latter, after arriving in the East, and trading with some success at Acheen and Priaman, having been wrecked as she was returning in the Bay of Biscay. The other voyage, usually classed as the fifth of the Company, though properly only a branch of the third already described, was more fortunate. It consisted only of a single vessel, the Expedition, for which the subscription was £13,700. It sailed on the 24th of April, 1609, under the command of Captain David Middleton, who had previously made the successful voyage in the Consent; and after reaching Bantam on the 7th of December, continued onwards to the Moluccas, where, notwithstanding the opposition of the Dutch, he managed, with considerable dexterity, to obtain a valuable cargo, and bring it safely home to England. This voyage, thrown into one account with the third, yielded the largest return which the Company had yet obtained, the clear profit on both voyages being no less than 234 per cent.

The result of these experimental voyages made it impossible to doubt, that under the Company's charter a most lucrative trade might be established. There were, however, several formidable obstacles in the way. Among the Eastern islands the Dutch were attempting to establish a supremacy, under which they evidently meant to exclude all other nations from any share in the spice trade; while the Portuguese, by their conduct at Surat, had shown that before the English could hope to traffic with any port on the continent of India they must be prepared to repel force by force. In future, therefore, it would be necessary for the Company to carry on their operations on a larger scale, and employ vessels which, while mainly adapted for mercantile purposes, might at the same time be able to
maintain their ground against any enemy that should presume to attack them. In order to accomplish this, additional subscriptions were required; but it was doubtful if these would be forthcoming so long as the conduct of the monarch left it doubtful whether he considered himself bound by the charter which his predecessor had granted. His conduct in giving a license to Sir Edward Michelborne justified suspicion; and it was therefore almost vain to hope that new risks would be run until assurance was given that he was prepared to recognize the validity of the charter by adopting it as his own personal deed. Accordingly, in 1609, when of course six years of the original fifteen were still unexpired, the Company succeeded in obtaining from King James a new charter so nearly identical in its terms with that of his predecessor that a separate analysis of it is altogether superfluous. The only points deserving of notice are, that while the number of members specially named in Queen Elizabeth's charter amounted to 218, in that of King James it is increased to 276; that the provisions against interlopers are rendered more stringent, by an authority given to the Company to seize and confiscate the ships and goods of contraband traders in any places, whether within the British dominions or not, provided they be places where the "Company, their factors and ministers, shall trade and traffic by virtue of these our letters-patents;" and that the duration of the privileges of the charter, instead of being restricted to fifteen years, and a conditional renewal for other fifteen after the former should have expired, is made perpetual. This last clause loses much of its apparent importance by a subsequent provision, in which full power is reserved to the crown to recall the charter at any time "after three years' warning."

In the preamble to this charter, King James declared that he had found "by certain experience, that the continuance of the said Company and trade will not only be a very great honour to us, our heirs and successors, and to our realm and dominions, but also in many respects profitable unto us and our commonwealth." In this declaration, as well as in the provisions of the charter itself, there was certainly an additional security that the exclusive privileges of the Company would not be rashly infringed. To this it may have been partly owing that the
subscription for the sixth voyage was the largest that had yet been made, amounting to £82,000. Three vessels were fitted out, one of them, the _Trade’s Increase_, of 1,000 tons burden; and the command was given to Sir Henry Middleton, who had made the second voyage. He set sail in the spring of 1610, arrived in Saldanha Bay on the 24th of July, and, after doubling the Cape, sailed northwards to the island of Socotra. It would seem that the Red Sea, and not India, was the original destination; for the commander, instead of continuing his course across the Indian Ocean, left the _Pepper-Corn_, the second largest of his vessels, at Aden, and then steered for Mocha, where he was induced to believe a ready market would be found for all his merchandise. At Aden he had been unable to procure a pilot, and had ventured for some distance within the Straits of Babelmandeb without one. At last two Arabs came aboard, professing great skill in navigation. Having been intrusted with the pilotage, they ran the _Trade’s Increase_ on a sandbank shortly after the town of Mocha had been descried. The subsequent proceedings leave little doubt that it was wilfully done.

Sir Henry Middleton seems to have been little qualified for his command. When the ship could not be got off, the most valuable part of her cargo was sent ashore with the view of lightening her. He afterwards landed with many of his people without taking any precautions for safety, and, as soon as the Arabs had completed their treacherous preparations, found himself a prisoner in their hands. Ultimately, after losing many of his men and remaining a considerable time in captivity, he obtained his release, recovered his ships, and sailed for Surat, the road of which was reached on the 26th of September, 1611. Here he found a Portuguese squadron, consisting of seven frigates lying outside, and of thirteen smaller vessels inside the bar. They had heard of his arrival in the Red Sea, and, though the English were not then at war with Portugal, now made him aware that they disputed his right to trade at Surat, and would not even allow him to communicate with the Englishmen who had been left there by Captain Hawkins. This arbitrary proceeding the Portuguese admiral justified on the ground that he was invested with the office of captain-major, an office which made him guardian of all the ports in the north of India, and
warranted him in seizing all vessels which presumed to trade with any of them without his carta or permit. Arrogant as this claim appears, it is not to be denied that the possession of it by the Portuguese had long been recognized even by the native courts; and that therefore the captain-major, whose income was chiefly derived from the fees paid for these permits, had, if not justice, at least prescription on his side, when he insisted that the English vessels should retire if they could not produce a letter from the King of Spain, or his viceroy at Goa, authorizing them to trade. The peace existing at this time between Spain, Portugal, and England, so far from weakening rather strengthened the captain-major's claim, because the charter of the Company expressly prohibited them from encroaching on the rights actually possessed by friendly European powers. On the other hand, it may be argued that the prohibitory clause in the charter applied only to the actual possession of places, and never could have been meant to recognize a right which, pushed to its extreme, would have warranted the Portuguese in excluding all other nations from traffic with any part of the continent of India. Such a right would have made the Company's charter little better than waste paper; and we cannot therefore wonder that Sir Henry Middleton at once declared his determination not to recognize it.

In the correspondence which ensued he told the captain-major that he had been sent by the King of England with a letter and rich present to the Great Mughul, in order to establish the trade which his countrymen had already commenced; and that, as India was a country free to all nations, and neither the Mughul nor his people were under vassalage, he was determined to persevere, at all hazards, and, if necessary, to repel force by force. When he gave this answer he was in the belief that an extensive and lucrative trade had been, or was about to be established by the Company at Surat, but the information which he shortly after received convinced him that, for the present, all idea of establishing such a trade must be abandoned.

It has been already mentioned that Captain Hawkins, who commanded the Hector in the Company's third voyage, had, on arriving at Surat, found the prospect so flattering that he gave up the command to his first officer, and, ordering the vessel to
proceed for Bantam, resolved to remain for the purpose of establishing a factory. He had brought a letter from the King of England to the Great Mughul, and believed he could not do better than proceed to Agra and deliver it in person. The character in which he proceeded was somewhat ambiguous; for though he speaks of himself as an ambassador, he does not seem to have been furnished with his powers. His credentials, however, were deemed sufficient; and his reception at court was so gracious that he was soon regarded as one of its leading favourites. The reigning Mughul at this time was Salim, the eldest son of the great Akbar, whose latter days had been so embittered by his misconduct that he had made an ineffectual attempt to disinherit him. On mounting the throne in 1605, Salim had assumed the pompous title of Jahangir, or Conqueror of the World, but did nothing to justify it. He was, in fact, a capricious tyrant, of low, dissolute habits, who owed his continued possession of the crown, not to any talent or virtue in himself, but to the respect entertained for his father's memory, and the good order which, during his long reign, had been established in every part of the empire.

Hawkins, who must have had some previous knowledge of the Mughul's character, and could not have been long at court without obtaining a thorough insight into it, ought to have been upon his guard; but, elated with the familiarity to which he was admitted, he deluded himself with the idea that he was about to make his fortune. Not long after his arrival, which took place 16th April, 1609, Jahangir, after promising to grant all the privileges of trade which he asked for the Company, proposed that he should remain permanently with him, as the English representative, at a salary which was to begin at £3,200 and increase yearly. The bait was tempting, and Hawkins at once swallowed it. His motives are best explained by himself in a letter addressed to his employers. "I, trusting upon his promise, and seeing it was beneficial both to my nation and myselfe, being dispossessed of the benefit which I should have reaped, if I had gone to Bantam, and that after halfe a dozen of yeeres, your worships would send another man of sort in my place, in the meane time I should feather my neast and do you service; and further, perceiving great injuries offered us, by
reason the king is so farre from the ports, for all which causes above specified, I did not think it amiss to yield unto his request."

When he had thus yielded, he began to feel some of the inconveniences of court favour. Being regarded as a mere upstart, his elevation gave umbrage to many of the nobility, while several Portuguese Jesuits, who possessed considerable influence at Agra, intrigued with the greatest zeal and perseverance for the purpose of defeating the great object of his mission. In these intrigues they were so unscrupulous that Hawkins thought he had sufficient proof of a conspiracy to poison him. Being still high in favour, he stated his fears to Jahangir, who proposed a rather curious remedy. "The king," he says, "was very earnest with me to take a white mayden out of his palace," promising that he "would give her all things necessary, with slaves," that "shee should turne Christian," and "by this meanes my meates and drinkes should be looked into by them, and I should live without feare." Hawkins objected to the maiden proposed, "in regard she was a Moore," but he added, "if so bee there could bee a Christian found, I would accept it." Jahangir took him at his word, and produced the orphan daughter of an Armenian Christian, a captain who had been highly esteemed by Akbar. "I little thought," says Hawkins, "a Christian's daughter could bee found;" but now, "I seeing she was of so honest a descent, having passed my word to the king, could not withstand my fortunes. Wherefore I tooke her; and for want of a minister, before Christian witnesses I married her: the priest was my man Nicholas, which I thought had beene lawfull, till I met with a preacher that came with Sir Henry Middleton, and hee shewing mee the error, I was newly marryed againe: so ever after I lived content and without feare, shee being willing to goe where I went, and live as I lived."

This marriage, though entered into under unpromising circumstances, appears to have proved happy. If so, it was the only good thing which Captain Hawkins obtained at Agra. Instead of being able, as he had hoped, to feather his nest, he ultimately found that he had only been building castles in the air. The salary promised him was never paid; and courtiers, bribed by the Portuguese, having succeeded in convincing
Jahangir that a breach with them would prove more pernicious than a league with the English promised, to be beneficial, the fickle and unprincipled monarch cancelled all the promises he had made of conferring commercial privileges on the English, and left Hawkins to find his way to the coast as he best could.

Such was the information which made Sir Henry Middleton despair of being able to establish a factory at Surat. If he had continued to have any doubts on the subject, they would have been dissipated by the natives themselves, who, while they assured him of their anxiety to trade, confessed that so long as the Portuguese retained their ascendancy, they durst not venture to incur their displeasure. Their advice therefore was, that the English vessels should quit Surat for the port of Gogo, in the Gulf of Cambay, where, it was said, the Portuguese would be less likely to interfere. Sir Henry Middleton had another plan in view; and, after succeeding in taking on board Captain Hawkins and his wife, who had arrived from Agra, and the Englishmen who had been left at Surat, called a council for the purpose of determining their future course. At this council, says Sir Henry, “I propounded whether it were best to goe from hence directly for Priaman, Bantam, &c., or to returne to the Red Sea, there to meete with such Indian shippes as should be bound thither; and for that they would not deale with us at their owne doores, wee having come so far with commodities fitting their countrie, nowhere else in India vendable, I thought we should doe oursels some right, and them no wrong, to cause them barter with us—wee to take their indicoes and other goods of theirs as they were worth, and they to take ours in lieu thereof.” The latter proposal, though carrying injustice and spoliation on the very face of it, was unanimously preferred by the council; and the ships of a Company, invested by the crown with exclusive privileges for the purpose of carrying on a legitimate trade, deliberately set out on a marauding expedition which virtually made every man connected with it a pirate.

While Sir Henry Middleton was thus detaining and rifting all the vessels from India which were so unfortunate as to fall into his hands, other three vessels—the Clove, Hector, and Thomas—fitted out under the auspices of the Company, sailed from England on the 18th of April, 1611, under the command of
Captain John Saris. Like those which Sir Henry commanded, their first destination was the Red Sea. As a means of securing a favourable reception at the different ports with which trade might be attempted, a firman or pass had been obtained from the sultan at Constantinople, by the intervention of the English ambassador there. In this document, addressed to all the “great viceroys and beglerbegs who are on the way (both by sea and land), from my most happy and imperial throne, to the confines of the East Indies,” they are strictly enjoined “kindly and courteously to entertain and receive the merchants and subjects of Great Britain, coming or passing through or by any of our dominions, with a view to trade to the territories of Yemen, Aden, and Mocha, and the parts adjoining, by assisting and relieving them with all things necessary for themselves, their men, i* and ships; and, in general, by yielding unto them “such offices of benevolence and humanity as shall be meet and convenient to be yielded unto honest men and strangers undertaking so long and painful a voyage.”

Fortified with this recommendation, Captain Saris had anticipated little difficulty in opening a traffic with the subjects of the sultan in the Red Sea, and was therefore mortified when, on arriving at the island of Socotra, he received a letter which had been left by Sir Henry Middleton, acquainting him with his proceedings and warning him against Turkish treachery. Though his hopes of peaceful trade were now faint, he determined to test the efficacy of his firman, and with that view sailed directly for Mocha. His reception was encouraging; and, by judicious management and the exercise of forbearance, past jealousies and fears might have been forgotten; but there seems to have been little sincerity on either side, and Saris, on meeting with some obstructions, hastily quitted the port and returned to the Straits of Babelmandeb. Here he found Sir Henry Middleton engaged in pillaging, and instead of repudiating his proceedings, was tempted to become a sharer in them. Sir Henry’s account of the unworthy compact for “romaging the Indian ships” is as follows:—“At last we agreed and sealed it in writings interchangeable, that he should have one-third part of what should be taken, paying for the same as I did, for the service of his three ships in the action; leaving the disposing of the ships afterward to me, who had sustayned the wrongs.”
When, by means of these violent proceedings, flimsily disguised under the name of barter, the depredators had possessed themselves of a sufficient quantity of Surat cloths and other Indian goods, for which a ready market could be found in the Eastern Archipelago, they set sail in that direction. Sir Henry Middleton was again unfortunate; and after learning that the Trade's Increase, which he had ordered to follow while he went forward with the Pepper-Corn, had been wrecked on a coral reef, died broken-hearted at the isle of Machian, one of the Moluccas. Captain Saris, after spending some time in the same group, sailed for the isles of Japan, where the Company had resolved to establish a factory. On the 11th of June, 1613, he cast anchor near Firando. Though he found the Dutch already installed, and disposed, not only to watch, but to thwart his proceedings, a letter from the King of England, and a valuable present to the emperor, procured him a favourable reception, and he had little difficulty in making arrangements for permanent trade. The voyage commanded by Sir Henry Middleton, notwithstanding the loss of the Trade's Increase, yielded 121 per cent; that by Captain Saris, 218 per cent. But it is evident, from the above account of their proceedings, that these returns have no title whatever to be classed, as they usually are, under the head of mercantile profits.

About the same time when Captain Saris set out on his voyage, a single vessel, the Globe, had been despatched from England, under the command of Captain Anthony Hippon. Her course, differing considerably from that which had hitherto been followed, deserves to be traced. After touching at the Point-de-Galle, on the island of Ceylon, the Globe, instead of proceeding directly to Bantam, turned northward into the Bay of Bengal, and followed the line of the Coromandel coast, which was thus visited by a Company ship for the first time, though it had long before been frequented by both the Portuguese and Dutch. On arriving at Pulicat, Captain Hippon, with the sanction of the native authorities, sent some of his people ashore, and was making arrangements for trade when the president of the Dutch factory, producing a document said to have been executed by the King of Golconda, and conferring the exclusive privilege of trade on those who had received Prince Maurice's permit,
peremptorily ordered them to depart. Captain Hippon, though little disposed to yield obedience to this arrogant mandate, was not in a condition to dispute it, more especially as he was anxious to take advantage of the approaching monsoon. He therefore proceeded north as far as Masulipatam, leaving some of his people as the nucleus of a factory at Petapoli, situated on the coast at some distance south of that town, and then shaped his course for Bantam, which was reached on the 26th of April, 1612. From Bantam the Globe proceeded first to Patany, on the east coast of the peninsula of Malacca, and then to Siam, establishing factories at both. On the homeward voyage Masulipatam and Pulicat were again visited. In this way, though in very humble beginnings, a foundation was laid for that intercourse with the Bay of Bengal which was afterwards to be so largely developed, and to yield such magnificent results.

The efforts of the Company, which had hitherto been of an experimental and very desultory character, had certainly done little to justify their title to a charter which invested them with the exclusive privilege of trading in nearly three quarters of the globe. In the Eastern isles, to which they had at first resorted, they were completely overborne by the Dutch, and were barely able to maintain a precarious existence; in the Red Sea, in which, without any great temptation, they had rather invidiously endeavoured to carry off a share of the traffic which properly belonged to the Turkey Company, they had not only failed, but recklessly damaged their mercantile character by exhibiting themselves as lawless depredators; and on the whole continent of India there was not a single port at which they had obtained a permanent footing. Had Queen Elizabeth been spared to reign, the affairs of the Company would in all probability have presented a very different appearance. She had expected, in granting the charter, that the Company would at least rival, if not outstrip the Dutch; and, before the result of the first voyage was known, had, in a letter from which we have already quoted, upbraided the directors with their sluggishness in not preparing for a second. Such being her feelings, she would doubtless have insisted that the Company should either carry on their operations on a grander scale, or resign their exclusive privileges. Had they chosen the former
alternative, she would have backed them with all the power of her government, and they would have had no reason to complain of unredressed injuries by Dutch or Portuguese. Very different was the conduct of King James, whose pusillanimity only encouraged aggression, and left the Company unaided to battle with their formidable opponents. To this cause, doubtless, is mainly to be ascribed the unsatisfactory progress which the Company had yet made. In almost every port which they visited, they found European rivals prepared to undermine them by intrigue, or crush them by open violence.

The course which the Company ought to have taken in such circumstances is very obvious, though it was long before they summoned courage to adopt it. Instead of sending out a few straggling vessels, which were unprovided with the means of repelling insult and outrage, they should have fitted out a fleet, and armed it fully with all the munitions of war. Some such resolution appears to have been adopted in preparing for the eighth voyage, which consisted of the Dragon and Hoseander, or Osiander, afterwards joined by the James and Solomon, and was commanded by Captain Thomas Best. The two first vessels sailed from Gravesend on the 1st of February, 1612, and arrived in the Swally or road of Surat in the beginning of September. Notwithstanding the discouraging account given by Captain Hawkins, little difficulty was found in opening a communication with the town; and Mr. Kerridge, who appears to have been a factor in the Osiander, was soon able to put Captain Best in possession of a sealed certificate giving the English authority to trade. As it wanted some of the requisite formalities, some doubts were entertained of its validity, and before these were solved the Portuguese again made their appearance. Besides an immense fleet of merchantmen, numbering 200 sail, and giving a striking idea of the extent of trade which the Portuguese must then have carried on with the north coast of India, there were four war galleons, which had come with the avowed determination of expelling the English. Captain Best was well prepared for them, and deeming it unnecessary to wait till he was attacked, at once assumed the offensive. On the 29th of November, placing himself in the Dragon, about two cables' length from the Portuguese vice-admiral, the depth of water not
allowing him to go nearer, "I began," he says, "to play upon him with both great and small shot, that by an houre we had well peppered him." The following day the fight was renewed, and with still more success on the part of the English, who again defeated the Portuguese, and drove "three of their foure shippes on ground on the sands thwart of the Barre of Surat." These having again been got off, the Portuguese attempted repeatedly to repair their disgrace, but always with the same result.

The success which the English had thus gained over a superior force, proved far more effectual than their previous attempts at negotiation, and Jahangir, becoming as anxious to secure their alliance as he had previously been indifferent or averse to it, entered into a treaty in regular form. The principal clauses in this treaty were:—That the English should have full freedom of trade in his dominions; that their persons, while ashore, should be protected from the Portuguese; that their imports should pay only 3½ per cent as customs; that in cases of death no fees should be demanded, and the goods of the deceased should be delivered up to the first English ships which might subsequently arrive; that in cases of wrong, redress should be speedily obtained; and that an English ambassador should be received, and permitted to reside at the Mughul court. This important treaty was finally delivered, with much formality, to Captain Best at Swally, on the 6th of February, 1613.

A great object had now been gained. The Portuguese claim to control the trade had been expressly disowned by the Great Mughul himself, and a permanent footing had been secured in several large commercial emporiums, where considerable sales of English goods could be made on favourable terms, and an unlimited supply obtained of the goods best fitted both for the home market and for barter against the spices of the Indian Archipelago. The affairs of the Company thus assumed a more promising appearance than they had ever presented before, and capital for future investments began to flow into their coffers. It was scarcely possible that, in these circumstances, the desultory mode of management hitherto pursued could be continued; and in the determination announced by the directors to abandon the system of separate adventures, and trade in future on a
joint stock, we see nothing more than a necessary result of their altered and improved position.

The resolution to trade in future on a joint stock, under the immediate management of the Company, must have been favourably received, as a sum of £429,000 was raised for the purpose, and apportioned in fitting out four voyages, which were to: all successively in the years 1613, 1614, 1615, and 1616. The fleets were larger than had been previously employed: the first two consisting of eight vessels each, the third of six, and the fourth of seven. The voyages themselves possess little interest; but the results, though not so extravagant as when they were swelled by the spoliation of native ships, were on the whole satisfactory, as the average return of profit was 87½ per cent. The most important incidents which occurred during the performance of these voyages were—a new encounter with the Portuguese in the road of Swally, in January, 1615, when a large fleet, under the command of the Viceroy of Goa in person, having wantonly attacked the English, was signally defeated, with the loss of 350 men; a declaration of war between the Portuguese and the Great Mughul, and a consequent strengthening of the English alliance with the latter; and the arrival of Sir Thomas Roe, invested with full powers to act as ambassador from the King of England.

This embassy, undertaken in accordance with one of the stipulations in the treaty above mentioned, had the interest of the Company mainly for its object, and was therefore maintained entirely at their expense. Sir Thomas Roe arrived in the end of 1615, and continued to be a resident at the Mughul court till the end of 1618. Though his recognized character, and the judicious manner in which he acted, gave him much more influence than Hawkins, it is impossible to read his journal without being satisfied that the Company, in employing an ambassador at all, had committed a blunder. Points of etiquette which his position as ambassador would not allow him to yield, were apt to bring him into collision with the Mughul himself, or the higher members of his court; and he gave it as his decided opinion, that as the object of his mission was only mercantile, a native agent duly authorized, and maintained at an expense of £100 a-year, would secure it better than ten ambassadors.
While thus candidly condemning the policy which had made him ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe lost no opportunity of furthering the interests of the Company; and on several occasions, by counterworking intrigues, and obtaining redress of grievances, undoubtedly contributed to place the English trade on a stable footing, and prepare it for the larger development which it at last received. Still, it must be confessed that the most valuable service which he rendered, was in writing a journal which makes us intimately acquainted with all his transactions, and contains a most graphic description of Jahangir and his court. The subject has been already alluded to when mentioning the adventures of Captain Hawkins; but the information of the journal, as well as that derived from other sources, will justify some additional details.

Jahangir, after succeeding his father in 1605, made great professions of moderation, but his bad habits soon resumed their ascendancy; and in the second year of his reign, on the suppression of a rebellion, headed by his eldest son Khusrav, who claimed the throne as the nominee of his grandfather Akbar, he gave full scope to his ferocity, by ordering 700 of the captured rebels to be impaled in a line leading from the gate of Lahore. In the sixth year of his reign (1611), he contracted a marriage with Nur Jahan, a celebrated beauty, whose husband had perished in defending his honour against Jahangir’s intrigues. This event gave a colour to his future reign. Her ascendancy over him was unbounded, and was employed by her less unworthily than might have been anticipated. In early life he had become excessively addicted to wine and opium, and while Hawkins resided at his court, was so completely enslaved by this vicious habit, that his daily routine is described as follows:—“His prayers being ended, four or five sortes of very well dressed and roasted meats are brought him, of which, as he pleaseth, he eateth a bit to stay his stomacke, drinking once of his strong drinke. Then he cometh for the into a private roome, where none can come but such as himself nominateth. In this place he drinketh other five cupfuls, which is the portion that the physicians allot him. This done he eateth opium, and then he ariseth, and being in the height of his drinke, he layeth him downe to sleep, every man departing to his owne home; and after he hath slept two houres, they awake
him and bring his supper to him, at which time he is not able to feed himselfe, but it is thruste into his mouth by others; and this is about one of the clocke, and then he sleepeth the rest of the night."

The government of such a disgusting drunkard could not be well conducted; and though the administrative talents of his wife, Nur Jahan, and the military prowess of his son, Prince Khurram, afterwards better known by his title of Shah Jahan, prevented the confusion which must otherwise have taken place, the court was a scene of constant intrigue, and corruption was rampant in every branch of the public service. Such was the state of matters when Sir Thomas Roe arrived. On first landing at Surat, he found the governor enriching himself by seizing the goods of merchants, and insisting on their being sold to him at prices of his own fixing. On advancing into the interior, he was everywhere struck with signs of devastation and neglect; and on his reaching the court, though he could not but be struck with the magnificence which surrounded the monarch, as he sat on his throne all covered with diamonds, pearls, and rubies, his admission to the drinking parties above described, when, with the exception of himself and a few grave personages, scarcely an individual remained sober, soon convinced him how little dependence could he placed on any arrangements that could be made with one who was so little master of himself.

Even at the time of Sir Thomas Roe’s residence, Jahangir’s sons, convinced that his drunken habits must speedily terminate his life, had begun to intrigue for the succession; and yet, such was the strength of his constitution, that his reign was prolonged for other ten years, and did not terminate till 1627. During part of this time, indeed, he could scarcely be said to possess the throne, as his sons were openly at war either with him or with each other; and the year before he died, he was some months a prisoner in the hands of one of his generals. On regaining his liberty, he set out on his annual visit to Kashmir, but had not long arrived before he was seized with a violent illness, and died on the way back to Lahore.
The Massacre of Amboyna

By the treaty with the Great Mughul, the Company had not only gained full access to the continent of India, but been enabled to arrange a regular course of interchanges, from which a great increase of mercantile profits was anticipated. At Surat, though the sales of English imports were limited, reasonable purchases could be made of the cloths and other goods which were in great demand at Bantam and other stations established in the Indian Archipelago, and could, in consequence, be advantageously exchanged against pepper and other spices, which were at first regarded as the most important staples of the Eastern trade. With the view of extending these exchanges, other stations along the coast of India were gradually adopted, and the vessels of the Company began regularly to frequent all the leading ports both on the Malabar and the Coromandel coasts, and still further north to the mouths of the Ganges.

The ample scope for traffic thus afforded was more than sufficient to give full employment for all the capital which the Company had yet been able to raise; but their ambition appears always to have been larger than their means, and they resolved to turn their attention to Persia. An important trade with this country had long been carried on by the Levant Company, but war had begun to rage between the Turks and Persians, and the usual channel of intercourse being thus interrupted, it was resolved to take advantage of the circumstance, and endeavour permanently to transfer the trade from the Levant to the Persian Gulf. The attempt thus to interfere with the monopoly of another British chartered company was rather ungenerous; and it may have been partly on this account that Sir Thomas Roe not only decidedly disapproved of it, but endeavoured,
on his own responsibility, to prevent it from being carried into effect. The flattering representations of the factors of Surat, however, prevailed; and a vessel was despatched to the port of Jask, situated a little east of the entrance of the Persian Gulf, with a small sum of money, and a cargo of English broadcloths, kerseys, lead, tin, iron, cutlery, &c., to be exchanged for Persian silks. The adventure proved successful; and ultimately a regular trade was established between the Persian Gulf, Surat, and Bantam.

It had been foreseen that this trade could not be established without coming into fierce collision with the Portuguese, who had long possessed it as an exclusive monopoly; but the signal successes which had been gained over them when they attempted to prevent the establishment of an English factory at Surat, appear to have satisfied the Company and their agents that Portuguese hostility was rather to be courted than feared, as, in all probability, a rich harvest of prizes would be made. The event proved as had been anticipated. The Portuguese, now in a state of rapid decline, made pretensions, and endeavoured to support them by hostilities, which only led to their discomfiture, and they had the mortification of seeing the English not only secured in their trade, but in high favour at the Persian court, and formally leagued with its monarch in an offensive and defensive alliance.

The favourable aspect which the affairs of the Company now bore had a visible effect in filling up the subscription to a new joint stock, which started in 1617-18, with the large capital of £1,600,000. At this time the number of proprietors of stock amounted to 954, and the number of ships possessed by them is stated at thirty-six, of 100 to 1,000 tons burden. The capital subscribed was allotted to three voyages, the first consisting of nine, and each of the other two of eight ships. Before the last of these voyages was undertaken, a remarkable change took place in the arrangements of the Company.

In the Eastern islands the Dutch not only claimed supremacy, but had actually established it. They had, however, tacitly acknowledged the Company's right of traffic, at least to a limited extent, and nutmegs, mace, and cloves formed part of the usual returns imported from the East into England. The larger
scale on which the Company’s operations were now about to be carried on having afforded the Dutch a pretext for interfering, they plainly intimated their determination to reserve the trade in the finer spices as an exclusive monopoly. They rested their claim on the fact that they had conquered the Spice Islands from the Portuguese, and being in actual possession of them, had a right recognized by the very charter of the London East India Company to debar all other parties from frequenting them. So satisfied were they with the validity of this claim, that, instead of regarding themselves as unlawful aggressors in the violent steps which they had taken to exclude the English, they assumed the character of complainers, and in 1618 presented a memorial to King James, in which, after stating what they called their grievances, they prayed for redress of past, and a prohibition of future encroachments. The London East India Company told a very different tale; and after enumerating the various forms of obstruction and oppression to which they had been subjected in carrying on their trade at Bantam, where their right of factory could not be disputed, and in endeavouring to extend it to islands over which the Dutch could not pretend to have established any exclusive authority, they besought the king to interfere in their behalf, and protect them against a violence which, though unprovoked, had become intolerable.

It was impossible that matters could remain as they were; but King James, in accordance with his usual policy, only temporized by engaging in a course of intricate and protracted negotiation. Ultimately, a kind of understanding was arrived at, and an agreement, acquiesced in by all parties, was formally concluded at London on the 7th of July, 1619. The leading stipulations were, that all excesses on either side should be forgiven; that the ships and property which had been seized should be mutually restored; that each nation should have the free privilege of trade to the East, without any limitation as to the capital which might be employed; that both companies should strive to diminish customs and other exactions, and regulate the market by purchasing at prices previously arranged by common agents; that, in sharing the purchases thus made, the pepper should be equally divided between the companies,
but only a third of the finer spices should be apportioned to the English; that the forts actually built should remain with their present possessors, but that all future forts acquired in the Moluccas or elsewhere by the common industry or common force should be possessed and garrisoned jointly; and that attempts should be made at the common expense to establish trade in new places, and especially in China. In order to give effect to this treaty, which was to last for twenty years, a special machinery was obviously required. Accordingly, a “Council of Defence” was instituted. It consisted of eight members, four from each company; and to make the equality still more complete, the members of each company were to preside alternately. To this council large powers were committed. Twenty ships, furnished in equal portions by each company, were to be maintained for war purposes, and not permitted, except under special circumstances, to be employed in the transport of merchandise. These ships, and more if necessary, were to be placed under the immediate authority of the council of defence, which was empowered to distribute them at different stations, and provide for the maintenance of the sailors and soldiers employed, by handing over the proceeds of the dues and customs, particularly in the Moluccas, to the treasurers of the companies. When the vessels employed sustained damage by storm or similar misfortune, the loss was to be borne by the company to which they belonged; but when they suffered in the common cause, as in war, a different rule was to be observed, and reparation was to be made at the common expense. To prevent the disputes which might thus arise, each ship, when placed on the station, was to be valued, in order that, at any future time, the amount of deterioration produced during its employment on active service might be easily ascertained. All questions arising between the companies were to be settled by the council of defence, and in the event of their being equally divided, the sovereigns of the companies were to act as arbitrators.

Had this treaty been honestly and candidly acted upon, it would not only have given the Dutch and English a complete supremacy in the East, but provided equitably for their separate interests. The two-thirds of the finer spices allotted to the Dutch could scarcely be considered more than their exertions
tions in rooting out the Spanish and Portuguese entitled them to expect; and the English, who saw themselves in danger of being excluded altogether, might have been satisfied when they were secured in a certain portion, which could not be diminished. The management, too, was fairly adjusted; and it is not easy to see how it was possible, under such a management, for one of the companies to overrule the other. Such, however, was the charge brought against their colleagues by the English, who complained that everything vague in the treaty was interpreted to their disadvantage, and that their funds were seized and appropriated to purposes in which they had no special interest. The truth seems to be, that though both companies professed to acquiesce in the treaty, neither of them was satisfied with it; and hence both, while eager to avail themselves of all the advantages which the treaty conferred, had no scruple in endeavouring to evade the obligations which it imposed. The Dutch, who believed that they could easily have driven their rivals out of the Molucca trade altogether, grumbled at being compelled to cede a whole third of it; while the English, who had never at any former period fitted out ten vessels on a single voyage for mercantile purposes, found it impossible to carry on their trade, while the larger portion of their capital was required to fit out vessels for war purposes only. The interest of the parties being thus apparently adverse, it is easy to understand how their former rivalry revived, and their enmity, instead of being suppressed, became more inveterate. This fact was soon to be demonstrated by a fearful tragedy.

In the island of Amboyna the English, under the authority of the treaty, had established a factory and several agencies. The whole power, however, was in the hands of the Dutch. The strong castle of Amboyna, which they possessed at the date of the treaty, remained under their own entire control; throughout the island they far outnumbered all other Europeans, and in its harbours were ships of war as well as merchant vessels, on whose assistance they could confidently calculate in any emergency. In such circumstances there was no external force from which they could seriously apprehend any danger; and yet, on the ground that a conspiracy had been formed for the purpose of wrestling the island from them, the Dutch authorities proceeded, in the name of law and justice, but in gross and
manifest violation of both, to perpetrate an atrocity which has left a stain on the national character.

According to their own account, part of their garrison in the castle of Amboyna consisted of natives of Japan. One of these, having incurred suspicion by the minuteness of his inquiries as to the state and defences of the place, was apprehended, and on examination divulged a plot, into which other eight of his countrymen and the English in the service of the London East India Company had entered, for the purpose of seizing the castle of Amboyna, and thereby making themselves masters of the island. The Japanese, whose names their countryman had mentioned while under torture, were first apprehended, and being subjected to the same horrible process, not only confessed their own guilt, but implicated the leading members of the English factory. After a short interval the English thus denounced were seized; and, partly under the terror of being tortured, and partly under the actual application of it, confirmed the statements of the Japanese. On the evidence thus extorted, a conviction was obtained; and sentence of death was not only pronounced, but actually inflicted on nine natives of Japan, one Portuguese, and twelve Englishmen. Among the last were Captain Gabriel Towerson, the English agent at Amboyna, and several of his factors and assistants.

In endeavouring to defend this proceeding, the Dutch dwell particularly on the uniformity of the confession made by the unhappy sufferers; but they omit to mention that, at the time when torture was inflicted, the answers desired to be obtained were actually suggested, and the accused, instead of being simply called upon to state the truth, were asked, while writhing in agony or threatened with it, whether they had not entered into the plot with which they were charged—whether such and such proposals had not been made—whether such and such plans had not been arranged—and whether a particular day, also named, had not been fixed for carrying them into execution. In this way, not by fair interrogatories, but by a series of leading questions, the answers were made to assume a degree of consistency well calculated to conceal or disguise the monstrous absurdities which the whole charge carried on the face of it. It ought also to be borne in mind, that the confessions which had been extorted were afterwards solemnly
retracted in the interval between the sentence and the execution, and that all the victims died protesting their innocence.

Even admitting that the suspicion of some kind of plot was not altogether groundless, the extreme measures adopted by the Dutch authorities are utterly incapable of vindication. The danger, if it ever existed, vanished the moment it was discovered. Where, then, was the necessity of hurrying on the trial while the accused remained without the means of providing a proper defence; or of executing it, without allowing them the opportunity of bringing a sentence which they held to be iniquitous under review? The Council of Defence, to which all questions affecting the interests of the companies had been specially referred, was still in existence. Where was the danger of a delay which would have submitted the judgment to its revisal? These are questions which the Dutch have found it impossible to answer; and the bloody deed of Amboyna, perpetrated on the 27th of February, 1623; therefore, remains to this day justly branded as a massacre.

When tidings of the massacre reached England, the public indignation was inflamed to such a pitch that all idea of amicable arrangement was abandoned; and even King James, forgetting his lethargic and mean-spirited policy, began to talk openly of war. He had even issued letters of reprisal, authorizing the injured parties to seek redress at their own hands, and seemed bent on measures still more decisive, when his inglorious career was brought to a close. The Dutch, dexterously availed themselves of the opportunities afforded by a new reign to protract negotiations, and managed to spin out a series of years, making fair promises of giving redress, but always, evading the performance of them. This crafty line of policy was only too successful, in consequence of the embarrassments in which Charles I was soon involved. The seeds of a civil war had been thickly sown in England even during his father's lifetime; and all other questions became comparatively insignificant when once public attention began to be fixed on the great contest which was to decide the fate of the English monarchy.

While this dispute was pending, the affairs of the Company were often at a very low ebb. In the Indian Archipelago, station after station was abandoned in order to escape from the oppres-
sion of the Dutch; and in various other quarters so many untoward events occurred, that the Company, unable to prosecute any regular system of trade, were obliged to rest satisfied with shifting expedients, sometimes successful, but oftener productive only of disappointment. Their stock in consequence, instead of commanding a premium, could with difficulty be sold at a considerable discount. It cannot be denied that, amidst these discouragements, much perseverance was displayed. Every opening for trade was eagerly embraced. When that with Persia threatened to prove unproductive, the Red Sea was again resorted to; and when misunderstandings with the Mughul endangered the factory at Surat, new stations were found on the opposite coast of the Indian peninsula. Here for some time the principal factory had its seat at Masulipatam; but the extortions of the governor having become intolerable, a new locality was obtained, in 1628, at Armegon, situated on the Coromandel coast about seventy miles north of Madras. The factory established at Armegon was substituted for that of Masulipatam, and is remarkable as the first station on the continent of India which the Company were permitted to fortify. The advantage which it thus possessed promised at one time to make it a great emporium; but the situation proved inconvenient, and the governor of Masulipatam, anxious to recover the revenue which he had lost by the withdrawal of the Company's trade, offered terms so favourable, that they were again induced to make that port their principal station.

During these transactions the Dutch question continued open, and many attempts were made, by commissioners appointed for that purpose, to obtain an equitable adjustment. In proportion, however, as the domestic difficulties of the king increased, the Dutch were emboldened to refuse redress; and the Company, losing patience, took the remarkable step of placing themselves in direct communication with parliament. Hitherto they had existed merely as creatures of the crown, and on several occasions had been made to feel how little dependence was to be placed on its countenance and support. King James, at the very commencement of his reign, virtually ignored Queen Elizabeth's charter, in the license by which he empowered Sir Edward Michelborne to trade within the prohibited limits; and
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on a subsequent occasion, even after he had made the charter his own by renewing and confirming it, he leagued with his worthless favourite, the Duke of Buckingham, in arresting the ships of the Company, for the purpose of extorting a share in the prize money which they were alleged to have gained when assisting the Persians against the Portuguese in the capture of Ormuz. As yet, King Charles had not been implicated in any overt attack on the privileges or interests of the Company; but the sluggish manner in which he urged their claim to redress for the injuries sustained from the Dutch must have satisfied them that, at the best, he was a very lukewarm friend. It is not surprising, therefore, that when, in 1628, the great struggle between the king and the parliament assumed a definite shape by the presentation of the celebrated Petition of Right, the Company, impatient of the interminable delays to which they had been subjected, took the bold step of withdrawing their case from the exclusive cognizance of the crown by bringing it directly under the notice of the legislature. Their memorial, prepared with this view, besides enumerating the hardships under which they laboured, founded their claims to public support on the benefits which they had, as a company, conferred on the nation. The question as to the expediency of the peculiar privileges which their charter conferred was thus fairly raised, and would doubtless have been fully discussed had not the parliament been suddenly dissolved before the memorial could be taken into consideration.

The memorial, implying, as it obviously did, a censure on the dilatoriness of the crown, and amounting to what many regarded as an interference with the royal prerogative, must have been very offensive to the king; but more urgent concerns engrossed his attention, and he so far concealed his displeasure as not only to leave the chartered rights of the Company unimpaired, but occasionally to issue proclamations in their favour. One of these proclamations, dated 19th February, 1631, deals with an internal abuse, and gives a striking manifestation of the helpless, or at least desponding state into which the Company must have fallen before they deemed it necessary to seek the protection of the king against their own servants. The plan originally adopted of giving an interest in each voyage
to all the persons employed in it had never been abandoned, and accordingly even common soldiers and sailors had been permitted to trade on their own account in certain specified articles. The quantity of space allowed to each for this private trade was a chest 4 feet long, $1\frac{1}{2}$ foot wide, and $1\frac{3}{4}$ foot deep. Under the cover of this permission, it appears that smuggling was carried on to such an extent as both to defraud the public revenue and diminish the Company's legitimate profits. The proclamation specially directed against this smuggling, "whereby the said Company's general affairs are of late much declined and decayed, and the adventurers therein much discouraged," intimates that in future greater vigilance will be exercised, and calls upon all officers to exert themselves to the utmost against those who, not satisfied with the specified amount of licensed traffic, and "the extraordinary great wages which they (the Company) are accustomed to pay in their employments," were ungratefully and ungenerously undermining their employers by "driving a secret underhand trade." The abuse thus denounced was surely one with which the Company themselves ought to have been fully prepared to deal, and it is almost piteous to see them virtually confessing their incompetency by calling in extraneous aid to assist them in their internal management. Even without the aid of government, it could not have been difficult to strike at the root of the evil by withdrawing the licence which made its detection almost impossible, and declaring that in future all the servants of the Company would be paid by fixed salaries and wages. The very opposite course was adopted; and the proclamation, while denouncing the evil, proceeds very preposterously to increase it, by announcing that the licence to carry on private trade, instead of being prohibited, would remain as before in the case of the lower classes of servants, and in the case of the higher classes would be extended, so as to give many of them double the quantity of private tonnage which had previously been allowed.

It would have been strange if the Company, while proclaiming their own incompetency and sanctioning gross mismanagement, could have prospered even under favourable circumstances; and unfortunately at this very time a series of events took place which placed their affairs in great jeopardy. The
Dutch had made good their footing at Surat, and greatly reduced the profits of the trade by a formidable competition. In the Persian Gulf, where, in addition to the ordinary profits of trade, the Company had obtained a permanent grant of half the customs levied at the port of Gomberoon, their position was endangered not only by a new succession to the throne, but by an attempt of the Portuguese to recapture Ormuz. In the Eastern Archipelago the spice trade had been almost extinguished, and the factory of Bantam, which, as it was the earliest, had long held precedence of all the other stations of the Company, became so unimportant as to be reduced to an agency dependent on Surat, which alone was now governed by a president and council. While thus beset with difficulties, the trade of the Company was brought almost to a stand in India by the devastation of a large portion of the country by a famine, followed as usual by a pestilence; and in England by the state of ferment into which all minds were now thrown by the approaching civil broils.

The best thing that can be said for the Company during this gloomy period is that they never abandoned themselves to despair, and even while losing ground, were always on the alert to take advantage of any favourable opening which might occur. In this way their success was often greater than they could have ventured to anticipate. The new Persian monarch, Shah Sufi, issued firmans reinstating them in all their former privileges, including the grant of the customs of Gomberoon, which, in 1632, yielded as the Company's share 550 tomans, a sum equal to £1,650 sterling. In the same year the factory at Masulipatam, which had been abandoned in consequence of the extortion and oppression of the governor, was re-established on favourable conditions by the express authority of the King of Golkunda, to whom the territory belonged; while Armegon, though abandoned as a commercial emporium, acquired new importance from the additional strength given to its fortifications. A secure asylum was thus obtained within the Bay of Bengal, to which the attention of the Company was now more especially directed.

During Sir Thomas Roe's embassy to the Great Mughul Jahangir, a firman had been obtained, in general terms autho-
rizing the English to trade in Bengal. The importance of the permission thus granted appears not to have been appreciated, and no use had been made of it when Jahangir's reign terminated by his death in 1627. During the reign of his son Shah Jahan, whose favour the English generally enjoyed, the idea of a Bengal trade was revived; and in 1634 a firman was obtained, which threw the whole trade of the province open to the Company, subject to the restriction that their ships were to resort only to the port of Piply or Peipley. This place, situated on the Subunreka ten miles above its mouth, and within a short distance of the estuary of the Hughli, had a very indifferent harbour, but possessed the important advantage of giving immediate access to a country of almost inexhaustible resources, with an immense industrial population, from whom an indefinite supply of the fine white cloths suited equally for the English, the Persian, and the south-eastern markets, might at all times be obtained. The prospect of a revival of trade seemed in consequence so promising, that new efforts were made; and Bantam, with the view of being again made a central emporium between the Indian peninsula and the Spice Islands, was once more restored to the dignity of a presidency. In the midst of this apparent success, an event took place by which the very existence of the Company was threatened.
Rival Companies

As the contests carried on between the Company and the Portuguese had long been productive only of mischief to both, a mutual desire for arrangement was felt. While they were wasting their strength the Dutch were continuing their successful career, and threatening to involve them in a common ruin. In these circumstances little difficulty was found in opening a friendly communication with the Viceroy of Goa, and forming a truce which, if approved by their sovereigns, might afterwards be converted into a permanent treaty. Under this truce, which gave each of the contracting parties free access, for all commercial purposes, to the ports and factories of the other, the Company naturally anticipated a large extension of traffic, and had begun to make the necessary preparations with that view, when they were startled by the information that King Charles had granted license to a new body of mercantile adventurers, for the special purpose of appropriating the advantages which the truce was expected to confer.

This extraordinary proceeding, which took place in 1635, was probably the result of a variety of causes. It may be that Charles, while he concealed his displeasure at the memorial which the Company presented to parliament in 1628, had never forgotten it, and was therefore not unwilling to avail himself of the first opportunity which offered to take his revenge. The very bitter terms in which the past conduct of the Company is stigmatized, certainly savours of vindictiveness. On different occasions his majesty had borne strong and willing testimony to the honour and benefit which the Company had conferred on the nation at large, whereas the establishment of a rival association is now justified expressly on the ground that "in
all this time, since the erection of the said East India Company, notwithstanding the manifold privileges granted to them, they had neither so settled and planted trade in those parts, nor made any such fortification or place of surety, as might give assurance or encouragement to any, in future times, to adventure to trade there; neither had we received any annual benefit from thence (as other princes did), by reason of the said Company's neglect in fortifying." They "had merely intended and pursued their own present profit and advantage, without providing any safety or settledness for establishing of traffick in the said Indies for the good of posterity, or for longer time than it should please the natives or inhabitants there to permit the continuance thereof." The conduct of the Company in this respect is contrasted with that of the Portuguese and Dutch, who "had planted and fortified themselves there, and established a lasting and hopeful trade there, for the good of posterity; and by advantage thereof had not only rendered our subjects abiding in those parts subject to their insolencies and apparent injuries, but, in a manner, wrought them out of trade there, which we found, not only by the complaint of divers of the adventurers in that society, but principally by the daily decrease of our customs for goods imported from thence, which we could impute to nothing more than the said Company's supine neglect of discovery and settling of trade in divers places in those parts where they had a plentiful stock, and fair opportunities to have compassed and effected it."

The charges thus lavishly brought against the Company were not wholly unfounded. They had commenced with experimental voyages, and shifted about from place to place, wandering over the whole extent of the Indian Ocean, from the Red Sea to the isle of Japan, without having secured a single station which they could call their own, and to which they could resort as a secure asylum in all emergencies. They thus existed merely by sufferance; and when attacked, succeeded only in a few rare instances in maintaining their ground. Their conduct in this respect was not dictated by motives of policy. Sir Thomas Roe, it is true, had cautioned them against the erection of forts, as incompatible with their prosperity as a mercantile company, and declared that "if the emperor would
offer me ten I would not accept one." But the Company had never adopted this view, and would gladly have fortified if they had possessed the means. The great difficulty was in the want of funds, which at no time sufficed for more than to furnish the necessary investments. They were thus very much at the mercy both of native princes and European rivals: and when subjected to injustice, were obliged either to overlook it, or to confine themselves to clamorous and unavailing supplications for redress. Claiming an exclusive right to the commerce of more than half the globe, they were bound to have achieved for themselves a much more dignified position.

Admitting that the Company were thus far in fault, it does not follow that Charles was justified in the method which he took to supplant them. They were entitled, at all events, to a three years' notice, and therefore ought not to have been threatened with violent extinction before even a single note of warning had been given. The truth is, that Charles had now been brought into that unhappy position from which he thought himself entitled to seek relief by any means which promised to be successful, however much they might be at variance with honour and equity. He was engaged in the fatal experiment of attempting to rule without a parliament; and having thus excluded himself from the only means of obtaining money by legal taxation, was ready to snatch at any expedient for replenishing his treasury. There can be little doubt that the license granted to the rival adventurers, afterwards known by the name of "Courten's Association," was one of those expedients. The truce recently concluded with Portugal was represented as about to open up new sources of wealth, and the king, consulting only his necessities, was deluded into the belief that, by means of a new body of adventurers, a large and permanent addition might be made to his own revenue. Sir William Courten, a wealthy London merchant, had the principal share in the new company, and has hence given it its name. He had lent large sums both to the king and his father, and may possibly have cancelled part of the debt, or granted a new loan, in return for the royal license. It is plain, however, from the language employed, that Charles had more than an indirect interest in the success of Courten's association. He speaks of the first
voyage as having been partly undertaken “at and by the charge
and adventure of us, and of our trusty and faithful servant,
Endymion Porter, Esq., one of the grooms of our bedchamber,”
and authorizes the ships, “as an ensign that they were special-
ly employed by us,” to carry the “union flag which our own
ships, and none but the ships employed in our particular service,
ought to bear.”

The old Company, naturally alarmed at the special favour
thus shown to the new adventurers, and the open infringement
of the exclusive privileges guaranteed to them by the charters
of Queen Elizabeth and King James, presented an earnest
remonstrance; but though they succeeded so far as to cause a
new proclamation to be issued, in which the right of traffic
conferrèd on the association was restricted to “such of those parts
and places before named, where the said East India Company
had not settled factories and trade before the 12th December,
1635,” they were so far from gaining their main object, that the
license, originally granted only for a single voyage, was extended
to five years, and declared to stand good against all who might
be disposed to challenge it, “any charters, letters-patents, grants of
incorporations, or of any liberties, powers, jurisdictions, privileg-
es of trade or traffick, or any act of parliament, statute, ordinance,
proclamation, provision or restriction, or other matter or thing
whatsoever, to the contrary hereof, in any wise notwithstanding.”
The passage now quoted is curious, not only as evincing the
king’s determination strenuously to support the new association,
but as displaying the extent to which he was prepared to stretch
his prerogative, and to set at nought all the other powers of the
state when they were supposed to interfere with any of his
favourite projects.

At the date of the second proclamation, the ships fitted out
for the first voyage of the association were already at sea. When
they arrived at Surat, the president and council, who
had not previously been informed of the license which had
been granted, were surprised above measure, and utterly at a
loss how to proceed. They had been preparing to take advantage
of the arrangement which had been made with the Portuguese,
and had partly completed their investment with a view to it.
Now, however, they found themselves forestalled, and virtually
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excluded from their most hopeful market. This disappointment was the more severely felt in consequence of the general stagnation of trade, which had been produced by the recent famine and pestilence; and also of a very violent proceeding on the part of the Mughul emperor, Shah Jahan, who, on learning that a vessel bearing his flag had been plundered by a pirate under English colours, had imprisoned the leading members of the Surat factory, and refused to release them till they engaged to pay a very heavy fine. Under these circumstances, trade was for a time almost entirely suspended. While thus overwhelmed by adversity, the Company had the additional dissatisfaction to learn that Courten’s vessels had made a prosperous voyage, and arrived in England with cargoes which would yield the adventurers a very profitable return. In a letter addressed to their servants at Surat, the governor and Company thus express themselves:—“Wee could wish that wee could vindicate the reputation of our nation in these partes, and do ourselves right for the losse and damage our estate in those partes have susteyned; but of all these wee must beare the burthen, and with patience sitt still, untill we may find these frowning tymes more auspicious to us and to our affayres.”

For several subsequent years the Company remained in a very depressed state. At one time the rivalship of Courten’s association, at another time the encroachments of the Dutch—who, no longer satisfied with their ascendancy in the Eastern islands, were ambitious enough to aim at the establishment of it in all the leading ports of India—absorbed all their thoughts, and formed the subject of various petitions, in which they implored the government to interfere and save them from impending destruction. Their importunity at last obtained a favourable hearing; and the privy council recommended, as the most effectual remedy, that the license to Courten’s association should be withdrawn, on the understanding that a new joint stock should be formed, on a scheme sufficiently large and liberal to promise a great extension of the trade. In accordance with this recommendation, the Company proceeded to take the necessary steps, and issued a prospectus embodying the following proposals:—1. That the subscription should be payable, by instalments, in four years; and that it should be left to the majority
of the subscribers to determine in what manner, and by whom the business should be managed. 2. That the subscription should be open to all persons, as well foreigners as English, till the 1st of May, 1640. 3. That on all past due instalments 1½ per cent per month should be levied, as a fine, till payment. 4. That the minimum subscription should be, by an Englishman £500, and by a foreigner £1,000. 5. That, in buying any share after the books were closed, an Englishman should pay £20 and a foreigner £40 for his freedom. 6. That the old Company, or adventurers in what was called the third joint stock, should be allowed sufficient time for bringing home their property, but be prohibited from sending any more stock to India on their former account.

The above terms are fair and reasonable, and, under ordinary circumstances, could, hardly fail to have eagerly and generally accepted; but troublous times were at hand, and few who possessed capital were inclined to expose it to the risks which it would necessarily run during the struggles of a civil war. When the date fixed for closing the books arrived, the whole amount subscribed was the paltry sum of £22,500. The proposed scheme having thus proved a complete failure, matters returned to their former state; and the Company were again left to fight their battle single-handed. While thus engaged, their course was checkered by prosperity as well as adversity. Under the former head, a first place must be assigned to the acquisition of a new locality on the Coromandel coast. This locality was the nucleus of what was destined to swell out into the presidency of Madras. The acquisition was made in 1640, on the most favourable terms, the naik or governor of the district volunteering to build a fort at his own expense, at which the English might settle and carry on their trade exempt from all customs. So satisfied was Mr. Day, a member of the factory of Masulipatam, who conducted the transaction with the naik, of the value of the offer which had been made, that he immediately undertook the erection of the fort, which, in honour of the naik's father, received the name of Chenappa-patan, or Chenna-patan, still applied to it by the natives, though Europeans from the first knew it only by the name of Fort St. George. The importance of this station soon became apparent; and the decisive step which Mr. Day
took in at once commencing operations was most fortunate, as it afterwards appeared that the Company, if they had been previously consulted, would have withheld their sanction under a belief that the state of their funds did not justify the outlay. Another circumstance, which at this time had a favourable influence on the Company’s prospects, was the overthrow of the Spanish rule in Portugal, which in consequence resumed its position as an independent kingdom. By this event, the friendly relations already existing between England and Portugal were drawn closer; and the Dutch, having no longer any pretext for continuing hostilities against the latter, were obliged to withdraw the blockades, which, though nominally directed only against Portuguese ports, had inflicted serious injuries on the English East India trade.

Such were the leading events which at this time were favourable to the Company. They were, however, more than counterbalanced by the unfavourable state of affairs both at home and abroad, and more especially by a heavy pecuniary loss inflicted on them by the king, who, in order to relieve his necessities in 1641, fell upon the singular device of buying all the pepper in the Company’s stores on credit, and selling it for ready money. The quantity of pepper was 607,252 bags, and the price agreed to be paid, at the rate of 2s.1d. per lb., amounted to £63,283, 11s. 1d.; but the sales, made at the rate of 1s. 8d. per lb., realized only £50,626. The king thus sustained an apparent loss of above £12,000 by the speculation, but ultimately the Company were the sole sufferers. The bonds which they had received from the farmers of the customs remained unpaid; and the only sum which they appear to have received was £13,000, which they retained out of the customs due by them. Even this sum they were not allowed to retain without question, as parliament, now at open hostilities with the king, did not admit that the bonds which had been granted in payment of the pepper constituted an effectual burden on the public revenue.

During the civil war the transactions of the Company remain almost a perfect blank. The collection of money for investments could not be openly announced without endangering their confiscation by one or other of the contending parties; and
the vessels were fitted out and despatched with as much secrecy as if they had been engaged in an illicit traffic. Among the few facts of importance which may be gleaned from the history of this period, are the erection of a factory at Balasore, situated within the Mughul territories a little to the west of Pipli, which had not realized the hopes at one time entertained of it; and a considerable extension of the trade of Madras, which, though still subordinate to Bantam, was rapidly outstripping it, and had already superseded Masulipatam as the principal factory of the Company on the Coromandel coast. For this prosperity Madras was mainly indebted to its fortifications, which not only gave security to the servants of the factory, but induced many of the native merchants and artisans to settle in the town and the adjoining district, where they could always be sure of finding protection in times of commotion. All these advantages had been obtained at a very trifling cost, for in 1645 the whole sum expended on Fort St. George was £2,294, and the estimate was, that not more than an additional £2,000 would be necessary to render it impregnable to any attack by native forces.

Courten's association, of which the Company had long complained as the worst thorn in their sides, after a short course of prosperity had rapidly declined. The same causes which depressed the Company must have effected them in a similar manner, but their misfortunes seem to have been far more owing to their own misconduct. After wandering about without any fixed plan, and committing depredations which subjected them to severe reprisals, they resolved in 1646 to establish a colony at St. Augustine's Bay, on the island of Madagascar. The project, injudicious in itself, was altogether beyond their means, and proved a failure. In order to relieve the embarrassments into which they were thus thrown they had recourse to fraud, and set up a mint, at which they coined counterfeit pagodas and rials. The cheat was soon discovered, and so seriously damaged their character that they afterwards found great difficulty in carrying on even a legitimate trade. Not long after this transaction, a proposal was made that the Company and the association should forget their quarrels and amalgamate. Had the Company been their own masters, they would never have entertained this proposal; but a complete change
had taken place in the political state of the kingdom, and, in the
general uncertainty which prevailed, it was dangerous to demur
to any proposal which had the sanction of the dominant party.
The king was now a prisoner in the Isle of Wight, and the
cause of the parliament was everywhere triumphant. The Com-
pany, trembling for their charter, endeavoured to meet the
threatened storm by proposing a new subscription, in which they
made a curious effort at conciliation. In the prospectus issued,
while the public generally were restricted to a certain day for
filling up the lists, an exception was made in favour of mem-
bers of parliament, for whom the period of closing was prolong-
ed that they might have an opportunity to consider the subject,
and to become subscribers. The device is said to have succeed-
ed; and the plan obtained so much of the approbation of the
commons, as to amount to a virtual recognition of the rights
and privileges of the Company. Accordingly, the council of
state—to which the questions at issue between the Company and
Courten's association, which was now designated by the name
of "The Assada Merchants," from their settlement on an island
of that name near Madagascar, had been submitted—while
delaying to give any formal decision, strongly recommended
an amalgamation.

In accordance with this recommendation, various conferences
were held between the managers of the two companies, and a
union was finally arranged. The leading conditions were—That
a stock of £300,000 should be subscribed within two months,
to be paid by instalments in four years; that a valuation should
be taken of all the houses, shipping, and goods belonging to the
Company in India; that the settlers on the island of Assada
should be allowed to trade direct to any ports of Asia, Africa,
and America, but not to trade from port to port in India; that,
on this continent, a fortified station should be fixed on for both
companies; that all Indian goods, spices, &c., should be joint
property; that salaries, both in England and India, should be
reduced; and that, in the future management of the joint trade,
a share of at least £500 should be necessary to give a vote. It
was of importance to obtain legislative sanction to this arrange-
ment, and a petition to that effect was immediately presented
to the House of Commons. It was taken into consideration on
the 31st January, 1650; but though the Company appear to have hoped for a distinct confirmation of their exclusive privileges, the utmost they could obtain was the cautiously worded resolution, "That the trade to the East Indies should be carried on by one company, and with one joint stock, the management thereof to be under such regulations as the parliament should think fit; and that the East India Company should proceed upon the articles of agreement made between them and the Assada merchants on the 21st November, 1649, till further orders from the parliament."

Whatever may have been the political predilections of individual members of the Company, they appear, as a body, to have been easily reconciled to the constitutional changes which followed the execution of the king; and, on the 14th of November, 1650, presented a petition, addressed, in the language and spirit of the times, to "the supreme authority of the nation, the high court of the Parliament of England." The great burden of the petition was the old complaint of ill usage from the Dutch, from whom redress, though hitherto asked in vain "from the late king and his council, was now confidently anticipated." At this time the new government was evidently preparing for a rupture with the Dutch; and hence, as the petition was opportune, it met with such a favourable reception, that on the very day on which it was presented parliament adopted a resolution referring it to the consideration of the council of state. That the impression already made might not be permitted to die away, the Company endeavoured to keep their case before the view of the council by a series of memorials. In the first of these, dated 9th May, 1651, after referring to their petition, they renewed their grounds of complaint against the Dutch, and drew up a list of their losses, which they estimated at £1,681,996, 15s. This was exclusive of interest, which it was alleged would amount to a larger sum than the principal. In a second memorial, presented in June, when the probability of a Dutch war was stronger than ever, they expressed their apprehensions for the safety of their homeward bound fleet, consisting of five ships laden with valuable cargoes, and particularly with saltpetre for the use of government; and prayed that ships of war might be stationed off the Land's End for the purpose of conducting their fleet in
safety into the Downs. In a third memorial, following close upon the other, they took the bolder step of praying that powers might be given, under the great seal of England, to their presidents and councils in India, to enforce obedience on all Englishmen within their jurisdiction, and to punish offenders conformably to the laws of England. On the 29th of January, 1652, they again importuned the council on the subject of their claims, because, knowing that ambassadors from the States-general were then in England endeavouring to negotiate a treaty, they felt that if they lost the present opportunity of obtaining compensation they might wait in vain for another. Ultimately, however, the negotiation having failed, and open hostilities between the two countries having been declared, their claims were again indefinitely postponed.

At the very time when the Dutch war broke out, it was apprehended that the proceedings of Admiral Blake at Lisbon, where part of the English fleet which had adhered to the Royalists had been attacked, might lead to a rupture with Portugal. The Company were thus in the perilous predicament of being attacked in India by two nations at once, while almost totally unprovided with the means of resistance. To add to their difficulties, a fierce war was raging between the Kings of Bijapur and Golkunda, to the great obstruction of their trade on the Coromandel coast. It is not to be wondered at, that in these circumstances the Company, yielding to a feeling of despondency, refused to sanction an additional outlay on the fortifications of St. George, though it was truly urged by the agents there that these formed the only security to the inland trade, and the principal protection to the shipping; and that, under certain firmans which had been obtained from the Nabob of the Carnatic, authorizing them to purchase cloths and other goods without restriction in all parts of his government, the trade might be very largely extended.

The vigour and success with which the war was prosecuted by Cromwell, soon threatened the Dutch commerce in Europe with total destruction; but in India, where their maritime and commercial ascendancy had been long established, they completely swept the seas. Shortly after the declaration of war, they appeared off Swally with a fleet of eight large ships, and might easily
have annihilated the English establishment at Surat, had they not been afraid of provoking the hostility of the Great Mughul by carrying war into any portion of his dominions. Contenting themselves, therefore, with offering large bribes to the governor and other officials, to induce them to harass the English by obstructing them in every way, they set sail for the Persian Gulf, where they not only put a stop to the lucrative trade which the Company had long carried on between Surat and Gomberoon, but captured three of their ships, and drove a fourth on shore, where she was totally lost. These disasters, which might have been expected to dispirit the Company, seemed rather to have roused their courage, for they are found petitioning the government to lend them five or six frigates, which they would man and equip at their own expense, and despatch to the East Indies for the purpose of making reprisals. This warlike movement appears not to have been encouraged, and in fact soon ceased to be necessary, as the Dutch, now completely humbled, were eagerly suing for a termination of hostilities. After a negotiation, during which the Dutch became sensible that they would be obliged to submit to any terms which Cromwell chose to dictate, the peace concluded was ratified at Westminster, 5th April, 1654.

In the treaty drawn up on this occasion the claims of the Company were not forgotten. By the twenty-seventh article, it was agreed:—“That the Lords the States-general of the United Provinces shall take care that justice be done upon those who were partakers or accomplices in the massacre of the English at Amboyna, as the republic of England is pleased to term that fact; provided any of them be living.” By the thirtieth article, four commissioners were to be named on both sides to meet at London, and “to examine and distinguish all those losses and injurys, in the year 1611 and after to the 18th of May, 1652, according to the English style, as well in the East Indies as in Greenland, Muscovy, Brazil, or wherever else either party complains of having received them from the other; and the particulars of all those injurys and damages shall be exhibited to the said commissioners so nominated before the aforesaid 18th of May, with this restriction, that no new ones shall be admitted after that day.” Should the commissioners not come to an agreement within three months, the whole case was to be submitted
"to the judgment and arbitration of the Swiss Cantons," who were authorized for that purpose to delegate commissioners, whose decision, given within six months, should "bind both parties, and be well and truly performed." At the first meeting of the commissioners, held on the 30th of August, 1654, the English Company stated their damages at £2,695,999,15s. Strange to say, the Dutch contrived to exceed this amount, and stated theirs at £2,919,861.3s.6d. Both statements were supported by a series of accounts; but the commissioners soon became satisfied that little dependence was to be placed upon them, and within the three months pronounced an award, of which the principal findings were that the island of Polaroon should be restored to the English, and that the Dutch Company should pay to the London Company the sum of £85,000, and to the heirs or executors of the sufferers at Amboyna the sum of £3,615.

It seems to be admitted that the award was fairly made; and therefore, when the comparatively paltry amount of the compensation is considered, it is difficult to account for the loud outcry which the Company had continued without interruption from the first years of their existence to make against the Dutch, as the main authors of all the calamities which befell them. Surely less clamour might have sufficed, when the object merely was to obtain redress for losses which, spread over the course of nearly half a century, had only reached the aggregate amount of £85,000. When the sum was paid, many questions arose as to the mode in which it was to be apportioned among the proprietors of the different stocks by which the voyages of the Company had been fitted out. A protracted and ruinous litigation might have ensued, had not Cromwell alarmed all the claimants, and united them as in a common danger, by proposing that in the meantime the money should remain with him as a loan. The Company pleaded the general state of their affairs, and the depressed circumstances of many of the individual claimants, as reasons for not lending the whole sum; and proposed to receive £35,000 in hand, and to express their gratitude to the Protector by lending him the remaining £50,000, on the understanding that it was to be repaid in eighteen months by instalments. The final apportionment of the sum among the claimants was left to the decision of five arbiters specially appointed for that purpose.
After the arrangement made with Courten's association, the Company began to trade on what was called a united joint stock; and while contending with many difficulties, made some arrangements which contributed greatly to their ultimate prosperity. Among others may be mentioned, the obtaining of a firman which, in return for a payment of 3,000 rupees (£300), gave them the privilege of free trade in Bengal without payment of customs. These very favourable terms, which were obtained in 1651, they owed to the influence of Mr. Gabriel Boughton, who, when English surgeon to the factory at Surat, had gained the favour of Shah Jahan by the cure of one of his daughters, and at a later period resided at Bengal as the medical attendant of the governor, Prince Shuja, Shah Jahan's son. While new facilities for trade were thus opened up in Bengal, the Coromandel coast was not overlooked, and in 1654 the important step was taken of raising Fort St. George to the rank of a presidency. In the use of these and similar advantages, the Company might soon have repaired all their disasters, and attained a higher prosperity than they had enjoyed at any former period. Unhappily new obstacles arose from within. The union with Courten's association had never been cordial; and the members of the latter, accustomed to much more freedom of action than the more regular management of the Company permitted, became loud in their complaints. When the union was formed, the mode of carrying on the joint trade was left open for future arrangement. On this subject, the views of the Company and of the Assada merchants were almost diametrically opposed. The Company, jealous of their privileges, and convinced that they could not maintain them without a joint stock, refused to carry on the trade on any other footing. The Assada merchants, on the contrary, while admitting that a company was necessary, insisted that it should be; not a joint stock, but a regulated company, in which the members should have liberty individually "to employ their own stocks, servants, and shipping, in such way as they might conceive most to their own advantage." To procure an authoritative settlement of the important question thus raised, both parties, in the end of 1654, appeared as petitioners before the council of state.

The Company, in their petition, repeated all the arguments which they had been accustomed to urge in favour of a joint stock; and while contending with many difficulties, made some arrangements which contributed greatly to their ultimate prosperity.
Rival Companies

stock: their own experience acquired during a course of forty years—the formidable competition of the Portuguese and Dutch—the failure of isolated voyages, the expenses of equipment far exceeding the means of individual adventurers—the extent of territory over which the trade extended, the factories of the Company being actually situated “in the dominions of not less than fourteen sovereigns”—and, above all, “the engagements which the Company were under to the native powers to make good any losses which their subjects might sustain by the depredations of Englishmen,” even though these should not belong to their service. On these grounds, they thought themselves entitled to pray that the Protector would be pleased to renew their charter, with such additional privileges as had been found necessary to enable them to carry on their trade; to prohibit private persons from sending out shipping to India; and to assist them in recovering their position in the Spice Islands. Were this prayer granted, they had no doubt of being able not only to procure a large subscription at present, but to establish the East India trade on a secure and durable basis.

On the other hand, the Assaqa merchants alleged that management by joint stocks had not been so profitable either to subscribers or to the public as that of separate voyages would have been; and appealed in proof to the successful manner in which the Turkey, Muscovy, and Eastland trades were carried on under free companies. Besides this appeal to experience, they argued the point at great length, insisting, in substance, that a free trade regulated would encourage industry and ingenuity, giving them full latitude and scope for exercise; while each person, instead of standing idle and leaving others to act for him, had the ordering of his own affairs, and consequently opportunity to make use of his own talents; that by increasing the number of traders, it would destroy the spirit of monopoly, and, by means of active competition, lower the price of foreign commodities, to the great advantage of the public; that instead of restricting adventurers to a set time when the subscription list of a joint stock required to be peremptorily closed, and to the payment of ready money as the only mode of investment, it left them at full liberty to choose their own time, and to invest in the mode which might be most convenient,
not merely in ready money, but in goods or shipping; and, finally, that besides being less expensive in its management than a joint stock, it would be far more efficient, because the adventurers, "being whetted on by their own interest and the competition of others, will in reason turn every stone for discovering of new trades;" and thus have some advantage over the Dutch Company, who, having little control over their servants abroad, make Holland the principal seat of their management.

While the subject of a joint stock or a regulated trade was thus keenly agitated, Cromwell at first maintained a strict neutrality between the contending parties, granting authority to both to undertake voyages to India, and conduct them on their own principles. An authoritative decision, however, was necessary; and to obtain it, the whole question was submitted to the council of state in a writing signed by the Protectors' own hand, and bearing date 20th October, 1656. The council referred the matter to a select committee, "who were directed to report "in what manner the East India trade might be best managed for the public good and its own encouragement." On 18th December following, the committee reported that, after taking means to obtain the fullest information, by directing notices to be affixed to the Exchange, appointing a day for all persons concerned in the East India trade to attend, and fully considering all the arguments urged orally or in writing by both parties, they had not ventured to come to any positive determination, though their own private opinion was that the trade ought to be conducted on an united joint stock. The council having the question thus returned upon them, summoned the governor and committees of the Company and the principal merchant adventurers to the East Indies to attend them; and after a full hearing on January 28, 1657, gave it as their advice to the Protector, "That the trade of East India be mannaged by a united joint stock, exclusive of all others." Within a fortnight thereafter, Cromwell announced his determination to act on this advice; and a committee of the council was appointed to consider the terms of the charter to be granted to the East India Company.

It is to be presumed that the charter thus virtually promised was actually granted; but, strange to say, no copy of it has ever
been discovered, and the only evidence of its existence is derived from a reference made to it in a petition which the Company presented to Cromwell in 1658, and from a letter from Fort St. George to the factory of Surat, in which it is stated that a vessel called the *Blackmoore*, which arrived from England on the 12th of June in that year, had "posted away with all haste after his highness the Lord Protector had signed the Company's charter." The Company were, of course, greatly elated with their success; and having again formed a coalition with the principal members of the merchant adventurers, succeeded in obtaining a subscription of £786,000 to form a new joint stock. It was necessary, however, before acting upon it, to make an arrangement for the settlement of previously existing claims. Under the original agreement with Courten's association, the trade had for some years been carried on by the funds of what was called the "United Joint Stock." The state of its affairs, made up to the date of 1st September, 1655, throws light (as in Table 1) on the position which the Company then occupied.

From this account, it appears that at its date the balance of the credit of the united joint stock amounted to the large sum of £156,317, 7s. 8d. In 1658, when the new joint stock was formed, this balance must have been considerably reduced; but as much remained as to make it necessary to settle the terms on which, if not the whole, at least that portion of it which belonged to what is called dead stock was to be transferred. The terms, apparently very favourable, were:—That "on the new stock paying £20,000, by two instalments, to the united stock, the forts, privileges, and immunities in India and Persia should be made over in full right, and the three ships and £14,000 in bullion, prepared for the voyage of this season, transferred at prime cost of the new stock; that on the arrival of these ships at the Company's factories, the goods, furniture, and stores were to be transferred to the new account, at the valuation of 6s.6d. sterling per rial of eight; that the servants of the new stock should assist those of the united stock in recovering their debts; and that the united stock should be charged with the expenses of the settlements and trade till the arrival of the shipping of the new stock, when the agents of this stock should take charge, and be entitled to receive the customs of Gomberoon after the
1st October, 1658." Another arrangement of some importance was, that such persons as had served an apprenticeship to the members of the joint stock, should be admitted freemen and members of the Company on paying a fine of £5; and that the persons who had been possessed of shares in the former trade, and, on that account, had property in the Indies, were not to

**Table 1**

**ACCOUNT-GENERAL OF THE UNITED JOINT STOCK,**

*On The 1st September, 1655.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Debit</th>
<th>Credit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salaries of the merchants remaining in India, from 30th November, 1650, to 30th November, 1656, at £2,066, 2s.8d. per annum, to be paid in India,</td>
<td>£82,053.12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariners' wages, for the like terms, per estimate</td>
<td>£9,641.19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two years' generall expences in Suratt, from 30th November, 1654, to November, 1666,</td>
<td>32,829.5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Coast of Coromandel,</td>
<td>At Madraspatnam and factories on that coast, 22,671.11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Bantam, &amp;c.,</td>
<td>At Bantam and subordinates, 26,451.10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary of the merchants gone upon the Three Brothers,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gratuitys to the committees, none having been paid since this stock began, —</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rests,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£185,589.7.0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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be deemed private traders, but were required, after a specified time, to carry the amount of such property to the account of the new stock.

Having amicably settled these preliminaries, the Company proceeded to make a new arrangement of their establishments abroad. In future, the other presidencies and factories, and more especially the factories and trade in Persia, were to be subordinate to the president and council of Surat; at the same time, the presidency of Fort St. George was not only to be maintained, but to have a control over all the other factories on the Coromandel coast and in Bengal, where the Company now had a principal factory at Hooghly, together with inferior agencies at Cossimbazar, Balasore, and Patna. The insular factories and agencies were to be subordinate, as before, to the president and council of Bantam. The abuse of private traffic by the Company’s servants, which had long been complained of, and had even, we have seen, been denounced in royal proclamations, again attracted attention; and the appropriate remedy was adopted by issuing an absolute prohibition of such traffic, and compensating for the withdrawal of it by increasing the salaries of the presidents and members of council, and of the subordinate servants. As an additional protection against the continuance of the abuse, all officials were required to sign security bonds to specified amounts, to keep diaries of their proceedings, and annually transmit certified copies of them to the court in England. It is scarcely necessary to observe that these regulations for the suppression of private trade proved unavailing; and that the abuse, instead of being suppressed, kept pace with the progress, and, in not a few instances, seriously damaged the interests and even brought a stigma on the character of the Company.

Scarcely had these arrangements been completed when Cromwell was called to his final account. This event, which took place in 1658, was attended with so many important changes, that all great interests, commercial as well as political, were more or less seriously affected by it. Having thus arrived at what may be considered a new era in the history of the Company, it will be proper, before continuing it, to bring up the history of the Mughul empire from the termination of the reign of Jahangir in 1627.
4

Shah Jahan, Aurangzeb and the Marathas

Several years before the death of Jahangir, the succession to his throne was keenly contested by different members of his family. Khusrav, the eldest son, who had been the favourite of his grandfather Akbar, failed in an attempt to seize the crown when Akbar died, and was in consequence subjected during the remainder of his life to a rigorous imprisonment. Parvez, the second son, naturally looked forward to the succession; and was confirmed in the belief that it was intended for him, when his father intrusted him with the nominal command in the Deccan, where a great contest for supremacy was waged between the Mohammedans and Hindus. He proved unequal to the task assigned him, and was ultimately superseded by the third son, Khurram, whose abilities were of a superior order; and whose military fame had been established by a successful campaign in Mewar. These alone would not have sufficed had he not also enjoyed the favour of Nur Jahan, who had established a complete ascendancy over her husband Jahangir, and virtually governed in his name. Under this influence Khurram, invested with ample powers, and bearing the title of king, which amounted to a recognition of him as heir apparent, proceeded to the Deccan. Here the first object was to recover those territories which had thrown off allegiance to the Mughul, and more especially the kingdom of Ahmednagar, which, owing to the great abilities of an Abyssinian, named Malik Amber, prime minister to the king, Nizam Shah, had successfully resisted all attempts to subdue it. Khurram was again successful; and, in return for his success,
was made Viceroy of Gujarat, in which capacity mention is often made of him in the journal of Sir Thomas Roe:

While Khurram’s way to the throne was thus apparently clear, he stood on the brink of a precipice. His brother Shehriar, the youngest son of Jahangir, had become the son-in-law of Nur Jahan by marrying Sher Afgan, her daughter by her first husband. In consequence of this affinity, Nur Jahan was bent on securing the succession to Shehriar, and made no secret of her intention. She had little difficulty in gaining the assent of Jahangir; but Khurram, determined not to be excluded from the great object of his ambition, raised the standard of revolt. He had married the daughter of Asaf Khan, Nur Jahan’s brother, and in him had a powerful supporter; but Nur Jahan chose her measures so skilfully, that Khurram soon found himself a fugitive in the Deccan. Here he succeeded in forming a league with his old opponent Malik Amber; but misfortune still attended him, and he was obliged to throw himself on his father’s mercy. It would not have availed him; but a new revolt, produced by the imperiousness of Nur Jahan, drew off her thoughts from the vengeance which she was meditating, and he escaped. In consequence of the revolt, both Jahangir and his queen became for a time prisoners in the hands of Mohabat Khan, a celebrated general, to whose military talents Khurram’s previous discomfiture had mainly been owing. Jahangir died shortly after obtaining his liberty, leaving a will which appointed Shehriar his successor. Nur Jahan attempted to give effect to it, but the death of her husband completely destroyed her influence; and though she survived for many years, she never again figured in public life. Shehriar, by seizing the royal treasure, was able to raise an army and fight a battle for the crown. Khurram, however, now supported by the leading parties in the state, completely defeated him, and, with the usual cruel policy of his race, put him to death, along with two sons of another brother who had joined him. All opposition now ceased; and Khurram, on his arrival at Agra, 26th January, 1628, mounted the throne under the title of Shah Jahan.

Shah Jahan, overjoyed at his accession after the many misfortunes which had befallen him, and which had made him at one time despair of being able to secure it, first testified
his gratitude to Asaf Khan, his father-in-law, by making him his wazir, and to Mohabat Khan by appointing him his commander-in-chief; and then began to indulge his natural taste for magnificence by public works and splendid entertainments. In the latter of these he seemed determined to outstrip all his predecessors; and on the first anniversary of his accession, not satisfied with the usual ceremony of distributing his own weight in presents of the most costly materials, caused vessels filled with jewels to be waved round his head or poured over his person as a supposed means of averting misfortune, and scattered the contents among the bystanders. In the valley of Kashmir, where the ceremony was performed, the value thus expended was estimated at £1,600,000.

He was not allowed long to indulge in such lavish and ostentatious displays. Though his cruel policy had extirpated all the members of his family who might have competed with him for the crown, in several quarters of his dominions the materials for revolt were provided and ready to explode. The Uzbeks, endeavouring to profit by the uncertainties of a new reign, laid siege to Kabul and ravaged the surrounding country, till the approach of Mohabat compelled them to retire. In Bundelkhand an insurrection, headed by Narsing Deo, the infamous murderer of Abul Fazl, was not put down without a serious struggle. But, as in his father’s reign, the Deccan was the great theatre of war. The conquest of it by Akbar had never been firmly secured; and even after the Hindus had been forced to yield, their place had been occupied by Muhammedan chiefs, who had established the three kingdoms of Ahmednagar, Bijapur, and Golkunda, which often refused to yield even a nominal supremacy to the Mughul, and were always ready to embrace any opportunity which promised to free them entirely from the yoke. Such an opportunity was offered by the revolt of an Afghan chief of the name of Khan Jahan Lodi, who had rendered important military services in the time of Jahangir; but, taking umbrage at some proceedings of Shah Jahan, suddenly quitted Agra at the head of 2,000 veteran troops, and, in the face of numerous obstacles, made his way through Bundelkhand and Gundwana to the court of Ahmednagar, where he was welcomed by Malik Amber.
The only chance which the Muhammadan kings of the Deccan could have had of resisting the Mughul arms, would have been by forming a mutual league and uniting all their forces against the common invader. Instead of this they kept aloof, under the influence of old jealousies and feuds, and allowed themselves to be crushed in detail. The King of Golkunda appears to have been first intimidated, and volunteered tribute. Nizam Shah, King of Ahmednagar, so long as he was guided by the counsels of Malik Amber, offered a strenuous resistance; but at last made choice of a new minister, who proved treacherous, and made peace with the Mughul by both murdering the king and sacrificing the independence of the kingdom. The most valiant struggle was made by Muhammad Adil Shah, who after obliging Mohabat Khan, the ablest general of the Mughul, to raise the siege of Bijapur, his capital, gained several other decided advantages. He too, however, finding the contest unequal, was obliged to succumb; and Shah Jahan, now acknowledged supreme over all the Muhammadan kingdoms of the Deccan, returned in triumph to his capital. During these campaigns the country suffered dreadfully from the ravages not merely of war, but of famine, which, caused by failures of rain during the two successive years of 1629 and 1630, depopulated whole districts, and inflicted calamities which it took nearly half a century to repair.

During the campaigns in the Deccan, disturbances had broken out in other quarters. They proved generally unimportant; and the only event in connection with them deserving of notice, was a declaration of hostilities against the Portuguese, whose fortified factory at Hughli, in Bengal, was in consequence attacked by the Mughul governor, and captured after a siege. An event which gave Shah Jahan more pleasure was the recovery of Kandahar from the Persians, by the treachery of Ali Mardan Khan, the governor, who, dissatisfied with the treatment which he had received from his own sovereign, delivered up the place and took refuge at Delhi. This important acquisition seems to have stimulated the ambition of Shah Jahan, who immediately despatched an army into Balkh and Budukshon, which were now in possession of Nazar Muhammad, younger brother of Imam Kouli, whose rule extended over all the territory beyond the Oxus, from the Caspian Sea to Mount Imaus. The enterprise
proved more difficult than had been anticipated; and, after a struggle of several years, Shah Jahan despaired of success. Not only Ali Mardan found his efforts unavailing; but two of the emperor's sons, Murad and Aurangzeb, sustained repeated discomforts. Even after an arrangement had been made which left Nazar Muhammad in possession of more than his original territory, Aurangzeb, attacked by the mountaineers of the Hindu Kush, made a most disastrous retreat.

Shah Jahan, though much chagrined, still had some compensation in the acquisition of Kandahar; but even this was soon to be wrested from him. In 1648 the Persian monarch Shah Abbas II made his appearance before it, at the head of a large army. The time was well chosen, for winter, which was about to commence, made it almost impossible to march an army from India to its relief. Aurangzeb, however, undertook the task; and, after almost incredible exertions, only arrived in time to learn that the place had already fallen. He determined to attempt the recovery of it; but, four months after he had opened his batteries, was obliged to raise the siege. A second attempt, in which he was assisted by Saad Ullah, the wazir, having also failed, Dara Shikoh, Shah Jahan's eldest son, obtained permission to make a third attack. His force was more numerous and better appointed than those which had previously been employed, and he set out in full confidence of success. Great efforts were made on both sides; but, after several desperate assaults, Dara Shikoh was beaten off, as his brothers had been, and Kandahar was left in the undisputed possession of the Persians.

Shah Jahan's warlike energy seemed now expended; and he had passed two years in tranquillity, when circumstances occurred which tempted him to interfere with the internal affairs of the Deccan, for the purpose of bringing it more completely under his sway. Abdullah Kuth Shah, King of Golkunda, had regularly paid the stipulated tribute. The Mughul government, therefore, had no claim against him; and he was entitled to expect that the conditions of the treaty which he had made would; on the part of that government also, be faithfully observed. He was soon taught the contrary. Mir Jumla, who had acquired great wealth as a diamond merchant, and risen by his talents to be Abdullah's prime minister, having lost favour through the misconduct of
his son, Muhammad Amin, entered into a correspondence with Aurangzeb, then in the Deccan, and lodged a formal complaint against his master. Abdullah, though tributary to the Mughuls, was still perfectly independent in regard to his internal administration, and was therefore both surprised and offended on receiving a mandate from Shah Jahan, haughtily ordering him to give Mir Jumla redress. So far from complying, he sequestered his property and placed his son in prison. This was probably the very step which Shah Jahan wished him to take, as it furnished him with a plausible pretext for further interference. Orders were accordingly given to Aurangzeb to employ force, if Abdullah still persisted in disobeying his mandate. Acting at once on this authority, Aurangzeb, without any previous warning of hostility, set out ostensibly on a visit to Bengal; and being brought in the course of his journey within a short distance of Hyderabad, Abdullah's capital, turned suddenly aside with a body of troops and took forcible possession of it. Abdullah, taken completely by surprise, escaped with difficulty to the hill-fort of Golkunda. Here, finding his position desperate, he was under the necessity of submitting to the terms which Aurangzeb chose to dictate. Mir Jumla, in reward for his treachery, was taken into Aurangzeb's confidence, and became one of the main instruments of his ambitious designs. The subjugation of Golkunda took place in 1656. In the same year Bijapur was subjected to similar treatment. Ahmednagar had before lost even the semblance of independence, and thus the authority of the Mughul seemed as firmly established in the Muhammedan portion of the Deccan as in any part of Hindustan.

The conquests thus achieved gave great delight to Shah Jahan. Had he known the use about to be made of them, his feelings would have been very different. Aurangzeb, while professing the utmost disinterestedness, was steadily pursuing his own aggrandizement, and preparing for the struggle which was eventually to give him the throne, even before it became vacant. To this struggle it is now necessary to attend.

Shah Jahan, now far advanced in years, had four sons, Dara Shikoh, Shuja, Aurangzeb, and Murad. They were all of full, or rather mature age. In 1657, the period to which we now refer, the respective ages of the first three were forty-two, forty,
and thirty-eight. Dara, recognized as heir apparent, was resident in the capital, where he enjoyed the full confidence of his father, and in relieving him from the cares, exercised the general powers of government. Shuja ruled as viceroy in Bengal, Aurangzeb, as has been seen, in the Deccan, and Murad in Gujarat. They were all fired with ambition, and disposed to take advantage of the political changes which might be occasioned by their father's death, but differed much in temper and character. Dara was open and generous, but so impetuous and hasty as to set at nought the dictates of prudence; and so liberal, particularly in his religious opinions, as to be obnoxious to the more orthodox Muhammedans. Shuja possessed talents, but rendered them useless by giving himself up to pleasure, and acquiring the habits of a confirmed drunkard. Aurangzeb was a perfect adept in dissimulation, and was equally successful in imposing on friends and foes. His principles, if he had any, never stood in the way of his interest; and when he had an end to accomplish, he was not to be deterred by any amount of crime which might be necessary in order to insure success. The only thing in which he could be said to be sincere was his religion, in which he carried fanaticism to its worst extremes, and persecuted with all the zeal which distinguished the earliest propagators of Muhammedanism. Murad, the youngest son, bore a considerable resemblance to Shuja in tastes and habits, but was duller in intellect, and, if possible, still grosser in his pleasures. By the mother of these sons Shah Jahan had also two daughters, who, within the recesses of the harem, exercised considerable political influence. Padshah Begum, the elder, was her father's favourite, and exerted herself to the utmost to further the interests of Dara. Roshanara, the younger, though not possessed, either in person or intellect, of the accomplishments of her sister, surpassed her as a skilful intriguer, and thus proved a powerful coadjutor to Aurangzeb, to whom she was strongly attached.

Such was the position of Shah Jahan's family in 1657, when he was seized with a severe illness, destined apparently to prove fatal. Dara, that he might be able to make the necessary preparations to insure the succession, endeavoured to stop all the avenues of communication through which his brothers might become acquainted with his father's state; but the fact was of too
public and important a nature to admit of concealment, and a very short time elapsed before they were made thoroughly acquainted with it. Shuja was the first to act. Immediately assuming the title of king, he assembled a body of troops and began to march in the direction of the capital. Murad, in like manner, assumed the regal title, but instead of quitting his province, endeavoured to provide the sinews of war by seizing the district treasuries and laying siege to Surat, where he expected to find a still richer deposit. Aurangzeb acted with less precipitation, and at first rested satisfied with collecting his forces and encamping with them near his northern frontier. While here he had the satisfaction of seeing Dara and Shuja engaged in hostilities, which only wasted their strength. He at last declared against Dara, but, with his usual dissimulation, endeavoured to disguise his real object by pretending to place his hostility to his eldest brother on religious grounds. For himself, if he had ever entertained ambitious thoughts, he had now laid them aside, and was desirous, as soon as an orthodox successor to the throne was appointed, to retire from the world and spend the remainder of his days at Mecca. Murad was stupid enough to be imposed upon by this shallow pretence, and at once leagued his arms with those of Aurangzeb, in the belief that, in the event of their success, he was to be rewarded with the imperial crown. Dara was thus exposed to two formidable attacks—the one from Shuja, advancing from Bengal, and the other from Aurangzeb and Murad, advancing from the Deccan. Against Shuja he sent his son Suleman Shikoh, who encountered him near Benares, and gave him a defeat which compelled him to retrace his steps to Bengal. Against his other brothers he sent the Rajput raja Jaswant Singh. The encounter took place on the banks of the Sipra, near Ujjain, in Malwa, and ended in Jaswant’s complete discomfiture. The gallantry of Murad had mainly decided the victory; and Aurangzeb, not satisfied with complimenting him upon it, hypocritically humbled himself before him as in token of the homage which he felt due to his future sovereign.

While his sons were thus warring with each other for the succession to the crown, Shah Jahan himself, contrary to expectation, had nearly recovered his usual health. Dara at once
resigned his power. A very different spirit animated the other brothers, who, when ordered to lay down their arms, positively refused. They had, in fact, advanced too far to recede, and nothing now remained but a further appeal to arms. Shah Jahan was disposed to take the field in person, but allowed himself to be dissuaded, and left the supreme command to Dara, who soon saw himself at the head of an army which seemed sufficient to crush all his enemies. He might have added greatly to its strength by waiting for the arrival of a large reinforcement, which his son Suleman was bringing from Benares; but his natural impetuosity urged him forward, and, contrary to the better advice of Shah Jahan, he risked an engagement, by which all was lost. The battle was fought at Samaghur, one march from Agra, in the beginning of June, 1658. Many individual acts of heroism were performed on both sides; and victory hung suspended till the disappearance of Dara, in consequence of his elephant having become unmanageable, so discouraged his soldiers that a general panic ensued. In the evening, when he reached Agra in his flight, he could only muster 2,000 men, all the rest of his army had perished or been dispersed. Three days after, Aurangzeb and Murad made their appearance, and took immediate possession of the capital. Dara was not in it, for, oppressed with grief and shame, he had hastily quitted for Delhi, but Shah Jahan was still in his palace.

Aurangzeb’s course was already determined, but policy did not allow him all at once to throw off the mask, and he spent some days in sending humble messages to his father, justifying his proceedings on the plea of necessity, and endeavouring to obtain the sanction of them. His object, probably, was to leave his father in nominal possession of the throne, while he retained all the powers of government in his own hand. Shah Jahan, however, was not to be thus won over. Dara’s misfortunes only gave him a stronger hold than ever on his affections, and he refused to concur in any proposal for disinheriting him. Aurangzeb, thus made aware that he could only possess the crown as an usurper, did not hesitate to make his father a prisoner and assume the reins of government. Murad, who had been dreaming of the crown, soon found that he was only his brother’s dupe. As soon as Aurangzeb had no further use for
him, he invited him to supper; and, after feasting him till he was in a state of helpless intoxication, stripped him of his arms and placed him in confinement.

Shah Jahan was allowed to remain in his palace, where he continued to live for seven years. Much outward respect was shown him, but a strict watch was kept on his movements, and he was entirely excluded from all share in the government. The energy and talent which he had displayed during the greater part of his reign appear to have entirely forsaken him, and he made no effort to regain his freedom. It is remarkable that no attempt at rescue was made from without. His reign had been long and prosperous, and his subjects had enjoyed a degree of happiness to which they had previously been strangers. His wars, carried on for the most part on the outskirts of his dominions, had brought few calamities on his own subjects, while his internal administration had been singularly moderate and equitable. It might have been supposed that such a reign would terminate peacefully, or at least that no usurper would be allowed to extinguish it by violence, without exciting universal indignation, and stirring up hosts of adversaries in every quarter. The fact was otherwise, and may be regarded as a proof that the people had become indifferent to a change of masters, and were now ready to submit to any yoke which might be imposed on them. In the interval between his dethronement and his death, Shah Jahan was almost forgotten. His public works, however, still speak for him, and prove him to have been, if not the wisest, the most magnificent prince who ever held rule in India. At times his expenditure was not only lavish but childish, as in the instance of the celebrated peacock throne, in the construction of which he is said to have spent about £6,000,000 sterling, chiefly in diamonds and precious stones. A better splendour was displayed in the new city which he built at Delhi, and the noble structures with which he adorned both that city and Agra. In the latter stands conspicuous above all the Taj Mahal, the mausoleum of his queen Mumtaz Mahal, situated in the midst of extensive gardens, on a terrace overhanging the Jamuna, and composed of a lofty marble structure, richly decorated with mosaics, and so chaste in design, and imposing in effect, as not to be surpassed in these
respects by any edifice in the world. Notwithstanding his lavish expenditure, the revenues, without being oppressive, were so ably and economically managed during Shah Jahan's reign, that in addition to vast accumulations of plate and jewellery, he left to the value of about twenty millions sterling in coin.

Aurangzeb was no sooner seated on the throne than he endeavoured to make it secure by crushing his competitors. Dara, after a short halt at Delhi, had proceeded to Lahore, and was busily employed in raising an army with the money obtained there from the royal treasury, when he learned that Aurangzeb was already at his heels. Conscious of his inability to encounter him, he quitted Lahore at the head of 4,000 men, and made for Sind by way of Multan. He was saved from pursuit by the advance of his brother Shuja from Bengal, at the head of a force so formidable that Aurangzeb thought his presence was immediately required. He accordingly returned to Delhi, and, having made the necessary preparations, marched south-east past Etawah, in the direction of Allahabad. The armies met at Kajwah, about midway between these cities. Shuja held a strong position which he was not disposed to quit, and several days elapsed before the decisive struggle took place. It was commenced by Shuja, who, advancing at sunrise on the 6th of January, 1659, proceeded amidst a furious cannonade to close action. The contest was manfully maintained till Aurangzeb, who had repeatedly been in imminent danger, succeeded in forcing the enemy's centre. Shuja was in consequence completely defeated, with the loss of 114 cannon and a number of elephants. Closely pursued by Muhammad Sultan, Aurangzeb's son, and Mir Jumla, he continued his flight, and never halted till he reached Bengal.

Dara meanwhile had arrived in Sind, where he found his ranks so much thinned by desertion, that, to escape capture by a detachment which had been following on his track, he had crossed the desert to Kutch. After a short stay here he entered Gujarat, and by the influence of Shah Nawaz Khan, its governor, had become master of the whole province, including the important towns of Surat and Baroach. His prospects thus brightening, he opened a communication with the princes of the Deccan, and also with Jaswant Singh, the Raja of Jodhpur.
In the latter he hoped to find an important coadjutor, but was disappointed, as the raja, after balancing interests, was satisfied he would gain more by giving his adhesion to Aurangzeb. Dara, now at the head of an army of 20,000 men, advanced into Ajmer, and took up a commanding position. He had not occupied it long before Aurangzeb made his appearance. After a cannonade of three days a general assault took place, and Dara saw himself once more defeated and compelled to become a fugitive. A week of incessant toil and hardship brought him to the neighbourhood of Ahmedâbad; but it was to meet a bitter disappointment, for the gates were shut against him. His only resource was a new flight to Kutch, where he arrived with a mere handful of adherents. His altered circumstances produced a corresponding change in the ruler, who received him so coldly that he resolved to pursue his march to Kandahar. The route brought him to the small territory of Jun, on the east frontiers of Sind. The chief, who was under great obligations to Dara, received him with much apparent kindness, but immediately meditated an act of gross treachery; and accomplished it by delivering him up to his enemies. Aurangzeb was so delighted with the news that he celebrated it by public rejoicings. Both Dara and a son Sepehr, who might have proved equally dangerous, were his prisoners. The son was forthwith confined in the strong castle of Gwalior; the father was reserved for more barbarous treatment. The form of a trial was given him; but the charge was not for any offence against the state, but for apostasy from Muhammedanism. Absurd and monstrous as the charge was, no difficulty was found in constituting a court which held it proven, and pronounced sentence of death. After a hypocritical show of reluctance, Aurangzeb confirmed the iniquitous sentence, and Dara was executed.

During these transactions the war with Shuja was vigorously prosecuted by Mir Jumla, who drove him from the different strong positions in which he had posted himself; and compelled him, after a series of struggles, to seek an asylum in Arakan. The particulars of his subsequent history are not well known. One account is that the ruler of the country, doubtless at the instigation of Aurangzeb, was preparing to detain him as a prisoner, and that Shuja, made aware of his danger, endea-
voured to avert it by heading an insurrection. If this account is true, he probably perished in the attempt to overthrow the Arakan government; but the only thing certain is, that neither Shuja nor any member of his family was afterwards heard of. The only immediate descendants of Shah Jahan who could now give Aurangzeb any alarm were Murad and his son, and Suleman Shikoh and Sepehr Shikoh, the two sons of Dara. They were already within his power, being all prisoners in the fort of Gwalior. Murad was put to death for a murder alleged to have been committed by him when Viceroy of Gujarat. The others quickly disappeared by deaths which Aurangzeb declared to be natural, but which were universally believed to have been violent.

Aurangzeb's supremacy was now firmly established in every part of Hindustan. In the Deccan, on the contrary, a new power had appeared; and a struggle, about to commence, was destined not to terminate till it had laid the Mughul empire in ruins. A race of native Hindus, called Marathas, occupied a tract of the Deccan, bounded on the north by the mountain range which forms the water-shed between the basins of the Narmada and the Tapti, by the sea on the west, by the Warda on the east, and in other directions by a line drawn obliquely from the vicinity of Goa through Bidar to Chandah. Within this tract the great physical feature is the range of the Western Ghats, descending precipitously to the sea through the narrow rugged strip known by the name of the Konkan, but sloping gradually towards the interior, so as to form a lofty table land. This country, studded over with natural fortresses, and rendered almost inaccessible by forests and mountains, was admirably adapted to be the abode of a nation of marauders. Such the Marathas were, and had been from time immemorial. Strong, active, and daring, full of craft and void of honour, they were ever on the alert to pursue their own interest, while utterly regardless of the means. Descending suddenly into the plains they spread devastation on every side, and before they could be overtaken were hastening back laden with booty to their mountain fastnesses. The terror of their name was thus widely spread; and many of their neighbours purchased exemption from their ravages by annual payments. The three Muhammadan sovereigns of Ahmednagar, Bijapur,
and Golkunda, being by their position brought into frequent communication with the Marathas, naturally endeavoured to turn their military qualities to good account by employing them as soldiers. In this way not a few of them acquired distinction, and rose to offices of trust. Malik Amber, the celebrated prime minister and virtual sovereign of Ahmednagar, in particular, made great use of their services, and was so well satisfied with them that not a few of his most distinguished officers were Marathas. One of these, called Jadu Rao, had attained to a command of 10,000 men. Subordinate to him, and under his immediate protection, was another Maratha, named Maloji Bhonsla. The latter, as he brought into the field only a few mounted retainers, could not have been a person of much consequence; but he was one of those bold and dexterous adventurers on whom no opportunity of advancing his fortune was ever thrown away.

Maloji, accompanied by his son Shahji, a boy of five years of age, was attending a great Hindu festival, when Jadu, at whose house it was celebrated, giving way to the hilarity of the occasion, took up his daughter, a girl of three years old, and placing her and Shahji on his knees, laughingly exclaimed, “What a fine couple! They ought to be man and wife!” No sooner had the words passed his lips than Maloji started up, and took the company to witness that Jadu’s daughter was affianced to his son. Jadu, who boasted of a Rajput descent, was indignant that one whom he probably regarded as a mere underling should thus presume to place himself on a footing of equality with him, and attempt to take advantage of a jocular expression for the purpose of claiming affiance with his family. A quarrel ensued; but Maloji continued to insist that the affiance had been made, and ultimately made good his point by obtaining advancement which placed him on an equality with Jadu, and thus obviated the main objection to the marriage. Shahji, thus become the son-in-law of Jadu, took a prominent part in the war which extinguished the independence, or rather closed the existence of the Muhammedan kingdom of Ahmednagar. Though on this occasion he belonged not to the winning but the losing party, he managed so well for himself as to become master of all the western portion of that kingdom between its capital and the sea.
Nominally this territory now belonged to the King of Bijapur, to whose share it fell when the Mughuls made a partition or the kingdom of Ahmednagar. Shahji, therefore, was now in the King of Bijapur's service; and being sent on an expedition to the south, greatly distinguished himself by making conquests in the territory of Mysore. He was rewarded for this service with a large jaghir, including within its limits the important towns of Sera and Bangalore.

By his marriage with Jadu's daughter, Shahji had several sons. The eldest accompanied him to Mysore, and died there; the second, born in May, 1627, and named Sivaji, had been left at Poona with a Brahmin, Dadaji Kondu, who, during Shahji's absence, managed his Bijapur jaghir. The training which young Sivaji here received determined his future character. He became at once a zealous Hindu, and an expert and fearless warrior. His principal associates were the horsemen retained in his father's service, or the mountaineers inhabiting the neighbouring Ghats. Under the influence of such companionship he soon shook off the authority of Dadaji, and was suspected of being in league with marauding parties. Having acquired a body of adherents, and perceived how carelessly some of the hill-forts belonging to Bijapur were guarded, he made himself master of one of considerable strength, called Torna, situated among the Ghats, twenty miles south-west of Poona. It had previously been under the charge of the revenue officer of the district; and when the government of Bijapur complained, he succeeded by artifice and money in obtaining a confirmation of his seizure. Shortly after, when, by the erection of a new place of strength in the vicinity, a new alarm had been excited, the government made their complaint to Shahji, who immediately ordered his son to desist from encroachment. Instead of complying, he threw off the paternal authority, as he had done that of his guardian, and not only withheld the revenue of his father's jaghir, but seized upon two forts situated within it. Hitherto he had feigned submission to the King of Bijapur, but he now felt strong enough to throw off the mask. His first act of open hostility was the plunder of a convoy of royal treasure in the Konkan. Feeling himself thus committed, he continued his aggressions, and ere long was in possession of five of the principal hill-forts in the Ghats. New
successes attended his arms, and the whole of the Northern Konkan fell into his hands.

The King of Bijapur naturally suspected that Sivaji's conduct was connived at by his father, and therefore endeavoured to strike at the root of the evil by making Shahji prisoner. He asserted his innocence, but was notwithstanding thrown into a dungeon, and told that if his son did not submit within a certain time, the entrance would be built up. This threat, savage as it was, would probably have been executed, had not Sivaji, who had hitherto kept on friendly terms with Shah Jahan, obtained his interposition in his father's behalf. Having no longer any fears for his father, Sivaji gave full scope to his ambition; and not being restrained by any scruples of honour and justice, procured the assassination of a Hindu raja and seized upon his territory, which comprehended the whole of the hilly country south of Poona from the Ghats to the Upper Krishna. While he was thus extending his authority, Aurangzeb arrived in the Deccan in 1655. This event, which might have seemed fatal to Sivaji's projects, was in the first instance rather made subservient to them, as he had previously been recognized as a commander of 5,000 horse in the Mughul service; and on presenting a submissive address to Aurangzeb was confirmed in all his acquisitions. As yet, however, he was by no means satisfied; and on seeing Aurangzeb occupied in carrying on war with the King of Golconda, could not resist the opportunity of turning his absence to account. For the first time, therefore, he made an inroad on the Mughul territories. His success fell far short of his expectations; and when Aurangzeb suddenly returned after a rapid and successful campaign, it required all Sivaji's address to save himself from the full weight of his vengeance. Very opportunely for him, Shah Jahan was seized with the sudden illness already mentioned, and Aurangzeb hastened off to prosecute his own ambitious schemes. Sivaji thus relieved from apprehension, renewed his attacks on Bijapur, the throne of which was now occupied by a minor.

The Regent of Bijapur, fully alive to the extent of the danger, raised a large army, and gave the command of it to a Muhammadan noble of the name of Afzal Khan. The selection was unwise, for Afzal Khan, full of Mussulman pride, despised his
enemy, and considered himself sure of victory. Sivaji, well aware of the kind of opponent he had to deal with, took his measures accordingly. Pretending to be overawed by the very terror of his name, he sent a messenger to say that he had given up all idea of resistance, and was only anxious to arrange the terms of submission. After some preliminaries, it was agreed that a personal interview should take place. Sivaji meanwhile showed great alarm lest some undue advantage should be taken of him, and as the most effectual means of dissipating his fears, induced Afzal Khan to meet him at a secluded spot with only a single attendant. Sivaji advanced with a timid, hesitating air, dressed in a cotton tunic. He was apparently unarmed, but wore beneath the tunic a coat of mail, together with a dagger concealed in its sleeve, while within his clenched fist, and attached to his fingers, were sharp hooks of steel, known by the name of "tiger's claws". Afzal Khan, thrown completely off his guard while Sivaji humbly implored forgiveness, was in a moment seized by the claws and stabbed to the heart. His army, which had shared in his over confidence, was at the same time attacked on all sides by Marathas lying in ambush, and either perished by the sword or sought safety in flight. This atrocity was perpetrated in 1659, the year after Shah Jahan had been dethroned; and owing to the condition both of the Mughul empire, where a civil war of succession was raging, and of the kingdom of Bijapur, which was threatened with dissolution from external violence and internal dissension, was allowed to escape with impunity. In 1662, when peace was concluded, Sivaji remained in possession of territory stretching 250 miles along the coast between Goa and Bombay, so as to include the whole of the Konkan between these points, and also extending about 150 miles above the Ghats, from Poona to Miraj near the banks of the Krishna. Within this territory, notwithstanding the ruggedness and general infertility of the surface, he was able to maintain an army of 7,000 horse and 50,000 foot.

Aurangzeb after dethroning his father had conferred the viceroyalty of the Deccan on his maternal uncle Shaista Khan, who arrived in 1662, and fixed his residence at Aurangabad. Hostilities had commenced between the Mughuls and Marathas, and Sivaji had carried his ravages into the very heart of the Mughul
province. Shaista Khan in consequence put his forces in motion, and driving the Marathas before him, gained possession of Poona. Sivaji had retired to the hill-fort of Singurh, about twelve miles to the south, and there lay watching his opportunity. Being informed by spies of all his enemy's movements, he learned that Shaista Khan had taken up his quarters in the house where Sivaji's early days had been spent. Well aware of the Marathas' craft, the Mughul commander had taken every precaution against surprise; and was living in supposed security, when a band of armed men, with Sivaji at their head, rushed into his bed-chamber. He escaped by leaping from a window, but not before he had lost two of his fingers by a blow from a sword. The Maratha party had gained admission into the town by joining a marriage procession, and had afterwards availed themselves of their thorough knowledge of the locality to penetrate into the house by a back entrance. Shaista Khan's son, and most of his attendants, were cut to pieces; and in the confusion, before any steps could be taken, Sivaji was again hastening back in triumph to his mountain fastness. Though the exploit failed in its main object, it was indirectly the cause of important results. Shaista Khan, unwilling to admit that he had been completely outwitted, threw the blame on the raja, Jaswant Singh; not hesitating to accuse him of treachery, though he had only recently arrived to assist him with a strong reinforcement. In the quarrel which ensued, the operations of the Mughul army were so much crippled that Aurangzeb interposed; and, removing Shaista Khan to the government of Bengal, devolved the command of the Maratha war on his son, Prince Moazzim, assisted by the raja. The change was favourable to Sivaji, who did not fail to turn it to account. After an ineffectual attempt on Singurh, the Mughul army had returned to Aurangabad. It was now Sivaji's turn to retaliate. Having, by a number of feigned movements, deceived the enemy, he suddenly darted off at the head of 4,000 horse, and was not heard of before he made his appearance at Surat, in the beginning of January, 1664. It possessed no means of defence, and, with the exception of the English and Dutch factories, which effectually resisted the attacks made upon them, was plundered without opposition during six days.

Not long after this achievement Sivaji lost his father, Shahji, who, at a very advanced age, was killed by a fall in hunting.
He thus acquired a considerable addition to his territories; and, assuming the title of raja, began to coin money in his own name. He also turned his attention to naval affairs; and collecting a fleet of eighty-seven vessels, manned with 4,000 men, took many Mughul ships, made descents upon the coast, and carried off much plunder from the ports and maritime tracts belonging to the King of Bijapur. All these aggressions could not be permitted to pass unavenged. The raja, Jai Singh, who enjoyed as much of the confidence of Aurangzeb as that emperor’s suspicious temper allowed him to give to any one, arrived in the Deccan at the head of a large army. Sivaji made little resistance in the open field, and, though his forts of Singurh and Purandhar when besieged, made an effectual resistance, became so desponding of success that, on being assured of favourable terms; he at once offered to make his submission. It is difficult to penetrate his motives, but his conduct on this occasion certainly differs much from that which he had been accustomed to pursue. Without any better security than Jai Singh’s promise, he arrived with only a few attendants in the raja’s camp, and then making the humblest professions of fidelity, readily accepted the terms which were offered. Of thirty-two forts which he possessed, he unconditionally surrendered twenty, with all the territory depending on them; the remaining twelve and all his other possessions he was contented to hold as a jaghir from the Mughul emperor. In return for all these sacrifices, he received nothing more than the rank of a commander of 5,000 men in the Mughul service, for his son, Sambhuji, a boy of five years of age, and a kind of percentage on the revenues of the different districts of Bijapur. The latter grant was valuable only for its indefiniteness, as it afterwards furnished the Marathas with a pretext for making many unfounded claims. On the completion of this arrangement, Sivaji joined the Mughul army with 2,000 horse and 8,000 infantry, in an invasion of Bijapur. The deference paid to him by Jai Singh, and two letters from Aurangzeb complimenting him on his services, made such an impression upon him, that he set out with his son Sambhuji on a visit to Delhi. His reception was mortifying in the extreme. On approaching the capital, he was met only by an officer of inferior rank,
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and on entering the presence, was left unnoticed to take his place among commanders of the third rank. Overpowered by feelings of shame and indignation, he slunk behind, and fell down in a swoon. What Aurangzeb intended by this treatment is not very obvious. If he thought that the Maratha spirit was thus to be tamed, he was greatly mistaken. Sivaji only burned for revenge, and, preparatory to it, began with all his usual craft to plan an escape. He had brought an escort of 500 horse and 1,000 foot, and lulled suspicion by asking leave to send them home, on the ground that the climate did not agree with them. He next feigned sickness; and, by gaining over some of the Hindu physicians who attended him, found means of communicating with his friends without. Meanwhile he was constantly making presents of sweetmeats and provisions to fakirs and other devotees. These were conveyed in large baskets and hampers, which passed so frequently, that the guards set over him ceased to inspect them. Escape thus became comparatively easy. One evening Sivaji was carried out in one of these hampers, and his son in another, and as he had taken the precaution to leave a servant in his bed to counterfeit him, some time elapsed before the escape was discovered. A strict search was made in every quarter, and all the avenues by which he might pass to his own country were carefully watched; but at length, after nine months of surprising adventures, he made his appearance among his own people in the disguise of a Hindu religious mendicant.

It was not Sivaji’s policy to come at once to a final rupture with the Mughuls; and therefore, availing himself of a change of commanders in the Deccan, he once more made his peace through the mediation of Jaswant Singh, obtained a formal recognition of his title of raja, and, in addition to the recovery of a large portion of his old territory, obtained the grant of a new jaghir in Berar. He was thus at liberty to turn his arms against Bijapur and Golconda, both of which, unwilling to risk a contest, submitted to the humiliation of paying tribute. An interval of tranquillity followed, and Sivaji turned it to good account, by introducing many important internal reforms, and organizing, with much skill and success, a regular form both of military and civil government.
The new arrangement made between Sivaji and the Mughuls was not sincere on either side. Aurangzeb only pretended friendship that he might once more obtain possession of Sivaji's person, and thus save the necessity of the protracted war which must be carried on, in order to subdue him by force of arms. A game of craft was accordingly played for some time, but so little to Aurangzeb's advantage, that he at last threw off the mask and declared open hostilities. Sivaji, so far from declining the contest, took the first active step by attacking and re-capturing his hill-fort of Singurh. Other forts, together with the territories annexed to them, were also recovered; and, in 1670, after again plundering Surat, he retired along the left bank of the Tapti into Khandesh, where he set the example, for the first time, of levying chouth—a kind of permanent blackmail, for which the Marathas afterwards became notorious, and which amounted to no less than one-fourth of the annual revenue. Heavy and odious as the exaction was, many districts readily submitted to pay it, in return for the exemption which it gave them from the other forms of Maratha plunder.

Sivaji's rapid successes were greatly favoured by Aurangzeb's suspicious temper and persecuting bigotry. Ever afraid that his sons might treat him as he had treated his own father, he never intrusted them with any important command, without sharing it with some other officer who might be able to neutralize any reasonable attempts. His war in the Deccan was carried on on this principle, and hence Prince Moazzim was not only crippled in his movements, but obliged to divide his forces so as to expose them to the danger of being beaten in detail. In 1671, Aurangzeb, under the influence of this suspicious spirit, left Moazzim without reinforcements, but at the same time sent Mohabat Khan to act independent of him, with an army of 40,000 men. Thus circumstanced, neither commander was able to cope with the enemy; and, after a few unimportant operations, the rainy season coming on, obliged both to retire into quarters. When the season for resuming operations commenced, Mohabat Khan, while eagerly prosecuting a siege, left 20,000 of his men exposed to the attack of a large army which Sivaji had raised. They were, in consequence, completely defeated. In this battle, which was fought in 1672, the Marathas were for the first
time successful against the Mughuls in fair conflict in the open field. As may be supposed, the moral influence of the victory was far greater than the actual gain and loss of the combatants, the conquerors being as much elated as the vanquished were disheartened.

While Aurangzeb was sustaining these losses in the Deccan, his attention was occupied by disturbances in the north-western provinces. The Afghans, always restless and troublesome, had for some time been kept in check by the governor of Kabul, Amin Khan, son and successor of the celebrated Mir Jumla; but in 1670 they defeated him in a pitched battle, and resumed their superiority. After various attempts to subdue them, Aurangzeb undertook the war in person, but with very indifferent success, and after the lapse of three years returned to Delhi. To save his honour, he had concluded a very imperfect arrangement. His return was opportune; for a formidable insurrection, headed by Hindu devotees, who possessed great influence among their countrymen, broke out in the vicinity of the capital. Its importance was at first underrated, and the idea gaining ground that the rebels were rendered invincible by enchantment, the Mughul troops could scarcely be brought to face them. Ultimately, however, Aurangzeb succeeded in inspiring his Mussulmans with a fanaticism equal to that of the devotees, and the insurgents sustained a signal defeat. The religious form which the insurrection assumed, gave new force to Aurangzeb’s bigotry, and he commenced a long course of persecution, with the revival of the odious jizia, or capitation tax on Hindus. The utmost discontent in consequence prevailed; and in the capital in particular, the streets were so crowded with clamorous suppliants, that one day, finding himself obstructed in proceeding to the mosque, he made way for himself by trampling down the mob with his horses and elephants.

In the provinces the results of this persecuting system were soon manifested. The Rajputs entered into a league for mutual defence, and the whole of the western part of Rajputana rose in arms. An exterminating war commenced, and raged furiously for many years; but as Aurangzeb’s resources far exceeded those of the insurgents, he gradually gained ground, captured the remarkable Rajput fortress of Chitor—situated on a lofty
isolated rock, which, rising abruptly from its base, had for additional security been scarped all round to the depth of nearly 100 feet—and by the terror of his devastations compelled an external submission from many who continued to hate him in their hearts. In the Deccan, every Hindu now considering his religion at stake, felt personally interested in the triumph of the Marathas. Sivaji, consequently, continued to prosper. In 1674, when a disputed succession in Bijapur made conquest easy, he extended his sway over the whole of the Southern Konkan, with the exception of a few isolated points; and beyond the Ghats pushed his boundary much farther eastward. Having now all the reality of a great sovereignty, he resolved to complete it in due form; and on the 6th of June, 1674, was crowned with a pomp which imperfectly but ostentatiously imitated the Mughul ceremonial on similar occasions. From this period, regarding himself as the founder of a new national dynasty, he lived in regal state, changed the name of his officers from Persian to Sanskrit, and became strictly observant of all the rites of Hinduism. These proceedings must have given mortal offence to Aurangzeb; and, accordingly, when the Marathas were engaged in making conquests from Bijapur, the Mughuls seized the opportunity to make an incursion into their territory. Sivaji deemed it too unimportant to require his presence, and contented himself with retaliating by sending detachments which plundered Khandesh and Berar; and proceeding beyond the Narmada, which had never before been crossed by a Maratha force, carried his devastations as far as Baroach, in Gujarat. For some time his thoughts had been fixed on the south. There the jaghir which his father acquired in Mysore was held by a younger brother under the nominal supremacy of Bijapur. It properly formed part of Sivaji’s patrimony, and he determined to obtain it either in virtue of his legal claim or by compulsion. The distance, however, was too great to allow him to set out for it without taking precautions. The territory of the King of Golkunda partly intervened, and in order not to leave his rear exposed it was necessary to come to an understanding with him. This was not difficult, as they agreed in regarding the King of Bijapur and the Mughul emperor as common enemies. After making overtures, which
were favourably received, Sivaji set out at the head of 30,000 horse and 40,000 foot. On the way he halted at Golkunda, and concluded an alliance by which, in return for defence against a Mughul or Bijapur invasion, a train of artillery, and a subsidy in money, he agreed to share with the king all the territory he should conquer beyond his father's jaghir. Continuing his route, he crossed the Tungabhadra at Kurnul, proceeded south-east to Cuddapah, then passed close to Madras, and finally turning south-west, presented himself before the strong fort of Gingi, belonging to Bijapur. He could not have taken it by force; but had previously made secure of it by bribing its commander. The heavy part of his army left behind succeeded in capturing Vellore. On arriving at his father's jaghir, his brother refused to resign it; but ultimately, after he had taken forcible possession, he entered into an arrangement by which he restored it to his brother on condition of receiving half the revenue.

The alliance with Golkunda had been short-lived; for the king, shortly after Sivaji's departure, arranged with the Mughuls, and consequently forfeited all claim to any share in the conquests which had been made. The immediate inducement to abandon the alliance was an invasion of Golkunda by the Mughuls under a celebrated leader of the name of Diler Khan. This chief, after his attack on Golkunda, entered the territory of Bijapur, and, though his force was small, so dexterously availed himself of internal dissensions that he was able to lay siege to the capital itself. In this extremity, the King of Bijapur earnestly applied for assistance to Sivaji, who was advancing for this purpose when he was astonished to learn that his son Sambhuji had deserted to the Mughuls. His father had imprisoned him in a hill-fort for gross misconduct, and the youth having made his escape fled to Diler, who received him with open arms. Notwithstanding this domestic calamity, Sivaji continued his exertions with so much vigour that all Diler Khan's efforts were baffled, and Bijapur was saved. As the price of this service, Sivaji obtained a large accession of territory, all the Bijapur districts between the Tungabhadra and the Krishna being ceded to him.

Amid all these successes, Sivaji was seized with an illness which carried him off on the 5th of April, 1680. In the course
of nature, he might still have had a considerable career to run, as he had only attained his fifty-third year; but he had lived long enough to produce great political changes, and become the founder of an empire. Originally little better than a marauding adventurer, he displayed wonderful sagacity in profiting by every opening that presented itself; and when brought face to face with the most powerful monarch of the East, not only maintained an equal contest but often gained decided advantages. When Aurangzeb entered upon his Muhammedan crusade, Sivaji met him on his own ground; and taking Hinduism under his protection, gave it once more a national ascendancy. It is not to be denied, that in pursuing his objects he was unscrupulous, and committed several atrocious crimes; but it may be pleaded for him in mitigation, that his enemies were in these respects still worse than himself, and that while their crimes were often the effect of mere barbarism delighting in deeds of blood for their own sake, he was never wantonly cruel, and threw honour and humanity aside only when he imagined, of course erroneously, that sound policy required it.

Sambhuji was a very different man from his father, and possessed none of his good qualities except courage. While a mere youth he had become a complete debauche; and when by his misconduct he had subjected himself to confinement, so little was his patriotism that the first use he made of his recovered freedom was to desert to the enemy. He had again returned to his country; but, so far from having recovered his father's good graces, was a prisoner in the fort of Panalla when his father died. As might have been expected in these circumstances, some demur was made to his accession, though he was the eldest son; and a party was formed with the view of placing a second son, Raja Ram, a boy of ten years old, on the throne. This party endeavoured to conceal the news of Sivaji's death; but Sambhuji got immediate notice of it, and was at once acknowledged by the garrison of the fort. What had previously been a prison was thus converted into a stronghold, where he remained secure till the party opposed to him broke down; and he entered Raigarh, the capital, as undisputed sovereign.

His first acts justified the opposition which had been made to him. Sivaji's widow, the mother of Ram Singh, was put to
death, Ram Singh himself was imprisoned, several Brahmins of his party were thrown into chains, and such of his enemies as belonged to other castes were beheaded. The disaffection thus produced was greatly increased by harsh treatment of his father's ministers, while he gave himself up to the guidance of a worthless favourite of the name of Kalusha, who pandered to his vices.

The first hostilities in which Sambhuji engaged terminated to his disadvantage. The island of Jinjira, situated on the west coast of India, a little south of Bombay, had long been possessed by the Habsis or Siddis, chiefs of Abyssinian origin, who held it of Bijapur on the condition of maintaining a fleet for the protection of commerce, and the safe conveyance of pilgrims to Mecca. The island was strongly fortified; and the Siddis having the command at sea, were able when attacked to offer a very formidable resistance. The proximity of the island to the Maratha capital would have made it a most desirable possession to that power, as it contributes to form one of the best harbours on the Indian coast; and many were the attempts which Sivaji had made to become master of it. He was always unsuccessful; and while making large conquests in other quarters, had the mortification of seeing all his efforts baffled whenever he directed them against this little spot. Sambhuji flattered himself that he would be more fortunate, and no sooner felt firmly seated than he resolved to commence the siege of Jinjira. One of his operations was to connect the island with the mainland by a mound, and effect the capture by means similar to those which Alexander the Great used when he took the city of Tyre. He proved no Alexander; and after being compelled to raise the siege, was enraged beyond measure on seeing the Siddis plundering his villages, and learning that they had defeated his fleet at sea. In the midst of his wrath he would willingly have fixed the blame on any but himself; and on the pretence that they had assisted his enemies, made war on the Portuguese, and was with difficulty restrained from attacking the English also.

A more formidable enemy than either immediately appeared, and gave him full employment. In the Deccan, the character of the new Maratha sovereign had soon become manifest; and the strict discipline which Sivaji had maintained rapidly disappeared.
through the idleness and debauchery of his son. He had left vast treasures, but these were soon squandered, and the attempt to replace them by increasing the land revenue spread general disaffection. Aurangzeb, perfectly informed as to the change which had taken place, had no sooner quelled the insurrection of the Rajputs than he began his march southwards with the avowed purpose of making a final conquest of the Deccan. His army was so numerous and well equipped that he never contemplated the possibility of failure, and therefore disdained to strengthen himself by forming any alliance with Bijapur and Golkunda. This overweening confidence was his first great fault; another, which looks like infatuation, was the announcement of his determination rigidly to exact the jeizia. Even his military talents appear to have forsaken him, for he began the campaign without any properly concerted plan. While making a long halt at Burhanpur, on the Tapti, he sent off two large detachments—one under Prince Azim to reduce some hill-forts of the Ghats, and the other under Prince Moazzim to overrun the Konkan and penetrate to the south of the Maratha country. Azim was partially successful, though more by bribery than prowess. Moazzim threaded his way through the thickets of the Deccan without being opposed; and yet, when he arrived in the vicinity of Goa, it was only to find himself in a worse condition than if he had sustained a signal defeat. Almost all his horses and cattle had perished under the hardships of the march and the want of forage, and even the men were beginning to suffer from scarcity. Sambhuji, in the meantime, was not idle. While he occupied the passes through the Ghats, his cruisers were scouring the sea, and capturing the Mughul vessels which were endeavouring to land provisions on the coasts. With the greatest difficulty Moazzim reached the country above the Ghats with an army almost disorganized, and spent the rainy season near Miruj, where his ranks were again dreadfully thinned by an epidemic.

When the campaign was resumed, Aurangzeb advanced in person to Ahmednagar, while Azim and Moazzim were ordered to enter Bijapur from opposite directions. Sambhuji immediately saw his advantage, and, assembling a body of horse in the north of Konkan, placed himself suddenly in Aurangzeb's
rear, sacked and burned the city of Burhanpur, and was again back in the Konkan, leaving the whole country in a blaze. In Bijapur the campaign was equally disastrous, neither of the royal princes possessing sufficient strength to make head against the forces opposed to them; and, though both received reinforcements, no advantage whatever was gained, except the capture of Sholapur. To this place Aurangzeb advanced with his army. This movement furnished Sambhuji with the opportunity of making another plundering excursion, during which he devastated part of Gujarat and plundered the city of Baroach. About this time he had entered into an alliance with the King of Golkunda, who was therefore now regarded as an enemy of the Mughuls, and his kingdom invaded by Aurangzeb. The army, commanded by Prince Moazzim, made little progress till the commander-in-chief, a fanatic Mussulman, who was offended at the influence possessed by a Brahmin, turned traitor and deserted, carrying the greater part of his troops along with him. Resistance was now vain; and, while the king took refuge in the fort of Golkunda, Hyderabad, his capital, was seized and sacked. Having been reduced to the necessity of accepting whatever terms were offered to him, the Mughuls left him effectually crippled, and next turned their arms against Bijapur. The siege of the capital was immediately commenced by Aurangzeb in person. It was successful, and the Bijapur monarchy ceased to exist. The splendour to which the capital had attained is still attested by its ruins. Aurangzeb having thus succeeded probably beyond his expectations, appears to have repented of his leniency in having left the King of Golkunda even a shadow of independence. Little difficulty was found in devising a pretext for breaking the peace, and the whole territory was speedily overrun. The king, Abul Hasan, shut up in his fort, shook off the effeminacy for which he had previously been notorious, and defended himself successfully for seven months. Treachery at last again did its work, and the Golkunda monarchy also was extinguished in 1687. The Mughul empire now reached its utmost limits in the south. The kingdoms of Ahmednagar, Bijapur, and Golkunda, were formally incorporated with it, and even a considerable portion of the Mysore, and more especially that part which had formed Shahji’s jaghir;
was held at least by military occupation. Venkaji, whom Sivaji had left in possession of the jaghir, was obliged to confine himself to Tanjore; and any other Marathas who had made acquisitions in the same quarter, were driven from the open country and found no safety beyond the precincts of their hill-forts.

While Aurangzeb was thus pursuing his victorious career, Sambhuji seemed to be almost forgotten. Under the guidance of the despicable Kalusha, he had been pursuing a shameless course of drunkenness and debauchery. The whole of the open country belonging to the Marathas was in consequence overrun, and a systematic attempt was about to be made on the forts, when a still more important object was gained by the capture of Sambhuji himself. He was living in security at a favourite pleasure house in the Konkan, when Tokarrab Khan, the Mughul officer at Kolapur, acting on a plan which is said to have originated with Aurangzeb himself, set off with a small body of troops, crossed the Ghats, and, after a journey of nearly sixty miles, made his sudden appearance. An alarm was immediately spread, and escape was still practicable, but Sambhuji was in such a state of intoxication as to be unable to attempt it, and was carried off in triumph, together with Kalusha, to the Mughul headquarters. Aurangzeb, deeming it possible to use him as a tool, offered him his life on condition of turning Mussulman; but he rejected the offer with scorn, and spoke of Mohammedanism in such contemptuous terms that an ordinary death was deemed an insufficient punishment, and he was subjected to horrid barbarities before being beheaded.

This execution, which took place in August, 1689, spread universal indignation among the Marathas. Sambhuji’s worthless character was overlooked, and the heroism with which he had courted death sooner than abjure his faith, made him be regarded somewhat in the light of a martyr. The principal chiefs, immediately on receiving tidings of his death, assembled at Raigarh, and acknowledged his infant son, Sahu, as raja. Raja Ram, Sambhuji’s brother, was appointed regent. The task thus assigned him was extremely difficult. Aurangzeb in person was at the head of an overwhelming force, and it seemed as if the Marathas, more especially after the capital, and with it the
young raja himself, fell into his hands, would have no alternative but to throw themselves on the victor's mercy. In this extremity Raja Ram fled to the strong fortress of Gingi, in the Carnatic, after putting the forts of the Deccan in a good state of defence, and ordering the troops to disperse in their villages and wait for better times. The leading chiefs, whose lands might have been forfeited, made no scruple of making a feigned submission to the Mughul, while they still kept up an understanding with their countrymen, and watched for the first opportunity of joining any rebellion which promised to be successful.

The subjugation of the Deccan being apparently complete, Aurangzeb despatched a general of the name of Zulfikar Khan to reduce Gingi. Raja Ram, who had now begun to govern in his own name in consequence of the captivity of his nephew, prepared for a vigorous defence; and Zulfikar Khan had no sooner reconnoitred the place than he saw that success was hopeless without strong reinforcements. While applying for these, he sent part of his army into Tanjore and other southern countries to levy contributions. They were thus employed when they received an urgent recall. The Marathas, who had never entirely desisted from their guerrilla warfare, had become emboldened by partial successes, and were mustering strong in various quarters. Scarcely any district in the Deccan was secure from their incursions; and whenever the chouth was withheld, nothing was to be seen but fire and devastation. Two Maratha leaders, Santaji Ghorpada and Danaji Jadu, particularly distinguished themselves. By intercepting convoys, and attacking isolated detachments, they spread such general alarm that Aurangzeb felt the necessity of endeavouring, by decisive measures, to revive the spirit of his troops. Zulfikar Khan was still before Gingi, and unable to make any progress because the reinforcements which he required had been withheld. When they were at last despatched, Aurangzeb gave the chief command to his son Kambaksh, but at the same time, adhering to his suspicious system, controlled his operations by sending along with him Assad Khan, Zulfikar Khan's father. As might have been expected, all parties were dissatisfied with this arrangement. Kambaksh complained that, while he bore the responsibility,
the authority which he possessed was only nominal; Assad Khan and his son, on the other hand, complained with equal reason that, while the burden of conducting the war lay on them, all the fame which might be acquired was reserved for another.

While the leaders were thus at variance, the combined operations necessary to insure success could not be adopted. It is even said that Zulfikar Khan carried his resentment so far as to enter into treasonable correspondence with the enemy, and furnish them with intelligence which enabled them to frustrate all the efforts of the besiegers. No wonder that, in such circumstances, the siege was protracted for years. Meanwhile Santaji and Danaji, the two leaders above mentioned, were not idle. Their partizans were spread over the whole country, and they could, on the shortest notice, gather thousands around their standard. Thus feeling their strength, they resolved to make a great effort for the relief of Gingi. The force provided for this purpose amounted to 20,000 chosen horse. It was commanded by Santaji, who came upon the besiegers so suddenly that one of their divisions was completely surprised. An attempt to check his progress only led to a second overthrow, and the Mughuls, cut off from their supplies and confined within their intrenchments, became, instead of besiegers, besieged. They adopted the best course which remained to them in the circumstances, and made an arrangement which allowed them to retire to Wandivash, about twenty miles distant.

During the greater part of the siege, Aurangzeb had remained in permanent cantonments near Punderpur, on the Beema, but on hearing of this disgrace, advanced to Bijapur. While strongly condemning the conduct of his generals, he inconsistently conferred the sole command on Zulfikar Khan, the only one who was truly to blame. After a number of desultory operations, the siege was resumed, and again began to linger till Zulfikar Khan, aware that Aurangzeb’s suspicions were aroused, saw the necessity of no longer dallying. Accordingly, after allowing Raja Ram to escape, he carried on his operations in earnest, and soon made himself master of the place.

This success was partly owing to internal dissensions which had broken out among the Marathas. Danaji and Santaji, after acting in concert, had given way to feelings of mutual jealousy, and came to an open rupture. Santaji, as the stricter disciplin-
arian of the two, was the less popular; and, after an attempt to maintain his position, found his party so weakened that he had no alternative but flight. He was pursued, overtaken, and, notwithstanding all his services, remorselessly put to death. At this time Raja Ram had taken up his residence in Satara, where he had not only succeeded in again organizing the government, but soon found himself so strong as to be able to take the field at the head of the largest army which the Marathas had ever raised. Proceeding northward he crossed the Godavari, levying the *chouth*, and when it was refused, spreading devastation as far as Jaulna, forty miles east of Aurangabad. Here his progress was checked by a Mughul detachment, headed by his old opponent Zulfikar Khan, who pressed closely upon his track, and inflicted upon him several defeats. These, however, were soon repaired, and the Marathas only dispersed for the time, to re-appear in another quarter as strong as ever. On the whole, therefore, the Mughuls, even when they gained a victory, were seldom permitted to reap the fruits of it, and hence were gradually becoming more and more exhausted and dispirited.

Aurangzeb could not shut his eyes to the difficulties of his position; and though now far advanced in life, gave proof of indomitable energy in the efforts which he made to improve it. Quitting his cantonments on the Beema, he suddenly appeared before Satara, which was taken in April, 1700, after a desperate defence, which protracted the siege for several months. While it was carried on, Raja Ram had died, and been succeeded by a minor son under the regency of his mother, Tara Bai. It is not improbable that this event favoured the Mughuls, as, in the course of a few years, all the principal forts of the Marathas were wrested from them. The war, however, still continued, and with every new success gained by Aurangzeb, seemed rather to enlarge its sphere. Under the Maratha system of devastation, the whole Deccan was converted into a desert, and districts which had previously escaped were thrown into consternation by their incursions. Malwa was almost overrun, and no part of Gujarat felt secure. Even the forts, in the capture of which the Mughuls had spent so much time and treasure, and lost so many lives, could not be retained, and began to fall, one by one, into the hands of their former possessors.

To meet the dangers which thus environed him, all the energy which Aurangzeb possessed in the most vigorous period of his life
would scarcely have sufficed, and this energy was now forsaking him. Borne down by the weight of years he longed for repose, and was not unwilling to have purchased it by setting the Raja Sahu at liberty, and even submitting to pay an annual percentage on the revenue of the Deccan. The Marathas listened to his overtures; but, conscious of their advantages, became so exorbitant in their demands that all attempts at negotiation failed, and Aurangzeb, threatened on every side, was compelled to retreat. He reached Ahmednagar after a series of disasters and narrow personal escapes. Here his health gave way, and it soon became apparent that his end was approaching. Thus brought face to face with the last enemy, he cowered before him, and trembled under both real and imaginary terrors. None of his crimes seems to have filled him with so much remorse as the dethronement of his father. He feared that the same measure was about to be meted out to himself, and hence saw his worst enemies in his own sons. A suggestion by Prince Moazzim to make arrangements for the future was interpreted into a wish to pluck the crown from his head before he had ceased to wear it; and when a letter from Prince Azim was read, requesting permission to come to Ahmednagar because his health was suffering at Gujarat, he exclaimed, "That is exactly the pretext I used to Shah Jahan in his illness." Nothing, indeed, could be more melancholy than Aurangzeb's death-bed. A letter dictated to Azim in his last moments gives utterance to his remorse and terror, and concludes thus:—"Come what may, I have launched my vessel on the waves. Farewell! farewell! farewell!" Another letter to Prince Kambaksh, his youngest son, is in the same spirit—"Wherever I look I see nothing but the Divinity. . . . I have committed numerous crimes, and I know not with what punishments I may be seized. The agonies of death come upon me fast." It was so; and on 21st February, 1707, Aurangzeb expired, in the eighty-ninth year of his age and the fiftieth of his reign. After his death a document of the nature of a will was found under his pillow, giving the northern and eastern provinces of the empire, with the title of emperor, and the capital, Delhi, to Moazzim—the south-west, and south, including the northern part of the Deccan, with Agra as a capital, to Azim—and the kingdoms of Golkunda and Bijapur to Kambaksh. The extent to which these arrangements were carried out, and the results, will afterwards be seen.
Progress of the East India Company - I

The reigns of the Mughul emperors, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb, together with the rise and progress of the Marathas, are so closely interwoven that it was necessary to link them together in a continuous narrative. In this way many years of the history of the London East India Company have been left behind. It will now be proper, therefore, to retrace our steps and return to the period of Cromwell's death, which took place in 1658, the very same year in which Shah Jahan ceased to reign. The effects, direct or indirect, which both events produced in regard to the Company must now be detailed.

After Cromwell, on the recommendation of his council of state, had decided that the trade to the East Indies should in future be carried on by one joint stock, the Company now united with the body designated sometimes as Assada Merchants, and sometimes as Merchant Adventurers, raised the large subscription of £786,000, and despatched five ships, three of them consigned to Surat, Persia, and Bantam, one to Fort St. George, or Madras, and one to Bengal. The civil war which the contending claims of the sons of Shah Jahan had produced in India had a most injurious effect on trade. At Surat in particular the operations of the Company were almost entirely suspended, and the president and council were greatly perplexed as to the course which they ought to pursue; because, as they themselves expressed it, "it was equally dangerous to solicit or to accept of protection, it being impossible to foresee who might ultimately be the Mughul." In England similar results were occasioned by the uncertainty which prevailed while the protectorate, feebly
and almost reluctantly continued by Richard Cromwell, was gradually supplanted by the re-establishment of monarchical institutions under Charles II. During this anxious interval the servants of the Company abroad were left very much to their own discretion. When the homeward bound vessels were about to return, the council of Surat, after consultation with the different captains, endeavoured to provide for all contingencies by entering into an arrangement by which the captains agreed to sail as a fleet, and bound themselves under a penalty of £6,000 each to keep together as far as practicable. On arriving at St. Helena, which had now become the Company’s principal intermediate station between Europe and India, they were to wait for intelligence from England, and in the event of its not proving favourable, to direct their course to Barbados, and there remain till assured of a safe return.

Formerly the Company had been averse to fortifications, or at least to the expense which it would be necessary to incur in erecting and maintaining them; but it was constantly becoming more and more apparent from the political state of India, as well as from the preponderating influence of the Dutch, that without fortifications, and the absolute control of them, it would be impossible to place the trade on a secure and lasting foundation. Accordingly we find the presidency of Surat, in accordance with instructions received from home, examining the west coast of the Indian peninsula, in order to discover some station which, strong by nature, might be made still stronger by art, so as to afford a secure asylum, and recommending for this purpose different stations which the King of Portugal might be induced to cede. It is rather remarkable that one of these was Bombay, which was shortly after to become the property of the British crown as part of the dowry of the Portuguese infanta. On the Coromandel coast the same necessity for strong fortification was felt, in consequence of the alarm which had been excited by the near approach of Sivaji to Madras when he was marching to his southern conquests. In the Persian Gulf, where the share of the customs of Gomberoon still formed a valuable branch of the Company’s revenue, the Persian government had given so many indications of hostility that it was seriously proposed to negotiate the occupation of Muscat.
would almost seem that in proposing this occupation some objects of a very questionable, if not piratical nature were contemplated; for among the inducements mentioned by the Surat presidency are not merely the beneficial effect it might have on their coast trade on the west of India, but the facility it would give "to seize in retaliation on the Malabar junks." In Bengal, notwithstanding various acts of oppression by the governor, the hopeful character of the trade—which seemed capable of being increased to any extent, and rendered peculiarly valuable on account of the fine qualities of the goods, particularly saltpetre, raw silk, taffetas, and other manufactures—made a fortified station particularly desirable; but it could not be obtained voluntarily, and the Mughul government still seemed so strong that the idea of attempting to gain it by force would, if any had been bold enough to propose it, have been scouted at once as impracticable and monstrous.

The restoration of Charles II, in 1660, had at first a decidedly favourable influence on the interests of the Company. Amicable relations were at once re-established with Spain; the bonds of friendship with Portugal were drawn closer by royal affinity; and the States-general, while congratulating the king on his return, not only proposed a renewal of friendship, but gave a pledge of their sincerity by ordering the immediate cession of the island of Polaroon to the London East India Company. In regard to this cession it must, however, be added, that the Dutch governor of Batavia, to whom the order was issued, postponed it for several years under various pretexts, and at last obeyed it only in the letter, while he grossly violated it in spirit by previously destroying all the spice trees, so as to render the possession worthless. Some of the other benefits which the Company owed to the Restoration were of a more substantial nature. The first of these to which it is necessary to attend was a new crown charter.

This deed, dated 3rd April, proceeds upon the following preamble:—"Whereas our well-beloved subjects, the Governor and Company of Merchants trading into the East Indies, have been of long time a corporation to the honour and profit of this nation, and have enjoyed and do enjoy divers privileges and immunities by force of several letters-patent and charters heretofore granted to them by our late royal progenitors Queen Elizabeth
and King James of blessed memory: And whereas we are given to understand that of late divers disorders and inconveniences have been committed as well by our own subjects as foreigners, to the great prejudice of the said Company, and interruption of their trade, whereupon they have humbly besought us to grant and confirm their said charters, with some alterations and additions, tending to the benefit and advancement of their trade and traffick”. As it would be superfluous to give any analysis of the contents of this charter, in so far as it merely repeats and confirms those previously granted, it is necessary only to attend to the alterations and additions, several of which are very important.

In regard to duration no change is made, the only limit to perpetuity being, as before, a three years’ notice; but an alteration affecting the very constitution of the Company is produced by a clause which, abolishing the right which every member had hitherto enjoyed of giving one and no more than one vote, provides that in future “every person shall have a number of votes according to his stock, that is to say, for every £500 by him subscribed or brought into the present stock, one vote;” and that “any of those that have subscribed or brought less than £500 may give their respective sums to make up £500, and have one vote jointly for the same.”

By another series of still more important clauses the strictly mercantile character of the Company was revolutionized, and full provision made for the large exercise of judicial and even political functions. Thus “all plantations, forts, fortifications, factories, or colonies, where the said Company’s factories and trade are, or shall be in the East Indies, shall be immediately and from henceforth under the power and command of the said governor and Company, with “full power and authority to appoint and establish governors, and all other officers to govern them”. The extent of the authority thus conferred is explained by its being added, that in each factory or place of trade the governor and his council “may have power to judge all persons belonging to the said governor and Company, or that shall live under them, in all causes whether civil or criminal, according to the laws of this kingdom, and to execute judgment accordingly”. As there might be factories where there were no governor and council, the chief factor and his council in such places were
empowered, when any crime or misdemeanour was committed, "to transmit the party, together with the offence, to such other plantation, factory, or fort, where there is a governor and council, where justice may be executed, or into this kingdom of England, as shall be thought most convenient." One can hardly help remarking how very absolute these powers are, and how very liable they must have been to abuse. One of the most frequent forms of alleged misdemeanour must have been the invasion of the Company's exclusive privileges. In all such cases, the Company were the complaining parties; and hence, in violation of all recognized rules of judicial procedure—at least under governments not actually despotic—they were in fact constituted judges in their own cause.

The military and political privileges conferred are, if possible, still more ample. They include "free liberty and license for the said governor and Company, in case they conceive it necessary to send either ships of war, men, or ammunition into any their factories, or other places of their trade in the said East Indies, for the security and defence of the same; and to choose commanders and officers over them, and to give them power and authority by commissions under their common seal or otherwise, to continue or make peace or war with any prince or people that are not Christians in any places of their trade, or shall be most for the advantage and benefit of the said governor and Company and of their trade; and also to right and recumence themselves upon the goods, estate, or people of these parts, by whom the said governor and Company may sustain any injury, loss, or damage, or upon any other people whatsoever that shall any ways interrupt, wrong, or injure them in their said trade within the said places, territories, and limits." Authority, moreover, is given "to erect and build such castles, fortifications, forts, garrisons, colonies or plantations at St. Helena, as also elsewhere," within their limits and bounds of trade, "as they in their discretions shall think fit and requisite; and for the supplying of such as shall be requisite to keep and be in the same, to send out of this kingdom to the said castles," &c., "all kind of clothing, provision of victuals, ammunition, and implements necessary for such purpose, without paying of any custom, subsidy, or other duty for the same; as also to transport and carry over such number of men, being willing thereunto, as they shall think fit."
The invasion of the exclusive privileges of the charter by unlicensed traders had occupied too much of the attention of the Company, and had too often been the subject of petition and complaint to the crown, to allow it to be overlooked. Several minute and stringent clauses are accordingly devoted to it. Thus "full power and lawful authority" is given to "seize upon the persons of all such English, or any other our subjects in the said East Indies, which shall sail in any India or English vessel, or inhabit in those parts, without the leave and license" of the Company, "or that shall contemn or disobey their orders, and send them to England." The only security against the abuse of these enormous powers was an appeal, but the exercise of it was attended with consequences which must have made it a mockery; for the moment an appeal was entered the Company were empowered "to seize upon" the person or persons convicted and sentenced, "and to carry him or them home prisoners into England." As unlicensed traders were not the only persons of whom the Company were apprehensive, it was provided that "for the better discovery of injuries and abuses to be done unto the said governor and Company, or their successors, by any of their servants by them employed in the said East Indies or voyages thither, it shall and may be lawful to and for the said governor and Company, and their respective presidents, chief agent, or governor in the said East Indies, to examine upon oath all factors, masters, pursers, supercargoes, commanders of castles, forts, fortifications, plantations, or colonies, or other person, touching or concerning any matter or thing as to which by law and usage an oath may be administered." In spite of all these precautions, it was still possible that by smuggling or otherwise the exclusive privileges conferred by the charter might be invaded; and therefore, as an additional security, custom-house officers are enjoined not to "permit any entries to be made of any goods or merchandizes of the growth, production, or manufacture of the ports or places aforesaid in Asia, Africa, and America, above limited or appropriated to the trade of the said governor and Company, other than such as from time to time shall be allowed of by the said governor and Company, or their successors, under their common seal, or the hand of the officer to be by them appointed to sit in the custom-house for that purpose." Thus
the Company who not many years before had been threatened with utter extinction, had obtained a charter in which the crown, for the purpose of making their privileges as ample as possible, stretched its prerogative to the very utmost, and took every imaginable precaution for their security both at home and abroad.

At this very time when the Company seemed about to enter on a new course of prosperity, a severe shock was given to their trade in Bengal by the rashness of their agent at Hughli. Irritated beyond measure at the oppression practised or countenanced by the governor, he resolved to take the remedy into his own hands, and seized a country junk in the Ganges with the determination to hold it as a security. Mir Jumla, the celebrated Mughul general, immediately threatened to retaliate both on the inland agencies and on their factory at Hughli. The agent, now terrified at the result of his own boldness, sought counsel from the president and council of Surat, who directed him at once to repair and re-deliver the junk; and in the event of this concession not being deemed sufficient, to prepare for shipping all the Company's property and leaving the place. In sending these orders, the members of the Surat council put the agent on his guard against the wiles of the Mughul officers, who, they assured him, "usually offered civilities at the very moment when they intended to have recourse to violence and depredation." The dispute was ultimately arranged, and the desperate measure of withdrawing entirely from Bengal was of course abandoned.

While the Company were thus threatened in the east of India, their footing in the west was about to become far firmer than it ever had been before by an event to which it is now necessary to attend. In June, 1661, two months after granting the above charter, Charles II married the Infanta Catherine of Portugal, and obtained, as part of her dowry, "the port and island Bombay in the East Indies, together with all the rights, profits, territories, and appurtenances thereof whatsoever." The island of Bombay, stretching eight miles from north-east to south-west, with an average breadth of three miles, has an estimated area of little more than eighteen square miles. Its value, however, must not be judged by its superficial extent.
By land-locking a deep bay in a central locality, it forms the very best harbour in India. The use of such a harbour had long been earnestly desired by the Company; and it was now secured in the best possible form by becoming the property of the British crown, and consequently not liable to be interfered with on any pretext by the native powers.

In March, 1662, the English government despatched to the East Indies a fleet of five men-of-war, under the command of the Earl of Marlborough. On board the fleet were a viceroy from Portugal, authorized formally to complete, the cession of the island, and Sir Abraham Shipman, with 500 soldiers, to take possession and thereafter remain as the first English governor. No opposition appears to have been anticipated; but the Portuguese at Bombay, naturally unwilling to be handed over to a foreign power, took advantage of some ambiguities in the treaty by which the island was ceded, and refused to deliver it up. The English were themselves partly to blame for the unexpected opposition, because instead of being satisfied with the “port and island Bombay”, which was all that the treaty with Portugal expressly granted, they insisted that this grant conferred with it a right to all the Portuguese stations in that locality, and more especially to the island of Salsette, only separated from Bombay by a narrow channel. The claim was certainly extravagant, as Salsette, thus represented as an accessory to Bombay, has an area of 150 square miles, and is consequently eight times larger than the principal.

The whole business was grossly mismanaged; and ultimately the English, prohibited from landing, and unwilling or unable to effect it by force, were obliged to look out for some other station where they might obtain refreshments, and employ proper remedies to diminish the mortality which, in consequence of protracted confinement in the ships, was now making fearful ravages. In this emergency application was made to Sir George Oxinden, who had been sent out by the Company as president and chief director of all their affairs “at Surat, and all others their factories in the north parts of India from Zeilon to the Red Sea,” for permission to land the troops at Surat, but even this could not be granted for fear of offending the Mughul; and Sir Abraham Shipman was reduced to the
necessity of landing the troops on the island of Anjedivah, fifty miles south-east from Goa, where numbers of them perished, the Earl of Marlborough had in the meantime left them to their fate, and sailed for England.

These untoward events seriously affected the prospects of the Company. They had hoped much from the presence of the ships of war, which they thought would have the effect of procuring them more respect from the native powers, and of intimidating the Dutch, who were now openly aspiring at an ascendency on the Indian coast as complete as that which they had established in the Eastern islands. It had even been expected that the king’s ships might have been made instrumental in opening up new mercantile channels to the Company by receiving on freight Portuguese investments from Goa, and thus forming the commencement of a carrying trade which might yield lucrative returns. The failure of the expedition to Bombay disappointed all these expectations, and for some time the Company appear to have done little more than employ their servants in giving effect to the new clauses in their charter for the hunting down of those whom they stigmatized as interlopers. Indirectly, however, the failure of the Bombay expedition proved rather a gain than a loss to the Company, as it was doubtless one main cause of the transfer which the crown afterwards made to them of all the rights in India conferred by the marriage treaty. Indeed, Sir Abraham Shipman, while his men were wasting away at Anjedivah, made a voluntary offer of Bombay to the Company. In this he undoubtedly exceeded his powers; and Sir George Oxinden, to whom the offer was made, was too prudent to accept a grant to which, even if the Company had approved, legal effect could not be given. At the same time, it might have been foreseen that the acceptance was only postponed, and that the crown, burdened with the expense which the possession of the island could not but entail, would ere long require little inducement to part with it.

During several subsequent years the transactions of the Company are very imperfectly recorded. The reason may have been because they were comparatively insignificant. The same fleet which had brought Sir George Oxinden as president to Surat, had carried Sir Edward Winter as agent to Fort St.
George. Besides that locality and the stations connected with it, all the agencies and factories in Bengal were placed under his immediate superintendence; and he had exerted himself apparently with good effect in adjusting the quarrel with Mir Jumla. Still, no idea appears to have been entertained of the vast expansion which the Company's traffic was destined to assume in that quarter; and hence, while distant outposts were eagerly sought after, and the English monarch was importuned for letters to his royal brother of Bantam, whenever retrenchment became expedient, and a contraction of the sphere of operations was proposed, Bengal is almost invariably brought forward as the quarter where the experiment might be made with the least risk of injurious consequences.

In accordance with this view orders were given, in 1663, to discontinue the factories which had been established at Patna, Cossimbazar, and Balasore, in order that all sales and purchases on the Company's account in Bengal might in future be made only at Hugli. When the Company are seen thus voluntarily withdrawing from the province within which the capital of their Indian empire was afterwards to be established, it is difficult to refrain from observing how little they are entitled to take credit for foresight. In fact, they were not so much the architects as the unconscious instruments of their future fortune.

The year after the Company had thus begun, as it were, to turn their backs on Bengal, an event took place which produced general consternation. The Maratha chieftain Sivaji, dexterously out-maneuvring the troops of Aurangzeb in the manner which has already been described, had advanced within fifteen miles of Surat on the 5th of January, 1664, before any tidings of his movements had been obtained. The town was then surrounded, not as at present by a brick, but by a mud wall; and hence no effectual resistance could be made when Sivaji entered it at the head of 4,000 horse. The inhabitants allowed themselves to be systematically plundered during six days—Sivaji, according to the account of one Smith, an Englishman, who was taken prisoner and carried before him, sitting outside the town in his tent ordering heads and hands to be chopped off in cases where persons were supposed to be concealing their wealth. While the natives were thus pusillanimous, a better
spirit was displayed by the inmates both of the Dutch and English factories. The English, in particular, greatly distinguished themselves. Having put their factory in as good a state of defence as the shortness of the time allowed, and called in the aid of their ships' crews, they met Sivaji's demands and threats with defiance; and when a number of Marathas, without venturing on an assault, forced their way into an adjoining house, a sally was made which dislodged them. By this valiant conduct the English saved not only their own property, but that of many natives whom they had taken under their protection, and rose high in the estimation of Aurangzeb himself, who granted them a firman exempting them for ever from a portion of the customs paid by other nations, and also from all transit charges. The visit of Sivaji, which at first threatened the Company with the loss of all their property at Surat, estimated at £80,000, was thus eventually the indirect means of procuring for them important advantages.

In 1665, the politics of Europe again assumed a threatening appearance. A Dutch war was evidently impending. The Company, well aware that, in that event, the Dutch would sweep the Indian seas, scarcely ventured to prepare an outward voyage, and contented themselves with instructing their agents in India to make all possible haste in completing their investments, and despatching the homeward bound ships. Nor was a Dutch war the only source of their anxiety, as new competitors, who were afterwards to prove the most formidable of all, were about to enter the field. The French had long had an eye to the Indian traffic; and an exclusive company, sharing largely in royal patronage, and invested with important privileges, had been formed. This company had hitherto rested satisfied with promising great things without attempting to perform them; but a new spirit having been infused into it, it was now about to act in earnest, and on an extensive scale. On the very first voyage eight vessels well armed, so as to be equally prepared for war and commerce, had been despatched. Made aware of the fact only by imperfect rumours, the London Company were at first apprehensive, from the arming of the vessels, that piratical objects might be intended; and sent out instructions that the homeward ships should sail as a fleet, and be provided with
the means of defence. On being better informed, they deemed it necessary only to inculcate the necessity of using caution, and guarding against misunderstandings which might lead to discussions between the two crowns. While giving these judicious counsels the court gave evident indications of uneasiness, and used language which might be interpreted into an instinctive foreboding of the great struggle which the two nations were afterwards to wage for supremacy in the East.

In the desire which the Company now felt for fortified stations, they had overlooked one danger. Their object was to secure an asylum against external foes, and it seems never to have occurred to them that foes of a different kind might arise and turn the fortifications against their own employers. A remarkable case of this kind now occurred. Sir Edward Winter had, as already mentioned, been appointed head of the Company's establishment at Madras, and, by their instructions, had added considerably to the strength of Fort St. George. His subsequent conduct had not given satisfaction; and, under the impression that he was endeavouring to enrich himself by private trade, the court had superseded him, and sent out Mr. George Foxcroft as his successor. On that gentleman's arrival in June, 1665, he was received with all due respect, and took his place at the head of the council, while his predecessor, agreeably to his instructions, continued, in the interval previous to departure, to act as his second. Sir Edward Winter, though his term for office was nearly expired, had been deeply offended at his dismissal; and while continuing to officiate in the council, had been constantly on the alert to detect something in the conduct or language of his successor on which he might found a charge against him. While under the influence of such feelings, he probably had little difficulty in finding what he wanted; and accordingly, Mr. Foxcroft, three months after his arrival, was attacked and violently carried off to prison, on the extraordinary ground of having uttered seditious and treasonable expressions against the king's government. During the scuffle caused by the apprehension, a Mr. Dawes, a member of the council, lost his life, and Mr. Foxcroft himself, together with his son and Mr. Sambrooke, another member of council, was wounded.
After this outrageous proceeding, Sir Edward Winter was too far committed to be deterred by any other irregularity, and he at once re-assumed the government. It seems that he was not without supporters, for he succeeded in forming a council, including among its members the lieutenant of the garrison. During this internal strife, there was no small risk that the fort itself would be lost to the Company. The Dutch, now at war with England—the Portuguese viceroy at Goa, offended by the course of proceedings at Bombay—and the King of Golconda—were all anxious to obtain possession of it. The last had even taken steps for that purpose, and was meditating an attack by one of his officers, when he was called away for still more urgent service.

Sir Edward Winter at first took credit for loyalty to his sovereign and disinterested zeal to promote the interests of the Company, and endeavoured to justify himself by numerous letters addressed to influential quarters; among others, it is said, to the king and the Archbishop of Canterbury. His conduct, however, had been too gross to admit of apology; and on finding that, with the sanction of government, force was about to be employed against him, he managed, after persisting several years in rebellion, to obtain a free pardon, and disappeared from the scene. The leniency with which he was treated says little for the wisdom and vigour of the Company’s management at this period, and was doubtless an incentive to similar acts of rebellion on subsequent occasions.

Sir Abraham Shipman, after making an offer of Bombay to the Company, as has been already mentioned, had continued with his troops at Anjedivah, enduring the misery of seeing them dying around him. At last, in 1664, he himself became one of the victims. Mr. Cooke, who had been his secretary, assumed the command; and, under the conviction that it was the only chance of saving the lives of the soldiers still surviving, entered into a convention with the Viceroy of Goa, by which he agreed to accept of the port and island of Bombay, according to the treaty as interpreted by the Portuguese. In one respect the terms were even worse than those originally offered to the Earl of Marlborough, for, by an additional article not then mentioned, the Portuguese resident in Bombay were, along with other liberties, to be exempted from the payment of customs. When the surviv-
ors on Anjedivah left for Bombay, their numbers did not much exceed 100; the expense incurred by government for the pay and maintenance of the troops, from the date of their embarkation in England, was above £13,000.

Mr. Cooke's convention with the Portuguese was no sooner known in England than it was disavowed; and, with the view of carrying out the cession as the English had interpreted it, Sir Gervase Lucas was appointed governor of Bombay. Before he sailed he drew up a report, founded on the documents transmitted by Mr. Cooke, and gave it as his opinion that the annual expense of the garrison necessary for the island would, without including contingencies, amount to at least £7,371, and that, moreover, a large outlay for new stores would be immediately required. This report appears to have made government doubtful as to the propriety of continuing to retain Bombay as an immediate possession of the crown. As yet it had yielded nothing, though it had already cost much, and was apparently about to cost more. The conclusion therefore was, that in the meantime "it would be improper to incur any great expense upon it", and that the whole establishment should be placed on a very narrow and economical footing.

Sir Gervase Lucas arrived at Bombay on 5th November, 1666, and, on assuming the government, found matters in a still worse state than his inquiries before leaving England had led him to anticipate. The Mughul government, when they saw the English in possession of an island which they were preparing to fortify, and which, by its natural position, might control the trade of Surat, became extremely jealous, and openly expressed their displeasure, especially after learning that an invitation had been given to the native merchants to settle at Bombay under British protection. The misunderstanding thus commenced was brought almost to an open rupture when Mr. Cooke, in order to compensate himself for some loss sustained during the pillage of Surat by Sivaji, took the unwarrantable step of seizing a Mughul junk which stress of weather had forced to seek shelter in Bombay harbour. This junk belonged to the governor of Surat, who instantly threatened to retaliate on the English factory. Sir George Oxinden remonstrated with Mr. Cooke, who, in consenting to restore the junk, took occasion to inform Sir George that he
considered himself, as a king’s servant, in a higher and more independent position than one who was the servant only of a company. The question thus raised was at a later period revived, and led to considerable embarrassment. Sir Gervase Lucas, while condemning many parts of Mr. Cooke’s conduct, agreed with him on the subject of precedence. The misunderstandings and jealousies which in consequence arose, were injurious to the interests both of the crown and the Company. To the latter, however, the ultimate result was favourable, as the difficulty of procuring a cordial co-operation between the two services must have been an additional inducement to the crown to shake itself free of all further responsibility in regard to Bombay. Before giving an account of the step by which this was finally accomplished, it will be proper to refer to several incidents which occurred about this time, and are of sufficient interest to deserve special notice.

The first of these is a celebrated lawsuit in which the Company became involved, in 1666, by the zealous endeavours of their servants to put down unlicensed trading. Frederick Skinner was agent for the merchant adventurers at Jambi, on the north-east coast of Sumatra, and, on the union of the companies, quitting the district, after making over his assets and debts to the united stock. His brother, Thomas Skinner, who had apparently entered into possession of Frederick’s effects, continued to trade as a merchant on his own account. A ship and merchandise belonging to him having been discovered by the servants of the Company, was forcibly seized, by the aid of the Sultan of Jambi. The grounds of seizure were apparently of two kinds—the one that the property in question belonged not to him, but to the Company, to whom it had been, or ought to have been given up by Frederick Skinner; the other that, as the vessel was trading without license within the limits of the Company’s charter, both it and the goods found in it were forfeited. In terms of the charter, the judgment thus pronounced was subject to review, and Skinner, on making his appeal, was entitled to insist that, for the purpose of carrying it out, he should be sent home in one of the Company’s ships to England. This, however, was refused, and he was left to make his way to Europe as he best could, by an overland journey. His complaint, presented at first to the government,
was referred successively to a committee of the council, and to the House of Peers. The Company, when ordered to answer, declined, on the ground that the House of Peers had no primary jurisdiction, and could only judge by appeal in the last resort. The lords found that they had jurisdiction, and peremptorily ordered the Company to plead. On their continued refusal judgment was given against them, to the amount of £5,000. The Company's plea raised a great constitutional question, which, on their petition, was keenly taken up by the House of Commons and decided in the Company's favour. Two branches of the legislature were thus diametrically opposed, and carried on the dispute with more temper than judgment. When Skinner attempted to enforce the judgment, the commons interfered and sent him a prisoner to the Tower. The lords were not slow to follow this bad example, and imprisoned the governor, Sir Samuel Barnadiston, and three other members of the court. Not satisfied with this, they declared the petition of the Company to the commons to be false and scandalous, and the commons retaliated by resolving that any one who should execute the judgment in Skinner's favour was a betrayer of the rights and liberties of the commons of England. The controversy threatened to be interminable, and was not settled till parliament had been adjourned seven times. At last the king held a conference with both houses at Whitehall, and succeeded, by personal persuasion, in inducing them to erase all the proceedings from their journals. In one sense this gave the Company the victory, as the judgment against them was not enforced, and Skinner remained without redress.

The next event of this period deserving of particular notice, is the general peace concluded by the treaty of Breda, 31st July, 1667. To this treaty Britain, France, Holland, and Denmark were parties. The benefit which commerce in general derived from the cessation of hostilities could not but be felt by the London East India Company. It was not, however, without alloy. The principle adopted in framing the treaty was that of uti possidetis, which of course left the parties, in regard to possession, exactly as they stood at its date. In the case of the Company, the effect was that they finally lost the islands of Polaroon and Damm, because, in the course of the war, the Dutch had
availed themselves of their naval superiority to capture them. The loss seemed the more grievous because the Company had been sanguine enough to expect that, by the possession of them, they might be able to secure a share in the envied spice trade. So intent were they on this object that, even after these islands were wrested from them, they continued to maintain an unavailing struggle against the ascendency which the Dutch had established in the Indian Archipelago. The only consolation which the Company received was, that the loss which they sustained by the Breda treaty was not so serious as they apprehended when first made acquainted with its terms. During the usurpation of Sir Edward Winter at Fort St. George, information had been received that he was in communication with the Dutch governor of Ceylon, and contemplating the delivery of the fort. Had this act of treachery been completed, the rule of *uti possidetis* would have covered it, and thus one of the three seats of the presidencies acquired by the Company would in all probability have been lost to them for ever.

The only other incident of this period which it is necessary to notice is of a strictly commercial nature, and yet, when its consequences are traced, it will be found to have had a far mightier influence, not merely on the fortunes of the Company, but on society at large, than any single event, military or political, which occurred in the seventeenth century. In a letter dated 24th January, 1668, and sent out with the Company's ships which made the voyage of that year, the agent at Bantam is desired "to send home by these ships 100 lbs. weight of the best tea that you can gett." The language evidently implies that the article was already understood; and it is known that several years before, an order had been given to obtain small quantities of tea as a present to his majesty; but this is the first instance of a public order, and an order given, it is presumed, for the purpose not of making presents of it as a mere curiosity, but of ascertaining whether it might not become an article of lucrative investment. Within a century of the date of this order, the quantity imported by the Company approached 3,000,000 lbs; and in 1834, the last year of the Company's monopoly, it exceeded 33,000,000 lbs, and paid duty to government to the amount of £3,589,361. Since then the import into the United Kingdom has more than doubled.
On the 27th of March, 1669, the grant of the port and island of Bombay, which government had been for some time contemplating, was completed by a regular charter, issued as usual in the form of letters-patent addressed by the king to all his subjects. After stating the nature and extent of the right acquired by the marriage treaty from the Portuguese, eulogizing the Company for having managed the trade to the East Indies "to the honour and profit of the nation," and expressing "an earnest desire that the said governor and Company may, by all good and lawful ways and means, be encouraged in their difficult and hazardous trade and traffick in those remote parts of the world," his majesty bestows the island and its appurtenances upon them "in as large and ample a manner, to all intents, constructions, and purposes, as we ourselves now have and enjoy, or may or ought to enjoy the same, by virtue and force of the said grant of our said brother the King of Portugal," constituting them "the true and absolute proprietors of the port and island, and premises aforesaid, and every part and parcel thereof." Along with the island were granted "all the artillery, and all and singular arms, armour, weapons, ordnance, munition, powder, shot, victuals, magazines, stores, ammunition, and provisions of war, and other provisions whatsoever; and all and singular ships, junks, vessels, and boats, and all manner of merchandize, and wares, cloathing, implements, beasts," &c. "which shall be or remain upon within the premises, or any part of thereof, and belong unto us at the time when the said port and island and premises shall be delivered up into the possession of the said governor and Company." Power was, moreover, given them "to take into their service, at their own costs and charges, such and so many of our officers and soldiers as shall then be in or upon the said port or island, or within the territories and precincts thereof, as they shall think fit, and as shall be contented or willing to serve them either in the said port and island or elsewhere."

The port and island thus granted were to be held of the crown "as of the manor of East Greenwich, in the county of Kent, in free and common socage, and not in capite nor by knight's service, yielding and paying therefore to us, our heirs and successors, at the custom-house, London, the rent or sum
of ten pounds of lawful money of England, in gold, on the thirtieth day of September yearly, for ever.” The only restrictions and reservations of any importance were, that the Company should not “at any time hereafter sell, alien, transfer, or otherwise dispose of the said island and premises, or any part or parts thereof, to any prince, potentate, or state, or other person or persons whatsoever, but such as are or shall be the subjects and of the allegiance” of the British crown, and that “the inhabitants of the said island, as our liege people, and subject to our imperial crown and dignity, jurisdiction and government, shall be permitted to remain there, and enjoy the free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion in the same manner as they did at the time of the said grant to us made by our said brother the King of Portugal as aforesaid, and that such order be observed for the exercise and conservation thereof in all things according to the purport and effect of the said article and treaty in that behalf; and further, also, that the said inhabitants, and other our subjects in the said port or island, shall and may peaceably and quietly have, hold, possess, and enjoy all their several and respective properties, privileges, and advantages whatsoever, which they or any of them lawfully had or enjoyed, or ought to have had or enjoyed, at the time of the surrender of the said port and island to us as aforesaid, or at any time since.”

All the inhabitants of Bombay, together with all afterwards born in it, or within its precincts and limits, were to have and enjoy all the liberties and privileges of British subjects under the government of the Company, who were to have full power to exercise judicial authority by themselves, their ministers, and agents, to repel force by force, by sea and land, in case of open hostilities with foreign enemies; and “in cases of rebellion, mutiny, or sedition, of refusing to serve in wars, fleeing to the enemy, forsaking colours or ensigns, or other offences against law, custom, and discipline military, in as large and ample a manner to all intents and purposes whatsoever as any captain-general by virtue of his office might do.”

The very liberal terms on which Charles II conferred Bombay on the Company, and the very ample powers with which he invested them for the purpose of governing it, justify
a suspicion that the act was not quite so disinterested as has been represented, and that the Company had already begun the practice they afterwards followed of smoothing the difficulties in their way by the free distribution of money in influential quarters. They did this to an enormous extent, as will afterwards be seen, in the comparatively pure period which immediately followed the Revolution, and endeavoured to justify it by alleging that it had long been customary. If so, it is not uncharitable to presume that Charles and his corrupt courtiers did not allow the custom to be forgotten in this instance. But whether obtained by a free grant or a corrupt bargain, the port and island of Bombay was unquestionably the most important acquisition which the Company had yet made. Even in a pecuniary view its value was by no means contemptible. According to a statement transmitted to the British government by the deputy-governor, Captain Gary, the year before the Company entered into possession, the annual revenue, derived principally from rent, produce, and customs, amounted to £6,490, 17s. 9d. It was understood that this amount might be largely increased; and consequently that in Bombay the Company had not only acquired a position which might be rendered impregnable by land and sea, but a revenue which, duly husbanded, might meet all the outlay necessary for fortifications and other improvements. The brightening prospect thus opened appears to have emboldened the Company greatly to extend their operations, and their investments became larger than at any former period.
Progress of the East India Company

Bombay was at first made subordinate to Surat. Sir George Oxinden, though still continuing to reside and hold his position as president at the latter, was appointed governor and commander-in-chief of the former; but at the same time authorized to send one of the members of his council, as deputy-governor, personally to administer the affairs of the island. With this view a series of directions had been drawn up by the court in England. The fort or castle was to be enlarged and strengthened; a town, so situated as to be under its protection, was to be built on a regular plan; inhabitants were to be induced to settle by exemptions from customs; and while the English were to be preferred, others also were to be encouraged by the free exercise of their religion. The improvement of the revenue, so far as practicable, without imposing new and burdensome taxes, was not to be forgotten. To foster manufactures of cotton and silk goods, looms were to be purchased for the weavers; and to give new facilities to commerce, a harbour and docks were to be constructed.

Before much progress could be made in carrying out these arrangements, several untoward events took place, and new difficulties arose from various quarters. The Portuguese, who had never been reconciled to the cession of Bombay, endeavoured to render it as little lucrative as possible to its new possessors, by taking advantage of their position at Tanna to impose heavy transit duties on all goods passing through it to or from Bombay; the trade of which was in consequence greatly crippled, as Tanna, situated at the head of Bombay harbour, commanded
the only proper line of communication with the mainland. While an important branch of traffic was thus in a manner interdicted, the trade of Surat was again suspended by an incursion of Sivaji. Immediately after his former visit, a substantial wall of brick, flanked with bastions, had been commenced and was approaching completion, but as much still remained open as to make it easy for Sivaji to penetrate into the heart of the town and resume his work of plunder. Besides the English and Dutch, there was now also a French factory. The last showed no fight, but obtained an ignominious exemption by giving the Marathas a free passage through their factory, and thus enabling them to obtain a rich booty by the plunder of a Tartar prince who had returned by way of Surat from a pilgrimage to Mecca. The Dutch stood upon the defensive, and seemed so well prepared that they were allowed to escape. The English, under President Aungier, who had succeeded on the death of Sir George Oxinden, distinguished themselves as before by beating off repeated attacks. On this occasion, however, they were not so fortunate as to obtain the approbation of the Mughuls. Sivaji, before he retired, had opened a friendly negotiation with the English, and several conferences had been held with the view of arranging the re-establishment of the Company’s factory at Rajapur. Sivaji was anxious to secure the revenue which had been lost by the withdrawal of the factory, and the presidency at Surat were disposed to consent, provided they could obtain compensation for past and security against future injuries. These conferences were not unobserved by the Mughul authorities, and gave rise to suspicions, of which the results afterwards became apparent.

At the very time when the bonds of amity with the Mughuls were thus loosened, the politics of Europe had been undergoing a change which threatened to expose the Company once more to an unequal contest with the Dutch. Hostilities were in fact declared; but, at the same time, by the alliance of England with France, which had now a considerable fleet in the East, the interests of the Company were better protected than formerly. With a wise precaution, however, they endeavoured to make themselves independent of foreign aid, and vigorously pushed on the fortifications of Bombay. They were thus engaged,
but the works were far from completed and very inadequately garrisoned, when, in February, 1673, Rickloff van Goen, the Dutch Governor-general of India, made his appearance on the coast with a fleet of twenty-two ships, having 1,000 regular troops on board. Bombay was evidently the object of attack; and could scarcely have resisted had it been made on the instant; but the Dutch lost time by endeavouring in vain to secure the co-operation of a land force under Sivaji, and when at last prepared for action, lost heart on seeing the kind of reception which awaited them. President Aungier, who fortunately happened to be in Bombay at the time, exerted himself, as Orme hyperbolically expresses it, “with the calmness of a philosopher and the courage of a centurion.” Besides 400 European soldiers, he succeeded in mustering 1,500 militia, chiefly Portuguese and natives. Nor was he destitute of a marine force. In the harbour lay two frigates, a Dutch prize fitted up as a ship of war, and three armed sloops which had been lately built as protection against the Malabar pirates; to this force a most important addition was opportunely made by the arrival of four French ships, which, on being informed of the danger, had hastened from Surat. Rickloff, under these circumstances, satisfied himself with reconnoitring, and then suddenly disappeared.

On the Coromandel coast the Dutch had excited similar alarm, and great fears were entertained for the safety of Fort St. George. Here, however, the French again proved important auxiliaries, and by means of a powerful fleet not only kept the Dutch in check, but made themselves masters of Trincomali, in the island of Ceylon, and took St. Thome by storm. The latter capture, as the place is situated only at a short distance from Madras, gave the Company more alarm than satisfaction, and they were therefore not displeased when, after a short tenue, the French were expelled and St. Thome returned to the possession of the King of Golconda. Another success of the Dutch gave them deeper concern. On the 22nd of August, 1673, the Dutch fleet engaged in the siege of St. Thome fell in with the Company’s homeward bound ships, ten in number and richly laden. A running fight commenced off the coast to the south of Masulipatam, and issued in the sinking of one and the
capture of two of the Company's vessels. The others, though not without sustaining considerable damage, found their way to Madras. In the Indian Archipelago, where the Dutch superiority was still more decided, it was impossible for the Company to traffic with any advantage, though they were now alive to the importance of carrying their trade still farther east, and endeavouring to establish that direct intercourse with China from which, in course of time, their chief, if not their only commercial profits were derived.

The danger to which Bombay had been exposed from the Dutch ceased entirely in consequence of a new whirl in European politics, by which, in 1674, peace was concluded, and shortly after happily cemented by the marriage of the Prince of Orange with Mary, daughter of the Duke of York. Another danger, however, immediately succeeded. The Mughuls and the Marathas were constantly at war; and now that the English, by the possession of an island belonging to neither, were gradually beginning to assume the dignity of an independent Indian power, their alliance was naturally courted by both. The true policy of the Company in the meantime was to maintain a perfect neutrality; but the circumstances were such as to make this almost impossible. The Mughul fleet, commanded by the Siddi, sought shelter from a storm in Bombay harbour. To refuse it was impossible, without provoking the Mughuls; to grant it was equally impossible, without giving umbrage to Sivaji. In this dilemma the Bombay government took the only course which lay open to them, by allowing the Siddi to remain till the storm blew over, and then requesting him to depart. He refused to obey; and collecting his vessels in the channel which separates the island from the mainland, landed a number of armed men at the villages of Sion and Mazagong, and drove out the inhabitants, apparently with the intention of gaining a permanent footing on the island. This was not to be tolerated; and after desultory hostilities to the disadvantage of the Siddi, he purchased permission to prolong his stay by engaging that no more than 300 of his men, armed only with their swords, should be ashore at one time, and that he would make no attack on the Corlahs—a fertile district of the Konkan, stretching along the eastern shore of Bombay harbour, and belonging to the Marathas.
Sivaji was naturally jealous of this arrangement, and though, from his anxiety to see the Company's factory again established at Rajapur, he entered into a formal treaty with them, binding himself to compensate them for all the losses which they had sustained by his depredations, it soon became apparent that he was determined not to tolerate the continuance of a hostile fleet in his immediate vicinity. His first step was to send his general, Moro Punt, down the Ghats with 10,000 men, to occupy Calliani or Kallian, opposite to the island of Salsette. By this movement he accomplished two objects—he levied chouth on the Portuguese, who had greatly offended him by a fanatical attempt to force the Marathas within their territories to become Christians, and he overawed the Siddi, who, afraid for his fleet, made all haste to depart. Bombay harbour had, however, proved so convenient a station that the Siddi fleet, after a short cruise, during which many devastating descents had been made on the Maratha coasts, again returned. The Bombay government having again permitted it to occupy its former station, Sivaji was greatly incensed, and resolved to rid himself of it at all hazards. With this view he at first collected a large fleet of boats within his own territory, on the east side of Bombay harbour; but finding the attack of the Siddi fleet in this manner impracticable, he made application to the Portuguese at Tanna for permission to cross over to Salsette, from which he anticipated little difficulty in finding access to Bombay itself. This permission being refused, he turned his attention to an opposite quarter, and dexterously availed himself of two small islands, called Kenneri and Heneri, situated so as to command the southern entrance of Bombay harbour. The natural strength of this position had hitherto been overlooked both by Portuguese and English; and when Sivaji had not only discovered it, but taken possession of Kenneri, the larger of the two islands, and began to erect fortifications upon it, the greatest alarm prevailed. It was of no use to attempt negotiation, and therefore action was immediately resolved upon. The plan, however, was very defective, and in the first encounter the advantage was rather in favour of Sivaji's party. A second attempt would have been disastrous to the assailants had not the Revenge, the only English frigate present, kept her
ground, and, after sinking five of the enemy’s vessels, compelled
the whole fleet of fifty to seek safety by flight. The Marathas
still kept possession of Kenneri, and, mounting several cannon,
fired without much skill or effect. Meanwhile the Mughuls,
informed of the hostilities, expressed a desire to share in them,
and sent a considerable fleet to Bombay. The dislodgment
of the Marathas might now have been easy; but the English,
having discovered that the Siddi, if he succeeded in capturing
it, meant to keep it to himself, withheld their aid, and left the
two native powers to fight it out as they best could. The
struggle was in consequence protracted, and was not finished
when Sivaji died in 1680.

Though war was thus raging in its vicinity, Bombay continued
to make progress, and the propriety of substituting it for
Surat, as the seat of the western presidency, had become so
obvious as now to be regarded only as a question of time. Its
fortifications had been carried on for a series of years without
interruption, and, as early as 1674, mounted 100 pieces of can-
non; its regular garrison consisted of two companies, each of
200 men; three companies of militia had been regularly
organized; and several well-manned vessels were permanently
stationed in its harbour. The progress would have been still
more rapid had not a deficiency of funds induced the govern-
ment to adopt rather questionable means of replenishing their
treasury. The inhabitants were burdened with new taxation in
the shape of excise duties, and both imports and exports were
charged with customs equalling, and in some instances far
exceeding those which the Great Mughul, in the plenitude
of his power, levied either from his own subjects or from stran-
gers. On imports, including corn, grain, and timber, 2½ per cent
was to be levied as custom, and 1 per cent to defray the expense
of fortifications; on exports the customs alone was fixed at 3½
per cent. Some articles of little bulk but considerable value, as
gold and silver, jewels, musk and amber, were the only exemp-
tions, while Indian tobacco and Indian iron imported, and,
still more unaccountably, the whole produce of the island
(cocoa-nuts, salt, fish, &c.) exported, were saddled with a
custom of 8 per cent. Some of these impositions almost look as
if the object had been not to encourage trade, but to extingui-
ish it. The only justification must be sought in the eager desire of the governor to show that the original estimate of the revenue from the island was not overrated, and that it was able not only to pay its expenses, but yield a surplus.

While the governor was thus taxing his ingenuity in the invention of new sources of revenue, Captain Shaxton, his deputy, was, if not actively encouraging, at least conniving at proceedings of a mutinous tendency. The principal grounds of complaint by the soldiers were, that their period of service, which was limited to three years, had expired, and that a month’s pay, which had been promised them, had been withheld. On these grounds they threatened to lay down their arms. If the complaints were well founded, and it is to be presumed that they were, as Bruce in his Annals commends the prudence of President Aungier in granting the demands of the soldiers, it is not easy to see the justice of the praise which the same author bestows upon him for firmness in afterwards seizing the principal leaders and trying them, not by civil, but by martial law. The charter, it is true, authorized martial law, but it was surely both right and expedient that, in having recourse to it for the first time, the guilt should not only have been of a very aggravated description, but that, even after it was proved, judgment should have been tempered with mercy. Nothing of this is seen in President Aungier’s proceedings. The men were promised pay and then refused it; they had served the full period for which they had enlisted, and insisted on their discharge. If the justice of the complaint could not be denied, the real fault was not in those who complained, but in the government who made it necessary. At all events, there was nothing in the conduct of the so-called mutineers to justify the sentence which condemned three of them to death, and which was actually carried into effect in the case of one of them. This first exercise of martial law in name of the Company took place on 21st October, 1674. Captain Shaxton, the worst culprit, if there was one, was next tried, and found guilty on several charges, but his station, though it only aggravated his offence, protected him, and he was sent to England to be dealt with as might there be deemed proper.

The most memorable event in the history of the Company, in 1676 was the formal adoption of the principle of seniority
as the rule of succession to offices of trust and emolument. In the letter of the court to the presidency of Surat, the mode in which the principle was to be applied is thus stated:—"For the advancement of our apprentices, we direct that, after they have served for the first five yeares, they shall have £10 per annum for the two last yeares; and having served these two yeares, to be entertayned, one yeare longer, as writers, and have writers' sallary; and having served that yeare, to enter into the degree of factors, which otherwise would have been ten yeares. And knowing that a distinction of titles is in many respects necessary, we do order, that when apprentices have served their times, they be styled writers; and when writers have served their times, they be styled factors; and factors having served their times, to be styled merchants; and merchants having served their times, to be styled senior merchants." By this arrangement many disputes as to advancement were obviated, and much discontent in consequence suppressed; but the principle of seniority, except in mere matters of routine, when the most ordinary qualifications combined with a sufficient amount of practice may suffice, is vicious in the extreme, because it removes all stimulus to exertion, and makes no account of either ability or industry. It is rather singular that in laying down this rule the court saw the necessity of departing from it in one very important particular, by holding out a kind of premium to military talent, enjoining all their civil servants "to apply themselves to acquire a knowledge of military discipline, that, in the event, either of any sudden attack, or of being found better qualified for military than for civil duties, they might receive commissions, and have the pay of military officers, till the pleasure of the court should be known."

In the course of the war carried on between the Mughuls and the Marathas, the Siddi had made himself master of Heneri in the same way as Sivaji had of Kenneri; and thus by the negligent and irresolute conduct which the local authorities had pursued, Bombay was exposed to a double danger, and its prosperity was seriously interrupted. The court at home, greatly perplexed at the threatening aspect of affairs, seem not to have been equal to the emergency, and disregarding the danger of being ousted altogether, kept insisting on a number of petty deductions, which produced much discontent among their own servants, and
imposed various new burdens which were loudly complained of by the other inhabitants. At the same time temporizing expedients became the order of the day; and both the Mughuls and Marathas, emboldened by the pusillanimous spirit in which their encroachments were met, set no limits to their arrogance. As if Bombay had been set up as a prize to be contended for, they were now only intent on deciding whether Siddi or Sivaji was to be the winning party. It would almost seem that the Company were gradually making up their minds to some such disastrous and ignominious results; for, in the face of remonstrances from India, complaining of the reductions already made, and distinctly stating that without additional expenditure and reinforcements the island would be lost, the court intimated their final decision that the fortifications having been the source of the heaviest expense, were to be continued in their present state without further improvements—that the manning of the batteries was to be reduced to the lowest scale possible—and that, with the exception of one small frigate, the armed ships stationed for guarding the harbour were to be sold. The letter of the court, after putting the island in jeopardy by these most improvident and niggardly injunctions, ludicrously, or, as some would rather term it, insultingly, concludes with a recommendation to the governor to maintain strict discipline, and have the garrison always prepared for a vigorous defence.

The above letter, addressed in the beginning of 1679 to Surat, which, by the way, was also to furnish its quota of reduction, by being degraded from a presidency to the less expensive form of an agency, produced a remonstrance which made the court pause before proceeding further in their reckless career of retrenchment. Surat accordingly resumed its rank as a presidency, and Bombay obtained some slight addition to its garrison. The change of policy thus indicated unhappily proved evanescent; and though Sambhuji, now at the head of the Marathas, in consequence of the death of his father, was known to have aggressive designs on Bombay, its garrison, in January, 1683, could barely muster 100 Europeans, clamouring for additional pay as absolutely necessary to furnish them with the means of subsistence. On a former occasion, when similar complaints were made, the only step taken was to tantalize
the complainers by obtaining letters-patent from the crown for the establishment of a mint at Bombay, a measure which, however useful in itself, only increased the quantity of coin without giving them any larger share of it. On the present occasion the complaints were similarly treated; and the letter from home, in 1684 was chiefly occupied with announcing the erection of a court of admiralty, the judge of which, appointed by royal commission, was to have jurisdiction as far as the Company's limits extended, and employ it specially for the suppression of unlicensed trading. In this arrangement Bombay was thus far interested, that it was not only to become the seat of the new court, but to be regarded in future as an independent English settlement, and the seat of the power and trade of the English nation in the East Indies.

While the court at home were conferring this magniloquent title on Bombay, an event had taken place which threatened to render it a mockery. Captain Richard Keigwin, the commander of the garrison, in concert with Ensign Thornburn and others, suddenly, on the 27th December, 1683, seized Mr. Ward, the deputy-governor, and the members of council who adhered to him, and issued a proclamation annulling the authority of the Company, and declaring the island to be immediately under the protection of the King of England. Dissatisfaction with the treatment which he had received from Sir Josiah Child, and his brother, Mr., afterwards Sir John Child, who had obtained a complete ascendancy, the one as governor of the Company and the other as president of Surat and governor of Bombay, had tempted him to turn rebel, while the general discontent produced by the paltry reductions and other impolitic proceedings already adverted to, soon made the rebellion completely successful. With comparatively few exceptions the garrison and the inhabitants, when assembled, approved of his conduct, and recognized him as governor. The whole power of the island was thus in his hands. It is not easy to see on what grounds he could have imagined that his usurpation would receive any countenance in England; but as if he had been acting with the sanction of the crown, and with a single view to its interests, he required all the inhabitants to renew their allegiance to it, and proceeded to administer the government
in its name. Immediately on hearing of the insurrection President Child despatched three of the Company’s homeward bound ships from Surat, having on board commissioners authorized to take measures which it was thought would prove effectual. When they arrived the frenzy was at its height; and the crews of the ships, catching the infection, so far from assisting in suppressing the revolt, began openly to fraternize with the revolters. The commissioners, alarmed at this new danger, were glad to avert it by allowing the ships to continue their voyage. In the meantime they remained on board a country vessel.

About a month after the insurrection broke out President Child arrived with three other Company’s ships, and on finding from the spirit which prevailed, both on the island and among his own crews, that force was out of the question, made lavish promises of pardon and redress of grievances. Keigwin listened to his proposals, but it was only to reject them; and after two months spent in unavailing conferences, the president despatched the ships to England, and with his commissioners returned crest-fallen to Surat, leaving the revolters still masters of the island. Keigwin, aware that appearances were entirely against him, drew up a justification, which he transmitted to the king and the Duke of York. His principal pleas were that by the misconduct of the parties intrusted with the management of the Company at home and abroad, Bombay was on the point of being lost, and nothing but the energetic measures which he had taken could have secured its continuance as a dependency of the British crown.

On receiving intelligence of the Bombay revolt, and of the attempt which Keigwin had made to justify his proceedings, the Company appointed a committee of secrecy to communicate directly with the crown, and take whatever other measures might seem expedient. In a report specially addressed to the king, they asserted that so far from acting penuriously with their officers and soldiers, their pay and encouragements were superior to those which the Dutch granted to their troops; that their president and governor had given every indulgence to the garrison “compatible with the duty of rendering the revenues equal to the charges of the establishment;” and that, since they had
entered to possession of the island, they had expended the sum of £300,000 on fortifications, an excellent harbour, and other improvements. In conclusion, they returned to an old complaint by blaming the interlopers as the main instigators to the revolt, endeavoured to arouse the jealousy of the king by reminding him that the revolters had attacked his prerogative by questioning the right of the crown to give exclusive privileges of trade without the authority of the legislature, and hinted that the revolt, so far from being caused by any undue use of their powers, was rather owing to a defect in the powers themselves, which did not permit them to deal summarily and effectually with delinquents.

During these proceedings in England, Keigwin continued not only to maintain his position, but obtained a recognition of his authority from Sambhuji, with whom he negotiated a treaty giving the privilege of free trade within the Maratha dominions. More than this, Sambhuji consented to the payment of a considerable sum due to the Company. This treaty and payment, together with the alleged fact that the island was now entirely supported by its own revenue, furnished Keigwin with plausible grounds for maintaining that his proceedings had advanced the interests both of the crown and the Company. It was impossible, however, that he could be listened to; and despatches were sent off from England, with a commission under the great seal, directed to the president and councils at Surat and Bombay, and to the commanders of the Company's ships, to take the necessary steps for the recovery of the island. In the event of a peaceable delivery, a general pardon was to be proclaimed to all except Keigwin and other three ringleaders. As it seemed probable that force would be necessary, President Child was appointed captain-general and admiral of the Company's sea and land forces, Sir Thomas Grantham vice-admiral, and the senior commander of the Company's ships rear-admiral. Though the revolt was the immediate occasion of these appointments, it will soon be seen that ulterior objects were contemplated by them. Indeed, the necessity of these appointments, so far as related to the revolt, had ceased before the knowledge of them had reached India, Keigwin having in the interval agreed to deliver up the island to Sir Thomas Grantham, on receiving a free pardon
for himself and his associates. In terms of this arrangement, the island was formally surrendered on the 19th of November, 1684. In the beginning of the following year a new reign commenced by the death of Charles on 6th February, 1685, and the accession of James II. A great change in the policy of the Company immediately took place; but before tracing it, it will be proper to attend to the changes which had in the meanwhile been taking place in the other settlements of the Company.

Notwithstanding the numerous obstructions to which the trade of the Company was subjected in the Eastern islands, it was determined still to persevere, and Bantam, as the most convenient intermediate point, continued to engross a considerable share of the annual investments. In the season 1676-77, the share allotted to it consisted of eight vessels, amounting in the aggregate to 3,180 tons. The spice trade was still the great inducement, but a new interest had been created by the prospect of establishing a factory in China. In that case, it was supposed that Bantam would become the entrepot between China and India. This purpose it was already serving to some extent; and the agent of Bantam was under orders to send annually, on the Company's account, tea of the best quality to the value of 100 dollars. In this season, however, a direct intercourse was to be attempted, by sending a small vessel to Amoy under the charge of a person of known prudence and intelligence. From this information, the expediency of adopting further steps might be judged. This hopeful experiment was frustrated by an atrocity. In April, 1677, Mr. White, the agent, and a number of the principal servants of the agency, while sailing up the river of Bantam in their boats, were waylaid by the natives and barbarously massacred. The king and his sons were suspected of complicity, but denied it, and promised to make every exertion to discover and punish the perpetrators. Whether they did so is very doubtful, but the promise was all that the few survivors could obtain. The effect was a temporary extinction of the agency. In the subsequent season new appointments were made, but they appear not to have been judicious. Instead of attending to their proper duties the persons appointed neglected them, and spent their time in squabbling with each other. In such circumstances trade languished, and before it could be revived
the opening which had been anticipated at Amoy was closed by a Chinese civil war. Amid these discouragements, the only favourable incident was an overture from the Viceroy of Canton offering to admit the English to trade. In more prosperous times it would have been eagerly embraced, but the Company contented themselves with returning a respectful answer, and requesting to know what privileges of trade would be given if an English factory were established at that port.

In the season 1679-80, the prospect at Bantam had again brightened; for three ships, carrying 1,600 tons and a stock of £69,000, chiefly bullion, were despatched to it. The inducement does not clearly appear; but from its being mentioned in the instructions that war was apprehended between the King of Bantam and the Dutch, it may have been anticipated that in the event of the king proving victorious, the Company, in pushing their trade in that quarter, would no longer have to encounter their most formidable competitors. In the succeeding seasons the investments to Bantam retained their importance, but from incidental allusions it may be gathered that it was not so much on account of that port itself as of the facilities which it afforded for forming connections with China. Amoy was again accessible, but its inferiority as a trading station to Canton had become more and more apparent. As the viceroy of the latter still continued to profess friendship, instructions were given in the season 1681-82 not only to renew the communication with him, but to make presents to him on a moderate scale, and assure him that, if proper privileges were granted, large ships with rich cargoes would annually visit his port.

The threatened war with the King of Bantam and the Dutch was now about to become a reality. It was probably with a view to it, and the hope of securing a powerful protector, that the king took the extraordinary step of sending ambassadors to England. They arrived, and had interviews both with the king and the Company. The only recorded result is that the Company’s ships carried out for him a present of 500 barrels of gunpowder. Before it arrived the war had been both begun and ended. The Dutch, with their usual sagacity, had made the victory easy by exciting an internal dissension, and giving their support to the winning party. The king’s own son had been
induced to take up arms against him, and in 1682 effected a revolution which gave him the throne. One of his first steps was to take possession of the Company's factory. This, we may presume, was done either at the instigation of the Dutch or to gratify them; but he had soon cause to see that while he supposed himself indebted to them for a throne, they had only been using him as their tool. The whole power was already in their hands, and scarcely a year elapsed before they had proclaimed themselves absolute masters. The Company, as on former occasions of a similar description, clamoured loudly for redress; and negotiations with that view were opened between the English government and the States-general. These, after promising much, proved abortive, and the Company's connection with Bantam was finally closed. It had lasted eighty years.

About this time the Company's trade in the Persian Gulf was threatened with similar extinction. At a very early period in their history they had here acquired a permanent revenue, independent of the profits of trade, by a grant of half of the customs of Gomberoon as a reward for assisting the Persians to expel the Portuguese from Ormuz. For a series of years they drew large sums by virtue of this grant, and at the same time carried on an extensive trade, making advantageous exchanges of English and Indian goods against the raw silks and other produce of Persia. Every new reign in that country, however, endangered both their revenue and their trade; and they would often have abandoned the latter altogether had they not been aware that the moment they ceased to carry it on the former also would be forfeited. At last the revenue became still more precarious than the trade, and it continued annually to figure in the Company's books under the name of arrears of customs at Gomberoon. Again and again communications passed on this subject between the court at home and the presidency at Surat.

The great question was how the Persian trade could be most effectually revived, and payment of arrears obtained. At one time negotiation, at another force, seemed expedient; and the Company hung, as it were, suspended between the two, leaning sometimes to the one and sometimes to the other. In the season 1675-76, the warlike tendency had so far prevailed that two of the ships consigned to Surat were armed for service in the Per-
sian Gulf; but before the final plunge was taken misgivings arose, and the conclusion arrived at was that could 3,000 tomands, equivalent to £9,000 sterling per annum, be obtained by treaty in lieu of the Gomberoon customs, it would be far better to negotiate. This was undoubtedly a very judicious conclusion. Negotiation appears accordingly to have been attempted, but unfortunately without success; for in 1677-78, we find the Company again agitating the question of peace or war with Persia, and again giving the preference to the former, though it was only hoped that instead of 3,000, 1,000 tomands might be recovered. During the following season the subject appears to have been overlooked, and in that of 1679-80 it is mentioned only to record the desponding resolution, that unless the trade at Gomberoon should be more advantageous than it had proved for several years it was to be relinquished. The very next year the court must have been agreeably surprised to learn that the arrears which they had thus begun to regard as a desperate debt had become the subject of a special firman, by which the King of Persia had ordered the payment of 1,000 tomands as their share of the customs for the previous year, and that their agent was in expectation of receiving another 1,000 tomands for the current year. It might have been supposed that negotiation, which had already produced such gratifying results, would henceforth have the preference, and yet, strange to say, the language of the court in regard to Persia becomes more warlike than ever; and in 1683, while their agent at Gomberoon was informed of "their determination to adopt more spirited measures," a remonstrance was presented to the King of Persia himself. The purport of this document, as analyzed by Mr. Bruce in his Annals, is singular enough to be worth quoting. "The court," he says, "after stating their claims to his justice, which was proverbially held in Europe to be unalterable," proceeded to inform his majesty, "that contrary to this justice his ministers or officers at the port at which the English factories were settled, or to which their ships resorted, had obstructed their trade, in direct violation of solemn treaties between the two countries; that though with respectful deference they prayed for relief, yet, possessing a naval power which was unrivalled, if such relief should be withheld by his ministers and officers, they trusted that so great and so just a
prince would, instead of considering that naval force which they employed for their protection as disrespectful to his dignity, view it only as a necessary expedient for restoring the amicable relations between Persia and England." The high-flown compliment paid to the Shah’s justice, however undeserved, may pass as an orientalism; but nothing can be more ludicrous than the description of their naval power as "unrivalled," and their request that he would consider the employment of it against him as only a "necessary expedient" for restoring "amicable relations."

For the unsatisfactory state of matters at Bantam and Gomberoon, the Company had some compensation in the progress which they continued to make at Madras and in Bengal. The attempt of the Dutch on Bombay had shown the necessity of preparing for a similar attempt on Fort St. George, and the works had been so strengthened as to be capable of a vigorous resistance. The expense was, as usual, a subject of complaint in the letter from the court; and in 1676 special instructions were given that no new buildings should be proceeded with, until plans and estimates were sent home and returned approved. This was undoubtedly the regular course, but the emergency justified the neglect of it, and subsequent events proved that the expenditure on fortifications had been wisely made. Sivaji, during an irruption into the Carnatic, had passed within a short distance of Madras, and there is reason to presume that nothing but its strength preserved it from treatment similar to that which Surat had more than once experienced. By his capture of Gingi and Vellore, he had permanently fixed himself in its vicinity; and nothing therefore could have been more imprudent than to leave any portion of it exposed to an attack, either by land or sea. Indeed, in the very next season, the court had become so much alive to the importance of Fort St. George as a place of security for their property and servants, that they virtually withdrew the censure they had previously passed, and ordered the commanders of ships consigned to the Coromandel coast, "to take in as many large stones at Johanna (one of the Comoro Isles) as they could stow, to be used for the building of the fort, that it might be placed in a sufficient state of defence against any enemy."

Meanwhile the subject of revenue was still uppermost in the minds of the court, and they never omitted an occasion of incul-
cating the necessity of increasing it, and proposing plans for this purpose. Among these the first which suggested itself was a house tax, with a view to which a survey was to be made of all the houses at Madras, both in the Portuguese and black towns. In anticipation of the discontent which this tax, and a duty imposed on articles of consumption, would produce, the authorities were instructed to explain that "those who lived under the English protection must contribute to the charges by which that protection was maintained." There were two other plans of increasing the revenue, for which less apology was required. The one was to obtain authority from the King of Golkunda to establish a mint at Madras, similar to the one which had already, by the authority of the English monarch, been established at Bombay; the other was to institute a bank, not, however, in the full sense of the term, but merely to receive deposits for a limited time, and to an amount not exceeding in all £100,000. The inducement to depositors was the payment of interest at the rate of not more than six per cent; and the object of the Company was not merely to procure the means of purchasing goods at the cheapest rates, but to form a stock which would enable the agency and its dependencies to counterbalance the influence of the Dutch. Considering the very humble scale of the proposed bank, it is difficult to understand how so much should have been expected from it.

The progress of the Company's trade in Bengal was at this period considerable. The principal factory was still Hughli, to which several others—Balasore, Cossimbazar, Dacca, Malda, and Patna—were subordinate. In the season 1674-75 the whole amount of stock, principally bullion, sent to the eastern coast of India was £202,000. Of this, £65,000 was destined for Bengal. It seems to have been suspected that it would prove insufficient, and accordingly the factors were authorized to increase it by taking up £20,000 at interest. The investment purchased was to consist chiefly of silks and taffetas of a fine quality, and saltpetre. Should any surplus money remain, it was to be employed in purchasing white sugar, cotton yarn, turmeric, and bees'-wax, merely to fill up spare tonnage. In the two following years the amount of the investment was nearly the same; but in 1677-78 it rose to £100,000, and was still considered far from its maximum,
as the factors were permitted to increase it by borrowing. In 1680-81 it amounted to £150,000, and in the following season to £230,000 distributed as follows:—£140,000 to Cossimbazar, £14,500 to Patna, £32,000 to Balasore, £15,000 to Malda, and £12,000 to remain at Hughli. Hitherto Bengal had been subordinate to Fort St. George, but it was now considered of sufficient importance to constitute a distinct and independent agency. Mr. Hedges, who had been a member of the management in England, was sent out with special powers to be agent and governor of the Company’s affairs in Bengal. His establishment, however, appears to have been on a very humble scale, as his guard, restricted to twenty soldiers under “a corporal of approved fidelity and courage,” were to perform in addition the double duty of protecting the factory at Hughli and acting against the interlopers.

In consequence of the erection of Bengal into a separate agency, vessels were despatched direct from England to the Ganges, and on a scale which shows that the importance of the trade in this quarter was now duly appreciated. In 1682-83, one of the vessels carried thirty guns; another was of the size of 700 tons, which was rather unusual at this period. The agent was empowered to borrow £200,000, which, with the unemployed stock and credit of the former season, was expected to yield a present sum for investment of £350,000; and hopes were held out that the stock of the ensuing season would amount to £600,000, principally in bullion. These hopes, however, were not realized, serious difficulties having arisen both at home and abroad—at home by the unexpected failure of several large houses which used to supply the Company with bullion for export; and abroad by the loss of one of the outward bound ships with £70,000 of bullion on board, the capture of Bantam by the Dutch, and the imposition of new and heavier customs in Bengal, together with the discovery of irregularities in the Company’s factories in that province. In consequence of all these untoward events a panic began to prevail, and a run took place on the Company’s treasury threatening it with insolvency. Instead, therefore, of providing foreign investments, the court resolved in the meantime to reserve all the produce of their sales for the payment of their debts, and neither to send bullion to India nor make any dividend to
their proprietors till these debts were liquidated. With the view of facilitating this process of liquidation, all the settlements abroad were placed on the lowest possible scale; and Bengal, which had begun to act as an independent agency, was again made subordinate to Madras. Somewhat inconsistently, at the very time when Bengal was thus shorn of its independence, the court were seriously contemplating a great addition to its importance by endeavouring to acquire possession of an island in the mouth of the Ganges. Could such an acquisition be made, fortifications were to be immediately commenced. Such was the dubious position of the Company’s establishments in Bengal when Charles II died.
Progress of the East India Company (111)

The Duke of York, now James II, had been a considerable shareholder in the Company, and was understood to be willing to employ all the power and influence of the crown in their favour. A new course of prosperity was hence anticipated, and it soon became apparent that the moderation and caution hitherto manifested were no longer deemed necessary. The interlopers were henceforth to be proceeded against with a rigour which, while admitted to be most desirable, had previously been deemed impolitic. In England prosecutions were immediately to be commenced in the Court of King's Bench against no fewer than forty-eight individuals, who were charged with violating the Company's exclusive privileges, and several of whom, it was supposed, would be unable to make any effectual defence, because the statements contained in their petitions to the king were to be laid hold of as admissions of guilt. In India the judge-advocate established at Bombay was furnished with the code of martial law established in the British army, that it might become the rule of his conduct in trying the commanders and officers of the interloping ships; and the president and council were specially enjoined not to perplex themselves with questions as to the legality of the proceedings, but to be careful in providing that the sentences pronounced by the judge should be carried into execution. The Company must have been aware that the outcry which had been raised against them would thus become more clamorous than ever; but they acted as if they had imbibed the spirit of the last of the Stuarts, and were resolved, if they could not conciliate public opinion, to set it at defiance.
In a similar spirit, the native powers were no longer to be addressed in submissive petitions, but given to understand that the Company would henceforth treat with them as an independent power, and when aggrieved would, if necessary, compel redress by force of arms. To show that this haughty tone meant as much as it expressed, the Company obtained the king’s patent, authorizing them to appoint their president, Sir John Child, “captain-general and admiral of all their forces by sea and land, in the northern parts of India, from Cape Comorin to the Gulf of Persia.” To give effect to this appointment, he was to fix the seat of government at Bombay, while Surat was to be reduced to a simple factory; and he was to maintain a kind of state, by the attendance of a guard of English grenadiers under the command of an ensign with the rank of captain. It was presumed that the removal to Bombay would give umbrage to the Mughul government, but under the new policy this was a very secondary consideration, as not only the Mughul, but Sambhuji and the native princes generally, were to be given to understand that the Company had now in Bombay an impregnable retreat, from which they would be able to retaliate at sea for any exactions and depredations to which they might be subjected on shore. This was no empty menace, for the same vessel which carried out the above public instructions, carried others of a still more important nature, transmitted from a secret committee, with the approbation of the king, and intended not to be made known till the moment for acting upon them had arrived.

An armament on a far larger scale than the Company had ever before fitted out had sailed from England. It consisted of ten ships, mounting from twelve to seventy guns each, and carrying as many troops as, with those which were ordered to join them on their arrival, would make 1,000 regular infantry. Its destination was Bengal. On arriving there, and forming, with the Company’s ships, a fleet of nineteen sail, it was to effect a landing at Chittagong, on the north-east side of the Bay of Bengal, and take permanent possession of it, fortifying it in the best manner, mounting 200 cannons upon it, establishing a mint, and levying five per cent customs on the inhabitants. The possibility of a failure seems never to have been contemplated. The instructions, accordingly, presuming a complete success, enter into a
number of minute details for the purpose of regulating future proceedings. After Chittagong was captured and made secure, and all Mughul ships of every description had been seized and declared lawful prizes, the expedition was to proceed up the eastern branch of the Ganges against Dacca. Supposing, as a matter of course, that the nabob and his troops would immediately save themselves by flight, peace was to be offered to him on the following conditions: that he should cede the city and territory of Chittagong to the Company, and pay the debts he owed them; that he should allow the rupees coined at Chittagong to pass current in his district, and restore all privileges according to ancient firmans. Should he claim restitution of the ships and property seized, he was to be told that the parties were to bear their respective losses and expenses during the war; and that, while these were the most favourable terms which the Company were disposed to concede, even these would not be binding upon them, unless they were ratified and embodied in a regular treaty by the Great Mughul.

As if a single war were not enough at one time, the armament was also to commence hostilities with the King of Siam, and seize his vessels by way of compensation for the losses which the Company had sustained in his dominions. Nor was this all. The Portuguese were to be dealt with after a similar fashion; and if they continued to exact customs at Tanna and Caranja, the president at Bombay was not only to refuse them, but to employ the fleet and military forces at his disposal in seizing Salsette and other dependencies, which it was asserted that the grant of the port and island of Bombay ought to have carried along with it.

The extravagance of these schemes, sufficiently apparent in itself, was signally proved by the result. On the 28th October, 1686, in consequence of a quarrel between three English and some native soldiers in the bazaar at Hughli, hostilities were prematurely commenced. The nabob’s troops were defeated, and Hughli suffered severely by a cannonade of the Company’s fleet. Before this event, Shaistah Khan, the nabob, was disposed to compromise matters with the Company, or submit their differences to arbitration. An amicable settlement was now impossible, and indeed was not desired by the Company, who had made.
up a list of claims exceeding in the aggregate £500,000 sterling, and were indulging the hope that by their warlike successes a considerable portion of it might be secured for their treasury, though they must have been aware that many of the items charged were fictitious, or at least conjectural. As a specimen the following may be mentioned:—“For detaining ye agent with ye silk at Cassumbuzar, 400,000 rupees” (£40,000). “For what extorted from us in presents, &c., 200,000 rupees” (£20,000). “To demorage of shipping, the three last years, 2,000,000 rupees” (£200,000). “For charge of 1,000 men and twenty ships for ye war, also 2,000,000 rupees” (£200,000).

Immediately after the attack on Hughli, the Mughuls, pretending to be intimidated, but merely with the view of gaining time, obtained a cessation of hostilities, during which the servants of the Company removed with their property from that town, and on 20th December, 1686, fixed on Sutanati, or Calcutta, as a safer station while negotiations were pending. How these would issue soon became apparent; for the nabob, making no secret of his intentions, seized upon the English factory at Patna, and imprisoned all the inmates. The prospects of the Company now became sufficiently alarming. The premature attack had made the Mughuls aware of what was intended; the subsequent delay had enabled them to complete their preparations; and it had become impossible to disguise the fact, that the armament which had been provided was inadequate to its object. Chittagong could not be attacked with any probability of success. In proportion to the extravagance of the hopes which had been entertained was the despondency produced by failure. Mr. Gyfford, the president of Madras, first took alarm. Aurangzeb’s army was approaching. It had already conquered the kingdom of Bijapur; that of Golkunda was on the point of sharing the same fate. What then was to prevent it from continuing its victorious career, and advancing upon Madras? Fort St. George, to reinforce the expedition to Bengal, had been left almost entirely without a garrison and without military stores. Thus unprovided with the means of defence, the president saw no safety for it except in negotiation. With this view he opened a communication with the Mughul, and by means of various flimsy excuses for the hostilities in Bengal, humbly deprecated
his displeasure, and prayed for a confirmation of the privileges which Madras had so long enjoyed.

The court at home, never dreaming of the gloomy aspect which affairs had assumed, continued to busy themselves with their schemes of aggrandizement, and the various changes which might become necessary, by the accomplishment of them. In imitation of the Dutch at Batavia and Colombo, they raised Bombay to the rank of a regency, and declared their wish that it should be fortified "as strong as art and money could make it." As the seat of government, Sir John Child, who presided at it, was to have unlimited power over all the Company's settlements in India. Madras, too, though subordinate to Bombay, was also raised to the rank of a regency, and at the same time (1687) received a charter of incorporation. Before this charter was granted the governor and deputy-governor of the Company were commanded to attend his majesty at the cabinet council. The subject of the intended charter was then largely debated, though the only question which appears to have excited much interest was—whether the charter should pass immediately by the king, under the great seal, or whether it should pass under the common seal of the Company. One member of council argued in favour of the former method, but the governor, when the king asked his opinion, replied as follows:—"What his majesty thought best the Company would always think so; but if his majesty expected the governor's private opinion, he had ever been of opinion, that no person in India should be employed by immediate commission from his majesty, because if they were they would be prejudicial to our service by their arrogancy, and prejudicial to themselves, because the wind of extraordinary honour in their heads would probably make them so haughty and overbearing that we should be forced to remove them". This view of the matter so far prevailed, that the charter was made to pass under the common seal of the Company. Under this charter the corporation was to consist of a mayor and ten aldermen (three Company's servants and seven natives), who were to be justices of the peace, and wear thin silk scarlet gowns, and of 120 burgesses with black silk gowns.

At the period when this charter was granted, the population of the city of Madras, the town of Fort St. George, and the
villages within the Company's bounds was estimated at 300,000. The whole was held of the King of Golkunda at a quit-rent of 1,200 pagodas, or about £430. The obligation to pay this sum could not be disputed; and yet, as if the Company under their new policy had considered themselves entitled to dispense with justice wherever force could effect their object, they caused intimation to be made to the king that their future payment to him would depend on his keeping St. Thome in such a manner as not to become an annoyance to Fort St. George. If he would not let it on lease or farm to the Company, the president, "as representing an independent power, was not only to refuse payment of the quit-rent, but to declare the place the property of the Company." For the gross fraud and violence thus proposed to be perpetrated, the only justification attempted was that the King of Golkunda's power had been "much decreased by the victories of the Mughul, and his expulsion from Masulipatam by the Dutch," and that "it was impracticable to carry on trade, or maintain a seat of government without revenue." Such were the Machiavellian principles shamelessly advocated by the court in their letters to Madras in the season 1687-88.

When the failure of the expedition to Bengal was announced in England, the court, instead of attributing it to the tortuous policy which they had begun to pursue, were ungenerous enough to throw the whole blame on their servants in India. The agency of Bengal were censured for their timid conduct, charged with having selfishly pursued their own ends, regardless of the honour and interests of the king and Company who had confided in them, and threatened with expulsion from the service if, by their sinister schemes, the objects of the war should not be accomplished. These objects the Company were not yet willing to abandon; and therefore, when despatching a large ship, called the Defence, under the command of Captain Heath, and a small frigate, fully armed, and carrying reinforcement of 160 soldiers, to assist in the war, they intimated their determination that "unless a fortification and a district around it should be ceded, to be held as an independent sovereignty, the charges of the armament be defrayed, and permission to coin money in Bengal, to pass current in the Mughul's and nabob's dominions, be granted, they would not consent to a
peace, or send any more stock or goods to the Ganges.” These boastings and menaces become ludicrous when viewed in connection with the actual position of affairs, and only proclaim the ignorance, presumption, and folly of those to whom the home management of the Company was at this time intrusted.

Captain Heath arrived in Bengal in October, 1688, and, proceeding to act on instructions which had become altogether inapplicable to the circumstances, embarked the Company’s property at Calcutta, and then proceeded to Balasore Roads. The members of the factory there had been seized and imprisoned; but Captain Heath, though he opened a negotiation with the governor, was too impatient to wait for the result of it. Having effected a landing, he captured a battery of thirty guns, and then plundered the town. By this proceeding he gained little, and threw away the only chance of obtaining the English prisoners, who were carried off into the interior to endure a hopeless captivity. From Balasore he proceeded to Chittagong; but instead of attacking it with his well-equipped fleet, now amounting to fifteen sail, he spent some days in fruitless negotiation, and then set sail for Arakan. It was supposed that as the king was at enmity with the Mughul, a locality for a fortified settlement might be easily obtained. The application, however, was refused; and Captain Heath, after an ineffectual attempt to secure his object by courting the alliance of a rebel chief, finally quitted the Bengal coast, and arrived at Madras on the 4th of March, 1689. On board the fleet was all that now remained to the Company of the wreck of their once flourishing factories in Bengal.

On the west coast of India the results were not more satisfactory. The first intimation of the warlike policy of the Company was communicated by the secret committee in a letter to President Child, intended for his eye alone, but marked to be opened in his absence by Sir John Wyborne, deputy-governor of Bombay. The president was absent, and Sir John not only opened the letter, but imprudently communicated the contents to the council. The secret was of a kind not likely to be kept, and great alarm was felt lest it should reach the ears of the governor of Surat. This was altogether contrary to the intentions of the Company, who were bent on carrying out a great scheme of
fraud by making sudden war on the Mughul in one quarter of his dominions, when they were deluding him with professions of friendship in another. In Bengal his territory was to be invaded, and his ships and those of his subjects seized as lawful prizes, not only there, but in the eastern seas and in the Persian Gulf; while on the west coast of India, and particularly at Surat, a mask of friendship was to be worn, and not thrown off so long as concealment might seem desirable. This nefarious mode of warfare excited no scruples in the mind of Sir John Child, who at once entered into the spirit of it, and discovered, as Bruce expresses it, "a high sense of duty, and a provident concern for the interests of the Company," by resolving not only to keep up the deception and avoid hostilities with the Mughul till the result of the Bengal expedition should be known, but even "should circumstances oblige him to commence hostilities, to take the responsibility on himself." The meaning is, that he was to act as a screen to the Company, and enable them, should the war prove unsuccessful, to allege, in utter disregard of truth and honour, that he had acted without their authority. In the case supposed, therefore, Sir John Child was to be treated apparently as if he had incurred the displeasure of the Company, and they were to follow out the wretched system of duplicity by negotiating with the Mughul "for the restoration of their privileges and trade, upon the same basis as they were anterior to his apparently unwise proceedings."

At this game of deceit it was not easy to overmatch the Mughul, and the Company's experience ere long furnished a new illustration of the old adage, that "honesty is the best policy." Sir John Child displayed considerable dexterity. At first he despatched two of the Company's ships to Mocha and Bussorah, and two others to China, with secret orders to seize all the Mughul or Siamese vessels they might fall in with. At the same time he despatched a ship to Surat to lie off the mouth of the estuary, and endeavour if possible to bring off all the members and property of the factory. The governor of Surat was too well informed, and too much on the alert to be thus imposed upon. Without proceeding to acts of violence, he kept such a strict watch that the escape of the agent and factors was impracticable. Craft being thus unavailing, Sir John Child tried
the effect of force, and suddenly seized all the Surat ships in the port of Bombay. The governor, affecting an intimidation which he did not feel, sent one of the English factors to him with a complimentary letter, in which he expressed an anxious wish to come to an accommodation, and to know what terms would satisfy the Company, and induce them to resume trade. The factor returned to Surat with a statement of grievances, comprising thirty-five articles, including, *inter alia*, satisfaction for stoppage of goods at the custom-house, for the obstruction of investments, for the demurrage of vessels detained, for the refusal to deliver up interlopers and their ships, for the raising of customs from 2 to 3½ per cent, for the refusal of permission to coin money, for the imposition of arbitrary taxes, and the seizure of horses and goods for the Mughul’s use without paying for them.

Before any answer was returned to these propositions, Captain Andrews, commanding one of the ships which had been sent to the Persian Gulf, returned to Bombay, bringing with him an interloping ship and six Mughul vessels, which were sailing under Dutch colours. These captures speedily becoming known, put an end to the trick of concealing actual hostilities, and therefore, without any further attempt at disguise, Sir John Child despatched two large ships to Surat, with orders to seize all Mughul vessels that should be met with, and also to attack the Siddi’s fleet, if it should attempt to cross the bar with the view of putting out to sea. During these proceedings a new governor arrived at Surat, and professed such friendly feelings, that Sir John Child, at the urgent request of the agent, made his appearance off Surat, and succeeded, as he thought, in negotiating a provisional convention on the basis of his thirty-five articles. Though these fell far short of what had at one time been anticipated, the Company, now alive to the difficulties in which their fraud and folly had involved them, were so delighted at the prospect of a treaty with the Mughul, that they voted the president a present of 1,000 guineas, as a mark of approbation for the wisdom of his proceedings during the war, and for his general services. The vote was afterwards discovered to have been premature. The governor of Surat had merely begun to play his part in the game of deceit, and in order to gain time had professed a willingness to accept of terms which he was
determined to repudiate. No sooner, therefore, was his object secured, than he threw off the mask of friendship, again imprisoned the members of the factory, confiscated all the Company's property, and offered a large reward for the person of Sir John Child, alive or dead. The president, thus completely outwitted, returned to Bombay, and found no other means of avenging himself than by capturing forty vessels of a large fleet of Mughul merchantmen.

Though the prospect of an amicable termination had now become hopeless, one effort more was made by sending a deputation to Aurangzeb himself, who was then encamped with his army at Bijapur. Meanwhile, Sir John Child found himself so completely powerless, that he was unable to prevent the Siddi from making several descents upon the island, and even threatening an attack upon the castle of Bombay. He had no spirit to face the gathering storm, and died on the 4th of February, 1690. Had he lived a few weeks longer, he would have seen the Company in a more humiliating position than he had ever contemplated as possible; for shortly after, Aurangzeb's answer to the deputation which had been sent to him arrived in the form of a firman, couched in the following terms:—

"All the English having made a most humble, submissive petition, that the crime they have done may be pardoned, and requested another firman, to make their being forgiven manifest, and sent their bakkeels to the heavenly palace, the most illustrious in the world, to get the royal favour; and Ettimaund Caun, the governor of Suratt's petition to the famous court, equal to the skie, being arrived, that they would present the great king with a fine of 150,000 rupees, to his most noble treasury, representing the sun, and would restore the merchants' goods they had taken away to the owners of them, and would walk by the ancient customs of the port, and behave themselves for the future no more in such a shameful manner; therefore his majesty, according to his duty and favour to all the people of the world, hath pardoned their faults, mercifully forgiven them, and out of his princely condescension agrees, that the present be put into the treasury of the port, the merchants' goods be returned, the town flourish, and they follow their trade, as in former times; and Mr. Child, who did the disgrace, be turned out and expelled. This order is irreversible."
While the Company were thus, by a kind of just retribution, reaping the bitter fruits of their war policy, another calamity had befallen them. Their great patron James II had been driven from the throne which he unworthily occupied. The Revolution, which saved the liberties of the nation from civil and ecclesiastical despotism, was no doubt eminently favourable to trade; but the Company unfortunately stood in a false position. They held a monopoly which a powerful party were bent on wresting from them, and they had themselves incurred much odium by the rigorous and despotic measures which they had adopted in maintaining their exclusive privileges. It would not have been wonderful if, in these circumstances, while they were regarded as almost identified with the dynasty which had just been expelled, they had shared its fate. The Company, though fully alive to the danger, did not lose heart; but resolved to leave no means untried that promised to avert it.

The spirit of freedom evoked during the struggle with the last of the Stuarts, was naturally taken advantage of by the opponents of the Company; and no sooner had William and Mary been seated on the throne, than it was boldly maintained that the crown had exceeded its powers in granting exclusive privileges of trade, without the consent of the other branches of the legislature. This question, on the solution of which the very existence of the Company evidently depended, could not be much longer delayed. It was not to be expected that, while thus existing only by a kind of reprieve, they would venture on any large expenditure in new and hazardous enterprises, or even continue their equipments on their previous scale. In the season 1689-90, they sent out only three ships, two of them destined for Bombay, and one for Fort St. George. At the same time, when they were thus curtailing their trade, they made strenuous exertions to increase their revenue; and, still clinging to the idea of becoming an independent Indian power, addressed the presidency of Bombay in the following terms:—"The object of our revenue is the subject of our care as much as our trade: 'tis that must maintain our force when twenty accidents may interrupt our trade: 'tis that must make us a nation in India: without that we are but as a great nation of interlopers, united by his majesty's royal charter, fit only to trade where nobody of power thinks it their interest
to prevent us; and upon this account it is that the wise Dutch, in all their general advices which we have seen, write ten paragraphs concerning their government, their civil and military policy, warfare, and the increase of their revenue, for one paragraph they write concerning trade." This language, which certainly sounds strange in a Company which professed to be established "on a purely mercantile bottom," may be partly explained by the change which had taken place in European politics.

The "wise Dutch", whose conduct, after having been so often the subject of bitter vituperation, is eulogized as a model, were now in close alliance with England; while France, which had been "rapidly acquiring power and influence in the East," had become their common enemy. Whatever might be the ultimate issue of the hostilities, it was scarcely possible, while they continued, to carry on a profitable trade. Both in the East and in Europe, French privateers were on the watch to make prizes of the Company's ships. It was therefore easy to represent the curtailed equipments as the result of prudent arrangements, and to justify the resolution to make revenue a primary object. The accomplishment of this object, however, was attended with considerable difficulty. At Bombay taxation had already been carried to an extent which had produced insurrection. In Fort St. George a similar result was threatened; but the court, listening only to their necessities, held that the additional revenue actually obtained was "by no means equal to what might have been expected, or drawn from a fortified town which could afford protection to shipping and trade, and that the amount might be increased to £100,000 per annum, if a similar system of taxation should be introduced with that which the Dutch had established at Batavia."

The opposition to the Company had now assumed a definite shape, by the presentation of a petition to the House of Commons, praying for legislative sanction to the establishment of a new company, formed on more liberal principles. From the causes already mentioned, the petitioners found much favour, and a committee was appointed who, after fully hearing both parties, reported on the 16th of January, 1690, that, in their opinion, "the best way to manage the East India trade, is to have it in a new company and a new joint stock, and this to be
established by act of parliament; but that till this was done, the exclusive trade should remain with the present Company”. Parliament was prorogued before this report could be taken into consideration, but in 1691 the resolution of the committee was virtually sanctioned by an address which the House of Commons presented to the crown. After this decided step, the Company became convinced that their privileges would never be secure until they were confirmed by statute. To this object, accordingly, their domestic policy was henceforth more especially devoted. In a petition to parliament they set forth their claims at full length, and ultimately gained what they justly considered a victory, because the adverse decision previously given against them was not repeated; and the House of Commons, as if satisfied that they had hitherto acted in the matter with some degree of precipitation, simply referred the whole business to the king. This was just what the Company desired, for they felt assured that even if argument should fail, they had it in their power to conciliate the favour of government by the employment of other means of a more efficacious nature. What these were will shortly appear; but in the meantime it is necessary only to mention the result—that, on the 7th of October, 1693, the Company obtained a new charter from the crown. Before considering its terms, it will be proper to glance at the state of affairs in India.

As already mentioned, the Company sent out only three ships from England in the season 1689-90. In the following season the same number only was sent, and not so much for the purpose of carrying on trade at the great marts, which they enjoyed before their unhappy hostilities with the Mughul, as of picking up any remains of traffic which might be found in localities not affected by these hostilities. Thus one of the vessels was sent to Bencoolen in Sumatra, where, as a substitute for Bantam, which was no longer accessible, a factory had been established and fortified; the second vessel, destined for Fort St. George, was to load with coast goods, including those which it might be possible to collect from Bengal; and the third, proceeding direct to Bombay, was to endeavour to obtain a cargo by touching at the different stations on the Malabar coast. In 1692-93 trade took a new start, and the number of ships despatched amounted to eleven. The main cause of the increase was the re-establishment of trade
within the Mughul territories, on terms which, though humiliating, the Company were too glad to accept; but something also may have been due to the better prospect which they now had of obtaining a confirmation of their privileges from the king. The latter cause must have operated still more powerfully in the ensuing season, and accordingly the number of ships sent out amounted to thirteen, which sailed as two successive fleets in January and March.

During the hostilities with the Mughul, the Dutch and French had turned the blunders of the Company to good account, and, in a manner, monopolized the Indian market. The advantages thus acquired by the Dutch were not eventually of serious consequence, because the strict alliance into which they were brought with England prevented them from using these advantages, at least openly, for the purpose of injuring the Company. The case was different with the French. While the Company were sacrificing all the substantial advantages which it had cost them the better part of a century to secure, the French had not only established factories at Surat on the Malabar coast, and in the mouth of the Ganges, but had acquired a commanding settlement on the Coromandel coast at Pondicherry, eighty-five miles south-south-west of Madras. Even when France and England were allies, the Company could not refrain from expressing the jealousy and fear which they felt at the rising prosperity of the French; and now that the alliance had been broken up, and the two nations were once more open enemies, one of the first instructions sent out to the presidency of Surat was to endeavour to secure the safety of their settlements and trade by wresting Pondicherry from the French. This was far more than the presidency could venture to attempt with the feeble means at their disposal, and the struggle which was finally to decide the ascendency between the rival establishments was necessarily reserved to a future period. Indeed, at this time, so far were the Company from being in a condition to undertake the siege of Pondicherry, that they were unable to maintain their own ground against a French fleet of four ships, mounting respectively sixty-six, sixty, forty, and twenty guns, which had made its appearance on the west coast of India, and captured one of the Company's ships within fifty miles of Bombay. This loss was somewhat counter-
balanced by a gain on the east coast, where Tegnapatam, situated only about twelve miles south of Pondicherry, was acquired by purchase from a native prince, and immediately converted into the strong and important settlement of Fort St. David. It is rather curious, that while the French, with whom we were then at war, allowed the Company quietly to fortify themselves in their immediate vicinity, the Dutch, our allies, manifested the utmost jealousy, and refused to recognize the right which the Company claimed, in virtue of their purchase, to levy harbour dues and customs.
New Charters

Both the disgraceful termination of the war in which the Company had engaged with the Mughul, and the state of the public mind produced by the Revolution, gave great advantages to their enemies, who endeavoured, by a petition which they presented to the House of Commons, to prove that nothing but the establishment of a new Company was able to save the East India trade from being entirely lost to the nation. The question raised by the petition was too important not to attract considerable attention; and a committee, appointed by the House, to take cognizance of it, began by requiring an exact state of the Company's accounts, an estimate of their stock, goods, cash, and debts, and a view of the correspondence both at home and abroad. The Company meanwhile met the petition of their opponents with a counter-petition, and both sides having been fully heard, resolutions were adopted, laying down a series of general propositions as to the terms on which the trade to the East Indies should in future be carried on. The most important of the resolutions were—"That a sum not less than £1,500,000, and not exceeding £2,000,000, was a fund necessary to carry on the East India trade in a joint stock—that no one person should possess any larger share than £5,000, nor have more than one vote—that no private contracts should be made, but all goods be sold at public sales by inch of candle, except saltpetre for the use of the crown, and in lots each not exceeding at one time the value of £500—that all dividends be made in money, and no dividend be made without leaving a sufficient fund to pay all debts and carry on the trade—that no ships, either with permission or without, for the future be allowed to go to the East Indies, except only such as should be of a company, or be
established by act of parliament—and that the joint stock of a company to trade to the East Indies be for twenty-one years, and no longer."

Though in these resolutions no express mention was made of the existing Company, it became evident, from other resolutions adopted immediately after, that the intention of parliament was to continue them in possession of their monopoly; for after stipulating "that persons having above the sum of £5,000 in the stock of the present East India Company, in their own or other persons' names, be obliged to sell so much thereof as should exceed the sum of £5,000, at the rate of one hundred pounds for every hundred," and "that the members of the committee of the East India Company be obliged to give security, to be approved of by the House, that the stock and estate they now had should be made good £749,000, all debts paid," it was added, "that security being first given, an humble address be presented to his majesty, to incorporate the present East India Company by charter, according to the regulations agreed upon by the House, that the same might pass into an act."

To some of these regulations as unnecessary or impolitic, valid objections might easily have been made; but the Company apparently resolved to waive them; for within a week, Sir Thomas Cooke the governor, and two other committees of the Company, produced their proposals of security. They were not deemed satisfactory, and the House, after a short delay, adopted the following resolution, dated 11th February, 1692—"That an humble address be presented to his majesty to dissolve the present East India Company, according to the powers reserved in their charter, and to constitute another East India Company for the better preserving of the East India trade to this kingdom, in such manner as his majesty in his royal wisdom should think fit." To this address, which was ordered to be presented by the whole House, his majesty replied, "That it was a matter of very great importance to the trade of this kingdom, and that it could not be expected he should give a present answer to it, but that he would take time to consider of it, and in a short time give them his positive answer." The Company having reason to believe that they had more to expect from the king than from the legislature, bound themselves by writing to submit to
such regulations as should be made. Accordingly, the committee of the privy council, to whom the whole matter had been referred, drew up an elaborate paper, entitled, "Propositions for regulating the East India Company." The propositions, thirty-two in number, while retaining the spirit of the resolutions sanctioned by the House of Commons, entered much more into detail, and also made some very important alterations and additions. Instead of accepting them as they had formerly promised, the Company returned what they called the "Humble Answer of the Governor, Deputy-governor, and Court of Committees of the East India Company, to a Paper of Propositions for Regulation of the East India Company." In this answer the propositions were minutely criticized, and for the most part strenuously objected to. Some of the answers are very quaint and curious. To the second proposition, which was—"The stock of the present Company to be part of the fund" (the proposed fund amounting to at least £1,500,000, and not exceeding £2,000,000), "and to be rated at £744,000, if they can give security that it shall effectually produce that sum; or else at so much less, as they will engage to make good after all debts paid, and satisfaction made to the Mughul and his subjects, against whose pretensions the new stock to be indemnified by the like security:"—it was answered—"The Company, recommending their righteous cause to God and his majesty's known and famous justice in the whole course of his happy life, say that the value of everything is what it will sell for; and their stock, under all the calumnies and persecutions of their adversaries, now currently sells for £150 per hundred; and they know and can prove it to be intrinsically more worth than that current price; but they know no law or reason why they should be dispossessed of their estates at any less value than they are really worth in ready money, by all the measures anything is valued in any part of the world. They humbly say as to security, they know no reason why they should give security for their own estates. They affirm that they owe not a penny to the Great Mughul or any of his subjects, other than their running accounts with their own banyas and brokers, which are changing daily, like merchants running cash in a goldsmith's hand. Although the Company owe nothing to the Mughul, as
aforesaid, yet the bare mentioning any such thing by a public act of his majesty, would be enough to persuade him to invent demands upon the Company for transactions and pretences done in ages past, before any of the present adventurers were born; and therefore that part of the proposition seems manifestly impossible, as well as unjust, neither the Mughul nor any of his subjects having made any complaint to his majesty of the Company's being in debt to him or them; that being only a suggestion of the interlopers and their adherents, not only now, but for many years past. As to that hypothesis—if they can give security—it will not become the Company to say what they might of their own ability, or the ability or disability of their adversaries; they are, on both sides, well known on the Exchange."

The other answers exhibiting a similar spirit, were regarded by the king as a formal rejection by the Company of the charter which had been offered to them; and accordingly, on the 14th November, 1692, he returned the following answer to the address which had been presented to him on the subject during the previous session of parliament:

"The House of Commons having presented an address to the king to dissolve the present East India Company, according to the power reserved in their charter, and to constitute a new one, his majesty took into consideration the proper methods of complying with their desires, and of securing effectually this advantageous trade to the nation.

"But his majesty, upon examination of the charter, and consulting his judges and learned council, found that he could not legally dissolve the Company but upon three years' warning; and that during the three years after warning the Company must subsist, and might continue to trade; and that although the king might constitute a new company, yet he could not empower such new company to trade till after three years, the crown having expressly covenanted not to grant any such liberties.

"Hereupon his majesty was very apprehensive of the ill consequences of giving warning to the Company, because they would then be less solicitous of promoting the true interest and advantage of the trade, whereof they could not long reap
the fruits, and that no new company could be immediately admitted to it; so that this very beneficial trade, which is already so much impaired, might be in danger of being entirely lost to the nation.

"His majesty, very desirous to prevent so great a mischief, and to gratify the House of Commons in the end, since he could not do it without great hazard in the manner they proposed, required the East India Company to answer directly whether they would submit to such regulations as his majesty should judge proper, and most likely to advance the trade; and the Company having fully agreed to it, and declared their resolution in writing, his majesty commanded a committee of his privy council to prepare regulations; which they did, and offered them to the Company; but the Company, notwithstanding their declaration of submission, rejected almost all the material particulars.

"So that his majesty, finding that what possibly the House of Commons might have expected, and indeed was necessary to preserve this trade, could not be perfected by his own authority alone, and that the Company could not be induced to consent to any such regulations as might have answered the intentions of the House of Commons, and that the concurrence of parliament is requisite to make a complete and useful settlement of this trade, has directed all the proceedings in this matter to be laid before them; and recommends to them the preparing of such a bill, in order to pass into an act of parliament, as may establish this trade on such foundations as are most likely to preserve and advance it."

The House of Commons endeavoured to act on this suggestion, but finding that the opposition of the Company still continued, resolved, on the 25th February, 1693, "That an humble address be presented to his majesty, that he will dissolve the East India Company, upon three years' warning to the said Company, according to the power reserved in their charter."

The king answered, "I will do always all the good in my power for this kingdom, and I will consider your address."

A crisis was thus evidently approaching; but the Company, though they had been bold enough to provoke it, became alive to the full extent of the danger, and determined to leave no
means untried that promised to prevent it. Unfortunately, however, at this very time, from mere inadvertency or some other cause which has never been properly explained, they incurred a direct forfeiture of their charter by failing to make payment of the first quarterly instalment of a tax of five per cent imposed upon their stock, by Act 4: Wm. and Mary, c. 15. In this act the stock was valued at £744,000, and consequently the whole sum exigible under the first quarterly payment was only £9,300. It was obvious that the non-payment of a sum so comparatively paltry must have been owing to oversight and not to inability; but the enemies of the Company were numerous, influential, and inveterate; and as the act, after ordering the first quarterly payment to be made on the 25th of March, 1693, expressly declared, that “in case the governors and treasurers of the said respective companies” (the East India Company, the Royal African Company, and the Hudson’s Bay Company) “shall make default in payment of the said several sums, or any of them respectively, charged on the stock of the said companies, at the days and times aforesaid, according to the true intent of this act, the charter of such company respectively shall be, and is hereby adjudged to be void,” it was seriously proposed to exact the full penalty. The Company being thus entirely at the mercy of government, abandoned all idea of resistance to any terms that might be offered them, and counted themselves fortunate when they escaped annihilation by obtaining new crown charters, which provided that the forfeiture, if really incurred, should not take effect.

The first of these charters, dated 7th October, 1693, after premising that “the governor and Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies have been of long time, to the honour and profit of the nation, a corporation,” and that “some doubt or question hath of late been made touching the validity of the charters of the said Company, and whether the same be not, in strictness of law, void, by the not actual payment into the receipt of our exchequer of the first quarterly payment of the tax of £5 per cent charged on the general joint stock of the said Company,” proceeds as follows: “Now know ye, that we, taking the premises into our royal considera-
tion, and well weighing what disorders and inconveniences would befall the said Company, and other persons concerned and employed in their trade, especially in the remote parts of the world, if we would take advantage of the forfeiture aforesaid (if any be), and we being willing that the said governor and Company, or late governor and Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies, and their successors, shall have and enjoy all such and the like lawful powers, privileges and advantages, and immunities; and in as ample manner, to all intents and purposes, as if the said first quarterly payment of the said tax had been duly and regularly made according to the said act; of our especial grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion," constitute and appoint Sir Thomas Cooke, knight, and various other individuals named, "and all and every other persons who were members of the said Company, or late Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies, on the 25th day of March, now last past, who have not since parted with their stocks in the said Company; and all and every other person and persons who, since the 24th of March last past, by buying stock or otherwise, have come into, and remain in a capacity of being members of the said Company, be and shall be one body corporate and politic in deed and in name," &c.

While thus generally confirming all the rights and privileges previously enjoyed by the Company, the new charter contains the following important proviso:—"If the said governor and Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies, and their successors, do not accept of, and from time to time, and at all times hereafter, act according to, and put in due and effectual execution, and submit and conform in all things unto such orders, directions, additions, alterations, restrictions, and qualifications, relating to the constitution, continuance, determination, rights, powers, or privileges of the said Company, or the government thereof, or of the said governor and Company; or the encouragement, management, regulation, or advancement of trade; or of the present or future joint stock of the said Company; or concerning any future subscriptions, to be made by way of increase or addition to the joint stock; or for ascertaining the true values of the said joint stock, at and during the times of any such
future subscriptions; which, and as we, our heirs or successors, by
the advice of our or their privy council, shall from time to time,
at any time before the 29th day of September which shall be in
the year 1694, think fit to make, insert, limit, direct, appoint,
or express in or by any further or other charter, letters-patents,
or other writing or instrument, under our or their great seal of
England, then and in each and every of the cases aforesaid, it
shall and may be lawful to and for us, our heirs and successors,
by letters-patents, under our or their great seal of England, to
determine, revoke, and make void these presents, and the grant
hereby made.”

The object of this proviso evidently was to bind the Company
to the acceptance of those conditions which the House of Com-
mons had embodied in a series of resolutions already referred
to; and accordingly, in little more than a month after the date
of the above charter, effect was given to the proviso by another
charter, in which, with several not unimportant modifications,
the parliamentary resolutions were enforced. In this new char-
ter, dated 11th November, 1693, after a repetition of the proviso,
and a preamble stating, inter alia, the importance of the traffic
to the East Indies, and the desirableness of rendering it “more
national, general, and extensive than hitherto it hath been,”
the Company are taken bound to accept and agree to a series
of propositions, of which the most important are—that all sub-
jects of the British crown, whether natural born, or “naturaliz-
ed and endenized,” shall be entitled to become members of the
Company; that £744,000 shall be added to the present general
joint stock “by the new subscriptions of such persons who shall be
minded to adventure any share; that no person shall subscribe
or hold more than £10,000 of stock in his own or any other
name; that the new subscriptions, if exceeding in the aggregate
£744,000, shall be individually reduced pro rata; that every
£1,000 up to £10,000 shall give a vote, thus allowing to the
individual possessed of the maximum of stock ten votes in all;
that the qualification for a committee shall be £1,000, and for
governor and deputy-governor £4,000; that all dividends shall
be paid in money; that no private trade shall be permitted; that
with the exception of saltpetre sold to the crown, all sales shall
be public, by inch of candle; that no single lot of goods, except
jewels, shall exceed £500 in value; and that British produce and manufactures should be annually exported to the amount of £100,000.

These clauses, though binding the Company to conditions which must have prevented many of the abuses of which their previous management was accused, not only fell far short of what their avowed opponents had anticipated, but failed to satisfy the public mind; and the question having again been keenly agitated, and brought specially before parliament by a petition praying for the erection of a new East India Company, the House of Commons, "examined the charters of the old Company, the book of new subscriptions, the state of their present stock, and the petition above mentioned; and after mature deliberation" resolved, on the 19th of January, 1664, "that all the subjects of England have equal right to trade to the East Indies, unless prohibited by act of parliament." The point thus summarily decided by one branch of the legislature was properly a question of law; and several years before, under very different circumstances, had undergone a lengthened discussion in the Court of King's Bench. In the year 1683, when the crown was stretching its prerogative to the utmost, the East India Company, deeming the time favourable for obtaining an authoritative decision in favour of the validity of their charter, determined to try the question, and with that view brought an action against Thomas Sandys for attempting to trade within the limits to which they had, by their charter, an exclusive right. Sandys argued that the Company was a monopoly, and being consequently struck at by the statute against monopolies, had usurped powers which, however sanctioned by the crown, could not be legally maintained. The case, of which a full report is given in the state trials, under the title of the "Great Case of Monopolies," attracted much attention; and having been fully argued by the ablest counsel at the bar, was not finally decided till 1685, when James II had mounted the throne, and Jeffreys was lord chief-justice. The decision, as might have been expected in the circumstances, was in favour of the royal prerogative, and found that "the grant to the plaintiffs of the sole trade to the Indies, exclusive of others, is a good grant." The victory which the Company thus gained was more apparent than real. The decision was in their favour,
but the argument was clearly against them; and the maintenance of their monopoly became in consequence identified, in the public mind, with that of despotism. Hence, when the Revolution had made way for the establishment of constitutional freedom, their position became insecure, and every new discussion of their privileges seemed only to bring them nearer to the brink of destruction. The resolution of the House of Commons was indeed a virtual repeal of their monopoly, because it declared that nothing but an act of parliament could make it valid.

There was still, however, good ground to hope that such an act of parliament might yet be obtained. The king, by the charters which he had granted, had gone as far as he could safely do in their favour; and it was well understood, that while many of the members of the legislature were sincerely attached to their interests, because convinced that the trade to the East Indies could be best carried on by the present Company, there were others on whom, after argument had failed, another kind of influence might be brought to bear. What this influence was, and how unscrupulously the managers of the Company had employed it, soon became apparent.

Several instances of bribery and corruption in the administration of public offices having been detected, rumours began to prevail that the whole body politic was corrupt. Suspicion fell especially upon the city of London and the East India Company; and on the 7th of March, 1695, the House of Commons appointed a committee to inspect the books of these two bodies. The guilt of the former was easily established, as the chamberlain’s books contained an entry bearing that 1,000 guineas had been paid to Sir John Trevor, speaker of the House of Commons, on the 22nd of June, 1694, as a doceur for his pains about a bill brought into parliament under the name of the “Orphans’ Bill.” The guilt of the Company was not so easily established, though enough was at once discovered to show that bribery to an enormous extent must have been carried on. From an abstract obtained from the Company’s books, it appeared that from 1688 to 1694, inclusive, £107,013, 12s. 7d. had been paid in cash for what was called the “Company’s special service.” In 1693, when Sir Thomas Cooke was governor and Francis Tyssen deputy-governor, the sum issued under this head was £87,402, 12s, 3d. On
searching for the orders for this issue, the committee discovered a minute of a court of committees, dated the 13th of April, 1693, and stating, *inter alia*, “The governor this day acquainting the court with what proceedings had been made in their affairs towards granting a new charter, and with what had been dis-burst by him in prosecution thereof, the court approved of the said charges, and ordered a warrant to be made out for the same; and returned him thanks for his great care, pains, and trouble in their service, desiring him to proceed in the perfecting thereof.” Two other minutes to a similar effect were found, together with one dated the 23rd of November, 1693, in which “it is ordered that the cashier-general do from time to time make payment of such sums of money for carrying on of the Company’s service as the governor shall direct, pursuant to the sense of the present debate.”

In regard to the disposal of the money, the committee reported that they had been unable to obtain any further account than that it was for special service, and that a large part of it had been put into the hands of Sir Basil Firebrace. On examining the Company’s cash-book, they found a balance at their credit of £124,249, 15s. 10d; but on asking Mr. Portmans, the cashier, if he had the same in cash, he answered that he had not, and in its stead produced the following voucher by Sir Thomas Cooke:—“Received, the 10th of January, 1693 (1694), of Mr. Edmond Portmans, for account of the East India Company, £90,000; which I have disbursed and paid for £99,197 stock, in the East India Company, for their account; which I promise to be accountable for on account of the East India Company; and was by order of the Company the 24th of November, 1693.” No such amount of stock had been transferred to the Company’s account; but the committee, on examining Sir Benjamin Bathurst, one of the Company’s court of committees, were told by him, that “finding so great a sum as £30,000 charged for secret services, he had some warm discourse with Sir Thomas Cooke about it, to know how it was disbursed; but he refused to give him any particulars, and told him he should remember he was bound by his oath to the Company to keep their secrets”. Sir Benjamin added, that “about April, 1694, understanding they were in want of money, he looked into the cash-book; which casting up, he
found a considerable sum in cash; and taking some persons with him, discoursed Sir Thomas Cooke thereof, who said the £90,000 he had received was to gratify some persons in case the bill should pass."

Beside the above suspicious payments, the committee discovered a contract of a very singular description. It bore the date of the 26th of February, 1694; and bound the Company to pay for 200 tons of saltpetre, to be brought home in the ship *Seymour* from India, the sum of £12,000, together with £25 freight per ton to the owners of the ship, besides all charges in England. It seems that this saltpetre, for which £12,000 was to be paid, could be purchased in India for £2,000; and this sum was actually advanced by the Company for that purpose, and not only so, but they also granted bond under the Company's seal for £10,000, as the remaining balance payable by a certain day, whether the ship should arrive in safety or not. The result of the contract is thus accurately explained by the committee:—"The Company runs the adventure of £12,000 for that which cost only £2,000, and must consequently lose £12,000 if the ship miscarry; and on the contrary, the seller on the other hand gets £10,000 clear without disbursing or running the hazard of one penny; and what is yet more, a certain loss of £9,000 or £10,000 will attend it if the ship arrive in safety."

The report of the committee was made on the 12th of March, 1695; and on the 18th the House of Commons resolved, "that whosoever shall discover any money or other gratuity given to any member of this House for matters transacted in this House relating to the orphans' bill or the East India Company, shall have the indemnity of this House for such gift." On the 26th it was ordered, "that Sir Thomas Cooke, a member of this House, do give an account to the House how the £87,402, 12s. 3d. mentioned in the report was distributed." When examined he refused to answer, and was committed to the Tower. At the same time a bill was ordered to be brought in for the purpose of obliging him to give an account. So much were the House in earnest that, in little more than a week, the bill, though counsel was heard against it, was passed and carried to the House of Lords. When it was read there for the first time it was vehemently opposed by the Duke of Leeds, lord-president of the
council, who commenced with a most solemn protestation of his cleanness and innocence, and laying his hand upon his breast, declared upon his faith and honour "that he was perfectly disinterested, and had no part or concern in this matter, and therefore might the better appear against it." Sir Thomas Cooke, being brought from the Tower to the bar of the lords, declared himself ready and very willing to make a full discovery on obtaining an indemnifying vote; and as the reports of the period express it, "bemoaned himself (weeping) that he was not indemnified at that instant, so that he might just then make the discovery which was expected, and which he was so desirous to make." On being asked what he wanted to be indemnified from, he answered, "All actions and suits, except from the East India Company, whom, if he had injured, he would be bound to undergo the utmost rigour." He also desired, he said, to be indemnified from scandalums, which he explained to mean the action of scandalum magnatum.

The lords sisted procedure with the bill sent up from the commons, and introduced a bill of indemnity, which was ultimately passed. The preamble and leading enacting clause of the act are as follows:—"Whereas it appears, by the books of the East India Company, that Sir Thomas Cooke, knight, in the year 1693, being the governor of the said Company, did receive, out of the stock and treasure belonging to the same, the sum of £77,258, and hath also received out of the stock and treasure of the said Company the further sum of £90,000: And whereas a true discovery of the distribution and application of the said several sums of money will be of public use and service, and is necessary to the vindicating the justice and honour of the government; and the said Sir Thomas Cooke hath voluntarily offered to make such discovery, so as he may be indemnified in such manner as is hereafter mentioned and provided: Be it therefore enacted, by the king's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that, if the said Sir Thomas Cooke shall, on or before the 23rd day of April, 1695, make a true and full discovery on oath, before a committee of the lords and commons, to be appointed by each House for that purpose, how and in what manner,
and to what person or persons, and to what particular uses, intents, and purposes, and on what account, the said sum of £90,000, and the sum of £67,000, part of the said sum of £77,258, have been distributed, paid, applied, disposed, and made use of, then the said Sir Thomas Cooke shall not, by reason or means of such discovery, be liable to any action or suit of any person or persons whatsoever, other than the said East India Company; nor shall such discovery or confession be allowed or given in evidence against him in or upon any action or suit, other than as aforesaid; and also shall be declared pardoned and indemnified for any crime he may be guilty of in the distribution, payment, application, or disposal of the said money, to any person other than to himself."

When examined before the committee of both Houses appointed in terms of this act, Sir Thomas Cooke produced a written statement, entitled, "A true and full discovery, upon oath, made by Sir Thomas Cooke, to the best of his knowledge, &c., ... which discovery is in pursuance of an act of this present session of parliament." This statement contained the names of the various parties to whom cash had been paid to the amount of £67,031, 18s. 2d., and of others from whom East India stock, to the amount of £90,000, had been bought for account of the East India Company. Among the cash items were £10,000 "delivered to Francis Tyssen, Esq., for the special service of the Company"; £10,000 to Mr. Richard Acton, "to defray the expenses of himself, and for his friends' soliciting to prevent a new settlement of an East India Company, and to endeavour the establishment of the old;" £10,000 to Sir Basil Firebrace, "in recompense of his trouble in prosecuting the Company's affairs, and in consideration of other losses he had sustained by neglecting his own business, and by not engaging himself with the interloping ships." An additional sum of £30,000 was set down as having been paid "to the said Sir Basil for £50 per cent loss on stock I was obliged to accept of him at £150 per cent on the Company's account." On being interrogated with reference to the above statement, Sir Thomas Cooke declared "that the first sum of £10,000 above mentioned was given in expectation to have the charter of the East India Company confirmed, and new regulations thereto made," and that "it
was intended for the king, but he could not say the king had it,” though “he believes Mr. Tyssen told him that he delivered it to Sir Josiah Child, who delivered it to the king.” He added that “it was a customary present, and that in King Charles’s and other former reigns, the like had been done for several years.” With regard to the £10,000 paid to Mr. Acton, he declared that he had given it with the privity of Sir Josiah Child, “who recommended Acton as a person capable of doing the Company service, having great acquaintance with parliament men, and others who had interest with them;” that “he could not particularize who they were, but the end aimed at was to get an act of parliament.” The sums paid to Sir Basil Firebrace were stated to be in implement of an agreement, by which the Company became bound, in case the charter passed, to take £60,000 stock of Sir Basil at £150 per cent. As the stock was then only £100 per cent, the Company lost £30,000 by the transaction. By another agreement of a similar nature, they would have been bound to accept a transfer of £40,000 stock on the same terms, if an act of parliament in favour of the Company had been obtained.

In following up the inquiry, various other persons were examined. Sir Josiah Child affected general ignorance of the matter, and said that “he never disposed of £10 of the Company’s money to his remembrance.” He admitted, however, that “he did recommend Mr. Acton as being an honest man, and thought he might do service to the Company in parliament, because of his acquaintances.” He also recommended “that a present of £50,000 should be made to the king, if his majesty would so far waive his prerogative that an act of parliament might be passed for settling the Company; but Mr. Tyssen told him the king would not meddle in that matter.” He “knew nothing of the £40,000 paid to Sir Basil Firebrace, but there was a kind of a company of twenty-five persons, that sat de die in diem, to destroy the Company, and he told Sir Thomas Cooke that he thought Sir Basil the fittest person to divide them.”

Sir Basil Firebrace, when first examined, admitted the payments as stated by Sir Thomas Cooke, viz—£10,000 as a gratuity for losses, and £30,000 in terms of contract. Both sums “were directly for himself, and for the use of no other person
whatsoever; he paid no part of the same towards procuring a charter or act of parliament, nor made any promises to do so, but he had several discourses with Sir Thomas Cooke about using his endeavours to procure a new charter.” Being asked “what particular services he did or was to do for procuring a new charter,” he said “that he wished he might answer that at some other time, being not well, not having slept two or three nights, and being much indisposed as to his health; that he was unwilling to take too much upon himself, but thought he did great service to the Company in solicitation and other services.” On the following day, having desired to be called in, he deposed, “that having had a treaty with Mr. Bates, whom he thought able to do service in passing the charter, and to have acquaintance with several persons of honour,” he gave him two notes, the one for 3,000 and the other for 2,500 guineas, payable to Mr. Bates or bearer. The latter note was paid after the charter for restoring the East India Company passed; the other after the charter for regulation passed. These notes were from Sir Thomas Cooke, who, he believed, “did know how they were to be disposed of.” In fact, Mr. Bates had introduced Sir Basil several times to the Duke of Leeds, the lord-president, “who made some scruples in point of law.”

Mr. Bates deponed “that Sir Basil Firebrace did apply himself to him to use his interest for obtaining a charter to the East India Company;” that “he did use his interest with the lord-president, who said he would do what service he could: that he received 5,000 guineas, told the lord-president of the fact, and urged the same upon his lordship’s acceptance, but he refused it.” He admitted, however, that “in regard he could not tell money very well himself;” he “did ask leave of my lord that his servant might tell the money.” His lordship gave leave, and accordingly his lordship’s servant, M. Robert, “did receive the money.” At first Bates alleged that M. Robert paid over the money to him, but on a subsequent examination he admitted that he had it not, and that it had remained with Robert till within the last few days, when Robert had brought it to him for the purpose of being given back to Sir Basil Firebrace. His reason for thus paying back the guineas was “the noise that it made, and that people might think he did not deserve them,”
More light was thrown on this disclosure by Sir Basil, who, when again examined, stated "that the East India Company's charter being forfeited, Sir Thomas Cooke was apprehensive "that it stuck with the Duke of Leeds," and told him that "some way must be found out to the duke." Sir Basil thereupon applied to Mr. Bates, who, after a good deal of haggling, agreed to accept of 5,000 guineas for his friend, and 500 guineas to himself. Sir Thomas Cooke sanctioned the agreement, remarking that if "it was insisted on it must be done." The agreement was that "if the duke did act in favour of the Company, he should have 2,000 and 3,000 guineas, and Bates 500 guineas for himself." Sir Basil added, "that from the time the notes were given, they had free access to the lord-president, and found him easy and willing to give them his assistance."

Mr. Tyssen deponed that "Sir Thomas Cooke and Sir Josiah Child gave him a note under their hands for £50,000, which was intended to be presented to his majesty if his majesty would pass an act of parliament as they should desire, and that he acquainted my Lord Portland with the Company's intention to make such a present; who told the deponent that the king would not meddle with it." On being asked "if he had offered the same to Lord Portland, he denied that he had so done, saying, if he had, he must never have seen his face more."

That bribery to an enormous extent had been carried on, there could now be no doubt, but the only case in which, as yet, it seemed capable of being proved, was that of the Duke of Leeds, against whom, accordingly, the commons resolved to proceed by impeachment. On the reading of the report of the committee in the House of Lords, the duke rose in his place and said that "as he had formerly protested himself to be free in this matter, so he still denied, upon his faith and honour, that he was guilty of any such corruptions as were suggested against him, and that if the whole truth were laid open it would tend to his honour and advantage." His explanation was, "that Mr. Bates introduced Sir Basil Firebrace to him, and that he had conferences with Sir Basil upon the subject of the East India Company, which Sir Basil was concerned for; that some time after Mr. Bates came and informed him that he was to have a sum of money of Sir Basil, and desired his
lordship to lend him one of his servants, Mr. Bates keeping
but a footman, to receive the money, and so he lent him M. 
Robert; that his lordship knew nothing of the sum, but after-
wards Mr. Bates came to him and told him he had received
5,000 guineas, which he offered to him, telling his lordship that
he had been very obliging and kind to him, and that in ac-
knowledgment of the many favours he had received from his
lordship's hands, he humbly desired him to accept of them,
which he refusing, Mr. Bates pressed him earnestly to take
one-half or a quarter, which he still refused, declaring he would
not touch a penny of them; and told him since he had taken
them, he thought there was no need of returning them—they
were his own, and he wished him good luck with them." While
the duke was making this apology, or rather confession, he got
private notice that the commons were preparing to impeach
him. Startled at the news he hastened off, and intimated,
through one of the members, his desire to be heard. Permission
was given, and he made a long and apparently rambling speech,
without making any favourable impression, for the impeach-
ment was immediately carried up to the lords. The first article,
containing the substance of the whole, was as follows:—"That
certain merchants trading to the East Indies, having either
forfeited their charter, or being under an apprehension that they
had forfeited the same, and having made their humble applic-
ation to their majesties in council for obtaining a charter of
confirmation: the said Duke of Leeds, being then president of
their majesties' most honourable privy council, and sworn to
give their majesties true and faithful advice, did, contrary to
his oath, office, and duty to their majesties, and in breach of
the great trust reposed in him, by himself, his agents, or servants,
corruptly and illegally treat, contract, and agree with the said
merchants or their agents, for 5,500 guineas, to procure the
said charter of confirmation, and also a charter of regulations,
or to use his endeavours to obtain the same."

By some strange oversight the duke's servant, M. Robert,
whom the previous deposition had shown to be a most impor-
tant witness, had not been examined, and when the necessary
steps for the purpose were about to be taken, it was found
that he had disappeared. A tardy proclamation for securing
him was issued, but it proved unavailing; and thus an essential link in the chain of evidence could not be supplied. The Duke of Leeds, now feeling confident that the impeachment could not be made good, began to use the language of injured innocence, and to complain of the hardship and injustice of having a charge hanging over his head, while no attempt was made to prove, and no opportunity was given him to disprove it. The state of matters was, however, well understood, and his shuffling only served to confirm the conviction generally entertained of his guilt. Meanwhile parliament seemed resolved to do its duty; and as the leading witnesses were justly suspected of prevarication or concealment, an act was passed for imprisoning them, and for restraining them from alienating their estates. Unfortunately, the zeal manifested by parliament was not seconded at court. At a very early period of the inquiry, the king, after giving the royal assent to several bills; addressed both Houses as follows:—"My lords and gentlemen, I take this occasion to tell you that the season of the year is so far advanced, and the circumstances of affairs are so pressing, that I very earnestly recommend to you the speedy despatching such business as you think of most importance for the public good, because I must put an end to this session in a few days". From this significant hint, it was well understood that there was a strong feeling in high quarters against the exposure to which the parliamentary inquiry into bribery and corruption threatened to lead; and in fact, on the 3rd of May, within a fortnight after the hint was given, and while the issue of the inquiry was still in suspense, parliament was prorogued. According to Burnet, "It was intended to hang up the matter to another session; but an act of grace came in at the end of this, with an exception, indeed, as to corruption; yet this whole discovery was let fall, and it was believed too many of all sides were concerned in it; for, by a common consent, it was never revived."

There cannot be a doubt that the Company suffered severely in public estimation by the disclosure, so far as it had gone. A distinction, however, ought to be made between the Company and the management. This had been gradually monopolized by Sir Josiah Child and a few wealthy individuals, who, taking undue advantage of the unlimited power of purchasing stock,
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and of voting upon it, had succeeded in ousting most of the independent members of committee, and supplanting them by their own creatures. On them, therefore, the chief blame ought to rest; more especially as the general court of proprietors, even before the parliamentary inquiry commenced, had been induced, in consequence of the rumours which had begun to prevail, to appoint a committee "to inspect into the affairs of the general joint stock under the management of the court of committees, and of the several transactions that had been had therein, for the satisfaction of the adventurers." The report of the committee thus appointed, had furnished most of the leading facts, which were afterwards more fully brought out by the parliamentary investigation.

While the Company were suffering severely in public estimation from these shameful disclosures, an alarm arose from a different quarter. Scotland and England, though their crowns were now worn by a single monarch, were still separate and independent kingdoms, and there was therefore nothing to prevent the former from having its East India Company as well as the latter. Indeed, as early as 1617, King James had given his sanction to such a company, by granting letters-patent under the great seal of Scotland, to Sir James Cunningham, of Glengarnock, appointing him, his heirs and assignees, to be its governors and directors, with authority "to trade to and from the East Indiês, and the countries or parts of Asia, Africa, and America, beyond the Cape of Bona Sperantia to the Straits of Magellan, and to the Levant Sea, and territories under the government of the Great Turk, and to and from the countries of Greenland, and all the countries and islands in the north, northwest, and north-east seas, and all other parts of America and Muscovy." Whatever may have been the original intention of this grant, it ultimately degenerated into a mere job for the benefit of the grantee, who sold it, and all his rights under it, for a valuable consideration. The purchasers were the London East India Company, who thus escaped the danger of a competition, which in honest and skilful hands might have proved formidable. This abortive attempt to give Scotland a trade to the East appears to have attracted little notice; and other interests, of a still more vital nature, so completely occupied
the public mind during the persecuting reigns of the Stuarts, that the better part of a century elapsed before the subject was again mooted. The better era which commenced with the Revolution brought new desires and aspirations along with it, and a general desire was felt by patriotic Scotsmen to give their country as high a place in commerce as it had already attained in liberty, religion, and arms. The influence exerted with this view on the public mind, was soon manifested in parliament, which, on the 14th June, 1693, passed an "Act for encouraging of Forraigne Trade," in which "our soveraigne lord and ladye, the king and queen's majesties, considering how much the improvement of trade concerns the wealth and welfare of the kingdom, and that nothing hath been found more effectuall for the improving and enlargeing thereof than the erecting and encourageing of companies, whereby the same may be carryed on by undertakeings to the remotest parts, which it is not possible for single persons to undergo, doe therefore, with advice and consent of the estates of parliament, statute and declare, that merchants more or fewer may contract and enter into societies and companies for carrying on of trade, as to any subject and sort of goodes and merchandice to whatsoever kingdoms, countreyes, or parts of the world, not being in warr with their majesties, where trade is in use to be, or may be followed, and particularly beside the kingdoms and countreyes of Europe, to the East and West Indies, to the straits and trade of the Mediterranean, or upon the coast of Affrica, or northern parts, or elsewhere, as above." By a subsequent, act, dated 26th June, 1695, John, Lord Belhaven, and various individuals specially named, including beside Scottish, several English and foreign merchants, "together with such others as shall joyn with them within the space of twelve moneths after the first day of August next," were constituted "a free incorporation, with perpetual succession, by the name of the Company of Scotland trading to Affrica and the Indies." Half the capital was to be "allotted for Scottish men within the kingdom;" but it was allowed to "Scotsmen residing abroad or forraigners to come in and subscribe," the least sum being £100 and the greatest £3,000. In carrying on their trade the company were "empowered to equip, fitt, set out, fraught, and navigate their
own or hired ships in such manner as they shall think fitt, and that for the space of ten years from the date hereof," and "from any of the ports or places of this kingdom, or from any other ports or places in amity, or not in hostility with his majesty, in warlike or other manner, to any lands, islands, countreyes, or places in Asia, Affrica, or America, and there to plant collonies, build cityes, touns, or forts, on or upon the places not inhabited, or on or upon any other place by consent of the natives or inhabitants thereof, and not possest by an European sovereign potentate, prince, or state;" they were also fully authorized not only to defend themselves by "force of arms," but "to seeke and take reparation of damage done by sea or land, and to make and conclude treaties of peace with the soveraigns, princes, estates, rulers, governours, or proprietors of the foresaid lands, islands, countreyes, or places in Asia, Affrica, or America."

Beside these extensive powers, which were declared to be exclusive, no subject of Scotland being permitted without the company's written permission to trade within these limits, various extraordinary privileges were conferred. Among others it was declared that "all persons concerned or to be concerned in this company" were "to be free denizens of this kingdom," and that "they with all that shall settle to inhabit, or be born in any of the foresaid plantations, collonies, cityes, touns, factories, and other places, that shall be purchast and possesst by the said company, shall be repute as natives of this kingdom, and have the priviledges thereof;" and that for the space of twenty-one years, the company's ships, goods, and other effects whatsoever, were to be "free of all manner of restraints or prohibitions, and of all customs, taxes, cesses, supplies, or other duties imposed or to be imposed by act of parliament or otherwise", with the exception only of the duties on tobacco and sugar, not the growth of their own plantations. This privilege is made still broader by a subsequent clause, which provides that "the said company, whole members, officers, servants, or others belonging thereto, shall be free, both in their persons, estates, and goods, employed in the said stock and trade, from all manner of taxes, cesses, supplies, excises, quartering of souldiers, transient or local, or levying of souldiers, or other impositions whatsoever;" and lest the power given to the company to redress themselves
should prove inadequate, his majesty expressly promises, that if "contrar to the said rights, liberties, privileges, exemptions, grants, or agreements, any of the ships, goods, merchandise, persons, or other effects whatsoever, belonging to the said company, shall be stopped, detained, embazled, or away taken, or in any sort prejudged or damnifyed," he will "interpose his authority to have restitution, reparation, and satisfaction made for the damage done, and that upon the publick charge, which his majesty shall cause depurse and lay out for that effect."

The liberality which parliament had displayed in conferring such ample privileges was fully seconded by the country at large. In a short time a subscription list, such as Scotland had never before seen, was filled up. The amount was £400,000; and the list contained the names of 1,219 shareholders, among whom were most of the leading nobility, the public bodies, clergy, lawyers, merchants, and a large selection of individuals of all classes, thus proving beyond a doubt that the formation of the company was the effect of a great national movement. Liberal as the home subscription had thus been, a large addition was anticipated from other countries; and the managers, among whom the celebrated William Paterson, the founder of the Bank of England, took the lead, despatched commissioners to London, Amsterdam, and Hamburg, with authority to open new subscription lists, and confer the privileges of the company on all who might be induced by these representations to apply for them.

The English parliament, on being acquainted with these proceedings, immediately took alarm; and having their attention specially called to the subject by a petition of their own Company, proceeded, on the 13th December, 1695, to present a common address from both Houses to the crown. This address proceeds as follows:—"The lords spiritual and temporal and commons, in parliament assembled, having taken into our consideration the state of the trade of this kingdom, do find that, besides many other disadvantages and difficulties it now lies under, an act of parliament that hath lately received your majesty's royal assent in your kingdom of Scotland, for erecting a company trading to Africa and the Indies, is likely to bring many prejudices and mischiefs to all your majesty's subjects that are concerned in the wealth and trade of this nation." After
quoting largely from the act in support of this allegation, it thus continues:—"By reason of which great advantages granted to the Scots East India Company, and the duties and difficulties that lie upon that trade in England, a great part of the stock and shipping of this nation will be carried thither, and by this means Scotland will be made a free port for all East India commodities; and consequently those several places which were supplied from England will be furnished from thence much cheaper than can be done by the English; and therefore this nation will lose the benefit of supplying foreign parts with those commodities, which hath always been a great article in the balance of our foreign trade. Moreover, the said commodities will unavoidably be brought by the Scots into England by stealth, both by sea and land, to the vast prejudice of the English trade and navigation, and to the great detriment of your majesty in your customs."

The king was thus placed in a very awkward predicament. He could not question the competency of parliament to grant the act complained of without attacking the national independence, and disappointing what had become one of the national hopes of Scotland; nor could he continue to sanction the act without placing himself in decided opposition to the legislature of England, and some of the most strongly cherished prejudices of the English people. He therefore answered somewhat vaguely, "I have been ill served in Scotland, but I hope some remedies may be found to prevent the inconveniences which may arise from this act;" and shortly after showed that he was really dissatisfied with the management of his ministers in Scotland by dismissing most of them from office. The English parliament took still more decided steps; and on receiving the report of a committee which had been appointed to examine the methods by which the act had been obtained, and the proceedings under it, the commons resolved, "that the directors of the company of Scotland trading to Africa and the Indies, administering and taking here an oath de fidei, and under colour of a Scots act styling themselves a company, were guilty of a high crime and misdemeanour, and that the Lord Belhaven, William Paterson (and other individuals named), be impeached of the same." This resolution, violent as it
undoubtedly was in its nature, and offensive in its terms, was not beyond the competency of the English parliament; and therefore, however much it must have roused the indignation of the Scots, did not properly furnish matter for formal complaint. Another step, however, was of a more objectionable nature.

The Scots company had, as already mentioned, sent a deputation to Hamburg, and had every prospect of obtaining a liberal subscription, when all their hopes were frustrated by hostility from an unexpected quarrel. The nature of the hostility will be best explained by a memorial presented on the 7th of April, 1697, and subscribed by his Britannic majesty's envoy extraordinary at the courts of Luneburg, and his resident in the city of Hamburg. In this document, addressed to the senate of this city, the memorialists express themselves as follows:—"We, the subscribers, ministers of his majesty the King of Great Britain, have, upon the arrival of commissioners from an Indian company in Scotland, represented at two several times to your magnificences and lordships from the king our master, that his majesty, understanding that the said commissioners endeavoured to open to themselves a commerce and trade in these parts, by making some convention or treaty with this city; had commanded us most expressly to notify to your magnificences and lordships, that if you enter into such conventions with private men his subjects, who have neither credential letters, nor are any other ways authorized by his majesty, that his majesty would regard such proceedings as an affront to his royal authority, and that he would not fail to resent it. Your magnificences and lordships had the goodness to answer us thereto by your deputy that you would no way enter into commerce with the aforesaid commissioners, nor encourage them in any sort. Notwithstanding whereof, we, the subscribers, do see with displeasure that, without any regard to the remonstrances made by us in the name of his majesty, the inhabitants of this city forbear not to make conventions and treaties with the said commissioners, who dare even erect a public office to receive subscriptions, as appears by the annexed print. And it is not very credible that strangers could so openly enterprise matters of such importance without being supported by this government: wherefore we make our
just complaints thereof to your magnificences and lordships, beseeching you, in the name of the king our master, to remedy in time that which is begun, and to do it so effectually as to prevent any consequences it may have, capable to disturb the friendship and good correspondence which we would cultivate between England and the city of Hamburg. We wait your magnificences' and lordships' answer in writing, to be transmitted to his majesty our master."

This memorial, which contains a gross misrepresentation of the character of the Scotch commissioners, and amounted in fact to a most unwarrantable interference with the independent rights both of Scotland and Hamburg, having been transmitted by the senate to the Commercir, or general body of merchants, called forth the following answer:—"We look upon it as a very strange thing, that the King of Britain should hinder us, who are a free people, to trade with whom we please; but are amazed to think that he would hinder us from joining with his own subjects in Scotland, to whom he had lately given such large privileges by so solemn an act of parliament." This answer unquestionably placed the matter in its true light; but the Hamburg merchants, though they signed for considerable sums in the company's books, were too cautious to commit themselves finally, and appended a condition making their subscriptions void, "if the company did not procure some declaration from the king that might secure them against the threatenings and other insinuations contained in the memorial."

It was now the first business of the Scottish company to endeavour to obtain the declaration for which their subscribers in Hamburg had stipulated; and accordingly, on the 28th June, 1697, their council-general presented an address to the king, in which, after enumerating their legal rights, and the prejudice which they had sustained by the interference of individuals acting in his majesty's name, they applied for the protection to which they were entitled by "natural right and the privilege of all merchants whatsoever, even though they had wanted the sanction of so solemn laws, and more especially for such declaration as in your royal wisdom you shall think fit to render the senate and inhabitants of the said city of Hamburg, and all
others that are or may be concerned, from the threatenings or other suggestions* which the memorial contained. As the king had evidently been brought into a false position, and could not have justified the proceedings of the memorialists without throwing all Scotland into a flame, the Scotch secretaries, after the lapse of more than a month, answered as follows:—“We are empowered by the king to signify unto you that as soon as his majesty shall return to England he will take into consideration what you have represented unto him, and that in the meantime his majesty will give order to his envoy at the courts of Luneburg and his resident at Hamburg not to make use of his majesty’s name or authority for obstructing your company in the prosecution of your trade with the inhabitants of that city.”

This answer, though little better than an evasion, promised more than was actually performed; and new remonstrances by the company proved unavailing, till the general dissatisfaction which had begun to prevail, obliged the king to reply that the promise of his secretaries had been fulfilled, and his residents abroad distinctly prohibited from further interference. Matters, however, appeared to be drawing to a crisis, when the proceedings of the Scotch company freed the king from his embarrassments, and paved the way for their own ultimate extinction. They were expressly prohibited from attempting to settle on any territory belonging to a power in amity with Britain. The site of the Isthmus of Darien, situated between the Atlantic and the Pacific, seemed so advantageous that all other considerations were lost sight of, and the first expedition fitted out by the company attempted to settle upon it. Spain, which claimed the territory, immediately remonstrated, and King William appears to have been only too glad to second their remonstrance. The consequence was, that the Scots, instead of being permitted to establish a trade, found themselves suddenly engaged single-handed in a war with the Spanish monarchy. For a time they fought the battle manfully, but disaster followed disaster. Of the 3,000 men whom Scotland had sent out to the Isthmus, only a small remnant returned; and the company trading to Africa and the Indies, after exciting so many hopes in the northern, and so many fears in the southern part of Great Britain, ceased to exist.
The discussions to which the establishment of the Scotch East India Company had given rise, and the obloquy which the London India Company had incurred by the nefarious proceedings of those who had usurped its management, had made the English legislature fully alive to the importance of placing the trade to the East on a new and permanent basis. The shape which the measure might have taken, had parliament been left at liberty to choose the wisest plan, would perhaps have differed much from that which was adopted; but circumstances had occurred which rendered a new arrangement expedient, not only on its account, but with a view to other purposes to which it might be made subservient. The powerful coalition which King William had formed to frustrate the ambitious designs of the King of France required an enormous expenditure, and the necessity of obtaining the necessary funds to meet it seemed for a time to outweigh all other considerations. It had thus become obvious that the question which had long been keenly debated between the existing India Company and the numerous party now leagued in opposition to them, would be determined not so much on its own merits as on mere pecuniary considerations. The government was in urgent want of money. What amount of contribution were the candidates for its favour prepared to furnish? On this low and unworthy ground the question of continuing the old, or of erecting a new company was now to be settled by act of parliament. The offer of the old Company was a loan of £700,000 at four per cent interest: their opponents offered £2,000,000, at eight per cent, and obtained the preference. Considering the different rates of interest, the smaller loan was certainly the more advantageous to the public, but the greater amount of present relief which the larger loan afforded, was eagerly grasped at and carried the day. Ostensibly, however, the preference given to it was justified, not merely by the amount of the loan, but by the terms on which it was offered. The old Company stipulated that the legislature should confirm their charter, and continue them in possession of all their privileges as a joint stock. Their rivals repudiated the idea of a joint stock, and asked only to be incorporated, at least in the first instance, as a regulated company, which would allow every member to
trade in his own name and on his own responsibility to the amount of his subscribed capital. This arrangement being in accordance with the more liberal ideas which the Restoration had introduced, was supposed to possess intrinsic merits, which, even if other considerations had been equal, would have entitled it to be preferred.

The resolution in favour of a new East India Company was adopted by the House of Commons on 4th May, 1698, and on the 26th a bill was brought in for the purpose of giving effect to it. It was strenuously opposed in all its stages, the old Company being allowed to appear by counsel against it, but ultimately passed both Houses by considerable majorities, and obtained the royal assent. The old Company, though powerfully supported, had lost favour with the public by the acts of bribery which had been proved against them; and even during the discussion of the bill which doomed them to extinction, had sustained new damage from the report of a parliamentary committee which had been appointed to examine their books; for in this report it was more than insinuated that by a kind of juggles the value of their stock had been greatly exaggerated, and large dividends had been paid, not out of profit, but out of capital. Some of the statements in this report throw so much light on the history of the Company that they deserve to be quoted. The original stock of the Company, in 1657, was £369,891, 5s. The aggregate dividends on this stock from October, 1661, to April 1, 1681, amounted to 390½ per cent, or about 19½ per cent per annum. On 2nd November, 1681, their funds were so low that a call was made on the adventurers for the residue of their subscriptions; and yet, on the 18th of January thereafter, circumstances had so suddenly altered that the call was revoked, and instead of it, a dividend of 150 per cent was declared. Of this dividend, however, only 50 per cent was paid in money, while the remaining 100 per cent was retained, and held to be equivalent to a duplication of the original stock, which was accordingly henceforth stated at double its original amount. On this doubled: stock dividends had been regularly paid at the rate of 25 per cent. These dividends were always made on the arrival of ships on general computations without the help of the books, or a minute statement of the whole account; and hence, even at
the time of making them, the Company were hampered by a large debt, which in 1680 exceeded £500,000, and in 1698 amounted on bond alone to £631,554, 10s., exclusive of debts in India to an amount which could not be specified. In 1693, in fulfilment of the conditions of the charter granted them in that year, they opened a new subscription, and received under it £744,000. The only legitimate purpose to which this sum could have been applied was that expressly specified in the charter, viz., to raise the stock of the Company to £1,500,000. The parliamentary committee, after failing to obtain a distinct answer as to the manner in which this sum had been disposed of, consulted the Company's cash-book, and ascertained that a large portion of it had been squandered in the system of bribery which has already been exposed, and that of the remainder no less than £325,565, 0s. 4d. had b. a repaid (on what ground is not explained) to the old adventurers. This report, given in at the very time when the Company were maintaining a desperate struggle for existence, must have told fearfully against them.

The act which founded the new East India Company ranks as 9 Wm. III. c. 44, and is entitled, "An act for raising a sum not exceeding £2,000,000, upon a fund for payment of annuities, after the rate of 8 per centum per annum, and for settling the trade to the East Indies." It is of great length, and is entirely occupied in its first part with regulating the salt and stamp duties, from which his majesty was to derive the annual sum of £160,000, necessary to pay the interest or annuities exigible at the rate of eight per cent on the £2,000,000 loan. In regard to the loan itself, the leading provisions are, that "it shall and may be lawful to and for his majesty, by commission under the great seal of England, to take and receive all such voluntary subscriptions as shall be made on or before the 29th day of September, 1698, by or for any person or persons, natives or foreigners, bodies politic or corporate (the governor and company of the Bank of England only excepted), of any sum of money whatsoever, not less than £100, for and towards the raising and paying into the said receipt of the exchequer the said sum of £2,000,000." The whole sum was subject to redemption; but during the non-redeemption his majesty might, by letters-patent, incorporate the subscribers under the name of
the General Society entitled to the advantages given by this act of parliament. Of the General Society thus incorporated, the sum total of subscriptions was to form the principal stock, and every subscriber to the amount of £500 and upwards was entitled to have one vote, and not more than one, in the election of twenty-four trustees, each of them qualified by the possession of not less than £2,000 of the society's stock in his own right. The subscribers, their executors, successors, or assigns, and the persons licensed by them, were to have the privilege of trading to the East Indies, each to the extent of his stock; or if, instead of thus acting individually, the whole or any number of them, or even corporations, should prefer to manage their share of the trade as a company or joint stock, they might be incorporated for this special purpose. In order "to maintain such ambassadors or other ministers" as the crown, at the nomination of the trustees, directors, or managers of the General Society, or of a joint-stock company established as aforesaid, should "be pleased to send to any emperor, prince, or state" within the specified limits, and to "defray any other extraordinary or necessary expense in carrying on the said trade," a duty of five per cent was to be levied on all India goods imported, but should any surplus remain after these purposes were served, it was not to belong to the state, but to be distributed among the shareholders. The right of trading to the East Indies was in future to belong exclusively to the General Society, subject, however, to two most important provisos:—first, that on three years' notice after 1711, and the repayment of the £2,000,000, all the rights granted by the act were to cease; and, second, that the old Company might still continue to trade as before, till the 29th of September, 1701. This was meant to be an equivalent for the three years' notice to which they were entitled under their charter, and yet fell far short of it, as the true meaning of the charter undoubtedly was, that while the three years were running, they were to enjoy the whole trade, instead of being subjected, as they now were, to a formidable competition. The equivalent, however, imperfect as it was, was not given without a grudge and had something like a stigma attached to it by a clause in the act, which expressly stipulated that the present East India Company should be
bound to pay all their just debts; and should they make dividends after the 24th of June, 1698, and before their debts were discharged, not only would the estate of the Company continue liable, but the individual members receiving such dividends would still be held bound in proportion of their shares, and, moreover, be subjected to the penalty of double costs. The stipulation thus inserted strikingly indicates the general suspicion which now attached to the proceedings of the London Company. Indeed, the language of the legislature evidently implies a doubt, not merely of their ability, but of their willingness to pay. There could not be any good ground for such a doubt; and yet it is impossible to deny that during the last years of their exclusive monopoly they had done too much to justify it.

The members of the General Society, though they had originally offered their subscriptions on condition of being established as a regulated, were soon found to be almost unanimous in favour of a joint-stock company; and accordingly, on the 5th of September, 1698, the crown, in accordance with the authority given in the act of parliament, granted a charter, incorporating the vast majority of their number as a company or joint stock, under the name of the English Company trading to the East Indies. The leading provisions of the deed are almost identical with those embodied in the charters of the old Company, and it is therefore unnecessary here to do more than refer to a few of the special clauses. Though the amount of their subscriptions to the £2,000,000 loan formed their proper capital, they were to have an indefinite power of augmenting their stock — one-tenth of their exports was to consist of British produce and manufactures; every shareholder to the amount of £500 was to have a vote, and none, however large his share, was to have more than one; all sales were to be by public auction by inch of candle; and no lot, except consisting of jewels, was to be of the value of more than £1,000; the management was to be intrusted, as formerly, to twenty-four individuals, who were to form what was called, not as before, the court of committees, but the "court of directors"; four general courts were to be held annually. Abroad, the same powers of judicature as had been conferred by previous charters were to be exercised, and some provision was made both for general...
and religious instruction, by the maintenance of a chaplain in every ship of 500 tons, and of schoolmasters and ministers in all the principal factories. With regard to ministers, in particular, it was provided that they should be obliged to learn the Portuguese, and "apply themselves to learn the native language of the country where they shall reside, the better to enable them to instruct the Gentoos that shall be servants or slaves of the same Company, or of their agents, in the Protestant religion."

The arrangements for the establishment of a new East India Company display little wisdom and foresight. The loan to government constituted the only capital; but this was already absorbed, and the only fund on which the Company could rely for carrying on their trade, was the annual sum of £160,000, payable to them as interest. This was wholly inadequate; and hence, at the very outset, their pecuniary resources began to fail. Their subscription list had been rapidly filled up, but as the instalments fell due, the defaulters became numerous, and the stock, which had at first brought a premium, with difficulty found purchasers at a considerable discount. While the new Company was thus hampered, the old Company still kept the field with its resources unimpaired, and all the advantages arising from pre-occupation. The result of a competition carried on under such circumstances could scarcely be doubtful; and it is therefore easy to understand how the old Company, in addressing their agents abroad on the recent changes, instead of using desponding terms, speak almost with exultation of the approaching contest, expressing themselves as follows:—

"Two East India Companies in England could no more subsist, without destroying one ye other, than two kings at the same time regnant in the same kingdom. Now, a civil battle was to be fought between the old and new company; two or three years must end this war, as the old or the new must give way. Being veterans, if their servants abroad would do their duty, they did not doubt of the victory; if the world laughed at the pains the two companies took to ruin each other, they could not help it, as they were on good ground, and had a charter."

The confidence thus expressed was founded, not merely on the superior advantages which they possessed in a trade which had long been established, and for the protection of which various
fortified stations had been provided, but on the important interest which they had secured in the stock of the General Society. The act of parliament left it open for them, as for any other corporation, to become subscribers to the £2,000,000 loan, and no less than £315,000 stood in the subscription list, in the name of Mr. Dubois, for their behoof. The consequence was, that instead of being extinguished when the three years of grace allowed them should expire, they would still be entitled to trade annually to India to the amount of the above subscription. There was, however, one great difficulty. As the law stood, their existence as a corporation and joint-stock company would terminate in 1701, and they would thereafter be obliged to trade, not as an united body, but as individuals, each in proportion to the amount which he had subscribed to the loan. The first object, therefore, now, was to provide against this emergency by endeavouring to secure a prolongation of their corporate character. In this they were completely successful, for in the beginning of 1700 a private act of parliament was passed, "for continuing the governor and Company of the merchants of London trading into the East Indies a corporation." This act, after referring to the privileges conferred on the subscribers to the £2,000,000 loan, and stating that "John Dubois, of London, merchant, hath, by the direction, and in trust for the governor and Company of merchants trading into the East Indies, subscribed and paid the sum of £315,000, as part of the said sum of £2,000,000, in order to entitle the said governor and Company to the several benefits of the said act," proceeds to declare that they shall "continue and be one body, corporate and politick, by the name aforesaid, subject, nevertheless, to be determined upon redemption of the fund." The reasons given for the enactment are, that the London Company, though entitled to the benefits conferred on the subscribers to the loan, would, notwithstanding, be deprived of them should they cease to be a corporation;" and "for that several hundred persons are interested in the said subscription of £315,000, they cannot manage the same, and the benefit of trade accruing thereby, but in a corporation."

Thus, by solemn acts of the legislature, two independent East India Companies were established, without any provision
whatever to prevent the evils which would necessarily arise from their rivalship and collision. The geographical limits of the trade were sufficiently ample for both, and each might have been assigned a distinct field, within which it would have found ample scope of all its capital and enterprise. Instead of this they were placed at once in hostile array, and commenced a system of warfare which, while it exposed them to the derision and extortion of the native rulers, could only terminate in their common ruin. So early was this perceived, that the new or English Company, afraid to face the difficulties which, from the very first, began to gather around them, made overtures for a union. The London Company were not disposed to listen. They had been forced into a struggle which they were most anxious to prevent; but, now that it had commenced, felt so confident of victory, that when their agents abroad expressed their alarm, they spoke slightingly of the danger, and described it “as a blustering storm, which was so far from tearing them up, that it only a little shook the roots, and made them thereby take the better hold, and grow the firmer, and flourish the faster.” The language thus employed was more vainglorious than sincere; and when the violent feelings which at the commencement of the struggle kept the companies aloof had been gradually moderated, a general desire for union began to be entertained. The king himself, probably convinced that the legislature itself was to blame for much of the confusion which had arisen, openly declared in favour of a union, and in particular when, agreeably to a practice then usual in passing a private act, a deputation of the London Company, consisting of the governor and committees, and about 100 proprietors, accompanied by the lord-mayor, sheriffs, and ten of the aldermen of London, obtained an audience of his majesty at Kensington on the 8th of March, 1700, to request that he would give the royal assent to the bill for continuing them a corporation, he took the opportunity, while assuring them of his favour and protection, to recommend the union of the two companies to their serious consideration, on the ground “that it would be most for the interest of the India trade.”

Though the union of the companies was not effected during the reign of King William, his recommendation had a powerful
influence in paving the way for it. At first, indeed, the London Company, instead of meeting its rival on a footing of equality, endeavoured to get rid of it altogether by making an offer to parliament to advance, at a reduced interest, as much money as would suffice to pay the whole of the £2,000,000 loan. This offer could not have been accepted without a gross breach of faith with the subscribers to that loan, and was therefore justly rejected. It was now felt that the union could only be effected on equitable terms; and as the necessity for it became daily more and more apparent, the deputies of the two companies, abandoning all attempts to overreach each other, began in good earnest to arrange an amalgamation. The result was embodied in a deed dated the 2nd of July, 1702, and entitled "Indenture Tripartite between her majesty Queen Anne and the two East India Companies, for uniting the said Companies." The leading object of this deed was to place the companies in the very same position, by dividing the whole sum advanced to government into two equal portions, and assigning one portion to each. At the time of its execution, the subscription to the £2,000,000 loan stood as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subscription</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English Company's subscription</td>
<td>£1,662,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Company’s subscription</td>
<td>315,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate traders’ subscription</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>£2,000,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Leaving out of view the separate traders, who were so called because they preferred to trade, to the amount of their subscription, on their own individual responsibility, and not on a joint stock, the whole sum subscribed by the two companies was £1,977,000. The share allotted to each company, under the new arrangement, was the half of this sum, or £988,500; but as the London Company had subscribed only £315,000, it was necessary for them to make up the difference by purchasing stock at par from the English Company, to the amount of £673,500. This arranged, the next object was to fix the value of what was called the dead stock of the companies, or that portion of stock which, consisting of forts, factories, buildings, &c., could not be turned into money, but behoved to be
reserved in common for the purpose of carrying on the trade. The whole of this dead stock was valued at £400,000, of which £330,000 belonged to the London, and only £70,000 to the English Company. It was therefore necessary, in order to maintain equality, that the latter Company should make up the difference by paying to the former £130,000. During seven years, the companies were to maintain their separate existence, but the trade was to be carried on as an united trade, for the common benefit of both, and under the direction of twenty-four managers, twelve of them chosen by each company. At the end of the seven years the London was to be entirely merged in the English Company, which should, "from thenceforth, for ever, continue the same corporation and body politick, with change of its name, and be from thenceforth called by the name of 'The United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies'."

Of the same date as the indenture tripartite, another was executed under the name of "Quinque-paitite Indenture of Conveyance of the Dead Stock of the two East India Companies." The inventory which it gives of this stock is of some interest, in so far at least as relates to the original Company, as it not only furnishes the names, but also indicates the extent of the acquisitions which it had made in the East during the 100 years of its existence. The various places and subjects conveyed, in terms of the above agreement, at the valuation of £330,000, are enumerated as follows:—"The ports and islands of Bombay and St. Helena, with all their rights, profits, territories, and appurtenances whatsoever. Under the presidency of the aforesaid island Bombay, the factories of Surat, Swalli, and Broach, and the factories of Ahmedabad, Agra, and Lucknow (in which three last places the Company have only houses and buildings and some other conveniences remaining, but they have at present no factors that reside there). On the coast of Malabar, the forts of Karwar, Tellicherry, and Anjengo, and the factory of Calicut. In Persia, the factories of Gombroon, Shiraz, and Ispahan, and the yearly rent, pension, or sum of 1,000 tomans, amounting to the yearly sum of £3,333, 6s. 8d. English money, granted by the Sufi of Persia to the said governor and Company. On the coast of Choromandel,
Chinghee and Orixa, Fort St. George, with the castle and fortifications, and territory thereto belonging, upon which a large city is built, consisting of—houses, which are held of and pay rent to the said governor and Company, together with the said city and its dependencies; and also all that fort called Fort St. David (being a strong fort and factory), and about three miles compass of the circumjacent country, upon which several small towns or villages are erected; the factories of Cuddalore, Porto-Novo, Pettipolee, Melchlepatam (Masulipatam), and Madapollam, and the fort and factory of Vizagapatam. On the island of Sumatra, the settlement of York Fort at Benculen, and the factory there, with a territory of about five miles thereto belonging, and the factory at Indrapore; also the factories of Tryaming and Sillebar, and some other out-pagars or factories depending on the factory of Benculen. In Cochin-China, the factory of Tonquin, in the kingdom of Bengal; the Fort William and the factory of Sutanati with a large territory thereto belonging; the factories of Balasore, Cossimbuzar, Dacca, Hughli, Malda, Rajahmal, and Patna. Also the right and title of the said governor and Company to Bantam, or any other settlements in the South Seas; and all rents, customs, and other profits, and all privileges, graunts, and phirmaunds in India."

It must be admitted that the subjects above enumerated were very moderately valued, and had not only cost more, but would have been rated far higher for an absolute sale. The object, however, being to effect an amicable amalgamation, the London Company lost little by consenting to liberal terms, though the effect certainly was to give an unfavourable view of the state of their affairs, and countenance the allegation that at the period when the arrangement was made, notwithstanding the large dividends regularly declared, they were barely solvent. This would almost seem to have been their own impression, for though they had at first professed aversion to the union, they at last became so urgent for it as once more to ask in the aid of the now notorious Sir Basil Firebrace, and purchase it by the promise of an enormous reward. As a compensation for his services, if they proved successful, £150,000 of the Company stock was to be transferred to him at £80. Assuming the stock to be at par, he was to make a gain of twenty per cent, or in other rewards receive a douceur of £30,000. The arrangement
was not more extravagant than impolitic, because it led many of the English Company to imagine that they had been outwitted in the bargain, and thus disposed them instead of entering into it cordially, to throw obstacles in the way of its completion. This want of cordiality was especially manifested abroad, where the servants of both companies, disregarding the instructions which they received from home, seemed determined to carry on a kind of internecine warfare. Year after year thus passed away, and the process of winding up the separate concerns of the companies, preparatory to the final amalgamation, made little progress. The necessity of taking some more decisive step for this purpose having become apparent, it was at last resolved, to have recourse to a referee. This important office was undertaken by no less a personage than Sidney, Earl of Godolphin, the lord high-treasurer of Great Britain; and in order that full effect might be given to his award, it was previously made binding on both companies by a special clause in an act of parliament.

This act of parliament (6th Anne, chap. 17), exacted a new loan of £1,200,000 from the United Company, thus making the whole amount of the advance to government £3,200,000. No interest was allowed on the latter loan; but as the former had borne interest at eight per cent, the effect was to accumulate both loans into one, bearing a common interest of five per cent. In return for the loan thus exacted, certain new advantages were conferred. The portion of the original loan, which still belonged to the separate traders of the General Society, had been reduced to £7,200, and it was now made optional to the United Company; on giving three years' notice of their intention after 29th September, 1711, to pay off this sum and incorporate it with their own stock, so as to put them in exclusive possession of the whole East India trade, and leave them without even the shadow of a competitor. It was also enacted that the existence of the Company, instead of being terminable by three years' notice after 1711, on repayment of the loan, should be prolonged under the same conditions till 1726; and power was given them to borrow £1,500,000, which they might either allow to remain as a bonded debt, or repay by means of calls on their shareholders. In this way the amount of capital, which would
otherwise have been absorbed by the additional loan, was more than replaced. Lord Godolphin's award was pronounced on the 29th September, 1708; and the arrangements consequent upon it being immediately completed, the amalgamation was finally effected. One Company only, bearing the name of "The United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies," now existed; and preparations were forthwith made for carrying on the East India trade on a larger scale than it had previously attained. The circumstances were propitious: the charter of the English Company on which the trade was in future to be conducted could no longer be called in question, as it had obtained the direct sanction of the legislature—the internal dissensions and animosities which at one time threatened to bring ruin on both companies had been suppressed—and the native governments, in consequence of the political changes which followed the death of Aurangzeb, had become less able to practise extortion and oppression.
BOOK III
The Successors of Aurangzeb

While parliament was discussing the best mode of establishing the trade to the East, the trade itself had been almost suspended, particularly on the west coast of India, by an embargo which Aurangzeb had laid on all European ships in the harbour of Surat. Various acts of piracy had been committed, and the Mughul, instead of endeavouring to discover the guilty parties, took the more compendious method of throwing the responsibility on the different European nations on whom he had conferred privileges of trade. An imperial mandate accordingly was issued, obliging the English, Dutch, and French not only to pay the damage which had been sustained, but to give security for the payment of any similar damage which might be sustained in future. Remonstrances against this despotic proceeding proved unavailing; and the different companies saw themselves reduced to the necessity of saving their trade by submitting to injustice. Under an arrangement which bound them to clear the seas of pirates, the Dutch engaged for that purpose to cruise in the Red Sea, the French in the Persian Gulf, and the English along the Indian coast. The hardship thus inflicted entailed a serious loss on the London Company, at a time when the threatening aspect of their affairs at home made retrenchment and rigid economy more than ever desirable. It says much for their spirit and foresight, that in these untoward circumstances they even ventured on a heavy outlay, in order to make a valuable acquisition in another part of India.

This acquisition is described in the inventory above quoted as "the Fort William and the factory of Sutanati, with a large territory thereto belonging." The factory of Sutanati had, it will be remembered, been established some years before, when,
after the humiliating result of the war rashly entered into with the Mughul, an insulting permission was given to resume the trade; but the territory now acquired included the three entire towns, or rather villages of Sutanati, Govindapur, and Calcutta—thus giving the Company a territorial footing in Bengal similar to that previously possessed at Madras and Bombay. Bengal was in consequence again raised to the rank of an independent presidency, and Fort William, newly erected, and so called in honour of the reigning English monarch, became its capital.

The United Company had thus at the very outset three distinct presidencies, each governed by its own president and council, and entitled to act independently of the others. Madras was the oldest, Bombay the strongest, and Bengal commercially the most important, but no one possessed any recognized superiority; and the only controlling power which could give them unity of purpose and action centred in the court of directors, who met in Leadenhall Street. This court, as constituted by the new charter, laboured under several very obvious defects. Its members, twenty-four in number, were elected by the general court of proprietors, composed of all who possessed at least £500 of stock. This amount gave one vote; but, contrary to the provisions of earlier charters, no additional amount of stock, however large, gave more votes than one. The proprietor of £500 and of £50,000 were placed on the very same footing, and, constitutionally at least, exercised the same degree of influence in the general management. The object of this provision apparently was to counteract the tendency to monopoly, and prevent the recurrence of the abuse which had taken place at an earlier period, when a few overgrown proprietors, with Sir Josiah Child at their head, usurped a selfish and injurious ascendancy. If this was the object, the means employed were not well calculated to accomplish it. Common fairness required that some proportion should have been established between the power of voting and the interest at stake; and it is therefore not surprising that the larger proprietors took the remedy into their own hands, and had recourse to the obvious but not very creditable expedient of manufacturing votes by splitting up their stock into £500 shares, and conveying them to confidential parties, who were bound to vote at their dictation. While no precaution was taken against
this practice, the evils produced by it were permitted to assume their most aggravated form. The directors held office only for a single year; and hence, as each annual election came round, it was not impossible that the whole body of managers, and consequently the whole system of management, would be changed. The electioneering carried on under such circumstances was not only unseemly but corrupt, and the directors often owed their seats far less to their qualifications than to the superabundance of their promises. In proportion as the Company extended their operations, extensive and valuable rights of patronage were acquired; and the appointments which might be obtained in return for votes, induced many to purchase stock who cared little for the dividends which might be realized from it. The true interest of the Company was to such voters a matter of secondary moment; and their influence was accordingly often employed not in promoting but in thwarting it. A court of directors elected on erroneous principles, and consisting of members who had no certainty of retaining office beyond a single year, could scarcely be expected to conduct the affairs of the Company on any regular and permanent system. This serious defect was aggravated by the constitution of the court itself. Under the old charters provision was made for the appointment of a governor and deputy-governor, who, by occupying the chair for a definite period, were able to arrange the business and give some degree of uniformity to the proceedings; but in the new charter this provision had been lost sight of, and for several years, whenever the directors met, the occupation of the chair was determined by a new election made on the spur of the moment. The obvious inconveniences of this arrangement were ultimately obviated by a by-law, which re-established the original practice. The other defects, however, remained; and more than half a century elapsed before any serious attempt was made to remedy them.

The history of the United Company during the first years of its existence furnishes few incidents deserving of special notice. The rivals who had questioned the legality of former charters with the view of securing a share in the East India trade, seeing themselves excluded by express acts of the legislature, had been obliged to quit the field; and encroachments on the exclusive
monopoly which had been secured, being now deemed hopeless, were no longer attempted. All the commercial transactions of the Company were henceforth carried on according to a regular routine; and the record of them would only present a dry detail of exports and imports, varying in amount from year to year, yet exhibiting on the whole a permanent and important increase. The profit also increased, though not always in the same proportion, the amount of dividend often fluctuating with the state of affairs at home and abroad. In 1708, when the complete union of the companies was effected, the dividend was at the rate of only five per cent, in 1709 it was eight per cent, in 1710 and 1711 nine per cent, and thereafter annually till 1723 ten per cent. A decline then took place, and the rate settled down at eight per cent. In 1712 the exclusive privileges of the Company, previously terminable in 1726, were prolonged by 10 Anne, c. 28, to 1733. By a subsequent prolongation, three years were added to this period; and finally, by 17 Geo. II. c. 17, the exclusive trade was secured till the expiration of three years' notice after 1780:

While the Company were thus secured at home against any attempts which might have been made to deprive them of their privileges, dangers threatened them from various other quarters. Of these, the first in order, if not the most alarming, was the state of anarchy with which the whole country seemed about to be overwhelmed, in consequence of the dismemberment of the Mughul empire. After Aurangzeb's death in 1707, a kind of will was found under his pillow. He had foreseen the contest which would be waged for his succession, and endeavoured to prevent it by apportioning his dominions among his three sons. To Muazzam, the eldest, he destined the northern and eastern provinces, with the title of emperor; and to Azam, the second son, all the provinces to the south and south-west, including the Deccan, with the exception of the conquered kingdoms of Bijapur and Golkunda. These he left to his third son, Kambaksh. This proposed partition, which would have been injudicious under any circumstances, threw away the only chance which remained of once more consolidating the Mughul power. The Marathas had shaken it to its very centre—the leading Rajputs had made themselves almost independent—and many other tributaries
were watching the opportunity to imitate their example. The confusion was, however, destined to be even worse than Aurangzeb’s will would have made it. The brothers, without paying any regard to that document, no sooner heard of his death than they flew to arms. Azam, who was nearest to the capital, took advantage of his position, and was immediately proclaimed sovereign of all India. Kambaksh, instead of questioning his title, formally acknowledged it, and was confirmed in possession of the kingdoms which his father had allotted him. Muazzam, though the true heir, was not disposed to a compromise, and offered it on favourable terms; but Azam, strong in actual possession, refused to listen to any decision but that of the sword. Muazzam accordingly advanced from Kabul, where he had been residing as governor, while two of his sons—the eldest from Multan, and the second from Bengal—hastened to join him. In the battle which ensued, Muazzam gained a complete victory. Azam, with his two grown-up sons, were slain in the field, and his only other son, an infant, was taken prisoner. It might have been supposed that the struggle for the succession was now at an end; but Kambaksh, who had submitted so readily to his second, rose in rebellion against his eldest brother. Muazzam, therefore, had no sooner mounted the throne in June, 1707, under the title of Bahadur Shah, than he found it necessary to march into the Deccan at the head of an army. His good fortune again attended him, and in a battle fought near Hyderabad, in February, 1708, Kambaksh was not only defeated, but fell mortally wounded.

On quitting the Deccan, Bahadur Shah conferred the vice-royalty on Zulfikar Khan, who had earned it by an opportune desertion of Azam, previous to the battle which decided his fate. Zulfikar immediately endeavoured to effect an accommodation with the Marathas. The circumstances were favourable. Sahu, the legitimate raja, after a long captivity, had been set at liberty by Azam, and had immediately laid claim to the Maratha sovereignty. He was resisted by Tara Bai, the widow of his uncle, Raja Ram, who claimed it for her infant son. Both claimants were strongly supported; and Zulfikar, taking advantage of the disunion thus produced, had made considerable progress in a negotiation with Sahu. He was obliged, however, before
concluding it, to repair to Delhi; but his deputy, Daud Khan Panni, following out his views, procured exemption from Maratha forays, by agreeing to levy the chouth by his own officials, and pay Sahu the proceeds. This was at the best a very humiliating arrangement, but the fortunes of the Mughul had already so far declined that any terms were deemed preferable to the hazard of a new struggle.

In returning from the Deccan, Bahadur Shah was encountered by a new confederacy of Rajputs, headed by the Rana of Udaipur and the Rajas of Jaipur and Marwar. Before he could crush it, a new alarm broke out which obliged him to comply with their demands, and in fact make them independent in everything but the name. The alarm proceeded from the Punjab, where the Sikhs, originally an insignificant religious sect, had risen rapidly into importance, and were now avenging themselves on their Mussulman persecutors by fearful devastations and wholesale massacres. The insurrection was deemed formidable enough to demand the emperor's personal presence, and was only partially suppressed when he died suddenly at Lahore, in February, 1712.

As usual, the succession was disputed by his four sons. Azim-us-Shan, the second son, was the favourite both with the nobility and the army; and, by a rapid march from his government of Bengal, where he had for several years been providing himself with the sinews of war, gained so much upon his competitors that resistance seemed all but hopeless. The other three brothers, seeing that their only chance of success was to unite against him as a common enemy, joined their forces, and, under the able guidance of Zulfikar Khan, forced him to action under circumstances so disadvantageous, that after a short struggle he lost the battle and his life. The question of precedence among the remaining brothers still remained to be determined, but Zulfikar Khan settled it by a very summary process. Muiz-ud-din, who, as the eldest, had the best legal title, seemed excluded by incapacity; but to Zulfikar this was his strongest recommendation. He had determined to use him as a tool, and therefore, espousing his cause, found little difficulty in seating him on the throne, under the title of Jehandar Shah. Zulfikar, almost as a matter of course, became Vizir, and wielded all the power of the state, while the pageant emperor gave himself up to folly and licentiousness.
One of the first acts of the new reign had been to seize and murder all who might have become rival claimants to the throne. Some of them, however, notwithstanding the remorselessness with which this barbarous policy was carried out, had escaped. Among them was Farrukshiyar, son of the second brother, Azim-us-Shan, who, when he set out to contend for the succession, had left him to govern Bengal as his deputy. The incapacity of Jehandar Shah, and the arrogance and tyranny of Zulfiqar Khan, having produced general discontent, Farrukshiyar saw his opportunity, and resolved to improve it. Supported by two brothers, Abdullah Khan and Hussain Ali, who, as Sayyids, or descendants of the Prophet, were held in reverence by the Muhammedans, while their possession of the respective governments of Allahabad and Bihar placed a powerful force at their command, he raised the standard of revolt and advanced to the vicinity of Agra. There Jehandar and Zulfiqar encountered him at the head of 70,000 men. The battle was so fiercely contested that the issue was long doubtful. Ultimately the imperial troops, who had little good-will to the cause for which they were fighting, gave way, and Jehandar, fleeing in disguise to Delhi, left Zulfiqar to follow with the remaining troops as he best could. Farrukshiyar was close upon his heels, and learned with delight, that instead of being obliged to wait the tedious process of a siege, the capital was already in his power. Zulfiqar met him as he approached, and delivered Jehandar a prisoner into his hands. This new act of perfidy did not save him, and both he and his master were immediately put to death.

Farrukshiyar having thus mounted the Mughul throne on 4th February, 1713, naturally conferred the highest offices of the state on the two Sayyids. Abdullah, the elder, was made Vizir; and Hussain Ali, who had almost miraculously recovered after being left for dead on the field, became Amir-ul-Omrah, or commander-in-chief. Pluming themselves on the important services which they had rendered, the brothers were disposed to repeat the game which had been played by Zulfiqar-Khan, by leaving Farrukshiyar only the name of emperor, while they really governed. The task proved more difficult than they had anticipated. Farrukshiyar, though of a feeble and irresolute character, had a high idea of his own qualifications for reigning,
and was surrounded by worthless favourites, whose rapacity and ambition could not be satisfied while nothing but the shadow of power was left him. The Sayyids, accordingly, soon found themselves thwarted in their arbitrary proceedings by a strong court party, who, without venturing to provoke an open rupture, were unwearied in intrigue. The first scheme was to get rid of the presence of Hussain Ali by exciting a war which required his presence. In this there was no difficulty, as Ajit Singh, the powerful Raja of Marwar, was again in rebellion, and was, moreover, actually encouraged in it by the court faction, who gave him to understand that obstinate resistance would please the emperor more than ready submission. The raja, however, was too acute to play the game of Farrukshiyar’s favourites; and, finding Hussain willing to grant him terms by which his own interests were secured, hastened to conclude a peace.

One of the stipulations of this peace was that the raja should give his daughter in marriage to the emperor. What the attractions of the lady were is not mentioned, but Farrukshiyar seems to have felt all the ardour and impatience of a lover. There was, however, a serious obstacle in the way. The dissipated course of life which he led had undermined his health, and he was labouring under a disease which did not permit him to marry. Fortunately, at this very period the Company had sent a formal embassy to Delhi to complain of the extortion and oppression practised upon them at their different factories, and more especially in Bengal. They had been induced to take this step in consequence of the favour which Farrukshiyar had shown them while holding the government of this province, and their consequent hope that he would protect them against the harsh treatment which they were receiving from Jafar Khan, his successor. The embassy carried with them presents to the value of about £30,000, intended partly for the emperor himself, and partly for the favourites by whom he was surrounded. It is not to be doubted that at a court where intrigue prevailed and all things had become venal, these presents must have smoothed down many difficulties; but the ultimate success of the embassy was owing not to them but to a cause on which they had not calculated. Mr. Hamilton, the physician to the embassy, had been called
to court to give his professional aid, and succeeded so well, that the disease of the emperor, which had refused to yield to native treatment, was removed, and his marriage, which had been vexatiously delayed, was celebrated with unprecedented splendour. There was in consequence no limit to the favour which Mr. Hamilton enjoyed. The emperor publicly attested his gratitude by bestowing rich presents upon him in the presence of all his courtiers, and was afterwards easily induced to comply with the petition which the embassy had presented, by issuing a firman which invested the Company with new and extensive privileges. Besides the three villages which they already possessed in the vicinity of Fort William, authority was given them to acquire other thirty-seven on the same terms and in the same locality. For a time, in consequence of the hostile

ty of Jafar Khan, this grant was rendered inoperative; but at last full effect was given to it, and the Company, though not without serious misgivings of allowing themselves to be “encumbered with much territory,” acquired right to a tract extending nearly ten miles along both sides of the Hughli, and completely commanding its navigation. Among the other more important privileges conferred by the firman were the conversion of the duties previously payable at Surat into a fixed annual sum, beyond which no charge of any kind was to be made; and above all, the removal of one of the greatest impediments which trade had experienced, by exempting all goods protected by the Company’s dustuk, or passport, from stoppage or examination by the officials of the Bengal government.

At the very time when Farrukshiyar was making these concessions to the Company his own affairs were hastening to a crisis. While Hussain Ali was absent with the army, the courtiers had thrown off part of their former caution, and by evincing a more undisguised hostility, furnished him with a pretext for providing additional securities for his personal safety. Pretending an alarm which it is probable they did not feel, the two brothers at first refused to appear at court, and then began to prepare for open hostilities. After a period of general consternation, during which the capital was threatened with anarchy, Farrukshiyar found it necessary to submit, and
consented to become virtually a prisoner in the hands of the Sayyids, by allowing the gates of the citadel, within which his palace stood, to be occupied by their guards, while an attempt was made to effect a reconciliation. After various abortive proposals it was at last arranged that Mir Jumla, the emperor's favourite and head of the court faction, and Hussain Ali, should both quit Delhi, the former proceeding to his government of Bihar and the latter to his government of the Deccan, while Abdullah Khan should still retain his office of Vizir. There was no sincerity on either side, and though the actual crisis was prevented, the course of intrigue continued as before.

During the confusion caused by the dissensions at Delhi, the Sikhs, after sustaining a series of disasters, had again become formidable. Their chief, Bandu, who had been made captive, had escaped, and suddenly issuing from his mountain retreat renewed his ravages in the level country. Feeble as the central government now was, the necessity of vigorous measures was so strongly felt, that a powerful force was despatched into the Punjab under the command of a chief called Abdusemed Khan, who conducted the campaign with consummate ability. After gaining repeated successes in the open field, he hunted the Sikhs out of their fastnesses, and made many of their leaders prisoners. Bandu himself was again among the number, and expiated his crimes on the scaffold at Delhi by a death in which all kinds of horrific tortures were accumulated. Numerous other executions followed, and the Sikhs, though still destined to play an important part in the history of India, were so completely subdued, that many years elapsed before their existence as a nation again became discernible.

In the Deccan the Mughul arms were less successful. At first, on Hussain Ali's arrival in 1715, their employment was in civil warfare, said to have been instigated by the emperor himself. Daud Khan Panni, who, as has been mentioned, was appointed by Zulfikar Khan to hold the government of the Deccan as his deputy, and negotiated a peace with the Marathas, was removed in 1713 on the accession of Farrukshiyar, and was now governing the united provinces of Gujarat and Khandesh. His immediate successor in the Deccan was Chin Kilich Khan, afterwards well known as the founder of the Nizam dynasty,
under his title of Nizam-ul-Mulk, meaning "Regulator or Governor of the State." To make way for Hussain Ali, he was removed to the comparatively insignificant government of Moradabad. Both of these chiefs considering themselves aggrieved by the loss of their more important appointments, hated Hussain, and were disposed to throw their weight into any confederacy that might be formed against him. Daud, naturally the more headstrong and impetuous of the two, was first worked upon; and no sooner learned that Hussain's destruction would be hailed at Delhi as a deliverance, than he resolved to attempt it, not covertly, but by open hostility. With this view, having mustered the forces of his own governments, and increased them by levies from the Marathas and other Deccan chiefs among whom he had any influence, he at once made his appearance in the field, and that there might be no doubt as to his intentions, sent Hussain his defiance. The trial of strength thus provoked was speedily decided. Daud, acting with his usual impetuosity, commenced the battle with a charge, before which those opposed to him were fleeing panic-struck, when he fell, pierced through the brain with a bullet. The fortune of the day was immediately reversed, and Hussain saw his threatened defeat converted into a complete victory.

While Daud Khan Panni and Nizam-ul-Mulk governed in the Deccan, the Marathas, either distracted by internal dissensions, or satisfied with the advantageous peace which they had extorted, gave little trouble. The aspect of affairs was now changed. Hussain, offended at the assistance which they had given to his enemies, and deeming himself strong enough to put them down by main force, was not at all dissatisfied when the proceedings of one of their leading chiefs gave him good ground for interfering. This chief, whose family name was Dabari, by establishing a line of fortified villages in Khandesh, had become the terror of caravans and travellers along the highroad leading from the Deccan to Surat. A strong detachment which Hussain sent against him met with little obstruction, and marched on unconscious of danger till it became entangled in ravines. The Marathas, true to their mode of warfare, had possessed themselves of every possible outlet, and almost every man of the detachment perished by the sword or was made prisoner.
The whole of the Maratha confederacy was now in motion, and Hussain, fearing that he might be involved in an interminable and inglorious warfare, at the very time when his presence was imperatively required at Delhi, hastily concluded a peace with Sahu, which confirmed him in the possession of a larger extent of territory than the Marathas had ever possessed before, and sanctioned the levying not only of the chouth, but of the sardes-mukhi, or an additional tenth of the whole remaining revenue throughout the Deccan. The only return which Sahu made for these concessions was an agreement to guarantee the country from future depredations, to furnish a contingent of 15,000 for the maintenance of the public tranquillity, and to pay an annual tribute of ten lacs of rupees (£100,000).

Farrukshiyar, while aware that his own intrigues had in a manner compelled Hussain to conclude this disgraceful treaty, refused to ratify it. The quarrels which ensued hastened the crisis. Farrukshiyar, had he possessed any degree of steadiness and energy, might easily have found in the chiefs who envied or hated the Sayyids, a combination powerful enough to free him from their galling yoke. His father-in-law, Ajit Singh, Raja of Marwar, Jai Singh, Raja of Ambar, Sirbuland Khan, governor of Bihar, and Nizam-ul-Mulk, who, considering himself exiled at Moradabad, was pining for higher employment, were all ready to have lent their aid. Instead of taking proper measures to court it, he only alienated them by the preference shown to unworthy favourites; and hence, when the period for a decisive trial arrived, found himself almost totally abandoned. Alarmed at the dangers by which he was beset, he now consulted only his fears, and endeavoured, by abject submission, to obtain at least a respite. Even this was denied; and after some attempts at a rescue, by a few partisans who still adhered to him in the capital, the Sayyids dragged him forth from his hiding-place in the seraglio, and caused him to be privately put to death in February, 1719.

The brothers, Hussain Ali and Abdullah Khan, were now absolute masters of the government, and might at once have put an end for ever to the Mughul dynasty. This was probably for themselves the safest course which they could have adopted; but its boldness deterred them, and they set up first one young
prince of the blood and then another. By a singular fatality both died, it is said, not by violence, but naturally, within six months. A third was found of more robust constitution, and mounted the throne with the title of Muhammed Shah.

The Sayyids evidently contemplated a continuance of their arbitrary rule; but symptoms of opposition were soon manifested in various quarters, and were rather encouraged than repressed by a timid and vacillating policy on the part of the government. It would indeed seem from the timid measures of the brothers, that they were conscious of having fallen greatly in public opinion, and felt the ground slipping from beneath their feet. With some of the earlier rebels against their authority, they found little difficulty in effecting a compromise. It was otherwise when Nizam-ul-Mulk began to bestir himself. He had been in communication with Farrukshiyar’s party; but, on seeing how little confidence could be placed in that fickle monarch, had given in his adhesion to the Sayyids. He expected that they would have rewarded him with the government of the Deccan; and was much dissatisfied on receiving only that of Malwa. Even here the Sayyids deemed him too formidable, and they endeavoured to remove him by pressing on his acceptance any one of the four governments of Allahabad, Agra, Khandesh, and Multan. He refused, and at the same time, considering it unnecessary any longer to dissemble, prepared to resist a threatened attempt to oust him by force. An open rupture ensued, and Nizam-ul-Mulk proceeded to execute a scheme which he had long been meditating. Instead of remaining in Malwa, he crossed the Narmada, gained possession by force or bribery of several important places, signally defeated two armies that were sent against him, obtained the adhesion of many chiefs, came to an understanding with the Marathas, and was soon virtually master of the whole Deccan.

His success had been greatly aided by a course of intrigue which had again commenced at the court of Delhi. Muhammed Shah, like his predecessor Farrukshiyar, was bent on throwing off the yoke of the Sayyids. The revolt of Nizam-ul-Mulk seemed to promise the means, and that ambitious chief was accordingly made aware that he could not do the emperor a greater service than by persisting in the course which he had
so successfully begun. The Sayyids, perfectly aware of the dangerous position in which they stood, were perplexed how to act, and lost much precious time before they were able to decide. The final resolution was, that Hussain, carrying the emperor and several of the suspected nobles along with him, should make the campaign of the Deccan against Nizam-ul-Mulk, while Abdullah should overawe the disaffected by residing and maintaining a strong force in the capital.

Meantime a conspiracy, to which the emperor himself was privy, had been formed. Its object was to get rid of the Sayyids at all events, by any means however atrocious. At the head of this conspiracy were Muhammed Amir Khan, a nobleman of Turki origin, who, while ostensibly opposed to the emperor’s party, was deep in his confidence; and Sadat Khan, who, originally a merchant of Khorasan, rose to importance by his military talents, and ultimately became the progenitor of the Kings of Oudh. The mode by which the conspirators proposed to effect their object was a barbarous assassination. It was not difficult to find both an agent and an opportunity. As Hussain was proceeding to the Deccan in his palanquin, a Kalmuk, of the name of Mir Haider, approached with a petition, and while Hussain was reading it, drew a dagger and stabbed him to the heart. The whole camp was immediately thrown into commotion, and ultimately divided into two hostile bodies—the one composed of the adherents of the Sayyids, and the other of the adherents of the conspirators. The latter, now openly countenanced by the emperor, who placed himself at their head, proved victorious, and drove the former from the field. Abdullah, who was only on his way to Delhi when the intelligence reached him, endeavoured to maintain the struggle by setting up a new sovereign in the person of one of the princes confined in the capital, and mustering a large army. It was, however, in a great measure undisciplined, and when the final encounter took place, offered little more than a show of resistance. Abdullah was taken prisoner; but, contrary to the usual practice on such occasions, was not put to death; Muhammed Shah returned to Delhi; and, not at all abashed at the atrocious means which he had employed, made a pompous celebration of his recovered authority.
The office of Vizir, conferred at first on Muhammed Amir Khan, as a reward for heading the conspiracy, was, on his sudden death, reserved for Nizam-ul-Mulk. He was still in the Deccan, and found so much employment in settling its affairs, that nearly two years elapsed before he reached Delhi. On his arrival in January, 1722, he found everything in disorder. Muhammed Shah, occupied only with his pleasures, acted at the dictation of a favourite mistress, who had acquired such an ascendancy over him, that she was allowed to keep his private signet and use it for her own purposes. His principal counsellors were young men whose only qualification was companionship with their master in his revels. Nizam-ul-Mulk, who still retained the austere habits acquired in the court of Aurangzeb, soon became disgusted. Not only were all his reforms thwarted, but his personal appearance and manners, so different from those of the youthful courtiers, were held up to ridicule for their master’s special amusement. He was not the man to tolerate these rude and insulting liberties, and it was not long before the emperor and his Vizir were mutually desirous to part. It is needless to dwell on the plots and counterplots to which this feeling gave rise. Suffice it to say, that in October, 1723, the Vizir sent in his resignation, and set out for the Deccan. Ostensibly there was no quarrel; for the emperor, in accepting the resignation, lavished on Nizam-ul-Mulk the highest honours which a subject could receive. It was not long, however, before the enmity rankling at his heart was fully manifested. Mubariz Khan, the local governor of Hyderabad, proceeding on instructions from Delhi, collected a powerful army for the avowed purpose of extending his own authority over the whole Deccan. Nizam-ul-Mulk, whose skill as a diplomatist was at least equal to his prowess as a soldier, had recourse to negotiation, and having protracted it till his preparations were complete, defeated Mubariz in battle, slew him, and affecting ignorance of the instigation which had been given from Delhi, sent his head to the emperor as a trophy.

When Nizam-ul-Mulk marched off to the Deccan, he was in possession of the governments of both Malwa and Gujarat. He was formally removed from them, and took his revenge by encouraging incursions of the Marathas, who, notwithstanding
partial repulses, had, during the rajaship of Sahu, continued to make rapid progress. The main instruments of this success were the raja's two ministers—first, Balaji Viswanath, who, originally the accountant of a district of the Konkan, became the founder of the Brahmin dynasty of Peshwas; and next, his son Baji Rao, who, after Sivaji, ranks as the ablest leader whom the Maratha nation has produced. Balaji, before his death in 1720, had obtained from Muhammed Shah a ratification of the treaty made with Hussain Ali during the reign of Farrukshiyar; and Baji Rao, following in his father's steps, had not only consolidated the rights of chouth and sarismukhi previously acquired, but introduced them into provinces where they had never before been levied.

This extension of Maratha power had, as already observed, been partly owing to Nizam-ul-Mulk, who, in revenge for his removal from Malwa and Gujarat, had encouraged the Marathas to invade them. His policy in the Deccan, which he now regarded as his own independent kingdom, was dictated by opposite motives, his great object here being to confine the Maratha power and influence within as narrow limits as possible. With this view, shortly after his victory over Mubariz in 1724, he dexterously availed himself of the disputed succession by which the Maratha counsels had long been distracted. Sahu, under the able ministry of Baji Rao, had established a complete ascendancy over his rival Sambhu, and confined him to a comparatively insignificant district lying near the western coast to the south of Satara. Still, however, Sambhu was equally with Sahu himself recognized as raja; and there was at least plausibility in the answer of Nizam-ul-Mulk, when, without denying his obligation to pay chouth and sarismukhi for the Deccan, he asked which of the two rajas had the legal right to it, and called upon them to exhibit their respective claims. Sahu, indignant at the very suggestion of a doubt on such a subject, disdained to give any explanation, and sent Baji Rao at the head of a numerous army to compensate himself by plunder for the more regular revenue which was withheld. Nizam-ul-Mulk had prepared for this result, and along with Sambhu, who had now openly joined him, advanced to the relief of Burhanpur, which was threatened by Baji. The first
effect of this advance was to send the Marathas into Gujarat. After a short time spent in pillaging it, they again suddenly made their appearance in the Deccan, and ultimately reduced Nizam-ul-Mulk to such straits, that he was glad to buy them off by humiliating concessions. His experience of the kind of enemy he had to deal with, left him little inclination to provoke a renewal of the contest; and though he did, on more than one occasion, endeavour to weaken their power by sowing dissensions among them, he came at last to a thorough understanding with Baji, and entered into a formal agreement, by which he undertook to protect Baji’s interests in the Deccan, while the latter was ravaging Malwa and extending his authority over other portions of the Mughul dominions.

Baji Rao easily found a pretext for this invasion. The grant of chowth in Gujarat had been revoked, and Sirbuland Khan, who had consented to it, was recalled from the government to make way for a successor in Abhi Singh, Raja of Jodhpur. The Mughul court, in making this appointment in favour of a raja who, to other infamies, had recently added that of murdering his father Ajit Singh, was influenced chiefly by the expectation that his own resources would enable him to make head against the Marathas. He was far from fulfilling this expectation. The Maratha Pila Gaikwar, ancestor of the Gaikwar family still ruling in Gujarat, resisted all his efforts to expel him, but was at last, at Abhi Singh’s instigation, basely assassinated. Nothing was gained by the atrocity; for it only exasperated the Marathas to such a pitch that, not satisfied with overrunning Gujarat, they carried their ravages to Jodhpur, and made the raja glad to compound with the loss of Gujarat for the safety of his hereditary state.

In Malwa, where the Marathas were headed by Baji Rao in person, their arms were equally triumphant; and the Mughul government, after several ineffectual expedients, tacitly concurred in the surrender of the province to the Peshwa in 1734. This important concession, so far from satisfying his ambition, only made it more grasping; and in proportion as the weakness of his adversaries was disclosed, he rose in his demands, and insisted not merely on levying the chowth, but on holding, in full right, as a jaghir, the province of Malwa, and the whole
country south of the Chambal, together with the cities of Mathura, Allahabad, and Benares. Muhammed, Shah, alarmed above measure by this new demand, evaded it for a time by temporizing, and endeavoured to induce the Maratha to withdraw it by giving him a right to levy tribute on the Rajputs, and to increase the amount of that already exigible from the Deccan. This last grant cost the emperor nothing, and was regarded as a stroke of good policy, because its natural tendency was to set the Marathas and Nizam-ul-Mulk at variance. In this respect it was not altogether a failure, as it drew Nizam-ul-Mulk's attention to his true position, and convinced him that he had much more to fear from the Marathas than from the Mughul. Under the influence of this conviction, he adopted a new system of policy, and resuming friendly communications with Muhammed Shah, undertook to employ all his power in protecting him against the encroachments of the Marathas.

This engagement was not allowed to remain long as a dead letter. In 1737, at the very time when it was entered into, Baji Rao was advancing on the Mughul capital. The only check he sustained was in the defeat, by Sadat Khan, governor of Oudh, of Malhar Rao Holkar, the founder of the Holkar family, who with a marauding party was ravaging the country beyond the Jamuna. This defeat elated the Mughuls, who magnified it into a discomfiture of the whole Maratha army, which was represented as in full retreat to the Deccan. When Baji Rao was informed of these vain boastings, he simply remarked that he would soon show the emperor he was still in Hindusthan. He was as good as his word. Suddenly quitting the Jamuna, and leaving the Mughul army which had been sent to oppose him inactive before Mathura, he hastened on by forced marches, and never halted till he presented himself before the gates of Delhi. The expedition, however, appears to have been undertaken rather in a spirit of bravado than with any serious design of attempting the capture of the city, for after a few days he disappeared and encamped at a considerable distance. Meanwhile, the consternation produced by his presence caused hasty messages to be despatched to every quarter from which relief might be expected; and while the Vizir Kamar-ud-din Khan, who had formed a junction with Sadat Khan, was advancing from his encampment at Mathura,
Nizam-ul-Mulk also hastened from the Deccan. Baji Rao, true to the Maratha tactics, avoided an encounter, and by a precipitate retreat soon placed the Narmada between himself and his pursuers.

Nizam-ul-Mulk, notwithstanding Baji's departure, continued his march to Delhi, where on his arrival he was invested with full powers to adopt whatever measures might be necessary for the safety of the empire; and his eldest son, Ghazi-ud-din, was appointed governor both of Malwa and Gujarat. So low had the Mughul resources now fallen, that after his utmost efforts the army under his command did not exceed 34,000 men. With this army, and a reserve commanded by the nephew of Sadat Khan, he set out in search of the Marathas; and proceeding southward past Seronge, took up a position near the fort of Bhopal, while Baji Rao crossed the Narmada and advanced to meet him. As Nizam-ul-Mulk was outnumbered by the Marathas, but possessed a powerful artillery while they were almost entirely destitute of it, he deemed it advisable to retain his position and act on the defensive. With an ordinary enemy this might have been expedient, but with the enemy with whom he had now to deal it was a decided blunder. The Marathas, keeping carefully beyond the reach of his artillery, commenced their usual system by laying waste the surrounding country, and cutting off his supplies. This they did so effectually that no alternative was left him but to commence a retreat. As may be supposed, it was only a series of disasters; and he was obliged to make a peace by which he conceded all the demands of the Peshwa, and bound himself to pay him £500,000 sterling. This humiliating peace, concluded in February, 1738, was only the forerunner of a far more overwhelming calamity.

The Persian dynasty of the Sufis or Safaris, after existing for two centuries, became so degenerate as to fall an easy prey to the Afghans of Kandahar in 1722, when, on the capture of Ispahan, after a dreadful siege, Shah Hussain, the last Sufi, went forth with his principal courtiers in deep mourning, and with his own hand placed the diadem on the head of Mahmud, his Khalji conqueror. It had been worn by the new monarch only for two years when he died raving mad, and was succeeded by his nephew Ashraf, who was no sooner seated on the
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throne than he was called to a struggle against both foreign and internal foes. The Turks and Russians, leagued together to dismember the kingdom and share it between them, advanced, the one from the west and the other from the north, with powerful armies, while Tahmasp, who had made his escape from Ispahan when his father Shah Hussain was obliged to surrender, had mustered a body of retainers, and announced his determination to make good his claim to the crown which his ancestors had so long worn. Of these various combatants, it might have been supposed that the Turks and Russians, from the superiority of their discipline, would be the most formidable. It proved otherwise. Ashraf compelled the Turks, after repeated defeats, to acknowledge his title; and, before he had measured his strength with the Russians, had the satisfaction to learn that the death of the Czar had induced them to withdraw. Tahmasp alone remained, and was not to be so easily disposed of. In himself he was not very formidable, but fortune had drawn to his standard one of the greatest warriors whom Persia has ever produced. This was Nadir Kouli, who began life as the head of a band of freebooters, and at last, after freeing his country from a foreign yoke, became the usurper of its throne. Victory scarcely ever failed to attend him; and by dexterously playing the two leading Afghan tribes, the Khaljís and the Abdalis or Duránís, against each other, succeeded in crushing both. Patriotism seemed for a time to be his ruling passion, and Tahmasp, as the legitimate monarch, ascended the Persian throne; but patriotism was eventually supplanted by ambition, and Nadir, unable to brook a superior, first declared the throne vacant, and then took possession of it in his own name in 1737, alleging that he had been called to it by the popular voice.

Henceforth known as Nadir Shah, he resolved to pursue his career of victory; and proceeding eastward, at the head of an army of 80,000 men, laid siege to Kandahar. It originally belonged to the Persian monarchy, but had been wrested from it, and was now in possession of the Khaljis. It was valiantly defended, and stood several assaults before it was taken. The capture of Kandahar and conquest of the adjoining territory made Persia conterminous with India. Nadir Shah, as he looked eastward into the valley of the Indus, and beheld a
mighty empire torn by intestine wars and tottering to its fall, must have been strongly tempted, if not to become its conqueror, to obtain a share in its spoils. He had already some ground of quarrel with its government. During the siege of Kandahar, not only had an application which he made for the delivery of some Afghans who had taken refuge within its territory been treated with neglect, but even the validity of his title to the Persian crown had been called in question. Instead of wasting time in unavailing remonstrance, he took a more effectual mode of expressing his resentment by seizing upon Kabul. The court of Delhi ought now to have been fully alive to the danger, but months passed away, during which Nadir was left to settle his conquest and make new preparations. The actual invasion seemed indeed to have become impossible, at least for one season; for the winter was approaching, and it was never dreamed that he would commence a campaign which, in its very first operations, would expose him to the rigours of a mountainous country and the assaults of its warlike inhabitants. How great then must have been the consternation when it was learned that all these supposed impossibilities had been overcome, and that Nadir, after crossing the Indus by a bridge of boats in November, 1738, had advanced into the Punjab at the head of a mighty army!

Great as was the danger, so tardily were the means of defence provided, that Nadir for the first time came in sight of the Indian army after he had reached the banks of the Jamuna, and was within 100 miles of the Mughul capital. Here, in the neighbourhood of Karnal, Nizam-ul-Mulk, to whom the chief command was intrusted, occupied a fortified camp. Just at the time when Nadir was approaching, Sadat Khan arrived with a reinforcement from Oudh, and the battle immediately commenced. The Indians, consisting for the most part of raw levies, were no match for the Persian veterans, and after little more than a show of resistance were signally discomfited. Muhammad Shah, deeming all further resistance hopeless, sent Nizam-ul-Mulk to make his submission, and then repaired in person to the Persian camp. He was courteously received, but was not permitted to attempt negotiation, as Nadir Shah, conscious of being complete master, had determined to dictate his terms
within the walls of Delhi. Thither therefore the two monarchs proceeded, the one as a miserable captive, the other as a conqueror in triumphant procession at the head of his victorious army. The entrance took place in the beginning of March, 1739.

Nadir Shah took up his residence with Muhammed Shah at the palace, and appears, from the careful arrangements which he made for the maintenance of discipline and the protection of the inhabitants, to have meditated no greater severity than the levy of a very heavy contribution. This mild intention, if he had it, was frustrated by the inhabitants themselves. On the very second day, hastily believing a rumour of Nadir Shah's death, they broke through all restraint, and commenced an indiscriminate massacre of the Persians at their various isolated stations throughout the city. The Shah was furious, and forthwith issued orders for a fearful retaliation. From sunrise to sunset the city was given up to the fury of 20,000 soldiers, and lust, rapine, and slaughter raged in their most horrific forms. This was only a deed of vengeance. Nadir's own claims still remained to be satisfied; and the work of confiscation and plunder was carried on for weeks without interruption. The "Peacock Throne" formed an important item in the spoils. At the most moderate estimate, the amount carried off in money, plate, and jewels, could not be less than £30,000,000 sterling.

After possessing Delhi during fifty-eight days Nadir Shah departed, leaving it a scene of wretchedness and desolation. The terror of the capital had spread into the provinces, the government was paralyzed, and the people remained sunk in a kind of stupor. The Marathas might now have completed their conquests, but even they were overawed by the suddenness and extent of the general calamity. Baji Rao, adverting to it, expressed himself thus:—"Our domestic quarrels are now insignificant; there is but one enemy in Hindustan." "Hindus and Mussulmans—the whole power of the Deccan must assemble." These feelings of alarm soon began to subside, and the elements of disunion were again at work. At the court of Delhi old animosities resumed all their former bitterness. A powerful faction, composed of Turki, or as they were called Turani nobles, and headed by the Vizir Kamar-ud-din Khan and Nizam-ul-Mulk, endeavoured to absorb the leading offices of the state, and even hold the emperor.
himself in subjection to their wishes, while their enemies were numerous and powerful enough to wage a constant struggle for ascendency. Feeble and discordant counsels were the necessary result, and no bond of union existed among the numerous dependencies still belonging nominally to the Mughul empire. In point of fact, the Marathas were now the most powerful nation on the Indian continent, and had the best prospect of becoming its ultimate masters. Even they, however, were not free from difficulties. Sahu, the nominal head of the government, had been deprived of all real power, and reduced to a mere cipher. Several of the chiefs who willingly acknowledged his authority, were not disposed to yield the same submission to the usurpations of the Peshwa, and stood ready to avail themselves of the first favourable opportunity of either re-establishing the raja or asserting their own independence. Baji Rao, well aware of the precarious position in which he stood, was obliged to regulate his policy accordingly, and often abandoned the course which his judgment approved for that which his own immediate interest seemed to require. Before the Mughul government recovered from the shock given to it by Nadir Shah, he might easily have established the complete ascendency of his nation by mustering his forces and marching at once upon the capital. Instead of this, he suddenly withdrew into the Deccan. The only apparent inducement was, that he might be able more effectually to watch the proceedings of his countrymen, Raghunath Bhonsla and the Gaikwar of Gujarat, who were plotting his overthrow. Of his feelings while thus employed he himself gave the following account:—"I am involved in difficulty, in debt, and in disappointments, and like a man ready to swallow poison. Near the raja are my enemies, and should I go at this time to Satara they will put their feet on my breast. I should be thankful if I could meet death." This solemn event was nearer than he imagined, for he died shortly after, on the 28th of April, 1740, as he was returning to Hindustan.

Baji Rao left three sons, the eldest of whom, Balaji Rao, succeeded him as Peshwa. The succession would have been disputed; but fortunately for him, Raghunath Bhonsla, his most formidable opponent, was absent with his army in the Carnatic, on an expedition on which Baji Rao had despatched him,
mainly for the purpose of preventing him from plotting mischief nearer home. On hearing of Baji's death, he hastened back to Satara; but as he came without his army, and found the Gaikwar and the pratnindh, or delegate of the raja, on whose co-operation he had calculated, unprepared or indisposed to second him, he was obliged to abandon all thought of opposition, at least till a more favourable opportunity should arise. The death of Baji Rao, and the time necessary to enable Balaji to secure himself in his new seat, gave Mahammed Shah a short respite from actual warfare. It was only a respite; for the clouds of another storm were again gathering thick around him, and indeed from so many quarters, that it was difficult to say from which it was destined first to come. On the one hand Balaji Rao, advancing into Malwa, insisted that this province should, in terms of the treaty which had been made with Nizam-ul-Mulk, but which had never received the imperial sanction, be formally confirmed to him; on the other hand the Rohillas, a recent Afghan colony occupying the tract which from them still bears the name of Rohilkhand, had begun, under an able leader of the name of Ali Muhammed, to assume an alarming appearance. In themselves, indeed, the Rohillas were not so numerous as to be very formidable; but they belonged to the warlike race which had repeatedly devastated the fairest provinces of India, and the danger apprehended was, that in the event of a new invasion from the west, they would league with their countrymen. The idea of such an invasion was by no means chimerical. Ever since the visit of Nadir Shah, who on retiring declared the Indus to be the eastern boundary of the Persian monarchy, it had been threatened, and in consequence of recent political changes in Persia it was becoming a certainty.

Nadir Shah perished by the hands of assassins in June, 1747. He had latterly become a cruel tyrant, and deserved his fate; though it was not so much his cruelty as his form of Muhammadan faith that provoked it. He was a Sunnite, while the Persians were zealous Shiites. The repugnance between them was therefore invincible, and his death was the work of Persian conspirators. But the same cause which made the Persians abhor his rule was its greatest recommendation to the Afghans, who like him were Sunnites, and devotedly attached to his service.
Accordingly the Abdalis, headed by their hereditary chief, Ahmed Khan, on hearing of the conspiracy, had hastened to the rescue; and, after finding that they were a day too late, fought their way through the hostile Persians, and succeeded in reaching their own country. Ahmed Khan immediately declared himself independent, changed the name of his tribe from Abdali to Durani, and before a year elapsed was crowned king at Kandahar. Ere long Balkh, Sind, Kashmir, and other provinces, acknowledged his sway. His ambition was not yet satisfied, and he looked round for new fields of conquest. Both the west and east lay before him, but various reasons induced him to prefer the latter. The left bank of the Indus was already in his power; and among other temptations to cross this river and commence an Indian campaign, was the fact that a civil war was raging in the Punjab in consequence of the revolt of its Mughul governor. Little opposition was made; and Ahmed, after capturing many towns, including Lahore, the capital, arrived at the Sutlej. On the other side lay a Mughul army, commanded by Prince Ahmed, the heir apparent, and Kamar-ud-din Khan, the Vizir. The Abdali force, though not mustering 12,000 men, crossed the river by selecting a spot which, from not being fordable, was not watched; and, hastening on to Sirhind, made a rich capture of stores and baggage. This bold movement so intimidated the Mughuls, that notwithstanding their superiority in numbers, they stood on the defensive, and even formed an entrenched camp. This course, dictated by excessive timidity, was the wisest which they could have pursued. The Duranis had no alternative but to retreat, or hazard a battle under the most disadvantageous circumstances. They chose the latter and sustained a defeat, but took advantage of the night to escape.

The Mughul Vizir had fallen, and the Mughul prince was prevented from following up his victory, by the intelligence that the succession to the crown had opened to him by the death of his father in April, 1748. Muhammed Shah thus ended a reign, remarkable only for its length, during a most disastrous period. Prince Ahmed, henceforth known by the title of Ahmed Shah, immediately repaired to Delhi; and his Afghan namesake, now distinguished from him by the name of Ahmed Shah Durani, instead of continuing his retreat, stopped short, and did not
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quit the Punjab till he had made it tributary. This, however, did not satisfy him. After a short absence he returned, and insisted on a formal cession of the whole province. As he was able to take it by force, it was deemed good policy to make a merit of necessity, and give him all he asked. This concession may serve to characterize Ahmed Shah’s short and inglorious reign. The office of Vizir, first offered to Nizam-ul-Mulk, who declined it, and died almost immediately after, in 1748, was conferred on Safdar Jang, who had succeeded his father, Sadat Khan, as governor of Oudh. He soon gave proof of his unfitness, by undertaking an expedition against the Rohillas, and so mismanaging it as to allow them to penetrate to Allahabad, and set the whole Mughul power at defiance. In this emergency he could devise no better remedy than to call in the aid of the Marathas, who indeed drove out the Rohillas, but compensated themselves by establishing a right to levy the chouth over all the territory that they conquered. After a course of intrigue and crime, Safdar Jang was supplanted in the royal favour by Ghazi-ud-din, one of Nizam-ul-Mulk’s grandsons, an unprincipled youth familiar with perfidy and murder. Like Safdar he employed the Marathas to extricate himself from difficulties, and ultimately succeeded by these means, in July, 1754, in seizing the person of his sovereign, Ahmed Shah, and raising to the throne a young prince of the blood, who assumed the title of Alamgir.

Alamgir—or, as he is often called, Alamgir II, to distinguish him from Aurangzeb, who used the same title in all regular documents—usually closes the list of Mughul sovereigns who actually held the reigns of government. For this reason, more than any other, he is entitled to a brief notice. When he was raised to the throne, Safdar Jang was still nominally Vizir. On his death, which happened soon after, he was succeeded by his son Shuja-ud-daulah in the government of Oudh, but the Vizirship was immediately appropriated by Ghazi-ud-din, under whose mismanagement nothing but additional confusion and disaster could be anticipated. By treacherously seizing the infant successor of the governor of the Punjab, whom Ahmed Shah Durani had appointed, he provoked the vengeance of this formidable foe, who, having crossed the Indus, did not halt till he had
made himself master of Delhi; and inflicted on this ill-fated city a renewal of the calamities which it had suffered from Nadir Shah. So low had the authority of the sovereign now fallen, that Alamgir is said to have besought Ahmed not to leave him to the mercy of his Vizir. Accordingly; on departing, he endeavoured to provide a kind of counterpoise by giving the command of the army to an able Rohilla chief of the name of Najib-ud-daulah. Ghazi-ud-din only waited till Ahmed was out of India, and then endeavoured to set Najib aside, in order to make way for one of his own creatures. Meeting with a resistance which he was unable to overcome, he again called in the aid of the Marathas, who advanced from Malwa under Raghoba, the second son of Baji Rao, entered Delhi, and after spending a month in the siege of the fortified palace, compelled Alamgir to reinstate Ghazi-ud-din in all his former authority.

As usual, the Marathas took good care to be fully compensated for their service. Feeling that no effectual resistance could be offered, they set no limits to their ambition, and openly talked of extending their conquests over the whole of Hindustan. The Punjab first attracted their attention, and Raghoba, learning that it was feebly governed by Timur, a son of Ahmed Shah Durani, marched at once to Lahore, gained possession of it in May, 1758, and continuing his triumphant career, so intimidated the Duranis, that they retired beyond the Indus without risking a battle. The Marathas next engaged in a similar attempt to subjugate Oudh, but were met with spirit by Shuja-ud-daulah, who, in league with the Rohillas, inflicted a severe loss on an isolated detachment, and drove it across the Ganges. Datta Sindhia, the Maratha in command of the main body, deemed it expedient to come to terms, and a kind of peace, not intended to be long kept, was patched up.

One main inducement to the peace was the rumoured approach of Ahmed Shah Durani. When his son Timur arrived from the Punjab, he was engaged in suppressing a revolt among the Baluchis. This delayed him till September, 1759, when he commenced a new Indian campaign by crossing the Indus at Peshawar, and continuing his course to Saharanpur, at some distance beyond the left bank of the Jamuna. While he was thus advancing, Ghazi-ud-din—remembering how Alamgir had
formerly obtained the protection of Ahmed, and nearly succeeded in expelling him from his Vizirship—was determined not again to run a similar risk, and followed the course which his cruel and perfidious nature dictated, by causing the unhappy monarch to be assassinated in November, 1759. Shah Alam, the heir apparent, was then absent in Bengal, and the new prince whom Ghazi-ud-din seated on the throne was never recognized. There was thus no ostensible sovereign at Delhi; the Mughul empire had ceased to exist.

When the Mughul empire was extinguished, the general expectation was that a Maratha empire would immediately arise on its ruins. Originally confined to a limited district in the Deccan, the Marathas had established their ascendancy in every part of India, possessing immense tracts of territory in absolute right, and levying heavy tribute from nearly the whole of the remainder. One great obstacle to the establishment of a consolidated Maratha empire had been disunion among the members composing its confederacy. Sahu, its nominal head, had been deprived of all real power by the Peshwa. Latterly, indeed, he was unfit for government, and died in a state of imbecility, in 1749. This event led to new complications, which were not arranged until many of the chiefs had acquired a kind of independence and become the founders of minor dynasties. Among the more conspicuous of these were Pitaji Gaikwar in Gujarat, Malhar Rao Holkar, and Dataji Sindhia, who, by obtaining an assignment to nearly the whole revenues of Malwa, secured the dominions which still bear their name and are possessed by their descendants. Other chiefs who have not left such permanent traces of their authority were equally powerful. Raghujji Bhonsla and Raghoba have been already mentioned. Another, Sadashiv Rao Bhao, or simply "the Bhao," a cousin of the Peshwa Balaji, possessed great influence, but had been contented, while the other chiefs were pursuing distant conquests, to remain in the Deccan as home minister and commander-in-chief. He was acting in this capacity when Raghoba returned from his campaign in the Punjab. His success had not been obtained without a very heavy outlay, and the Bhao, on learning that, instead of bringing any sum into the treasury, he had made it liable to a debt of nearly £1,000,000.
sterling, expressed his dissatisfaction so strongly, that Raghoba was piqued, and told him he had better conduct the next expedition himself. The Bhao, elated by some recent successes which had somewhat increased the Maratha territory, and added largely to its revenue, was not disinclined to avail himself of an opportunity of acquiring new distinction. Treating Raghoba's taunt as if it had been a serious proposal, he exchanged situations with him, and assumed the chief command in Hindusthan.

The only formidable enemy whom the Marathas had now to encounter was in the field. Ahmed Shah Durani, after nearly annihilating two separate Maratha detachments, the one commanded by Holkar and the other by Sindhia, had taken up a position at Anupshahar, situated on the right bank of the Ganges, seventy-three miles south-east of Delhi. The Bhao, accompanied by Viswas Rao, the youthful son and heir of the Peshwa, and the leading Maratha chiefs, advanced at the head of a numerous host, without encountering serious opposition, and having gained possession of the capital, disgraced himself by rapacity. Palaces, tombs, and shrines were defaced for the sake of their rich ornaments, and the silver ceiling of the hall of audience torn down was coined into rupees, to the amount, it is said, of seventeen lacs (£170,000). Ahmed, in addition to his own Duranis, was cordially joined by the Rohillas, and rather lukewarmly by Shuja-ud-daulah, governor of Oudh, who would willingly have remained neutral, and afterwards made the most of the event by taking part with the winning side. As the contest, however, had assumed a religious aspect, the Hindus being ranged on one side and Muhammedans on the other, he found it impossible to withhold his aid from Ahmed, who was considered as the representative of the latter.

Ahmed, as soon as the rains permitted him to move, hastened to the Jamuna, with the view of relieving a fort on its banks to which the Marathas had laid siege. He arrived only in time to learn that it had fallen, but showed such desperate determination, by effecting a passage of the river more by swimming than fording, that his enemies were intimidated and drew off to Panipat. Here the Bhao encamped with an army consisting of 70,000 cavalry and 15,000 infantry, of whom 9,000 were
disciplined sepoys. In addition to these were predatory and other followers to the number of 200,000. In artillery, an arm of war which the Marathas had at last learned to prize, he was amply provided, and was able, after surrounding his camp with a broad and deep ditch, to mount 200 guns for its defence. Ahmed’s army consisted of about 40,000 Afghans and Persians, and 50,000 Indians, of whom 13,000 were cavalry. The armies were thus not unfairly matched. In respect of available troops they were nearly equal, while at the same time each laboured under a great disadvantage—the Bhao, in the excessive number of followers, who, without adding to his strength, hampered his movements and consumed his provisions; and Ahmed, in an artillery so defective that it barely mustered thirty pieces of various calibre, and, furnishing no proper means of attack, compelled him to imitate the Bhao’s example, and remain on the defensive.

Under such circumstances, time rather than prowess was to decide the struggle; for neither leader felt disposed to force on an action so long as he could obtain subsistence for his army from the surrounding country. At this mode of warfare the Marathas could not easily be surpassed, and their foraging parties at first found no difficulty in bringing in abundant supplies. Gradually, however, the Duranis, by the rapidity and boldness of their movements, made foraging so dangerous, that the Bhao, threatened with famine, saw the peril of his position, and attempted to escape from it by proposing negotiation. Ahmed, whose supplies had also begun to fail, was urged by his Indian allies to come to terms or risk a decisive action; but his constant answer was—“This is a matter of war with which you are not acquainted. In other affairs do as you please, but leave this to me.” He was aware of the straits to which his enemies were reduced; and, even after they had begun in a kind of desperation to make vigorous attacks upon his lines, seemed more inclined than ever to confine himself to skirmishing, in which he usually had the advantage. He was well aware of the crisis which was approaching, and fully prepared to profit by it. The Bhao’s supplies were completely exhausted; and after a last effort at foraging which proved utterly unavailing, becoming convinced that he could no longer maintain his position, he
yielded to the urgency of his soldiers, and, with many
prognostications of disaster, issued orders for a general attack.
It was made with the utmost impetuosity, and so long as it was
directed against the Rohillas and other Indian allies of Ahmed,
seemed irresistible. The Durani chief endeavoured to rally the
fugitives, but finding it impossible, ordered his own men to
advance. This at once changed the fortune of the day. By a
dexterous movement, while the main body attacked in front, a
division wheeled round to the flank, and the whole Maratha
army, panic-struck by this double onset, turned their backs and
fled. As no quarter was given, the slaughter was fearful. About
200,000 are said to have fallen. Among the slain were the
Peshwa's son Vishwas Rao, the Bhao, recognized only by what
was supposed to be his headless trunk, and many other great
Maratha chiefs. The dream of a Maratha empire had vanished.
The wreck of the army, abandoning the acquisitions made in
Hindusthan, retired beyond the Narmada; the Peshwa, shutting
himself up in a temple near Poona, died of a broken heart;
and the whole nation, sunk in grief and despondency, became
as it were paralyzed.

Strange to say, Ahmed did not profit much by his victory,
for the Muhammedan confederacy which he had formed
having broken up, he quitted India, and never returned to
take any share in its affairs. The only two powers which then
seemed capable of wielding the sceptre, which had been
wrested from the hands of the Mughul, having thus been
providentially removed, the work of conquest passed to other
hands. The two most powerful nations of Europe, after they
had long been contented to play a subordinate part in the
contest, resolved at last to become principals, and France and
Great Britain started as rival candidates for the establishment
of a new Indian empire. The history of this memorable struggle
is now to engage our attention.
The Capture of Madras

From the first the French East India Company, much more than that of England, was the creature of the state. All the influence of the crown was employed to obtain subscribers to their funds; and no unimportant part of the official correspondence of a commercial nature, during the ministry of the celebrated Colbert, relates to solicitations employed for this purpose. It is very questionable whether the prosperity of the company was much promoted by this state patronage, but there cannot be a doubt that they were able in consequence of it to escape many of the dangers which might have beset them at the outset, and to start at once as a body able not only to repel aggression but to become aggressive. The alarm which their presence in the East excited in the Dutch and English companies must not be ascribed exclusively to commercial jealousy. As mere traders they could not appear very formidable rivals, but from their close connection with government their trade might easily be made subservient to political purposes, and become a dangerous instrument of intrigue at the native courts. In this way Louis XIV, not satisfied with disturbing the peace of Europe by his ambitious schemes, might be tempted to extend them to India, and by engaging in wars of conquest make the operations of trade impossible. Knowing the character of the French monarch, it was not uncharitable to suspect him of such intentions. It must be confessed, however, that the company established under his auspices continued for the greater part of a century to rest satisfied with commercial operations, and the erection of such factories as seemed necessary for conducting them with ease and safety. The most important of the localities on which they had thus fixed were
those of Chandernagore, situated, like the Dutch factory of Chinsura, near the town of Hughli, on the river of that name in Bengal, and Pondicherry on the Coromandel coast. The latter was the seat of government, and had gradually become, by the regularity of its buildings and the strength of its fortifications, worthy of the honour thus assigned to it, though, like Madras and all other places on the same coast, it laboured under the great disadvantage of having no proper harbour.

In the year 1742 the office of governor of the French settlements in India was conferred on Joseph Dupleix. The son of a wealthy farmer-general and a director of the company, he had at a comparatively early age obtained the appointment of first member of council at Pondicherry. After ten years' service in this capacity, he was, in 1730, made head of the factory of Chandernagore. Here, by engaging in private trade, he accumulated a large fortune; and at the same time, by the ability of his public management, rose so high in the confidence of his employers, that in 1742, as already mentioned, they made him governor. Thus recalled to Pondicherry, he entered on the duties of his new station in the possession of very superior advantages. To natural talents of a high order, he added a thorough acquaintance with the manners of the inhabitants, and with the political circumstances of the country. These advantages both vanity and ambition disposed him to improve to the utmost, and he was no sooner installed in office than he began to entertain schemes with a view to the ultimate establishment of French ascendancy in the East. It was vain to expect this from the commercial operations of the company. In these it had been found impossible to compete successfully with the British and the Dutch; but another course was still open, and Dupleix was determined to put its practicability fairly to the test.

The approaching dismemberment of the Mughul empire was now manifest. Its soulbahdars or governors were almost openly aspiring to independence, and even their subordinate deputies, or nabobs, were disposed to imitate the example. The parties thus formed were often so equally balanced, that neutrals of comparatively feeble resources could easily, by throwing their weight into one of the opposite scales, determine the result. This was the plan on which the governor of Pondicherry began
to act. In carrying it out he found an able coadjutor in his own family. Madame Dupleix, though of European parentage, had been born and brought up in India. Many of the native languages were familiar to her, and by giving easy access to the natives enabled her to be the fittest medium of communication between them and her husband in any course of intrigue. In this way his measures for extending the influence and territory of the French in India were carried on with equal secrecy and success.

While Dupleix was revolving plans of aggrandisement, and smoothing the way for the accomplishment of them, the relations between Great Britain and France had ceased to be friendly, and the war known as that of the Austrian succession was declared in 1744. The companies on both sides of the Channel supposed it possible that warlike operations might be excluded from the countries lying within the limits of the Indian Ocean, and with this view endeavoured to enter into arrangements which would have left each as free as before to prosecute the Indian trade. Had the respective governments sanctioned the arrangements, the singular and not uninstructive spectacle might have been seen of two nations living peacefully with each other in one quarter of the globe while a fierce war was raging between them in all other quarters. But without such sanction the proposed arrangement, though seriously entertained, was a dream. This seems ultimately to have been the conclusion of all parties, for it soon appeared that at the very time when the proposal of an Indian neutrality was under discussion, the French government were secretly entertaining a project which was to enable them, as soon as war was actually declared, to bring an overwhelming force into the East, and strike a blow by which English interests there would be at once annihilated.

The project referred to was suggested to the French ministry by Bernard Francois Mahe de la Bourdonnais, usually designated for brevity as Labourdonnais. He was born at St. Malo, apparently of humble parentage, in 1699, and when only ten years of age began life as a sailor, by making a voyage to the Pacific. During a second voyage, made in 1713, to the East Indies, he employed his leisure in studying mathematics, under a Jesuit who happened to be on board, and kindly undertook
to give him lessons. After other two voyages, one to the North and the other to the Levant, he in 1719 entered the service of the East India Company as second lieutenant, and had become second captain in 1724, when he took part in an expedition to the Malabar coast, for the purpose of relieving the settlement of Mahe, which had for a considerable time been suffering severely from a blockade by the natives. The success of the expedition was mainly owing to his ability; but from some cause not explained, he shortly after quitted the company's service and engaged in commerce, making several successful voyages, from Pondicherry to Bengal, and to Mocha in the Red Sea. In the latter locality he employed his influence in reconciling a serious difference which had arisen between the Arabs and the Portuguese. His conduct in this matter was gratefully remembered by the viceroy at Goa, who, on a visit which Labourdonnaïs paid to that capital, made him such tempting offers that he was induced to enter the service of Portugal. The object intended at the time was an expedition to Mombas, on the east coast of Africa; but this having been abandoned, he did not find the scope for his talents which he had anticipated, and returned to France in 1733. The following year he obtained the important appointment of governor of the Mauriitius, or the Isle of France, and the Isle of Bourbon, situated in the Indian Ocean to the east of Madagascar. These isles had early become known to the Portuguese, and were at a later period frequented by the Dutch, who gave one of them its name of Mauritius in honour of Prince Maurice of Nassau; but their importance as intermediate stations for ships sailing to the East had been first discerned by the French, who had regularly colonized them, and placed them under a distinct governor.

When Labourdonnaïs arrived at his government in 1735 he found everything in confusion. The two islands had separate councils, which, claiming equal jurisdiction, were constantly disputing as to the extent of their powers; abuses of every kind prevailed, and the capabilities of the soil remained almost totally undeveloped. The new governor at once saw the greatness and difficulty of the task which lay before him, and immediately commenced it with characteristic energy. Ere long the face of matters was completely changed. The kinds of cultiva-
tion best adapted for each island were rapidly extended; new towns and villages arose, harbours capable not only of supplying the wants of commerce, but of furnishing a rendezvous for ships of war, were constructed and fortified; and, government no longer hampered by the selfish aims and unseemly quarrels of those who administered it, became regular and effective. In carrying on this work of reform Labourdonnais often encountered an opposition which obliged him to stretch his powers to the utmost, and perhaps occasionally to exceed them. Those who had profited by abuses were naturally hostile to the removal of them, while many from mere natural indolence were indisposed to great and sudden changes, even when they could not deny them to be improvements. A spirit of hostility was thus engendered, and continued to manifest itself by murmur, complaint, and misrepresentation. These, though probably loudest in the islands, were not so effective there as in France, where, the facts being imperfectly known, were easily distorted. The consequence was, that while Labourdonnais was labouring with the utmost zeal and disinterestedness for the public good, he was generally stigmatized among his countrymen as little better than a selfish and capricious tyrant. He appears not to have been aware of the amount of prejudice which had been raised against him till 1740, when, having visited Europe in consequence of the death of his wife, he had ample proof of the bitterness and unscrupulousness with which he was pursued by his enemies.

Labourdonnais took immediate steps to set himself right with the ministry, the directors of the company, and the public at large, and succeeded so well that not only was his resignation refused, but new and important powers were committed to him. In the interviews which he had with Cardinal Fleury and the other members of the French cabinet, he did not rest satisfied with exculpating himself from absurd charges, but gave a full exposition of his views as to the course of policy which ought to be pursued in the East. Assuming that France and Great Britain were about to be at open war, he endeavoured to show that the maintenance of peace between the two East India Companies was impolitic if not impossible, and that no time should be lost in providing a fleet, which, cruising in the Indian Ocean,
might be ready the moment war was declared to establish a complete supremacy. So satisfied was he of the valuable prizes which might be made by preying on the English company, that he offered to form a private association, which would fit out a number of armed vessels at its own expense, and be contented with the profits which might be realized by privateering.

The French government refused to sanction the private scheme, but resolved to effect the same object by means of an expedition consisting of vessels belonging partly to the navy and partly to the East India Company. The command was given to Labourdonnais, who set sail 5th April, 1741, for the Isle of France. His fleet was neither so numerous nor so well equipped as he had anticipated, but he was full of resources in himself, and possessed such a knowledge of naval and military affairs as enabled him to repair the defects of the ships and give the necessary training to the crews and soldiers. His object was to be ready as soon as the declaration of war should reach him to strike the meditated blow. In the meantime he hastened to Pondicherry, which was said to be threatened by the Marathas; and on learning that the danger had blown past, proceeded to the Malabar coast, where Mahe was once more indebted to him for deliverance from a formidable attack of the natives. On again arriving at the Isle of France, in 1742, he met with a bitter disappointment. The directors of the French East India Company had been somewhat cavalierly treated by the government, who had made all their arrangements with Labourdonnais without giving them any proper share in their deliberations. Their consent to his expedition being therefore rather forced than voluntary, they were more disposed to frustrate than to forward it. Accordingly, still dreaming of a possible neutrality between the companies, they easily found a pretext for issuing peremptory orders for the return of their vessels to France. Labourdonnais did not venture to disobey, and thus saw himself deprived of the main part of his fleet at the very time when the period for action was to all appearance about to arrive. His first feeling was again to tender his resignation; but a communication from the French minister approving of his past conduct, and pointing to higher promotion, induced him to remain at his post, and make new efforts to assemble a force which might yet enable him to execute his
original project. He was thus employed when the war was openly declared.

The British government, well aware of what was intended by France, had not omitted to make the necessary preparations. A British squadron, commanded by Commodore Barnet, and consisting of two ships of sixty, one of fifty, and a frigate of twenty guns, appeared opportunely in the eastern seas. At first it cruised in two divisions, in the Straits of Sunda and of Malacca, and made several valuable French prizes. One of the vessels taken was immediately rendered available by being converted into a forty-gun ship, bearing the name of the Medway's Prize. The squadron having left the straits, arrived on the Coromandel coast for the first time in July, 1745. At this time the French had no fleet on the coast, and Pondicherry with its fortifications in an unfinished state had a garrison of only 436 Europeans. It promised to be an easy capture, but was saved by the dexterity of Dupleix, who, aware that force would not avail him, had recourse to diplomacy. Pondicherry, though really independent, belonged nominally to the nabobship of Arcot. This fact was turned to good account by the French governor, who, by flattering the pride of the nabob, and claiming his protection, induced him to intimate to the governor and council of Madras, that any attempt by land on the French settlements in Arcot would be treated as an act of hostility against himself. It was represented to him in reply, that the commander of the squadron, holding his commission directly from the King of Great Britain, was independent of the Company; but he could not, or would not understand the distinction, and only answered, that if his intimation was disregarded he would hold the Company responsible for the consequences. The time had not yet arrived for treating such menaces with defiance; and therefore, on an assurance from the nabob that he would deal impartially between the companies, and issue a similar prohibition to the French, in the event of any meditated attack on the English settlements, Commodore Barnet, at the earnest entreaty of the government of Madras, abandoned all idea of land operations, and, after making a few additional prizes in the Bay of Bengal, retired for shelter during the monsoon to the island of Mergui on the eastern shore. In the beginning of
1746 the squadron returned to the Coromandel coast, and was reinforced from England by two ships of fifty and a frigate of twenty guns. This, however, did not make much addition to its absolute strength, as one of the sixty-gun ships having become unfit for action was sent home, and along with it the original frigate.

The English squadron, confined by the agreement which had been made with the nabob to operations at sea, was unable to effect anything of consequence, and was continuing a cruise rewarded only by a few paltry prizes, when intelligence arrived that Labourdonnais had at last effected his object and sailed for India with a fleet which might be expected to put British prowess to the test. At this critical moment Commodore Barnet died at Fort St. David, and was succeeded by Captain Peyton, who was his second in command, and very imperfectly supplied his place. The squadrons first came in sight of each other on the 25th of June, when the English were cruising on the Coromandel coast near Negapatam. The French fleet consisted of nine ships, the largest of which, mounting seventy guns, of which sixty were eighteen-pounders, carried Labourdonnais' flag. The rest of the ships were of much smaller size and lighter metal, and carried as follows:—one, thirty-six; three, thirty-four; one, thirty; two, twenty-eight; and one, twenty-six guns; almost all twelve and eight pounders. These ships, however, were much larger than the number of their guns indicates, as Labourdonnais, after exerting himself to the utmost under very unfavourable circumstances, had been unable to give them their full complement. On the other hand they carried more than the usual complement of men, having on board 3,300. Of these 700 were Africans or Lascars, and about 300 unfit for duty from sickness. The English had not above half the number of men; but, unlike the majority of the French, they were well disciplined; they had also fewer guns, but more than made up for the deficiency by superior weight.

All things considered, the English squadron had thus decidedly the advantage. So conscious, indeed, was Labourdonnais of his inferiority in real naval strength, that his great object was to come as speedily as possible to close quarters, and turn his superiority in the number of men to account by having
recourse to boarding. In this object he was baffled by the English, whose vessels, besides sailing and manoeuvring better than his, had the advantage of the wind, and succeeded in frustrating all the efforts of Labourdonnais to deprive them of it. From the long time spent by the one party in making and the other in counteracting these efforts, the fight did not commence till four in the afternoon. Owing to the distance maintained, it was almost entirely confined to the cannon, and lasted till nightfall without any decisive results. When the combatants separated, it was apparently with the intention of renewing the engagement on the following day, but Peyton, after obtaining the sanction of a council of war, deemed it prudent to sheer off, and virtually acknowledging a defeat, without having actually sustained it, made the best of his way to Trincomali in Ceylon. The only reason assigned was the leaky condition of the sixty-gun ship.

Labourdonnais, who was waiting to resume the fight, was astonished, when the morning dawned, to find that he had already gained the victory. He could not pursue, as the wind was against him; and, in fact, though he speaks with regret of the enemy having escaped him, was not at all displeased with their departure, inasmuch as his loss had been more severe than theirs, and both the state of his ships and want of provisions must have compelled him speedily to retire. Thanking his good fortune, he steered directly for Pondicherry. Immediately on his arrival, his reception by the governor convinced him that he had little to expect from his co-operation. Dupleix, whose vanity and ambition were still greater than his talents, could not conceal his jealousy of Labourdonnais. He saw in him the person who, in the event of anything befalling himself, was destined to be his successor, and he was mortified to find that an expedition, destined to act within the limits of what he conceived to be his exclusive jurisdiction, had been placed beyond his control, the only instructions given him being to assist it with his advice and second it with his efforts. The feelings which rankled in his mind, scarcely disguised at the first, were soon openly manifested, and led eventually to a course of proceedings which ruined both Labourdonnais and Dupleix, sacrificed the French interests in India, and saved those of Great Britain from impending destruction.
After a short and unsatisfactory consultation, in which the only point settled was, that Labourdonnais' first endeavour must be to clear the coast of the English squadron, he set sail with that view, and had the satisfaction to learn that the danger apprehended from it was groundless. Judging by what the English commander ought to have done, he naturally expected that he would soon reappear, and even though too cautious or cowardly to risk a general action, would keep hovering on the coast, so as to keep up a constant alarm, and make it most hazardous, if not impossible, for the French to disembark their troops for the purpose of making an attempt upon Madras. This was visibly the great object now in contemplation, and to prevent the execution of it the commander of the British fleet ought to have devoted his utmost efforts. After spending a month at Trincomali he did make his appearance, but it was only to repeat his former procedure, and save himself by flight, because he had discovered or imagined, that while his force remained the same, that of the enemy had been augmented by additional guns procured at Pondicherry.

Convinced that he had nothing to fear from the English squadron, Labourdonnais returned to Pondicherry, and began to prepare in earnest for the siege of Madras. It was a prize worth fighting for, and to all appearance might be gained without much struggle. Within the territory belonging to it, and forming a tract which stretched about five miles along the coast and one mile inland, a population of 250,000 had been gathered, but nearly the whole of it consisted of natives, by whom it was known that no resistance would be offered. Madras itself consisted of three divisions. Farthest north was an immense assemblage of huts, huddled together without any order, and occupied entirely by the lowest classes of natives; immediately adjoining this suburb, on the south, was what was called the Black Town, containing many good houses, which belonged to Indian and Armenian merchants, and surrounded by a wall of so little height and strength as to be almost useless for defence; south of this lay the town proper, or Fort St. George. It formed a parallelogram about 400 yards long from north to south, and 100 yards broad. It was inclosed by a slender wall, and defended by four bastions and batteries of defective cons-
There were no outworks. Within the inclosure were an English and Roman Catholic church, the factory and buildings connected with it, and about fifty good houses, occupied by English, or other Europeans under their protection. Their whole number did not exceed 300. Of these 200 were the soldiers of the garrison. Few of the common men and only two or three of the officers had ever seen service.

As the danger which threatened the settlement must have been foreseen, it is impossible to exculpate the authorities from the charge of gross negligence in not providing better against it. If they trusted to the promise of the nabob to interfere for their protection, as he had for that of the French, they were soon made aware of the folly of leaning on such a broken reed. Their application to him was disregarded, either because Dupleix had previously gained his ear, or they were too parsimonious to make a liberal use of the only means which could have rendered it effectual; and Labourdonnais, after completing his preparations without interruption, cast anchor on the 14th of September, about four leagues south of Madras, with nine ships and two bomb-vessels. On board were 2,900 European mariners and soldiers, 400 Africans, 400 Indian natives, and all the artillery and stores necessary for the siege. The soldiers being immediately landed began to advance along the shore, while the fleet proceeded to take up its station as near Madras as it could safely approach.

The fort alone being capable of any resistance, Labourdonnais naturally directed his attack against it, and having erected a battery of nine mortars, on an open space to the west, at the distance of 500 yards, commenced the bombardment. Defence was never seriously contemplated; but immediate surrender was delayed in the hope that the English squadron might make its appearance. Its approach was at one time actually rumoured, and spread such consternation among the French, that they were preparing to decamp: Unhappily for the besieged it proved a false alarm, and Labourdonnais, only urged by it to more strenuous exertions, not only opened another battery to the south, but began to cannonade from the sea. An assault had now become imminent, and in order to avert its horrors, a flag of truce was sent from the town. The deputies who accom-
panied it proposed a ransom, but Labourdonnais at once declared, that though he was not unwilling to entertain such a proposal, it could only be after the capture was completed by a surrender. Ultimately, after he had given his word of honour that the ransom would be moderate, his terms were accepted, and he entered the town in triumph. Though the siege lasted and the bombardment continued with interruptions from the 18th to the 25th of September, so bloodless was it that not one Frenchman was killed, and only five Englishmen.

By the terms of capitulation the whole of the merchandise and the moveable property passed at once to the captors, and all the English became prisoners of war. The important point of the ransom remained to be settled, but the honourable and liberal spirit which characterized Labourdonnais' proceedings made it impossible to doubt that it would be fairly, amicably, and generously arranged. Suddenly it was whispered that a serious difficulty had arisen. Dupleix, on the ground that Madras was locally within his government of India, claimed a right to dispose of it. So confident was he of possessing this right, or at least so determined was he to insist upon it, that on receiving a letter from the Nabob of Arcot, who had now, when too late, endeavoured to interdict the French from laying siege to Madras, he had pacified him by promising that the town when taken would be delivered into his hands. From the subsequent proceedings of Dupleix it is plain that he never meant to have fulfilled this promise. It furnished him, however, with a plausible pretext for sending a letter to Labourdonnais, in which he desired him not to consent to any terms of ransom, and intimated for the first time that he considered himself entitled to speak authoritatively on the subject.

Before this letter arrived; the capitulation, including the ransom as one of its essential conditions, had taken place. As a completed act, Labourdonnais could not honourably recede. Nor did he wish it; for, so far from acquiescing in the alleged right of Dupleix to dictate the terms of the capitulation, he regarded it as an arrogant assumption, at total variance with their respective commissions. Instead of deviating from the course originally chalked out, he proceeded to fix the amount of the ransom. Dupleix now listened only to his passion, and even end-
eavoured to gain his object by attempting to seize the person of Labourdonnais, and tampering with the soldiers under his command. At Pondicherry, also, he entered on a course of intrigue, and endeavoured to gain a kind of sanction to his proceedings, by inducing the French inhabitants to petition and protest against the ransom as most injurious to French interests. Labourdonnais remained unmoved, and intimated his determination not to quit Madras until every stipulation to which he had consented should be honourably performed. Vilence having thus proved unavailing, Dupleix saw the necessity of changing his tactics, and while weaving new pretexts for delaying the actual restoration of Madras to the English, solemnly bound himself to carry it into effect as soon as certain preliminary arrangements were completed.

During the heat of the quarrel between the two French governors, three ships of war, one of seventy-two, and two of forty guns, with 1,366 men on board, arrived at Pondicherry. Added to the force which Labourdonnais already possessed, they gave him such an ascendency as placed all the other English settlements in India at his mercy. To all appearance nothing could now save Bombay and Calcutta from sharing the fate of Madras. This petty quarrel saved them. Labourdonnais, detained by it, lost his opportunity. The very day after the ransom had been fixed, by regular treaty, at eleven lacs of pagodas, nearly £440,000 sterling, the monsoon commenced with a furious hurricane, by which six ships of the French fleet lying in the Madras Roads were driven out to sea. One of them, foundered: four of the others, including the seventy-gun ship, were completely dismasted, and otherwise seriously injured. In fact, the French marine force in the East was so completely crippled as to be afterwards incapable of achieving anything of consequence.

Labourdonnais, trusting to the promise of Dupleix faithfully to perform all the conditions of the capitulation, finally quitted Madras, committing the charge of it to a member of the council of Pondicherry. On arriving at this place, he left as many soldiers and sailors as, with those previously there, amounted to 3,000 Europeans. His whole fleet now consisted of only seven ships, four of them in good and three in wretched condition. He sailed on the 20th of October, intending to proceed for Acheen
with the whole; but, when at sea, changed his intention with regard to the three, on finding that even if capable of reaching that port they would be unserviceable, and steered with them directly for the Mauritius. He had quitted that island at the head of a powerful armament, with which he was confident of achieving glorious results. How mortifying must have been the contrast presented by his return! His misfortunes, however, were not yet ended. During his absence he had been superseded in his government, and nothing remained for him but to return to Europe shorn of all his honours. The voyage was singularly unfortunate. After passing the Cape of Good Hope, he narrowly escaped capture by British cruisers; and, having been obliged to part company with the other ships of the fleet, arrived in the West Indies. Here, as war was not yet declared between France and Holland, he took passage in a Dutch vessel which touched at Falmouth. The officials there, probably acting on information which had been given them, recognized him, and he was carried to London as a prisoner of war. The reception given him was equally honourable to himself and to those to whom he owed it. All classes vied in testifying respect and showing kindness, and when he expressed a wish to return to France, he found even among the directors of the Company on whom his skill and prowess had inflicted such heavy losses, a generous individual ready to become security for him to the whole amount of his fortune. The very idea of security, however, was scouted, and his parole was at once declared sufficient. The short period during which Labourdonnais was less the prisoner than the guest of England was the last during which fortune may be said to have smiled upon him. The moment he reached his native shore, her persecutions again commenced. He had performed services which entitled him to the highest honours his country could bestow. Instead of reward, only a dungeon awaited him, and he was immured in the Bastile on the 2nd of March, 1748. Here he was left to pine away twenty-six months before he was permitted to communicate with the council, and though most of the charges made against him carried their refutation along with them, and the few which had any plausibility were proved to be groundless, three years elapsed before his acquittal was pronounced. What could it now avail him? The judicial murder
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had already been committed; and, after a short struggle with disease and poverty, death came to his relief. The injustice of which he had been the victim was afterwards formally though very inadequately recognized, by a pension to his widow, the grant bearing on the face of it that he had died "without receiving any reward for so many services, or any compensation for so many persecutions."
The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle

At the time of Labourdonnaís' departure, Dupleix stood pledged to the restoration of Madras in January, 1747. Meanwhile his duplicity had involved him in a serious difficulty. When only anticipating the capture of the town, he had neutralized the threatened opposition of Anwar-ud-din, Nabob of Arcot, by promising to make him a present of it. This promise served its purpose at the time, and he had thought no more of it; but the nabob was not to be thus duped, and on finding that it was not to be voluntarily surrendered to him, sent his son, Maphaz Khan, at the head of an army of 10,000 men, to take it by force. Dupleix was, or from policy pretended to be afraid, and proposed negotiation. The effect only was to confirm Maphaz Khan in the belief that his arms were irresistible. Without listening to the two deputies who had been sent to treat with him, he imprisoned them, and proceeded to take up his position near the spot where Labourdonnaís had erected his batteries. His subsequent operations displayed considerable skill. A shallow stream which ran along the west side of the town, and reached the sea about 700 yards below, was so dammed up at its mouth by a mound of sand as to form a kind of wet ditch. To get rid of this obstruction, he employed a great number of men to make an outlet for the water by cutting through the mound; and at the same time sent a strong party three miles to the north to take possession of the only spring from which the inhabitants were supplied with good water. Thus threatened, Dupleix opened his fire from the walls on the 21st of October. He had no idea, however, of submitting to the indignity of a siege, and therefore, on the following day, sent out a body of 400 men to act on the offensive. They had with them two field-pieces, which they
had concealed, and with which, when the enemy advanced with an appearance of resolution, they opened a most destructive fire. The Mughuls, who had never seen artillery so served before, were confounded, especially at the rapidity of the discharges, turned backs, and fled with the utmost precipitation. The French had their not lost a single man, and remained masters of the whole tents and baggage. Maphaz Khan seemed disposed, after collecting his scattered troops, to make a stand in the neighbourhood, but on learning that the French expected a reinforcement from Pondicherry, hastened off to St. Thome, situated on the coast, about four miles to the south. In this town—which, known to the natives as Mailapur, owes its European name to a tradition of being the place where the apostle St. Thomas suffered martyrdom, and had attained great splendour under the Portuguese, though it had again sunk into comparative insignificance—Maphaz Khan occupied a position which, had he known to profit by it, would have cut off the communication between Pondicherry and Madras. This was obviously his intention, but he managed so ill as only to place himself between two fires, the reinforcement from the former advancing to attack him in front, while a detachment of 400 men from the latter attacked his rear. The detachment arrived so late that this part of the plan failed. The reinforcement, however, persisted in their original intention, and after forcing a passage across a stream, on the north side of which the enemy were advantageously posted, drove them back at the point of the bayonet, and following close upon their heels into the town, where both resistance and retreat were impossible, made fearful slaughter. Conspicuous among the fugitives, who escaped to the plain to the westward, was Maphaz Khan, mounted on an elephant, on which the great standard was displayed. These encounters with the native troops established a new era in Indian warfare. The infinite superiority of European discipline was no longer doubtful; and from the valour displayed by some of the natives who had been exercised in it, and fought on the French side, the important fact was discovered that a native army might be formed, and so trained as to become the most effectual instrument of European domination. The first great exemplification of this fact, if not the discovery of it, is unquestionably due to Dupleix.
While gaining these laurels, the governor of Pondicherry was meditating an act of gross iniquity. The law of nations, as well as solemn pledges given to Labourdonnais, bound him to restore Madras in return for a ransom which had been stipulated, and the amount of which had been fixed by regular agreement. In utter disregard of these obligations, he summoned a meeting of the inhabitants on the 30th of October, and there, while the garrison was drawn up in arms, caused a manifesto to be read, acquainting the English with the injustice which he had resolved to perpetrate, and of which they were forthwith to be made the victims. This infamous document annulled the treaty of ransom, confiscated all the property of the English, and offered them personally only the alternative of remaining on parole as prisoners of war till exchanged, or of being arrested and sent to Pondicherry. Several of them, to escape this disgraceful treatment, disguised themselves and found their way to Fort St. David; but the English governor and a number of the principal inhabitants were actually carried under escort to Pondicherry, and ostentatiously paraded before 50,000 spectators. In a similar spirit the threatened confiscation was executed with the utmost rigour, and many private families were utterly ruined.

Fort St. David, the most important English settlement on the Coromandel coast after Madras, became, on the capture of the latter, the seat of the presidency. The fort, situated 100 miles south of Madras, and fourteen south of Pondicherry, was small but strong, and formed the nucleus of a considerable territory, including within it the important town of Cuddalore. This town, which lies about a mile south of the fort, at the mouth of the Pennar, was surrounded on three sides by a wall flanked with bastions, and, though nearly open to the sea, was separated from it by a narrow belt of sand thrown up by the waves, and skirted on the north and east by a shallow stream. The object of Dupleix being to banish the English entirely from the coast, his task seemed only half finished while Fort St. David remained in their possession. No time, therefore, was lost in fitting out an expedition against it. The command was intended for a Swiss of the name of Paradis, who was recalled for the purpose from Madras, where he had acted as governor under Dupleix, and been the willing instrument of his infamous proceedings. He
left Madras in the beginning of December, with 300 Europeans, and had proceeded south about twenty miles, encumbered with ill-gotten booty, when Maphaz Khan, who was burning to revenge his disgrace, suddenly made his appearance at the head of 3,000 horse and 2,000 foot. Great as was the disproportion of numbers, Paradis kept the enemy at bay, and arrived at the Dutch settlement of Sadras, ten miles south of the place, where he was attacked with the loss of only twelve men, who were taken prisoners and paraded by Maphaz Khan as proof of his having obtained a victory. A reinforcement sent from Pondicherry enabled the whole to arrive there without further interruption.

The force destined to act against Fort St. David consisted of 1,700 men, mostly Europeans, with six field-pieces and as many mortars. Before it set out the officers refused to serve under Paradis, and compelled him by a kind of mutiny to resign the command to M. Bury, to whom it was considered to belong by right of seniority. At daybreak on the 9th of December, the Pennar, which falls into the sea about a mile and a half north of the fort, was reached and immediately crossed, with no show of opposition except from a few native soldiers, who fired under cover from the surrounding thickets. A greater resistance had been anticipated, as it was understood that the nabob had entered into close league with the English, and promised a large supply of troops. Assuming that he had not fulfilled, and in all probability was not disposed to fulfil his promise, the French resolved to leave the fort behind, and make a sudden dash at the town of Cuddalore. There seemed little risk, as the garrison of the fort mustered no more than 200 Europeans, and 100 topasses, or natives of Portuguese descent; and the whole force without it, for the defence of the territory, consisted of about 2,000 peons, or native soldiers, not disciplined according to the example which the French had already set, and so imperfectly armed that scarcely 900 of them had muskets.

A few of these peons had been stationed about a quarter of a mile from the place where the French had forded the river. It belonged to a summer residence of the governor of the fort, and was inclosed by a brick wall, which, together with the house and the court of buildings attached to it, might have furnished the means of a vigorous defence. The
peons, however, were not capable of making it, and were no sooner attacked than they abandoned the post. The French troops, having now no apprehension of danger, began to refresh themselves from the fatigues of their march, and were sleeping, or cooking, or straggling about without their arms, when a sudden cry arose that an enemy was approaching from the westward. It proved to be a body of 6,000 horse and 3,000 foot belonging to the nabob, and led by his two sons, Maphaz Khan and Muhammed Ali. So great was the consternation of the French, that instead of attempting to profit by their position, they rushed out and made directly for the river, which, owing to the want of skill and courage on the part of their assailants, they crossed without sustaining any serious loss except that of their baggage. The garrison of the fort perceiving their flight sallied out, and, joining the nabob’s troops, continued the pursuit for six miles. The enemy, brought to bay, faced about and offered battle; but it was not thought prudent to attack them, and they were permitted to return unmolested to Pondicherry.

Dupleix, grievously disappointed at the failure of his attempt, determined to renew it in a different form, and secretly despatched 500 men in boats, with instructions to proceed to Cuddalore, and take it by surprise, by entering the river, and landing on the east side, where it had no defences. He had underrated the difficulties. While the boats were passing through the surf, many of the soldiers could only save their lives by throwing aside their arms; and even after they had reached the river, were so overwhelmed by a hard gale from the south, that they thought themselves fortunate in being able to secure their own safety by putting back to sea. Again disappointed, Dupleix turned his arms in a different direction, and commenced a war of devastation within the nabob’s territories adjoining Madras. Mere passion may have suggested this apparently wanton procedure, though subsequent events seem to prove that there was deep design in it. His knowledge of the native character made him perfectly aware that the nabob would dissolve his alliance with the British the moment he was convinced that it was not his interest to maintain it. This was the conviction to which Dupleix was now labouring to bring him. He had little difficulty in succeeding. After a short negotiation, the nabob consented to throw
his weight into the French scale, recalled his army from Fort St. David, and sent Maphaz Khan to Pondicherry, where a most pompous reception was given to him, and the new alliance was formally proclaimed.

It now seemed as if the situation of the British on the Coromandel coast was desperate. They had been abandoned by their only ally, and after looking in vain for assistance from home, had almost ceased to hope for it. Ever since the capture of Madras the only relief which had reached them was by a vessel from Ceylon, which, on the 19th of February, 1747, brought a supply of £60,000 in silver for the exhausted treasury, and twenty recruits for the garrison of Fort St. David. This relief, paltry though it was, could not have come more opportunely, for on the 2nd of March the French were again seen approaching. They were the same troops as before, but the former failure had so far humbled the officers that they had been prevailed on to receive Paradis as their commander. On reaching the banks of the Pennar, they were somewhat surprised to find that the passage was to be contested. The garrison, as if a new spirit had been infused into it, had marched boldly out, and stood posted on the opposite bank, with three field-pieces and a troop of horse, composed chiefly of volunteers. A cannonade commenced, and was kept up with some spirit till the evening, when the French effected a passage at a point out of cannon-shot, and the garrison deemed it prudent to retire. By a singular coincidence the garden was again occupied, only to be precipitately abandoned. A number of ships were described approaching the roads. The French only waited to satisfy themselves that they were English and hastened off for Pondicherry.

It proved to be the long looked for British squadron. It had remained inactive in Bengal, but had at length ventured out, under the command of Admiral Griffin, who had arrived from England with two ships, one of sixty and the other of forty guns. There was no enemy to encounter it; and partly by troops brought with it from Bengal, and partly by subsequent reinforcements from England and Bombay, Fort St. David was garrisoned so strongly as to be beyond the reach of danger. The aspect of affairs had now completely changed, and it was the turn of M. Dupleix to feel alarm. It soon appeared, however,
that there was not much cause for it. Admiral Griffin seemed satisfied with his acknowledged supremacy at sea without attempting to derive any benefit from it; and the whole season for action passed away with no more important result than the destruction of a fifty-gun ship which had belonged to Labourdonnaïs' squadron, and was lying in the roads of Madras. On the approach of the October monsoon an attempt was made to remain on the coast, but it was found impossible, and all the ships were ultimately obliged to take shelter at Trincomali.

In the beginning of 1748 the squadron returned to Fort St. David, and at the same time Major Lawrence, a British officer of distinguished merit, arrived to take the command of all the Company's forces in India. For some months nothing of moment occurred. In consequence of a rumour that Dupleix was about to renew his designs on Cuddalore, Major Lawrence formed a camp between the garden already mentioned and the banks of the Pennar. Here he had remained for some time, when the alarming discovery was made, that though not yet disposed to risk a new campaign, the French governor had, with characteristic cunning and duplicity, been endeavouring to prepare for it by tampering with the fidelity of the native troops in British pay. The commander of a body of 400 sepoys sent from the English settlement at Tellicherry had promised to desert with them to the French in the first engagement that should happen; and within the fort itself, an Indian, who had acted as interpreter and agent to the English governor of Madras, was ascertained to have long carried on a treacherous correspondence with the enemy, by communicating with Madame Dupleix in the Malabar tongue. The interpreter and an accomplice suffered death, and the commander of the Tellicherry sepoys, together with ten of their other officers, were banished to St. Helena.

A more honourable warfare than that to which Dupleix had thus stooped was now anticipated. A French squadron of seven large ships and two smaller vessels, which had sailed from the Mauritius in the end of April, were seen on the 10th of June sailing in the direction of Fort St. David. The English fleet in the roads consisted of three ships of sixty, three of fifty, three of forty, and one of twenty guns, and could scarcely have failed,
if the enemy had been brought to action, to gain a victory. Unfortunately the admiral and several of his officers were on shore, and so much time elapsed before the ships put to sea, that the opportunity was lost. The French commander, aware of his inferiority, had never-intended to fight, and had only assumed the appearance of it, the better to disguise his main object, which was to land 400 soldiers and £200,000 in silver at Pondicherry. Having succeeded in this, he at once quitted the coast, and left Admiral Griffin, after a vain attempt to discover him, to reap the fruits of what he called his bad fortune, but many designated by a harsher name. The latter was the view taken by a court-martial in England, and he was suspended from the service.

The English fleet, while engaged in its fruitless search of the hostile squadron, had arrived at Madras. From the state of wind, some days must necessarily elapse before it could return to Fort St. David; and so bent was Dupleix on effecting the capture in which he had been so often baffled, that he determined to avail himself of the interval in making another attack on Cuddalore. The force employed consisted of 800 Europeans and 1,000 sepoys, who, by pursuing a circuitous route from Pondicherry, arrived in the morning of the 7th of June at the hills of Bandapolam. Cuddalore was only three miles distant, and the plan was to halt till the night, and then come upon it by surprise. Major Lawrence, made aware of what was intended, determined to meet stratagem by stratagem, and caused all the cannon to be brought from Cuddalore into the fort. His object was to make the French believe that he had taken this step because he thought the place untenable, and meant to abandon it without a struggle. The stratagem succeeded; and the French, advancing under the full belief that they were about to make an easy conquest, had actually applied their scaling-ladders to the walls, when a fire of musketry from all the ramparts, and four or five pieces of cannon loaded with grape-shot, opened upon them. The cannon, openly removed by day, had been secretly replaced at nightfall, and the garrison had at the same time been reinforced. Of these facts the French were of course ignorant, and hence their consternation was extreme. The panic seized officers as well as men, and the whole rushed off in headlong flight.
The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle

The Indian struggle had hitherto attracted comparatively little notice in England; but at last both the government and the Company awakened to a full sense of its importance, and resolved to make adequate preparations. A fleet consisting of seven ships of the navy, with a bomb-ship and tender, and eleven ships of the Company, carrying military stores and 1,400 regular troops, sailed from England in November, under the command of Admiral Boscawen. At the Cape of Good Hope it was joined by six ships of the Dutch East India Company, having 400 soldiers on board, and after a considerable detention by contrary winds, proceeded for the Mauritius, which was seen on the 23rd of June. It was expected that both this island and that of Bourbon would fall easy conquests, but the difficulties proved greater than had been anticipated; and after a series of attempts rendered futile by gross blunders, it was resolved by a council of war that, as the capture, even if practicable, was only a secondary object, the armament ought to proceed forthwith to the Coromandel coast, which was its primary destination. It arrived at Fort St. David on the 29th of July, and being joined by the squadron of Admiral Griffin, whose services had entitled him to nothing better than a court-martial, constituted the most powerful naval force which had ever been brought to the East Indies by any European nation. It consisted of thirty ships, thirteen of them ships of the line, and none of them of less than 500 tons burden.

The English at Fort St. David were elated above measure, and felt full of confidence that they were not only about to recover Madras but to avenge all the injustice they had suffered, by the capture of Pondicherry. They might well have this confidence, for they were scarcely less powerful by land than by sea, mustering in all, for service on shore, 3,720 Europeans, 300 topasses, and about 2,000 imperfectly disciplined sepoys. To these was to be added such a force as might be sent by the Nabob of Arcot, who, suspecting that fortune was again to change sides, had cast in his lot with the British. To strike at once at the centre of the French power and influence, Pondicherry was made the very first object of attack. The heavy cannon and cumbersome stores were transported in the ships, which anchored two miles south of the town, while the army continued its course along the shore.
The town of Pondicherry, situated eighty-six miles S.S.W. of Madras, occupied a gentle declivity at the south-east extremity of a long flat hill, and stretched, at the distance of about seventy yards from the shore, rather more than a mile from north to south, and nearly three-quarters of a mile inland. It was at this time one of the best built cities in India, and, when viewed from the sea, presented at once a pleasing and commanding appearance. For the latter it was indebted to several conspicuous public edifices, and more especially to a citadel, which, though of small dimensions, was of considerable strength. It stood within the town, and, along with it, was inclosed on the three sides toward the land by a ditch, and a wall and rampart flanked with bastions. The eastern side, facing the sea, was defended by several batteries, which were capable of mounting 100 cannons, and completely commanded the roadstead. At the distance of a mile from the walls, a large hedge of aloes and other thorny plants, intermingled with cocoa-nut and other palms, commenced on the north at the sea-shore, and was carried round, for above five miles, in a regular curve, by the west and south, till it reached in the latter direction the river of Ariancupan. This hedge, impenetrable to cavalry, and not easily to be passed even by infantry, formed, with the river, which fell into the sea a mile and a half below, a complete line of defence. So carefully had this object been attended to, that at each of the openings made in the hedge for the four roads which led from the town to the surrounding country, there was a redoubt mounted with cannon, and near the point where the hedge joined the river, a small fort bearing the same name had been erected.

Owing to the time which had been lost on the outward voyage, partly by contrary winds and partly by the injudicious attempt on the Mauritius, the season was far advanced when the besiegers commenced operations. Every day, therefore, was of the utmost consequence, and not an hour ought to have been spent, except upon some object which would contribute essentially to a successful result. Unfortunately a very different principle of action was adopted, and the troops, instead of proceeding at once to Pondicherry, stopped short at the fort of Ariancupan. From a very extraordinary neglect on the part of
the authorities of Fort St. David, no means had been used, though the fleet had long been expected, to obtain such accurate information as would be needed when the siege should commence. Hence, when Ariancupan was approached, no person could be found to give any accurate description of its works or its garrison. An engineer sent to reconnoitre, was afraid to go near enough to make the necessary observations, and represented it as a place of no strength, though covered by an entrenchment, while a deserter reported that it was defended only by 100 sepoys. This information was inaccurate, for the fort was a triangle, regularly fortified, and surrounded by a deep dry ditch, full of pitfalls, and the garrison consisted of 100 Europeans and 300 sepoys, under an active European officer. Admiral Boscawen, thus grossly misled, ordered an immediate assault. It was made with the greatest bravery, but with the most disastrous results. The storming party persisted, from mere shame, after they saw that success was impossible, and did not retire till 150 of their number were struck down by musketry and grape-shot, and Major Goodere, the most experienced officer of the king’s troops, was mortally wounded.

This was an ominous commencement, but the next step taken was still more reprehensible. When it was seen that the fort possessed greater means of resistance than had been imagined, there was no necessity for remaining before it. A small detachment would have sufficed to watch it, and prevent any danger that could have arisen from its being left behind. All this was overlooked, and the siege of Pondicherry was postponed till this paltry place could be forced to yield. The French were too skilful not to profit by the egregious blunder, and by holding the fort as long as possible, gained the incalculable advantage of stopping the entire progress of the besiegers during eighteen days. Even at last it was not so much taken as abandoned, in consequence of the accidental explosion of a large quantity of gunpowder.

The besieging army moved from Ariancupan on the 26th of August, and proceeded, after forcing the redoubt which guarded the opening in the hedge leading to the north-west, to prepare for commencing operations in that quarter, the engineers having selected it as the most eligible. To facilitate the communication between the fleet and the camp, the ships were
moved to the north of the town. In sieges, the first parallel is usually made within 800 yards of the covered way, but so ignorant were the engineers of the commonest rules of their profession, that when they opened ground on the 30th of August, it was at the distance of 1,500 yards. By slow and laborious steps, they kept creeping on till they reached the distance at which they ought to have begun, and then only made the astounding discovery that they had begun the siege from a wrong direction. Between their works and the town lay a morass, which, by means of a back water, had been flooded. What was now to be done? September was already far spent, and the rainy season would soon commence. To commence anew was impossible, and the only alternative which remained was to retire at once, or to persist in operations which held out little or no promise of success. The former part of the alternative was the wiser, but shame mingled with other considerations to prevent the adoption of it, and by great exertions, during which many lives were lost, two batteries of eighteen and twenty-four pounders, the one of eight and the other of four pieces of cannon, were constructed on the edge of the morass; these were followed by two bomb-batteries. The fire, which would have been crushing at a shorter distance, produced little effect, and was, moreover, returned double by the besiegers. A kind of diversion was attempted by the ships, which began to batter the town, but as those of two tiers could not come nearer than 1,000 yards, their fire never told. According to the French account, the only person killed was an old Malabar woman passing along the street.

The final result was now only too apparent. No impression had been made on the defences, sickness prevailed in the camp, and the rainy season had commenced. The ships ran the risk of being driven off the coast, perhaps wrecked upon it; and the country would in all probability become so flooded, that the removal of the cannon and heavy stores, though still practicable, would soon be impossible. To persist would therefore have been madness, and the decision of a council of war was scarcely necessary to sanction the order which was issued to raise the siege. Five days were employed in the humiliating process, and on the 6th of October, the troops began their march back to
Fort St. David. The mortality, by casualty or sickness, had been very great, particularly among the Europeans, of whom 1,065 out of the original 3,720, or very nearly a third of the whole, perished. The survivors, at least those of them who were responsible for the operations, had not the satisfaction of thinking that they had done their duty; for the whole siege, from first to last, exhibited nothing but a tissue of monstrous blunders.

The French garrison, originally 1,800 Europeans and 3,000 sepoys, lost only 200 of the former and about fifty of the latter, and were therefore well entitled to sing their Te Deums. Even Dupleix may be excused for the ostentatious vanity he displayed in sending bombastic letters to all the native princes, including the Mughul himself, intimating how gloriously he had triumphed. There cannot be a doubt that, by the issue of this siege, the reputation of the French for military prowess rose in India far above that of any other European nation, and that many years and signal victories were required to restore to the British the reputation which they had lost.

The British, notwithstanding the disgrace and loss which had befallen them, were still more powerful than their rivals, and might therefore hope for an early opportunity of regaining their laurels. Pondicherry was beyond their reach, but Madras remained to be recovered. That this would be the next object attempted, was in itself sufficiently probable. Though captured fairly by Labourdonnais, the retention of it was a gross fraud. Of this Dupleix himself could not but be conscious, and hence it is easy to understand how unwilling he was, after incurring infamy in order to obtain the possession of it, to incur the risk of having it again wrested from him. His anxiety to retain thus equalling the eagerness of the original possessors to recover, he exerted himself in strengthening its defences. At first, indeed, he acted as if he had resolved to raze it entirely to the ground, and commenced the work of destruction by laying the black town in ashes. Very inconsistently with this proceeding, he shortly after began to make improvements on the white town, and had rendered it much more capable than before of standing a siege, when he had the mortification to learn that all his labour was in vain, as Madras was about to return unransomed and improved to its former possessors. Hostilities between
Great Britain and France had been terminated by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, and possession was to be restored as nearly as might be to the state in which it was at the commencement of the war. It would be difficult, and is not necessary, to decide how far the interests of the two rival companies were beneficially or injuriously affected by the treaty of peace. In some respects both were gainers. The British recovered Madras; the French escaped from the disasters which were evidently impending over them, in consequence of the maritime supremacy which their rivals had established.

Now that the sword had been sheathed, and there was neither necessity nor pretext for keeping up powerful and expensive armaments, the natural course for all parties would have been to abandon all schemes of territorial aggrandisement, and confine themselves, in accordance with their original profession, to the peaceful pursuits of commerce. On the other hand, there were strong temptations to deviate from this course. The Mughul empire was only the shadow of what it had once been; in all quarters chiefs who had formerly been subordinate were aspiring to independence, and, to all appearance, a general scramble for territory was about to ensue. Under such circumstances, why should the two most powerful nations of Europe consent to have their hands tied up, and to remain inactive spectators of a struggle in which their interests, perhaps their very existence was involved? Why should they not become, if not principals, at least auxiliaries, and give—or, not to mince the matter—sell their skill and prowess to the party able and willing to pay for them most liberally? Such thoughts had long been familiar to Dupleix, whose imagination was warmed, and ambition inflamed, while he contemplated the possibility of associating his name with the establishment of a French Indian empire. The superiority of the forces which he could bring into the field could no longer be called in question. With a mere handful of men he had already put armies to flight. Haughty chiefs, who formerly despised him, had crouchingly courted his alliance, and he had only to temper force with policy, in order to compel or persuade them to acknowledge him as their master. In the English Company no individual had yet appeared in a position which permitted him to entertain, or pointed him out to others
as destined to realize similar views; but there can be no doubt that, both at home and abroad, territorial aggrandisement in India was by many contemplated as practicable, and longed for as most desirable. The question of aggrandisement being thus virtually decided in the affirmative, both by France and England, the contest for Indian supremacy did not cease, but only changed its form, in consequence of the peace; and the troops of the two nations, no longer permitted to turn their arms directly against each other, had recourse to the expedient of doing it indirectly, by taking opposite sides in native quarrels. To show in what manner, to what extent, and with what results this was done, it will now be necessary to give some account of that portion of Southern India where this species of armed neutrality between the British and French was first exhibited.
The Carnatic

The Carnatic, anciently called Canara, properly denotes the tract of country where the Canara language is spoken, but has long since lost its original application, and has two principal meanings, one more extensive, and the other more limited; the former, including under it nearly the whole of the south-eastern portion of the Indian peninsula, from the Krishna to Cape Comorin, and the latter adopting the same northern limit, but not descending further south than the country immediately north of the Coleroon, and at the same time so confining it on the west as not to leave it an average breadth of more than seventy-five miles. In this latter sense the Carnatic is nearly identical with the territory which, under the Mughul empire, formed one of the principal provinces of the subah or government of the Deccan, and was administered by the subahdar’s nabob or deputy, under the title of the Nabob of Arcot, the whole nabobship taking its name from Arcot, the capital. The country thus defined consists of two portions, differing greatly in their physical features, and distinguished from each other by the names of Balaghat and Pavinghat, or the land above and land beneath the mountain passes. The Balaghat, covered by a portion of the Eastern Ghats, is elevated, and forms a kind of table-land, not so much traversed by continuous ridges as broken up by isolated hills and mountains, rising in precipitous masses, and not infrequently separated from each other by deep ravines. The Pavinghat, on the contrary, is a maritime flat, little elevated above sea level, and traversed by the beds of numerous streams, generally dry during the hot, but filled to overflowing during the rainy season. Immediately south of the nabobship of Arcot, and
separated from it by a boundary not well defined, were the two rajahships or Hindu states of Trichinopoly and Tanjore, which, though governed by their own princes, were so far dependent on the Nabob of Arcot, who levied tribute from them, not indeed in his own name, but as the deputy of the Mughul.

The Nabobship of Arcot was held from 1710 to 1732 by an able and popular chief, of the name of Sadatulla, or, more properly, Sadat Ulla Khan. The office was not recognized as hereditary. It was held by commission from Delhi, but in the event of the Mughul not exercising, or delaying to exercise the right of nomination, a temporary appointment was made by the Subahdar of the Deccan. Such was the regular mode of procedure when the Mughul empire was in vigour; but in the state of decay into which it had fallen, the imperial commission was regarded as only a form, and the right of appointment was tacitly, if not overtly contested between the Subahdar and the nabob, the one claiming it as his prerogative, and the other striving to render it hereditary in his family. Sadat Ulla having no issue, had adopted the two sons of his brother, and left a will by which he destined the nabobship to Dost Ali, the elder, and the subordinate government of Vellore to Bakar Ali the younger. By the same deed he conferred the office of dewan or prime minister on Ghulam Hussain, the nephew of his favourite wife. Nizam-ul-Mulk, who, as has been already seen, regarded himself as independent sovereign of the Deccan, not having been consulted in these appointments, regarded them as encroachments on his authority, but, owing to other political entanglements at the time, was not in a position to give effect to his resentment.

Dost Ali, at the time of his succession, had two sons, of whom the elder, Safdar Ali, was arrived at man's estate, and several daughters, one of whom was married to Murtaza Khan, or Mortiz Ali, his brother's son, and another to a distant relation of the name of Chanda Sahib, whose daughter by a former marriage was the wife of the above Ghulam Hussain, Dost Ali's dewan. Chanda Sahib, thus son-in-law to the nabob and father-in-law to his minister, naturally possessed great influence at court. His ambition tempted, and his talents enabled him to make the most of it. Ere long, under a pretext of assisting
his father-in-law in administering the office of dewan, he had managed to supplant him. Not satisfied with the civil power thus placed entirely in his hands, he aspired to military power also, and obtained it by ingratiating himself with the soldiers.

The Raja of Trichinopoly had died, like Sadat Ulla, in 1732, and, like him, also without issue. He had destined the succession to his first wife, but it was claimed by a collateral male heir, who, by the support of the commander-in-chief, pushed the rani, or queen, to the desperate step of soliciting the aid of the Nabob of Arcot. It was readily granted; and an army entered the rajaship, ostensibly for the purpose of collecting the accustomed tribute, but with a secret understanding that it was to support the queen. It was commanded by Safdar Ali and Chanda Sahib, and gradually approached the capital, where the queen still held possession, but by a tenure so precarious, that the admission of a portion of the nabob’s troops was deemed necessary to her safety. She was well aware of the danger which she thus incurred, and took what she conceived to be an effectual security against it, by requiring Chanda Sahib, who conducted the negotiation, to take an oath on the Koran, that the admitted troops should be employed solely to re-establish her authority, and then be withdrawn. He took the oath, but having no intention to keep it, took it only on a brick wrapped up in the usual splendid covering of the Koran, and no sooner gained possession than he made the rani prisoner, and hoisted the Muhammadan flag. Measures had been so effectually taken, not only in the fortress of Trichinopoly, but at various other stations, that the whole country submitted without resistance to this abominable treachery.

Safdar Ali returned home, leaving Chanda Sahib as governor. The office of dewan of Arcot having thus become vacant, was conferred on Mir Assad, Safdar Ali’s preceptor, who, well aware of Chanda Sahib’s ambitious character, quickly perceived the serious blunder which had been committed in making him ruler of Trichinopoly. It was more than probable that he would be tempted to revolt, and then the tribute withheld would be the least part of the loss, as the independence of the nabobship itself would be endangered. These representations had their full effect on Safdar Ali, but were lost on his father, Dost Ali, who,
besides being of an indolent temper, was disposed to judge Chanda Sahib more favourably, and refused to sanction any proceedings against him. The fact, however, that such proceedings had been urged, was not lost on Chanda Sahib, who immediately took measures for his protection, by putting Trichinopoly in a complete state of defence, and intrusting tried friends with his other most important stations.

Safdar Ali and Mir Assad, unable to obtain the nabob's concurrence in their designs against Chanda Sahib, determined to pursue them without his knowledge, and entered into a negotiation with the Marathas. The plan was, that the Marathas, under the pretext of levying the *chauth* which the nabob had withheld, should invade his territories, and then, when Chanda Sahib came to his relief, as it was anticipated he would, suddenly unite their forces with Safdar Ali, and make a dash at Trichinopoly. By this intricate and tortuous policy, they overshot the mark. Dost Ali, knowing nothing of underhand arrangements with the Marathas, saw only that his territories were attacked, and, with more spirit than might have been expected from his age and habits, took post with a handful of men in a pass which was supposed, though erroneously, to be the only one through which the invaders could descend into the low country. He was here encountered, defeated, and slain. Safdar Ali, who had misgivings as to the course which the Marathas might pursue, retired, on hearing his father's fate, to Vellore, while Chanda Sahib, who had been advancing into Arcot with an auxiliary force, hastened back to secure his own interests at Trichinopoly.

The Marathas, aware of the advantage which they had gained, thought no more of their engagements with Safdar Ali, and, as a means of forcing him to any terms which they were pleased to dictate, commenced their usual system of plunder and devastation. Safdar, anxious above all things to be immediately confirmed in the succession which had opened to him by his father's death, complied with all their demands, and purchased their departure by agreeing to pay them, by instalments, 10,000,000 rupees, equivalent to £1,000,000 sterling. This was the only part of the treaty made public, but there was another article, kept secret for very obvious reasons, which handed over Chanda Sahib to their mercy, and left them free
to appropriate as much of his territory as they could conquer at their own expense.

On the first news of the invasion of the Marathas, the late nabob, as well as Safdar Ali and Chanda Sahib, sent their families and treasure to Pondicherry, which they justly regarded as far stronger and every way more secure than any native fortress. Chanda Sahib, moreover, laid in a large store of grain at Trichinopoly, which, if it could not be starved out, promised to withstand any effort which the Marathas could make to take it. The Marathas seemed to be of this opinion; for immediately on their treaty with Safdar Ali, they turned their faces northwards, and commenced their journey, as if determined to lose no time in regaining their homes. It was a méré stratagem. They had calculated that Chanda Sahib, as soon as convinced that they were really gone, would consider his stores of grain unnecessary, and turn them into money. It was so; and though they had proceeded 250 miles north-west of Trichinopoly, they made sure of their prize by hastening back, and completely blockading the fortress. Famine made defence impossible; and after a siege of three months, it was compelled to surrender at discretion, on the 26th of March, 1741. The Marathas left 14,000 men, under Murari Rao, to guard their conquest, and carried off Chanda Sahib, whom they confined in a strong fort in the vicinity of Satara.

Safdar Ali, when relieved from the alarm which Chanda Sahib had given, saw himself threatened by a still more formidable enemy. Nizam-ul-Mulk had returned to the Deccan, and had given him to understand that, as an indispensable condition to his being confirmed as nabob, he must pay up all the arrears of tribute which had accrued since the death of Sadat Ulla. His first step, on receiving this intimation, was to remove his family and treasures to Madras. He had formerly lodged them in Pondicherry, but circumstances had transpired to convince him that an understanding existed between Chanda Sahib and Dupleix, and that as his interest was decidedly opposite to that of the former, his true safety lay in courting an alliance with the only nation which seemed capable to counteract the designs of the latter.

Safdar Ali, after he had secured his treasures in Madras, endeavoured to propitiate Nizam-ul-Mulk by pleading poverty.
The Marathas had impoverished the country, both by pillage and the immense contribution which they had exacted; and his finances were in consequence so depressed, that he had serious thoughts of retiring from the world altogether, and spending the remainder of his days at Mecca. It is not likely that Nizam-ul-Mulk would have allowed himself to be defeated of his purpose by such pretences, but Safdar Ali was not destined to feel the effects of this resentment, for he perished shortly after by the hands of an assassin. The crime was generally believed to have been instigated by Mortiz Ali, who immediately caused himself to be proclaimed nabob; but, unable to stand the storm of indignation which his atrocious conduct raised, was obliged to save himself by flight. Muhammed Saaed, an infant son of Safdar Ali, was immediately brought forward by the army, and, contrary to expectation, was confirmed as his father's successor, by Nizam-ul-Mulk, who, at last, in 1743, made out his promised, or rather threatened visit to Arcot, by marching into it with an army of 80,000 horse and 200,000 foot. His presence was not unnecessary, for the country was rapidly verging towards anarchy. Every petty chief was affecting independence; and on one day no fewer than eighteen individuals, bearing the title of nabob, presented themselves to do homage to Nizam-ul-Mulk, who gave vent to his surprise and indignation by declaring that he always imagined there was only one nabob in the Carnatic, and that he would whip any of his chobdars, or gold-sticks-in-waiting, who announced an individual under that title.

As Nizam-ul-Mulk was bent on founding a new dynasty in the Deccan, he probably judged it good policy to give an exemplification of the hereditary principle in appointing to the nabobship, and was therefore easily induced to overlook any irregularities in the nomination of Muhammed Saaed. At the same time, he made little sacrifice, as he retained possession of the person of the infant nabob, and administered the government by one of his officers, Khoja Abdulla, as deputy. After this arrangement, he marched with his whole army to Trichinopoly to expel the Marathas, and succeeded, by presents and promises, without being obliged to strike a blow. Having thus settled matters to his satisfaction, he returned to Golkunda. Khoja Abdulla, who had accompanied him, remained in command of
the army till the spring of 1744, when he took formal leave, with the intention of resuming the government of Arcot. The very next day he was found dead in his bed, without visible marks, but certainly not without the suspicion of poison. Assuming that he was poisoned, public opinion agreed in fixing the crime on the person who profited most by it.

This was Anwar-ud-din, who immediately stepped into the place which had belonged to Khoja Abdulla, and lost no time in setting out for Arcot. The young nabob, however, still stood in his way. It is almost needless to say that it was not long, and that another assassination, to which Anwar-ud-din and the infamous Mortiz Ali were believed to be the instigators, made the nabobship once more vacant. Anwar-ud-din was forthwith confirmed in the office, no longer as deputy but as principal. He was, however, most unpopular. The stain which was fixed on him as the supposed murderer or associate in the murder of Muhammed Saaed could not be wiped away by all his protestations; and the inhabitants of the nabobship could not be reconciled to one who, even if he could be supposed innocent of the murder, did in fact owe his government to the extinction of their favourite race of native princes.

It has already been seen how Anwar-ud-din interfered in the hostilities between the British and the French, and passed from the one side to the other according as he imagined that his interest might be affected. Owing to his uncertain and vacillating conduct, Dupleix appears to have become satisfied that, as he could never be useful to him as an ally, the true policy would be to cripple him as an enemy, by giving him full employment at home. The most effectual means for this purpose were easily discovered. Chanda Sahib was still a prisoner with the Marathas, but had so many powerful connections in Arcot, that could he obtain his liberty, and be set up as a claimant for the nabobship, he would probably carry the national feeling along with him. In the event of his success, French interests might be greatly extended by express stipulations previously entered into for that purpose; and even in the event of his failure, more opportunities might occur of forming new and valuable connections with native powers. A scheme so much in accordance with the ambitious views
which Dupleix had long entertained was not to be delayed, and he therefore began at once to give effect to it by employing some of the members of Chanda Sahib’s family, still resident in Pondicherry, as the medium of communication. Chanda Sahib, as might be expected, gladly embraced a proposal which promised at the very outset to give him his freedom. The Marathas were equally inclined to come to terms. So long as Safdar Ali lived they had a special interest in detaining their prisoner, because if they allowed him to escape, the instalments to which they were entitled under their treaty would not be paid. Since his death the case had altered; for Anwar-ud-din, thinking perhaps that he could set the Marathas at defiance, positively refused to fulfil the obligations undertaken by his predecessor. The Marathas, therefore, had no longer any interest in detaining Chanda Sahib, and readily struck the bargain by which Dupleix agreed to pay a very heavy ransom for him. The sum is said to have been 700,000 rupees (£70,000).

Chanda Sahib, attended by his son Aabid Sahib, a few friends who had clung to him in misfortune, and a small Maratha force, left Satara in the beginning of 1748, and proceeded south by slow steps, hoping to be able gradually to rally an army around him. On reaching the Krishna, the Rajas of Chitteldrug and of Bednore, then at open war, applied to him for aid. He gave it to the former; and on the 24th of March a battle took place at Myaconda, in which he was defeated and taken prisoner, and his son was slain. He was carried in triumph to Bednore, but soon regained his liberty, and saw his fortunes suddenly assume a promising appearance at the moment when they seemed to have become desperate. On the very day when the battle of Myaconda was fought, Nizam-ul-Mulk died. Anwar-ud-din thus lost his protector at the time when he stood most in need of him; and Chanda Sahib obtained powerful assistance from a quarter to which he had never looked for it. It will be necessary, however, before entering on the series of events occasioned by the death of Nizam-ul-Mulk, to attend to a transaction which occurred about the same time, and in which the English East India Company became committed to a course of policy at variance with that which they had previously professed to pursue.
Shortly after hostilities ceased between the British and French, a native prince of the name of Saujohi arrived at Fort St. David, and applied for aid to reinstate him on the throne of Tanjore. Seven years had elapsed since he had lost it, and yet, according to his own account, he was not only the lawful heir, but so powerfully supported that he had only to appear at the head of a small force in order to insure success. His application was certainly made at a favourable time. Peace had been suddenly proclaimed, when the British, ashamed of their discomfiture at Pondicherry, were earnestly longing for an opportunity of regaining their laurels. A large body of troops was assembled and ready for action; but, according to all appearance, from the mere want of an enemy to fight with, they would be obliged to return to Europe without having performed a single achievement. It is not wonderful that under such circumstances the application of Saujohi was welcomed by many. The motives which influenced them, however, were not such as the governor and council of the presidency could adopt, and their resolution to give assistance was placed on very different grounds. Besides endeavouring to secure the Company against loss by binding Saujohi if successful to bear the whole expense of the war, they also stipulated for the cession of the fort of Devicotta, advantageously situated at the mouths of the Coleroon, and of the district attached to it. On such low grounds, and for such selfish objects the Company were made to appear for the first time in the very questionable character of mere mercenaries, lending out their troops for hire, and sending them to spend their blood in a native quarrel with which they had no concern.

The kingdom of Tanjore, in which this injudicious campaign was to be carried on, consisted of a tract extending from the Coleroon southwards along the coast about seventy, and inland about sixty miles. It had fallen into the hands of the Marathas in the time of Sivaji, and was appropriated by his brother, Venkaji, who died after a reign of six years, leaving three sons. It passed to all of them in succession in the order of their birth. But on the death of the last, as they had all left children, a number of rival claimants appeared, and a civil war ensued, during which three irregular successions took place within seven years. The whole power of the government had been usurped
by Sayyid, the commander of the fort of Tanjore, who set up puppet kings at pleasure. In this way Saujohi, after wearing the crown for several years, had been set aside to make way for Pratap Singh, his illegitimate brother. It is obvious from this account that the actual possessor of the throne of Tanjore at the time when Saujohi made his application at Fort St. David was an usurper; but this affords no justification of the conduct of the governor and council, who had no right to embroil the Company in a war for mercenary objects, and who had, moreover, on several occasions not only recognized him as sovereign, but courted his alliance.

The force by which it was expected that Saujohi would recover the kingdom of Tanjore, consisted of 430 Europeans and 1,000 sepoys, with four field-pieces and four small mortars. The troops, accompanied by Saujohi, and commanded by Captain Cope, set out in the end of March, 1749; the battering cannon and provisions proceeded by sea in four ships, two of them of the line. Much time appears to have been lost, for it was the 13th of April before the army encamped on the banks of the Valaru, near its mouth at Porto Novo, though the distance from Fort St. David did not exceed twenty miles. Time, however, was not the most serious loss. The wrong season had been chosen. The change of monsoon from north to south took place on the very evening of their arrival, and was accompanied with a dreadful hurricane, which continued to rage till four o'clock next morning, and with such fury, that many of the draught bullocks and horses were killed, the tents of the camp were blown to rags, and all the military stores were much damaged. At sea the ravages of the storm were still greater. The Pembroke, a sixty-gun ship belonging to the expedition, was wrecked, only six of her crew escaping. It was in the same storm that the Namur, of seventy-four guns, on which Admiral Boscawen's flag was hoisted, and the finest ship of her size in the English navy, perished with 750 men.

After another delay, rendered necessary by a march to Porto Novo to repair the damage which had been sustained, Captain Cope reached the northern branch of the Coleroon. Here he encamped and entrenched, because he was afraid to advance till better informed of the kind of reception that might
be anticipated. It soon appeared that Saujohi's representations were not to be confirmed. No persons of rank declared for him, and not a single squadron joined his standard, while Pratap Singh's troops were seen moving up and down on the opposite bank as if to dispute the passage. Captain Cope thought it imprudent to put them to the test, and remained where he was, till he was reinforced from Fort St. David with 100 Europeans and 500 sepoys. He now ventured to proceed, and discovered that he might safely have done it before, as scarcely any resistance was offered. Difficulties, however, soon multiplied upon him. The line of march was through a thick wood, which exposed them to a galling fire from parties of the enemy concealed in it, while the open plains were covered with large bodies of horse and foot moving on their flanks and rear. The position was really perilous, and seemed still more so because the English troops who had not before been brought face to face with an Indian army, naturally overrated the advantage which it derived from vast superiority of numbers. A general alarm was consequently felt, an alarm which might have grown to a fatal panic, had not the steadiness of the artillery kept the enemy at bay while a retreat to the river was effected. Here a council of war was deliberating whether to proceed or wait, when positive orders from Admiral Boscawen to advance on Devicotta at all events, left no alternative. Happily, a line of road, leading through a comparatively open country along the banks of the river to the sea-coast, was accidentally discovered by some of the soldiers. Pursuing it without much annoyance, the troops, after a march of ten miles, halted in the evening a mile east of the town.

The ships were anchored near the mouths of the river, not more than four miles from the camp, and yet so imperfectly were the means of intelligence provided, that they were not aware of each other's presence. The excuse afterwards given was that the intervening ground was low and covered with trees. What was now to be done? The battering cannon was on board the ships, and the troops had only three days' provisions. A sudden assault could not succeed, as the walls were too high to be escaladed; a proposal to advance the field-pieces by night, and gain an entrance by battering in the gates, was
rejected, perhaps because it was too rational for Captain Cope to approve of it; and the childish resolution was adopted of trying to terrify the place into a surrender by throwing shells into it. In two nights of this foolish work all the shells were expended, and nothing now remained but retreat. It was accomplished with much more difficulty and loss than the advance; and the troops, after a long and harassing march, returned to Fort St. David, with nothing better to detail than misfortunes and blunders.

The presidency having undertaken the cause of Saujohi, had still two, and only two, honourable courses before them. The one was to persevere in his name; the other was to abandon the contest altogether. Declining both these courses, they devised a third, which, though it enabled them ultimately to gain their object, left a stain on their reputation. They made no scruple of abandoning Saujohi, but felt a stronger longing than ever for Devicotta. It was determined, therefore, to wrest it from its rightful owners, at all events, whether by force or fear. A new expedition was accordingly fitted out, and with much more prudence than before. It was commanded by Major Lawrence, the officer of highest reputation in India, and escaped the fatigue and dangers of a land march, by proceeding at once to the scene of action by sea. Six ships, three of them of the line, carried the Europeans, 800 in number, with the artillery and baggage; while 1,500 sepoys accompanied them in large boats used by the natives for coasting. Having arrived and anchored in the mouth of the Coleroon, the troops and stores proceeded in boats up the arm leading to Devicotta, and were landed on the bank opposite to it. This position was chosen, both because the ground on the other side was marshy, and the Tanjore army lay encamped under the walls.

The fort, about a mile in circuit, formed an irregular hexagon, inclosed by a brick wall eighteen feet high, and flanked by square or circular towers. The attack was made on the eastern side by four twenty-four pounders, and in three days the breach was pronounced practicable. The great difficulty now was to cross the stream, which besides being dangerous from its rapidity, had woody banks, from which the enemy were prepared to defend the passage. It was ultimately effected
by John Moor, a ship-carpenter, who not only contrived a raft capable of carrying 400 men, but swam the river during a very dark night with a rope, which was attached without being seen to the root of a large tree on the one side and to the raft on the other. By this contrivance the whole troops were transported, and soon succeeded in clearing the thickets. The enemy had not attempted to repair the breach, but learning from it the direction in which the final attempt would be made, endeavoured to counteract it by forming an entrenchment, which stretched from the banks of the river across this side of the fort. This entrenchment, though not finished when the troops crossed, presented a serious obstacle to further progress, the more especially that in front of it there was a deep and miry rivulet. The attack, however, was resolved upon; and Clive, who had finally quitted the civil for the military service, and attained the rank of lieutenant, volunteered to conduct it. His offer was accepted, and he advanced to the rivulet with a platoon of thirty-four Europeans and 700 sepoys. The Europeans and part of the sepoys having crossed without much difficulty, Clive hastened on to take the entrenchment in flank at that part where it remained unfinished. The Europeans kept close by him, but the sepoys who had passed remained at the rivulet, waiting till their companions from the other side should join them. Clive and his handful of Europeans thus left their rear completely exposed. The enemy at once saw their advantage; and a party of horse, who had stood concealed on the south side between the projections of the towers, rushed out and were within a few yards of the platoon, before they saw their danger, or could face about to meet it. In an instant, twenty-six of the party were cut down; only four escaped. Clive, reserved for greater things, was one of them. A horseman had lifted his sword to strike him, but he escaped the blow by stepping nimbly aside.

On this disaster, Major Lawrence lost no time in advancing with all the Europeans in a compact body. The trench was easily carried, and the Tanjorines, after attempting in vain to repeat the manoeuvre which had proved so fatal to Clive’s little band, began to save themselves by flight. No resistance was offered at the breach, and the fort when entered was found
completely evacuated. The real object of the expedition being now accomplished, the presidency had no longer any taste for Tanjorine warfare, and only kept up a show of hostilities till they should be able to secure their new conquest by regular treaty. It was not necessary to wait long, for the king, though naturally indignant at having been involved in hostilities with a foreign power which he had done nothing to provoke, had no inclination to continue them. On proposing terms of accommodation he was surprised and delighted to learn that the claims of a rival to his crown were not to be insisted on, and that if a pension of 4,000 rupees was settled on Saujohi, for the sake of saving appearances, effectual steps would be taken to prevent him from giving any further trouble. In short, the presidency, instead of continuing to be his protectors, would condescend to act as his jailers. In return for their generosity in thus sacrificing him, all they asked for themselves was Devicotta, together with as much of the adjoining territory as would yield an annual revenue of 9,000 pagodas (about £350), and also the expenses of the war! This last stipulation, all things considered, was utterly disgraceful to those who exacted it; but the king was not in a condition to resist, for events had just taken place in Arcot which made him aware that he might soon be engaged in a deadly struggle with still more formidable enemies.

As Clive was first brought prominently into notice during this Tanjore campaign, it will be proper in concluding it to prepare for the remarkable career on which he was now about to enter, by giving some details of his earlier life.

Robert Clive, the eldest of a family of six sons and seven daughters, was born on the 29th of September, 1725, at the mansion of a small estate called Styche, situated in the parish of Moreton-Say, near Market-Drayton, in Shropshire. His father, Richard Clive, possessed the above estate, and added to the rather scanty income which he derived from it by practising as a lawyer; his mother was Rebecca, daughter of Nathaniel Gaskill, of Manchester. In this city he spent his childhood in the family of Mr. Bayley, who had married his mother's sister. According to this gentleman he was in his-seventh year of a fierce and imperious temper, and "out of measure addicted"
to fighting. From Manchester he was sent while yet very young to a school at Lostocke, in Cheshire, taught by Dr. Eaton, who is said to have predicted, that if "he lived to be a man, and opportunity enabled him to exert his talents, few names would be greater than his." From Lostocke he removed, at the age of eleven, to a school at Market-Drayton, where he took a lead among his schoolfellows for mischief and daring, and was one morning seen seated on a stone splot near the top of its lofty steeple. A few years later he attended the Merchant Tailors' School in London. His last school was at Hemel-Hempstead, in Hertfordshire, where he was in 1743, when he was appointed a writer in the service of the East India Company.

His destination was Madras, which he reached late in 1744. The voyage was tedious, but he appears to have turned his time to good account, for during a nine months' detention of the ship at Brazil he made himself familiar with the Portuguese language. His letters, written to his friends at home shortly after he had entered on the duties of his office, display a kindly, thoughtful, manly spirit, and are so well expressed as to justify a doubt of the accuracy of the statement which has been made, that he idled away his time at school, and was in consequence very imperfectly educated. To one he says, "I must confess, at intervals, when I think of my dear native England; it affects me in a very particular manner; however, knowing it to be for my own welfare, I rest content and patient, wishing the views for which my father sent me here may, in all respects, be fully accomplished." To a cousin of his own age he opens his heart more fully, and writes as follows:—"I really think the advantages which accrue to us here are greatly overbalanced by the sacrifices we make of our constitutions. I have not been acquainted with the fickleness of fortune, and may safely say, I have not enjoyed one happy day since I left my native country. I am not acquainted with any one family in the place, and have not assurance enough to introduce myself without being asked. If the state I am now in will admit of any happiness, it must be when I am writing to my friends. Letters surely were first invented for the comfort of such solitary wretches as myself."

These extracts have a tinge of the melancholy to which he was constitutionally subject, and which was doubtless aggravat-
ed not merely by the loneliness referred to in them, but also by an employment to which he appears from the very first to have had a decided aversion. As yet the character of the Company was almost entirely mercantile, and the writer spent his time very much as ordinary clerks do in large commercial establishments. While thus employed Clive’s temper occasionally gave way, and the secretary under whom writers were placed on their first arrival was so offended at something he had said or done, that he complained of him to the governor. He was ordered to ask the secretary’s pardon, and complied; but shortly after, when that gentleman with great kindness, wishing to bury the past in oblivion, invited him to dinner, he received the ungracious, surly, and half vindictive answer, “No, sir; the governor did not command me to dine with you.” Other intemperate acts, hazarding the loss of his situation, are recorded; and he is even said to have made an attempt on his own life. The account given is, that an acquaintance calling upon him was asked to take up a pistol which was lying in the room, and fire it out of the window. On seeing that it went off, Clive, who was sitting in a very gloomy mood, started up, as if astonished, and exclaimed, “Well, I am reserved for something! That pistol I have twice snapped at my own head.” The last act of his life makes this story not improbable, and yet it cannot be considered as perfectly authenticated.

If want of congenial employment was one of the main causes of this wild and reckless conduct, the remedy was at hand. Labourdonnais’ attack on Madras in 1746 must, for the time at least, have converted every servant of the Company within it into a soldier. No record remains of the manner in which Clive comported himself, but it can scarcely be doubted that had defence been attempted he would have been found among the foremost. As it was, he only shared the fate of his fellows, and was still resident in the town as a prisoner of war, when Dupleix, by grossly violating the terms of capitulation, freed him from his parole, and left him at liberty to consult his convenience or safety in any way he pleased. On this occasion he was one of those who escaped, disguised as natives, and succeeded in reaching Fort St. David. Here, shortly after his arrival, he became involved in a transaction which gave him more notoriety than
fame. Two officers, who had won money at cards, were strongly suspected of having played unfairly, but most of the losers were terrified into payment. Clive, who was one of them, was not to be so bullied, and distinctly declared that he would not pay, simply because the money was not fairly won. The officer whom he thus accused challenged him. The parties met, it is said, without seconds. Clive having fired and missed; his antagonist came up, and holding the pistol to his head, told him to ask his life. He did so, and was then told that he must also retract his charge of unfair play. He refused, and when the pistol was again placed at his head exclaimed, "Fire, and be—I said you cheated; I say so still, and I will never pay you." The officer, in astonishment, threw away his pistol, saying that Clive was mad.

It is probable that at Fort St. David Clive resumed his occupation as a writer, but it was only as a temporary expedient. He had found his true vocation, and in 1747 obtained an ensign's commission. The hopes already entertained of him appear from the letter of the court of directors of this year to the presidency of Madras. After alluding to the capture by Labourdonnaiss, they say, "Be sure to encourage Ensign Clive in his martial pursuits, according to his merit; any improvement he shall make therein shall be duly regarded by us." His first recorded service after he obtained his commission was at the mismanaged siege of Pondicherry, where he attracted much notice by activity and gallantry. Strange to say, rumour at this very time charged him with an act of cowardice. While posted at a battery the ammunition failed, and he ran off to bring it, instead of sending a sergeant or corporal. An officer maliciously insinuated that it was not zeal but fear that had made him run. Clive, the moment he was made aware of the insinuation, called upon the officer to disavow it, and on receiving only an unsatisfactory explanation challenged him. While they were on the way to the place of meeting, some irritating words passed, and he was struck by his opponent. Their swords were instantly drawn, but some persons present interfered and prevented them from fighting. Their conduct was made the subject of a court of inquiry, and as the falsehood and malignity of the insinuation were easily proved, the author of it was ordered to ask Clive's pardon
in front of the battalion to which they both belonged. Here the matter ought to have rested, but as no notice had been taken of the blow, Clive insisted that satisfaction was still due. On its being refused, he waved his cane over the head of his antagonist and branded him as a coward. It would seem that he really was so; for he submitted to the disgrace, and next day resigned his commission.

The details now given bring down the narrative of Clive's life to the date of the second Tanjore campaign, in which he has been seen volunteering to lead the assault on Devicotta, and making a hairbreadth escape with his life during the act of daring. The insight thus far obtained into his character disposes us to regard him as a man of a gloomy cast of mind, and a hot, irritable temper; jealous of his honour, and quick to resent an injury; bold even to foolhardiness, yet collected in the midst of danger; never losing his presence of mind, but always performing his part fearlessly, with indomitable energy and perseverance. As yet little opportunity has been given for the display of these qualities, but they will soon find a proper sphere, and make their possessor the hero of great events.

In concluding the account of the Tanjore campaign, it was observed that the king's submission to the harsh and unjust terms imposed upon him was partly owing to the danger with which he was threatened from another quarter. The events in which this danger originated must now be explained. Nizam-ul-Mulk left six sons. At his death, Ghazi-ud-din, the eldest, was high in office at the court of Delhi, and easily obtained from the emperor, Ahmed Shah, a confirmation of his succession to the subah of the Deccan. Other engagements, however, prevented him from attempting immediately to take possession, and rival claimants, taking advantage of his absence, began to contest the succession. On the one side, Nazir Jung, as the second son of Nizam-ul-Mulk, pretended to have become lawful heir by an alleged renunciation of his elder brother; on the other side, Hedayet Mohi-ud-din Khan, afterwards known by his title of Muzaffar Jung (Victorious in War), though only the son of Nizam-ul-Mulk's daughter, claimed in virtue of an alleged will, by which his grandfather, with whom he had always been a special favourite, had left him the subah
of the Deccan and the greatest part of his treasures. Nazir Jung had the start of his competitor, and gaining possession of the treasures, possessed the most effectual means of securing the favour of the army. Muzaffar Jung's cause had in consequence become almost hopeless; when he was unexpectedly joined by Chanda Sahib, who, encouraged by promises of aid from Dupleix, was preparing to contest the right to the nabobship of Arcot with Anwar-ud-din. The union between Muzaffar Jung and Chanda Sahib was founded not only on mutual interests, but also on similarity of fortunes, inasmuch as they were both claiming on a female title.

The combined forces, forming a respectable army, immediately advanced to the frontiers of the Carnatic, and were there joined by a powerful reinforcement from Pondicherry. It consisted of 400 Europeans and 2,000 sepoys, under the command of M. d'Auteuil, who had been allowed by the blundering of the nabob to make their march across the low country without molestation. Seeing the aid given to his enemies by the French, Anwar-ud-din's natural course would have been to strengthen himself by an alliance with the English; but whether he was so confident in his own might that he disdained to ask assistance, or the miserable expedition to Tanjore had made them averse, or left them too feeble to afford it, he advanced unaided to the encounter. His army consisted of 12,000 cavalry and 8,000 infantry, with which he took up a position with one flank resting on the hill-fort of Ambur, about fifty miles west of Arcot, and the other on a hill bounding one of the passes into the Carnatic. If he chose this spot under the idea that it commanded the only practicable entrance into his territories, he was mistaken; but the enemy, though probably aware of his blunder, did not attempt to profit by it. Their numbers doubled his, and they doubtless deemed it more creditable to force his position than to evade or turn it. The brunt of the action on their part fell on the French troops, who gallantly carried the position, after they had been twice repulsed. The contest was now hopeless, but Anwar-ud-din continued it with great bravery till he was slain. His two sons, Maphuz Khan and Muhammed Ali, were both present. The former was taken prisoner; the latter fled and took refuge in
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Trichinopoly, nearly 250 miles distant from the scene of action. The victorious army proceeded at once for Arcot, and entered it without opposition. Muzaffar Jung and Chanda Sahib immediately assumed the dignities which they had claimed; the one taking the title of subahdar and the other of nabob. Much time which ought to have been employed in giving a finishing stroke to the war was consumed in childish ceremonials; but, as if this had not been enough, Dupleix thought it right that his own vanity also should be gratified, and the new subahdar and nabob made a pompous entry into Pondicherry, where they spent some time vying with their entertainer in senseless extravagance. French interests at the same time were not forgotten, for Chanda Sahib made the company a grant in perpetual sovereignty of eighty-one villages in the neighbourhood of their capital.

The ceremonials over, Dupleix, fully alive to the danger of further delay, urged the departure of his guests, and laboured to impress them with the necessity of proceeding instantly against Trichinopoly. They expressed complete acquiescence in all his views, and set out as if determined forthwith to carry them into effect. No sooner, however, were they beyond the reach of his importunity, than they followed their own course. They did proceed with their army for the south, but suddenly changed the direction and turned from Trichinopoly to make a campaign in Tanjore. Their motive was to replenish the treasury, which was nearly exhausted. Tanjore seemed the far easier conquest of the two, and they had no doubt that, at the very worst, the king would gladly buy them off by a large contribution. Being thus undecided as to the character which they ought to assume, they acted in the irresolute manner usually exhibited in such circumstances, and allowed themselves to be entrapped into a negotiation which the king skilfully protracted till he knew that Nazir Jung had arrived in Arcot. This was a contingency which, though most probable in itself, had never once occupied their thoughts. Indeed, their first knowledge of it was obtained by a message from Dupleix. It had all the effect of a surprise, and they took the only course open to them, by retreating with precipitation towards Pondicherry.
While the French were taking a decided part in the great struggle which was to determine the future fortunes of the Deccan, the English knew not how to act. The presidency had, on their own responsibility, become parties to a war in Tanjore, but the result had disappointed them; and their interference now seemed to them not a precedent which they ought to follow, but a beacon which they ought to avoid. The success which had attended the French arms was as gall and wormwood to them; and they would fain have employed all their force on the opposite side, especially if they had felt sure that it was to prove the winning side. This, however, was very doubtful; and the result of inter-meddling, therefore, might be to subject themselves to the displeasure, and ultimately call down the vengeance of the successful competitors for the subah and nabobship. These, and similar considerations, might perhaps have justified them in resolving to remain as mere spectators of the contest, but certainly could not justify the very extraordinary course which they adopted. When Muhammed Ali, who had shut himself up in Trichinopoly and assumed the title of nabob, earnestly implored their assistance, they at first turned a deaf ear, and afterwards, as if in mockery rather than in earnest, sent him a paltry reinforcement of 120 Europeans. By this act they committed themselves as much as if they had sent him 1,000. They had chosen their side and must maintain it; and yet, with monstrous and suicidal inconsistency, they at this very time declined Admiral Boscawen's offer to remain, and allowed him to depart with his fleet for Europe. So absurd did the proceeding appear to the French, that for some time they did not believe the departure to be more than a feint; but at length, when satisfied that it was a reality, could not refrain from openly manifesting their delight.

After the British and French had taken their sides, both were naturally anxious to show that they had made the right choice, and given their support to those who had the best title. On this subject volumes were written, but to very little purpose, for two reasons: first, because, were it worth the while, it could easily be shown that the titles of all the claimants were absolutely bad; and, secondly, because it was mere hypocrisy on the part of the two companies to pretend that they were fighting for
legitimacy, when it was well understood that the justice of the war was a matter of perfect indifference to them, and that their true position was that of mercenaries, intent only on the gain which they stipulated, or might be able to extort, in return for their services. The most favourable view that can be taken of the matter is, that the regular course of government had been completely broken up, and that, in the general scramble which had ensued, the two companies were as well entitled as any other parties to make the most of it, more especially as it was not impossible that their important commercial interests might be compromised.

When Muzaffar Jung first took the field, Nazir Jung seems to have regarded it as little more than a youthful outbreak, which, if it did not carry its own punishment along with it, might at any time be easily suppressed. After the battle of Ambur he saw reason to view it in a very different light, and made his preparations accordingly. Appointing the celebrated fort of Gingi, situated about thirty-five miles north-west of Pondicherry, as the general place of rendezvous, he issued summonses, in his character of Subahdar of the Deccan, to all its various dependencies, and soon saw himself furnished with contingents from all quarters, to such an amount that his whole army was estimated at 300,000. Among these were a contingent of 6,000 horse, furnished and commanded by Muhammed Ali, whose hopes of the nabobship were bound up with Nazir Jung's establishment as subahdar; and a contingent of 600 Europeans, furnished by the Company and commanded by Major Lawrence. The presidency, having satisfied themselves that the man who could muster an army of 300,000 men must be the real subahdar, had got rid of all their doubts and scruples on the subject of his title, and resolved magnanimously to share his fortunes. At the same time it was thought prudent to feel his pulse, and Major Lawrence, together with Captain Dalton, and a member of council who accompanied them, were commissioned to act as a trio, and treat with Nazir Jung on the interests of the Company. He received them with politeness, paid them oriental compliments, and was liberal in his promises.

The French endeavoured to keep up the spirits of their allies, and along with them took up an excellent position, from
which all the mighty host of Nazir Jung would have been unable to dislodge them. The only part of the force really formidable was the detachment under Major Lawrence. M. d’Auteuil endeavoured to bribe it into inactivity by sending a messenger to acquaint the major that, though their troops were arrayed on opposite sides, it was his wish that no European blood should be spilled. He therefore asked to know in what part of Nazir Jung’s army the English took post, in order that none of his shot might come that way. Major Lawrence, estimating this communication at its true worth, replied that the English colours were carried on the flag-gun of their artillery, and that, though he too was anxious to spare European blood, he would certainly return any shot that might be sent him. M. d’Auteuil, in proposing a kind of neutrality between the French and English, had not given the true reason. His men were in mutiny, and no fewer than thirteen of his officers had thrown up their commissions in presence of the enemy. This unworthy proceeding was adopted to avenge themselves on the governor, with whom they had had a bitter quarrel before leaving Pondicherry. The cause need not be inquired into, but the effect was important. M. d’Auteuil, convinced that his men would not fight, ordered them to quit the field and march home without delay. Muzaffar Jung, who had previously begun to despair of his cause, and been attempting to come to an accommodation with his uncle, thought that not a moment was to be lost; and on receiving a solemn assurance that he would neither be imprisoned nor deprived of the government which he had held during his grandfather’s lifetime, passed over to the enemy. The pledge given him was violated without scruple. He was immediately thrown into fetters, and his troops, attacked and dispersed, were almost cut to pieces. Chanda Sahib behaved with more spirit, and fared better. Accompanying the French at the head of his cavalry, he repeatedly charged the Marathas, who, led by Murari Rao, hung upon their flank and rear, and well nigh succeeded in cutting off their retreat.

The arrival of the troops in wretched plight threw Pondicherry into consternation. Dupleix, though he pretended to make light of it, saw the full extent of the disaster, and, as usual when force failed, had recourse to diplomacy. It was known
that there was considerable disaffection in Nazir Jung’s camp. Several chiefs, who had pledged themselves for the honourable treatment of Muzaffar Jung, were indignant at his captivity, and still more at the evasive answers given to themselves when they applied to be confirmed in their governments. Dupleix, having obtained permission, after several rebuffs, to send an embassy to Nazir Jung’s camp for the purpose of negotiating a peace, employed his deputies not only in ascertaining the extent of the defection, but in fomenting it. Their proposals were purposely so framed as to protract the negotiation, which, though it ostensibly failed, gained all that he sought by it. He had secured a party who, from belonging ostensibly to Nazir Jung’s camp, would do better service than if they had been ranged under French banners.

Major Lawrence, who had suspicions of the French deputies, endeavoured to put Nazir Jung on his guard, and obtained a personal interview for this purpose; but as he could only communicate by an interpreter, who feared to give the true meaning of his words, the warning was given in vain. The major then endeavoured, along with the deputies who accompanied him, to obtain a confirmation of a grant of territory near Madras, which Muhammed Ali, as nabob, had made to the Company in return for the services of their troops. After much prevarication compliance was promised, provided he would accompany the camp to Arcot, to which the subahdar was eager to proceed, not for any strategical purpose, but to indulge his taste for licentious pleasures. Disgusted at all he saw, Major Lawrence refused; and after speaking his mind freely, returned with his troops to Fort St. David.

Leaving Nazir Jung to his degrading pleasures at Arcot, we must now follow the proceedings of the French, who, having recovered from their consternation, not only began to regain their lost ground, but were emboldened to make new conquests. In order to avenge an attack which had been made by Nazir Jung’s orders on their factory at Masulipatam, situated at the mouths of the Krishna, a detachment of 200 Europeans and 300 sepoys, with several pieces of battering cannon, were embarked at Pondicherry, in two large ships, in the beginning of July, 1750, and landing in the night, took the city by surp-
rise with almost no loss. It was immediately put in a position of defence, and reserved to become the nucleus of other conquests which were already meditated in the same quarter. Their next conquest, if not so important in itself, did more to redeem the credit of their arms. About fifteen miles east of Fort St. David stood the town of Trivadi, with a pagoda so strongly fortified as to serve as its citadel. It seemed to the French a desirable possession, both from its proximity to the British territory, and as a station which might be turned to good account in a southern campaign. It was taken without resistance, and garrisoned with only fifty Europeans and 100 sepoys. Muhammed Ali, to whom it previously belonged, justly inferring that the capture had been made not for itself but for ulterior objects, took alarm and resolved to make an effort to regain it. With this view he raised an army, half of it drawn from the subahdar’s camp at Arcot, and by engaging to defray all expenses, induced Major Lawrence, who was acting at Fort St. David as a temporary governor, to send him a detachment of 400 Europeans and 1,500 sepoys. His whole force mustered 20,000 men, with whom, after encamping for a short time in the plain of Trivandiparam, a little west of Fort St. David, from which he was to receive two 24-pounders and military stores, he marched along the south bank of the Pennar, and found the French posted on the opposite bank, about eight miles east of Trivadi. The French were entrenched; and Muhammed Ali, though strongly urged by Captain Cope, who commanded the British detachment, to take up a position which would force an engagement, was too cowardly to comply, and contented himself with skirmishes and a distant cannonade. After some time wasted in this way, Muhammed Ali proposed marching off to the west, but Captain Cope refused to accompany him; and on being refused payment of the expenses which had been promised, was ordered by Major Lawrence to return with his troops to Fort St. David. They arrived there on the 15th of August, and the French lost not a moment in taking advantage of their absence. Mustering a force which amounted in all to 1,800 Europeans, 2,500 sepoys, and 1,000 horse, levied by Chanda Sahib, they brought the enemy to action, and gained a complete victory without the loss of a single man. Muhammed Ali
escaped with difficulty, and reached Arcot with only two or three attendants.

Notwithstanding the consternation produced by this defeat, Nazir Jung still remained inactive; and the French, left at full liberty to pursue their victorious career, were emboldened to attack Gingi. This celebrated fortress, in which we have already seen the Marathas resisting, for many years, the whole power of the Mughul empire under Aurangzeb, is situated among the Eastern Ghats, about thirty-five miles north-west of Pondicherry, and eighty-five miles south-west of Madras. It consisted of three steep and craggy hills, with an intervening hollow, the whole surrounded by a lofty wall flanked with towers, and inclosing an area nearly three miles in circuit. The town lay in the hollow, and the hills were both crowned on their summits, and along their declivities, with forts and other works, rendering the whole place so strong, at least according to Indian ideas, as to be deemed impregnable. How little it was really so was soon made apparent. The main body of the French army was commanded by M. d'Auteuil, but was preceded by a detachment of 250 Europeans and 1,200 sepoys, with four field-pieces, under M. Bussy, who was rapidly establishing the reputation which he ultimately acquired of being the ablest French officer in India. His object probably was to take the place by surprise; but on coming in sight of it he found 5,000 of the fugitives from Trivadi encamped under the walls. He waited, therefore, till the main body came in sight, and then attacking, drove off the enemy with little difficulty. One of the gates of the outer wall was next driven open by a petard, and the whole of the troops, artillery, and baggage were lodged in the town before night, with the loss of only three or four men. The real contest now began: the enemy firing and throwing rockets from their mountain heights, while the French answered them from their guns and mortars. The mischief done in this way by either side was not great, and preparations were made for an assault. This honour was reserved solely for the Europeans, who attacked the three hills at once in separate parties, carried redoubt after redoubt, reached the summits, and had their flags flying triumphantly on them all by daybreak, with the loss of only twenty men.
If the French were astonished at thus easily capturing what was justly considered the strongest fortress of the Carnatic, it is easy to conceive what dismay the first intelligence of the event produced in the camp at Arcot. Nazir Jung was at last aroused from his disgraceful stupor. In the excess of his confidence he had allowed many of the chiefs to return home with their contingents, and sent back the greater part of his own troops to Golkunda. Besides recalling these, he gave a striking proof of his fear by sending two officers to Pondicherry to negotiate. It was now the turn of Dupleix to be imperious, and he set no limits to the extravagance of his terms. He well knew that they would be rejected, and had proposed them with this very view, for the party which he had secured in the enemy's camp had organized a conspiracy, and Nazir Jung's life was hanging by a thread. Totally unconscious of the danger impending over him, he ceased negotiating, and began his march towards Gingi late in September, 1750. Though many of the troops absent on leave had failed to return, his force still consisted of 60,000 foot, 45,000 horse, 700 elephants, and 360 pieces of cannon. Including camp followers, the whole army was little short of 300,000. This vast and unwieldy body moved so slowly that fifteen days were spent in marching thirty miles. It was still sixteen miles from Gingi when its further progress was arrested by the sudden setting in of the rains. Retreat was now the only prudent course, but it was considered disgraceful, and after the lapse of two or three days became impossible. The whole country was flooded, and the camp lay inclosed between two swollen rivers. Provisions began to fail, sickness as usual followed, and the prospect was gloomy in the extreme. Nazir Jung, now as anxious to quit the Carnatic as he had been fond of remaining in it, again made overtures of peace, and expressed a willingness to submit to the terms which lately he would not even entertain. Dupleix was not unwilling to have two strings to his bow, and began to negotiate without losing sight of his conspirators. At the same time he found himself in a kind of dilemma. If he made the treaty he must abandon the conspiracy, and, in all probability, sacrifice all the chiefs whom he had tempted to join in it; if he remained true to them they would do their bloody
deed, and the treaty would be useless. Ultimately it was a mere toss which of the two methods of settlement would be adopted; for at the very time he was pressing Nazir Jung’s deputies to send back the treaty ratified, he sent orders to M. de la Touche, who commanded at Gingi, to march out to attack the camp whenever the conspirators should intimate to him that they were ready. This intimation reached Gingi before the ratified treaty was returned to Pondicherry, and Nazir Jung’s fate was sealed. The French force, consisting of 800 Europeans, 3,000 sepoys, and ten field-pieces, arrived within sight of the enemy’s camp. It extended eighteen miles, as every chief had a separate quarter. Where the space occupied was so enormous, the French, left to themselves, would have been at a loss to choose their point of attack; but the conspirators had provided for this by sending a guide, who conducted them to the locality immediately occupied by Nazir Jung. He had ratified the treaty only the day before, and would not at first believe that the French had attacked him. When convinced of the fact, and asking how the battle went, he was astonished to learn that a large portion of his army remained motionless as mere spectators. Enraged, he mounted his elephant and hastened off in the direction where they stood. The first troops he came up to were those of Kurpa, and Nazir Jung thinking, as it was not yet clear daylight, that the nabob who was at their head on his elephant did not recognize him, raised himself up to receive his salutation, when two shots, fired from the nabob’s howdah, pierced his heart, and he instantly expired.

Muzaffar Jung was immediately proclaimed as subahdar, and, accompanied by a large portion of the army which had just belonged to his murdered predecessor, set out in triumph for Pondicherry. The governor and Chanda Sahib received him in a tent without the gates, and a procession took place in which none of the usual accompaniments of oriental ostentation were wanting. No sooner was he seated in the palace than the new subahdar, opening his heart to Dupleix, made him aware that, along with the honours, he had already begun to experience some of the perplexities of sovereignty. The Pathan chiefs, to whose treachery he was mainly indebted for his elevation, were determined that he should pay for it liberally. How to satisfy them was the puzzle. Their demand was that three years’ arrears
of tribute, which they owed, should be remitted; that in future no tribute should be exacted from them, either for the territories which they possessed, or the large additions which they thought themselves entitled to expect; and that one-half of the contents of Nazir Jung's treasury should be distributed among them.

Dupleix undertook the office of mediator, and, after several days spent in discussion, concluded an arrangement, which was signed by all the parties, and with which all of them declared themselves perfectly satisfied. Business was naturally succeeded by festivities, and Pondicherry assumed the appearance of a gay and luxurious capital. The most gorgeous of the ceremonies was the installation of Muzaffar Jung as subahdar. His first act, after it was completed, was to declare Dupleix governor for the Mughul of all the countries south of the Krishna. All the revenues due to the Mughul for these countries were, in the first instance, to pass through his hand; and no coin but what was coined at Pondicherry was to be current in the Carnatic. From the terms used it is difficult to say whether it was meant that the subahdar or Dupleix should in future take precedence; but in the appointment of Chanda Sahib to the nabobship of Arcot and its dependencies, it was expressly stated that he was to hold it under Dupleix, as his superior. To the French East India Company the immediate advantages were the acquisition of tracts of territory near Pondicherry, Carrical in Tanjore, and Masulipatam, producing a revenue estimated by themselves at £38,000, but probably not less than £50,000; the indirect advantages were unlimited, inasmuch as, under the titles and powers conferred on their governor, they could make anything they pleased. The treasure taken from Nazir Jung was estimated at £2,000,000 sterling, exclusive of the jewels, worth at least £500,000. Of the treasure, one-half belonged to the Pathans, under the agreement; the other half, and the jewels, were appropriated by the subahdar, subject, however, to a deduction of £50,000 paid to the company, as the expenses of the war, £50,000 to the officers and troops which gained the battle of Gingi, and a present to Dupleix, consisting, besides many precious jewels, of money fixed at the conjectural amount of £200,000.

Muzaffar Jung left Pondicherry for Golkunda on the 4th of January, 1751, accompanied by his own troops, and also a
French detachment, commanded by M. Bussy, and consisting of 300 Europeans and 2,000 sepoys. On reaching the territory of Kurpa, a quarrel ensued between some of the inhabitants and the soldiers, and three villages were set on fire. The nabob, professing great indignation at the injury done to his subjects, retaliated by attacking that part of Muzaffar Jung’s division where the women were placed. According to oriental ideas, there could not be a grosser insult; and he was vowing to take summary vengeance when M. Bussy interposed, and procured the nabob an opportunity of explaining. He did so, but in such terms as only to aggravate the insult. It now appeared that the whole affair was concerted. The Pathan chiefs had never been satisfied with the arrangement at Pondicherry, and had been on the watch for a favourable opportunity to give effect to their resentment. The army was about to pass to a defile, and found it preoccupied by the Pathans, who had even planted the posts leading to it with cannon, which had been brought forward several days before. A battle ensued, which was decided by the fire of the French artillery, but the victory cost Muzaffar Jung his life. In pursuing the fugitives he came up with the Nabob of Kurnool, who, finding escape impossible, turned at bay with a handful of troops. Both instantly prepared for a personal encounter, and drove their elephants right in the face of each other. Muzaffar Jung had his sword uplifted to strike, but the nabob anticipated him, and drove the point of his javelin through his forehead, into his brain.

The French were returning with the acclamations of victory when they learned, to their dismay, that they had sustained a worse loss than defeat. M. Bussy did the best that could be done in the circumstances, by urging the immediate appointment of a successor. There was considerable room for choice, for, besides an infant son of Muzaffar Jung, three of his uncles, the brothers of Nazir Jung, were in the camp. Necessity dictated the exclusion of the infant, and the choice fell on Salabat Jung, who, as the eldest of the brothers, had the next best claim. M. Bussy, who had a chief share in his election, took care that the interests of his company were not forgotten, and procured from him a confirmation of all the grants made to the French by his predecessor, and the promise of still greater advantages. On these conditions Dupleix recognized him as subahdar, and placed M. Bussy’s detachment at his service.
MUHAMMED ALI was in the camp when Nazir Jung was assassinated, and fled for the third time to Trichinopoly. His prospects were now gloomy in the extreme. The English, after sending him assistance, had withdrawn in disgust and left him to his fate, and it was not likely that Chanda Sahib would allow him to escape, as before, by repeating the blunder into which he fell when, instead of laying siege to Trichinopoly, he invaded Tanjore. Dupleix could doubtless control his movements, and would take care that they were conducted more skilfully. Muhammed Ali, while thus threatened and perplexed, was incapable of coming to any manly decision, and followed the true bent of his nature by weaving an intricate web of policy. While applying to every quarter from which any aid could be anticipated—to the Marathas, the Mysoreans, and the British presidency—he entered into secret communications with the French, and adjusted, it is said, the terms of a treaty, by which he was to renounce his claims on the nabobship of Arcot, and content himself with some inferior appointment in the Deccan. The surrender of Trichinopoly, of course, formed a leading stipulation in such a treaty; and, when completed, would have formed another most important link in the scheme of French aggrandisement, on which Dupleix was exerting all his energies with every prospect of success.

The Madras presidency could not but be aware that the ultimate effect of the accomplishment of this scheme would be to drive the British and every other European rival from the field, and make the French absolute masters of the destinies of India; but so little were they prepared to take the course which
even self-preservation should have dictated, that they voluntarily deprived themselves of the ablest and most experienced officer in their service, by allowing Major Lawrence to sail for England. When they had thus weakened their hands they began to be alarmed at the consequences of their timorous policy, and wished that they had not so hastily withdrawn their aid from Muhammed Ali. The best reparation they could now make, was to send him a new detachment, and endeavour if possible to dissuade him from the suicidal step which he was understood to be contemplating of making a surrender of Trichinopoly. The aid thus offered consisted only of 280 Europeans and 300 sepoys; but he gladly accepted it, as his fortunes, in consequence of recent events, were assuming a more favourable aspect. He had been a steady adherent of Nazir Jung, and it was not unreasonable to suppose that Salabat Jung would rather confide in his brother's friend than in those who had been the main instruments of his assassination. At all events, as he had removed with his army into the Deccan, it was not likely that he would soon return to the Carnatic. Chanda Sahib would thus be left to fight his own battles, and there seemed no reason to despair of being able to muster a force equal to any which he could bring into the field.

The first campaign in which Muhammed Ali was concerned, after he had renewed his alliance with the British, proved very disastrous. In addition to Trichinopoly, he claimed authority over two territories or kingdoms; the one, Madura, lying immediately south, and the other, Tinnevelly, lying beyond Madura, and reaching to Cape Comorin. His power in these kingdoms was more nominal than real; and with the view of establishing it more firmly, he fitted out an expedition, and gave the command of it to his brother, who met with little opposition from the inhabitants, but was paralysed by a mutinous spirit among his own soldiers. Their sympathies were with Chanda Sahib; and had not strong measures of repression been used, they would have declared in his favour. In Madura a similar feeling prevailed; and being fostered by a soldier of fortune, who had once been in the service, and was still in the interest of Chanda Sahib, gained a complete ascendant in the garrison of the capital.
As the loss of Madura, by interrupting the communication with Tinnevelly, from which Muhammed Ali expected a considerable revenue, greatly crippled his resources, Captain Cope, who commanded the Company's detachment, volunteered to recover it. His means were very inadequate. He had only one battering cannon, three field-pieces, and two coehorns; and with these he set out at the head of 150 Europeans and 600 native cavalry, to lay siege to a city above two miles in circuit, and fortified with a double wall and a ditch. The deficiency of troops, so far at least as regarded numbers, was, however, sufficiently supplied, for on coming within sight of Madura he was joined by the army of nearly 5,000 men which was returning from Tinnevelly; the artillery continued as before, and his whole success depended on the breaching power of a large old native gun which might at any moment burst in his hands. The enterprise, though little judgment had been displayed in arranging it, seemed favoured by fortune. Several large breaches already existed in the outer wall, and the gun fired through one of them at the inner wall for two successive days made a breach which was deemed practicable with the aid of fascines. It was now resolved to storm. The reader naturally asks, Why not continue the firing for another day, and enlarge the breach, so as to make fascines unnecessary? The answer is, It was impossible: the old gun had expended all its shot! The storming party passed the first wall without resistance, but at the foot of the breach of the inner wall were encountered by a trio of champions; "one of them," says Orme, "a very bulky man, in complete armour," who fought manfully and wounded several of the forlorn hope before they were cut down. Meanwhile, bullets, arrows, and stones poured thick from above. Nothing daunted, the storming party gained the parapet, but there saw a sight which might well have filled them with dismay. On each side of the breach was a mound of earth, with trees laid horizontally upon it, yet leaving openings through which the enemy thrust their pikes, while at the bottom of the rampart a strong entrenchment had been thrown up, and from three to four thousand men stood ready to defend it. The assault, in which it would have been madness to persist, was abandoned, and on the following day Captain Cope, after blowing his old gun to pieces, because he
Intrigues of Muhammed Ali

had not the means to carry it away, returned crest-fallen to Trichinopoly. It was indeed high time to be off; for the bad spirit of the Tinnevelly army could no longer be restrained, and 2,500 horse and 1,000 infantry went over to the enemy.

At the time when this reverse was sustained, news arrived that Chanda Sahib was preparing to march from Arcot to besiege Trichinopoly. Muhammed Ali's applications to the presidency for aid became more urgent than ever, and he endeavoured to give weight to them by promising not merely to pay all expenses, but to give a grant to the Company of a considerable territory adjoining Madras. Tempting as the offer was, there is reason to doubt if it would have succeeded had it not found a powerful advocate in a very unexpected quarter. Dupleix, ostensibly for the purpose of marking the boundaries of his new acquisitions, though probably as much for the purpose of tantalizing his rivals, had caused small white flags to be planted in almost every field. These flags were seen from Fort St. David, which, ever since the capture of Madras, had continued to be the seat of the presidency, and naturally excited mingled feelings of fear and indignation. What was to become of the English Company's trade with the interior if they allowed themselves to be hemmed in by a rival company, whose boundary line would ere long be converted into an impassable barrier by the imposition of heavy, perhaps prohibitive duties? The designs of Dupleix had hitherto been only surmised, but he had now thrown off the mask and given them warning—the more impressive because of its insolence—of what they must be prepared to expect. It would be madness to hesitate any longer. Their own ruin was involved in that of Muhammed Ali, and their only safety was in supporting him to the utmost of their power. Influenced by such considerations the presidency awoke from their lethargy and resolved on action, still, however, not as principals but under their old disguise of mercenaries or auxiliaries.

In the beginning of April, 1751, a detachment was provided of 500 Europeans, fifty of them cavalry, 100 Africans, and 1,000 sepoys, with eight field-pieces, and placed under the command of Captain Gingen, who was to wait near Fort St. David the arrival of Muhammed Ali's troops from Trichinopoly.
After a delay of six weeks he was joined by only 600 horse and 1,000 foot, and proceeded south-west to Bhadrachalam, a large and strong pagoda, garrisoned by 300 of Chanda Sahib's troops, who surrendered after being threatened with an assault. Shortly after the army was more than doubled by the arrival of 100 Europeans, sent by Captain Cope, and 2,000 horse and 2,000 foot, commanded by Muhammed Ali's brother, and set out to encounter Chanda Sahib in person. He was encamped near Volkunda, situated thirty-eight miles N.N.W. of Trichinopoly, on the highway from that city to Arcot. Its principal defence was a rock 200 feet high, and about a mile in circuit at its base, which was washed by the Valaru. It was inclosed by three walls; one at the bottom, mostly cut out of the solid rock; another near, and the third actually on the summit. The governor was summoned by both parties, but answered that he wished to see the issue of a battle before he would yield it up to either. Captain Gingen, becoming impatient, determined to force a surrender; and after posting his army so as to intercept the approach of Chanda Sahib, should he attempt to interfere, sent a strong detachment to attempt the capture. The town, inclosed only by a mud wall, was easily gained; but the rock, as should have been foreseen, could not be assaulted till a breach was made, and the detachment returned to the camp.

Captain Gingen, while thus assuming the offensive, seems to have been ignorant or regardless of the fact, that he was opposed by far superior numbers. Chanda Sahib had an army of 12,000 horse and 5,000 sepoys, and was besides supported by a strong battalion of French. These at break of day next morning were seen approaching along the bed of the river, which was nearly dry. Instead of attempting to intercept their progress, Captain Gingen and his officers were deliberating in a council of war whether they should fight or retreat. It was resolved to fight; but meanwhile the French were near the foot of the rock, and the resolution came too late. The troops, aware of the hesitations of the council of war, had no hope of victory; and, seeing some of their officers betraying symptoms of fear when the guns of the fort opened on them, were seized with panic. Strange to say, it was at first begun and for some time confined to the Company's battalion, for not only
did their own officers—Clive, now a lieutenant, among the
number—endeavour to rally them, but Abdul Wahab Khan,
Muhammed Ali’s brother, riding up to them, and pointing to
his own men, who still kept their ground, upbraided them for
their cowardice. It was all in vain, and the day was lost. Even
after the danger was over, the fear was so unequivocally de-
clared, that Captain Gingen, to free them even from the sight
of the enemy, commenced his retreat at midnight, on the road
leading to Trichinopoly, and did not venture to halt till he had
reached the pass or straits of Utatur. Chanda Sahib followed
slowly by the same route. When he appeared in sight some
skirmishing took place, and even a regular battle was talked of,
but the spirit of the troops was still such that Captain Gingen
was afraid to risk it, and stole away with them in the silence of
the night. So eager were they to place themselves beyond the
reach of pursuit, that they marched eighteen hours without
refreshment in the hottest season. Chanda Sahib following
leisurely found them encamped on the northern bank of the
Coleroon, within sight of Trichinopoly. The site of the
encampment was now the only spot of ground beyond the Cole-
roon which Muhammed Ali could call his own.

About five miles north-west of Trichinopoly, the Cauvery,
after a somewhat circuitous south-easterly course of 380 miles
from its source in the Western Ghats, divides into two principal
arms, the northern of which is called the Coleroon, while the
southern retains its own name. For the first fifteen miles, as
far as the fort of Coilady, the two arms run nearly parallel
to each other, and again approach so near that they are only
prevented from uniting by means of an artificial mound. The
long and narrow slip of land thus inclosed between the arms
forms what is called the island of Seringham. Near its western
extremity, where the fork begins, and at a short distance from
the Coleroon side, stood one of the most famous pagodas, or
Hindu temples, in Hindustan. It consisted of seven squares,
one within the other, each surrounded by a wall twenty-five
feet high and four thick, and entered by four lofty turreted
gates, facing the cardinal points. The wall of the outermost
square is about four miles in circuit. The pagoda owed its
celebrity to the supposed possession of the very image of Vishnu
which Brahma used to worship; and the myriads of pilgrims flocking to it sufficed at one time to maintain 40,000 Brahmans in voluptuous idleness. About half a mile east of this pagoda, and near the Cauvery side, stood another, also of large dimensions, but with one inclosure only.

The encampment on the north bank of the Coleroon was inconvenient for obtaining supplies, and for this reason, and also no doubt because it was deemed safer to have a river between them and the enemy, Muhammed Ali’s army crossed over into the island of Seringham. The whole, including the English battalion, took up their quarters within the three first inclosures, and abstained at the earnest solicitations of the priests from approaching nearer to the sanctuary of the idol. The post was admirably adapted for defence, but a cowardly spirit still prevailed among the troops, and they would not believe themselves safe till they had taken the last retrograde step now possible, and place themselves under the walls of Trichinopoly. Chanda Sahib gladly occupied the island thus evacuated. It was not, however, with the intention of remaining in it. The great prize for which he was contending was now full in his view, and leaving only a garrison in Seringham, he crossed the Cauvery, and encamped on the east of Trichinopoly. The main body of Muhammed Ali’s troops were stationed on the south side, and the English battalion under Captain Cingen on the west. Captain Cope, with 100 Europeans, remained within the walls.

Trichinopoly, situated within half a mile of the south or right bank of the Cauvery, is in the form of a parallelogram, of which the east and west sides have each a length of 2,000, and the north and south a breadth of 1,200 yards. It is inclosed by a ditch, 30 feet wide, and 12 deep, supplied with water more or less copiously according to the season, but never dry, and two walls flanked at regular intervals by round towers. The outer wall, only 18 feet high, and about 5 thick, has neither rampart nor parapet; the inner wall, 30 feet high, and 25 feet apart from the other, is much stronger in every respect, having a rampart and a parapet both of stone, the former rising from a broad base by large decreasing steps, so as to be only 10 feet broad at the top, and the latter about 7 feet high, loopholed for musketry. Within the walls in the north part of the city is a lofty precipi-
ous rock of sienite, commanding an extensive view of the surrounding country.

Such was the only place of strength now belonging to Muhammad Ali; and on the issue of the siege about to be commenced, depended not only his fate, in which, from the worthlessness of his character, no great interest could be felt, but the decision of the momentous question, whether a French or a British empire was to be established in India. The presidency at Fort St. David, now fully committed to the war, were grievously disappointed at the series of disgraces and defeats which had been sustained, and could not look forward to the siege of Trichinopoly, without the gloomiest forebodings. They had no idea, however, of abandoning the contest in despair, and began to display a firmness and decision of which, it must be confessed, they had previously given few examples. Mr. Saunders, the governor, though devoid of the versatility and showy talents of Dupleix, surpassed him in more solid qualities; and having now no doubt as to the course which the interests of the Company dictated, pursued it with judgment and perseverance. His means, however, were very limited, and his first reinforcement for Trichinopoly consisted of only eighty Europeans and 300 sepoys, cumbersed with a large convoy of stores. The conducting of such a body through a hostile country was a matter of no small difficulty, more especially, as Bhadrachalam which lay in the line of route, though it still held out against Chanda Sahib, was at this very time besieged by a polygar in his interest. The removal of this obstruction was therefore the first object to be accomplished. The charge of the reinforcement was given to Mr. Pigot, a member of council. He was accompanied, it would seem not officially, but rather as a volunteer, by Clive, who, after the capture of Devicotta, had resumed his position as a civil servant of the Company, though still closely connected with the army, by holding the appointment of commissary for supplying the European troops with provisions. It was in this capacity that he was present at Volkunda when the ignominious flight took place; and hence, though he is mentioned as having been present at the council of war which preceded, and was one main cause of that flight, he did not share in the disgrace of it, but returned to Fort St. David.
Pigot and Clive, after reaching Bhadrachalam, and relieving it by surprising and defeating the troops of the polygar, sent the reinforcement forward to its destination through the kingdom of Tanjore, and were on their return to Fort St. David with twenty-four attendants, twelve of them sepoys, when they were surrounded by the polygar’s troops, and after losing the greater number of their attendants, only escaped by the fleetness of their horses. Not long after, another reinforcement was despatched to Trichinopoly. Affairs there were still in a most unsatisfactory state. The British officers were quarrelling among themselves instead of thinking how they might best sustain the honour of their country; and it seemed absolutely necessary to make an example of several of them by dismissing them at a time when their places could hardly be supplied. To meet the difficulty in part, Clive returned to his true vocation, and set out for Trichinopoly in command of the reinforcement. It proceeded through the territory of Tanjore, the king of which still professed neutrality, and received from Devicotta a small accession under Captain Clarke, who, as senior officer, assumed the command. The whole united mustered only 100 Europeans and fifty sepoys, with a field-piece. The French, who were in possession of the fort of Goilady, detached a body of thirty Europeans and 500 sepoys to intercept them. A skirmish ensued greatly to the disadvantage of the French, and the detachment reached Trichinopoly in safety. The superiority of the enemy was still very decided. Chanda Sahib’s troops were ten times more numerous than those of Muhammed Ali; and while the French battalion mustered 900, the English did not exceed 600 men. In pecuniary resources, also, the enemy had decidedly the advantage. The whole country either acknowledged their authority, or was subject to their exactions, while almost all the usual sources of Muhammed Ali’s revenues were dried up. The only thing to balance these advantages of the besiegers was the strength of the place.

Captain Clive returned to Fort St. David in the beginning of August, 1751, and after representing the fatal issue to which affairs at Trichinopoly were evidently tending, suggested as a last resource to attempt a diversion by an attack on Arcot. The bold proposal was accepted, and he was requested, or volunteer-
ed to undertake the execution of it. After stripping Fort St. David and Madras so as to leave only 100 men in the one and fifty in the other, the whole force that could be mustered for the expedition, amounted to 200 Europeans and 300 sepoys, with three field-pieces. Of the officers, eight in number, six had never seen service, and of these six four were civilians, who, animated by Clive’s example, quitted the desk for the sword. Starting from Madras on the 26th of August, they proceeded south-east to Conjeveram, where they arrived on the 29th, and learned that the fort of Arcot was garrisoned by 1,100 men. From Conjeveram they continued their march nearly due west, not far from the northern bank of the Paliar, and on the 31st were within ten miles of Arcot. Their approach was made known by spies, who had seen the detachment marching with unconcern in a violent storm of thunder and rain. The garrison on hearing this report lost all heart, and under the combined influence of superstition and cowardice, abandoned the place a few hours before the detachment arrived. The city being without walls or defences was immediately entered, and Clive and his 500 men, marching in triumph under the gaze of 100,000 spectators, took possession of the fort. It was inhabited by 3,000 or 4,000 persons, who were permitted to remain, and contained goods which had been deposited in it for security to the value of £50,000. The goods were judiciously and generously restored to the owners without ransom; the artillery, consisting of eight pieces of cannon, from four to eight pounders, and a large quantity of lead and gunpowder, were all that remained to the captors.

Clive anticipating a siege made it his first business to provide the necessary stores, and then, in order to strike new terror into the garrison, set out in quest of them with the greatest part of his men and four field-pieces. They were found about six miles to the south-west, near the fort of Timeri, but though drawn up as if they meant to make a stand, they only continued firing a single field-piece, managed by two or three Europeans, and made off for the hills before they could be brought within musket-shot. Two days after Clive again marched out of the fort, and, as before, found the enemy, now increased to 2,000, within gunshot of Timeri. They were posted in a grove inclosed by a ditch and a bank, and having about fifty yards in
front a large tank almost choked up and dry, with a bank much higher than that of the grove. As the detachment advanced, the enemy fired smartly from two field-pieces, and killed three Europeans. On this the detachment advanced rapidly, and the enemy, leaving the grove, hurried into the tank, where they were so well sheltered, that they inflicted some loss without sustaining any. Clive removed his troops behind some buildings, and sent out two platoons to attack two sides of the tank. Both gained the banks, and at the same instant let fly a double volley among the crowds within. They made no attempt to return, and fled, while Clive gained possession of the pettah or village under the walls of the fort. This he immediately summoned to surrender, but the garrison, discovering that he had no battering cannon, refused, and he had no alternative but to retreat, the enemy’s cavalry hovering around him at a safe distance till he reached Arcot.

The next ten days were employed on necessary works within the fort; and the enemy, increased to 3,000 men, acquired new courage and began to talk of besieging. They were allowed to lull themselves into security, and on the 14th of September, two hours after midnight, were surprised in their sleep. Clive, with the greater part of his troops, beat up their camp from end to end without the loss of a man, while they fled on all sides with shrieks and confusion. When day broke, not a man of them was to be seen.

Two eighteen-pounders with some military stores had been asked from Madras, and were on the way escorted only by a few sepoys. In hope of intercepting them, a large detachment of the enemy occupied the pagoda of Conjeveram; and, on being expelled by thirty Europeans and fifty sepoys from Arcot, withdrew to a neighbouring fort. Here their numbers were continually augmented. The convoy being thus endangered, Clive, reserving only thirty Europeans and fifty sepoys, sent out all the rest of his troops to insure its safety. On this, the enemy with considerable dexterity suddenly changed their tactics, and hastening to Arcot, surrounded the fort with their whole force as soon as it was dark. A fire of musketry was immediately opened upon the ramparts from the adjacent buildings, while a large body, horse and foot promiscuously, rushed towards the principal gates with loud outcries and the noise of martial
music. A few hand-grenades thrown into the mass so frightened the horses, that they galloped off, trampling the foot beneath them; a second assault made in the same manner was repulsed by the same means. The fire against the ramparts was still kept up and continued till daybreak, when the assailants fled precipitately on seeing the approach of the detachment and convoy. It is rather singular, that during the attack on the fort, the inhabitants within it expressed no sympathy with their countrymen outside. Some may see in this nothing but Clive's good fortune, but others with more justice will see in it the due reward of the kindness and generosity which he had displayed in allowing them both to occupy their dwellings and retain possession of their goods.

The capture of Arcot produced the effect which had been anticipated; and the pressure on Trichinopoly was considerably relieved by the withdrawal of 4,000 of Chanda Sahib's troops. These, joined on their route by his son Raja Sahib, with 150 Europeans from Pondicherry, and the other troops previously collected in the neighbourhood, entered Arcot on the 23rd of September. Clive, unwilling to be cooped up within the fort, determined to take the initiative, and try whether he could not, by a vigorous effort, rid himself of the enemy altogether. Facing the north-west gate of the fort was a street, which, after running north for 70 yards, turned east to the nabob's palace, where Raja Sahib had fixed his headquarters. From the palace another street ran south, and was continued along the east side of the fort. The space thus bounded by streets on the west, north, and east, and by the north wall of the fort on the south, formed a square occupied by buildings and inclosures. With the intention of placing the enemy between two fires, Clive sallied out from the north-west gate with the greatest part of his troops and the four field-pieces, and advanced along the street leading north and east; while Ensign Glass was ordered to proceed from the east gate up the street leading north to the palace, which was thus the common point at which the two detachments, if they removed the obstacles in their way, would meet. On turning east, Clive saw the French troops, with four field-pieces, drawn up at the palace, and a cannonade commenced at the distance of only 30 yards. A few minutes cleared the street of the French,
and obliged them to take refuge in the palace. Meanwhile, Raja Sahib's troops occupying the houses in the street, and sheltered by them, kept up a continual fire, with so good an aim that fourteen men sent to capture and bring away the French guns were all killed or wounded. To escape this murderous fire, Clive took advantage of a large choultri or building for the reception of travellers. It was situated on one side of the street, and having an open front supported by pillars, while its other three sides were inclosed, afforded good cover; and at the same time, giving free ingress and egress, enabled the artillerymen to load and fire without much danger. In this way the guns were gradually withdrawn into the north street; and the whole party which had sallied from the north-west gate were able to return by it into the fort. The platoon under Ensign Glass returned about the same time, after encountering similar difficulties. The whole attack was a decided failure, and gave Clive a lesson of caution which seems to have been, at this early stage of his military experience, by no means unnecessary. It cost him the lives of fifteen Europeans, who were killed on the spot or mortally wounded; and the services of sixteen more of his party, who were disabled. Among the latter was Lieutenant Revel, the only artillery officer; among the former was Lieutenant Trenwith, who, by pulling Clive aside when he saw a sepoy aiming at him, saved his commanding officer's life and lost his own, as the sepoy immediately changed the aim, and shot him through the body.

The day after this affair Raja Sahib was reinforced by 2,000 men from Vellore, commanded by Mortiz Ali in person, and commenced the siege by occupying all the avenues leading to the fort. Its defence must have been regarded, both by besiegers and besieged, as all but impossible. Its walls, about a mile in circuit, and several of the towers flanking them, were in many places ruinous; the rampart, surmounted by a low and slightly built parapet, was too narrow to admit the firing of artillery; and the ditch, choked up in some places and dry in others, was generally, even when it contained water, so shallow as to be fordable. The only two gates—the north-west and east, already mentioned—were large piles of masonry projecting 40 feet beyond the walls, and the entrance to each of them was not by
a drawbridge, but a broad causeway. This large, decayed, and ill-constructed fort had an efficient garrison of only 120 Europeans and 200 sepoys; and was besieged by an army of above 10,000, composed as follows—150 Europeans, 2,000 sepoys, 5,000 peons or undisciplined native infantry, and 3,000 cavalry. As it was provisioned only for forty days, it was necessary to send away all the inhabitants except a few artificers, one of them, a mason, who most fortunately knew of a secret subterraneous aqueduct, by which, if it had not been choked up in consequence of his information, the only reservoir within the fort might have been drained of its water. As many of the houses of the town were within musket-shot, and would give great facilities to the besiegers, an attempt was made to burn several of them. It failed, because they were almost entirely of stone; and it was resolved to get rid of the two which threatened to be most annoying by employing more destructive means. Accordingly, at midnight, Ensign Glass and ten men, with several barrels of gunpowder, were let down from the wall by a rope. They got into the houses without being discovered, but made the explosion so unskilfully that the effect intended was not produced. Nor was this the only misfortune. The rope broke while Ensign Glass was ascending by it, and the fall unfitted him for further duty.

For a fortnight the besiegers, while waiting for the battering cannon, kept up a bombardment with four mortars, which did little damage. The fire of musketry from the houses was more effective; indeed, the aim was so sure that a man could scarcely show his head above the parapet without being hit. In this way three sergeants, accompanying Clive while he visited the works, were picked off, and several other persons were killed or wounded. Before the siege began in earnest, Mortiz Ali was tempted to try a stratagem. Pretending to be dissatisfied with Raja Sahib, he withdrew with his troops to a different quarter of the city, and sent a secret messenger to acquaint Clive with his feelings, and assure him that if he would make a sally, he would support him with all his force. Clive was not to be thus caught, and cleverly foiled Mortiz Ali with his own weapons. Instead of giving a refusal, he pretended to approve of the scheme; and by maintaining the correspondence for several
days, induced a large portion of the enemy to remain inactive. Mortiz Ali, perceiving at last that he was outwitted, returned to his former place in the camp.

On the 24th of October, two eighteen-pounders and seven smaller pieces arrived from Pondicherry. With these the French opened a battery to the north-west, and served it so well that the very first shot dismounted, and the second entirely disabled one of the eighteen-pounders in the fort. The other eighteen-pounder there was also soon dismounted, and removed to a spot not exposed to the fire from the battery, which, being thus scarcely answered at all, succeeded in six days in beating down all the wall between two towers, and making a practicable breach. The garrison, meantime, spared no exertion. Immediately under the rampart opposite to the breach two trenches were dug, leaving a considerable space between them, which was covered with crows'-feet; and still farther back, a house was pulled down to the height of a breastwork, from which palisades were carried along the ends of the trenches up to the parapet. One field-piece was placed on one of the towers flanking the breach, and two on the flat roof of a house opposite to it. The enemy, aware of the reception prepared for them, did not yet venture to storm, and proceeded to erect another battery on the south-west.

The garrison, in the meantime, more in the spirit of bravado than the anticipation of any important result, thickened the highest tower of the ramparts, and crowned it with a mound of earth. On the top of this mound, which commanded the palace, as it towered above the intervening houses, they hoisted up an enormous gun, said to have been sent from Delhi by Aurangzeb, and transported by 1,000 yoke of oxen. The iron balls belonging to it weighed seventy-two pounds. The very first of these, fired from it with a charge of thirty pounds of gunpowder, went right through the palace, to the no small terror of Raja Sahib and his staff. It was fired only once a-day, and after four discharges burst. The besiegers, wishing to retaliate in similar style, filled up the interior of a large house with earth well rammed down; and having thus formed a square mound, and raised it so high as to overlook every part of the fort, intended it for two small cannon and musketry. The garri-
son allowed the works to proceed till the cannon were actually mounted, and then opened upon it with their reserved eighteen-pounder, and with such good effect, that in less than an hour it tumbled down with the fifty men stationed upon it.

The perilous position of the garrison being well known at the presidency, it was resolved to reinforce it; and, with this view, a party of 100 Europeans and 200 sepoys left Madras under Lieutenant Innes. After a considerable part of the journey was accomplished, they were surrounded by 2,000 of the enemy, and were only able, after serious loss, to retreat to the fort of Ponamali, fifteen miles west of Madras. Relief from the presidency having thus become apparently hopeless, Clive opened a communication with Murari Rao, the Maratha chief of Gooti, who had been encamped for some time with 6,000 men among the mountains, thirty miles west of Arcot. He had come as the hired ally of Muhammed Ali, but had remained inactive on seeing the desperate state of his affairs. Clive’s name, however, was now beginning to carry a charm along with it; and Murari Rao’s answer was, that he would lose not a moment in coming to the assistance of such brave men as the defenders of Arcot, “whose behaviour had now first convinced him that the English could fight.” This intelligence alarmed Raja Sahib, who endeavoured to anticipate the arrival of the Marathas by sending a flag of truce to the fort, offering honourable terms to the garrison, and a large sum of money to Clive, and threatening, if his offers were not accepted, to storm immediately and put every man to the sword. Clive only disdained his bribe, and laughed at his threats.

The reinforcement from Madras, slightly increased, and commanded by Captain Kilpatrick, was again attempting to advance; and a detachment of Marathas had actually arrived in the neighbourhood, and captured a quantity of ammunition going to the besiegers. Raja Sahib, now awake to the danger of further delay, and encouraged by the effect of his south-west battery, which had made a still larger breach than that on the north-west, determined to storm. The day selected was the 14th of November, one of the greatest of Muhammadan festivals, commemorative of the murder of Hussain, the chief of the Fatimites. During its celebration, every son of Moslem falling
in battle against unbelievers, is understood to pass at once to paradise without enduring the delays and pains of intermediate purgatories. Taking advantage of the enthusiasm which such a period excites, and heightening it by inebriating drugs, Raja Sahib, as soon as morning broke, gave the signal for assault. Every part of the fort was threatened; but the principal attack was made in four divisions, two directed against the breaches, and two against the gates. Clive, after making his arrangements, had gone to sleep, and on being aroused found the garrison at their posts. The ditch in front of the north-west breach was fordable, and the division allotted to this part of the attack rushed across it. A large number immediately sat down with great composure underneath the wall to act as a reserve, while the rest hastened up to the breach, filled it, and had even passed, before the defenders gave fire. It was most deadly, and continued without a moment’s interruption, those behind supplying loaded muskets to those in front as fast as they could discharge them. The two cannons planted on the roof of the house opposite the breach did fearful execution, and the assailants were forced to retire. Fresh bodies, however, again and again renewed the assault, but were driven off as before. Meantime, those seated under the wall were not forgotten, and a few bombs with short fuses thrown from above obliged them to decamp. At the south-west breach, the attack was made in a different manner. The ditch under it not being fordable, the assailants brought forward a raft, which was large enough to carry seventy men. These embarked upon it, and, though fired upon by two field-pieces, one on each flank, were nearly across, when Clive, observing the bad aim of the gunners, took the management of one of the pieces, and in two or three discharges caused such confusion that the raft was overset, and those upon it who escaped drowning swam back to the opposite side.

The assault had lasted nearly an hour. As soon as it ceased, the assailants employed themselves in carrying off their dead. They might have been permitted to discharge this duty of humanity undisturbed; but the fire of the garrison was not slackened, and they were obliged to desist. An act of heroism, on the part of a native, is not unworthy of being recorded. The leader of the sepoys at the north bridge, after greatly distin-
Intrigues of Muhammed Ali

guishing himself, had fallen. He was greatly beloved by his men, and one of them crossed the ditch for his body. Though the attempt exposed him to the fire of forty muskets, he had the good fortune to escape unharmed with his honourable burden. The whole loss of the enemy was computed at 400 men, almost all natives; for the French, as if unwilling to encounter the English in the deadly breach while the two governments were actually at peace, had kept aloof, and been only spectators of the assault. The loss of the garrison amounted only to four Europeans killed, and two sepoys wounded. When the assault took place, so many of the garrison were disabled by wounds or sickness, that the whole number engaged mustered only eighty Europeans, officers included, and 120 sepoys. These, during the attack, served five pieces of cannon, and expended 12,000 musket-cartridges.

Two hours after their repulse, the enemy renewed their fire both with cannon and musketry; and with the exception of two hours, during which they were allowed, at their own request, a truce to bury their dead, maintained it till two in the following morning, when it suddenly ceased. When the day dawned the garrison were overjoyed to learn the cause. The enemy had evacuated the town; and the siege, after lasting fifty days, was finally raised. In the camp were found four pieces of artillery, four mortars, and a large quantity of ammunition, showing how precipitate the departure of the enemy must have been. In the evening, Captain Kilpatrick arrived with his detachment.

Raja Sahib's repulse had been the signal for the departure of all his auxiliary chiefs, and he was left only with the troops which his father had sent from Trichinopoly. With these and the French he moved west to Vellore, close to the eastern side of which he inclosed himself within strong intrenchments. Clive, being now free to act, left Captain Kilpatrick in command of the fort, and proceeded with 200 Europeans, 700 sepoys, and three field-pieces, south to Timeri, which surrendered on the first summons. His next movements depended on the Marathas, who had promised to join him, but as usual employed themselves in plundering the surrounding country. Basin Rao, whom his uncle, Murari Rao, had left in command of 1,000 horse, conducted himself so negligently when in the vicinity of Velloer...
that he exposed himself to a night-attack, and was obliged to leave his camp to the enemy. Anxious to repair the loss he applied to Clive, who set out with him, and was thus engaged when he learned that a party of Europeans from Pondicherry were on the way to Arni, a strong fort on the road between Arcot and Gingi. He proposed to intercept them, and succeeded, after some difficulty, in obtaining the consent of Basin Rao, whose objections were not overcome till he learned that the French were carrying a large sum of money to Raja Sahib. Even after he gave his consent, he was unable to muster more than 600 horse. These, when added to Clive’s original force, left him far inferior to the enemy, whom he discovered after a forced march of twenty miles, preparing to cross the river immediately to the north of Arni with 300 Europeans, 2,000 horse, and 2,500 sepoys.

The enemy, perceiving their superiority, wheeled round and determined to give battle. Clive on his part did not decline it, and awaited the attack in an advantageous position—the Marathas occupying a grove of palm trees on the left, the sepoys a village on the right, and the Europeans an open-ground in the centre between the two. In front were swampy rice fields, with a causeway leading through them to the village. The French, with about 1,500 of their sepoys and their artillery, advanced along the causeway, while the horse, with the remaining sepoys interspersed with them, moved forward on the grove. Here a spirited action commenced, and the Marathas displayed much gallantry, making five successive charges, though only to be repulsed. The division advancing along the causeway were more successfully opposed, and were so galled and enfiladed by the English field-pieces that all but the artillerymen with the cannon quitted the causeway and made for the rice fields. Their position was not thereby improved, and a general alarm spreading over their whole ranks they commenced a retreat. Clive followed close in pursuit, but night coming on they made their escape with comparatively little loss, crossed the river and entered Arni. So much, however, were they dispirited that they did not venture to remain, and quitted it in disorder, followed by the Marathas, who, now entirely in their element, overtook them, and captured Raja Sahib’s military chest, containing 100,000 rupees.
In consequence of this defeat, many of the enemy's sepoys deserted and offered their services to Clive, who enlisted 600 of those who were best armed.

During the siege of Arcot, the French, by occupying Conjeveram, had interrupted the communication with Madras, and captured a party of disabled men who were proceeding thither. Some of them they are said to have atrociously murdered in their litters, but Lieutenant Revel and Ensign Glass, already mentioned, obtained quarter, and were living as prisoners in Conjeveram when Clive appeared before it and summoned it to surrender. The French commander so far forgot himself as to threaten that, if he were attacked, he would expose these English officers on the walls. Clive paid no regard to this unworthy menace; and on receiving two eighteen-pounders from Madras, began to batter in breach at the distance of 200 yards. On this occasion he made another of those remarkable hairbreadth escapes, of which we have already seen several instances, an officer who accompanied him while reconnoitring being shot dead by his side. The breach would soon have been rendered practicable, but the French commander, dreading the resentment which he knew he must have provoked, did not venture to stand an assault, and abandoned the place in the night, leaving his two prisoners behind. After ruining the defences of Conjeveram, Clive sent 200 Europeans and 500 sepoys to Arcot, and returned with the rest to the presidency, to give an account of his triumphant campaign.

Raja Sahib's scattered troops, seeing the field again clear by the departure of the British, re-assembled, and moving down toward the coast, ravaged part of the Company's territory around Madras and in the vicinity of St. Thome. They next returned to Conjeveram, repaired the defences of the pagoda, garrisoned it with 300 sepoys, and kept possession of the open country as far east as Ponamiali. The presidency, who had been employed in preparing a reinforcement for Trichinopoly, determined to employ it, in the first instance, in expelling these dangerous and troublesome intruders. Clive, appointed to this task, marched from Madras in February, 1752, with a detachment which, when augmented by a reinforcement from Arcot, consisted of: 380 Europeans and 1,300 sepoys, with six field-
pieces. The enemy, though mustering 400 Europeans, 2,000 sepoys, and 2,500 horse, with a large train of artillery, did not venture to risk an encounter, and removed south to Vandalur, where, as they strongly intrenched themselves, they seemed determined on a stand. On Clive's approach it looked as if their courage had again failed them, for they had not only abandoned their camp, but dispersed as if some sudden terror had struck them. It soon appeared, however, that they were not obeying their fears, but following out a deep-laid scheme. When again heard of they were united at Conjeveram, and preparing to move west on Arcot. Aware that it had been almost entirely stripped of its garrison to furnish the above reinforcement, they had determined to fall upon it suddenly, after they had tempted Clive so far away as to make it difficult for him to advance to its relief. The stratagem nearly succeeded, not merely in consequence of the feebleness of the garrison, but of treachery within it. Two native sepoy officers had been gained over, and were to have opened the gates. Fortunately the plot was discovered, and the enemy, finding that the signals agreed upon were not answered, went off as suddenly as they had appeared.

Notwithstanding intelligence of their departure, Clive continued his march westward, and at sunset had come within sight of Coverypauk, when the van, advancing without suspicion, were fired upon from nine pieces of cannon at the distance of only 250 yards. The whole enemy were here lying in ambuscade, and the cannons were the French artillery posted in a grove, with a ditch and bank in front. Clive made his arrangements hastily, but with the greatest coolness. Ordering the infantry to take shelter in a water-course immediately on the left, and the baggage to be moved back half a mile, under the guard of a platoon and one of the field-pieces, he sent a detachment, with two field-pieces, to oppose Raja Sahib's cavalry, who were spreading out on the plain, and employed his other three remaining pieces to answer the fire from the grove. The French infantry advanced along the water-course in a column of six men abreast, and were met by the English infantry in the same order. Neither ventured to come to the bayonet, and an indecisive fire of musketry was kept up for two hours by moonlight. The enemy's cavalry were also kept at bay, and failed in several
attempts on the baggage. So far the fight was equal. It was otherwise with the artillery. Clive’s three pieces were no match for the French nine, and so many of his gunners were killed or disabled, that he saw no alternative but to take the enemy’s battery or to retreat. The former, if practicable, was of course the more desirable, and was at once adopted, when a sergeant, who had been sent to reconnoitre, returned with the information that the enemy had left the rear of the grove without any guard. A strong detachment was immediately despatched towards the enemy’s rear by a long circuit. Clive himself accompanied it half-way, and returned only in time to find the troops he had left in the water-course on the point of giving way. He succeeded with some difficulty in rallying them, and had renewed the fight, when all at once the enemy’s artillery ceased to fire. The attack on the rear had been completely successful. The detachment reached the grove unperceived, and gave a general volley at the distance of only thirty yards. The panic was instantaneous, and the enemy fled without firing another shot. Many of the Frenchmen who had crowded into a choultris in the grove gladly accepted of quarter, and became prisoners of war. Among the immediate fruits of the victory were nine field-pieces, three coehorn mortars, and the surrender of the fort of Coverpauk.

Clive continued his march to Arcot, and was next day on his way to Vellore, in the hopes of inducing Mortiz Ali to pay a contribution, or at least deliver up the elephants and baggage which Raja Sahib had deposited with him, when he received an order to repair with all his force to Fort St. David, from which it was determined to despatch him, in command of a reinforcement, to Trichinopoly. In marching south across the country in obedience to this order, he passed the spot where Nazir Jung had lost his life, and where Dupleix, to commemorate the very detestable action which he heralded as a victory, had founded a city under the name of Dupleix-Fateabad, or the City of Dupleix’s Victory. In its centre a column, with a pompous inscription in French, Persian, and several Indian languages, was to have been erected. Clive did an act of justice, as well as sound policy, by levelling the whole with the ground. Though his route lay through a country still nominally in the hands of the enemy,
no obstruction was offered. Their spirits and their foree
t were equally broken; and Muhammed Ali, who lately did not
possess any spot north of the Coleroon, was, mainly by Clive’s
exploits, put in virtual possession, as nabob, of a territory
sixty miles long by thirty broad, and yielding an annual revenue
of £150,000. Three days after Clive’s arrival at Fort St. David,
Major Lawrence returned from England and again assumed
the chief military command.
WHILE Clive was gaining his successes in Arcot, Chanda Sahib continued to beleaguer Trichinopoly. The chief burden of the siege fell upon the French, who, having obtained a train of battering artillery from their settlement of Karrikal, erected their principal battery at the distance of 1,200 yards from the north-east angle of the fortress. Their headquarters were fixed at some distance eastward, near the south bank of the Cauvery; and in order to save the trouble of connecting them by trenches, they converted the battery into a regular redoubt by inclosing the flanks and rear with a parapet and a ditch. The battery was mounted with three eighteen-pounders and three mortars; and on a rock, afterwards known as the French Rock, situated nearly due south of the battery and about 2,000 yards from the south-east angle of the fortress, two eighteen-pounders were placed. Two guns were also posted on the north bank of the Cauvery, within the island of Seringham, opposite to the northern gate. These arrangements indicated a great lack of engineering skill and enterprise, as both of the two gun-batteries were far too distant to make any impression on the walls. Accordingly, after they had continued for several days wasting their ammunition to no purpose, the troops under Captain Gingen not only got rid of their former fears, but ran to the opposite extreme, and blamed him for not allowing them to be foolhardy. All his caution, though it had formerly been excessive, was now necessary to prevent them from exposing themselves to disaster.

To meet the enemy's attack the defenders raised up a glacis, leaving nothing but the parapet of the wall visible, opposite to the principal battery, flung up an entrenchment opposite to
the French Rock, and mounted two guns close to the south bank of the Cauvery, to answer those on the opposite side in the island of Seringham. A constant firing was now kept up on both sides without any result. The time wasted, however, began to tell severely against Muhammed Ali, whose resources were much more limited than those of the besiegers. Besides maintaining his own troops he was expected to subsidize the Company’s troops. This he feared would soon become impossible, and the consequence might be that these troops would withdraw and leave him to his fate. Very naturally, therefore, he looked about for new allies; and found one in Mysore, then the most powerful of the neighbouring states. Its sovereign was at this time an infant, and the whole power was concentrated in the hands of his uncle, the dalaway or regent, who listened to Muhammed Ali the more readily from the deep hatred which he bore to Chanda Sahib. At the same time, while gratifying his hatred, he did not forget his interest, and sold the promise of his assistance at a very extravagant rate. He was not long, however, in beginning to fulfil it. In the beginning of October, 1751, a party of horsemen arrived from Seringapatam, the capital of Mysore. Their number was only seventy, but they brought with them what was of more consequence, in the shape of a subsidy of 500,000 rupees (£50,000).

This was only a foretaste of the aid about to be furnished by the dalaway, for in the latter end of November he began to assemble an army at Karur, about forty-five miles W.N.W. of Trichinopoly; and, not contented with his own troops, hired a body of 6,000 Marathas, under the command of Murari Rao. We have already seen 1,000 of these mercenaries, under Basin Rao, co-operating with Clive in Arcot. A party of 500 sent to Trichinopoly distinguished themselves as soon as they arrived by their activity; and both by the boldness of their charges, and their cunning devices in laying ambuscades, cut off a considerable number of the enemy. Unduly elated by this success, they were eager for a general engagement, and on finding the English indisposed to risk it, told them, “they were not the same kind of men they had seen fighting so gallantly at Arcot.”

Muhammed Ali’s prospects now began to brighten, for after some frivolous delays, the Mysore army, consisting of 12,000
horse, of whom 4,000 were Marathas, led by Murari Rao, and 8,000 foot, arrived at Trichinopoly. The numbers appear much more formidable on paper than they were in reality, for at this time the Mysorean troops were cowardly and undisciplined. Independently, however, of their actual value, they had indirectly a powerful influence in inducing other neighbouring states to join the same side; and hence the King of Tanjore, who had hitherto professed neutrality, no sooner learned the arrival of the Mysorean army than he declared in favour of Muhammed Ali, and sent him an auxiliary force, consisting of 3,000 horse and 2,000 foot, under the command of his general Monakji. The Polygar Tondeman, whose country is Tanjore and Madura, also espoused the same side, and sent a considerable reinforcement. The army of Muhammed Ali now amounted to 20,000 horse and 20,000 foot; that of Chanda Sahib, increased from different quarters, was little inferior, since it had exactly the same number of foot, and was only 5,000 weaker in cavalry.

The urgency of the Marathas and their other confederates for action was now greatly increased, and Captain Gingen had much difficulty in resisting their importunity. When he announced his determination to wait for the reinforcement which was expected from the presidency, several of the native officers lost all patience, and scrupled not to stigmatize his so-called caution as mere cowardice. So dissatisfied, indeed, was Nusheraj, the Mysorean commander, that he was more than once on the point of returning home with his army, and was only appeased when the revenues of all the districts recovered since his arrival were made over to Mysore. Murari Rao, equally offended, said less, but acted with the characteristic duplicity of his countrymen, by entering into a secret correspondence with the enemy.

The reinforcement commanded by Major Lawrence, ably seconded by Captain Clive, was now on its way. It consisted of 400 Europeans and 1,100 sepoys, with eight field-pieces, and was cumbered with a large quantity of military stores. Both armies, aware of the effect which it might have on future operations, were equally on the alert, the one to secure its safe arrival, and the other to intercept it. On the 26th of March it
arrived at a fort of the King of Tanjore, within twenty miles of Trichinopoly, and there deposited such of the stores as were most cumbersome. M. Law, the commander of the French battalion, acting not merely on his own judgment, but by special instructions from Dupleix, was determined not to allow it to pass without a strenuous effort to effect a capture. The first struggle commenced at the fort of Coilady. It was in possession of the French, who had here posted a strong body with artillery. Major Law, anxious to avoid the danger, ordered his guides to look out for another road. Instead of doing so they led him to the very spot. The error was first discovered by the fire of six pieces of cannon from the opposite side of the Cauvery. Great was the confusion, but both by good fortune and good management the loss sustained was small, and the line, by diverging to the left, was soon beyond the enemy's reach. A more serious contest was at hand. On advancing towards Elimiserum, a rock crowned with a fortified pagoda, five miles south-east of Trichinopoly, Major Lawrence learned that the greater part of the enemy's army was drawn up in battle array between it and the French Rock, while the remainder occupied the space between this rock and the village of Chukleypollam, on the south bank of the Cauvery. The object was very apparent. Had the major attempted to pass to the north of Elimiserum he could scarcely have escaped being surrounded. He therefore passed to the south, and had only proceeded a short way, when he had the satisfaction of being joined by 200 Europeans and 400 sepoys under Captain Dalton, and the greater part of Muhammed Ali's army.

Scarcely half an hour had been spent by the troops in taking refreshment when the scouts came in at full speed to announce that the whole of the enemy's army was advancing. Clive, sent out to reconnoitre, observed that a large choultry with some stone buildings in front of the French battalion remained unoccupied, and was ordered forward as fast as possible with the first division of artillery, supported by the grenadiers, to take possession of it. The enemy, though aware of their object, did not attempt to outstrip them, as they might and ought to have done, and contented themselves with opening a cannonade. It was the hottest that had yet taken place in India, the
French firing from twenty-two pieces, and the English from nine. The latter, though much fewer, did more execution, because the English not actually serving the guns were sheltered by the choultry and its buildings, while the French stood exposed in the open plain. This advantage soon told; and the enemy beginning to waver, first drew back their artillery, and then commenced a general retreat. Had the native troops on the English side done their part a decided victory might have been gained, but they had remained almost inactive, as if they had been not combatants, but mere spectators. This is said to have been owing, not to any want of bravery, but to the bad example set by Murari Rao, whose intrigue with the enemy was now so far advanced that he was unwilling to act against them. Though from this cause the enemy escaped with a comparatively small loss, an important object had been gained; for the reinforcement, no longer interrupted in its progress, arrived in the course of the evening at Trichinopoly.

Major Lawrence, not to allow the enemy to recover from the terror inspired by their defeat, proposed immediate action, but met with so many obstructions from his allies, whose notions of fortunate and unfortunate days often induced them to sacrifice their most favourable opportunities, that he resolved to attempt something with his own troops on his own responsibility. His object was to surprise Chanda Sahib's camp, which lay to the east of that of the French, and had no entrenchments. With this view he despatched Captain Dalton with 400 men, with orders to make a long circuit, and commence his attack on the east side of the camp, beat it up, and set fire to it. Owing to a blunder of the guides the expedition failed, but the mere fact of its having been attempted so alarmed the French commander that nothing would satisfy him but a retreat to the island of Seringham. Chanda Sahib remonstrated, but M. Law carried his point, and with so much precipitation, that a part of the baggage and whole magazines of provisions were set on fire, to save the difficulty of transport or prevent the danger of capture. The whole proceeding looks like infatuation. By retiring beyond the Cauvery the siege was truly at an end. Why then remain cooped up in an island, with the certainty of being soon pressed for supplies, and the probability
of being excluded from the possibility of egress? The only plausible account which has been given of the enemy's withdrawal to the island is, that "they were afraid to fight, and ashamed to retreat."

The English East India Company, while naturally encouraged and elated by the favourable turn which affairs had taken, were suffering severely in their mercantile interest by the length and expensiveness of the war; and it therefore seemed justifiable, even at some risk of failure, to adopt any plan which promised to bring it with the least delay to a successful termination. Such a plan was suggested by Clive, and adopted by Major Lawrence. It was to form the army into two divisions; and while retaining the one south of the Cauvery, to send the other to the north of the Coleroon. Hazardous it certainly was; for the defeat of one division almost necessarily involved the destruction of both. A difficulty remained. To whom was the command of the northern division to be intrusted? Major Lawrence was anxious to appoint Clive, but several of the officers as his seniors had a prior claim. The Marathas and Mysoreans removed the difficulty, by declaring that they would not allow any of their troops to accompany the expedition unless Clive had the command of it. He was accordingly appointed, and after arranging to choose a central position between the Coleroon and the straits of Utatur, so as to be always within a forced march of Trichinopoly, set out on the 6th of April, 1752, with 400 Europeans, 700 sepoys, 3,000 Marathas commanded by Innis Khan, 1,000 Tanjorine horse, two battering cannon, and six field-pieces. Having reached the north bank of the Coleroon by crossing the island of Seringham three miles east of the pagoda of Jumbakistna, he marched north seven miles and took possession of the village of Samjaaveram, with its two pagodas, one on each side of the highroad leading to Utatur.

Dupleix, alarmed at the critical position into which Chanda Sahib's army had been brought by M. Law's injudicious retreat into the island of Seringham, sent M. d'Auteuil to supersede him. He was accompanied by 120 Europeans, 500 sepoys, with four field-pieces, and a large convoy of provisions and stores. Clive, on learning his arrival at Utatur, and intention to avoid
Samiaveram, by making a large circuit to the west, set out with the greater part of his force to intercept him. M. d'Auteuil, informed of this movement, hastened back to Utatur, and Clive retraced his steps to Samiaveram. M. Law, who knew of Clive's departure and not of his return, sent a party of eighty Europeans and 700 sepoys to attack Samiaveram, and make an easy prize of the few troops who had been left in it. They arrived in the vicinity at midnight, and were informed by a spy of the return of the force sent against M. d'Auteuil. The commanding officer refused to believe it, and pushed forward with his men. On being challenged by the advanced guard of the English sepoys, an Irishman, who was in command of a body of deserters, stepped out and told them that Major Lawrence had sent him with a reinforcement. The sepoys, hearing some of the other deserters speaking English, were so fully satisfied, that they never thought of asking the counter-word, and even sent one of their number to conduct them to headquarters. Thus guided, they passed without interruption through part of the Maratha camp, and reached the lesser pagoda. Here they were challenged by the sentinels, and answered by firing a volley. Clive, who was sleeping in a neighbouring choultry, started up, and, imagining that it was his own sepoys who were firing in consequence of some alarm on the outskirts, hastened off to the larger pagoda for a body of Europeans, and returned with 200 of them to the choultry, when he was confirmed in his first impression by finding a large body of sepoys drawn up facing the south, from which any alarm might be supposed to have come, and firing at random. Never doubting that they were his own men, he left his Europeans twenty yards in their rear, and went in among them, upbraiding them for their panic. His voice betrayed him to one of the sepoys, who instantly attacked him with his sword, and wounded him in two places. Clive immediately encountered his assailant, who took to his heels and ran off for the lesser pagoda. Still unconscious of his mistake, and enraged that he should thus have been attacked by one of his own men, he followed in pursuit, and first learned the real state of matters by being accosted by six Frenchmen. With singular presence of mind, he at once recovered from
his surprise, and with great composure told the Frenchmen he had come to offer them terms, at the same time bidding them look round and see how completely the pagoda was surrounded by his army. Three of the Frenchmen went back into the pagoda to acquaint their countrymen with the offer of quarter; the other three actually gave up their arms and followed him to the choultry, where he took the necessary steps to rid the camp of intruders.

Clive's personal dangers were not yet over. The pagoda, desperately defended by the French and the English deserters, remained in their hands till daybreak. As the only chance of escape, a sally was attempted. It failed; and Clive, anxious to save further bloodshed, advanced to parley. Weak with the loss of blood and fatigue, he was standing with his back towards the wall of the porch, and leaning in a stooping posture on the shoulders of two sergeants, when the Irish deserter, probably aware that whatever terms were made, he could have no hope of mercy, insolently advanced, and telling Clive that he would shoot him, fired his musket. The bullet missed him, but passed through the bodies of both the sergeants, who fell mortally wounded. The escape looks like a miracle. It was afterwards discovered that, at the very commencement of the alarm, he had had another escape scarcely less wonderful. The very first volley which started him from his sleep, shattered a box under his feet, and killed a servant who was lying close to him. Three hairbreadth escapes in a single day—the midnight volley—the sepoys' sword—and the Irish desperado's deadly aim—make it impossible to doubt that a special Providence was watching over him and reserving him for great events. The 700 sepoys who had entered the camp, managed to quit it again during the confusion, and were hastening back to the Coleroon, when the Marathas were observed in full pursuit. They attempted to escape by throwing down their arms and dispersing. It was in vain; every man of them perished.

The position of the two armies was now reversed. The besiegers saw themselves besieged and in danger of being starved out. Their great hope was in M. d'Auteuil; but this hope soon failed them, for that officer, despairing not only of reaching Seringham, but of maintaining his position at Utatur, made
a rapid retreat to Volkunda, after sacrificing a large quantity
of his stores. This loss, and the dangers which threatened on
every side, determined Chanda Sahib’s officers to execute a
design which they had for some time contemplated. Approaching
him in a body, they announced their determination to quit
his service. Instead of upbraiding them, he told them that
they had only anticipated a similar proposal from himself. He
was unable to pay their arrears, but assured them that they
would not be forgotten should better fortune again attend
him; and gave the best proof of his sincerity by making over
to them at a valuation the greater part of his elephants, camels,
horses, and other military effects. Some of the troops thus set
free returned home; others took service with the Mysoreans.
Very few went over to Muhammed Ali; but Clive, at
Samiaveram, was joined by 2,000 of the best horse and 1,500
sepoys. Chanda Sahib was left with only 2,000 horse and
3,000 foot, who were lodged in the pagoda of Seringham. The
French battalion, with 2,000 sepoys, shut themselves up in
the pagoda of Jumbakistna, and gave out that they meant to
defend themselves to the last extremity. As their only hope,
they still kept their eyes turned towards M. d’Auteuil, who,
on his part, so far from being able to bring them succour, was
entirely occupied with his own difficulties. After various move-
ments, which only entangled him more and more, he was
coop ed up by Clive in the fort of Volkunda, and obliged to
come to terms. One of these was that deserters should be
pardoned. It seems strange that there should have been any
occasion for such a clause; but its importance is perceived
when we learn the astounding fact, that though the whole
number of Europeans under M. d’Auteuil was only 100, no
fewer than thirty-five, more than one-third of the whole, were
English soldiers who had deserted.

The surrender of M. d’Auteuil left the French in Seringham
without the least prospect of relief. Preparatory to a capi-
tulation, it was thought desirable that an attempt should be made
to secure the escape of Chanda Sahib. M. Law was aware that
in the hands of Dupleix he might still be turned to good
account; and he appears, moreover, to have been sincerely desi-
rous not to allow him to fall into the power of Muhammed Ali,
who was well known to be-thirsting for his life. So completely, however, was the island now watched, that the only mode of escape which seemed practicable was to bribe some of the native auxiliaries to allow him a passage through their quarters. Several were thought of—the Marathas, but they would sell him to the highest bidder—the Mysoreans, but they would employ him as a hostage to obtain the performance of the promises which Muhammed Ali had made to them—and the Tanjorines, but they bore him an old grudge, and would be willing to take an opportunity of avenging it. It was known, however, that Monakji, the Tanjorine commander, was at variance with the prime minister, and might in consequence be induced to pursue a separate interest. To him, therefore, the overture was made. He gave his consent readily, and received a large sum of money in hand, with the promise of much more, and almost any advantage for which he chose to stipulate. The bargain was thus concluded, and nothing remained but to fix the time of Chanda Sahib’s departure, when, on the 31st of May, on the arrival of battering cannon from Devicotta, Major Lawrence summoned M. Law to surrender. Monakji, now pretending zealous friendship, took advantage of the summons to urge Chanda Sahib to come over that very night, and assured him that every hour’s delay added greatly to his risk. Some suspicion of treachery was felt, and Monakji was asked for a considerable hostage. He answered with great calmness, that if treachery was meant, no hostage could prevent it, and that, moreover, the mere giving of a hostage would be equivalent to a divulging of the whole secret. He bound himself, however, by an oath on his sword and poniard, the most sacred of all obligations to an Indian soldier, to send off Chanda Sahib as soon as he came into his quarters, with an escort of horse to Karrikal. All this had taken place at an interview with M. Law, whose suspicions were still further lulled by a Tanjorine officer who told him he was to command the escort, and showed him the palanquin and other preparations for the journey. Chanda Sahib, who was waiting to hear the result of the interview, immediately placed himself in the power of Monakji, whose first use of it was to put him in irons.

M. Law, after concluding the arrangement for his unfortunate colleague in arms, had no alternative for himself. He was
absolutely at the mercy of his antagonists, and had no hope except in the moderation of Major Lawrence. The French, he said, was not at war with the English; and now that Chanda Sahib was a prisoner, and his army dispersed, he expected to be treated not as an enemy, but as the representative of a friendly power, and assisted to return in safety with his army to the French settlements. Major Lawrence replied that he acted only as the interpreter of the intentions of Muhammed Ali, and justified the terms which he proposed to exact by producing a letter in which Dupleix declared that he would never cease to pursue him while a Frenchman remained in India. The first summons to M. Law was to surrender at discretion; a second, in more peremptory terms, demanded a decisive answer by a fixed hour, and added that, if the batteries once began to play, every man in the pagoda should be put to the sword. Ultimately, all evasions proving vain, M. Law resigned himself to his fate, and made an unconditional surrender. The whole force under his command, and which thus became prisoners of war, consisted of a battalion of 820 Europeans and 2,000 sepoys. Their artillery were eleven battering cannon, mostly eighteen-pounders, twenty field-pieces, four thirteen-inch mortars, and two petards; they had also a large quantity of ammunition, stores, and carriages of all descriptions. The native horse and foot within the pagoda of Seringham were allowed to depart without molestation. They all embraced the offer except 1,000 Rajputs, who, having vowed to defend the sanctity of the pagoda, kept their station, and threatened death to any one who should dare to penetrate beyond the third inclosure. It was deemed unnecessary to disturb them. The only point still to be decided was the fate of Chanda Sahib. He was still the prisoner of Monakji, who held him as his prize and refused to part with him. Major Lawrence proposed his safe custody in one of the English settlements; but the confederates were unanimous in rejecting this proposal. They were, however, far from being agreed as to any other, and Monakji began to suspect that his prisoner would eventually give him more trouble than profit. The Dalaway of Mysore, Muhammed Ali, and Murari Rao, were all equally bent on securing possession of his person; and it was impossible to gratify one of them without offending the other two. In these
circumstances Monakji took the course which his savage nature dictated, and rid himself of further importunity on the subject of Chanda Sahib by putting him to death. Muhammed Ali, now freed from a rival in the Carnatic, became nabob in reality as well as in name, and will in future be mentioned under that title.

No sooner was the surrender of the French completed than Major Lawrence urged the nabob to lose no time in proceeding into the Carnatic at the head of the confederate army. The soundness of his advice was readily admitted; still the nabob lingered and betrayed a mysterious backwardness to move. Major Lawrence had no idea of the cause, till the Mysorean explained it by refusing to move until Trichinopoly and its dependencies were yielded up to him as the stipulated recompense of his services. The secret had been well kept; but now when dissimulation could no longer avail, the nabob, when questioned on the subject, readily admitted that he had promised all which the Mysorean asked. This ought to have settled the question; and be the consequences what they might, the only honest course was to fulfil the promise. Nothing, however, was farther from the nabob's intention, and it was easy to devise plausible pretexts for evading the obligation. Trichinopoly was not his; it belonged to the Great Mughul; he was only viceroy, and might be recalled at pleasure; the Mysorean, when he took advantage of his distress to extort the promise, must have known that it was not in his power to perform it; to give up Trichinopoly to an Indian king would only be to involve himself and the British as his allies in a war with the whole Mughul empire.

It would be useless to explain the negotiations which ensued, and detail the cunning tricks which the parties employed to outwit each other. The most important point is that the Company, while recommending mutual concession, agreed to stand by the nabob, and so far to support him in his injustice by intimating to the Mysorean, that if he had recourse to force they would repel it. The effect was to patch up a hollow agreement, which neither party meant to keep. By this agreement the dalaway was put in possession of the revenues of the island of Seringham and some other districts, and promised the possession of Trichinopoly in two months; in return he engaged to
assist the nabob with all his force in the complete reduction of the nabobship. When, in terms of this agreement, the Mysorean was asked to march, he made so many frivolous excuses as left no doubt as to his intentions. As the most effectual means of frustrating them, Captain Dalton was left in Trichinopoly with 200 Europeans and 1,500 sepoys. This measure was doubtless necessary, since the Mysoreans and Marathas still retained their old encampment in the vicinity; but it greatly reduced the strength of the expedition intended for the Carnatic, reducing the Company's battalion to 500 men and 2,500 sepoys, while the nabob was unable to accompany them with more than 2,000 horse. Such was the whole army which set out on the 28th of June, to accomplish objects for which ten times their number would scarcely have sufficed. The first place of importance which they reached was Volkunda, the governor of which, though he refused to deliver up the fort, took the oath of allegiance to Muhammed Ali, as nabob, and, besides paying 80,000 rupees as arrears, gave security for the regular payment of the revenue in future. From Volkunda the nabob sent his brother, Abdul Wahab Khan, with 1,000 horse, to Arcot, appointing him deputy-governor of the districts north of the Paliar, and proceeded with the rest of the troops to Trivadi, about seventeen miles west of Fort St. David. To this settlement, now no longer the seat of government, which had been again removed to Madras, Major Lawrence repaired for the recovery of his health, leaving the command to Captain Gingen.

The reverses sustained by the French in the south produced great consternation at Pondicherry. These, however, were somewhat balanced by the successes of M. Bussy in the north. After the death of Muzzaffar Jung, Salabat Jung, the new subahdar, appointed by Bussy's influence, proceeded with him for Karnul, by the hand of whose chief Muzzaffar Jung had fallen, and barbarously revenged the act by massacring a large number of the inhabitants, storming the fort, and putting the garrison to the sword. They then crossed the Krishna, and continued their march northward in the direction of Golkunda. But a serious obstruction was to be removed before they could reach it. Ghazi-ud-din, the eldest son of Nizam-ul-Mulk, had never, as was falsely alleged, renounced his claim to the subah-
ship, and was now taking active steps to secure it. With this view he had formed an alliance with the Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao, who stood ready with 25,000 Marathas to dispute Salabat Jung's further progress. Negotiation was attempted, and the Peshwa, aware that his presence was urgently required at Satara, made no scruple of changing sides. The obstacle being thus removed, Salabat Jung, accompanied by Bussy, more as his protector than his protege, made a triumphant entrance into Golkunda. Ghazi-ud-din, had, in the meantime, set out from Delhi, and arrived at Aurangabad, which now vied with it in importance, and was regarded as the capital of the Deccan. As negotiation could not here avail, another, device equally characteristic was adopted, and Ghazi-ud-din was cut off by poison. The death of the chief was, as usual, followed by the dispersion of his army, and Salabat Jung, now left without a rival, took his seat on the musnad at Aurangabad, amid general rejoicings. At such a season Bussy could obtain anything he chose to ask; and, besides receiving large pecuniary presents to himself and his officers, arranged for the future payment of his troops at a very extravagant rate. Dupleix also displayed the extent of his authority by disposing of the nabobship of Arcot, as if it had been his own absolute property. First, he proclaimed himself nabob, next he laid aside the title and conferred it on Reza Sahib, Chanda Sahib's son; and when his exhausted treasury required to be supplied, he set aside this appointment also, and made an attempt to dispose of it for money to Mortiz Ali. This man, who had already sealed his infamy by two atrocious murders, grasped eagerly at the honour, and after advancing a sum of about £80,000, was formally installed at Pondicherry. While there, however, having become acquainted with the views which Dupleix had upon his treasures, he repented of his bargain, and, without explaining his intentions, made a precipitate return to his fortress at Vellore.

Though greatly hampered by the state of his pecuniary resources, Dupleix contended manfully with fortune, and was soon able to throw serious obstacles in Muhammed Ali's way. In this he was greatly aided by the misconduct of the nabob himself, whose dishonesty with regard to the cession of Trichinopoly had begun to tell strongly against him. While the larger part of
his force was detained there to counteract the intrigues of the Mysoreans and Marathas, scarcely a chief in the Carnatic voluntarily declared in his favour. In these circumstances it seemed desirable to strike some decisive blow which might at once raise the sinking spirits of his followers and intimidate his enemies. His scheme was to effect the capture of Gingi. Major Lawrence strongly disapproved of it, and paid a visit to Madras for the purpose of dissuading the presidency from entertaining the proposal. His influence, however, proved less than it ought to have been; and on the 23rd of July, 1752, the nabob's application for assistance was complied with, by sending, under Major Kinneir, who had lately arrived from England, a detachment of 200 Europeans and 1,500 sepoys, accompanied by 600 native cavalry, on this formidable enterprise. The low country was easily traversed, but on reaching the mountains difficulties presented themselves at every step. For ten miles round, Gingi is encircled by mountains, and accessible only by a few strong passes. These the invading force ought to have secured, but no troops could be spared for this purpose, and the whole continued to advance. When Gingi was reached, is soon appeared that the whole march hitherto had been labour in vain. The governor, when summoned, refused to surrender, and there were no means of compelling him, for, by a very unaccountable blunder, two pieces of battering cannon, on the way from Fort St. David, had not been waited for. Meanwhile Dupleix, who had been on the alert, no sooner learned that the expedition had passed the mountains than he detached 300 Europeans and 500 sepoys, with seven field-pieces, who took up a strong position at Vikravandi, near the pass through which Major Kinneir had led his troops. No longer dreaming of the capture of Gingi, his object now was to disentangle himself. He had the good fortune to succeed, and having not only got clear of the mountains, but been reinforced by above 1,000 of the nabob's horse, determined to give battle. He had not properly counted the cost, and sustained a defeat in which the loss was not so great as the disgrace, the whole troops, not excepting the Europeans, having given way under panic.

Elated by this success, Dupleix reinforced the victors, who, now mustering 450 Europeans, 1,500 sepoys, and 500 horse,
encamped near the north boundary of the territory of Fort St. David. The Company's troops, after retreating to Trivadi, retired still further, and took up a position at a redoubt in the bound hedge, about three miles west of the fort. Here they remained inactive, waiting the arrival of two companies of Swiss of 100 men each, who had just arrived at Madras from England. To avoid delay, one of the companies was embarked in the light boats of the country, and were proceeding for Fort St. David by sea. It had been assumed that on that element Dupleix would not venture to violate English colours. The mistake was discovered when too late, for as soon as they were seen from Pondicherry, a ship set out and made them all prisoners. The capture was loudly complained of, as a violation of the peace subsisting between Great Britain and France, but Dupleix thought he had a sufficient precedent in the capture of French troops at Seringham.

To avoid a repetition of the loss, Major Lawrence embarked with the other company of Swiss in one of the Company's ships, and brought them safely to Fort St. David, on the 16th of August. The next day he took command of the whole force, consisting of 400 Europeans, 1,700 sepoys, and 4,000 of the nabob's troops. The enemy immediately drew back to Bahur, and when still pursued, encamped between the bound hedge of Pondicherry and Villenore, which thus became their advanced post. From this they were soon driven, but here the pursuit ended, because Major Lawrence, under instructions from the presidency, which, amidst overt acts of war, still clung to a semblance of peace, refrained from passing the bound hedge. In this state of matters he determined, as a last attempt to bring them to action, to pretend a precipitate retreat; and, as if he had in his return become afraid, hastened back to Bahur. The stratagem, clumsy though it was, succeeded; and Dupleix, only afraid that his enemies should escape, insisted on pursuit, against the remonstrances of M. Kirkjean, his nephew, who commanded the French. They accordingly advanced within two miles of Bahur. Major Lawrence lost no time in preparing for action, and at three next morning was in motion with his whole force. The action commenced with the sepoys on either side, and did not become decisive till the British and French
battalions met at the point of the bayonet. After a short struggle, two platoons of British grenadiers broke the enemy's centre, and his whole line immediately gave way. Had the nabob's cavalry done their duty, instead of galloping off to plunder, few of the enemy could have escaped. Even as it was, their loss was serious in men, artillery, ammunition, and stores. This victory was still more important in its indirect consequences. Murari Rao had actually been gained over to the French, and a detachment of 3,000 Marathas was on the way to join them, when they received intelligence of the affair of Bahur. Nothing more was wanting to make them change their route; and they made their appearance in the nabob's camp, complimenting him on his victory, and lamenting their misfortune in not having been able to join him in sufficient time to share the honour of it.

Major Lawrence having advanced to Trivadi, prepared to devote the remainder of the season, before the rains should set in, to the reduction of all the country northward from Pondicherry to the Paliar. It was at the same time determined by the presidency, at the urgent request of the nabob, to attempt the reduction of the forts of Chingleput and Covelong, situated north of that river. Being of great strength, they commanded a considerable tract of country, and often sent out detachments, which plundered within the territory of the nabob and the Company. The only force which could be saved for the task of subduing them, consisted of 200 raw recruits just arrived from England, and apparently the very refuse of London, and 500 sepoys, as ignorant of service as the recruits. The only hope of success was, that Clive had volunteered to command them.

Heading these troops with four twenty-four pounders, Clive set out on the 10th of September for Covelong. It stands on the sea-shore, about twenty-five miles south of Madras, and consisted of a fort inclosed by a strong wall, flanked with towers and mounted with thirty pieces of cannon. It had a garrison of fifty Europeans and 300 sepoys, and was in possession of the French, who had seized it in 1750, by a very disgraceful stratagem. A ship anchored in the road, making signals of distress. The natives going on board, were told that most of the
crew had died of scurvy, and that the survivors, still suffering from the same disease, and unable to navigate the vessel, must perish if not allowed to go on shore. They were allowed, and repaid the humanity by making themselves masters of the place. The Frenchmen, thirty in number, landed, only counterfeiting disease, and having concealed arms under their clothes, rose in the dead of the night and overpowered their benefactors.

The troops arrived in the evening at a height two miles to the westward. Half of them remained, and the other half proceeded, during the night, in charge of Lieutenant Cooper, to occupy a garden 600 yards south of the fort. At break of day, a party from the garrison, advancing to the garden, fired suddenly through some crevices of the gate. This alarm, and the fall of Lieutenant Cooper by a shot, so frightened the recruits in the garden, that they immediately took to their heels, and were running as fast as their legs could carry them, when they were met by Clive, advancing with the other half of the troops, and compelled by him, though not without difficulty, to return. The next day he summoned the governor of the fort, and receiving a very blustering answer, began without loss of time to erect a battery at the distance of 300 yards from the walls. He at the same time placed a strong guard on an adjoining rock. An unlucky shot having struck it, and killed or wounded fourteen men with the splinters, all the rest hastened off, and for some time could not be persuaded again to expose themselves; indeed, several hours after, one of the advanced sentries was found hiding at the bottom of a well.

Clive tried to shame them into courage by constantly exposing himself to the hottest of the fire, and at last succeeded in giving them some degree of firmness. It was high time, for a reinforcement was approaching from Chingleput. The very name of Clive, however, seems to have sufficed, for on hearing that he was on the way with half his troops to give battle, it fled with precipitation. The blustering governor was as easily cowed, and, just as the battery was finished and preparing to fire, surrendered at discretion. Besides the cannon mounted on the walls, fifty of large calibre were found within the fort. They proved to be part of those captured by Labourdonnaïs when he took Madras. The day after the surrender a large body of
troops were observed at daybreak crossing a stream about a mile west of the fort. They proved to be a new and stronger reinforcement sent by the governor of Chingleput to make a vigorous effort for the relief of Covelong. They had no idea of the surrender, and were advancing in security, when, from an ambuscade which had been laid for them, a sudden fire was opened. In a few minutes 100 men were struck down, and more than half of the rest stood as if rivetted to the spot, till they were taken prisoners. The few who escaped carried back their consternation to Chingleput.

This fort, situated about twenty miles south-west of the other, near the northern or left bank of the Paliar, was much stronger both by nature and art. Allowing for some irregularities, it was nearly in the form of a parallelogram, about 400 yards long from north to south, and 320 broad from east to west, and was nearly inaccessible on three sides, being surrounded by a lake on the west and north-west, and by swampy rice-fields on the east and north-east. It was naturally weak only on the south, where higher ground commanded it; but to compensate for this defect, the fortifications were much stronger here than elsewhere; for while the parts washed by the lake were inclosed only by a slender wall, and those opposite to the rice-fields were but feebly defended, the south side had first a deep ditch faced with stone, and then a stone wall 18 feet high, flanked with towers. Within these works another wall, continued parallel to them, formed a second similar inclosure. The cannon mounted were fifteen pieces, and the garrison consisted of forty Europeans and 500 sepoys. Clive made his appearance before the consternation caused by the defeat at Covelong had subsided, and by means of a battery of four twenty-four pounders, placed at first at the distance of 500, and afterwards of only 200 yards, a breach was in four days effected in both the outer and the interior walls. Much remained to be done, and a stout defence might still have been made, but the officer in command had no heart to continue a resistance which he was satisfied must be ineffectual, and surrendered on condition of being permitted to march away with the honours of war. With these services Clive closed the first part of his career. His health had suffered severely, and made a visit to England absolutely necessary.
The nabob's affairs, while thus flourishing in the north, were becoming more and more entangled at Trichinopoly. As is almost invariably the case, the honest course would have been the most politic. By performing his promises to the King of Mysore, he might not only have secured a powerful ally, but been able to make his whole force available for the reduction of the Carnatic; by attempting a course of fraud and trickery, he at once provoked and justified retaliation. He would not keep faith, and therefore only received his deserts when it was not kept with him. The effect of his double-dealing has already been seen in the attempt of Nanjiraj, the Mysore general, to take advantage of his departure. The vigilance of Captain Dalton frustrated several conspiracies formed for the purpose of seizing the city; but at last all disguise was thrown aside, and both Nanjiraj and Murari Rao entered into open alliance with Dupleix, who had all along been active in fomenting their quarrel with the nabob. Open war being thus declared, a series of desultory affairs took place. In some of these Captain Dalton's troops suffered severely, but the means of resistance which he still possessed convinced the Mysorean that if Trichinopoly were to be taken, his surest means was famine. He accordingly endeavoured to cut off all the sources of supply. For a time little apprehension was felt by the garrison, more especially as Kheir-ud-din, the nabob's brother-in-law, who had been left as his representative, assured Captain Dalton that the provisions in the magazines were sufficient to last four months. At last, however, when the blockade began to be more effective, and provisions were sold in the city at an enormous price, Captain Dalton thought it necessary to ascertain the actual state of provisions by a personal inspection of the magazines. Then for the first time he learned that Kheir-ud-din had been selling the provisions for his own profit, and that the quantity in store was equal to a consumption of only fifteen days.

Appalled at this discovery, he immediately communicated it to Major Lawrence, who was then encamped at Trivadi. So urgent did the case appear to him, that, withdrawing all the troops, except a garrison of 150 Europeans and 500 sepoys, he was on his way the very next morning with all the rest of the
troops. After a short halt at Fort St. David, to procure the necessary stores, he proceeded, accompanied by the nabob, through the territories of the King of Tanjore, and reached Trichinopoly on the 6th of May, 1753. The very day after, a detachment of 200 Europeans and 500 sepoys, with four field-pieces, sent by Dupleix, arrived at Seringham, under M. Astruc, and joined the Mysoreans. The whole force which Major Lawrence could muster, inclusive of all the troops that could be spared from the garrison, amounted only to 500 Europeans, 2,000 sepoys, and 3,000 of the nabob’s horse. With the infantry only, the horse refusing to move because their pay was in arrear, he passed over into the island on the 10th of May, and was immediately attacked by great numbers of the Mysoreans. Their infantry was easily repulsed; their cavalry, gallantly headed by that of the Marathas, gave more trouble, but were ultimately obliged to yield; the brunt of the battle was then borne by the French, who maintained their post and kept up a cannonade till evening, when Major Lawrence deemed it prudent to repass the Cauvery. The operations of the day had convinced him that M. Astruc would prove a more formidable opponent than M. Law, and that instead of attempting to dislodge the enemy from the island, his most important business was to replenish the magazines of the city with provisions. This task was attended with the greatest difficulty, and kept him inactive for five weeks.

In the meantime Dupleix, fully alive to the important struggle about to be waged, kept his eye fixed on Seringham, and continued to urge forward reinforcements, till the whole army within the island amounted to 450 Europeans, 1,500 sepoys, 3,500 Marathas, 8,000 Mysore horse, and above 16,000 Mysore infantry of an heterogeneous and worthless description. To this army Major Lawrence had nothing to oppose but his 500 Europeans and 2,000 sepoys. Even of the latter 700 were constantly employed in escorting provisions. The enemy, confident in superiority of numbers, was now emboldened to quit the island, and began to form a chain of positions with the view of cutting off the communications of the city with the surrounding country. In this they were so successful that provisions again began to fail, and even the most sanguine ceased to hope that the city
could be saved. To add to the general despondency, Major Lawrence was suffering from a severe illness, which threatened to withdraw him entirely from duty.

While the enemy were steadily pursuing their plan of gaining their object by starvation, Major Lawrence was most reluctant to quit any commanding position which it seemed possible to maintain, and kept a guard of 200 sepoys posted on a rock about a mile south-west from his camp and north-east from that of the enemy. Being thus equidistant from both, the possession of the rock was soon contested. M. Astruc, determined to have it, attacked it with a select body, and supported them at a distance by his whole force. Major Lawrence at first endeavoured to support the sepoy guard by a platoon of only forty Europeans, but, on perceiving all the army of the enemy in motion, took the bold resolution of leaving only 100 Europeans to guard the camp, and risking a general action with the remainder of his troops, amounting in all to 300 Europeans, eighty artillery-men, with eight field-pieces, and 500 sepoys. The great contention now was, which of the two armies should first reach the rock. M. Astruc was successful, and carried it by a vigorous effort when Major Lawrence was only half way. What was now to be done? Advance and retreat seemed equally desperate. In such circumstances the boldest course is usually the safest. The order to advance was received by the soldiers with three cheers, and while the grenadiers attacked the rock with fixed bayonets, the rest wheeled round it to engage the French battalion. The grenadiers carried all before them, and, with some sepoys who had followed in their track, commenced a deadly fire from the top of the rock upon the French drawn up below within pistol-shot; the other troops behaved with equal gallantry, and reserving their fire till within twenty yards of the enemy's line, poured in such a volley that the French fled in consternation, leaving three pieces of cannon behind them. The Marathas, in endeavouring to cover the retreat of the French, and even to regain the day, were severely handled. Though the victory had been gained, the struggle was not yet ended. The victors were a mile distant from their camp, and in order to reach it must pass over an intervening plain in the face of nearly 12,000 cavalry, who stood ready to pounce upon them.
The moment their retrograde movement should begin. Nothing but the utmost skill, coolness, and courage could have saved them. Fortunately the heroic band possessed all these qualities in an eminent degree, and made the cavalry pay so dearly for attempting to charge them, that they were at last allowed to proceed without interruption.

The enemy, ashamed and dispirited by their defeat, lost much time in mutual recrimination. The sepoys employed in forwarding supplies made diligent use of the interval, and succeeded in bringing in a stock of provisions sufficient to last for fifty days. The danger of famine being thus removed, Major Lawrence determined to march into the Tanjore country, with the double object of meeting a reinforcement which he expected from the presidency, and inducing the king to throw aside the neutrality he had again professedly assumed, and furnish a contingent of cavalry, which was very much wanted. To facilitate this negotiation the presence of the nabob was thought desirable; but when he prepared to set out, an unexpected difficulty occurred. His troops, clamouring for their arrears of pay, declared he should not quit the city till they were satisfied; This he could not or would not do; and the singular spectacle was seen of 200 Europeans, with fixed bayonets, escorting the nabob, in whose cause the Company had already expended much blood and treasure, because his own troops, so far from escorting him, were bent on committing outrage on his person. A few days after his departure the whole of these troops repaired in a body to Captain Dalton, and intimated their intention to join the enemy. This intimation they accompanied with the singular request that he would not fire upon them while they were marching off. Glad to be quit of them on any terms he granted their request, and they walked off unmolested at noon-day.

The enemy being now in complete possession of the whole country around Trichinopoly, the city itself was the only object now to be contended for, and both parties made their arrangements accordingly. The garrison, as a matter of stern necessity, reserved all the provisions which had been stored up for their own use, and the inhabitants, threatened with absolute starvation, had no alternative but to quit their habitations. The whole population, estimated at nearly 400,000, disappeared in less
than a month, and nothing remained to fill up the blank but a garrison, which, including soldiers and artificers of all descriptions, did not exceed 2,000 men. Of these nearly one-half were native peons or undisciplined infantry, who, being of no use except to give an alarm, occupied the interval between the two walls; the others, on whom the whole burden of the defence lay, consisted of about 600 sepoys, who were stationed at intervals on the ramparts, and 200 Europeans, of whom part kept the gates, while the rest lay on their arms every night, ready to start on the first announcement of danger. The besiegers, who had been contented with maintaining the blockade; now began to think that they might venture on more decisive measures. Dupleix was of the same opinion, and was constantly importuning M. Brenier, who had succeeded M. Astruc in the command, to attempt an escalade. To procure the information which was previously desirable, he suggested the employment of a French officer of the name of De Cattans, who was to be sent into the town as if he had deserted, and then act as a spy. De Cattans readily undertook the degrading and perilous office, but by overacting his part excited suspicions which ultimately led to his detection. Captain Dalton seized the opportunity to turn the devices of the enemy against themselves, and induced De Cattans, by the promise of interceding for his pardon with Major Lawrence, to write a letter to M. Brenier, recommending an escalade at a particular spot which he pointed out. It was in fact, though it did not appear so externally, the strongest point in the city; and any attempt to escalade it must have resulted in the repulse and destruction of the party engaged in it. M. Brenier, however, would have fallen into the snare, and only escaped it in consequence of being obliged to employ his troops elsewhere.

Major Lawrence's approach, which had for some time been rumoured, was now certain. He had received a reinforcement from Fort St. David of 170 Europeans and 300 sepoys, and was moreover accompanied by a Tanjorine army of 3,000 horse and 2,000 matchlock-men, under the command of Monakji. On the 7th of August he arrived at a place called Dalaway's Choultry, situated on the south bank of the Cauvery, about five miles east of Trichinopoly. The intervening plain was so much
flooded by the rains that it was deemed necessary to strike to the south-west, along with a convoy of nearly 4,000 bullocks, understood to be laden with provisions, though it afterwards turned out that only one-tenth of them were thus laden, while the nabob and his officers had selfishly appropriated all the rest for the transport of baggage and trumpery. On arriving within a mile of the Sugar-loaf Rock, situated two and a half miles south-east of the city, Major Lawrence found it occupied by the main body of the enemy; while the Golden Rock, about one and a quarter mile due west from the Sugar-loaf, was in possession of a strong detachment. Instead of endeavouring to force the enemy’s posts, he resolved to keep on the outside of them. With this view he caused the convoy to make a considerable circuit to the south-west, intending himself to march round by the Golden Rock. This, however, was not possible while that strong position was held by the enemy’s detachment. It was necessary to drive them from it, and this was the great difficulty. In fact, had M. Brenier supported the detachment as he ought, it would have been impossible. Instead of supporting he weakened it, by withdrawing the greater part of the detachment to assist in meeting a feigned attack on his main body. Having thus allowed himself to be outwitted, he did not discover his blunder till it was too late to repair it. The Golden Rock had been carried by the English grenadiers and a party of 800 sepoys, when the French infantry hastening forward to relieve it had reached only half way. Major Lawrence followed up the advantage he had thus gained with signal ability, and ultimately drove off the whole body of the enemy in confusion. Had the Tanjorine horse pursued as they ought to have done, instead of remaining mere spectators of the flight, a decisive victory would have been gained.

The enemy, after their defeat, encamped in a strong position at Weyconda, two miles west of the city; and Major Lawrence endeavoured to turn their own tactics against themselves by occupying the Five Rocks, situated about three miles farther south, and thus interposed between the enemy and the open country from which they drew their supplies. He had frightened them away from Weyconda to Mutachellinur, on the south bank of the Cauvery, over against the south-west extremity of
the island of Seringham, and was preparing to act more decidedly when all offensive movements on his part were suddenly arrested. The enemy had received a reinforcement equal in strength to the whole English force. It consisted of 400 Europeans and 2,000 sepoys, with six guns, together with 3,000 Maratha horse, and a great number of peons or native infantry, under the command of Murari Rao. The Europeans of this reinforcement had arrived at Pondicherry in June. Had they been immediately forwarded to Trichinopoly they would have given the French such an ascendancy as must have been decisive of the campaign. Most fortunately Dupleix detained them nearly two months in the Carnatic for some purpose connected with the gratification of his vanity, and thus lost a most favourable opportunity for decisive action.

The Madras presidency on their part were not idle; and on hearing of Dupleix’s reinforcement, determined to strengthen Major Lawrence with every man that could be spared for the field. Having succeeded in mustering 237 Europeans and 300 sepoys, they sent them under Captains Ridge and Calliaud by sea to Devicotta. Major Lawrence moved eastward to meet them, and after a sharp action, in which the French were decidedly worsted, the junction was happily effected. Both parties having now received all the reinforcements they expected, were anxious for a trial of strength.

On the 20th of September, 1753, Major Lawrence drew up his army in order of battle at the Fakir’s Tope, a mile and a half S.S.W. of the city. The enemy, encamped between the Sugar-loaf Rock and the Golden Rock, and covering a considerable space behind, showed no inclination to accept the challenge. Major Lawrence determined to attack them next day, but concealed his intention by ordering his tents, which, in expectation of battle, he had sent to the city, to be brought back and pitched in their former place. At night the tents were again sent back, and the whole army rested on their arms, with orders to be in readiness at four o’clock the next morning. At this hour the army began to move in profound silence; and by a sudden obscuration of the moon, which had before been shining brightly, the first division arrived within pistol-shot of the Golden Rock before they were discovered. Their sudden fire so discon-
certed those in charge of the rock, that they hurried off, leaving two field-pieces, which they had loaded with grape, undischarged. Before the confusion thus caused in the camp could be repaired, the British in three divisions kept advancing, with reserved fire and fixed bayonets, on the left flank of the French battalion stationed at the Sugar-loaf Rock, while the sepoys attached to the divisions kept up a constant fire on swarms of Mysorean and other fugitives, who were fleeing in all directions. The whole of the British battalion, consisting of 600 men, arrived in an unbroken line within twenty yards of their French antagonists. The latter were commanded by M. Astruc, who did the utmost to bring them into order, and even prevailed upon them to receive the English fire before they gave theirs. In this encounter Captain Kilpatrick, who led the first division of English, fell desperately wounded. His place was taken by Captain Calliaud, who, by dexterously wheeling round and gaining the left flank of an entrenchment, behind which the French battalion was posted, poured in a close fire. The grenadiers at the same time pushing on with their bayonets, drove them crowding upon their centre. A well-levelled discharge from the centre and left of the British battalion in front completed the confusion, and the rout became irremediable. The victory was now gained; but the Tanjorines again prevented it from being so complete as it might have been, by remaining to plunder the camp, when they ought to have been pursuing the fugitives. The loss of the enemy in Europeans amounted to 100 killed and nearly 200 taken prisoners; among the latter was M. Astruc, regarded as undoubtedly the best of the French officers. On the British side not more than forty Europeans were killed or wounded.

The enemy, though still mustering about 30,000 infantry of all sorts, and 16,000 horse, were so dispirited that they did not venture beyond Seringham, and allowed provisions of all kinds to be poured into the city in such abundance, that a six months' supply was easily provided at a moderate rate. It was deemed advisable, however, in order not to encroach on this supply during the rainy season, which was now at hand, that the troops should quit the city and be carried into cantonments. With this view Major Lawrence, after reinforcing the garrison,
so as to make it strong enough with ordinary vigilance for any attempt that might be made against it, removed to Coilady on the frontiers of Tanjore, from which abundant supplies could be obtained, without the necessity of escorting convoys. The Tanjorines were permitted to return home, but not without great reluctance on the part of Major Lawrence, who suspected, and as it afterwards appeared on too good grounds, that the king would scarcely be induced to send them back when the campaign should be resumed.

The enemy remained in the island of Seringham as inactive as if a cessation of hostilities had taken place; and, so far from endeavouring to take advantage of Major Lawrence’s absence, allowed the market of Trichinopoly to be regularly supplied in abundance from the surrounding country. In the beginning of November they received a reinforcement of 300 Europeans, 200 topasses or natives, chiefly of Portuguese origin, and 1,000 sepoys. Even this did not make them more adventurous, and they remained as if determined to attempt nothing till Major Lawrence should again appear and challenge them to encounter him in a new campaign. This apparent indolence was part of a scheme. It had been conceived possible to take Trichinopoly by surprise, and the object now was to lull the garrison into a false security. The circumstances were not unfavourable. Captain Dalton, whose vigilance and experience were successful in detecting and frustrating several plots, had sailed for England; and Captain Kilpatrick, on whom the command had devolved, was still confined to bed with his wounds.

The point selected for assault was Dalton’s battery, the same recommended in the letter of De Cattans, who, after obtaining what was equivalent to a promise of pardon, had been unjustifiably hung by Major Lawrence. It was situated on the west side, near the north-west angle of the walls, and had once formed part of a gateway. This part, so far as it jutted beyond the wall, had been converted into a solid battery with embrasures; the remainder retained its original form, and led by zigzag passages inclosed between terraces to a gate in the inner wall. The enemy had learned; both from the letter of De Cattans and from deserters, the exact mode of entrance, and must thus have been aware of the difficulties which it would be
necessary to surmount, but they still preferred the battery as the most accessible point of attack, because the ditch immediately in front of it was almost choked up by a rock on a level with the water.

On the night of the 27th November the greater part of the enemy's army crossed over from the island. The Mysoreans and Marathas were distributed in parties round the walls, and by approaching the ditch and making other demonstrations, were to divert the attention of the garrison while the French battalion were carrying out the real attack, which was planned as follows:— At three o'clock in the morning 600 of the battalion were to commence the escalade, and the remaining 200, together with a large body of sepoys, were to wait at the outside of the ditch, ready to cross as soon as the escaladers should have gained an entrance into the town. The battery was guarded by fifty sepoys and some European gunners. All these were present and on the alert when the rounds passed at midnight, and yet the event proved that, three hours after, the greater part had absented themselves, and the few who remained had fallen fast asleep. Owing to this gross breach of duty, the whole of the escalading party were able to cross the ditch and mount the battery without causing the least alarm. The sleepers being at once despatched with the bayonet, the assailants began to move forward, intending not to fire till they were fired upon. This intention was frustrated by an accident. Within the battery, close to a slight wall inclosing it at the back, was a pit thirty feet deep. It was not observed in the dark, and as several of the party screamed in tumbling into it, some shots were let off. This was alarm sufficient, and all the garrison were instantly in motion. The French, aware that concealment was now impossible, turned the two guns which they found in the battery, and fired them into the town, together with a volley of firearms, at the same time endeavouring to strike terror by beating their drums and shouting Vive le Roi! Captain Kilpatrick, still unable to leave his bed, gave his instructions with great coolness and precision to Lieutenant Harrison, the next in command, who not only executed them but improved upon them, and by the precaution of keeping up an incessant fire on the passage leading to the gate in the inner wall, killed the
two persons who were hastening forward to burst it open with a petard.

The attack had now become almost desperate. From the ramparts and terraces commanding the battery the garrison assembled at their posts commenced a murderous fire, which the assailants vainly endeavoured to answer. Those who had got into the passages between the two walls, clambered back into the battery with the view of effecting their escape, but the want of ladders made this impossible, except by leaping down a perpendicular height of eighteen feet into the water of the ditch, or on the rock on a level with it. About 100 made this desperate plunge; but the rest, deterred by what these suffered, crept into the embrasures or any corner that gave some kind of shelter, and as soon as daylight appeared, asked and obtained quarter. The number who thus surrendered was 360; the number of those found killed within the works was sixty-seven, and of the 100 who took the frightful leap, few escaped without being killed or disabled. With the exception then of the 200 who had remained outside the ditch, the whole French battalion was in a manner annihilated by this fatal assault. The noise of the firing was heard at Coilady. On being informed of the cause Major Lawrence reinforced the garrison, and shortly after followed with his whole force.

The Raja of Tanjore, on the return of his troops, justified the fears which Major Lawrence had entertained, by not only refusing to send them back, but giving unequivocal manifestations of hostile designs. Dupleix and Nanjiraj, by working alternately upon his hopes and fears, had completely alienated him from his alliance with the nabob; and he was on the point of declaring himself openly, when the serious reverse sustained by his new allies in their attempt on Trichinopoly made him pause. Irritated at his vacillation, Dupleix determined to try the effect of force, and engaged a body of 1,200 Marathas to ravage his territories. The raja, who had dismissed his old general Monakji, because he suspected him of being too friendly to the English, sent a new and incapable general of the name of Ganderao, who made his arrangements so unskilfully, that the Marathas easily eluded him, and continued their devastations with little interruption. In this way the whole of the eastern part of Tanjore was converted into a waste.
The raja applied for assistance to Major Lawrence, who, in promising it, complained of Ganderao's inefficiency, and suggested the re-appointment of Monakji. After considerable demur this suggestion was adopted, and Monakji, shortly after resuming the command, obtained a signal success. Proceeding at the head of 3,000 horse, he found that the Marathas, from ignorance of the country, had got entangled between two branches of the Cauvery, which a sudden flood had swelled so much as to leave no means of egress. Monakji encamped at the point which he knew would first become fordable on the falling of the waters, and before the Marathas deemed it possible, crossed over and met them face to face. With their usual gallantry, augmented by despair, they endeavoured to cut their way through the Tanjorines, but were repeatedly repulsed. Ultimately, 800 of them lay dead or the field. The survivors were reserved for a worse fate. In the spirit of a savage, Monakji caused them to be impaled alive, and even extended his barbarism to the dead by ordering their bodies to be suspended on the surrounding trees. This success did not produce the effect which might have been anticipated from it. The raja, satisfied that the immediate danger was passed, dismissed Monakji from his command with a few compliments; and instead of reinforcing Major Lawrence as he had promised, disbanded his troops as no longer necessary.

While the nabob's army thus received no accession, and was on the contrary diminished by the necessity of increasing the garrison of Trichinopoly, in consequence of the great number of French prisoners detained in it, the enemy, by means of reinforcements, was able to muster 600 Europeans, 400 topasses, 6,000 sepoys, and nearly 30,000 Mysoreans and Marathas. To meet these Major Lawrence was unable to bring into the field more than 600 Europeans and 1,800 sepoys. Notwithstanding this enormous inequality of force, the enemy were so dispirited by their repeated defeats, that they did not venture to cross to the south bank of the Cauvery.

Trichinopoly had so long been the seat of war that there was not a tree left standing in the plain around it, and the British could only procure firewood by sending out detachments to a distance of five or six miles. Their provisions were obtained
with still greater difficulty. These from what was called Tondeman's Country were brought no farther than the skirts of the woods, distant about seven miles; while those from Tanjore were not brought nearer than eighteen miles, the merchants depositing them at Trictapolly, a fort situated at that distance eastward on the banks of the Cauvery. The detachments employed in escorting the provisions from these distances were seldom less than 150 Europeans and 500 sepoys. Experience seemed to have proved that this force was sufficient, for from the beginning of January to the middle of February, 1754, seven convoys had been safely escorted. The next convoy in readiness was larger than any of these. It consisted of military stores as well as provisions, and required no less than 3,000 bullocks. The escort was strengthened in proportion, and composed of the grenadier company of 100 men, eighty other Europeans, 800 sepoys, and four pieces of cannon. As not much less than a half of the whole army was thus required, the more prudent plan undoubtedly would have been not to divide it, but to employ it all as an escort. A more serious blunder was committed in intrusting the command of it to an officer of little experience and less ability.

The escort, which left Trictapolly on the morning of the 13th of February, reached Killycotta, about eight miles farther west, in the evening. The following morning it was journeying on in the same direction, without any apprehension of danger, and had proceeded two miles beyond Killycotta, along the skirts of Tondeman's Woods, when several bodies of cavalry were seen moving on all sides among the thickets and underwood. The officer commanding the convoy had adopted the worst possible arrangement, for he had no more than a single platoon in his front and rear, while the rest of the troops were distributed in small bodies along the line of bullocks and carts. Most imprudent as this arrangement was, he made no attempt to alter it, and left his troops exposed to the sudden and impetuous onset of 12,000 Mysorean and Maratha horse, the latter commanded by Murari Rao and Yunas Khan, and the former by an officer of the name of Hari Singh, and another, destined to future celebrity under the name of Hyder Ali. These cavalry formed only part of a detachment which had
been lying in wait for the convoy, and was composed, in addition to the cavalry, of 400 Europeans and 6,000 sepoys, with seven pieces of cannon. The issue was not for a moment doubtful. The sepoys at once flung down their arms and fled. The grenadiers, who had gained so many laurels in previous fights, still distinguished themselves, and, with the other eighty Europeans, were selling their lives as dearly as possible, when the French arrived, and much to their credit, obliged the Marathas to grant quarter. This was the severest loss which the British had yet sustained during the war. The whole of these Europeans were either killed, or wounded and taken prisoners. The loss of the convoy scarcely deserves to be mentioned along with that of the troops, and yet must have been severely felt. Besides the whole of the provisions and military stores, £7,000 in money fell into the enemy’s hands.

The presidency of Madras, on hearing of the disaster, made an exertion to repair it, and sent a detachment of 180 men by sea to Devicotta. There, however, they were obliged to remain till an opportunity should be found of joining the camp in safety. Major Lawrence, though his Europeans had been reduced to 400, still kept his position in the plain. It was now impossible, however, to draw supplies from Tanjore, both on account of the distance, and because the raja, again disposed to league with the enemy, discouraged his merchants from furnishing them. Tondeman’s Country—being thus the only resource, 400 sepoys were detached to collect them at Killanore, a village in the woods about twelve miles distant. The want of a body of horse was now ever more felt, and the presidency, on the suggestion of Major Lawrence, sent a deputy to the Raja of Tanjore, for the purpose of inducing him to send a contingent. He was too irresolute and crafty to comply; and without declaring for any party, resumed his old game of neutrality. While the nabob and British were thus left without an ally, a new danger was discovered. Treachery was at work in the city and the camp. Though it was frustrated, the details are not unworthy of being recorded.

Muhammed Yusuf, who had enlisted into the British service under Clive, excelled alike in valour and stratagem, and gradually raised himself by merit to the chief command of all the sepoys. In
this position he rendered essential service to Major Lawrence. Not only did he possess a perfect knowledge of the country, and constantly procure intelligence of the enemy's movements, but he planned all the marches of the convoys, choosing his times and his routes with so much dexterity, that during three months not one of the convoys of provisions coming from Tondeman's Woods was intercepted. The enemy were most anxious to deprive Major Lawrence of his services, but having no hope of corrupting his integrity by a bribe, endeavoured to effect their object by a very base plot. A Brahmin, named Poniapa, acting as Indian interpreter to the British, necessarily possessed much of their confidence, and became privy to their most secret designs. This confidence, of which he was altogether unworthy, he shamefully betrayed by entering into a secret correspondence with the enemy, and ultimately engaging to act entirely in their interest. In the course of this guilty intercourse it was resolved by all means to get rid of Muhammed Yusuf; but, as he was too much on his guard to be cut off by any kind of assassination, the following scheme was adopted:—A letter, addressed by the Mysorean commander Nanjiraj, was purposely placed so as to be intercepted. Captain Kilpatrick, on obtaining possession of it, carried it to Major Lawrence, who caused Poniapa to interpret it in their presence. It desired Muhammed Yusuf and another sepoy officer to meet according to promise with some persons deputed by Nanjiraj, to adjust the time and mode of betraying Trichinopoly, promising him, if the plot succeeded, an immense sum in money, and various other advantages. Muhammed Yusuf and the other sepoy named in the letter were at once imprisoned, but a short investigation established their innocence, and they were released. Suspicion now fell upon the proper party, and Poniapa, though refusing to the last to make any confession of his guilt, was blown from a gun.

The first symptom of a favourable turn in the affairs of the nabob and his British allies appeared about this time, when Murari Rao, who had become tired of the war, picked a quarrel with Nanjiraj, by making some exorbitant demands for money, and, on being refused, withdrawing to an encampment on the north bank of the Coleroon. Another incident, which at first
threatened very disastrous results, terminated triumphantly. On the 12th of May a party of 120 Europeans and 500 sepoys, with two field-pieces, set out under the command of Captain Calliaud, at four in the morning, intending to wait about two miles south of the Sugar-loaf Rock, for a convoy of provisions which had been ordered to advance from Tondeman’s Woods. The place where they meant to halt was an old water-tank, nearly choked up, though its mound was nearly entire. They had nearly reached it when Muhammed Yusuf, who was riding in front, was surprised on ascending an eminence, by the neighing of his horse and the answer of it by several others. On advancing to reconnoitre, he was fired at from the other side of the eminence by several French troopers. The presence of the enemy in the very tank in which the party had determined to wait for the convoy was now certain. Captain Calliaud immediately prepared for attack, and by dexterously moving the sepoys on the left, while the Europeans wheeled round to the right flank, placed the enemy between two fires, and obliged them to abandon the tank with precipitation. The day was only dawning when the action began, but there was now sufficient light to perceive that the enemy consisted of 250 Europeans, with four field-pieces, 1,000 sepoys, and 4,000 Mysore horse. A smart cannonade immediately commenced, and both armies, attracted by the sound, immediately prepared to take part in the engagement. Captain Polier, commanding in the absence of Major Lawrence, whom sickness had obliged to retire into the city, hastened forward with all his remaining troops, while the rest of the enemy’s army crossed over from Seringham. When the two armies were thus pitched against each other, the inequality was seen to be enormous. On the one side stood the British battalion, mustering only 360 men, 1,500 sepoys, and eleven troopers; on the other side 700 Europeans, fifty troopers, 5,000 sepoys, and 10,000 horse; fortunately, from the cause already mentioned, none of them Marathas. With such odds a decisive victory was scarcely possible; and the utmost, therefore, which Captain Polier proposed, was to fight his way back to the camp. The English, defiling from the tank into the plain, marched onward in column, while the sepoys followed in a line at right angles with the rear of the battalion, and ex-
tending beyond it both on the right and left. In this manner they proceeded, galled by the enemy's seven field-pieces, but suffering little from their musketry, which kept too far off to do much mischief, and without halting reached a second tank about a mile nearer the city. Just as they reached this post, Captain Polier, who had previously been struck, received another wound, which so disabled him that he was obliged to resign the command to Captain Calliaud. The fight being now visible from the walls of the city, Major Lawrence, although very ill, ordered himself to be carried to the top of one of the gates, and there beholding how his little army was hemmed in, trembled for its fate. While the enemy's sepoys and cavalry were drawn up opposite to three sides of the tank, the fourth side was menaced by the French. As the latter advanced, the three British field-pieces, brass six-pounders, capable of carrying a large quantity of grape-shot, and admirably served, did fearful execution. In a few minutes nearly 100 of the French battalion were struck down. The rest, dismayed at the havoc, showed signs of faltering. Captain Calliaud seized the favourable moment, and sallying out with all the Europeans, gave a volley so well levelled that an indiscriminate flight immediately ensued, and continued till the fugitives were fairly out of cannon-shot. The rest of the enemy were not slow to follow the example, and the whole hastened back for Seringham; the British, satisfied with their victory, did not attempt pursuit. In the evening the convoy reached the camp in safety. More depended upon its arrival than the enemy seemed to have been aware of. Had they succeeded in preventing it, mere want of provisions would have obliged the victors to decamp for Tanjore the very next day.

The enemy, ashamed and enraged at their disgraceful defeat, sought to wreak their vengeance in any quarter where it could be done without much danger, and fixed upon Tondeman's Country, from which Trichinopoly had drawn the greater part of its supplies after Tanjore had ceased to send them. Accordingly, on the very second night after their defeat, M. Maissin, the French commander, with all his Europeans, 3,000 sepoys, and 2,000 horse, suddenly entering that country, began to commit every species of ravage. The Polygar Tondeman,
who had some warning of their approach, had caused his people to remove with their cattle and all their effects into the depth of the forests, whither it was impossible to follow them. The invaders, in consequence, could do nothing more than gratify their impotent malice by burning empty villages. Disappointed of the plunder which they had anticipated, they carried their depredations into Tanjore.

Major Lawrence, in expectation that the raja, on seeing his country thus attacked, would apply to him for assistance, set out with his army in order that he might be at hand to comply with the application as soon as it should be made, and thus bind the raja by interest to an alliance of a more durable nature than any he had been able to form with him. He, at the same time, ordered the reinforcement at Devicotta to effect a junction with as little delay as possible. The very next day after his arrival, a message from the raja arrived, urging him to hasten his approach. The cause of this urgency was soon explained. The invaders, not contented with pillaging the country, had been guilty of an atrocious proceeding, which threatened to doom a large portion of it to perpetual barrenness. It has been already mentioned that at Coilady the Coleroon and Cauvery would again unite were the junction not prevented by an artificial mound. At this point the level of the Coleroon is about twenty feet lower than that of the Cauvery, and the object of the mound is to prevent the whole from being precipitated into the Coleroon, when it would run waste to the sea, and preserve the Cauvery as a separate and independent stream, which, employed in irrigating the plains of Tanjore, renders them almost fabulously fertile. The invaders had cut across this mound, and afterwards cannonaded the workmen sent to repair it.

This attempt to starve a whole population in order to compel their sovereign to adopt a certain political course, proved as impolitic as it was iniquitous; for the only effect was to inspire the raja with a deep hatred of those who had employed such abominable means to effect his ruin, and convince him that his only security against the repetition of such malice was a close and cordial alliance with the British presidency. Another event, which took place at the same time, formed an additional inducement to this alliance. On the invasion of
Tanjore the raja despatched Ganderao, with 1,500 horse, to Trictapolly. Murari Rao, who, after quarrelling with Nanjiraj, had fixed himself at Pitchanda, on the north bank of the Coleroon, watching for any change of circumstances which he might be able to turn to account, no sooner heard of the approach of Ganderao than he resolved to encounter him. If he succeeded in giving him a defeat, one of two objects would be gained. The raja, already frightened by the French and Mysorean invasion, would be glad to pay a large sum as the purchase of his retreat; or if this were refused, the destruction of Ganderao's detachment would avenge the slaughter of the Marathas, and the barbarities practised on those of them who had been taken prisoners during a former campaign. Thus stimulated both by interest and revenge, Murari Rao, crossing the Coleroon and Cauvery by night, with 3,000 of his best troops, surprised Ganderao at daybreak, and so completely defeated him that only 300 of his whole force escaped. Major Lawrence arrived at Tanjore only two days after this defeat, and was consequently able to negotiate with the raja under the most favourable circumstances. The result was that Monakji was not only reinstated in his command, but appointed prime minister in room of Succuji, who had hitherto been the great obstacle to a permanent British alliance.

Major Lawrence was again in possession of an army sufficient to enable him to cope with the enemy. The Company's force consisted of a battalion of 1,200 men, some of them topasses, and 3,000 sepoys, with fourteen field-pieces; to these were added 2,500 Tanjorines and 3,000 infantry, under Monakji. A considerable reinforcement had also been expected under Maphaz Khan, the nabob's elder brother. As the legal heir of Anwar-ud-din, his right to the nabobship was better than that of Muhammed; but as he was taken prisoner in the action in which his father was slain, he was entirely overlooked in the new arrangements, and on obtaining his liberty found it necessary, after considerable hesitation, to recognize the validity of his brother's title. He had, in consequence, been placed at the head of a body of troops nominally belonging to the nabob, but made them entirely subservient to his own purposes, and found so many pretexts for delay that the army
was at last obliged to set out without him. The whole troops furnished by the nabob, therefore, were only his own guard of fifty horse. On entering the plains of Trichinopoly, encumbered with a considerable convoy, Major Lawrence found that the enemy, who had previously fixed their camp at the Five Rocks, had quitted it and advanced eastward, to dispute his further progress. Both armies drew up in order of battle; and from the apparent resolution with which the French moved to the attack, a decisive engagement was expected. Suddenly, however, after enduring a destructive cannonade with great steadiness, they wheeled round before coming within musket-shot, and began to retreat with some appearance of confusion. Major Lawrence was preparing to pursue when he ascertained that the retreat of the French infantry was only a feint to cover an attack upon the convoy. The plan was, that while the British battalion were engaged with the imagined pursuit, Hyder, at the head of the Mysore horse, should wheel round and fall upon the rear, where the baggage and provisions were deposited. Hyder's impetuosity and eagerness for plunder frustrated the stratagem. By making his attack prematurely, he succeeded in carrying off only thirty-five carts, laden partly with arms and ammunition, and partly with baggage belonging to the British officers. This loss was more than compensated by the result of the action. The French, besides sustaining a virtual defeat, had 100 of their battalion killed or wounded, while only eight of the British fell. After proceeding to Trichinopoly without further interruption, and lodging the stores of provision in its magazines, Major Lawrence made several attempts to bring the enemy to a general engagement. Instead of accepting his challenges they retired as he advanced, and finally quitted the plains on the south side of the Cauvery, to establish themselves once more in the island of Seringham. The commencement of the rains prevented further military operations; and before a new campaign could be undertaken, a great change in French East India politics was effected. To various occurrences which preceded and contributed to this change, it is necessary now to attend.
The French Ascendancy

SALABAT JUNG, indebted for his appointment of Subahdar of the Deccan to French influence, naturally clung to Bussy, through whom that influence had been exercised, and made him almost the absolute disposer of his fortunes. The French commander possessed talents which enabled him to take full advantage of his position, but found a strong party at Salabat Jung’s court disposed to thwart him in all his proceedings. At the head of this party was Sayyid Laskar Khan, who, though he hated Bussy in his heart, was such an adept in cunning that he not only persuaded him of his sincere friendship, but had been invested with the office of diwan by his special recommendation. No sooner, however, was he firmly seated in this office than he threw off the mask and took open part with those who were jealous of Salabat Jung’s French partialities, and disposed to take any steps that might seem necessary to counteract them. While they were on the watch for an opportunity, Bussy, worn out by anxiety and fatigue, fell sick, and departed, by the advice of his physicians, to sequester himself from all business at Masulipatam, now become, along with a large tract of the adjoining territory, entirely a French possession. His enemies were immediately on the alert, and made it their first business to get rid of the French troops and sepoys whom Bussy had left behind, under the pretext that they were the best security of Salabat Jung’s person and authority against both foreign and intestine foes, but really for the purpose of controlling his measures. The task thus undertaken by the diwan and his associates was delicate and difficult. Salabat Jung, who was deficient in personal courage and sagacity, was unwilling to part with the troops; and the troops themselves,
consisting of an European battalion and 5,000 sepoys, all paid by Bussy himself and acting entirely under his orders, would have resisted any overt attempt to disband them. Underhand measures, therefore, were resorted to. First, the pay which had been furnished at certain regular periods was withheld; and when the troops complained, the reason assigned was, that several of the provinces at a distance from Hyderabad, where the Subahdar was then holding his court, had failed to replenish the treasury by the usual payment of revenue. As the most effectual remedy, it was suggested that the troops should be sent to enforce the collection of it. By this device they allowed themselves to be scattered over the country in detached parties.

One important difficulty being thus overcome, the diwan next persuaded Salabat Jung that his presence was imperatively required at Aurungabad. Here the mere distance from the French settlements tended greatly to diminish French influence, while the absence of the greater part of the battalion and sepoys removed all apprehension of danger from any opposition which they might have been disposed to offer to the removal of the court. Meantime the troops sent to collect the revenue made little progress, because thwarted by secret orders from the diwan himself, and their pay in consequence became more irregular than ever. Disappointment, clamour, and desertion had consequently began to prevail, when Bussy, informed of the state of affairs, and the causes which had produced it, made his appearance in Hyderabad. He had previously given orders to all the scattered detachments to meet him there, and hence on his arrival found himself at the head of 500 Europeans and 4,000 sepoys. With some difficulty having appeased their discontent, and satisfied their most pressing wants, by money obtained partly from the treasury and partly on his own credit with native bankers, he took the bold resolution of marching uncalled with his whole force to Aurangabad, a distance of 300 miles. What had now occurred might be repeated, and he was determined that in future the pay of his troops would be drawn from some source over which the French Company had full and undivided control.

After a considerable delay, caused by the rainy season, he commenced his march. Sayyid Laskar Khan and his adherents
were in consternation, but many reasons inclined Bussy to act with moderation. Instead of advancing directly to Aurangabad, he halted at some distance, to give an opportunity for the adoption of conciliatory measures. Salabat Jung, who still retained his French partialities, was ready at once to concede whatever might be asked of him; and the diwan, who had at one time bethought himself of taking refuge in the strong fortress of Daulatabad, was delighted to discover that his peace could be made on terms which personally cost him nothing. Bussy had still more reason to be satisfied, for the object of his journey had been fully accomplished. The payment of his troops had formerly depended on sources which might easily be cut off by accident or design; it was now secured by the allotment of a permanent revenue, not liable to be interfered with by native officials, but placed under the absolute control of the French East India Company. This revenue was derived from a tract of country called the Northern Circars, which, along with Masulipatam and the adjoining district previously ceded, made the French absolute masters of a line of coast extending about 600 miles along the Bay of Bengal, from the mouths of the Krishna to the Temple of Juggernaut, near lat. 20°. At a moderate estimate the revenue of the whole could not be less than £500,000 sterling. This immense grant having been made with a special view to the maintenance of the French troops, was strictly speaking revocable the moment these troops should be withdrawn from Salabat Jang’s service; but no such contingency was then contemplated, and it appears to have been perfectly understood that, when the French were established in possession, nothing but force would suffice to deprive them of it. But how could such force be successfully employed? The chain of mountains bounding the Circars on the west formed an almost impassable barrier to any invasion from the Deccan, while their long line of coast made it easy, if attacked, to employ all the resources of the other French settlements in their defence. This consideration had not escaped the notice of the diwan, who endeavoured without success to tempt Bussy to exchange the Circars for an inland territory of much greater extent and value.

The ambitious schemes which Dupleix had long meditated, and which aimed at nothing less than the establishment of
French ascendency throughout the Deccan, seemed now in a fair way of being accomplished. Hitherto, however, the war in the Carnatic had been a serious obstacle. It formed a constant drain on the resources of the French Company; and what was worse, did not compensate for the cost by any adequate return. Beyond the Coleroon the position of affairs was still more unfavourable; and, after all the exertions which had been made, the superiority remained decidedly with the British. Could it be possible to come to some arrangement with these formidable rivals? If they could be induced to quit the field, a host of difficulties would at once disappear. The practicability of some such arrangement, and the advantages that would naturally follow from it, had been repeatedly urged upon the attention of Dupleix by his employers; and though he was little disposed to adopt a peaceful policy, he deemed it expedient so far to defer to their wishes as to make formal proposals of negotiation to the Madras presidency in the beginning of 1754.

The English Company, whose finances had suffered severely during the war, were still more desirous to terminate hostilities, and had repeatedly urged the presidency to embrace the first opportunity of securing so desirable a result. There was thus little difficulty in making the preliminary arrangements for a conference. The place selected for this purpose was the Dutch settlement of Sadrass, situated on the road between Madras and Pondicherry. Here the deputies appointed by the two companies met on the 3rd of January, and opened the business by mutually producing their proposed basis of negotiation. It was at once perceived that their views were totally irreconcilable. The English Company insisted that Muhammed Ali should be acknowledged Nabob of the Carnatic, and the French that Salabat Jung should be acknowledged Subahdar of the Deccan; in other words, each insisted that the other should yield the whole that had been at issue in the contest. As matters stood, Salabat Jung and Muhammed Ali were merely representatives of the two rival companies, and the recognition of either without any modification of their powers, or any effectual check on the abuse of these, would have been to place the one company entirely at the other's mercy. This was too obvious not to be seen, and yet the negotiation was allowed to proceed, though
there was no common point from which it could start. In the
course of the discussions which followed, the French produced
seven patents, two from Muzaffar Jung, four from Salabat
Jung, and one from the Great Mughul. Those from Muzaffar
Jung and Salabat Jung, *inter alia*, appointed Dupleix com-
mander from the Krishna to Cape Comorin, and gave him the
whole territories of Arcot and Trichinopoly after Chanda
Sahib's death. The patent from the Great Mughul was in the
form of a letter confirming all the grants which Salabat Jung
had made in favour of Dupleix and his allies. The English
Company also professed to be in possession of patents from
Nazir Jung, Ghazi-ud-din, and the Great Mughul, giving and
confirming the nabobship of the Carnatic to Muhammed Ali.
Though the patents thus founded upon were contradictory and
neutralized each other, it is not impossible that they may all
have been genuine; for at this period of political confusion in
India, there was little difficulty in obtaining any kind of docu-
ment that might be wished, provided a sufficient sum of money
was paid for it. Several suspicious circumstances, however, made
the genuineness of the patent from the Great Mughul, which
the French had produced, more than questionable. The seal
was proved to be that of a former reign; and when attention
was called to the circumstance, Dupleix, instead of courting
examination, suddenly withdrew it and all his other documents,
on the ground that those which Muhammed Ali was alleged to
have in his possession at Trichinopoly had been only promised,
not produced. As the production certainly ought to have been
mutual, the objection was so far well founded; the absurdity,
shared alike by both parties, was in hypocritically endeavouring
to give a semblance of legality and equity to acquisitions which
had originally been made in defiance of both, and were still
only maintained by the sword. After a large amount of quib-
bling and tergiversation, the whole negotiation ended in smoke.
Much recrimination followed, and the only result was, to leave
both sides more exasperated than ever.

In carrying on the war in India the English Company were
placed at a great disadvantage in being left to depend entirely
on their own resources, while the French Company were direct-
ly countenanced and supported by their government. They
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had therefore good reason for the remonstrance which they presented to the British ministry, calling upon them to take the necessary steps either to terminate the war, or to furnish the resources by which it was to be carried on. The former alternative was adopted, and the position of matters in the East became the subject of an earnest correspondence between the two governments. After various conferences in London, between the Earl of Holderness, principal secretary of state, and two deputies sent over from Paris, the British ministry, dissatisfied with the little progress made towards a settlement, began to prepare for the worst, by equipping a squadron of men-of-war for the East Indies. The French ministry, made aware by this decisive step that procrastination would no longer avail, began to act in earnest, and entered into an arrangement by which the disputes of the companies were to be settled on a footing of equality. In order to carry out this arrangement, it was necessary that commissaries should be appointed to adjust the terms. Had talent and experience only been required, the choice of the French Company would naturally have fallen on Dupleix; but the policy about to be adopted was so opposed to that which he had all along pursued, that some degree of suspicion justly attached to him, and he was considered ineligible. But if ineligible to be appointed a commissary, to adjust the terms of a settlement, he was obviously unfit to be employed in giving effect to it, and could no longer be permitted to hold the government of Pondicherry. He was therefore superseded by M. Godeheu, a director of the French Company, who arrived on the 2nd of August, 1754, invested with absolute authority over all the French settlements in the East Indies. It is easy to conceive how bitterly Dupleix must have felt when thus compelled to resign. Even when deprived of the substance of power he clung to its shadow, and was permitted during the two months which elapsed before he took his final departure for Europe, to gratify his vanity by wearing the dress and parading the streets with all the insignia belonging to him in his imaginary capacity of Nabob of the Carnatic. The fact of his being gratified by such an exhibition proves him to have been devoid of true dignity of character, and makes it impossible to take much interest in his future fortunes. Yet his fate
was hard. He had not only spent his life, but embarked his whole fortune in the service of the French East India Company. From them, therefore, he was entitled to generous treatment. So far from this, they would not even do him justice, and he was obliged to seek it by a law process, which was still pending when he died, ruined and broken-hearted.

Immediately on his arrival, M. Godeheu entered into communication with Mr. Saunders, governor of Madras, and gave proof of his good faith and anxiety for a settlement by releasing the company of Swiss soldiers who had been captured while proceeding in country boats for Fort St. David. A favourable answer was returned, but meanwhile both parties continued their warlike operations. The French received a reinforcement of 1,200 men, of whom 600 were hussars under the command of Fitscher, a partisan of some reputation; a still larger accession of force was made to the British, by the arrival of the squadron above mentioned. It was commanded by Admiral Watson, and consisted of three ships, of sixty, fifty, and twenty guns; together with a sloop of war and several Company's ships, having on board the 49th regiment of 700 men, under command of Colonel Adlercron, forty royal artillerymen, and 200 Company recruits. The superiority was decidedly with the British, and probably had some effect in inducing M. Godeheu to propose terms so reasonable that they were at once acceded to, so far as to justify a suspension of hostilities, on the 11th of October, 1754. Its duration was fixed at three months; but before these expired, the terms of a treaty, conditional on the approbation of the two companies in Europe, were adjusted, and became the basis of an eighteen months' truce. The leading principle of the treaty was, that on the east coast of India the two companies should be placed on a footing of perfect equality. With this view it was stipulated that they should for ever renounce all Moorish government and dignity, never interfere in quarrels among native princes, and restore to them all places and possessions except those which the treaty, when made definitive, should expressly reserve; that in Tanjore the English should retain Devicotta, and the French Karrikal, with the districts at present attached to each; that on the Coromandel coast the English should retain Fort St.
George and Fort St. David with their present districts, and the French Pondicherry, with either an additional district or a new settlement between Nizampatam and the Gundlacama, to compensate for the deficiency for the settlement of Karrikal compared with those of Devicotta and Fort St. David; that at Masulipatam a district should be formed equal in extent to the island of Divy in the same vicinity, and then a partition should be made by mutual agreement, giving the district to the one company and the island to the other; that to the northward of Masulipatam, and within the Northern Circars, each company should have four or five subordinate factories, merely as places of trade, without any district attached to them, and so situated as not to interfere with each other. Till the treaty was made definitive by its ratification in Europe, existing possession should be retained by both companies in conformity with the principle of *uti possidetis*, but during the truce no new acquisitions should be made, and the allies should either be bound to act in accordance with it, or be repelled by the troops of both companies in the event of their making an attack upon either.

In this treaty the French Company apparently made the larger sacrifice. Their revenues within the territorial limits over which the treaty extended had been augmented during the war to at least £700,000 per annum, while those acquired by the English Company fell short of £100,000. By consenting to an equality of possession, they renounced an income nearly equal to the whole difference between these two sums. Such at least seems to be the plain meaning of its leading stipulations, and yet it must have been understood differently, for Bussy's connection with Salabat Jung underwent no change in consequence of it; and, as if in direct defiance of the very first article, he continued to fight his battles as before. It may be alleged that it was impossible for him to do otherwise, as this was the condition on which the Northern Circars had been made over to him. The moment the troops were withdrawn, the Circars would have reverted to the ruler of the Deccan, and thus the principle of *uti possidetis*, which, according to another stipulation, was to be maintained so long as the treaty remained only conditional, would have been violated, to the manifest damage of the French Company. In point of fact,
then, the suspension of hostilities was only partial; and while the English Company were specially excluded from attempting anything in the Carnatic, there was nothing to prevent the French Company from endeavouring, through the intervention of Bussy, to extend their influence, and pave the way for the establishment of a complete ascendency in the Deccan. It soon appeared that this was not the only serious flaw in the treaty. The allies had been made parties to it without being consulted, and could not understand why they should be obliged to follow in the wake of foreign mercenaries, and make peace and war at their dictation. Nanjiraj, in particular, continued to linger in Seringham, and openly declared that he would never quit it excepting for the purpose of making himself master of Trichinopoly. The nabob on his part was equally warlike; and having little fear of the Mysorean, now that the French were under an obligation not to assist him, began to meditate an expedition against Madura and Tinnevelly. Strange to say, the Madras presidency, as if they had already regarded the treaty as a dead letter, were no sooner applied to than they agreed to furnish 500 Europeans and 2,000 sepoys for this expedition. The French remonstrated against this proceeding as a violation of the truce; but as they were themselves setting a similar example in the Deccan, little attention was paid to their remonstrance.

The nabob and his brother, Maphaz Khan, who was now acting as his representative in the countries south of the Coleroon, joined the expedition with 1,000 horse; but the detachment was commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Heron, an officer lately arrived from England. Major Lawrence had previously left for Madras with the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the king’s service—an honour which, so far from rewarding him according to his merit, did not even compensate for the marked slight which he received when Colonel Adlercron, as his superior officer, superseded him in the chief command of the British forces in India. The expedition set out in the beginning of February, 1755, and, after some detention and loss among the Colleries, one of whose polygars made a vigorous resistance, gained undisputed possession of Madura. Tinnevelly made no resistance, and all the surrounding country professed submission
to the nabob. It was soon found, however, that the submission was only nominal. The tribute promised was not paid, and the whole amount of revenue realized fell far short of the expenses of the expedition. In consequence of this unexpected and most unsatisfactory result, a rigid inquiry was instituted, and Colonel Hunter, convicted of having increased his private fortune by presents obtained at the sacrifice of his public duties, was dismissed the service.

During these transactions the Mysoreans, who had continued to linger at Seringham, in the hope that force or intrigue might yet put them in possession of Trichinopoly, suddenly marched off to meet a double danger which was threatening their own territory. Balaji Rao had appeared on the frontiers with his devastating Marathas, and at the same time Salabat Jung was advancing at the head of an army to exact alleged arrears of tribute. Part of this army consisted of the French battalion headed by Bussy, who in consequence found himself in a very awkward position. By the terms of his service he could not refuse to follow Salabat Jung on any expedition which it pleased him to undertake; and yet how could he, as the avowed servant of the French Company, take part in an expedition against the Mysoreans, with whom they had long been and still were in alliance? From this dilemma Bussy relieved himself by dexterous diplomacy. By acting as a mediator between the parties he induced the Mysoreans to accept Salabat Jung as a protector against the threatened Maratha invasion. Balaji Rao, thus intimidated, was easily bribed to desist from his intended invasion; and Salabat Jung, after encamping under the walls of Seringapatam, consented to an arrangement which gave him a large sum in payment of past arrears, and a promise of punctuality in the future payment of tribute.

The British squadron under Admiral Watson, having no prospect of active employment on the Coromandel coast while the treaty between the two companies subsisted, returned in the beginning of November to Bombay. Here a considerable number of troops had recently arrived from England; for the purpose of acting in concert with Balaji Rao in an expedition which he had agreed to undertake against Aurangabad, the
capital of the Deccan. It was hoped that Salabat Jung, thus attacked, would be frightened into a compromise, and induced to break off his connection with Bussy, as the only effectual means of securing his own safety. This expedition had been planned in England before the conditional treaty with the French was known, and the presidency of Bombay, taking the change of circumstances into consideration, resolved to abandon it. Clive, who had arrived with the troops with the rank of colonel in the king's service, and the appointment of governor of Fort St. David, was of opinion that the expedition would not amount to a violation of the treaty, and urged that no time should be lost in carrying it into effect. His opinion, however, was overruled; the more easily, perhaps, that the original command of the expedition had been destined, not to him, though he was unquestionably best entitled to it, but to a Colonel Scott, on whom ministerial influence more than merit had conferred it. By Scott's death, indeed, Clive had actually succeeded to the command, but the presidency were not to be moved from the view they had at first taken; and it was determined to employ the whole naval and military force then at Bombay on another expedition, as to the justice and expediency of which no doubt could be entertained in any quarter.

The west coast of India had long been infested by a body of pirates, who preyed indiscriminately on the vessels of all nations, native and foreign, and carried on their depredations so boldly, systematically, and successfully, as to have become in fact a formidable naval power. Kanhoji Angria, under whom they first acquired importance, was at one time commander of the Maratha fleet, and in this capacity held the government of Severndrug, a strong fort situated on a small rocky island close to the coast, about seventy-eight miles south from Bombay. In course of time, finding himself strong enough, he aspired to independence, and having gained over a large portion of the fleet, set his old masters at defiance. A war ensued, but the results were so unfavourable to the Marathas, who were not only worsted at sea, but so vigorously encountered on shore, that they at last, in 1713, consented to a peace which, in return for a promise of allegiance and tribute, left
Kanhoji in possession of ten forts and sixteen places of less strength, with their dependent villages. It is not to be supposed that when he had thus succeeded in reaping the fruits of his depredations, he would forthwith desist from them. On the contrary, he was only emboldened to extend them, and continued to levy what he called his chouth by the indiscriminate plunder of all ships that came within his reach. Along the whole coast, from the vicinity of Bombay southwards to that of Goa, his vessels, protected by forts, and sheltered within creeks and the mouths of the numerous small streams which descend from the Western Ghats, lay ready to pounce on any hapless vessel that might chance to heave in sight. In carrying on their depredations the pirates derived great facilities from the nature of the navigation. The sea and land breezes blow alternately in the twenty-four hours, dividing the day between them. The land breezes, however, do not reach more than forty miles out to sea, and hence vessels, in order to profit by them, must keep within that distance from the coast. They were thus obliged to run into the very danger which they were anxious to avoid, and fell a frequent and easy prey to Kanhoji’s fleet of grabs and gallivats. These two classes of vessels, which, for mercantile purposes, are still in common use on the Malabar coast, were admirably adapted for predatory warfare. The grabs, varying in burden from 300 to 150 tons, and made broad in proportion to their length, for the purpose of drawing little water, carried a number of guns, two of them from nine to twelve pounders, placed on the main deck so as to fire through portholes over the prow, and the rest, usually six to nine pounders, fitted to give a broadside. The gallivats, which never exceeded seventy tons burden, combined the double advantage of sailing and row boats. Besides a very large triangular sail, they were provided with forty to fifty stout oars, which enabled them to act as tugs to the grabs, and pull them even in a calm at the rate of four miles an hour. Thus attacked, it was scarcely possible for a merchant vessel to escape. Her enemies keeping at first at a safe distance, plied her with shot till they had dismayed her or thoroughly damaged her rigging, and then, as she lay helpless in the water, either compelled her to strike, or boarded her by sending forward a number of gallivats, each with from 200 to 300 men.
The East India Company tried both force and negotiation with Kanhoji. After an ineffectual attempt to coerce him in 1717, Mr. Charles Boone, then governor of Bombay, tried the effect of a written remonstrance, and in November, 1720, received a long and rambling, but very characteristic answer, in which Kanhoji, instead of seeking to disguise or palliate the principles on which he acted, says: "As touching the desire of possessing what is another's, I do not find the merchants exempt from this sort of ambition, for this is the way of the world; for God gives nothing immediately from himself, but takes from one to give to another. Whether this is right or no, who is able to determine? It little behoves the merchants, I am sure, to say our government is supported by violence, insults, and piracies, forasmuch as Maharaja (which is Sivaji), making war against four kings, founded and established his kingdom. This was our introduction and beginning, and whether or no by these ways this government hath proved durable, your excellency well knows, so likewise did your predecessors." In 1722 the British and Portuguese, the latter furnishing the land forces, and the former three ships of the line under Commodore Matthews, made an attack on the strong fort of Kolaba, at that time the chief seat of Kanhoji's power; but his usual good fortune, or the cowardice of the Portuguese, saved him; in 1724 the Dutch, with seven ships, two bomb-vessels, and a body of troops, made an equally unsuccessful attempt on Viziadrug or Gheriah. These ignominious failures strengthening a prevalent belief that the forts attacked were really impregnable, the reduction of them was abandoned as hopeless; and as the only other alternative, the Company were reduced to the necessity of giving convoy to their merchant ships by means of a naval force, which was maintained at an annual expense of £50,000. The expense of this expedient was not the worst part of it. Humiliating as it was, it proved unavailing; and Kanhoji, only emboldened by the ineffectual resistance opposed to his ravages, continued them with more daring, and on a more extended scale. At his death, in the end of 1728, he was possessed of immense wealth, a powerful fleet, and a territory stretching 100 miles along the coast, and backward to the mountains.

1 Duff's History of the Mahrattas, vol. i. p. 459.
Kanhoji Angria left two legitimate and three illegitimate sons. The former were recognized as his successors, and fixed their residence, the one at Kolaba and the other at Severndrug. Ultimately, after various changes, produced partly by domestic dissensions and partly by foreign influence, the succession passed to one of the illegitimate sons, called Tulaji, who made Gheriah his capital. It was against him that the squadron under Admiral Watson and the troops under Colonel Clive were now about to be employed. His depredations committed on all ships not bearing his passport had been severely felt, as well by the Marathas as by the Bombay presidency; and both as early as 1751 had come to a mutual determination to put him down as a common enemy. Actual steps, however, were not taken till 1755. The very year before, the pirates had given new proof of their formidable power, by attacking at once three Dutch ships of fifty, thirty-six, and eighteen guns, burning the two first, and capturing the last; and it was resolved, at the earnest entreaty of Balaji Baji Rao, the Peshwa, to attack Tulaji Angria both by land and sea. At this time neither Admiral Watson’s squadron nor the troops from England had arrived. The land forces were accordingly furnished entirely by the Marathas, who of course retained the command of them; but the ships, consisting of the Company’s marine force, the Protector, of forty-four guns, with a ketch of sixteen guns, and two bomb-vessels, and a Maratha fleet of seven grabs and sixty gallivats, were placed under the sole command of the Company’s chief naval officer, Commodore James. This great armament must have made it almost impossible to doubt of its sufficiency, and yet such was the exaggerated idea entertained of the strength of Angria’s forts, that the presidency instructed the commodore to content himself with blockade, instead of risking the safety of his vessels by attacking them. If such were the fears of the presidency, we can hardly blame the Marathas for being still more timorous. On anchoring fifteen miles north of Severndrug, and disembarking the troops, in number 10,000, to proceed the rest of the way by land, Commodore James learned that the enemy’s fleet was lying securely at anchor within the harbour of Severndrug, and might, by stealing upon it during the night, be so effectually blockaded, as to make escape
impossible. He made his arrangements accordingly; but the Maratha admiral, after promising liberally to second him, soon found that he had promised more than he was able to perform. His officers refused to stir before morning; and thus, as much perhaps from treachery as from cowardice, appeared in sight only in time to alarm the enemy, and enable them to put to sea with all their ships.

Commodore James, after a chase, continued till the approach of night made it fruitless, returned to Severndrug. Beside the fort of this name on the island, there were three other forts on the mainland, within point blank distance of it. These, though originally built for the purpose of keeping it in check, had afterwards fallen into Angria's hands, and now formed part of its defences. On returning dispirited from the chase, the commodore found the Maratha army engaged in laying siege to the land forts. Such at least was the name which they gave to their operations; but there could not be a more ludicrous misnomer, for they were firing only from a single gun, a four-pounder, at the distance of two miles. To keep up a blockade for the purpose of assisting such besiegers would have been worse than futile; and it was therefore evident that, if the instructions which the excessive caution of the Bombay presidency had dictated were literally observed, this expedition against the Angria pirates would necessarily prove, like the others which had preceded it, a complete failure. Rather than expose himself and his employers to such disgrace, Commodore James determined to act on his own responsibility, and try the effect of a bombardment. The result soon justified his decision. In the course of a single day Severndrug, which imaginary fears had magnified into an impregnable fortress, hung out a flag of truce, and the land forts almost immediately followed the example. After this brilliant exploit the fleet and army proceeded north six miles, and attacked the fortified island of Bancuti, which yielded almost without a show of resistance. The Maratha commander was so elated by a success which far exceeded his utmost hopes, that he endeavoured to tempt the commodore by an offer of 200,000 rupees to continue his career of victory, and complete it by the capture of Dabul, another of Angria's strongholds, situated on the coast about eight miles
farther south. The commodore's own wish would have been to comply with this proposal, but having already exceeded his instructions he did not venture to act without express sanction. In the hope of obtaining it, he hastened off in the Protector to Bombay. Here, however, notwithstanding his unexpected achievements, the presidency were still haunted by doubts and fears, and he was reluctantly compelled to desist from further operations.

Such was the state of matters when the Bombay presidency, by the arrival of Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive, found themselves in possession of a powerful force, for which, from their determination not to employ the troops in the Deccan, as originally intended, they had no immediate occasion. In these circumstances, the work which Commodore James had so ably begun, naturally suggested itself, and it was determined to strike at the root of Tulaji Angria's power by attacking Viziadurg or Gheriah. This place, situated about 170 miles south of Bombay, was very imperfectly known by Europeans, and figured in their imaginations as a fortress built, like Gibraltar, on an inaccessible rock, and at least equal to it in strength. So prevalent was the idea, that it was deemed prudent, before actually undertaking the expedition, to reconnoitre. With this view Commodore James proceeded with the Protector and two other ships, and, undeterred by the fleet which lay crowding the harbour, advanced sufficiently near to the fort to obtain a full survey of it. His report was, that Gheriah, though undoubtedly strong, was very far from being impregnable. Its site was a rocky promontory, connected with the mainland by a narrow belt of sand, and stretching south-west about a mile in length by a quarter of a mile in breadth. The face of the promontory all round, where washed by the sea, formed a continuous precipice about fifty feet high. Above this rose the fortifications, consisting of a double wall flanked with towers. The sandy isthmus contained the docks where the grabs were built and repaired; and immediately beyond, on the north, was the harbour, partly formed by the mouth of a stream which descended from the Ghats.

Commodore James returned from his survey in the end of December, 1755; but nearly six weeks were afterwards spent in
making preliminary arrangements. Some of these related to the terms on which the Company and the Marathas were to cooperate, and it was expressly stipulated, that while the former were to obtain Bancuti and five adjoining villages in perpetuity, Gheriah, if taken, should belong to the latter. Another arrangement related to the distribution of the spoil which was expected to fall to the actual captors. With this the two governments could not well interfere; but it is difficult to understand how, in making this arrangement, the undoubted title of the Marathas to a fair proportion was altogether overlooked. Without paying the least regard to it, a committee of ten officers, representing the British naval and military forces about to be employed, met at Bombay, and made a distribution among themselves of the whole anticipated prize-money. In thus excluding their allies the British were guilty of an act of premeditated injustice. So mercenary, indeed, was the spirit which they manifested, that the two services were on the point of quarrelling as to the principle of division adopted. Clive's rank as colonel entitled him only to the same share of prize-money as a naval captain; but it was contended on the part of the army, that his position as their commander-in-chief entitled him at least to share equally with Rear-Admiral Pococke, who was only second in command in the navy. As neither service would give way, the quarrel would have proved serious had not Admiral Watson succeeded in terminating it by volunteering to make up the difference claimed out of his own pocket. There was, doubtless, generosity in the sacrifice thus offered by Admiral Watson, and generosity also in the conduct of Clive, who, when the actual deficiency, amounting to £1,000, was afterwards tendered to him, refused to accept it; but it would have been more creditable to themselves individually, and to the services over which they presided, had they in the first instance recognized the just claims of their allies, and afterwards, instead of countenancing, sternly rebuked the haggling and rapacious spirit manifested by their subordinates. On a review of the whole transaction, it is difficult to agree with Sir John Malcolm, who thinks it "pleasing on this occasion to record the conduct of both the naval and the military commanders," though at the same time he cannot refrain from censuring "that
spirit of plunder, and that passion for the rapid accumulation of wealth which actuated all ranks."

The expedition, consisting of four ships of the line, and other vessels, amounting in all to fourteen, having on board a battalion of 800 Europeans and 1,000 sepoys, sailed in the beginning of February, 1756. The Maratha army, under Ramaji Pant, had previously advanced from Choul, a town and seaport twenty-three miles south of Bombay. On the appearance of the fleet, Tulaji Angria, in alarm, left the defence of the fort to his brother, and repaired to the Maratha camp, where he endeavoured to avert his fate, by proposing terms of accommodation. Had he succeeded, the Marathas, on gaining possession, would doubtless have amply compensated themselves for the meditated injustice of excluding them from a share of the plunder. The British, convinced that this was their intention, and perhaps conscious that their own conduct afforded too good a justification of it, saw that no time was to be lost. The morning after their arrival, Admiral Watson having summoned the fort without receiving any answer, gave orders to prepare for action. The fleet, drawn up in two parallel divisions on the north side of the promontory, opened on the fort at the distance of only fifty yards, with 150 pieces of cannon and the mortars of five bomb-ketches. Within ten minutes, one of the grabs which crowded the harbour was set on fire by a shell, and the whole of the piratical fleet, which for fifty years had been the terror of the Malabar coast, was in flames. Before night set in, the enemy's fire was silenced, but no surrender was offered. There was little doubt that the fort would be obliged to succumb, and the great question now was how to secure the spoil. According to the report of a deserter the Marathas were to be put in possession of the place on the following day. What would then become of the prize-money, about the distribution of which the two services had been prematurely quarrelling at Bombay? Once accessible to such dexterous pillagers, every vestige of it would speedily disappear. This was to be prevented at all hazards; and therefore, as if the capture of the fort had been only a secondary object, or as if the Marathas, to whom the delivery of it in the event of its capture was guaranteed by

treaty, had no right to take possession, Clive landed his troops, and took up a position commanding the only approach to the fort by land. The Maratha commander, finding himself outwitted by this manoeuvre, made secret overtures to Captain Buchanan, the officer on picket, and offered him a bill on Bombay for 80,000 rupees (£8,000) if he would permit him and a few of his people to pass. The bribe, which would have rendered the receiver infamous, was indignantly rejected; but, as Duff remarks,1 “it is a circumstance worthy of notice as elucidating the character of the times, that the Bombay government thought common honesty so rare, as to present Captain Buchanan with a gold medal in consideration of his extraordinary good behaviour.”

The Marathas having been excluded access to the fort the bombardment was renewed, and at length, on the afternoon of the second day, on an intimation by the garrison to the advanced guard of the troops on shore, that they were ready to surrender, Clive marched up and took possession. The captors had reason to congratulate themselves on their good fortune. Though the cannonade had destroyed the artificial works, the rock still formed a natural bulwark, against which, if it had been valiantly defended, nothing could have availed but regular approaches on the land side. Within the fort were found 200 pieces of cannon, six brass mortars, a great quantity of naval and military stores of all kinds, and value in money and other effects to the amount of £120,000. This sum was divided as originally arranged at Bombay. The Marathas got nothing, and when they complained were told that whatever claim they might have had was forfeited by the treacherous attempt to bribe a British officer and obtain possession for themselves. It may be so; but, in considering the justice of the case, it is necessary to remember that those who now accused them of want of good faith had been the first to set them an example. It has been already mentioned, that in terms of a treaty made between the Company and the Marathas, the former obtained possession of Bancuti, with some dependencies, and the latter were, in the event of its capture, to obtain possession of Gheriah. Strange to say, the Company now showed great reluctance to

fulfil their part of the agreement. Gheriah, it was thought, would be a most valuable acquisition to the Bombay presidency; and therefore, when delivery was asked by the Marathas, Mr. Bourchier, the governor, endeavoured to evade the obligation on pleas so frivolous as to be disgraceful. At first a compromise was attempted, and Bancuti was offered to the Marathas in exchange for Gheriah. When this was indignantly refused, a list of grievances was concocted, and the Marathas were told that they had failed in performing their part of the treaty—they had not properly fixed the limits of the Bancuti cession—they had not delivered up the person of Tulaji Angria—and the Peshwa had contracted for a supply of goods from the Dutch. The last grievance, though evidently regarded as the worst of all, had nothing to do with the point in question, and the other two were frivolous pretexts which scarcely deserved examination. Mr. Bourchier himself ultimately seemed ashamed of them, and the Marathas were put in possession of Gheriah. Pending the dispute the British squadron and troops remained to influence the issue, and did not return to Bombay till the beginning of April. Shortly after, they sailed for Madras, which was reached on the 12th of May. Clive's ultimate destination was Fort St. David, where, by a singular coincidence, he entered on the duties of his office on the 20th of June, 1756, the very day on which Calcutta fell into the hands of Siraj-ud-daulah, Nabob of Bengal. This event, with the causes which led to it, and the momentous consequences by which it was followed, must now be traced.
BENGAL, united as it usually was with Bihar and Orissa, formed so important a branch of the Mughul empire, that the government of it became an object of ambition to the leading members of the imperial family, and the aspirants to the throne of Delhi were more than once indebted for their success to the sinews of war furnished by its revenues. In the war of succession which was waged on the death of Aurangzeb, Bahadur Shah, who, as the eldest son, undoubtedly possessed the best title, would in all probability have found it unavailing, had he not been opportunely furnished with the means of carrying on the contest by the arrival of his son, Azim-us-Shan, with the treasures which he had amassed as Viceroy of Bengal. At a later period, when, on the death of Bahadur Shah, Azim-us-Shan made an ineffectual attempt to seize the throne, to the prejudice of his elder brother, who succeeded, and reigned for a short period under the title of Jahandar Shah. Faruksiyar, Azim-us-Shan's son, found an asylum in Bengal, where he had for a time, nominally at least, held the office of viceroy, and where he remained secure till he was able to issue at the head of a force which proved victorious, and placed him on the imperial throne. These, however, were the last instances in which Delhi may be said to have received its emperors from Bengal. Vast political changes were in progress, and the time was evidently approaching when the authority of the Great Mughul, though it might still continue to be formally recognized, even in distant provinces, would cease to have any real existence. The causes tending to this result in Bengal were not so visibly manifested as in the Deccan, but they had long been at work, and had made its governors virtually independent.
As early as the time of Aurangzeb, a governor of Bengal, who afterwards acquired celebrity under the name of Jaffar Khan, had begun to cherish ambitious designs. He was the son of a poor Brahmin, and spent the early part of his life at Ispahan, in the service of a Persian merchant, who had purchased him as a slave, and educated him as a Muhammedan with his own children. On the death of the merchant he obtained his freedom, and returned to India, where he was employed in a subordinate situation by the Diwan of Berar. His expertness in accounts and general business habits brought him under the notice of Aurangzeb, who made him diwan successively of Hyderabad and Bengal. The latter position gave him full scope for the display of his talents; and by the introduction of various improvements he added greatly to the amount of the revenue. He thus rose high in the favour of Aurangzeb, but at the same time incurred the hatred of the viceroy, Azim-us-Shan, who was so offended by his interference in all pecuniary transactions that he sanctioned a plot against his life. As much by his courage as his good fortune he escaped the daggers of the assassins, and afterwards proceeding boldly to Azim-us-Shan’s palace, upbraided him as the author of the crime. The viceroy cowered before him, and made solemn protestation of his innocence; but the diwan was not to be duped, and took the most effectual measures both to manifest his suspicions and guard against a repetition of the attempt. Besides transmitting an authenticated statement of the whole circumstances to Aurangzeb, he quitted Dacca, where the viceroy resided, and removed, with all the officers of the diwani, to Murshidabad, which in consequence ultimately supplanted Dacca as the capital of Bengal. In return for the dangers he had run new honours were conferred upon him; and at the time of Aurangzeb’s death he was not only diwan of the three provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, but also invested with a large share of military authority.

Fortunately for Jaffar Khan the contest for the succession to the throne called away Azim-us-Shan from Bengal, and thus delivered him from the enemy from whom he had most to fear. Faruksiyar, indeed, was left to act as his father’s deputy, but his authority, never confirmed at Delhi, was easily set at nought; and Jaffar Khan, bearing, among other lofty titles which
Aurangzeb had conferred upon him, that of nawab, or nabob, continued to extend and consolidate his power. All important and confidential situations were filled by his own relations and dependants; and though he had many enemies at court, he was able to render all their machinations powerless, by the regularity with which he transmitted the revenue, increased by his exertions from £1,000,000 to £1,500,000 sterling. To a court so needy as that of Delhi, there could not be a greater recommendation of the merit of a provincial governor than the punctual arrival of long trains of bullock-carts laden with boxes of treasure. Still more to conciliate favour, the strong military escort which accompanied each train brought with them, as presents to the emperor and his ministers, numbers of elephants, horses, antelopes, hawks, shields made of rhinoceros hides, sword-blades, Sylhet mats, Dacca muslins, Kasimbazar silks, and various articles imported by Europeans. The nabob, well aware how much his favour at court depended on these transmissions, was careful to make them as widely known as possible, and gave them all the appearance of great public events. He himself, accordingly, attended by his principal officers, accompanied the convoy some miles from Murshidabad; and besides intimating its approach by regular despatches to the vizier, caused it to be recorded and published in the royal gazettes. By this publication he not only relieved himself from responsibility in the event of the convoy not reaching its destination, but gave the necessary information to the governors on the line of route, and left them without excuse if they failed to provide for its safe transport through their territories.

Jaffar Khan, presuming on the importance of the service which he thus rendered; and being by nature strongly inclined to arbitrary measures, often stretched his authority to the utmost, and was guilty of many acts of oppression towards both natives and foreigners. The desire to increase the revenue furnished him with a pretext for numerous exactions. He was too clear-sighted not to perceive how much foreign commerce contributed to the general prosperity of the country, and he was therefore disposed to deal liberally with Mughul and Arabian merchants, strictly prohibiting the custom-house officers from

1 Stewart's History of Bengal, p. 380.
demanding more than the prescribed duties of \(2\frac{1}{2}\) per cent and the regulated fees. The Europeans, on the contrary, he regarded with the utmost jealousy, and would fain have expelled them from the country altogether. He hated them with all the rancour of Muhammedan bigotry; he believed them to be politically dangerous; and he could not understand why the English in particular should be exempted from duties which all others were obliged to pay. Under the influence of such feelings, he soon made them aware that they must either forego this privilege, or compensate for it by presents renewed as often as he chose to intimate that he expected them. The system thus pursued proved so capricious and oppressive, that the East India Company resolved to bring their case under the notice of the emperor, by sending a deputation or embassy to Delhi. The result of this embassy, which took place during the reign of Faruksiyar, has been already mentioned. That monarch—influenced, partly by the magnificence of the presents which the ambassadors brought with them, partly by the grudge which he bore the nabob for having not only treated him superciliously when he was nominal Viceroy of Bengal, but also openly set him at defiance when he would have supplanted him in his government; and, above all, by gratitude to the surgeon of the embassy for effecting a cure on his person after all the native physicians had failed—granted the demands of the Company to their utmost extent. In point of fact, however, their success was only partial. The nabob, without venturing to question the authority which conferred the privileges, put his own interpretation upon them, and was thereby able to render some of them inoperative. Still a very decided advantage had been gained; and Portuguese, Armenian, Mughul, and Hindu merchants, fixing their residence in Calcutta, in order to enjoy the protection of the English flag, added rapidly both to its population and its wealth.

During the troubles which preceded and immediately followed the deposition and death of Faruksiyar, he quietly looked on, as if he had been an unconcerned spectator; but as soon as Muhammed Shah seemed firmly seated on the throne, he resumed his intercourse with Delhi; and by sending his usual escort of revenue and presents, found no difficulty in obtaining
a confirmation of his government. This, however, was now of comparatively little consequence to him personally, as he was far advanced in years. An object nearer his heart was the continuance of the government in his family. He had no son, and wished to give the succession to Serferaz or Sarfaraz Khan, his grandson by an only daughter. Her husband, Shuja-ud-din Khan, was still alive, and thought himself better entitled to the government than his own son, who indeed had no claim to it except what was derived from the fondness of a doting grandfather. He therefore intrigued at Delhi, and successfully thwarted the designs of Jaffar Khan, who, unable to obtain the government for his favourite, did all he could to compensate him by delivering to him on his death-bed the key of all his treasures and valuables, and appointing him by will both his public and his private successor.

Immediately on the death of Jaffar Khan, in 1725, Shuja Khan and his son, who appear previously to have kept each other in the dark as to their real intentions, came to an understanding. The former accordingly took quiet possession of the government; and the latter consented to wait till the succession, now assumed to be hereditary, should open to him by course of nature. At the time when Shuja Khan thus seated himself on the musnud of Bengal, he was and had long been deputy-governor of Orissa. Shortly after he had fixed his residence at Cuttack, the capital of this government, a person named Mirza Muhammed, related to him by marriage, arrived with his two sons, and were all admitted into his service. The two sons—the elder named Haji Ahmed—the younger Mirza Muhammed Ali, but better known by the name of Ali Vardi Khan—were men of talent and education, and made themselves so useful to Shuja Khan, that they obtained a complete ascendancy over him. As a matter of course they accompanied him to Bengal, and became influential members of his government. Sarfaraz Khan, in implement of the agreement made with his father, became Diwan of Bengal; but all the real power centred in a council consisting of the above two brothers, and two Hindus—the one, Roy Alam Chand, who, under the name of comptroller of the household, performed all the duties pertaining to the office of diwan, while Sarfaraz Khan only
nominally held it—and the other the imperial banker, Jagat Seth.

For a time the mildness and equity of Shuja Khan’s government contrasted favourably with the severity and injustice which had too often characterized the measures of Jaffar Khan. All his council were men of talents, and without having recourse to the oppressive exactions of his predecessor, the revenues were so well managed, that he was able even to increase the customary sum sent to Delhi. He thus stood high in favour at that court, and not only obtained, with many honourable titles, a confirmation of the government of Bengal and Orissa, but a re-annexation of the province of Bihar, which had been dissevered from it.

This apparent increase of power ultimately proved the ruin of his family. The government of Bihar fell vacant, and the nabob committed the fatal mistake of conferring it on Ali Vardi Khan. This crafty and talented favourite proceeded forthwith to Patna, the capital, and at the very outset assumed almost regal state, being accompanied by an escort of 5,000 troops. The troubled state of the country was the pretext; but there cannot be a doubt that at this early period he was meditating the designs which he afterward carried into execution. Shortly after his arrival at Patna, he took a body of Afghans into his service. These, far superior in native courage and discipline to the ordinary Indian troops, put him in possession of a power which could hardly fail to give him the victory when the struggle which he contemplated should come to be decided. Meanwhile, Shuja Khan ceased to fulfil the early promise of his government, and exchanged its cares for indolence and luxury. He was thus governor only in name, and left all important affairs to be managed chiefly by the influence of Haji Ahmed. The two brothers were thus enabled to play into each other’s hands, and make all necessary arrangements for an emergency which was expected soon to arise. They saw that Shuja Khan’s life was fast drawing to a close, and they deemed it unnecessary to disturb him in his possession. Towards his son, however, their feelings were very different, and they had already set on foot a course of intrigue, by which they hoped to gain over the court of Delhi to their
interest, and set the claims of Sarfaraz aside. Before their schemes were matured, Delhi itself was in the hands of the Persian conqueror, Nadir Shah, and Shuja Khan died. Ali Vardi Khan had previously secured his nomination to the government of Bihar, free from any dependence on Bengal; but the higher objects to which his ambition pointed had not been secured, and Sarfaraz Khan took undisputed possession of the government in accordance with his father's will, which, while it appointed him heir, bound him to act in all affairs of moment by the advice of Haji Ahmed, Roy Alam Chand, and Jagat Seth. Sarfaraz, though he promised compliance with this condition, could not have been sincere, for he had already become aware that Haji Ahmed was leagued with his brother Ali Vardi in plotting his overthrow. So far, therefore, was he from intending to take him into his council, that he was bent on destroying him, and only waited for an opportunity. It was necessary, however, to proceed with caution. The person of Haji might easily have been seized, as he resided in Murshidabad; but Ali Vardi being at Patna, could not be reached, and would certainly break out in open revolt the moment any hostile proceedings were adopted against his brother. Had Sarfaraz Khan possessed common prudence and discretion, he would have secured himself against the designs of the brothers, by courting the esteem and attachment of the other two members of his council. Instead of this course, which good feeling as well as sound policy dictated, he insulted both, and converted them into implacable enemies. When Alam Chand, after obtaining a private interview, ventured to use the freedom of an ancient counsellor, and to remonstrate with his new master on the notorious licentiousness of his private life, and his total neglect of all serious public business, his counsel was scorned, and he only called forth a volley of ignominious abuse and invective. The treatment of Jagat Seth was still more outrageous. The fame of a lady of exquisite beauty, whom the banker's son had married, excited the nabob's curiosity, and he insisted on seeing her. According to oriental ideas there could not be a grosser insult; but Sarfaraz Khan, accustomed to listen only to his passions, which had been indulged to such an extent as to impair his intellect, was
not to be dissuaded, and the lady, after Jagat Seth had implored in vain for the honour of his family, was carried to the palace in the evening. No violence was offered her; but even momentary exposure to the rude gaze of the licentious nabob was dishonour which was not to be effaced, and could only be avenged. From this moment Sarfaraz Khan was left without a sincere friend; and those who, for his father's sake, were once disposed to have stood like a shield around him, entered eagerly into a conspiracy to effect his ruin.

The primary object of the conspiracy was to make Ali Vardi Khan Nabob of Bengal. To give some colour to the proceeding, application was made to the reigning emperor, Muhammed Shah, who, having never confirmed Sarfaraz Khan in his government, was easily induced to regard him as an usurper, and set him aside to make way for one who, while he far surpassed him in talents, promised to enrich the Delhi treasury by the present payment of £1,000,000 sterling, the transmission of Sarfaraz Khan's confiscated property and effects—valued at several millions more, and the future delivery of the revenue with all the punctuality which had been observed by Jaffar Khan. The contemplated revolution thus obtained a kind of legal sanction, and secured the support of many who probably would have stood aloof if it had continued to wear its original form of conspiracy and rebellion. Everything being now prepared, one obstacle remained to be surmounted. Haji, with his family, was still at Murshidabad, and completely at the mercy of Sarfaraz Khan, who, the moment the conspiracy was unfolded, would certainly make them the first victims of his rage and vengeance. By means of a series of dexterous and unscrupulous manoeuvres, the nabob was deluded into the belief that Haji's absence would prove his best security, and he allowed him to depart with his family for Patna. Ali Vardi, now free to act, at once commenced operations, and advanced with such rapidity that his movements were not known at Murshidabad till he had surmounted the difficult passes of Terriagulli and Sikligulli, among the Rajamahal Hills, where his progress might have been arrested, and about to penetrate into the very heart of Bengal. Sarfaraz Khan, confounded at the intelligence, looked about in vain for the counsel and aid
of which he had deprived himself by his gross misconduct. At last, however, after wasting some time in unavailing negotiation, he began to display an energy of which he had not previously been deemed capable, and hastily collected an army of 30,000 men, with which he encamped on a plain near Comra, about twenty-two miles north of his capital. Though superior in numbers, his troops were no match for Ali Vardi's Afghans, who speedily decided the fortune of the day. On seeing that all was lost, Sarfaraz Khan refused to join the fugitives, and rushed into the thickest of the enemy, when, after he had nearly expended his whole quiver of arrows, he fell pierced through the forehead by a musket-ball.

Ali Vardi, following up his victory, entered Murshidabad without opposition, and seated himself on the musnud. The odious government of his predecessor made the change generally acceptable, and all ranks hastened to congratulate and do homage to the new nabob. He proved not unworthy of it. Contrary to the usual practice of eastern conquerors, he displayed no thirst for blood, and not only spared Sarfaraz Khan's sons, but pensioned them, and sent them to reside with some degree of state at Dacca. The only quarter in which the new government met with open hostility was in Orissa. Here Murshid Kuli Khan, a brother-in-law of the late nabob, was governor. Being well aware that it was intended to dispossess him, he at first endeavoured to make terms, but the utmost he could obtain was to quit the province with his property and family, without being subjected to molestation. As he was not of a warlike temperament, he would probably have submitted, had not a bolder course been almost forced upon him by his wife and the leading members of his court. Having determined on resistance, he at once raised the standard of revolt, and sent Ali Vardi a letter of defiance. The example might soon have spread, and therefore Ali Vardi, without losing a moment, left his brother Haji in charge of the government of Bengal, and hastened forward at the head of his troops to commence the campaign. The ultimate result could hardly be doubtful, though the struggle proved longer and more formidable than had been anticipated. Instead of waiting to be besieged in Cuttack, his capital, Murshid Kuli moved northwards to Balasore, and a little beyond it occupi-
ed a position where his camp, besides being fortified and defended by 300 cannon, was rendered almost inaccessible by a river and surrounding forests. Had the same wisdom been displayed in maintaining this position as in selecting it, Ali Vardi would have gained no laurels. The population, attached to their own governor, refused to furnish him with supplies, and his army began to melt away both by famine and desertion. The impatience and rashness of Mirza Bakar Khan, the enemy’s general, brought on a battle at the very time when he ought to have avoided it, and the nabob gained a victory so complete that Murshid Kuli, finding no safety within the province, was glad to seek an asylum in Masulipatam.

Ali Vardi, believing that the insurrection was at an end, gave the government of Orissa to Sayyid Ahmed, his brother’s second son, and set out for Bengal. He was scarcely seated in the capital when intelligence arrived which left him no alternative but to retrace his steps. Sayyid Ahmed, by profligacy and vindictiveness, had rendered himself so obnoxious that a new insurrection, headed by Bakar Khan, had broken out, and made him prisoner. The fame of the nabob as a warrior was now so widely spread that his mere presence in Orissa sufficed to dissipate the revolt. Delighted not more at its suppression than at the recovery of his nephew, he again settled the province, which, as it was no longer to be governed by Sayyid Ahmed, but by an officer of experience, was expected to give no further trouble. In this belief, Ali Vardi disbanded the greater part of the troops he had brought with him; and, escorted only by about 5,000 horse, proceeded by slow stages for Bengal, amusing himself on the way with hunting. After passing the frontiers of Orissa, he had entered the district of Midnapore, and was encamped near its capital, when he was startled by the intelligence that Bhaskar Pant, in the service of Raghuji Bhonsla, a Maratha chief, who had established himself in possession of Berar, had arrived in Bengal, at the head of a formidable army, with the professed object of levying the chouth, but more probably with the hope of making a permanent conquest. The nabob had not been unaware of the intended invasion, but expected that it would be made from the north-west through Bihar, and at so late a period as would give him ample time to reach Murshid-
abad and provide sufficient means of defence. He was therefore taken completely by surprise when he learned that they had entered by Orissa, and were following close upon his track. He immediately hastened northward to Burdwan, expecting that he might be able there to deposit his heavy baggage in safety. He had only reached it when the arrival of the Marathas was announced by smoking villages and the helpless inhabitants fleeing in terror before them. The Maratha commander, with the usual policy of his nation, avoided a general action, and after several skirmishes endeavoured to induce the nabob to buy him off by offering to withdraw on the payment of a heavy contribution. Still hoping to be able to reach his capital, Ali Vardi refused to submit to the humiliating terms, and made an effort to continue his retreat. With this view he gave orders that the heavy baggage and camp-followers should remain at Burdwan, but the terror had now become so general that the orders were disobeyed, and the confusion became inextricable. The greater part of the baggage, artillery, and tents fell into the hands of the enemy.

The nabob would now gladly have escaped by paying the contribution first demanded. It was no longer in his option. Bhaskar Pant, who would have been satisfied at one time with ten lacs of rupees (£100,000), was too well aware of the advantage he had gained, and refused to take less than a crore (£1,000,000), together with all the elephants. Desperate as the case was, any risk was better than this ignominy; and after a struggle of four days, during which new losses and hardships were endured, the nabob succeeded in placing the Bhagirathi between him and his pursuers. Here Nawazish Muhammed, the eldest son of his brother Haji, joined him with a considerable reinforcement, and he found little difficulty in obtaining sufficient supplies. It was now Bhaskar Pant's turn to take alarm. The rainy season had commenced, and the whole country was becoming inundated. It seemed madness to remain, and he would have departed had not a bolder spirit than his own interfered. An Arab by origin, of the name of Mir Habib, was Diwan of Orissa when Murshid Kuli governed it, and made no scruple, when satisfied as to the winning side, to abandon his old master and take service under Ali Vardi. His only object, however; was
to serve himself; and having been taken, or rather, perhaps, allowed himself to be taken prisoner by the Marathas, he ingratiated himself with their commander, and was soon the most influential, as he was certainly the ablest of his advisers. From his thorough knowledge of the country he was able to turn every circumstance to advantage, and when Bhaskar Pant spoke of retreat, pointed to the defenceless state of Murshidabad. When Bhaskar Pant hesitated, he volunteered to surprise it, and was provided with a detachment for that purpose. The nabob obtaining intelligence of his departure, tried to outstrip him. He was a day too late. Mir Habib had already plundered the suburbs, and extorted from the banker, Jagat Seth, a sum which has been estimated at £2,500,000 sterling. The success of this expedition induced Bhaskar Pant to abandon the intention of returning to Berar, and he encamped for the rainy season at Katwah, on the Hugli.

Though the season made operations on a large scale impossible, the Marathas made repeated incursions, and were at last masters of the whole of Bengal west of the Ganges, except Murshidabad and its environs. The nabob, contented in the meantime with the possession of his capital, continued strengthening its works and making preparations for a decisive campaign. His resources on the east of the Ganges were still unimpaired, and his troops, placed in cantonments and abundantly supplied with provisions, suffered few privations. It was otherwise with the inhabitants of the districts overrun by the enemy. Plundered of their property, and pursued by fire and sword, multitudes fled across the river, carrying their terrors along with them, and sought shelter and protection in Calcutta. Even here the alarm became general; and an entrenchment, afterwards known by the name of the Maratha Ditch, was commenced. It was intended to carry it round the territory, and form an inclosure seven miles in extent; but as the Marathas did not attempt to cross the river, and were believed not to possess the necessary means, the work was abandoned when scarcely half the distance was completed. At the same time when the ditch was begun, permission was obtained from the nabob to fortify the Company's factory at Kassimbazar, by surrounding it with a brick wall, flanked with bastions at the angles.
As soon as the dry season commenced, Ali Vardi boldly assumed the offensive by crossing the Bhagirathi on a bridge of boats. Another stream, which it was still necessary to cross in order to come to close quarters with the enemy, was bridged in the same manner; and though a serious loss was sustained by the sinking of a boat near the centre, when scarcely a half of the troops had passed, the Marathas were so intimidated on seeing themselves about to be attacked, that they fled with the utmost precipitation, seeking to gain the passes which led through the forests of Pachete into Bihar. The rapidity of the pursuit having frustrated this intention, they suddenly doubled upon their track, passed eastward through the forests of Bishenpore, and gained the open country. The nabob, thus outmanoeuvred, retraced his steps. From some cause not easily explained, Bhaskar Pant changed his tactics, and instead of continuing his flight, advanced to offer battle. The encounter took place at Midnapore, and resulted in the complete defeat of the Marathas, who at once evacuated Bengal, and made the best of their way back to Berar.

Ali Vardi returned in triumph to his capital, but not to enjoy a long repose. Raghunath Bhonsla, disappointed and enraged at the defeat of his general, determined to take the field in person. Fortunately for the nabob the Marathas were at this time divided into two powerful factions. The object of contention was the office of Peshwa, who, as the raja had been reduced to a mere cipher, was to all intents the real head of the Maratha confederacy. The rival claimants were Raghunath Bhonsla and Balaji Rao. The latter proved successful, but the strife was not ended, and Raghunath no sooner entered Bengal in one direction than Balaji made his appearance in another. Ali Vardi’s course of policy was plain, and he lost no time in purchasing the alliance of Balaji, who at once took the burden of the war upon himself, and drove his rival countryman before him without being obliged to strike a blow. Raghunath Bhonsla, notwithstanding this second failure, clung tenaciously to his purpose, and the very next year after he had been ignominiously chased from Bengal, sent Bhaskar Pant once more into it at the head of 20,000 cavalry. His aims, however, were somewhat lowered. He had once been sanguine of conquest, but he would
now be satisfied with money. Bhaskar was accordingly instructed to offer peace in return for such a contribution as Balaji was supposed to have received. Ali Vardi had hitherto been contented to meet his enemies in the open field, but as defeat after defeat appeared to have no effect, he resolved to get rid of them at all events, though it should be by means of an atrocity. Taking advantage of the mercenary spirit which had been so unequivocally displayed, he professed to be extremely anxious for a termination of hostilities, and sent two of his principal officers to the Maratha camp, with instructions to tempt Bhaskar Pant to an interview, by promising to concede whatever he should ask. Accordingly, when he demanded heavy contributions, he was told that he had only to pay the nabob a visit in order to obtain them. His avarice blinded him to the danger, and on a fixed day, moving out with the greater part of his army from Katwah, where it had been encamped, he drew it up in order of battle, and advanced with his principal officers and attendants to the tent where the nabob was waiting to give them audience. The rest is soon told. A band of assassins had been concealed within the screens around the tent, and only waited a signal to commence their horrid butchery. When the Maratha officers entered, Ali Vardi eagerly asked which was Bhaskar Pant, and on his being pointed out, cried aloud, “Cut down the infidel!” In an instant Bhaskar and nineteen chiefs who had accompanied him were despatched. To complete the atrocity, Ali Vardi put himself at the head of his troops, and without any note of warning, charged the Maratha line, which immediately gave way and fled in confusion.

Ali Vardi gained little but infamy by this abominable treachery. As a just retribution, his principal general, Mustafa Khan, to whom he was indebted for most of his victories, rose in arms against him; his brother Haji, offended at being refused an unreasonable request, retired in disgust to Patna, to waste the residue of a long life in sensual indulgences; and his favourite grandson, whom he had destined for his heir, and spoiled by excessive indulgence, becoming too impatient to wait for the succession, endeavoured to seize it by force. Nor were the Marathas slow to avenge their murdered countrymen. Year after year Raghuji Bhonsla headed an invasion of some part of
Bengal, and when he died, his son and successor, Janoji, continued the warfare with the same indomitable energy. The ultimate result was, that Ali Vardi, worn out by years and incessant fatigue, and broken in health, was obliged to compound with his relentless enemies by ceding to them the whole province of Orissa, and agreeing, moreover, to pay twelve lacs of rupees annually. This was truly a recognition of the claim to levy chouth in Bengal; but to save the nabob's dignity, that obnoxious term was not used in the treaty, which simply declared that the payment was to be made "on condition that the Marathas should not again set foot in his highness's territories." That there might be no doubt as to the limit thus fixed, it was added that "the river Sunamukhi, which runs by Balasore, should be considered as the boundary between the two dominions; and that the Marathas should never cross that river, nor even set a foot in its waters."

Before the nabob consented to this treaty, he had been rendered almost broken-hearted by the tragical deaths of his brother Haji and his favourite nephew, Zain-ud-din. The one, as already mentioned, had retired to Patna in disgust, and the other was residing in it as governor of Bihar, when the nabob, having discovered that two Afghan chiefs, Shamsher Khan and Sardar Khan, were intriguing with the Marathas, dismissed them and their followers from his service. The whole, numbering about 8,000 men, arrived in the vicinity of Patna. Their presence could not be viewed without alarm, and it was deemed necessary to get rid of them by some means, foul or fair. Haji is said to have proposed a scheme for assassinating the leaders, but Zain-ud-din, who, though the youngest of the nabob's nephews, was expecting to succeed him, thought it good policy to conciliate the Afghans, whose military prowess would give him a decided superiority over all rival claimants. The nabob is said to have preferred assassination as the safer policy, but at last, overcome by the urgency of his nephew, who represented that they were anxious to make their submission, he authorized him to receive it. The new terms of service having been adjusted, Zain-ud-din, anxious to give the chiefs a proof of his confidence, and obviate any fears they might have of treachery, received their visits of ceremony, on being restored to favour, in the absence of his
guards and presence of only a few household officers. The first
day, given to Sardar Khan, passed off quietly. The second day
was allotted to Shamsher Khan. His approach was announced
by the arrival of nearly 1,000 Afghan infantry, who arranged
themselves in the square of the palace. Immediately after the
hall of audience was entered by a chief named Murad Sher
Khan, and a crowd of officers, who pressed forward to present
their offerings. While Zain-ud-din was intent on the ceremony,
one of the Afghans aimed a blow at him with his dagger. It
missed, but Murad Sher Khan immediately followed it up with
his sabre, and the governor fell dead on the pillow of his musnad.
Haji was the next victim, but was not permitted to die so easily.
He was known to have accumulated vast wealth; but, when
dragged before Shamsher Khan, refused to discover it. Every
kind of torture and ignominy failed to overcome his firmness,
and at last, after seventeen days of indescribable suffering, death
came to his relief. On searching his house, seventy lacs of rupees
(£700,000), besides jewels and other valuables to a great amount,
were found buried. The insurgents gathering around them all
the discontented spirits of Bihar, gained possession of the entire
province, and were even able, by leaguing with the Marathas,
to threaten Bengal. The nabob, however, roused by the strongest
of all motives, displayed even more than his wonted ability
and intrepidity, and gained two victories in a single day, in the
one avenging his murdered kindred by defeating and slaying
Shamsher Khan, and in the other, not so much defeating as
terrifying the Marathas, who, after they had drawn up for the
encounter, fled in confusion, without venturing to risk it.

After the treaty concluded with the Marathas in 1751, Ali
Vardi enjoyed some respite from the toils of war. He was suffering,
however, both from age and disease, and died of dropsy in
1756. He had attained his eightieth year. Death at such a period
of life can scarcely be said to have been hastened by any adventitious
cause, and yet it is thought that he might have lived
longer had he not been visited anew by domestic calamities.
His own family consisted only of three daughters, whom he
married to his three nephews. The tragical death of the young-
est at Patna has already been recorded. The eldest, Nawazish
Muhammed, who was governor of Dacca, and the second,
Sayyid Ahmed, who for many years had been governor of Purnea, where by good conduct he recovered the character which he had lost by his disastrous government of Orissa, died of fever, within a few months of each other, just before their uncle was seized with his last fatal illness. The only surviving members of the nabob's family were his eldest daughter, Ghasiti Begum, the widow of Nawazish Muhammed, and two grandsons: the one Shaukat Jung, the son of Sayyid Ahmed, whom he succeeded in the government of Purnea, and the other Siraj-ud-Daulah, or, as he is usually called, Siraj Daulah, the son of Zain-ud-din, and the successor to the nabobship. This youth, who has already been seen ungratefully taking up arms against his grandfather, was stained with many other crimes. Several assassinations were known to have been perpetrated at his instigation; and there was no kind of vice with which he had not grown familiar. Ali Vardi was not ignorant of his real character, and truly described it on his death-bed, when, on being asked by some of his women to recommend them to the care of his successor, he answered with a ghastly smile, that "if he should for three days behave dutifully to his grandmother, then they might entertain hopes of his tenderness."

The irrational partiality which Ali Vardi entertained for this worthless youth was his greatest folly, and the iniquity of appointing him to succeed him in the government, while aware how incapable he was of discharging its duties, is one of the blackest stains on his memory. The inhabitants of Bengal, though shocked at the crimes which the nabob committed in usurping the government, and in ridding himself of his enemies when they threatened to be too strong for him, felt that on the whole he had ruled them wisely and justly, and were sincerely attached to him. It was a poor return for their attachment to place them at the mercy of an ignorant, rapacious, heartless profligate.

During the sixteen years of Ali Vardi's government, the East India Company had not much reason to complain. Like the inhabitants generally, they suffered by the unsettled state in which the country was kept by intestine dissensions and Maratha incursions; but their privileges were respected, and the few irregular contributions exacted from them amounted to
so small a percentage on their investments, as not seriously to affect the profits. We have seen that during the general alarm produced by the Marathas, Ali Vardi allowed the Maratha Ditch to be dug and the factory of Kassimbazar to be put in some state of defence. He was not disposed, however, to permit any encroachment on his prerogative, and peremptorily prohibited the British and French, when at war, from carrying on any hostilities within his dominions. It would even seem that he eyed the progress of the European companies with a degree of suspicion, and had a presentiment of the ascendancy which they were destined to establish. On one occasion he said, "he feared that after his death the Europeans would become masters of many parts of Hindustan;" and on another occasion, when urged by Mustafa Khan, who was then his most influential counsellor, "to expel the English from Calcutta and seize their wealth," he gave no answer till Mustafa had retired, and then observed to one of his nephews, who had seconded Mustafa's iniquitous proposal, "My child, Mustafa Khan is a soldier, and wishes us to be constantly in need of his service; but how came you to join in his request? What have the English done against me, that I should use them ill? It is now difficult to extinguish fire on land; but should the sea be in flames who can put them out? Never listen to such advice as his, for the result would probably be fatal." This distinct allusion to naval warfare shows that he had formed a just conception of the main arm of British power, and deprecated collision with it as at once unjustifiable and perilous. It would have been well for Siraj-ud-daulah had he entered into the enlarged views which dictated this advice, and acted upon them.
At the time when Ali Vardi was appointed to the government of Bihar, one of his daughters, who was married to his youngest nephew, gave birth to a son. The event seemed so auspicious that he declared his intention to adopt the boy and make him his heir. Mirza Mahmud, as he was originally called before he assumed the title of Siraj-ud-daulah, received the kind of training which was considered suitable to his prospects. All his wishes were gratified, all his faults overlooked, and he never knew what it was to be refused or contradicted. The natural cruelty of his temper appeared in the amusements of his childhood. No bird or animal within his reach was safe from torture. As might be anticipated, his vices ripened with his years, and the cruelty which he had practised on the brute creation was transferred to his own species. To every virtuous feeling he seems to have been an utter stranger. His only companions were infamous profligates, with whom he used to patrol the streets of Murshidabad, and commit every form of indecency and outrage. With his other vices he possessed a certain degree of low cunning, which he employed in concealing some of the worst parts of his conduct from his grandfather, who, it is charitable to suppose, though his general character was well known to him, must have been ignorant of his worst villanies, when, in 1753, he placed him on the musnud, and required all the courtiers and officers to recognize him as his successor. From that time Ali Vardi, without ceasing to hold the reins of government, threw a large share of his authority into the hands of Siraj-ud-daulah, who of course perverted it to the worst of purposes.
Nawazish Muhammed, as the eldest nephew, naturally thought himself best entitled to the succession, and took no pains to conceal his dissatisfaction. He had for some years, though resident at Murshidabad, held the government of Dacca, and from its revenues acquired enormous wealth, which enabled him to keep a large body of armed men in his pay. In himself, as he was possessed of very moderate talents, and had nothing warlike in his disposition, he was not dangerous. His two leading ministers, however, an uncle and a nephew, the one named Hussain Quli Khan and the other Hussain-ud-din, were men of capacity, and it was deemed necessary to remove them. The uncle resided at Murshidabad with his master, the nephew at Dacca, where he acted as deputy-governor. Ali Vardi wished to act warily in the dismissal of these officers, as he feared that Nawazish, if alarmed by any hasty step, would at once retire to Dacca and assert his independence. Siraj-ud-daulah had no idea of temporizing, and having no scruples as to the atrocity, determined to rid himself of all fears by taking the nearest road. His hired assassins entering Dacca; stabbed Hussain Khan in the dead of the night; and a few days after, Hussain Quli Khan was assassinated in open day in the streets of Murshidabad. Nawazish and his brother Sayyid Ahmed, who, as they were both aspiring to the nabobship, had hitherto acted independently of each other, now saw the necessity of uniting their interests, and leaguing against Siraj-ud-daulah, as their common enemy. A civil war was imminent, when they both died suddenly, as has been already told.

Deaths which happened so opportunely for Siraj-ud-daulah might, without uncharitableness, have been attributed to his agency, but all writers agree in regarding them as natural. Their effect was to allow him to take the benefit of all the arrangements which Ali Vardi had made in his favour. It soon appeared, however, that his title to the nabobship was not to remain unchallenged. Ghasiti Begum, Ali Vardi's daughter, had succeeded to the wealth of her late husband Nawazish, and saw no means of saving it from the rapacity of the new nabob, except by placing herself at the head of a powerful party. Her sex made it impossible for her to claim the government in her own name, and she therefore set up a competitor
in the person of an infant two years old, the son of a deceased brother of Siraj-ud-daulah. Another competitor appeared in the person of his cousin, Shaukat Jung, governor of Purnea. Could he have succeeded, the inhabitants of Bengal would not have gained much by the change, as it would have been difficult to choose between them, so closely did they resemble each other in ignorance and profligacy. The title of the claimant set up by Ghasiti Begum was evidently bad, as the father of the infant was only a younger brother. Not only, therefore, had Biraj-ud-daulah justice on his side when he resisted the Begum's attempt, but he was also furnished with a plausible pretext for the measures he adopted against her. As his own aunt and Ali Vardi's daughter, she was certainly entitled to be treated with all the leniency consistent with safety, but it is not easy to condemn him for dispossessing her of a palace, where all the discontented spirits of the capital would have rallied around her, and depriving her of treasures which had been, and would in all probability continue to be employed in secretly undermining or openly assailing his government.

A Hindu, of the name of Rajballabh, who had become diwan to Nawazish after the assassination of Hussain Quli Khan, and made common cause with his widow, being perfectly aware of the treatment which awaited him from Siraj-ud-daulah, had resolved, even before Ali Vardi's death, to provide against the danger by removing his family and treasures. The difficulty was to find a place where they would be beyond the nabob's reach. They were then in Dacca, and the plan he adopted was to send them away in the charge of his son Kishandas, under pretence of making a pilgrimage to the celebrated Temple of Juggernaut, on the coast of Orissa. In prosecuting this intended pilgrimage, Kishandas proceeded with several loaded boats down the Ganges, as if to enter the Bay of Bengal by one of its mouths, but stopped short, and sailed upwards till he reached the Jellinghi, by which the Ganges communicates with the Hughli. He was thus enabled to enter the latter river. This was in fact the preconcerted scheme, for his real destination was not Juggernaut, but Calcutta. His father had prevailed with Mr. Watts, the chief of the Company's factory at Kassimbazar, to apply to the presidency for permission to Kishandas
and his family to halt for some days in Calcutta. It does not appear very distinctly whether Mr. Watts was duped by Rajballabhb into the belief that nothing more than a halt was intended, or whether he was aware that the real object was to secure permanent British protection. Be this as it may, Mr. Watts' application in behalf of Kishandas was successful, and he arrived in Calcutta, where he was hospitably received by Omichand, an extensive Hindu merchant, who had large connections at Murshidabad, and was naturally inclined to conciliate the good-will of so influential a person as Rajballabhb.

The arrival of Kishandas, and the reception given to him at the British presidency, filled Siraj-ud-daulah with rage. Not only had large treasures, on the confiscation of which he had confidently calculated, escaped, but the very idea that a body of foreign merchants, whose settlement in the country existed only by sufferance, should protect any party whom he had marked out as a victim, was galling to his pride. He immediately proceeded to the palace, and gave utterance to his disappointment and indignation, exclaiming, that the suspicions which he had long entertained of the English were now confirmed, and that they were evidently in league with the faction which meant to contest his succession to the nabobship. Ali Vardi, now on his death-bed, turned to Mr. Forth, surgeon of the factory of Kassimbazar, who was attending him professionally, and put a variety of searching questions to him, asking, How many soldiers were in the factory at Kassimbazar? Where the English fleet was—whether it would come to Bengal—and with what object it had come to India? The answers satisfied him that the British, in the expectation of a war with France, had already sufficient work upon their hands, and were in no condition to provoke the hostility or even risk the displeasure of the Bengal government. Siraj-ud-daulah was silenced, but not satisfied, and was so little careful to conceal his feelings, that his determination to sack Calcutta and expel the English was openly talked of.

This ominous circumstance and the previous conversation with Mr. Forth, is said not to have been communicated to the presidency; but sufficient warning was given them when a letter, dated two days after the death of Ali Vardi, was received,
demanding the delivery of Kishandas and his treasures. The letter purported to come from Siraj-ud-daulah, and seems to have borne sufficient evidence of its genuineness. The governor and council, however, learning that the bearer of it, a brother of Ramramsingh, the head of the spies, had come in a small boat, landed in the disguise of a pedler, and proceeded in the first instance to the house of Omichand, chose to conclude that this was an invention of this crafty Hindu, who, having by some recent changes in the mercantile arrangement of the Company, lost some of his importance, had devised this curious method of endeavouring to regain it. This extraordinary conclusion once formed, it was gravely resolved that both the messenger and the letter were too suspicious to be received, and Ramramsingh's brother was hurried back to his boat, and turned off with insolence and derision.

The presidency, after they had thus committed themselves, appear not to have been perfectly satisfied with the propriety of their proceeding, and instructed Mr. Watts to give explanations which might prevent any evil consequences. He was thought to have succeeded; for, when his vaqueil or agent appeared at the durbar, and stated the grounds on which Ramramsingh's brother had been treated as an impostor, Siraj-ud-daulah gave no sign of emotion or displeasure. He acted, indeed, as if the matter had passed entirely from his mind, and made no further communication to Mr. Watts or the presidency respecting Kishandas and his treasures.

At this very time letters arrived from England stating a rupture with France was inevitable, and ordering the settlement to be put in a state of defence. The work was immediately commenced; but as the fort was in such a dilapidated state as to make it necessary rather to rebuild than repair it, a considerable number of labourers were employed, in the first instance, to repair a line of guns which were placed along the brink of the river opposite to the west side of the fort. When these repairs were begun, Siraj-ud-daulah was proceeding at the head of an army of 50,000 men for Purnea, to encounter his cousin and rival claimant, Shaukat Jung. It was known that he had a number of spies in Calcutta, and though the presidency had used every effort to discover and expel them, enough
still remained to carry tidings to him of the operations in which they were engaged. Their nature and extent were of course exaggerated, and a letter arrived from the nabob, in which, after stating that he had been informed that the English were building a wall and digging a large ditch around the town of Calcutta, he peremptorily ordered them to desist, and restore the fortifications to the state in which they were before. Mr. Drake, the governor, answered this letter with more candour than good policy; he explained the full extent to which the operations had been carried, and the motives which, as they originally dictated their commencement, rendered it expedient to continue and complete them. "The nabob," he said, "had been misinformed by those who had represented to him that the English were building a wall round the town; they had dug no ditch since the invasion of the Marathas, at which time such a work was executed with the knowledge and approbation of Ali Vardi; in the late war between England and France, the French had attacked and taken the town of Madras, contrary to the neutrality which it was expected would have been preserved in the Mughul's dominions; and that there being at present great appearance of another war between the two nations, the English were under apprehensions that the French would act in the same manner in Bengal; to prevent which they were repairing their line of guns on the bank of the river."

This answer was received by the nabob on the 17th of May, at Rajamahal, and threw him into a transport of rage, which astonished even those of his attendants who were most familiar with the violence of his temper. It is not easy to see why it should have had such an effect. His dignity may have been offended at the very supposition that Europeans should presume to make war within his territories without his sanction; and still more at the assumption, that if they did so, the party attacked would be obliged to trust to their own resources, instead of leaving it to him to repel and punish the aggressor. Beyond this, there was nothing in the answer to provoke an outburst of passion even in the proudest and most sensitive of tyrants. The rage, if real, and not merely assumed to give a colour to further proceedings, was probably provoked by perceiving that a plan which he had long been meditating,
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and a revenge which was rankling in his mind, were in danger of being frustrated. Were Calcutta put into such a state of defence as would enable it to resist the attacks of the French, whose skill in siege operations had been rendered famous throughout India, by the capture of fortresses previously deemed impregnable, how could he be able to make himself master of it, and rifle it of the fabulous wealth which was believed to be treasured up within its precincts? Now, therefore, was the decisive moment. Calcutta, if not forthwith attacked, would set him at defiance, and both the fame which he anticipated as its conqueror, and the plunder on which his heart was set, would be lost to him for ever.

Instigated by some such motives as these, the expedition to Purnea was immediately postponed, and the army began its march back to Murshidabad. Its movements were too slow for the nabob's impatience, and a detachment of 3,000 men was pushed forward to invest the Company's factory at Kassimbazar. Though the garrison consisted only of twenty-two Europeans and twenty topasses, no attempt was made to carry it by a sudden onset, and the detachment were contented to remain for nine days after their arrival, merely watching it so as to preclude either egress or ingress.

On the 1st of June, the nabob came up with the main body of the army. The idea of resistance seems not to have been entertained, as the fortifications, undeserving of the name, consisted only of a brick wall, three feet thick, with small bastions at the angles, but without ditch or palisade. Part of the curtain formed the outer wall of a series of chambers looking inward, and affording, by their roofs, a terrace resembling ramparts. These, however, were completely overlooked from without by buildings at the distance of only 100 yards. The cannon were still more defective than the works, most of them being honey-combed, and the ammunition was sufficient for only 600 charges. The nabob, immediately on arriving, sent a message for Mr. Watts, who obeyed, after obtaining assurance of personal protection. He was received with insolence and invectives, and ordered to sign a paper, importing that the presidency of Calcutta should, within fifteen days, level any new works they had raised, deliver up all government tenants under their
protection, and refund whatever the revenue might have lost by the granting of dustuks or passports of trade to parties not entitled to them. Mr. Watts, alarmed for his life, signed the paper, and the two other members of the council being sent for, imitated his example. No terms of capitulation were made, and a party of the nabob's troops took possession of the place without opposition. Their orders were to seal up what effects they found; but they disobeyed, and stole the greater part. The soldiers in the factory, after enduring three days of such contumely, that the ensign in command of them went mad and shot himself, were imprisoned at Murshidabad. One of the members of council, and the junior servants of the factory, were allowed to retire to the Dutch and French factories; but Mr. Watts and the other member, instead of being sent, as they expected, to communicate the nabob's resolves to the presidency, were detained in the camp, and told that they were to accompany the nabob himself to Calcutta. This was the first intimation they received of his determination to attack it.

The extreme violence and injustice exhibited by the nabob at the very outset must have made it almost palpable to the minds of the presidency that nothing less than the complete destruction of the settlement was aimed at; and yet, in the vain hope of depreciating his wrath, before the final step was taken, letters were daily despatched to Mr. Watts, instructing him to express their readiness to demolish everything that could be considered a recent addition to their fortifications. The letters were probably intercepted by the nabob, as they never reached Mr. Watts; but the presidency, while writing them, could not well act at variance with the offer they contained, and thus nearly three weeks passed away without any preparation against the coming danger. Had a proper use been made of this intervening period, by applying for reinforcements to the other presidencies, and making the most of the means of defence at their disposal, the governor and council might have set the nabob at defiance, and given the first example of what a mere handful of our countrymen can achieve, when true heroism inspires them, against myriads of native Indians. Unfortunately neither the European soldiers nor civilians in Bengal were, at that period, animated by that spirit which in
our own times has been so illustriously displayed. When, at length, the struggle arrived they were far less disposed to face it than to flee from it:

The letter which filled the nabob with so much rage, and was the ostensible cause of his abandoning the expedition to Purnea, was received by him at Rajamahal on the 17th of May, and though his intention then announced was never revoked, and he from that day continued his march southwards, evidently bent on mischief, the 7th of June arrived before the first note of alarm was despatched to Madras and Bombay. The passage by sea, as the south monsoon was then blowing, was impossible, and an overland message could not be carried in less than thirty days. It was therefore evident that long before any answer could be received the nabob would have ample time to do his worst. Conscious of the desperate predicament in which they were thus placed, the presidency applied to the Dutch at Chinsurah, and the French at Chandernagore, and endeavoured to persuade them that they ought to unite their forces as in a common danger. The former simply refused—the latter, as if in mockery, proposed that they should abandon Calcutta, and place themselves with their effects under their protection. What that protection would have been may be inferred from the fact that the nabob in passing Chandernagore was propitiated by a present of 200 barrels of gunpowder. The presidency, now thrown entirely on their own resources, began to display some activity. Works of defence, such as the shortness of the time would admit, were erected, provisions were laid in, and the number of Indian matchlock-men was augmented to 1,500. The regular garrison consisted of 264 men, and the inhabitants enrolled as militia amounted to 250, forming an aggregate of 514, but of these two-thirds were toasses, Armenians, and Portuguese, on whom no reliance could be placed, and of the remaining third, mustering in all 174, not more than ten had seen service.

With such feeble resources a successful defence was more than doubtful, and therefore the attention of the presidency was, first of all, directed to the means of escape. On the opposite side of the river Hughli, about five miles below Calcutta, the native fort of Tanna, mounting thirteen guns, commanded
the narrowest part of the channel. The necessity of securing this fort, so as to give a free outlet to the sea, seemed so urgent, that it was determined, while the nabob was only advancing, to assume the offensive and endeavour to gain possession of it. Accordingly, on the morning of the 13th of June, two vessels of 300 tons, and two brigantines anchored before it, and opened a fire which at once dislodged the garrison, consisting of not more than fifty men. A party immediately landed, spiked some of the guns, and threw the rest into the river. If it was intended to retain the fort, the true plan would have been not to destroy the guns but point them so as to repel any attack on the land side. The mistake was soon apparent, for the very next day a detachment of the enemy, 2,000 strong, arrived from Houghli, drove the few Europeans and Iascars within the fort to their boats, and resisting any attempt to dislodge them by a cannonade, obliged the ships to weigh anchor and return to Calcutta.

The same day when the ships sailed against Tanna a letter was intercepted, addressed to Omichand, by the head spy, and advising him to put his effects out of danger. This confirming the suspicion previously entertained, Omichand was immediately put under strict confinement in the fort. Kishandas was, in like manner, confined; but when an attempt was made to apprehend Omichand’s brother-in-law, a serious fray took place. He had concealed himself in the female apartments, and not only did all the peons and armed domestics in Omichand’s service resolutely resist a forcible entrance into them, but the person at their head, a native of high caste, to save the women from the dishonour of being exposed to strangers, rushed in, slew thirteen of them with his own hand, and then stabbed himself. Meanwhile the nabob was hastening forward with such expedition that many of his troops died of fatigue and sun-stroke. On the 15th of June he reached Houghli, and immediately after transported his army to the Calcutta side, by means of an immense fleet of boats. The militia and military immediately repaired to their posts, and all the natives took to flight, with the exception of about 2,000 Portuguese, whose claim as Christians was so far recognized as to procure them admission into the fort.

At noon of the 16th the nabob was seen approaching from the north. His first movement showed that he had not taken
any means to acquaint himself with the locality. Had he turned eastward he would have arrived where the Maratha Ditch had not been completed; and met with no obstacle. Instead of this he came directly in front of a deep rivulet, where it enters the Hughli, and formed of itself so strong a defence as to render the ditch unnecessary. There was indeed a bridge over it, but this was defended by a redoubt, which had recently been erected, and the approach to it was, moreover, flanked by a ship of eighteen guns, which had been stationed there for that purpose. When the point of attack was perceived the greater part of the Company’s matchlock-men were posted near the banks of the rivulet. The first of the nabob’s operations was to send forward a detachment of 4,000 men, with four pieces of cannon, into the adjoining thickets. Here, from three in the afternoon till dark, an incessant fire was kept up by both sides without any result. At midnight all was still, and Ensign Pischard, who commanded the redoubt, suspecting from what he had learned on the Coromandel coast of the Indian mode of warfare, that the enemy were buried in sleep, crossed the rivulet with his party, seized and spiked their four guns, cleared the thickets, and returned without the loss of a man.

On the following day the nabob changed his tactics. Omichand’s chief peon had not stabbed himself mortally; and, still breathing indignation and revenge, had caused himself to be carried to the enemy’s camp. By his advice the attack on the north was abandoned, and an entrance was easily effected from the east, through various passages where there were no defenders. The suburbs were thus in the hands of the enemy, who set fire to the great bazar, and took possession of the quarter which had been inhabited by the principal Indian merchants. An unavailing attempt was made to dislodge them, and the space left to the defenders became gradually more and more contracted. Had the fort been considered tenable they would probably have at once retired into it, and by thus concentrating their efforts made them more efficient. Fort William, however, like that of Kassimbazar, scarcely deserved the name. It stood near the river, about half-way between the north and south extremities of the Company’s territory, and formed nearly a parallelogram, of which the longest sides, the east and west,
were each 200 yards; the breadth on the south side was 130, and on the north only 100 yards. The walls, not more than four feet thick, formed the outer side of chambers, and were in several places pierced with windows; the terraced roofs of these chambers, supplied the place of ramparts. The four bastions, one at each angle, were each mounted with ten guns, but the two on the south side were rendered useless to each other by a line of warehouses which had been built contiguous to the wall. The roofs of the warehouses were, however, strong enough to bear the firing of three-pounders, which were mounted on them. The east gateway, forming a considerable projection, was mounted with five guns, three in front and one on each flank. Besides these, which formed the proper works of the fort, a line of heavy cannon, mounted in embrasures of solid masonry, was placed outside, on the brink of the river, under the west wall.

It is plain from this description how very little engineering skill had been employed in the construction of the fort. In addition to other disadvantages it was overlooked by the English Church, opposite to the north-east bastion, and several other houses belonging to the English town, which consisted for the most part of spacious detached inclosures, and occupied the ground 600 yards towards the east and half-a-mile to the north and south of the fort. Taking all these things into consideration, it is easy to understand the reluctance of the defenders to allow themselves to be cooped up within the fort, and their consequent anxiety to dispute every inch of ground as they were obliged to recede. They accordingly erected three batteries, each mounting two eighteen-pounders and two field-pieces, one at the distance of 300 yards from the east gate, so as to command the principal avenue leading due east from it to the Maratha Ditch; the second in a street commencing about 200 yards north of the fort, and continuing in that direction with one of its sides bordering on the river; and the third 300 yards to the south of the fort, at a point where a road leading north and south was bridged over to give passage to a rivulet. The principal approaches being thus secured, breast-works with palisades were erected in the smaller inlets, and trenches were dug in the more open grounds.
It soon appeared that the defence of these outworks required a far greater force than the garrison could afford. Even had they been sufficiently defended, many points remained by which the enemy could penetrate; and, availing themselves of the houses and inclosures, advance, without once losing shelter, near to the walls. The contest thus became too unequal to be long successfully maintained. Post after post was necessarily abandoned, and the whole three batteries were taken the very first day they were attacked. This result spread general consternation, and, with the exception of the comparatively few Europeans, all were stupefied with fear. The enemy were of course proportionally emboldened, and not only kept up an incessant firing, but made attempts to escalade. On one of these attempts, made at midnight, the governor ordered the drums to beat the general alarm, but the summons, though thrice repeated, did not bring forward a single man except those on duty. In such a state of matters it was impossible for the bravest and most sanguine not to feel that a fatal issue could not be long delayed. It was some consolation, however, to know that, if the worst should happen, the means of escape had been provided. A ship, and seven smaller vessels, and numerous boats, with the natives who plied them, were lying before the fort. As night approached all the European women were embarked; and at two in the morning a council of war, to which all the British, except the common soldiers, were admitted, met, to deliberate whether escape to the ships should take place immediately or be deferred to the following night. The council broke up without any formal resolution; but, as the immediate abandonment was not carried, the natural conclusion was that the other alternative had been adopted.

In the morning, when it was intended to embark the Portuguese women and children, a scene of inextricable confusion arose. Many of the boats had deserted in the night, and not a few of those which remained were upset by overcrowding. The enemy in the meantime were not idle. Having gained possession of all the houses and inclosures on the banks of the river, they shot down the helpless fugitives and endeavoured to burn the ship and other vessels by means of fire-arrows. In the panic which now began to prevail many became more intent on their
own personal safety than on any united effort for the general benefit. Two members of council, attended by several of the militia, in superintending the embarkation of the European women, had accompanied them to the ship, and forgotten or been unable to return. Nor was this the worst. The ship suddenly weighed anchor, and the other vessels, following in her wake, sailed down to Govindapur, about three miles below. Many of the militia, believing themselves abandoned, rushed to the boats and quitted the shore. Not long after Mr. Drake, the governor, seeing only two boats remaining at the wharf, and several of his acquaintance preparing to escape in them, followed the disgraceful example. He was indeed only a civilian, and might have some shadow of excuse when he entirely forgot himself under the influence of momentary terror; but what can be said for Captain Minchin, the military commander, who, valuing his own precious person more than honour and duty, sailed off in the same boat with the governor? Can we wonder that for a time those thus fouly and mercilessly abandoned could do nothing but vent execrations against the fugitives?

The soldiers and militia within the fort now numbered only 190. On recovering in some degree from their astonishment and indignation, they proceeded to deliberate. Their position, though fearful, was not yet altogether desperate, and it might therefore be possible by acting with prudence and energy to keep the enemy at bay till they could provide themselves with some means of escape. Their first step was to appoint a new governor. Mr. Pearkes, as the eldest member of council present, was entitled to the office, but he waived his right, and Mr. Holwell was appointed. The task which thus devolved upon him was difficult in the extreme, and he appears to have performed it with judgment. On the return of two or three boats to the wharf he took the precaution of locking the western gate, in order to prevent any more desertions. At the same time he ordered the ship, which was originally stationed opposite to the northern redoubt, and still remained there, to come down immediately to the fort, and made preparations for continuing a vigorous defence till it should become possible to get on board of her. The ship immediately weighed anchor,
and all were buoyed with the hope of a speedy rescue when she struck on a sandbank, and stuck so fast that the crew at once abandoned her. This was a fearful disappointment, but there was still another resource. The vessels were still at Govindapur, and it was not to be imagined that the highest civil and military authorities on board of them, after feeling themselves secure, would not recover from their unmanly panic, and leave no means untried to bring off their abandoned companions. Indeed no great effort was required, for the ship, once again before the fort, could easily, have repelled any attempt of the enemy to prevent the garrison from embarking. It was strange that the anticipated relief from Govindapur was not volunteered; and still stranger that it was not in a manner extorted by all the signals of flags by day, and fires by night, which the garrison continually threw out. With a cowardice and heartlessness almost unexampled, the ships at Govindapur beheld the signals unmoved, and the garrison were abandoned to their fate.

The day on which the shameful desertions from the garrison took place the enemy warmly attacked the fort, but were so vigorously met that they desisted about noon, and contented themselves during the rest of the day and the succeeding night with setting fire to all the adjacent houses, except those which gave them a command of the ramparts. On the following morning their efforts became more determined than ever, while the means of resistance were rapidly becoming feebler and feebler. While some of the defenders were resisting with the courage of despair, others were entreating or clamouring for a capitulation. To calm the latter class Mr. Holwell caused Omichand, who was still a prisoner in the fort, to write a letter to Monichand, the governor of Hughli, who was commanding a considerable body of the besieging army, and threw it over the wall. This letter requested him to intercede with the nabob for a cessation of hostilities, as the garrison were ready to submit, and were only resisting in order to preserve their lives and honour. The only answer the letter received was a determined attempt to escalade. It was repulsed, but at a fearful loss. In the course of a few hours twenty-five of the garrison were killed or desperately wounded, and seventy more had received slighter
hurts. The common soldiers, moreover, had intoxicated themselves by breaking into the arrack store, and were no longer under control. Mr. Holwell prepared another letter of similar import, addressed to Roydurlabh, and threw it over the north-east bastion, and at the same time hung out a flag of truce, in answer to one with which a man was advancing on the part of the enemy. A parley ensued, and was not finished when the fort was taken. The drunken soldiers, endeavouring to escape, had forced open the western gate. Part of the enemy when they saw it opening rushed in, while others gained admission by escalading the wall where, by a most absurd arrangement, it formed the abutment of warehouses. Further resistance was impossible, and the garrison surrendering their arms were made prisoners.

The capture being thus effected on the 21st of June, the nabob, at five in the afternoon, entered Fort William, and seating himself in state, surrounded by his general, Mir Jaffar, and his principal officers, received their congratulations on the great achievement which he had performed. Omichand and Kishandas, on being presented to him, were received with civility. Mr. Holwell was then sent for, and, after a severe reprimand for the presumption which had been manifested in even daring to defend the fort, was told to divulge the place where the wealth of the Company was concealed. The treasury had already been searched, and, to the nabob's infinite disappointment, only 50,000 rupees (£5,000) had been found in it. Could this be all which he was to receive, instead of the countless sums which had inflamed his imagination and provoked his rapacity? In two other conferences which he had with Mr. Holwell before seven o'clock he returned to the same subject, and then dismissed him with repeated assurances of personal safety. Mr. Holwell, from whose narrative the account of the subsequent catastrophe is derived, believes that the nabob did not mean to violate his word, and only gave a general order that the prisoners “should for that night be secured.”

Mr. Holwell on returning found his fellow-prisoners surrounded by a strong guard, who as soon as it was dark ordered them to collect themselves and sit down quietly under a

1 Holwell's Tracts, p. 387, et seq.
verandah, or piazza of arched masonry, which extended on each side of the eastern gate, in front of the chambers already described as abutting on the wall. At this time the factories, both to the right and left, were in flames, and parties were seen moving about with torches, and some of the prisoners imagined that it was intended to suffocate them between two fires. This was a mistake, for the torch-bearers were only searching for a place in which to confine them. During this search they were ordered into that part of the verandah which fronted the barracks, along which was a large wooden platform for the soldiers to sleep on. The prisoners readily obeyed this order, for it now seemed that the worst which was to happen to them was to spend a night on the platform, at a season when all the air which could reach them through the openings of the piazza was required to temper the excessive heat. No sooner, however, were they within the space in front of the barracks than the guard advancing, some with pointed muskets, others with clubs and drawn scimitars, forced them back into a room at the southern extremity. It was the soldiers' prison; or, as it was generally termed, the Black Hole. The whole formed a cubical space of only eighteen feet, completely inclosed by dead walls on all sides, except the west, where two windows, strongly barred with iron, furnished the only supplies of air, but gave no ventilation, as at this time no breezes blew except from the south and east. Few were aware of the nature of the horrid place till they found themselves crammed within it and had the door shut behind them. Their whole number was 146.

It was about eight o'clock when they entered, and in a very few minutes the dreadful consequences began to appear. Attempts were first made to force the door, but it opened inwards and could not be made to yield. Mr. Holwell, who had secured a place at one of the windows, seeing an old officer "who seemed to carry some compassion in his countenance," offered him 1,000 rupees to get them separated into two apartments. He went off, but soon returned saying it was impossible. The offer was increased to 2,000 rupees, but the answer was the same. The nabob, without whose orders it could not be done, was asleep, and no man durst awake him. Meanwhile suffocation was doing its work. First, profuse pers-
piration, then raging thirst, and lastly, in not a few instances, raving madness followed, before death relieved the sufferer. The general cry was—Water! water! and several skins of it were furnished by the natives outside, some apparently from compassion, but others from brutal merriment, holding up torches to the windows to enjoy the desperate struggles which took place among the unhappy prisoners as each supply was handed in. From nine to eleven this dreadful scene continued. After this the number who had already fallen victims was so great that the survivors began to breathe more freely. At six in the morning an order arrived to open the prison. It was not easily executed, for so many dead bodies were lying behind the door that twenty minutes elapsed before it could be forced back so as to leave a passage. Of the 146 who had been thrust into the dungeon only twenty-three came out, and these more dead than alive. Strange to say, one of these was a woman, a native of India, though of English parentage, and of such personal attractions that Mir Jaffar carried her off as a trophy to his harem.

Siraj-ud-daulah must have been well aware of the barbarity perpetrated, at least in his name, if not by his authority, and yet was so far from showing any signs of humanity and contrition, that when Mr. Holwell, still unable to stand, was carried before him, he rudely interrogated him as to concealed treasures, threatened new injuries if he refused to disclose them, and ordered him to be kept a prisoner; he was accordingly put in fetters, along with two others of the survivors who were supposed to know something of the imaginary treasures; the rest were set at liberty. Most of them, unwilling to remain within the nabob’s reach, proceeded to Govindapur, but found guards stationed to prevent any communication between the shore and the Company’s vessels still lying there. Two or three, however, managed to get on board, and brought tidings which must have wrung the hearts of those who had been instrumental in bringing such a catastrophe on their comrades by a double cowardice—first, by deserting them, and then leaving them to perish unsuccoured. “Never, perhaps,” as Mr. Orme justly remarks,1 “was such an opportunity of

1 History of Military Transactions in Hindustan, vol. ii. page. 78.
performing a heroic action so ignominiously neglected; for a single sloop, with fifteen brave men on board, might, in spite of all the efforts of the enemy, have come up, and, anchoring under the fort, have carried away all who suffered in the dungeon."

The plunder of Calcutta fell far short of the nabob's expectations. No treasures were forthcoming except those of Omichand, who, in consequence of the hard measure dealt out to him by the presidency, had not been permitted to remove them, and is said to have been pillaged of £40,000 in money, besides many valuables. Even the quantity and value of the Company's merchandise were less than might have been anticipated. The capture had been made at the wrong season. The investments provided had been shipped off before the previous April, when the monsoon made navigation impossible; the imports of the past year had been mostly disposed of, and no new cargoes had yet arrived from England. Owing to these causes the Company's loss in goods was estimated at not more than £200,000. Even of this only a small portion escaped the hands of the soldiers, or the embezzlement of the officials, who should have accounted for it to the treasury. The nabob therefore had made, on the whole, only a barren conquest, and consoled himself for the disappointment in the manner suitable to his character, by pompously changing the name of Calcutta to Alinagore, or the Port of God, in commemoration of his victory, and by maltreating Mr. Holwell and his two companions, who were sent as prisoners to Murshidabad, and subjected to much hardship and indignity. The nabob, flattering himself that the British would never dare to show themselves again in Bengal, left Monichand in command of Calcutta, with a garrison of 3,000 men, and proceeded homewards to carry out the expedition against Purnea, which he had so suddenly abandoned. After crossing the Hughli with his army he determined to make the Dutch and French factories feel the weight of his displeasure. In passing southward he had imperiously ordered them to join his standard with all their forces. They declined; and he now sent a message threatening them with extirpation if they did not forthwith send him a large contribution by way of fine. Ultimately the Dutch compounded for
£45,000, and the French for £35,000. The difference in favour of the latter was probably made in consideration of the present of gunpowder already mentioned.

The vessels at Govindapur had not remained there with the intention of rendering any assistance to the Calcutta garrison. On the contrary, yielding only to their fears, they had continued to sail down the river, and would willingly have quitte it altogether, had they not encountered a new danger, which frightened them so that they were glad to return to their former anchorage. When they were endeavouring to pass the fort of Tanna the cannon, with which it had again been mounted, opened upon them, and drove two of the smaller vessels ashore. This sufficed to spread a panic through the whole fleet. That the danger was magnified by excessive timidity was proved a few days after, when two ships from Bombay came up the river and sustained the fire of the fort without injury. Thus reassured the fleet again weighed anchor, passed Tanna without any loss of the least consequence, and reached the town of Fulta, the station of all the Dutch shipping. Here it was determined to remain, at least till the monsoon should change, provided the nabob did not interfere. Not long after their arrival they were joined by several other ships, and the agents from the subordinate factories of Dacca, Balasore, &c., who naturally anticipated a similar fate to that which had befallen Kassimbazar and Calcutta. In this opinion they were not mistaken, for the nabob had no sooner reached Murshidabad than he issued orders for the confiscation of all the English property within his dominions.

Though the nabob did not molest the fugitives at Fulta their sufferings were not over. Ever dreading that they might be attacked they did not venture to sleep on shore, and crowded the vessels, where they lay, most of them on the decks, without shelter, exposed to the inclemencies of one of the worst climates in the world, during its unhealthiest season. Numbers were in consequence carried off by malignant fever, which infected the whole fleet. The evils thus produced by natural, were greatly aggravated by moral causes. Many, conscious of the light in which their conduct would generally be viewed, and unable to reflect on it without shame and remorse, endeavoured
to exculpate themselves at the expense of their neighbours. Much time was thus spent to no purpose in mutual recrimination, and no course of united action was possible. At last, however, after a course of wrangling, the authority of the governor and the other members of council was acknowledged, and one of their number, with a military officer, set out for Madras, to represent their condition and solicit the necessary assistance.
The Battle of Plassey

The first intelligence of the danger impending over the Company’s settlements in Bengal reached Madras on the 15th of July. It was not sent off till after the capture of the factory at Kassimbazar, and consequently left room only for conjecture as to what might have happened subsequently to that event. Judging by what had happened on other occasions, the Madras presidency did not view the matter in a very serious light. Native governors had repeatedly threatened as much, and even done more violence, and yet allowed themselves to be bought off at last by a sum of money before proceeding to extremities. Why might not the same thing be repeated now? These and similar considerations had the more weight at Madras, because that settlement had then full employment for the force at its command. An application had been made by Salabat Jung for assistance to throw off his connection with the French, and it had been resolved to grant it. A war with France was also regarded as inevitable, and it was known that the French government in the prospect of it were preparing a powerful armament for the East. In such an event Admiral Watson’s squadron, then lying in the roads, would scarcely be able when united to maintain its ground, and therefore nothing but the direst necessity would justify the despatch of any portion of it to Bengal. The same argument applied to the land force. It was impossible, however, after the intelligence which had been received, to ignore it entirely, and a detachment of 230 men, mostly Europeans, was despatched for Bengal in the Company’s ship Delaware, which had recently arrived from England. It sailed on the 20th of July, and arriving in the Hughli on the 2nd of August, found the fugitives pining away at Fulta. Sickly
and dispirited as they were no co-operation was to be expected from them, and the detachment, far too feeble to venture unaided on offensive operations, had no alternative but to encamp in the vicinity of Fulta, whose deadly swamps soon made fearful havoc among them.

On the 5th of August the full extent of the Bengal catastrophe became known at Madras. There was now no room for conjecture. The nabob had not been bought off, as many had too readily and complacently assumed, but had, under circumstances of ineffable barbarity, inflicted on the Company a heavier blow than had ever been sustained before. The most flourishing and productive of all the presidencies was, in fact, annihilated, and nothing but its recovery could save the Company from ruin. It is rather strange that, with this fact before them, members of the Madras council were found to argue that the claims of Salabat Jung should still have the preference, and that the claims of Bengal would be satisfied by sending a fifty-gun ship, and deputies to treat with the nabob. This view, absurd as it now appears, would have been adopted had not one of the members, possessed of sounder judgment and more enlarged experience, put the matter in its true light, and succeeded, after a long war of words, in bringing over the whole council to his opinion. The resolution ultimately adopted, and assented to by Admiral Watson, after obtaining the sanction of a council of war, was that the whole squadron, having on board an adequate land force, should proceed to Bengal.

Before the armament could sail several perplexing points remained to be decided. Who should command the land forces? What should be the extent of his authority both in acting and in negotiation? In what relation ought he to stand to the late governor and council of Calcutta? Was he to be subject to them, or to act independent of them? The last of these questions was first considered. The members of the late Calcutta council, not satisfied with wrangling at Fulta, had each sent separate letters to the Madras presidency, and deemed it necessary for their own exculpation to charge each other with the grossest misconduct. Taking the matter as they represented it, they had proved unworthy of the authority with which they had been invested, or were so divided by mutual animosities as to be incapable of
The Battle of Plassey

exercising it. Still, what right had the Madras presidency to sit in judgment on them? The three presidencies were co-ordinate, and accountable only to the court of directors. So long, therefore, as the appointment of the Calcutta council remained uncancelled their jurisdiction within their presidency, notwithstanding the violence which had deprived them of it, was unquestionable. Mr. Pigott, the governor of Madras, proposed to solve the difficulty by proceeding in person to Bengal with the united powers of commander-in-chief, and general representative of the Company in all other affairs. This was mere extravagance. How could his council invest him with such powers? and if he had them, what kind of a commander was he likely to prove, when his only qualification was the opinion he had of his own sufficiency? This proposal having fallen to the ground, a kind of middle course was adopted by acknowledging Mr. Drake and his council as a presidency, with full powers in civil and commercial affairs, and reserving to themselves, or the officer whom they might appoint, independent power in all things military.

The next point was the choice of the commander, to whom this independent power was to be intrusted. There were only three persons in the presidency on whom this choice could fall. Colonel Adlercron, as the first in rank, had the most legitimate claim, and was by no means disposed to forego it. To him, however, there were strong objections. He had never seen service in India, and as a king’s officer, not dependent on the Company, showed little deference to their agents. It seems, however, from his letter, inserted by Sir John Malcolm in his Life of Clive (vol. i. pp. 137-38), that the presidency had at one time requested him “to undertake this service with the whole of his majesty’s troops,” and pressed him “to give the necessary orders accordingly.” A change of mind afterward took place, and they justified it mainly on the ground that “he could not engage to return hither upon our request, and that the Company should not have any part of the plunder that may be taken, towards reimbursement of the immense loss they have sustained.” Colonel Lawrence had all the Indian experience which Adlercron wanted, and had, as we have seen by his exploits in the Carnatic, proved both an able and a successful warrior. He deserved
the utmost confidence, and had he obtained the appointment
would undoubtedly have added to his laurels. It may have been
fortunately; but the unceremonious manner in which he appears
to have been set aside, required a stronger justification than
Ormë adduces, when he says, "The climate of Bengal was so
adverse to an asthmatic disorder with which Colonel Lawrence
was affected, that it was thought he would be disabled from
that incessant activity requisite to the success of this expedition,
of which the termination was limited to a time."

After Adlercron and Lawrence were rejected, Clive, now in-
stalled as governor of Fort St. David, was the only officer whose
claims were worthy of a moment's consideration. He had early
brought them under the notice of the presidency, who had
probably from the very first turned to him as the most eligible
commander. The following letter, written to the court of dir-
ectors, October 11th, 1756, after his appointment and arrival
at Madras, gives so good an account of his feelings when pre-
paring to set out on the expedition which was destined to crown
his own fame and found the British Indian empire, that it des-
ers to be quoted entire:—

"HONOURABLE GENTLEMEN,—From many hands you
will hear of the capture of Calcutta by the Moors, and the
chain of misfortunes and losses which have happened to the
Company in particular, and to the nation in general; every
breast here seems filled with grief, horror and resentment; in-
deed, it is too sad a tale to unfold, and I must beg leave to refer
you to the general letters, consultations, and committees, which
will give you a full account of this catastrophe. Upon this melan-
choly occasion the governor and council thought proper to
summon me to this place. As soon as an expedition was resolved
upon, I offered my service, which was at last accepted, and I
am now upon the point of embarking on board his majesty's
squadron, with a fine body of Europeans, full of spirit and resent-
ment for the insults and barbarities inflicted on so many British
subjects. I flatter myself that this expedition will not end with the
taking of Calcutta only, and that the Company's estate in those
parts will be settled in a better and more lasting condition than
ever. There is less reason to apprehend a check from the nabob's
forces than from the nature of the climate and country. The
news of a war may likewise interfere with the success of this expedition; however, should that happen, and hostilities be commenced in India, I hope we shall be able to dispossess the French of Chandernagore, and leave Calcutta in a state of defence. I have a true sense of my duty to my country and the Company; and I beg leave to assure you that nothing shall be wanting on my part to answer the ends of an undertaking on which so very much depends. Success on this occasion will fill the measure of my joy, as it will fix me in the esteem of those to whom I have the honour to subscribe, with great respect.

R. CLIVE.”

In another letter to a director he says—“A few weeks ago I was happily seated at St. David’s, pleased with the thoughts of obtaining your confidence and esteem, by my application to the civil branch of the Company’s affairs, and of improving and increasing the investment; but the fatal blow given to the Company’s estate at Bengal has superseded all other considerations, and I am now at this presidency upon the point of embarking on board his majesty’s squadron, with a very considerable body of troops, to attempt the recovery of Calcutta, and to gain satisfaction from the nabob for the losses which the Company have sustained in those parts. The recapture of Calcutta appears no very difficult task, but our further progress for reducing the nabob to such terms as the gentlemen of Calcutta may think satisfactory, is precarious and doubtful, from the prospect of a war which may not allow time for such an undertaking. You may be assured I will never turn my back to Bengal, if not ordered from thence, without trying my utmost efforts towards obtaining the desired success.”

Two months having been spent in debate, the expedition did not sail till the 16th of October. The squadron consisted of the Kent, of sixty-four, bearing Admiral Watson’s flag; the Cumberland, of seventy, bearing Admiral Pococke’s flag; the Tiger, of sixty; the Salisbury, of fifty; the Bridgewater, of twenty guns, and a fire-ship; together with three Company’s ships, and two smaller vessels as transports. The land force, under Colonel Clive, consisted of 900 Europeans, 250 of them belonging to Adlcrcon’s regiment, and 1,500 sepoys. The instructions recommended the attack of Murshidabad itself, if the nabob refused redress, and the capture of Chandernagore if war with France should be
declared. The lateness of the season nearly proved fatal to the fleet. The northern monsoon was setting in, and the currents from the north were so strong that during the first twelve days, instead of making progress, it was carried six degrees of latitude to the south of Madras. As the only practicable passage it was necessary to cross the Bay of Bengal, and then proceeding north along the eastern coast, where the currents are less felt, recross when opposite to Balasore, and thus gain the entrance to the Hughli.

The fire-ship, unable to stem the violence of the monsoon, bore away to Gey Ion; the Marlborough, sailing heavily, fell behind; and the Cumberland and Salisbury, in making for Balasore Roads, struck on a sandbank, which stretches out several miles from Point Palmyras. Both got off, but the Cumberland, unable to continue her course, was driven south to Vizagapatam. Ultimately, on the 20th of December, more than two months after leaving Madras, and exactly half a year from the day when Calcutta was taken, Fulta was reached by the whole squadron, except the Cumberland and Marlborough. Their absence was a serious loss, as 250 of the European troops were on board the one, and most of the heavy artillery had been shipped in the other. Little addition to their strength was obtained at Fulta, for half of the detachment under Major Kilpatrick were dead, and the remainder so sickly that not more than thirty were fit for duty. Some degree of order, however, had been restored by a despatch from the court of directors, appointing Mr. Drake and three other members of council a select committee for the conduct of all political and military affairs. Major Kilpatrick, previously associated with them, and Admiral Watson, and Colonel Clive now added, increased the whole number to seven.

Letters had been procured at Madras from Mr. Pigott, the governor, Muhammed Ali, Nabob of Arcot, and Salabat Jung, Subahdar of the Deccan, exhorting Siraj-ud-daulah to give redress for the wrongs he had inflicted; and these, along with others, written by Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive, were sent open to Monichand, governor of Calcutta. On receiving for his answer that he durst not forward to his master letters couched in such menacing terms, it was resolved to commence hostilities forthwith. Accordingly the whole fleet, including the vessels previously at Fulta, quitted it on the 27th December,
and next day anchored ten miles below the fort of Budge Budge. This fort, situated on a commanding point on the same side of the river as Calcutta, and only twelve miles south-west from it by land, though double that distance by water, was the first object of attack. It was not expected to offer any resistance, and the only anxiety felt was to make prisoners of the garrison while they were making their escape. With this view an ambuscade was devised. At sunset Clive landed with 500 men of the battalion, and all the sepoys, and proceeded, under the direction of Indian guides, across a country full of swamps, and intersected by numerous deep rivulets. The mere march must have been full of hardship, but this was greatly increased by the neglect to provide any bullocks for draught or burden. Their place was necessarily supplied by the men themselves, who had to drag along two field-pieces and a timbrel of ammunition. They set out at four in the afternoon, and did not reach the vicinity of Budge Budge till eight next morning. The whole march by land looks like a blunder; and, indeed, is so characterized by Clive himself, who says, in a private letter to Mr. Pigott, that it was much against his inclination, and that he applied to the admiral for boats to land them at the very place where they arrived, after suffering "hardships not to be described." This blunder, therefore, was not his; but there was another of a still more serious nature from which he cannot be so easily exculpated. The place occupied on arriving was a large hollow, probably a lake in the rainy season, as it was ten feet below the level of the plain. It was a mile and a half north-east of the fort, a mile from the river, and half-a-mile east of a highroad leading to Calcutta. The eastern and part of the southern banks of the hollow were skirted by a village, which seemed to have been recently abandoned. The two field-pieces were placed on the north side of this village. The plan of the ambuscade was as follows:—The grenadiers and 300 sepoys were detached to take possession of a village on the bank of the river adjoining the wall of the fort. The company of volunteers were posted in a thicket on the west side of the road. Clive with the rest of the troops continued in the hollow. It was expected that when the garrison in the fort

discovered the troops in possession of the village adjoining the north wall, they would mistake them for the whole of the attacking force, and under that impression endeavoured to escape by making for the highroad. While they were hastening along it the volunteers, opening upon them from the thicket, would drive them towards the hollow, where their slaughter or capture would be easily effected.

The idea of danger to themselves seems never to have entered the mind of the commander or his soldiers. They were all worn out with fatigue, and to make their rest more easy were allowed to quit their arms. Even the ordinary precaution of stationing sentinels was neglected, and in a few minutes they were all asleep. Not so the enemy. The previous day Monichand had arrived from Calcutta with 1,500 horse and 2,000 foot. He was now encamped with them within a distance of two miles, and having by means of spies made himself acquainted with all Clive's arrangements, was only watching the opportunity to turn them against himself. The troops, huddled in the hollow or scattered in the village, had not lain down above an hour when a volley from the east side of the village suddenly broke their slumbers. The soldiers rushed in alarm to that part of the hollow where their arms were grounded. Had a retreat out of the reach of the enemy's fire been ordered a fatal panic would probably have ensued; but Clive, whose presence of mind never forsook him, made his men stand firm, and detached two platoons which forced their way into the village at the point of the bayonet. This gave time to the artillerymen, who on the first alarm had rushed into the hollow, to regain their guns and open a fire, under which that of the enemy soon slackened. Fortunately for Clive, Monichand was a coward, and on receiving a ball through the turban was so frightened that he thought only of flight. According to Orme, "had the cavalry advanced and charged the troops in the hollow at the same time that the infantry began to fire upon the village, it is not improbable that the war would have been concluded on the very first trial of hostilities." This is questioned by Sir John Malcolm, who says that, owing to the thick jungle, cavalry "had no means of advancing, except through openings where

they must have been seen, and the possibility of surprise defeated." Sir John, from his profession, must be admitted to be the more competent authority of the two; but, in his zeal to defend the honour of his hero, forgets the time and manner of the surprise. If, as he admits, there were openings through which cavalry might have penetrated, how could they have been seen in the dark, and by men who were fast asleep? A gross mistake was undoubtedly committed; and though Clive did all that could be done to repair it, it cannot be denied that his success on this occasion was due far less to conduct than to good fortune.

Immediately on Monichand's retreat the whole of the troops were marched to the village adjoining their fort, and there found the Kent, which had outsailed the other vessels, anchored in front of it. The assault was deferred till next day, and to assist in it 250 sailors were landed. One of these, who had got drunk, straggled up to the ditch, crossed it, scrambled over the rampart, and seeing no sentinels, hallooed to the advanced guard that he had taken the fort. It was indeed evacuated by the enemy, who had only waited till it was dark enough to conceal their retreat.

The impression produced by the affair at Budge Budge was somewhat singular. The British, astonished at the resolution displayed in venturing to attack them, began to think that they had underrated the Bengal troops, and even Clive was dispirited. In the letter to Mr. Pigott, already referred to, he says, "You will find by the return that our loss in the skirmish near Budge Budge was greater than could well be spared. If such skirmishes were to be often repeated," he afterward adds, "I cannot take upon me to give my sentiments about our future success against the nabob in the open field; the little affair above mentioned was attended with every disadvantage on our side. . . . Indeed, I fear we shall labour under many of these disadvantages when attacked by the nabob; and I take it for granted he will be down before the Cumberland and Marlborough can arrive." On the other hand, Monichand, who had formed rather a contemptible opinion of the British, from the facility with which Calcutta had been taken, now magnified their prowess in order to palliate his own defeat; and no sooner reached
Calcutta than he quitted it, leaving only 500 men in the fort, and proceeded northward to communicate his terror, first at Hughli, and afterwards to the nabob himself at Murshidabad.

To prevent the fleet from coming up the river, Monichand had prepared a number of ships, laden with bricks, intending to sink them in the narrowest part of the channel, near Tanna. The appearance of the sloop-of-war frustrated the execution of this scheme; and the rest of the fleet, leaving Budge Budge on the 30th of December, anchored on New-year's Day opposite to Tanna, which was abandoned without firing a shot. The next morning Clive, with the greater part of the troops, landed at Aligar, a fort opposite to Tanna, and advanced by the high-road on Calcutta. Admiral Watson, with the Kent and Tiger, arrived before him opposite Fort William, and by the force of their cannonade compelled the enemy, in little more than two hours, to evacuate both the fort and the town. A detachment sent ashore, under command of Captain Coote, immediately took possession. When Clive arrived he naturally expected to be recognized as military governor of Calcutta, and was mortified above measure when Coote showed a commission from Admiral Watson, by which he was himself appointed governor, and specially instructed not to deliver up the place till further orders. This was another of the many instances of collision arising from jealousies and misunderstandings between his majesty's and the Company's officers. At first, as neither party would give way, the affair assumed a very threatening appearance. Clive, admitted into the fort, insisted on retaining the command of it, while the admiral threatened if he did not evacuate to fire upon him. Before such extremities were resorted to explanations took place, and a compromise was effected, by which Clive waived his claim to the command on the assurance that it would afterwards be given him. In accordance with this arrangement Admiral Watson remained in possession, and the next day delivered up the fort to the Company's representatives in the king's name.

This last proceeding throws some light upon the quarrel, and shows that more was involved in it than at first sight appears. From the very first, before it was known what view the court of directors would take, Mr. Drake and his colleagues insisted
that, notwithstanding the loss of Calcutta, their authority remained entire, and hence Mr. Manningham, the member of council whom they had sent as their deputy to Madras, formally protested against the independent powers with which Clive was invested by this presidency. The case was still stronger now, for a new commission had arrived from England expressly empowering Mr. Drake and three of the council to conduct all the political and military affairs of the presidency. It is not to be supposed that if the government of Madras had been aware of this commission they would have made Clive independent of it, and therefore it was not unreasonable to expect that when he arrived and found them regularly installed in office, he would either resign his independent powers, or at least keep them in abeyance. Such was not his view, but it seems to have been Admiral Watson’s; and hence their quarrel, which had nothing personal in it, originated in a determination on the part of the one to uphold the authority of the Calcutta committee, and on the part of the other to give effect to the instructions which he had received at Madras. How bitterly Clive felt at the treatment he had received appears from several passages in a private letter to Mr. Pigott:—“Between friends,” he says, “I cannot help regretting that I ever undertook this expedition. The mortifications I have received from Mr. Watson and the gentlemen of the squadron in point of prerogative, are such that nothing but the good of the service could induce me to submit to them.” Speaking of the commission granted to Captain Coote, he characterizes it as a “dirty underhand contrivance, carried on in the most secret manner, under a pretence that I intended the same thing, which, I declare, never entered my thoughts.” Again, referring to the true cause of all the misunderstandings and heartburnings, he observes, “The gentlemen here seem much dissatisfied at the authority I am vested with. It would be contradicting my own sentiments, if I was not to acknowledge that I still possess the opinion that the gentlemen of Madras could not have taken a step more prudent, or more consistent with the Company’s interests; for, I am sorry to say, the loss of private property, and the means of recovering it, seem to be the only objects which take up the attention of the Bengal gentlemen.” Farther on he gives utterance to the same
opinion in still harsher and even rancorous terms—"I would have you guard against everything these gentlemen can say; for, believe me, they are bad subjects and rotten at heart, and will stick at nothing to prejudice you and the gentlemen of the committee; indeed, how should they do otherwise when they have not spared one another? I shall only add, their conduct at Calcutta finds no excuse, even among themselves; and that the riches of Peru and Mexico should not induce me to dwell among them." Clive could not entertain an opinion without acting upon it; and therefore, when the committee sent him a letter, demanding that he should place himself under them, he answered, "I do not intend to make use of my power for acting separately from you, without you reduce me to the necessity of so doing; but, as far as concerns the means of executing these powers, you will excuse me, gentlemen, if I refuse to give these up; I cannot do it without forfeiting the trust reposed in me by the select committee of Fort St. George."

Intelligence having been received that the recapture of Calcutta had thrown the enemy into great consternation, and that the nabob's army would not be ready for some time to march from Murshidabad, it was determined to take advantage of the interval by assuming the aggressive and attacking Hughli. This place, situated on the right bank of the river, twenty-seven miles above Calcutta, was regarded as the royal port of Bengal, and had thus an adventitious importance in addition to that which it derived from its wealth and population. As the object now was to bring the nabob to terms as speedily as possible, the capture of it was good strategy, as nothing seemed better calculated to convince him of the disasters which he might bring upon himself by continuing obstinate. The town, though open, was guarded by 3,000 men, and, moreover, defended by a fort with a garrison of 2,000 men. Considering the importance of the means of defence, the force employed in the attack seems very inadequate. It consisted of only a twenty-gun ship, a sloop of war, and three other vessels, having on board 150 Europeans and 200 sepoys, under the command of Major Kilpatrick and Captain Coote. It was expected to reach Hughli in one tide, but a delay of five days took place in consequence of the ship having struck upon a sandbank. The intended sur-
prise was thus a failure, and the enemy, forewarned, had ample
time to prepare their means of resistance. Such, however, was
their pusillanimity or dismay, that the 3,000 men in the town
only saw the British troops landed, and then made off without
risking an encounter. The fort was battered by the vessels till
night, and then attacked in two divisions; one of them by feint
on the main gate, while the other, consisting of a party of
troops and sailors, under Captain Coote, stormed at the breach.
The garrison, seeing their assailants on the ramparts, fled
precipitately at the lesser gate. These easy successes made the
British over-confident, and Captain Coote, who had proceeded
three miles to the north with only fifty Europeans and 100
sepoys, and destroyed several granaries of rice, narrowly escape-
d as he was returning, from being overwhelmed by the
fugitive troops, who, unknown to him, were lying in the neigh-
bourhood watching his movements. By singular good fortune
and dexterity he disengaged himself without the loss of a single
man. If, as Mr. Mill gratuitously asserts, without adding
any authority, the capture of Hughli was undertaken "solely
with a view to plunder;" the result must have been disappoint-
ment, as the value of all that was obtained was estimated only
at £15,000.

During the expedition to Hughli, intelligence arrived that
the long expected war between Great Britain and France was
actually declared. The state of matters in Bengal thus assumed
an ominous appearance. The French had 300 Europeans and
a train of artillery at Chandernagore, and it was feared that
they would at once join the nabob. In that case the British
would in all probability be overmatched. The whole force
then in Bengal would scarcely enable them to keep the field,
and to all appearance the larger part of it was about to be
withdrawn, as the Madras presidency, alarmed for their own
safety, had directed Clive to return as early as possible with
what troops could be spared. A vigorous and successful pro-
secution of the war against the nabob being, in consequence,
deemed hopeless, the tone of the Bengal select committee was
immediately lowered, and they resolved to lose no time in
endeavouring to negotiate a peace. With this view they opened

1 Mill's British India, vol. iii. p. 175.
a communication with the banker, Jagat Seth, and condescended to request him to mediate in their behalf. The nabob's fears had formerly inclined him to come to terms, but the attack on Hughli made him furious, and his army was immediately ordered to march southward and avenge it. Jagat Seth, aware that the time for negotiation had passed, and afraid to implicate himself by interceding in behalf of those whom the nabob had again doomed to destruction, ventured no further than to instruct Ranjit Roy, his ablest agent, to accompany the army, and at the same time correspond with Clive. Omichand was also in the nabob's train. During the nabobship of Ali Vardi Khan, he obtained the far largest share of the contracts by which the Company provided their shipments. This lucrative employment he had lost, because the Company, imputing a deterioration in the quality of the goods to his avarice, had determined, instead of employing contractors, to deal at first hand with the producers themselves. His offence at this change was the main ground of the suspicion by which the presidency thought themselves justified in imprisoning him, and preventing the removal of his goods from Calcutta, when it was attacked. His fortunes had in consequence been shattered, for besides the large sum of money found in his treasury, his loss by the destruction of houses and other property was immense. His whole thoughts and efforts were now employed in obtaining compensation. For this purpose the favour of the nabob and of the Company were equally necessary to him. The former he had secured by ingratiating himself with Mohan Lall, the principal favourite at the court of Murshidabad; the latter he now hoped to recover by aiding their endeavours to procure a peace. The Company has thus two influential agents in the nabob's camp. For the time, however, they seemed to have failed, and the nabob continued to advance.

In the eagerness to negotiate, the necessity of providing against the only alternative had not been overlooked. About a mile to the north of Calcutta, and half that distance from the bank of the river, a camp had been fortified. The spot was well chosen, for having the river on the west, and a large lake and extensive marshes about two miles beyond the Maratha Ditch on the east, an enemy from the north could not enter
the Company's territory without coming in sight of it. The artillery, which had hitherto been the great want, had at length been supplied by the arrival of the Marlborough. On the 30th of January the nabob's army began to cross the river, about ten miles above Hughli. Very fortunately it had not been joined by the French, who threw away an excellent opportunity of crippling, if not crushing their rivals, by reviving the chimerical idea of neutrality between the two companies, while war was raging between their respective nations. Even without the French as auxiliaries, the nabob seemed so formidable that even after his army had began to cross, proposals of peace were forwarded to him. He received them with great apparent cordiality, and at the same time continued his march. On the 2nd of February he proposed a conference with deputies, but failed to keep his promise of sending them passports. The very next morning the van of his army was seen advancing at full march from the north-east. From the nature of the ground their progress might easily have been stopped; but Clive, unwilling either to divide his force or to commence hostilities while the least hope of accommodation remained, allowed them to pass. Most of them spread themselves along the ground outside the ditch, but a predatory horde, armed only with clubs, entered the Company's territory, and were engaged in pillaging the houses of the natives in the north part of the town, when a detachment posted at Perring's Redoubt sallied out and expelled them. New bodies of the enemy continued to arrive, and coolly began to entrench themselves in a large garden midway between the head of the lake and the ditch, and about a mile and a half from the British camp. This insult was not to be borne, and yet the only punishment which it provoked was an ineffective cannonade.

Next morning the main body of the enemy appeared, following the direction of the van, but so eagerly was the hope of a possible accommodation still clung to, that on the nabob again proposing a conference at a village six miles to the north, two deputies were sent. On arriving they found, as might have been anticipated, that the nabob had started some hours before. They followed on his track, and found him seated in quarters which he had taken up in Omichand's garden, in the north-
east part of the Company's territory, within the ditch. It is
difficult to account for the inertness manifested by Clive on
this occasion. All the advantages derived from his fortified
camp were apparently lost without any attempt to turn them
to account, and at least part of the enemy had without molesta-
tion interposed between him and Calcutta. The deputies might
now have considered their business at an end. The nabob by
hastening on with his army, without waiting for them, had
given the most significant intimation of his designs. They were
determined, however, not to be balked of an interview, and
succeeded in obtaining it. Raidurlabh, the diwan, on their
introduction to him by Ranjit Roy, deemed their application
for an interview, under the circumstances, so strange, that he
suspected them of being assassins, and insisted on having their
swords. They refused to be so insulted, and were conducted
to the durbar or council. Besides the nabob and his principal
officers, many others of inferior degree were present. These
had apparently been selected for the largeness of their stature,
and the ferocity of their countenances. To give them a still
more terrific appearance they were dressed in thick stuffed
dresses, with enormous turbans, and kept scowling at the
deputies, as if they only waited the signal to murder them.
After expostulating with the nabob for entering the Company's
limits, while amusing them with offers of peace, the deputies
produced a paper of proposals. The nabob, after reading them
and referring to the diwan, dismissed the assembly. The
deputies, on leaving, were whispered by Omichand to take
care of themselves. Alarmed before, they now set no limits to
their fears, and, ordering their attendants to extinguish the
lights, that the path they took might not be seen, hastened off
without waiting to confer with the diwan.

The report of the deputies left no room for further negotia-
tion, and Clive determined to attack the nabob’s camp in the
morning. His force consisted of 650 men, forming the European
battalion, 100 artillerymen with six field-pieces, 800 sepoys,
and 600 sailors, who had been landed at midnight, and armed
with firelocks. The enemy mustered about 40,000 men, most
of them encamped between the ditch and the lake, but a con-
siderable part with the general, Mir Jafar, within the ditch,
to protect the nabob in his quarters in Omichand’s garden. The attack was made, but proved far less successful than had been anticipated. Clive, in a letter addressed to the secret committee at home, gives this summary account of the matter:

“About three o’clock in the morning, I marched out with nearly my whole force, leaving only a few Europeans, with 200 new raised bucksarees, to guard our camp. About six we entered the enemy’s camp, in a thick fog, and crossed it in about two hours, doing considerable execution. Had the fog cleared up, as it usually does about eight o’clock, when we were entire masters of the camp without the ditch, the action must have been decisive; instead of which it thickened, and occasioned our mistaking the way.”

The loss on his part was severe, amounting to 120 Europeans, 100 sepoys, and two field-pieces; and his troops were not only dispirited, but blamed the attack as ill-concerted. Orme is decidedly of this opinion, and says that “the men ought to have assembled at Perring’s Redoubt, which is not half a mile from Omichand’s garden, to which they might have marched in a spacious road, capable of admitting twelve or fifteen men abreast.” This seems plausible, but an obvious objection is, that, by that arrangement, facility of attack would have been purchased by leaving the nabob an easy outlet to join the main body of his army, and thus escape. By beginning with the main body, and proceeding gradually towards the nabob’s headquarters, he took the best means to secure his person, and, to all appearance, would have succeeded but for a natural event of unusual occurrence, and therefore not anticipated. The moral effect, however, was as great as if the success had been complete. The nabob, having received a practical specimen of the kind of enemy he had to deal with, was much more disposed to be pacific.

The very next day after the attack he employed Ranjit Roy to write a letter containing proposals of peace, and under the pretext of proving his sincerity, though probably more with a view to his own personal safety, retired with his whole army, and encamped about three miles north-east of the lake. Here, after various messages of negotiation brought and carried by Ranjit Roy and Omichand, a treaty was concluded on the 9th of February. Its leading terms were—that the nabob should
restore the Company's factories, but with only such of the plundered effects as had been regularly brought to account in the books of his government—permit them to fortify Calcutta in any way they should think expedient—exempt all merchandise with their dustuks from fee or custom—and confirm all the privileges granted to them since their first arrival in the country. The nabob, now as anxious for friendship as he had previously been bent on hostile measures, thought the treaty did not go far enough, and, only three days after concluding it, proposed an alliance offensive and defensive against all enemies. This was exactly what Clive wished, and the new article, brought by Omichand, was returned by him ratified the same day.

The treaty did not meet the views of all parties at Calcutta. While it was under consideration, Admiral Watson, with characteristic bluntness, cautioned Clive against trusting to the nabob's promises. "Till he is well thrashed, don't, sir, flatter yourself he will be inclined to peace. Let us, therefore, not be overreached by his politics, but make use of our arms, which will be much more prevalent than any treaties or negotiations." Many, moreover, were dissatisfied with the terms, and expressed their disappointment that no compensation had been provided for the losses of private sufferers, not a few of whom had been absolutely ruined by the pillaging of Calcutta. Their case had not been overlooked, and Clive had brought it specially under the nabob's notice. On finding, however, that he gave only promises, but refused to come under any formal obligation on the subject, he could not permit the claims of individuals to stand in the way of what he believed to be "the interest of the Company." In a private letter to the chairman of the court of directors, he states the grounds on which he acted with great force and clearness:—"If I had only consulted the interest and reputation of a soldier, the conclusion of this peace might easily have been suspended. I know, at the same time, there are many who think I have been too precipitate in the conclusion of it; but surely those who are of this opinion never knew that the delay of a day or two might have ruined the Company's affairs, by the junction of the French with the nabob, which was on the point of being carried into execution. They never considered
The situation of affairs on the coast, and the positive orders sent me by the gentlemen there, to return with the major part of the forces at all events; they never considered that, with a war upon the coast and in the province of Bengal at the same time, a trading company could not subsist without a great assistance from the government; and, last of all, they never considered that a long war, attended through the whole course of it with success, ended at last with the expense of more than fifty lacs to the Company." These views are well expressed, and prove that Clive was a statesman as well as a warrior. They fail, however, to meet one very obvious objection to the treaty. It provided no guarantee of any kind for its observance, and thus left the nabob at full liberty to disregard it whenever he might think he could do so with impunity. It was therefore merely a promise, and what this was worth from such a quarter Clive himself tells us in the same letter, when he says:—"It cannot be expected that the princes of this country, whose fidelity is always to be suspected, will remain firm to their promises and engagements from principle only. It is, therefore, become absolutely necessary to keep up a respectable force in this province for the future." If so, it follows as an obvious inference that, in treating with such princes, obligations written or verbal are in themselves worthless, and that, to give them any value, they ought always to be accompanied with a material guarantee, which would operate as a penalty in the event of their being violated. It will be seen that Clive at a later period of his career both saw this necessity and acted upon it.

Next to peace with the nabob, the object nearest Clive's heart was the destruction of the French interest in Bengal. It seemed to follow from the terms of the offensive and defensive alliance against all enemies, that the nabob could no longer continue to give any countenance to the French; and therefore, on the very day when the alliance was ratified, Clive told Omichand to sound him on the subject, and endeavour to obtain his consent to an attack on Chandernagore. He detested the very idea, and with good reason, for not only did the revenue gain considerably by the French trade, but good policy dictated that the rival companies might be employed as mutual checks on each other, and prevent the danger to which the native government
might be exposed, if one of them were allowed to gain an entire ascendancy. The nabob therefore made no secret of his unwillingness to withdraw his protection from the French; but as he only temporized, and did not expressly prohibit the attack, Clive determined to carry it into effect. With this view, on the 18th of February, he crossed the river with his troops, a few miles above Calcutta. The French had no difficulty in penetrating his design, and immediately claimed the nabob's protection. Their messengers found him on his return homewards at Augadip, about forty miles south of Murshidabad; and having succeeded in convincing him that their destruction would endanger his own safety, induced him to write a letter, peremptorily forbidding the attack. Not satisfied with thus interfering in their behalf, he made them a present of 100,000 rupees, gave orders to Nanda Kumar, now governor of Hughli, directly to assist them if his prohibition was disregarded, and even made preparations for sending back Mir Jafar, with half his army, to encamp at Chandernagore. On seeing the nabob thus decided, Clive made a merit of necessity, and, in conjunction with Admiral Watson, gave both verbal and written assurances that the nabob's wishes in the matter would be strictly attended to, and that the attack would not be made without his sanction. As it thus appeared that the French were not to be crushed by violence, the next best thing was to secure their neutrality; and with this view, not only were negotiations resumed, but a treaty was actually drawn up, and only waited to be signed when at the last moment a demur took place. The French commissioners, when the question was put to them, admitted that they were acting only in their own name, and could not bind the government of Pondicherry. Though it must be admitted that a treaty made under such circumstances would have been futile, the conduct of the British was not ingenuous. It is difficult to believe that that they were not from the first aware of the defect of powers which they now pretended to have discovered, or that they had ever intended to do more than amuse the French, while they were employing all kinds of influence to overcome the nabob's reluctance to the proposed attack. In this intrigue the principal parts were performed by Mr. Watts, who had become the Company's representative at
Murshidabad, and Omichand, who, having succeeded in effacing the suspicions under which he suffered so severely at Calcutta, was now become one of the Company's most active and confidential agents. So zealous was Omichand, that when the nabob—suspecting an intention of attacking Chandernagore, notwithstanding his express prohibition—indignantly asked him to answer strictly whether they intended to maintain or to break the treaty, he answered, that the English were famous throughout the world for their good faith, insomuch, "that a man in England who on any occasion told a lie was utterly disgraced, and never after admitted to the society of his former friends and acquaintance." After this rather apocryphal declaration, he called in a Brahmin, and took what was regarded as a most solemn oath, by putting his hand under the Brahmin's foot, and swearing that the English would never break the treaty.

The pressure brought to bear upon the nabob by intrigues with his ministers and favourites was much increased by an alarm which reached him from a different quarter. Ahmed Shah Abdali, having again invaded Hindustan, had entered Delhi, and was understood to contemplate an incursion into the eastern provinces. The nabob was, in consequence, more anxious than ever to secure the British alliance, from which he anticipated important aid, in the event of an Afghan invasion, and became less and less decided in his refusals to sanction the attack of the French settlements. Taking advantage of this feeling, Admiral Watson thus addressed him:—"You are going to Patna. You ask our assistance. Can we, with the least degree of prudence, march with you and leave our enemies behind us? You will then be too far off to support us, and we shall be unable to defend ourselves. Think what can be done in this situation. I see but one way. Let us take Chandernagore and secure ourselves from any apprehensions from that quarter, and then we will assist you with every man in our power, and go with you even to Delhi, if you will. Have we not sworn reciprocally that the friends and enemies of the one should be regarded as such by the other? And will not God, the avenger of perjury, punish us if we do not fulfil our oaths? What can I say more? Let me request the favour of your speedy answer."
The answer was not speedy; and proof having been obtained that the nabob was intriguing with the French, the admiral assumed a harsher tone, and sent a letter concluding with the following menace:—"I now acquaint you that the remainder of the troops, which should have been here long ago, and which I hear the colonel told you he expected, will be at Calcutta in a few days; that in a few days more I shall despatch a vessel for more ships and more troops; and that I will kindle such a flame in your country as all the water in the Ganges shall not be able to extinguish. Farewell! Remember that he who promises you this never yet broke his word with you or with any man whatsoever."

This was rather strange language to address to an ally, an independent prince, with whom a treaty offensive and defensive had been concluded only a few weeks before. The nabob, however, was a coward at heart; and, though foaming with rage, sent two letters in reply. In the one, quietly pocketing the menace, he contented himself with excusing the delay which had taken place in the payment of the compensation due under the treaty; in the other, rather evading than facing the subject of Chandernagore, he used the following expression:—"You have understanding and generosity; if your enemy with an upright heart claims your protection, you will give him his life; but then you must be well satisfied of the innocence of his intentions; if not, whatsoever you think right that do." This expression, which may be variously interpreted, becomes still more enigmatical in the work of Mr. Orme, who gives it thus:—"If an enemy comes to you and implores your mercy, with a clean heart, his life should be spared; but, if you mistrust his sincerity, act according to the time and occasion." At this time Clive considered himself and the admiral so completely bound not to attack Chandernagore "contrary to the expressed order of the nabob," that he says they could not do it without being "guilty of a breach of faith;" and yet, with no better authority than they managed to extract from the above dubious expression, they felt relieved of all their scruples. They might at least, in a case of so much dubiety, have asked the nabob to give his own explanation. They refrained, and it must have been purposely, for when they were proceeding with
The Battle of Plassey

their preparations the explanation arrived unasked, and amounted to an expressed retractation of any assumed previous assent. So far, however, from giving effect to the prohibition, they treated it as "an indignity." Perhaps the best explanation of the resolution to proceed at all hazards may be found in the fact that three ships had just arrived from Bombay, having on board three companies of infantry, and one of artillery, and that the *Cumberland*, which parted from the squadron on the voyage from Madras, had at length reached Balasore Roads.

The capture of Chandernagore was an enterprise not unattended with difficulty. The settlement, situated on the right bank of the river, and a little south of the town of Hugli, extended two miles along the bank, and a mile and a half inland. The fort, standing about thirty yards from the water, and nearly equidistant from the south and north extremities of the settlement, formed a square of about 130 yards, inclosed by a wall and rampart, with a bastion at each angle mounting ten guns. Several more guns were mounted on the ramparts, and eight on a ravelin on the banks of the river opposite to the western gateway. Beside these cannon, which were all from twenty-four to thirty-two pounders, six of less calibre stood on the terrace of a church within the fort, and overlooking its walls. The French, on learning the declaration of war, had, as we have seen, endeavoured to ward off the danger to which it exposed them, by proposing a neutrality, but, with much more wisdom and foresight than had been exhibited at Calcutta, continued in the meanwhile to make the best use of the time in strengthening their defences. They demolished the buildings within 100 yards of the walls, using the materials to form a glacis, and began to dig a ditch. Neither of these works was completed, but their defects were in some measure supplied by batteries without the verge of the glacis, and in positions commanding the principal streets and approaches by land. The approach by water had not been overlooked, for not only had a battery been erected about 150 yards south of the fort, to command the narrowest part of the channel, but a number of vessels had been sunk in it. The garrison mustered 600 Europeans, of whom only a half were regular troops, and 300

sepoys. Some assistance was also expected from Nanda Kumar, who was encamped with a body of troops in the vicinity; but Omichand had succeeded in bribing him not to interfere.

Clive, having been joined by the Bombay reinforcement, commenced hostilities on the 14th of March. To avoid four batteries facing the south, he made his approach from the west, along a road leading to the north face of the fort. The French made the most of their position; and, by means of detachments placed in the thickets, continued skirmishing till three in the afternoon, when they retired into a battery under the protection of the north bastion. This proving untenable, in consequence of a fire of musketry kept up from some adjoining houses, they spiked the cannon, and retired into the fort. The abandonment of this battery necessarily involved that of those to the southward, as they might now be attacked in rear. Their defenders were therefore recalled next morning. All the batteries without the works had thus been rendered useless except the one on the brink of the river. The 15th was employed in effecting a lodgment near the southern esplanade, by taking possession of the adjoining houses, under the shelter of which the besiegers suffered little from the fire of the garrison. The 16th was employed in bringing up the artillery and stores, and the 17th and 18th were chiefly occupied by the besiegers in keeping up a fire of musketry from the tops of houses, shelling the fort from a thirteen-inch mortar and some coehorns. No decided progress, however, was made. On the 19th, the ships Kent, Tiger, and Salisbury arrived, after a very difficult navigation, and anchored about a mile below the fort. The narrow channel in which the ships had been sunk was now the main obstacle, as the ships so long as they remained outside of it could not act with effect. Fortunately it was ascertained by diligent soundings, and the information of a deserter, that a practicable passage still remained. It was therefore determined that the effect of a bombardment by the ships should be forthwith tried. Indeed, every delay was attended with the greatest danger; for the nabob, on finding that remonstrances had proved unavailing, was no longer satisfied with sending threatening messages, but had actually sent forward part of his army, as if he had at last resolved to make common cause with the
French. Raidurlabh, the diwan, advanced with this detachment within twenty miles of Hughli, and would have been in time to attempt the relief of Chandernagore had not Nanda Kumar treacherously assured him of the contrary.

The attack was fixed for the 24th. At sunrise on that day two batteries which had been completed on shore opened their fire. The fort returned it vigorously, and for a time established a decided superiority. At seven o’clock, when the ships were first brought into action, a marked change took place. The *Tiger*, in passing to the north-east bastion, which was her station, and where she finally anchored at the distance of only fifty yards, fired her first broadside at the ravelin with such effect that that defence was immediately abandoned. The *Kent* was less fortunate. Her allotted station was the ravelin before the middle of the curtain; but in proceeding to occupy she encountered such a deadly fire, that some degree of confusion ensued, during which the cable, instead of being stopped, was allowed to run to its end. The consequence was, that the ship fell back so far that she lay just beyond the south-east, and at the same time exposed to a flank of the south-west bastion. It was too late to make a change, and the *Salisbury*, to which this very position had been assigned, was entirely thrown out of the action, the whole brunt of which was borne by the *Tiger* and the *Kent*. Notwithstanding these disadvantages the fire of the besiegers was so telling that at nine o’clock the fort hung out a flag of truce. At three in the afternoon the capitulation was concluded. Though the defence was of short duration, its efficiency, while it lasted, is proved by the state in which it left the *Kent*. She had received six shot in her masts, and 142 in her hull; her casualties also were severe, amounting to nineteen killed and seventy-two wounded. Among the latter were the commander, Captain Speke, and his son, who were both struck down by a single shot. The captain ultimately recovered, but his son died. Ives, who was surgeon of the *Kent*, professionally attended both of them, and gives such an interesting account of the heroism displayed by the son, a youth of only sixteen years of age, that it would be unpardonable to omit it.¹

¹ Ives, *A Voyage from England to India*, pp. 132-34.
When he was carried down into the after-hold his leg was hanging only by the skin. Great as his suffering must have been, he was thinking only of his father, whose wound he feared had been mortal. On being assured of the contrary he became calm; but when it was proposed to examine his own wound, he earnestly asked the surgeon if he had dressed his father; "for he could not think of being touched till his father had been taken care of." Being told that this was already done, "then," replied the generous youth, pointing to a fellow-sufferer, "pray, sir, look to and dress this poor man, who is groaning so sadly beside me." He, too, had been dressed already; and the poor youth, on submitting himself to the surgeon, observed, "Sir, I fear you must amputate above the joint." Ives replying "I must," he clasped his hands, and, looking upward, solemnly and fervently ejaculated, "Good God, do thou enable me to behave in my present circumstances worthy of my father's son." After this prayer he told the surgeon that he was all submission, and bore the operation (amputation above the knee-joint) without speaking a word, or uttering a groan that could be heard at a yard distant. The next day he was removed to the hospital at Calcutta. For the first eight or nine days the symptoms were favourable. A change then took place, and he died on the thirteenth day after the operation. His father having been removed, not to the hospital, but to the house of a friend, the noble-hearted boy, still suspecting the worst, sent the following note, written by himself in pencil at two o'clock in the morning of the very day on which he died:—"If Mr. Ives will consider the disorder a son must be in, when he is told he is dying, and yet is in doubt whether his father is not in as good a state of health. If Mr. Ives is not too busy to honour this chitt, which nothing but the greatest uneasiness could draw from me. The boy waits an answer." It is scarcely necessary to account for the verbal inaccuracies of the note by mentioning that the heroic sufferer had become delirious. Mr. Ives immediately hastened to his bedside, when the following dialogue took place:—"And is he dead?" "Who?" "My father, sir." "No; nor is he in any danger, I assure you; he is almost well." "Thank God! Then why did they tell me so? I am now satisfied and ready to die." "At this time," says Mr. Ives, "he had a locked
jaw, and was in great distress; but I understood every word he so inarticulately uttered. He begged my pardon for having disturbed me at so early an hour; and before the day was ended surrendered up 'a valuable life.' Valuable, indeed; for who can doubt, after reading the above narrative, that had William Speke been spared he would have earned for himself a place among the greatest and best of the naval heroes of his country. It ought to be added that Captain Speke was not unworthy of being the father of such a son. His heart was bound up in the boy; and the first thing he did when taken below was to tell how dangerously his poor Billy was wounded. For some days the surgeon was able to rejoice him by hopes of a recovery, but at last was obliged by his silence and looks to prepare him for the worst. On the tenth day he for the first time put a direct question on the subject. "How long, my friend, do you think my Billy may remain in a state of uncertainty?" The surgeon answered, "If he lived from the fifteenth day of the operation there would be the greatest hopes of his recovery." On the sixteenth day, looking steadfastly in the surgeon's face, he said, "Well Mr. Ives, how fares it with my boy?" Receiving no answer, he could not but know the cause. After crying bitterly, he asked to be left alone for half an hour, and when at the end of that time Mr. Ives returned, "he appeared, as he ever after did, perfectly calm and serene." Captain Speke never perfectly recovered from his wound, and died at the early age of forty-three. He lived long enough, however, to distinguish himself in the naval victory gained by Sir Edward Hawke off Belleisle. In that action he commanded the Resolution of seventy, and obliged the Formidable, though much superior in force, to strike to him.

Though the nabob had not disguised his displeasure at the expedition against Chandernagore, rumours of the approach of the Afghans were so prevalent, that in his anxiety to secure the assistance of the British troops, he not only refrained from expressing any indignation at its capture, but congratulated the commanders on their success, and made an offer of the whole territory to the Company on the same terms on which the French had held it. His sincerity was more than questionable; for he still retained a large body of men at an intermediate spot
between Hughli and his capital, apparently to embrace any favourable opportunity of resuming hostilities; and, so far from withdrawing his protection from the other French factories in Bengal, gave an asylum in Kassimbazar to a body of their troops, consisting partly of some who had escaped from Chandernagore before it fell, and partly of others who, after they had become prisoners of war, had broken their parole. There can be little doubt—indeed it was fully established by letters afterwards discovered—that he was at this time in correspondence with Bussy; and in hopes that that distinguished officer would appear in Bengal at the head of a formidable force. In one letter to him, written before Chandernagore was taken, the nabob says, "These disturbers of my country, the admiral and Colonel Clive (Sabat Jung!), whom bad fortune attend! without any reason whatever are warring against Zubal-ul-Tujar (M. Renault), the governor of Chandernagore. This you will learn from his letter. I, who in all things seek the good of mankind, assist him in every respect, and have sent him the best of my troops, that he may join with them and fight the English; and if it become necessary I will join him myself. I hope in God these English will be punished for the disturbances they have raised. Be confident; look on my forces as your own. I wrote you before for 2,000 soldiers and musketeers, under the command of two trusty chiefs. I persuade myself you have already sent them as I desired; should you not, I desire you will do me the pleasure to send them immediately." In another letter, written the week after Chandernagore was taken, he says, "I am advised that you have arrived at Ichapore. This news gives me pleasure. The sooner you come here, the greater pleasure I shall have in meeting with you. What can I write of the perfidy of the English? They have without ground picked a quarrel with M. Renault, and taken by force his factory. They want now to quarrel with M. Law, your chief at Kassimbazar; but I will take care to oppose and overthrow all their proceedings. When you come to Balasore I will then send M. Law to your assistance, unless you forbid his setting out. Rest assured of my good-will towards you and your company."

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1 Or "The Daring in War," the title by which Clive is still known among the natives in India.

2 Or "The Essence of Merchants."
These letters, written after the treaty offensive and defensive with the British had been concluded, were undoubtedly a gross violation of it; and as their substance, though not their actual contents was known to Clive, he must now have been convinced that he had been somewhat precipitate in signing the treaty, as it had already become in fact a dead letter. Neither party, however, was yet prepared to proceed to extremities, and some time was spent by them in endeavouring to outwit each other. The nabob, in order to leave no pretext for saying that he had not fulfilled his part of the treaty, complied liberally with most of its articles, paying a large sum to a count of the damage which the Company had sustained: and then insisted, with some show of reason, that the whole of the British forces, army and navy, should forthwith return to Calcutta. The ships departed, carrying with them the plunder of Chandernagore, valued at considerably more than £100,000. Clive refused to move, and encamped on a plain to the north of Hughli. This step, while it could not be regarded by the nabob in any other light than a direct menace, amounted to a violation of the orders which he had received from his employers at Madras. One of their main reasons for not giving the command to Colonel Adlercron was because he would not promise to return whenever they should require. Clive had given this promise, and on the faith of it had been intrusted with powers which made him independent of the Bengal presidency. Up to a very recent period his letters to Madras had contained assurances of his determination to return; but their tone had recently altered, and it now appeared that though the promise had never been recalled, a change of circumstances had occurred of such importance as to justify him in disregarding it. What this change was must now be explained.

The nabob, constantly urged to surrender or dismiss the French assembled at Kassimbazar, pretended to adopt the latter alternative, and ordered them to remove westward into Bihar. Had he really intended to part with them he would have sent them to join their countrymen in the Deccan; and hence Clive, so far from being satisfied with the dismissal, remonstrated against the mode of it, and even threatened to take the remedy into his own hands, by sending a detachment in pursuit. While thus condemned, on the one hand, for insufficient compliance with
the wishes of the British, the nabob was solemnly warned by the French, on the other, that by dismissing them he was depriving himself of the only soldiers on whose fidelity and prowess he could safely calculate. M. Law, who was at their head, even pointed out distinctly the source from which danger would arise. Many of the nabob's principal officers were disaffected, and they were only waiting to combine with the English to effect his destruction. This information was correct; but the nabob, though convinced of its truth, was too irresolute to act upon it, and, in dismissing M. Law, simply observed, that "if anything new should happen, he would send for him again."

"Be assured," was the reply, "that this is the last time we shall see each other; remember my words—we shall never meet again; it is nearly impossible."

A conspiracy had indeed been formed; and it is painful to add that Clive and the Company were not merely implicated, but had engaged to take a leading part in the execution of it. Admitting the fact that Siraj-ud-daulah was a despicable tyrant, and the consequent probability that his government, if not his life, must ere long have been terminated by violence, what right had those who had courted his alliance, obtained it, and profited by it, to league with his subjects for the purpose of dethroning him? Even had the treaty never been concluded, or had open hostilities been again formally declared, it would have been impossible to reconcile such a proceeding with any of the recognized rules of honourable warfare. What then must be thought of allies, who, availing themselves of the influence which they derived from this character, employed it in lulling the nabob into a fatal security, while measures were being concocted for effecting his ruin? According to the account of Clive himself the nabob "performed almost every article of the treaty, paid Mr. Watts the three lacs of rupees, delivered up Kassimbazar and all the other factories, with the money and goods therein taken. The gentlemen write from thence that little or nothing is wanting." It is true that he soon found reason to write in a very different spirit. A month later he says, in a letter to Mr. Pigott, "The most of the articles of peace are complied with; yet from the tyranny, cowardice, and suspicion of the nabob, no dependence can be had upon him. No consideration could induce him to deliver
up the French; it is true he has ordered them out of his dominions, and they are at some distance from the capital; but he has retained them in his pay, and has certainly written to Deleyrit and Bussy to send men to his assistance. One day he tears my letters, and turns out our vakeel, and orders his army to march; he next countermands it, sends for the vakeel, and begs his pardon for what he has done. Twice a-week he threatens to impale Mr. Watts; in short, he is a compound of everything that is bad; keeps company with none but his menial servants, and is universally hated and despised by the great men. This induces me to acquaint you there is a conspiracy going on against him." The very mention of such a thing might have awakened Clive's sense of honour, and reminded him that it must necessarily be a nefarious transaction, with which it would be pollution to intermeddle. No idea of this kind, however, occurs to him; and he simply adds, "I have been applied to for assistance, and every advantage promised the Company can wish. The committee are of opinion it should be given as soon as the nabob is secured. For my own part, I am persuaded there can be neither peace nor security while such a monster reigns."

From the concluding part of this extract it may be inferred that the Company were not yet prepared for the kind of co-operation which Clive was evidently contemplating. They were for giving assistance only "as soon as the nabob is secured." In other words, they were not disposed to act as principals in the conspiracy, but had no objections to countenance it, and take advantage of it in the event of its success. Such appears to have been their first view; but any scruples they had were afterwards overcome, and in their letter to the secret committee at home they advocate direct co-operation, arguing that from the detestation in which Siraj-ud-daulah was held, the conspiracy, or, as they rather choose to call it, the confederacy, must succeed; but that if they withheld their aid they could expect no advantages from such success; whereas, if they took a prominent part, they might look for remuneration for past losses, and full security against any future misfortune, similar to that to which their weakness had before exposed them. The "prominent part" had always been Clive's wish, and he immediately began to prepare for it with all his characteristic energy. The first thing deemed
necessary was to dissipate any suspicions which the nabob had felt, and convince him that he might calculate on the British as sincere and faithful allies. In playing this deceitful game, Clive was greatly aided by a letter which he received about this time from the Peshwa Baji Rao, who, after expressing indignation at the treatment the English had received from Siraj-ud-daulah, and offering to avenge their wrongs, proposed to invade Bengal. On condition of Clive’s co-operation with his troops, he would repay double the amount of the losses that had been sustained, and vest the commerce of the Ganges exclusively in the East India Company. Clive knew the character of the Marathas too well to invite them into Bengal, and the only use which he made of the Peshwa’s letter was to send it to the nabob. If it was spurious, as some suspected, and had been written at the suggestion of the nabob himself, as a means of sounding the Company, and ascertaining how far they were actuated by ambitious views, the return of the letter would be equivalent to taking him in his own snare; if it was genuine, how could there be a greater proof of good faith than in preferring his alliance to the tempting offers of the Maratha? “The letter,” says Sir John Malcolm, “was genuine; and the nabob expressed himself much gratified by the conduct of Clive, who, on this occasion and others, endeavoured to remove the suspicions that Siraj-ud-daulah entertained of the designs of the confederates.” One of the other methods which Clive took of removing the nabob’s suspicions, or, as his biographer calls it, “of lulling him into security,” was as follows:—Having sent back the Company’s troops to Calcutta, and ordered those under his own independent control into garrison, he observed in a letter to the nabob, “that while the armies continued in the field their enemies would be endeavouring to interrupt that perfect harmony and friendship which subsisted between them; that he had therefore put his army into quarters; and though he had no reason to doubt his excellency’s strict adherence to, and full compliance with all the articles of the treaty, yet, nevertheless, he wished he could disappoint those hopes their mutual enemies entertained, by withdrawing his army from Plassey.”

While Clive was thus endeavouring to impose upon the credulity of the nabob, and telling him of “that perfect harmony and
friendship which subsisted between them,” he was apparently by
the same messenger who carried the letter to the nabob send-
ing letters to Mr. Watts with such passages as the following:—
“The nabob is a villain, and cannot be trusted; he must be
overset, or we must fall.” “As for any gratuity the new nabob
may bestow on the troops, it is left to his generosity and to your
and Omichand’s management.” “I have wrote the nabob a
soothing letter; this accompanies another of the same
kind, and one to Mohan Lall (the nabob’s chief favourite) agreeable
to your desire.” “To take away all suspicion I have ordered all the
artillery and tumbrils to be embarked in boats and sent to
Calcutta,” but “I am ready, and will engage to be at Nusary
in twelve hours after I receive your letter, which place is to be
the rendezvous of the whole army.” “Tell Mir Jafar to fear
nothing; that I will join him with 5,000 men who never turned
their backs; and that if he fails seizing him, we shall be strong
enough to drive him out of the country. Assure him I will
march night and day to his assistance, and stand by him as long
as I have a man left.”

Before the conspiracy reached the point to which we have
now brought it, a number of important preliminaries had been
arranged. The object was to get quit of Siraj-ud-daulah at all
events; and in this his most influential ministers and subjects
were ready to concur. At first, however, there was some diffi-
culty in determining who was to be the new nabob. The earliest
aspirant was Yar Latif Khan, who commanded 2,000 horse in
the nabob’s service, but was at the same time in the pay of the
Seths, whom he was engaged to defend, even against the nabob
himself. This officer having requested a secret conference
with Mr. Watts, was referred by him to Omichand, to whom
he stated that the overthrow of the nabob would be easy, in
consequence of the general detestation in which he was held;
and that if the English, whom he had sworn to extirpate, would
take advantage of his absence on an intended expedition to
Patna against the Afghans, to seize upon Murshidabad, they
might, by proclaiming him as the new nabob, obtain any advan-
tages for which they might stipulate. The scheme was approved
by Mr. Watts, and forthwith sanctioned by Clive. Yar Latif
Khan was probably put forward by the Seths merely for the
purpose of sounding the views of the English commander, for
the very next day after the conference, an Armenian of the
name of Petrus came to Mr. Watts with similar proposals from
Mir Jafar, who—declaring that he was in danger of assassination
every time he went to the durbar, and that the Diwan Rai-
durlabh, the Seths, and several officers of the first rank in the
army had engaged to join, if the English would assist in dethron-
ing the nabob—requested that if the scheme were accepted
the terms should be settled without delay, and that Colonel Clive
would immediately break up his camp, and soothe the nabob
with every appearance of pacific intentions until hostilities
should commence.

Mir Jafar, being a far more important personage than Yar
Latif Khan, had no difficulty in obtaining the preference. He
was brother-in-law of the late nabob, Ali Vardi Khan, and held
both under him and Siraj-ud-daulah the office of paymaster-
general, which necessarily gave him great influence with the
army, and has caused him to be sometimes described as its
commander-in-chief. Ali Vardi made a trial of his military
talents, by appointing him to the command of a large detach-
ment, intended to expel the united Marathas and Afghans from
Orissa. His incapacity was, however, soon proved; and after
his indolence and pusillanimity had enabled the enemy to gain
decided advantages, Ali Vardi was obliged to supersede him. Mir
Jafar showed his resentment, and endeavoured to gratify his re-
venge by leaguing secretly with a treasonable faction, and though,
more from fear of the danger than a sense of returning duty, he
abandoned the league, he had gone too far to be forgiven, and
was deprived of all his employments. He seems to have been
reinstated at a later period, as he figures among the principal
persons whom Siraj-ud-daulah, on his accession, dismissed from
office, in order to make way for his own favourites. Mir Jafar
expressed his resentment, as before, by placing himself at
the head of a treasonable intrigue, and encouraging Shaukat
Jung, governor of Purnea, to assert his claim to the masnad.
The failure of that attempt had induced him to shake himself
free of all connection with it; and he had insinuated himself
into the good graces of the nabob, for he was present in his
capacity of bakshi or paymaster-general at the capture of
Calcutta, and is the only officer of distinction who stands chargeable with a direct participation in the atrocities of the Black Hole. The English woman, who survived the horrors of that night, was carried off in triumph to Mir Jafar’s harem.

Such was the man who, again plotting for the overthow of his master, was selected to usurp his place. His character must have been too well known to invite confidence in his professions, and care was therefore taken to insert all the obligations exacted from him, in formal written documents, to which, not with much propriety, the names of a public and a private treaty have been given. The public treaty, written in Persian, commenced with the following sentence, in Mir Jafar’s own hand: — “I swear by God, and the Prophet of God, to abide by the terms of this treaty whilst I have life.” It is entitled, “Treaty made with the Admiral and Colonel Clive” (Sabat Jung Bahadur), and consists of twelve articles, and a thirteenth, called an additional article. The first article simply agrees to comply with “whatever articles were agreed upon in the time of peace” with the Nabob Siraj-ud-daulah. The second article is, “The enemies of the English are my enemies, whether they be Indians or Europeans.” Article III confiscates to the English all the effects and factories of the French in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, and engages never more to “allow them any more to settle in the three provinces.” Articles IV, V, VI, and VII give compensation as follows:—To the Company for losses, and the maintenance of forces, one crore of rupees (£1,000,000); to the English inhabitants in Calcutta, fifty lacs of rupees (£500,000); to the Gentoos, Musalmans, and other subjects of Calcutta, twenty lacs (£200,000); to the Armenian inhabitants, seven lacs (£70,000). Article VIII gives to the Company all the land within the Maratha Ditch belonging to zamindars, and also 600 yards without the ditch. Article IX converts all the land to the south of Calcutta, as far as Kalpi, into a zamindary, and gives it to the Company, subject, however, to the payment of revenue, in the same manner as other zamindars. Article X engages to pay for the maintenance of any English troops whose assistance may be demanded; Article XI not to erect any new fortifications, below Hughli, near the Ganges; and Article XII, to pay the aforesaid stipulated sums on being established in the government of the three provinces.
The thirteenth, or additional article, is the counter-obligation, in which, "on condition that Mir Jafar Khan Bahadur shall solemnly ratify, confirm by oath, and execute all the above articles, we, the underwritten, do, on behalf of the Honourable East India Company, declare on the holy Gospels, and before God, that we will assist Mir Jafar Khan Bahadur, with all our force, to obtain the subahship of the province of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa; and further, that we will assist him to the utmost against all his enemies whatever, as soon as he calls upon us for that end; provided that he, on his coming to be nabob, shall fulfil the aforesaid articles." This article, as well as the treaty, was signed by Admiral Watson, Mr. Drake, governor of Calcutta, Colonel Clive, Mr. Watts, Major Kilpatrick, and Mr. Becher, one of the members of council. Had there been no objection to it in any other respect, it is strange how it never occurred to them that in engaging to employ all their force to obtain the subahship for a creature of their own, they were usurping the sovereign rights of the Mughul emperor, and pledging themselves, if he resisted or resented their interference, to wage open war against him. This oversight is the more remarkable, because the treaty, on the face of it, recognizes the emperor's supremacy. Mir Jafar designates himself "servant of King Alamgir," and the date of the deed is "the fourth year of the reign." What right then had Mir Jafar to rule over provinces to which, even if he had been the next heir, instead of being a stranger in blood, his title would not have been valid until confirmed at Delhi? and what right could the representatives of a body of English merchants have, not only to sanction his usurpation, but solemnly pledge themselves "to assist him to the utmost against all his enemies whatever?" No answer can be given that will bear a moment's examination; but it is needless, when so much of an extravagant nature was done, to dwell on a matter which, in the now degraded condition of the Mughul empire, may possibly have been regarded as mere punctilio.

The private treaty, though it appears to have been an afterthought, was probably regarded by some of the parties as the more important of the two. In a passage, quoted above, Clive mentions, in a letter to Mr. Watts, that "as to any gratuity the new nabob may bestow on the troops, it is left to his gen-
erosity." A more mercenary spirit was afterwards developed. A gratuity to the army and navy only had been first proposed; but, when the matter was discussed in the select committee, Mr. Becher, one of the members, suggested that, "as they had set the machine in motion, it was reasonable and proper that they should be considered." The hint was sufficient; and it was resolved, as Clive describes it in a letter to Mr. Watts, that, instead of trusting to Mir Jafar's generosity, his "private engagement should be obtained in writing to make them (the committee, in which you are included), a present of twelve lacs of rupees, and a present of forty lacs to the army and navy, over and above what is stipulated in the agreement." This engagement formed the subject of the private treaty, and by means of it enormous sums, while they still continued to be misnamed presents, were regularly constituted as debts. It will be seen, as the narrative proceeds, that there was a third treaty of a very singular description.

The treaties, signed by Mir Jafar, arrived in Calcutta on the 10th of June, and two days after, the troops stationed there, together with 150 sailors from the squadron, were proceeding up the river, in a fleet of 200 boats, to join the main body under Clive at Chandernagore. The danger of delay was manifest. A plot to which so many were privy could not be effectually concealed. The soldiers, both at Calcutta and Chandernagore, began to talk of it openly; and Omichand, who from the first had a leading share in its management, had threatened to divulge it to the nabob, unless his silence was purchased at an enormous cost. The nabob's own suspicions were aroused, and his first impulse was to attack the palace, and thus obtain possession of the person of Mir Jafar. Had he acted on it he might possibly have escaped the fate impending over him; but he hesitated, after putting Mir Jafar on his guard, and was so overwhelmed with astonishment and terror, when the sudden flight of Mr. Watts from Murshidabad revealed the full magnitude of the danger, that he descended from menace to entreaty, and made overtures for an accommodation. To this Mir Jafar assented, and, during a visit which the nabob paid to him, swore upon the Koran that he would neither join nor give assistance to the English. This was of course in direct contradiction
to the oath of the treaty; but Mir Jafar had no scruples, and was ready to commit any amount of perjury when anything could be gained by it. The nabob felt so secure after this reconciliation with his paymaster-general, that on the 15th he sent a letter to Clive, inveighing bitterly against the treachery manifested by Mr. Watts, whom conscious guilt alone had forced to flee. "Suspicion," he said, "that some trick was intended, had been the real cause which induced him to keep his army so long at Plassey; but God and the Prophet would punish those by whom the treaty was violated." As soon as he had thus committed himself to hostilities, he ordered the whole of his army to assemble forthwith at their former encampment at Plassey, and also wrote M. Law, who had proceeded with his soldiers no farther than Rajamahal, to join him with the utmost expedition.

The nabob's message of defiance must have passed another which Clive, on commencing his march, had addressed to him. After enumerating all the grievances, real and imaginary, to which the English had been subjected by the nabob's caprice, violence, and perfidy, he announced that he had determined, with the approbation of all who are charged with the Company's affairs, to proceed immediately to Kassimbazar, and submit their disputes to the arbitration of Mir Jafar, Raidurlabh, Jagat Seth, and others of his great men; that if it should appear he (Clive) deviated from the treaty, he then swore to give up all further claims; but that if it appeared his excellency had broken it, he should then demand satisfaction for all the losses sustained by the English, and all the charges of their army and navy. He added, in conclusion, "that the rains being so near, and it requiring many days to receive an answer, he found it necessary to wait upon him immediately." Clive, in quitting Chander-nagore, left only 100 sailors to garrison it, and set out at the head of about 3,000 men, of whom 800 were Europeans. The artillery consisted of eight six-pounders and a howitzer. Bold as he was, he would not have ventured to commence operations with this force had he not trusted to the promise of Mir Jafar to join him. With great anxiety, therefore, he continued his march day by day, while Mir Jafar, not only did not make his appearance, but returned no answer to repeated messages which were sent to him. It was not until the 17th, when the army had advanced far on its way, and
by means of a detachment sent forward under Captain Coote, had captured the town and fort of Katwa, situated at the confluence of the Hadji with the Bhagirathi, that the first letter from Mir Jafar arrived. Its contents were very unsatisfactory, for, instead of announcing his approach to form the promised junction, it spoke in rather ambiguous terms of the reconciliation with the nabob, and the oath by which he had bound himself not to take part against him. Mir Jafar of course declared that the whole was, on his part, a trick, by which he hoped to lure the nabob more easily to his ruin; but when, on the 19th, another letter arrived, in which he gave only the vague intelligence that his tent would be either on the left or the right of the army, and excused himself for not being more explicit, because guards were stationed on all the roads to intercept all messages, Clive’s suspicions were thoroughly roused. Mir Jafar either meant to deceive him, or had miscalculated his strength. On either supposition further advance was perilous in the extreme.

The light in which matters now appeared to Clive is evidenced by a letter written to the secret committee, on the same day on which that of Mir Jafar was received:—"The party I sent has taken Katwa town and fort. Both are strong. Notwithstanding which, I feel the greatest anxiety at the little intelligence I receive from Mir Jafar; and if he is not treacherous, his sang froid, or want of strength, will, I fear, overset the expedition. I am trying a last effort, by means of a Brahmin, to prevail upon him to march out and join us. I have appointed Plassey the place of rendezvous, and have told him at the same time, unless he gives this or some other sufficient proof of the sincerity of his intentions, I will not cross the river; this, I hope, will meet with your approbation. I shall act with such caution as not to risk the loss of our forces; and whilst we have them, we may always have it in our power to bring about a revolution, should the present not succeed. They say there is a considerable quantity of grain in and about this place. If we can collect eight or ten thousand maunds, we may maintain our situation during the rains, which will greatly distress the nabob; and either reduce him to terms which may be depended upon, or give us time to bring in the Birbhum Raja, Marathas, or Ghazi-uddin. I desire you will give your sentiments freely, how you think I should act, if Mir Jafar can give us no assistance."
The dubiety and indecision thus expressed, were not produced by a momentary fit of despondency, for on the 21st of June, two days after despatching the above letter, Clive, unable to satisfy himself as to the course which it was expedient to pursue, or decide it on his own responsibility, held a council of war, and submitted to it the following question:—"Whether, in our present situation, without assistance, and on our own bottom, it would be prudent to attack the nabob; or, whether we should wait till joined by some country power?" The council consisted of sixteen members, of whom nine voted the affirmative, and seven the negative. The former was thus carried, Clive not only voting with the majority, but lending his influence to secure it by violating the ordinary routine, and giving his own opinion first, instead of beginning with the youngest officer. Eyre Coote, who had already given proofs of the military genius which afterwards made him famous in Indian warfare, stood at the head of the minority. To all appearance, Siraj-ud-daulah was now safe, at least from the conspiracy which was to have discarded him, in order to make way for Mir Jafar, and Bengal was not to be revolutionized till one of its own petty rajas could usurp the government; or one of the most worthless vizirs who had ever held office at the court of Delhi could be bribed to mingle in the plot; or the Company, in despair of accomplishing their object by other means, should resort to the miserable alternative of leaguing with the Marathas. But though the majority of the council of war had voted as Clive had in a manner dictated, by anticipating instead of waiting to receive their opinion, he was not himself satisfied. The arguments of Coote had not been lost upon him, and within an hour after the council broke up, the army received orders to be in readiness to start next morning. This change of opinion in Clive is said, by Orme, to have been produced after an interval of deep and solitary meditation in an adjoining grove. It must, indeed, have been an anxious moment; for, even after the absurdity of stopping where he was had become apparent, he could not act in opposition to his own previously declared conviction and the decision of the council of war, without feeling how immensely he had added to his responsibility.

The hazards which the army was now about to run were of the most formidable description. It was occupying the town of
Katwa, and could not reach the nabob's army without passing into a large flat which, from being nearly inclosed by two arms of the Ganges, was known by the name of the island of Kassimbazar. Between it and the army ran a deep and rapid river, the passage of which, had the enemy known how to use his advantages, might have been successfully disputed, or, at all events, could not have been effected without serious loss. This obstacle overcome, the peril of the position was indefinitely increased. Retreat was impossible. A body of troops not exceeding 3,000 was about to encounter an army of not less than 50,000 infantry and 18,000 cavalry, in a position where, if a reverse was sustained, not a man would escape to tell the tale. The river was crossed without opposition, and shortly after a letter arrived from Mir Jafar, giving notice of the nabob's movements, and suggesting the possibility of taking him by surprise; but, in other respects, so far from satisfactory, that Clive immediately sent back the messenger who brought it, with the answer "that he should march to Plassey without delay, and would the next morning advance six miles further to the village of Daudpore; but if Mir Jafar did not join him there he would make peace with the nabob." According to Mir Jafar's information, the nabob had arrived at Munkara, a village six miles south of Kassimbazar, intending there to entrench himself and wait the event. This information proved false; for when Clive arrived at Plassey, at one in the morning, after a fatiguing march of fifteen miles, the continual sound of drums, clarions, and cymbals, which always accompany the night watches of an Indian camp, told him that the nabob's army was not a mile distant. The intention to encamp at Munkara had been formed in the belief that Clive would advance immediately after the capture of Katwa; but from circumstances already explained, his movements not having been so rapid as was expected, the nabob quickened his own pace and arrived at Plassey before him. Naturally of a cowardly disposition, and surrounded by treachery, of which the evidences could not have escaped his notice, the nabob became more and more desponding as the danger approached. On the evening of his arrival, his attendants had gone out, one by one, to say their usual prayers, at the time of sunset. Being at the time absorbed
in his own gloomy reflections, he was not aware that they had left him alone, till looking up he perceived a man who had secretly entered the tent, probably to steal. Starting up, and calling loudly for his attendants, he exclaimed—"Surely they see me dead."

In the immediate vicinity of Plassey was a grove of mango trees, planted in regular rows, and extending about 800 yards, with a breadth of 300. It was inclosed by a slight bank, and a ditch nearly choked up with weeds and brambles, and slanted with its west side along the bank of the river, which was distant at the southern extremity 200 yards, and at the north not more than fifty. At a short distance north of the grove was an entrenchment, which Raidurlabh, while encamped here, had thrown up. It stretched for about 200 yards from the bank of the river, in a line nearly parallel to the north side of the grove, and then diverging to the north-east, was continued in that direction for about three miles. The nabob's army was encamped within this entrenchment, and began at daybreak, on the 23rd of June, to issue from various openings and advance towards the grove. His artillery consisted of forty to fifty pieces of cannon, mostly of the largest calibre. Several of them were mounted on a redoubt constructed in the entrenchment, in the angle formed by the change in its direction; four of them on the bank of a large tank about 900 yards south of the redoubt, under forty Frenchmen, headed by one Sinfray; and two on a line with the tank, and close to the river. The rest of the artillery, reserved to accompany the army in its movements, was placed on machines, each forming a kind of stage, about six feet high, and large enough to contain a cannon, with its ammunition, and the gunners required to manage it. Every machine was dragged along by forty to fifty yoke of white oxen of the largest size, and attended, moreover, by an elephant trained to assist at difficult tugs by shoving with his forehead. Behind the posts occupied by Sinfray, and the two cannon near the river, Mir Madan, the son of Mohan Lall, was stationed with 5,000 horse and 7,000 foot. The rest of the army, consisting of separate compact masses, formed an immense curve which commenced at a hillock of trees, situated without the entrenchment, about 300 yards east of the redoubt, and terminated
about half a mile east of the southern angle of the grove. The artillery, two, three, and four pieces together, were stationed at the different openings between the columns in the curve. Clive had fixed his headquarters at a hunting-house of the nabob, situated a little north of the grove, on the bank of the river, and, having ascended to the roof, surveyed the vast host in splendid array hemming him in on every side, except that towards the river. At first, to show the enemy how unable they were to intimidate him, he abandoned the shelter of the grove, and drew up his little army in front of it in a line facing the tank. The battalion occupied the centre, while the sepoys in two equal divisions formed the wings. Three of the field-pieces were placed on the right, and three on the left of the battalion; the other two field-pieces and the howitzers were advanced about 200 yards in front of the left wing. At eight o'clock the first shot was fired by the enemy, and a distant cannonade was kept up for some time. It produced no result, and Clive again placed his men under the shelter of the grove. This apparent retreat elated the enemy, who now, advancing nearer, fired with great vivacity, though to very little purpose, for the troops remained quietly seated among the trees, while the artillery, sheltered behind the bank, continued the cannonade. Though Clive had drawn up in line of battle he had no intention of bringing on a general engagement. He knew the advantages which night would give him; and hence, in accordance with his original design, is was resolved at eleven o'clock, after consulting his officers, to continue the cannonade during the day, and attack the camp at midnight. After this resolution his personal presence was less necessary, and he retired into his quarters to snatch an interval of rest. He had lain down, and is said to have been fast asleep, when Major Kilpatrick sent to inform him that he had a good opportunity of seizing the tank which Sinfray occupied, and was about to advance for that purpose with two companies of the battalion and two field-pieces. Clive started up, and running to the detachment stopped it, at the same time reprimanding the major for acting without orders. He soon perceived, however, that the proposed attack ought to be executed, and placing himself at the head of the detachment, found little difficulty in driving out Sinfray and his Frenchmen, and obliging them to retire into the redoubt.
A great change had taken place in the condition of the enemy, and the victory, which Clive had not ventured to anticipate before midnight, was about to be forced upon him before the day closed. As the enemy’s ammunition lay exposed on the machines, partial explosions of it were repeatedly heard during the cannonade. A still more serious misfortune befell it at noon, when a heavy fall of rain rendered a great part of the powder useless. The fire from the machines immediately slackened. Nor was this the nabob’s only misfortune. For, about the very time when the ammunition failed, Mir Madan, the best and most faithful of his officers, was brought into his tent mortally wounded by a cannon-ball, and died in his presence, after uttering a few words expressive of his own loyalty and the want of it in others. The nabob had hitherto remained in his tent, beyond the reach of danger, alternately yielding to his fears and buoyed up with assurances of victory. He now lost all self-command, and under the influence of terror and despair sent for Mir Jafar. As soon as he arrived, the nabob, throwing his turban on the ground, implored him in the name of Ali Vardi Khan, the brother-in-law of the one and grandfather of the other, to forgive the past, and become the defender of his life and honour. Mir Jafar readily promised all that was asked of him, and immediately proceeded to complete his treachery, first by sending a message to Clive, informing him of what had passed, and urging him either to an instant or a nocturnal attack on the camp; and secondly, by urging the nabob to recall his army within the entrenchments, and renew the engagement on the following day. The message to Clive was not delivered, as the messenger was afraid to proceed with it during the cannonade; but the treacherous advice, backed by the influence of Raidurlabh, another of the leading conspirators, was, after some demur, adopted, and the fatal order was issued to retire within the camp. Mohan Lall, who was probably aware of the motives which dictated the advice, and foresaw the inevitable consequences, at first refused to obey, and showed that the very attempt to retire would spread an universal panic, and throw the whole army into confusion. His remonstrances, however, were unavailing; and the preparations for retiring were immediately perceived in the almost total cessation
of the cannonade on the part of the enemy, the yoking of the trains, of oxen to the unwieldy machines, and a gradual retrograde movement of the whole army. It was at this stage that Clive had been aroused by Kilpatrick's message.

While the detachment was driving Sinfray from the tank, the portion of the nabob's army stationed farthest to the southeast was observed to linger behind the rest, and even advance in the direction of the grove. The movement was at first misunderstood, and Clive having sent a detachment to oppose their further progress, some execution was done before it was ascertained that the troops acting so suspiciously were those of Mir Jafar, who had now at last thrown off the mask, and openly declared himself. Had the issue of the battle been any longer doubtful, Jafar's conduct would have decided it. Clive, when once certain that he could calculate on the neutrality of not the co-operation of a large part of the army opposed to him, determined on a vigorous effort, and carried at once both the redoubt to which Sinfray had retired, and the commanding hillock immediately to the east of it. By five o'clock the British force was within the entrenchment, and in possession of the camp. The nabob, on being made acquainted with Mir Jafar's desertion and the British advance, mounted a camel, and fled at its utmost pace, accompanied by about 2,000 horsemen. With his departure all idea of resistance ceased, and nothing remained but to reap the fruits of the victory. The soldiers who had gained it, seeing the baggage of a whole camp lying before them, were naturally reluctant to leave it unplundered, but on being promised a donative, received the order to advance with acclamation. The pursuit, continued for about six miles, brought them in the evening to Daudpore. The loss of the victors in killed and wounded was only seventy-two; that of the vanquished was also trifling, and is computed by Clive himself at not more than 500. The victory thus feebly contested on the one hand, and won unexpectedly, almost without an effort, on the other, was in its results the most important that had been gained in India since Europeans first landed on its shores. It founded the British empire in the East.

On the evening of the battle Mir Jafar, who had remained encamped in the neighbourhood, sent a message to Clive,
congratulating him on his success, and on the following day met him by appointment at Daudpore. Conscious how dilatory and even suspicious his conduct had been, he was not free from misgivings as to the manner in which he would be received, and hence, when on his approach the guard drew up and rested their arms to pay him the usual honours, he mistook the compliment, and supposed it to be a signal for his destruction. Clive, seeing his alarm, soon reassured him by hastening forward to embrace him, and salute him Nabob of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. But it was no time for idle ceremony, and Mir Jafar after a short delay proceeded to the capital to complete the victory by the capture of Siraj-ud-daulah and his treasures. This dastardly prince was still in his palace, and had given out that he intended to defend himself to the last. It was plain, however, from his conduct, that he was only meditating flight. On the morning after the battle he sent off the inmates of his seraglio with fifty loaded elephants, and was only lingering behind till the darkness of night of should favour his escape. His preparations were not completed when the news of Mir Jafar’s arrival told him he had not a moment to lose. Hastily assuming the dress of a menial, and carrying a casket of his most valuable jewels, he slipped out at a window, accompanied only by his favourite concubine and an eunuch. At the palace wharf he entered a boat which had been previously prepared, and was carried up the river at a rapid rate.

Mir Jafar was not informed of the nabob’s flight till midnight, and immediately sent parties in pursuit. Being thus frustrated in his design of seizing the person of his late master, he made sure of the next most important object, by taking possession of his treasury. The whole value found in it amounted only to 150 lacs of rupees, or £1,500,000 sterling, though Mr. Watts had with singular extravagance estimated it at twenty-four crores, or £24,000,000. The city meanwhile remained in confusion; but the gradual approach of Clive with his army prevented any attempt at insurrection. He arrived within a short distance on the 25th, but did not make his entrance till the 29th. He was escorted by 200 of the battalion and 300 sepoys, and established his quarters in a palace spacious enough to accommodate all the troops that came with him. Mr. Watts and Mr.
Walsh, with 100 sepoys, had been sent forward on the 25th, and had spent the interval in ascertaining the state of the treasury, and endeavouring to make arrangements for payments of the sums which Mir Jafar had promised, but which it was now very apparent he had not then the means of discharging. By the public and private treaties he had incurred obligations to the amount of £2,750,000, whereas his treasury, if drained of its last rupee, would yield only £1,500,000. Nor was this all. In addition to the stipulated sums, immense presents were expected. Of these no less than £160,000 were destined for Clive, £80,000 for Mr. Watts, £50,000 for Mr. Walsh, £30,000 for Major Kilpatrick, and £20,000 for Mr. Scrafton. The acceptance of such presents under the circumstances, and after the state of the treasury was known, deserves no better name than extortion. Even a worse name might be used for it afterwards appeared that Mir Jafar in making them was under the impression that he had purchased an influence which might enable him to escape from the obligations he had contracted to the Company and to other parties.

Clive, immediately after his entrance, proceeded to the nabob’s palace, where Mir Jafar and all the great officers of the city were waiting to receive him. The masnad—or throne stood in the hall of audience unoccupied, for Mir Jafar, after the first salutation, retired to a different part of the hall, as if desirous to avoid it. Clive perceiving this, took him by the hand, led him to it, and placed him upon it. This done, he made obeisance to him as nabob in the usual forms, and having presented him with a plate of gold rupees, addressed the great officers through an interpreter, congratulating them on the good fortune which had given them so excellent a prince in exchange for a despicable tyrant. The hint was sufficient, and all the persons present imitated Clive’s example, by doing homage and presenting gold. The following morning the nabob returned Clive’s visit, and at once opened the subject which he knew to be nearest the hearts of both of them—the obligations he had undertaken, and his present inability to pay them. It was agreed to refer the matter to the Seths, to whose house they forthwith proceeded, attended by Watts, Scrafton, Miran, the nabob’s son, and Raidurlabh. Omichand, who was attending.
followed, under the impression that he stood high in Clive's estimation, in consequence of the important part which he had played in the revolution. A suspicion that something was wrong must have passed through his mind when, instead of being invited to the carpet at the conference with the Seths, he was left to find a place for himself in the outward part of the hall. The cause of this treatment must now be explained.

While the conspiracy for the overthrow of Siraj-ud-daulah was in progress, Omichand naturally expected an ample compensation for his services. He had suffered heavy loss from the plunder of Calcutta, and great injustice from the servants of the Company, who had imprisoned him on suspicions, which if not groundless were never substantiated, and yet he had voluntarily taken up his residence at Murshidabad, and become the most active agent in a conspiracy, which, had it been discovered, would have cost him his life. When the term reward is used in its ordinary moral sense; to designate what is due to merit, it is impossible to say that he deserved anything. Conspiracy, whatever be the form which it assumes, is a crime; and the conspiracy in which Omichand took so active a part was carried out with a very large amount of treachery and perfidy, and for the most part from mercenary motives. Still Omichand was no worse than his fellow-conspirators; and therefore, while the fugitive governor of Calcutta and the other members of the select committee were putting in claims for tens of thousands, on the ground, as one of them expressed it, that "they had set the machine in motion," why should he, who had been so instrumental in keeping it going till the work was finished, be blamed for setting an extravagant value on his "services? He is said to have asked a commission of five per cent on all the sums found in Siraj-ud-daulah's treasury. When he made this claim, he gave a significant hint, or rather uttered a direct menace, that if it were not granted he would compensate himself by divulging the conspiracy. It is doubtful if he ever made the menace in the serious sense in which Mr. Watts interpreted it, and most improbable that he would ever have given effect to it, as he was too acute not to perceive that Siraj-ud-daulah's overthrow was inevitable, and that therefore the ultimate effect of breaking with the conspirators would be his
own ruin. Be this as it may, when Mr. Watts returned the public treaty, as finally revised, and containing an article stipulating a payment of thirty lacs (£300,000) to Omichand, the select committee could scarcely find terms strong enough to express their abhorrence of his rapacity, and their virtuous indignation at his threatened treachery. It was dangerous to expunge the article altogether, as in that case Omichand might be tempted to do his worst; and it appears to have been suggested, that as a kind of compromise the sum should be reduced from thirty to twenty lacs. It was reserved for the mind of Clive, ever fertile in expedients, to suggest a plan which would at once keep Omichand faithful to the conspiracy, and punish him for his real or fancied treachery.

Besides the public and private treaties above explained, there was, as has been already hinted, a third treaty, of a very singular description. It was, in fact, a duplicate of the public treaty, with one very important difference. It contained an article giving twenty lacs of rupees to Omichand.Externally this duplicate had all the appearance of an original, and was shown as such to Omichand, to satisfy him that his interests had not been neglected. The preparation of this duplicate was the plan which Clive had devised. To distinguish it from the other, which alone was to receive effect as the genuine treaty, it was written on red paper, but all the signatures were genuine, with a single exception. Admiral Watson refused to put his name to a document which he knew was only to be used for the purpose of perpetrating a fraud. The honourable feelings which dictated this refusal might have made the select committee pause; but having gone so far they were not now to be deterred by ordinary obstacles, and the admiral’s signature was forged.

The deception practised on Omichand by the substitution of a false for a genuine treaty was completely successful. Though himself full of wiles, he was so firm a believer in English honour, that we have seen him vouching for it to Siraj-ud-daulah with a solemn oath. How, then, could he suspect that the representatives of the Company had combined to cheat a Hindu by palming upon him a document which they knew to be tainted both with fraud and forgery? He went
accordingly to the Seths in the full belief that no individual had a more direct interest than himself in the arrangements about to be made for the payment of the sums stipulated in the treaty. While seated aloof he was probably too distant to catch the purport of the proceedings. After the treaties were read, examined, and acknowledged, a long discussion took place, the result of which was, that only one-half of the stipulated sums should be paid immediately—two-thirds in coin, and a third in plate, jewels, and effects, at a valuation; and that the other half should be paid in three years, by equal annual instalments. The conclusion cannot be better told than in the words of Orme:—“The conference being ended, Clive and Scrafton went towards Omichand, who was waiting in full assurance of hearing the glad tidings of his good fortune; when Clive said, ‘It is now time to undeceive Omichand,’ on which Scrafton said to him in the Indostan language, ‘Omichand, the red paper is a trick; you are to have nothing.’ These words overpowered him like a blast of sulphur; he sank back, fainting, and would have fallen to the ground had not one of his attendants caught him in his arms, and carried him to his palanquin; in which they conveyed him to his house, where he remained many hours in stupid melancholy, and began to show some symptoms of insanity. Some days after he visited Colonel Clive, who advised him to make a pilgrimage to some pagoda, which he accordingly did soon after to a famous one near Malda. He went and returned insane, his mind every day more and more approaching to idiocy; and, contrary to the usual manners of old age in Indostan, still more to the former excellence of his understanding, he delighted in being continually dressed in the richest garments, ornamented with the most costly jewels. In this state of imbecility, he died about a year after the shock of his disappointment.” On reading the account of the fatal effect of Clive’s “trick,” few will be disposed to deny that Orme is right when—admitting it to be uncertain whether Omichand would have betrayed the conspiracy, as “part of his fortune was in the power of the English, and he had the utmost vengeance of Jafar and his confederates to fear”—he says, “as his tales and artifices prevented Siraj-

Orme’s Military Transactions, vol. ii. p. 182
ud-daulah from believing the representations of his most trusty servants, who early suspected, and at length were convinced, that the English were confederated with Jafar, the 2,000,000 rupees he expected should have been paid to him, and he left to enjoy them in oblivion and contempt."

Orme, while he thus expresses himself, does not say one word in reprobation of the trick itself. His language rather implies that he saw nothing wrong in it either morally or politically, and would have approved the declaration of Clive when he said, in his examination by the committee of the House of Commons, that he thought it "warrantable in such a case, and would do it again a hundred times." Clive, in the course of the same evidence, seems to consider it sufficient for his own justification that "he had no interested motive in doing it, and did it with a design of disappointing the expectations of a rapacious man;" that "he thought art and policy warrantable in defeating the purposes of such a villain." In judging Clive's conduct on this occasion, it is but fair to view Omichand's conduct in the worst possible light, and assume that if his demands had not been apparently conceded, he would have put his threat in execution. This was certainly Clive's belief; for immediately after Mr. Watts had acquainted him with the demand and the menace, he wrote in answer:—"I have your last letter, including the articles of agreement. I must confess the tenor of them surprised me much. I immediately repaired to Calcutta; and, at a committee held, both the admirals and gentlemen agree that Omichand is the greatest villain upon earth; and that now he appears in the strongest light, what he was always suspected to be, a villain in grain. However, to counterplot the scoundrel, and at the same time to give him no room to suspect our intentions, inclosed you will receive two forms of agreement—the one real, to be strictly kept by us, the other fictitious. In short, this affair concluded, Omichand will be treated as he deserves. This you will acquaint Mir Jafar with." On the assumption, then, that Omichand deserved the worst epithets here applied to him, the question still returns, Do the means employed to frustrate his intentions admit of justification?—were they in accordance with honour, equity, and sound policy? Sir John Malcolm
undertakes to prove the affirmative; but his elaborate argument only shows how completely zeal for the reputation of his hero had warped his judgment, and blinded him for the moment to the necessity of that good faith which he himself inviolably maintained, and which formed one of the brightest features in his own distinguished career. He admits that the concoction of the fictitious treaty "must have been repugnant to the feelings even of those who deemed themselves compelled by duty to have recourse to such an artifice," and that the affecting termination of Omichand's life "must make an impression upon every well-constituted mind;" but still insists that, "while we give a tear to weak and suffering humanity, we must do justice to those who deemed themselves compelled by circumstances, and by the situation in which they were placed, to repress all private feeling, and even to incur obloquy; in the performance of their public duty." The select committee are thus represented, by a very extraordinary flight of imagination, as actuated by the highest and purest motives, and submitting with rare disinterestedness to a kind of martyrdom, in order to secure a great public benefit not otherwise attainable. Was it really so? When the transaction is bared of all the extraneous matter with which Sir John Malcolm has encumbered it, it will be seen that the only thing at stake was a sum of money. Twenty lacs of rupees promised by an article in the fictitious treaty satisfied Omichand, and induced him to remain true to his fellow-conspirators. The same sum inserted in the genuine treaty would of course have had the very same effect; and therefore the only question to be answered is, Whether, in order to save a sum of £200,000 to the treasury of the Nabob of Bengal, the representatives of the Company and of British honour in India were compelled to commit fraud and forgery? It would be an insult to the understanding of the reader to argue such a question, instead of leaving him to follow the natural impulse of his own mind by answering it in the negative.

We must now follow Siraj-ud-daulah in his flight. His women, with the fifty laden elephants, were captured the very day after their departure, at Bogwangola, a town on the right bank of the Ganges, about twelve miles north-east of Murshidabad. Pursuers were also upon the track of the nabob, but his swift
boat had enabled him to out-distance them, and, but for a strange fatality which attended his movements and defeated his plans, he seemed about to escape. Before setting out to encounter Clive he had sent a pressing invitation to M. Law, who had immediately set out with his body of Frenchmen, and was within a few hours' march of Rajamahal, when, hearing of the disaster at Plassey, he deemed it prudent to stop, and wait for further intelligence. Had he proceeded he would almost to a certainty have joined the nabob and saved him, as there would have been little difficulty in defeating further pursuit, and reaching Patna. This was Siraj-ud-daulah's original intention, as he had reason to believe that the governor of Bihar residing there remained faithful amid the general defection, and would give him an asylum. He had accordingly shaped his flight in this direction, and arrived without interruption at Rajamahal. Here the boatmen, worn out with their excessive exertions, were permitted to pass the night in the boat, while the nabob and his two attendants sought shelter ashore in a deserted garden. Orme's account is that he was here accidentally recognized at break of day, by a person who had too good reason to remember him, from having been deprived of his ears by his orders, thirteen months before, when at this place he stopped short on the expedition to Purnea, and retraced his steps to execute the fatal resolution of expelling the English from Bengal. The native account is, that the person who had been thus maltreated was either a dervise or a fakir, and that by a singular coincidence the place where the nabob sought shelter was the cell of this very devotee. He was received with much apparent hospitality; but his host, stimulated at once by revenge and the hope of reward, took the earliest opportunity of communicating his important discovery to Mir Kassim, Mir Jafar's brother-in-law, who was then the commander of Rajamahal. His capture being thus effected, Siraj-ud-daulah was hurried back, suffering every kind of indignity consistent with the preservation of his life. At midnight he was brought as a felon before Mir Jafar, in the palace which so lately was his own, and, throwing himself on the ground, earnestly asked only for life. Mir Jafar was or affected to be moved, and a consultation ensued, during which the question of life or death was freely
discussed. No formal decision was given; but Mir Jafar must have been perfectly aware of what was to follow, when he went off to bed leaving the unhappy prisoner in the charge of his son Miran, a worthless youth of seventeen, who, having from the first given his opinion for murder, was not slow in bribing a wretch to perpetrate it. Siraj-ud-daulah had been removed to a distant chamber to await his fate. He was not kept long in suspense. As soon as the murderer entered he saw his purpose in his looks, and begged a few moments' respite to perform his ablutions and say his prayers. Even this was denied, and he was speedily despatched by the blows of a poignard. In the morning his mangled remains, after being exposed through the city on an elephant, were carried to the tomb of Ali Vardi Khan, his maternal grandfather. He was only in the twentieth year of his age, and the fifteenth month of his government. Worthless though he was, his tragical fate excited general commiseration, and the question must often have been asked, Why did not the English, whose influence at the court was paramount, not interfere to prevent it? Clive, when he urged the new nabob to press forward to Murshidabad and endeavour to secure the person of Siraj-ud-daulah, might have made him aware that he must not touch his life. This precaution, which mere humanity seemed to dictate, he omitted to use; it may have been from oversight. When afterwards referring to the subject, in a long letter which he addressed to the secret committee of directors, he contents himself with saying, "Siraj-ud-daulah was not discovered till some days after he is flight; however, he was at last taken in the neighbourhood of Rajamahal, and brought to Murshidabad on the 2nd instant late at night. He was immediately cut off by the nabob's son, and, as it is said, without the father's knowledge. Next morning the nabob paid me a visit, and thought it necessary to palliate the matter on motives of policy; for that Siraj-ud-daulah had wrote letters on the road to many of the jemadars of the army, and occasioned some commotions among those in his favour."1

M. Law, after losing the opportunity of saving Siraj-ud-daulah, and hearing of his capture, immediately marched back with his body of troops into Bihar, intending to offer their

services to Ramnarain, the governor, who, as he had formerly promised to support Siraj-ud-daulah, would now, it was supposed, not be disinclined to assume independence. By accepting of French assistance and forming alliances with neighbouring chiefs, it might be possible not only to set the new nabob at defiance, but to assume the offensive, and carry the war into the very heart of Bengal. This danger seemed so formidable to Mir Jafar that he immediately called Clive's attention to it, and urged the expediency of endeavouring to make prisoners of the French before they could reach Patna. The natural course would have been to have employed his own soldiers for this purpose. As yet, however, though he professed to have been called to the throne by the popular voice, he did not feel so secure as to be able to part with any of the troops on whose fidelity he could calculate, while, for very obvious reasons, it would have been madness to employ those whom he suspected. Clive easily saw the dilemma in which he was placed, and set his mind at ease by undertaking to send a detachment of his own troops in pursuit of the French. The detachment, consisting of 250 Europeans, 300 sepoys, fifty lascars, and two field-pieces, was placed under the command of Major Coote. The baggage and stores were laden in forty boats, which, besides being very imperfectly equipped, were not ready to start from Murshidabad before the 6th of July. By this time the French had got half-way to Patna, and were almost beyond the reach of capture. The expedition, however, deserves notice for the remarkable courage and perseverance displayed by those employed in it.

The troops arrived at Rajamahal on the 10th, and the boats on the 11th of July. Mir Kasim was expected to give all necessary assistance, but sent only 120 horsemen, who refused to proceed without two months' pay, and were therefore left behind. Major Coote, thus thrown on his own resources, set out again on the 13th, and in five days reached Bhagalpur, a distance of sixty-five miles. Here it was ascertained that the French had passed Patna, which is fifty-five miles in advance, four days before. Major Coote might now have been justified in abandoning the pursuit as hopeless; but he was of a character not to be deterred by ordinary obstacles, and by the 21st
accomplished twenty-five miles more, which brought him to Monghyr. The detachment had expected to find a resting-place within its fort—a place of considerable strength, situated on a precipitous rock, washed by the Ganges; but the garrison, instead of admitting them, manned the walls, lighted their matches and gave such unequivocal proofs of hostile intentions, that it only remained to make a circuit and continue the march still farther westward. Coote was now so near Patna that he was determined to reach it at all hazards, and was still pressing onward when he encountered an obstacle on which he had not calculated. The Europeans became mutinous. It required all Coote's energy to maintain them in discipline. As they murmured at their hardships and fatigues, he endeavoured to shame them into their duty by putting them into the boats, while he himself continued to march at the head of the sepoys. In this way he proceeded to Futwa or Futtuha, which is within ten miles of Patna. Hitherto Ramnarain, though perfectly aware of his approach, had taken no notice of it, but two letters were now received from him apologizing for the escape of the French, and ascribing it to the want of timely notice. It thus appeared that, however hostile Ramnarain's intentions might be, he was not yet prepared to avow them. The boldness of Coote's march, with a mere handful of men, for above 200 miles through a country known to be unfriendly, had perhaps overawed him. On the 26th the whole of the detachment, as well as the boats, reached Patna, and took up their station at the Company's factory, a spacious building, situated on the bank of the Ganges, outside but close to the western wall of the city. Ramnarain having made himself acquainted with the exact strength of the detachment, and probably also with the mutinous spirit which part of them had manifested, was now less disposed to profess friendship, and, on frivolous pretexts, declined to receive the visit which Coote had proposed to pay him. Matters, consequently, assumed a very ominous appearance. Two men were overheard talking of a design to massacre the detachment, and, at the same time, the conduct of the Europeans became so disorderly that Coote had no alternative but to bring thirty of them to a court-martial, which sentenced them to be flogged. The infliction of such a punish-
ment at so trying a time is a rare example of firmness and decision; but it must necessarily have weakened the detachment, and consequently added to the impending danger. Coote was, notwithstanding, determined to persevere in the original design of the expedition, and made preparations to continue the pursuit. The camp attendants and many of the boatmen now took alarm and deserted. By great exertions their places were supplied; and the detachment, after reaching Dinapur and crossing the Sone at its confluence with the Ganges, proceeded up the right or southern bank of the latter river, till they arrived opposite to Chhapra. In this place the Company had a factory for the collection of saltpetre, which is made in large quantities in the surrounding districts. It was therefore deemed expedient to cross over, but from the want of boats and other assistance, three days were consumed in the operation. At Chhapra Coote learned that Law’s party had reached Benares, and been favourably received by the raja, who was dependent on Suja-ud-daulah, Nabob of Oudh. To have proceeded would have been to risk collision with this formidable enemy, and it was therefore determined to wait for further orders. On the 12th of August a letter was received from Clive, ordering the return of the detachment to Patna, there to concert with Mahmu Ami Khan, Mir Jafar’s brother, a scheme for wresting the government of Bihar from Ramnarain. Not a moment was lost; and the very next day the troops, carried swiftly down the stream by the current, landed at Patna, and resumed their quarters in the factory. Coote saw that the only chance of overthrowing Ramnarain was to assault the citadel, then garrisoned by 2,000 men, and make him prisoner. The attempt was not only daring, but must have seemed almost desperate; and yet Coote would have made it, had not Mahmud counselled delay, in order to give him an opportunity of seducing the garrison. Before the result was ascertained, Mir Jafar, who had suggested the deposition of Ramnarain, became suspicious of the designs of his own brother. Coote was, in consequence, recalled, and arrived with the detachment at Murshidabad, on the 7th of September. The expedition thus failed of its object. Its indirect results, however, were important. The indomitable resolution which its commander displayed drew all eyes upon him as one
of the destined heroes of Indian warfare; and, at the same time, made a powerful impression on the minds of the natives, convincing them how hopeless would be any attempt to arrest the progress of a nation, a mere handful of whose soldiers could thus wander hundreds of miles through their country, as if defying attack, and yet without meeting an enemy bold enough to attempt it.

The very same day on which Coote set out on his remarkable expedition, an extraordinary scene was exhibited in Calcutta. The spoils of Mir Jafar’s treasury arrived. After a variety of discussions and equivocations, 7,271,666 rupees, in coined silver, were received, packed in 700 chests, and despatched down the river in 100 boats. At Nadia these were joined by all the boats of the squadron, and many others, the whole “proceeding with banners displayed, and music sounding, as a triumphal procession, to contrast that in which the inhabitants of the Ganges had seen Siraj-ud-daulah returning the year before from the destruction of Calcutta. Never before,” says Orme, from whom the whole quotation is made, “did the English nation, at one time, obtain such a prize in solid money; for it amounted (in the mint) to £800,000. sterling.” The reference to the mint would scarcely be intelligible without the explanation that the coined silver was not the regular currency of the country, but collections of coins of various countries, which had been hoarded up in the treasury of Murshidabad by successive nabobs.

The arrival of so much money, and the distribution of it partly among those whom the pillage of Calcutta had ruined, naturally diffused universal joy. Almost every family found itself suddenly raised to affluence, commerce revived, and the whole settlement gave signs of rapid and unexampled prosperity. The benefits, however, were not without alloy. A most mercenary spirit was engendered, and, at a time when unusual generosity might have been expected, the meanest selfishness was unblushingly displayed. Clive, as we have seen, had not forgotten his own interests, and had shared in the spoil to an extent which cannot easily be justified, and which his most unqualified admirers must unite in deploring, as it gave his enemies a handle for the charges which embittered his life, and probably led to the
act by which it was prematurely terminated. It must be admitted, however, that in all pecuniary arrangements where his comrades in arms or colleagues in council were concerned, Clive's conduct was characterized by a nice sense of honour and great disinterestedness, and in this respect often contrasts honourably with their rapaciousness. The select committee, while providing for themselves a most liberal compensation in the event of Clive's success, were not willing to incur responsibility in the event of failure; and hence, after giving their express sanction to all previous proceedings, and taking credit to themselves for "setting the machine in motion," addressed a letter to him, which could only be interpreted as a mere attempt to reap the profit without incurring any of the hazard. This letter was written before the battle of Plassey, and Clive, answering it after the battle, says:—"I cannot help thinking that had the expedition miscarried, you would have laid the whole blame on me." To another letter from the committee, written the very day when the battle was fought, he thus replies:—"I have received your letter of the 23rd instant, the contents of which are so indefinite and contradictory that I can put no other construction on it than an intent to clear yourself at my expense, had the expedition miscarried. It put me in mind of the famous answer of the Delphic oracle to Pyrrhus—'Aio te, Aeacide, Romanos vincere posse.'" The triumphant result of the expedition saved the committee from the ungenerous course which they appear to have contemplated; but when the division of the money was discussed disputes of a disgraceful character arose. Admiral Watson, though not formally a member of the select committee, was virtually so, in consequence of the active part which he had taken in all their proceedings, and on this ground thought himself entitled to share in the money allotted to that body. Clive, without admitting the strict justice of the claim, saw its reasonableness, and exerted himself to make it effectual; but, though he offered at once to set the example, by deducting his part, most of the others were too selfish to follow his example. It was perhaps thought that, as the admiral had refused to damage his character by signing the fictitious treaty, he was compensated in reputation for the loss of money. He certainly was; and it is more than probable that he himself was of the same opinion,
when, not many days after, he received in his own person a proof of the utter emptiness of all earthly possessions, and died of fever, after a few days' illness.

Another pecuniary dispute, which gave Clive much vexation, while it served to bring out some of the better and more prominent parts of his character, related to the division of prize-money. Besides the nabob's so-called donation to the army and navy, as to which there could not be any misunderstanding, since the obvious meaning was that the two services ought to share it between them; another and the largest present appears to have been made through Clive to the troops who, under him, had gained the victory. As the squadron could not ascend the river and take part in the victory, it could not be denied that this present belonged exclusively to the troops engaged. All this was clear, but some were selfish enough to maintain that by the term "troops" only soldiers should be understood, and that the sailors, who actually served in the expedition, had no claim. To obtain an equitable settlement of this and various other points, Clive assembled a council of war, which was attended by officers deputed from every branch of the troops. After much discussion, and in the face even of a strong protest made by Clive, the majority came to the shameful decision that the claim of the sailors who came with the expedition should not be recognized. Officers who had committed themselves thus far had no scruples in going further, and, in order to prevent the possibility of appeal against their meditated injustice, proceeded to vote that the division should be immediately carried into effect. In vain did Clive represent that "the money could not be divided till it was shроffed, and the agents of both parties present, without the greatest injustice." They still persisted, till Clive overruled their votes, and broke up the council of war. So bent, however, were they on carrying their point, that they sent him what they called a "remonstrance and protest." The nature of its contents may be learned from Clive's admirable answer, the principal part of which was as follows:—"Gentlemen,—I have received both your remonstrance and protest. Had you consulted the dictates of your own reason, those of justice, or the respect due to your commanding officer, I am persuaded such a paper, so highly injurious to your own honour as officers, could never have escaped you. You say you were assembled at a council
to give your opinion about a matter of property. Pray, gentlemen, how comes it that a promise of a sum of money from the nabob, entirely negotiated by me, can be deemed a matter of right and property! So very far from it, it is now in my power to return to the nabob the money already advanced, and leave it to his option whether he will perform his promise or not. You have stormed no town and found the money there; neither did you find it in the plains of Plassey, after the defeat of the nabob. In short, gentlemen, it pains me to remind you, that what you are to receive is entirely owing to the care I took of your interest. Had I not interfered greatly in it, you had been left to the Company's generosity, who, perhaps, would have thought you sufficiently rewarded in receiving a present of six months' pay; in return for which I have been treated with the greatest disrespect and ingratitude; and, what is still worse, you have flown in the face of my authority for overruling an opinion, which, if passed, would have been highly injurious to your own reputation, and been of the worst consequences to the cause of the nation and the Company." This answer, and the decisive step of placing the officers who brought the paper in arrest, and sending a captain, who had acted as ringleader, down to Calcutta, opened the eyes of the remonstrants. Either brought back to a sense of duty, or alarmed at finding that in selfishly grasping at too much they were risking the loss of all, they made their submission and were forgiven.

This dispute, and various others, which, though of a less glaring, were of a very disagreeable nature, leave no room to doubt that the sudden influx of wealth, obtained by nearly emptying the nabob's treasury, had diffused a mercenary and rapacious spirit among all classes, civil and military, in Calcutta. On seeing this result Clive must have had some misgivings as to the propriety of the course he had pursued, in accepting so much money for himself, and allowing so much to be exacted by others, who could not like him plead that they had done enough to deserve it. It was, perhaps, owing to some such feeling, that, in his very long letter to the secret committee of the court of directors, dated a month after he entered Murshidabad, while giving very full details as to the money which Mir Jafar had bound himself to pay, and the insufficiency of the treasury to pay it, he makes no allusion to the private treaty in which
the select committee, in stipulating for a donative to the army and navy, had inserted an exorbitant donation to themselves, nor to the enormous sums which, without being stipulated, had been received in the name of presents. The omission could scarcely be a mere oversight; if it was intentional, it is difficult to account for it on any other supposition than that it was a delicate subject, which it would be imprudent to mention incidentally, and which it was then judged premature to attempt to justify. The whole sum paid by Mir Jafar to individuals, including the stipulation to the army and navy, but exclusive of that to the Company, amounted—taking the rupee at the rate of exchange which it bore at the time—to £1,238,575. Of this Clive received in his capacities as member of the select committee and commander-in-chief, and in the form of an unstipulated gratuitous donation, £234,000.

It is not easy to overrate the advantages which the revolution in Bengal secured to the Company. The money must have been sufficient to compensate them for all their losses. All the land within the Maratha Ditch, and for a circuit of 600 yards without it, granted them in absolute property, must have been, from its position, of great and increasing value, and the zamindary, very vaguely described as including the country lying south of Calcutta, between the lake and the river, as far as Kalpi, must, notwithstanding the reservation of the customary payments, have added largely to their revenue, and still more largely to their power. The freedom of navigation was, moreover, secured by the stipulation that no forts should be erected on the banks of the river, from Hughli downwards; while the internal trade was set free from all exactions and annoyances by the certainty that the Company's dustuks or passports would no longer be liable to question, at least on frivolous grounds. Instead of existing merely on tolerance as traders, the victory of Plassey had made them a great political power. They had unmade one nabob and made another; and unless they were voluntarily to recede from the high position thus won for them, the three great provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa must henceforth acknowledge them as, to all intents, their lords paramount. Before proceeding to trace the further progress of this great revolution, it will be necessary to return to the Carnatic, which was likewise about to become the theatre of important events.
The French in the Deccan

The presidency of Madras, when they fitted out the expedition to Bengal, anticipated its return before the impending rupture between Great Britain and France should be actually declared, or at least in time to enable them to ward off the dangers with which they would in consequence be threatened. In this expectation, owing to the course of events in Bengal, they were disappointed. Clive, convinced that he could not serve the interests of the Company so effectually as by overthrowing Siraj-ud-daulah, retained all the troops which he had taken with him, and ventured, on his own responsibility, to disregard the orders repeatedly sent him to return. Thus weakened by the absence of a large part of their forces, the presidency of Madras remained on the defensive. The French, in the meantime, were not disposed to avail themselves of any superiority which they possessed. They expected the arrival of a powerful armament, and deemed it imprudent, while they had the prospect of striking a final blow at all the British settlements in India, to risk any loss, by engaging in partial operations. A kind of neutrality had hence been established between the companies, and it almost seemed as if the declaration of hostilities between their respective governments had only made them desirous of remaining at peace. This neutrality, however, being only a temporizing expedient, the result not of choice but of accidental circumstances, was necessarily of short duration. It was soon found that neither party could safely remain on the defensive. The Nabob of Arcot, though now nominally in possession of almost the whole territory which he claimed under that title, was unable to derive any regular revenue from it; and his British allies, who had obtained
large tracts of land in assignment of the debts which they had incurred in his behalf, were unable to make them effectual for payment. Two of the nabob’s brothers, one in the north and another in the south, were in open revolt; and numerous tributaries, influenced by their example, plainly intimated their determination not to pay unless under compulsion. The necessity of an immediate effort being thus made apparent, the presidency ordered Captain Calliaud, commanding officer at Trichinopoly, to proceed southward with all his disposable troops, to effect the subjugation and settlement of Madura and Tinnevelly, and sent a detachment northward to Nellore. Neither expedition proved successful. In an attempt to storm Nellore a serious repulse was received; and the siege of Madura was suddenly abandoned, in order to provide for the safety of Trichinopoly, against which the French, when made aware of the defenceless state in which it had been left, had secretly sent an overpowering force, collected on the spur of the moment by emptying Pondicherry and other places of their garrisons. The measure was dexterously planned, but very indifferently executed, and Trichinopoly was saved by Calliaud, who, by making his way into the city after the enemy supposed that they had rendered access to it impossible, performed the only memorable achievement in this desultory warfare, which, after its immediate objects had failed, continued to be carried on by both sides, as if in mere wantonness, with no advantage to themselves and infinite misery to the inhabitants. The result was, on the whole, unfavourable to the presidency, who, while their sources of revenue were dried up by the devastation of the country which ought to have furnished them, were constrained to purchase the departure of the Marathas, who had made an incursion into the Carnatic, and demanded a large sum as the arrears of chauth.

On the 24th of February, 1758, Admiral Pococke, who had succeeded Admiral Watson, arrived at Madras, with the ships of war from Bengal; and Admiral Stevens, exactly a month after, with four ships of the line from Bombay. This formidable squadron sailed on the 17th of April to the southward, but the hopes which it had raised were suddenly damped on the 28th, when a squadron of twelve sail, evidently French, was descried making for the road of Fort St. David. It was
commanded by Count d'Ache, and had on board Count Lally, an officer of Irish descent, who, having acquired distinction in European campaigns, had been sent out with the most extensive powers as governor-general of all the French settlements in India. He was accompanied by the regiment of his name, which mustered 1,080 strong, a small number of royal artillery, and many officers of distinction. This armament, which had long been expected, had been sent out by the French government, with a strong unhesitating conviction that, with the other troops already collected at Pondicherry, it was destined to achieve a series of triumphs. In none was this conviction stronger than in Lally himself, who was so impatient to commence operations, that leaving the rest of his ships to anchor in the vicinity of the Fort, he hastened off to Pondicherry to proclaim his commission, and urge the immediate departure of the troops there, with all the necessary requisites for carrying on the siege. This precipitancy displayed far more energy than wisdom, and raised up a host of obstacles which might easily have been avoided by acting with more calmness and deliberation. He had no doubt a right to expect that the most essential preparations had been already made, and that at all events no difficulty would be found in procuring the means of transport. Great therefore was his indignation on learning that everything remained to be provided. In these circumstances prudence counselled delay; but his resolution had been formed, and difficulties, so far from changing it, would only furnish an opportunity of acquiring new distinction by surmounting them.

On the very evening of his arrival 2,000 men, half of them Europeans and half sepoys, were on the march from Pondicherry for Fort St. David, under the command of Count d'Estaing. It had not even been deemed necessary to obtain exact knowledge of the roads or furnish provisions. The consequence was, that they went astray, and, after a night of hardship and fatigue, arrived in the morning in a state bordering on starvation. The following day, when other troops were despatched, and with them artillery, stores, and baggage, blunders still more serious were committed. Without paying the least regard to the feelings and prejudices of the natives, Lally issued a general order, compelling all, without distinction of rank or caste, to
supply the want of bullocks and other beasts of burden, by becoming themselves drawers and carriers. When this order was issued, the governor and council, aware of the general ferment which it would produce, endeavoured to prevent the execution, but Lally, ridicule another and even impugning their motives, persisted in his own reckless course. He was consequently regarded with abhorrence by the native population, who took their revenge by deserting on every opportunity, and rendering no service which they could possibly avoid.

While Lally was thus blundering and raising up obstacles to his own success, the fate of his whole armament was hanging in a trembling balance. The British squadron, after reaching the north extremity of Ceylon, steered again for the coast of India, and arrived off Nagapatam on the very day when the French squadron was entering the road of Fort St. David. Continuing its course northward along the shore, it no sooner came in sight of the enemy than Admiral Pococke threw out the signal for chase. Count d'Ache did not decline the challenge thus thrown out to him; and when come up with, about noon of the 29th, was waiting, with his ships in line of battle. His squadron, diminished by a ship and a frigate which had gone with Lally to Pondicherry, still amounted to nine sail. The British squadron consisted of only seven sail. The engagement proved indecisive. After it had lasted an hour and a half the French sheered off, apparently not for flight, but to reassemble their ships, which had become scattered, and resume the action. The British, very much damaged in their rigging, were unable and perhaps had no great inclination to follow. The combatants thus parted by a kind of mutual consent. The loss of the French during the action was the more severe, and afterwards it was considerably increased, one of their ships, the Bien Aime, of fiftyeight guns, having run ashore, in consequence of cutting her cable, and become a total wreck.

It was six days after the action before Count d'Ache reached Pondicherry. The troops he had with him were immediately landed and marched off to Fort St. David. As the difficulty of land transport had been greatly increased by Lally's rash and improvident proceedings, the artillery and ammunition were sent by sea, and put ashore near the mouth of the Penaar.
Everything being now provided for the siege, operations commenced on the 14th of May, by the erection of a battery in the vicinity of Cuddalore, and were continued with considerable vigour. The garrison consisted of 619 Europeans, of whom 286 were effective, and 250 seamen taken from two frigates which had been run ashore when the French squadron first made its appearance, and of 1,600 sepoys, lascars, and topasses. Such a force placed within a fortification which, by means of additions and improvements, had been rendered so complete that want of space was its only serious defect, should have been able to make a protracted defence. It was not so. Instead of acting on a kind of regular plan, the commander of the fort seems to have contented himself with allowing the garrison, as Mr. Orme expresses it, "to lavish away their fire night and day on everything they saw, heard, or suspected." In this way they sustained more injury than they inflicted, for "twenty of the carriages of their own guns were disabled and the works themselves shaken." The besiegers were thus permitted to proceed with little interruption. By the 30th they had advanced their trenches to within 200 yards of the glacis, and from twenty-one pieces of cannon and thirteen mortars kept up an incessant fire, with a constantly increasing superiority over that of the defenders, who were now beginning to feel the want of the ammunition of which they had been so lavish at the commencement, when no good purpose could be gained by it. It was now evident that the place must fall if not speedily relieved. Of this there was still some hope. Admiral Pococke with his squadron was known to be on the coast; and as he had already gained some advantage over his opponent, it was naturally expected that he would not allow Fort St. David to fall without a strenuous effort to save it. He did indeed make this effort; and after having been driven northward as far as Sadrass, had worked his way back, but with so much difficulty, that he only gained four leagues in two days. On the 25th he descried the French fleet lying in the road to Pondicherry; but Count d'Ache's courage had cooled after his previous encounter, and instead of accepting the challenge to fight, he resolved, with the sanction of his captains and the governor and council, to keep his ships moored near the shore under the protection of the batteries. Lally, hearing of this resolution and ashamed
of it, hastened from the siege, bringing with him a detachment of 400 Europeans and as many sepoys, whom he tendered to Count d’Ache to serve on board the fleet. The want of men, in consequence of the great number of sick who were on shore in the hospital, had been the only excuse for not risking an engagement, and as this obstacle was now removed by Lally’s offer, the previous pusillanimous resolution was abandoned. Count d’Ache, however, though thus compelled to quit the protection of the shore, had no intention to engage if he could possibly avoid it; and therefore, taking advantage of the wind, steered directly for Fort St. David, while Admiral Pococke had the mortification of only seeing him depart without being able to pursue. One of his ships, the Cumberland, sailed so badly that she operated as a continual drag upon the others; and the whole squadron, losing instead of gaining ground, was obliged to give way and return northward to Alamparva. When the garrison, after being buoyed with the hope of relief, saw Count d’Ache’s squadron enter the road, they at once abandoned all idea of further resistance, and on the 2nd of June hung out a flag of truce. The capitulation, in such terms as the victors chose to dictate, was soon arranged, and the French took possession of the place. The first use they made of their conquest was to raze the fortifications to the ground. Their strength was far greater than they had imagined, and they had good reason to congratulate themselves on their good fortune in having met with defenders so unskilful and pusillanimous, that all their lavish firing killed only twenty men. The fall of Fort St. David was immediately followed by that of Devicotta, which was abandoned by its garrison the moment the enemy were seen approaching it.

Lally, elated above measure with these successes, set off for Pondicherry to celebrate a Te Deum, and fix upon the scene of his next conquest. On this subject there could have been no room for doubt. He had spared no means to increase his force, having for that purpose bared all the forts of their garrisons, recalled the detachment which had so long kept Trichinopoly in a state of siege by occupying the island of Seringham, and in spite of remonstrance voluntarily relinquished all the advantages which Bussy had gained, by peremptorily withdrawing
him and all his troops from the Deccan, at the very time when French ascendancy there, after being well nigh overthrown, had again been triumphantly established. Nothing could justify Lally in the adoption of such measures but the determination to strike one great and decisive blow at British interests in the Carnatic, and hence the universal belief was that his next attempt would be to capture Madras. That presidency was, of course, in great alarm, and busily engaged in preparing against a siege deemed all but certain, when the cheering intelligence arrived that Lally and his army had set out in an opposite direction.

After celebrating his triumph in Pondicherry, Lally turned his attention to the state of the finances, and learned that the treasury was almost empty. The fact not only disappointed him, but aroused his indignation, for he strongly suspected that the greater part of the officials were engaged in systematic embezzlement, enriching themselves by plundering their employers. To a man of his warm temperament suspicion was equivalent to proof; and he was unsparing in his sarcasms against the governor and council. An open quarrel ensued, and much time was wasted in unprofitable bickering. Meanwhile the want of money only became more pressing. The troops were clamouring for their arrears of pay. How were they to be discharged, and how could any enterprise of importance be undertaken with an exhausted treasury? In this perplexity an expedient which it was thought might meet the necessities of the case was suggested. In 1751 the King of Tanjore, when attacked by Chanda Sahib, had purchased present relief by granting him a bond for 5,600,000 rupees. This bond was in possession of the government of Pondicherry. Why not attempt to make it available? The same kind of pressure which had extorted it from the king, might be successfully employed to extort payment. The circumstances were peculiarly favourable. Not only were the British, to whom alone the king could look for assistance, unable to furnish it, but in the fort of St. David a prisoner had been found whose presence with the army might be made to work effectually upon his fears. This prisoner was Gatika, the uncle of a claimant to the Tanjore throne, whose pretensions the Madras presidency, tempted by the offer of Devicotta, and other advan-
tages, rashly undertook to support in 1749. The proceedings, which were disgraceful to the presidency, have already been detailed; and it is therefore sufficient here to mention, as the result, that on finding it impossible to succeed by force, they suddenly changed sides, and made a sordid bargain, by which, in return for the cession of Devicotta by the reigning sovereign, they not only ceased to be the protectors, but engaged to become the jailers of the claimant. A timely warning of what was intended enabled him to escape; but his uncle, who managed for him, and was the more formidable rival of the two, was imprisoned in his stead. This was the hapless individual who was now to be a tool in the hands of the French to extort money, in the same manner as his nephew had been used by the British to extort the cession of a fort.

A roving expedition to Tanjore was thus, under the influence of pecuniary embarrassment, preferred to the siege of Madras; and Lally, leaving 600 men of his own regiment, with 200 sepoys, to form a camp of observation between Alamparva and Pondicherry, commenced his march southward with the remainder of the army. The improvidence manifested on his former expedition was repeated, as if the lesson of a dear-bought experience had been lost upon him; and the troops, not only unprovided with the means of transport, but destitute even of necessary food, were subjected to every species of privation, in passing through a country of singular difficulty. Before reaching Carrical, to which, as the place of rendezvous, the heavy artillery and cumbrous stores had been sent by sea, they had crossed no fewer than sixteen rivers, several of them accessible only after wading through extensive flats of mud and sand. They were thus employed during seven days, and in the whole seven had not once received a regular meal. The King of Tanjore, now that the enemy had arrived in his country, had little confidence in the army which had collected, not only among his own subjects, but by means of reinforcements drawn from various other quarters. The British, who should have been his principal resource, rather tantalized than assisted him, by sending him a detachment of 500 sepoys, with ten European artillerymen, and 300 Colleries, or native peons, drawn from the neighbouring polygars. But if the King of Tanjore was unable to cope with
his enemy in the open field, he was at least his equal in diplomacy, and opened a negotiation, which, whatever might be its issue, would at least have the effect of procuring a respite. Lally was within six miles of the city of Tanjore, when he received a message from the king, proposing that a conference should be held with a view to arrange the terms of accommodation. Nothing was more anxiously desired by the French commander, who probably had begun to feel that the enterprise in which he was engaged was of very doubtful policy, inasmuch as it was only delaying the execution of other enterprises of far more importance. In order, therefore, that not a moment might be lost, he halted his army, and sent forward two deputies, a captain and a Jesuit, with full powers to treat. Their first demand was payment of the principal and interest of the bond granted to Chanda Sahib. The king made an offer so paltry that it might at once have been rejected. The deputies, however, deemed it necessary to report it to Lally, who sent them back with a demand strangely modified. Instead of the whole sum due under the bond, he would accept 1,000,000 rupees in money, 600 draught bullocks, and 10,000 lbs. weight of gunpowder. As the latter part of the demand would have acquainted the king with the fact that in the hurry of the expedition, this essential element of warfare had been very inadequately provided, the deputies, more prudent than their principal, had the good sense to suppress it. The king refused the bullocks, on the plausible pretext that his religion did not allow him to supply them; but seemed willing to increase the amount of his money offer. Lally, when made aware that the gunpowder had not been mentioned, disapproved of the prudential considerations which had influenced the deputies, and sent them back, not only to mention it, but to insist upon it as an indispensable part of the arrangement. The result was as had been anticipated. Monakji, who was still the king's general, scouted the proposal as an insult, and the negotiation terminated abruptly.

Lally, now anxious to recover the time he had lost, immediately moved his camp, and took possession without opposition of the petta or suburbs, on the east side of the city wall. As yet, however, he was totally unprepared for attempting a siege. Only a few pieces of ordnance had accompanied the army, and those
shipped for Carrical had not arrived. At last, when some heavy cannon were brought forward, the king became once more alarmed, and to prove his sincere desire for peace, made a payment of 50,000 rupees to account, on receiving the Jesuit and a lieutenant-colonel as hostages for repayment of this advance in the event of hostilities being renewed. On this footing negotiations were renewed, and seemed approaching to a successful result, when Lally, thinking he had obtained proof of the king's insincerity, sent Dubois, the commissary of his army, to reproach him with his insincerity. At the same time he summoned a council of war, and having obtained from it a confirmation of his own opinion, that no reliance could be placed on professions of peace, and that the siege ought forthwith to be commenced, and prosecuted with the utmost vigour, wrote a letter denouncing vengeance on both town and country, and even threatening to carry off the king and his whole family as slaves to the Mauritius. This threat fixed the wavering resolution of the king, who announced his determination to defend himself to the last extremity. Captain Calliaud, who, though repeatedly applied to for assistance, had hesitated so long as negotiations with the French were pending, now sent from Trichinopoly a reinforcement consisting of 500 of his best sepoys, with two excellent sergeants and seventeen cannoneers.

After determining on the siege, Lally pushed on the necessary operations with great activity; and two breaching batteries, one of three and the other of two guns, were opened, on the 2nd of August, within 400 yards of the south wall. The effect fell far short of what had been expected. Five days' firing produced a breach of only six feet wide, and yet exhausted so much of the imperfect supply of ammunition, that only 150 charges for the cannon were left. The supply of the troops was still more deficient, amounting to no more than twenty cartridges a man. Nor was this all. The Tanjorines, though very ineffective as regular troops, were excellent skirmishers, and had so much increased the difficulty of obtaining provisions, that not more than two days' consumption remained. Rumours, too, of a naval engagement, in which Count d'Ache had been worsted, began to prevail, and the whole prospect looked so gloomy that Lally summoned a council of war, and submitted
to them, as the only alternative, to assault forthwith or raise
the siege. Of the twelve officers forming the council only two
advocated the bolder course; the rest, with Lally at their head,
decided against it. This decision could not long remain a secret.
Monakji, on being made acquainted with it, immediately
collected all his forces, and well nigh succeeded in surprising
the French camp. He was repulsed with difficulty, and con-
tinued, after the retreat commenced, to follow with clouds of
cavalry. The damage inflicted was not serious; and Lally,
though burning with shame at his discomfiture, and at the loss
of all his battering cannon and heavy baggage, had reason to
congratulate himself and his army on an almost miraculous
escape when they at length succeeded in reaching Carrical.
Their anxiety, however, was not at an end, for the first sight
which met them was the English squadron riding at anchor in
the mouth of the river.

Admiral Pococke, after endeavouring in vain to reach Fort
St. David in time to prevent its premature surrender, retraced
his steps, and anchored in the Road of Madras. Here eight
weeks were spent in making repairs and in obtaining necessary
supplies, and the 25th of July arrived before the squadron was
again ready to put to sea. Having sailed on that day it came in
sight of Pondicherry on the 27th, and beheld Count d’Ache’s
squadron at anchor. Before night both squadrons were out at
sea, and seemed equally determined to make another trial of
their strength and prowess. The weather, however, proved so
unfavourable that they were tossed about, occasionally losing
sight of each other, and were not able to meet, front to front,
and form their lines, till the 2nd of August. The battle was
fought not far from Carrical, and ended in the discomfiture of
the French, who drew off after several of their ships had sus-
tained serious damage. Their usual tactics saved them from
pursuit. While the British aimed chiefly at the hulls of the
vessels, they aimed chiefly at the masts and rigging, and thus
crippled their opponents so effectually that though Admiral
Pococke threw out the signal for a general chase it proved
utterly fruitless. In less than ten minutes Count d’Ache and
his ships were nearly out of cannon-shot. This distance was
rapidly increased, and within four hours after the action ceased
the hindmost French was five miles in advance of the foremost British ship. As it was hopeless to continue such a chase Admiral Pococke returned, and was anchored, as has been stated, in the mouth of the river, about three miles off Carrical, when Lally arrived from his ill-fated attempt on Tanjore.

Count d’Ache, now satisfied of the inability of his squadron to encounter that of the British, again anchored in the Road of Pondicherry, as close to the shore as the depth of water would allow. He was haunted with the idea that Admiral Pococke was remaining to windward solely with the view of seizing the first available opportunity to attack him. Having this conviction, he felt insecure even under the protection of the batteries of Pondicherry, and to the dismay of its inhabitants announced his determination to quit the coast, and make the best of his way to the |Mauritius. Lally, startled by this intelligence, hastened to Pondicherry, and backed by the authority of a mixed council which he had summoned to discuss the matter, endeavoured, partly by persuasion and partly by menace, to induce Count d’Ache either to encounter the English squadron once more, or at least to defer his departure so long as it continued on the coast. He did not succeed. The French admiral, supported by all his captains, declared it impossible either to fight or remain, and after consenting, with much reluctance, to leave 500 of his sailors and marines to serve on shore, set sail with all his ships and turned his back on India.

Lally, while smarting under his recent failure at Tanjore, was not disposed to allow the whole, or even the larger portion of the blame to rest on his own shoulders, and found little difficulty in satisfying himself that if all had done their duty as well as he did his, the result would have been very different. In thus attempting his own vindication, he made rash and intemperate charges both against his own officers and the leading members of the government. He thus stirred up a new host of enemies who fought him with his own weapon. Charges of misconduct were freely bandied to and fro; and Lally had the mortification to know that throughout the settlement, and in its highest official circles, he was denounced as incompetent, and, what he must have felt to be still more insulting, stigmatized as a coward. The true way to answer his accusers was to wipe
off the disgrace of Tanjore by some brilliant achievement, and his thoughts turned at once to Madras, the capture of which would at once recover all the fame which he had lost, and be the most important service which he could render to his country. He was perfectly aware, however, that the enterprise was by no means hopeful. During the time which he had lost in Tanjore the British presidency had been busily employed in improving their means of defence; and the departure of Count d'Ache leaving Admiral Pococke in complete possession of the sea, not only made it easy for him to pour in all necessary supplies, but would expose the besiegers to the danger of attacks and surprises, by the sudden landing of troops at their most vulnerable points. Then, as before, the treasury was exhausted; and it was again necessary, at the expense of considerable delay, to engage in subordinate operations merely for the purpose of endeavouring to replenish it. So discouraging were all these considerations that Lally speaks in his own Memoire as if he never contemplated the possibility of a successful siege, and expected to do nothing more than bombard the place, pillage the Black Town, and devastate the surrounding country.

Before setting out for Madras Lally had judged it expedient, for reasons already mentioned, to engage in several military operations of minor importance. Saubinet, an officer whom he had despatched with a detachment to the west, captured Trinomali on the 10th of September, and Carangoly a few days after. The Chevalier de Crillon, with another detachment, had recovered Trivatore. Lally himself, in the meantime, made a tour of inspection, visiting Alamparva, Gingi, and Chittapet, on the way to Wandiwash, which he had appointed as the place of rendezvous for all the separate detachments. Here he was joined by Bussy, who, in obedience to the peremptory orders which he had received, but with a full conviction of the pernicious consequences, had quitted the Deccan. He had brought his troops with him as far as Nellore, and then hastened forward with a few attendants, in the hopes that from his representations he might be permitted to return before the evils which he foresaw were actually realized. Lally, however, received his statements with indifference and incredulity, and attached Bussy permanently to his own army. It will shortly be
seen that the French thus lost all the ascendency which they had
established at the court of the Deccan, and exposed themselves
to an attack which ultimately deprived them of the large and
valuable territory which had been permanently ceded to them
in the Northern Circars. While at Wandiwash, Lally sent Count
d’Estaing with a detachment against Arcot. It proved unnec-
essary; for Raja Sahib, the late Chanda Sahib’s eldest son, whom
the French had recently invested with the title of nabob, had
already succeeded by bribery in corrupting the governor of his
so-called capital. Lally, whom even the semblance of success
now elated, considered the surrender of Arcot so important
an event that he set out to receive it in person. After making
his entry in a triumphal form, under the discharge of all the
weapon, he endeavoured to magnify the event by causing it to
be proclaimed, with much ostentation, in Pondicherry and all
the other French garrisons. While thus gratifying his vanity he
overlooked a capture which would have been of much more
consequence. The fort of Chingleput, situated thirty-six miles
south-west of Madras, was justly regarded as the key of the
country on which that city depended for supplies of provisions
and other necessaries. The possession of it would therefore have
contributed greatly to the success of the meditated siege. Strange
to say, both French and British had neglected it; the latter
furnishing it only with a handful of troops, which might easily
have been overpowered; while the former, who might have
carried it by escalade, by open day, made no attempt to secure
it. At length, when Lally awoke to a sense of its importance,
he found that the presidency had anticipated him, and added
greatly to the strength of the garrison. The capture, however,
still seeming possible, he resolved to march against it with
his whole force, and made application to the government of
Pondicherry to furnish him with the funds necessary to put it in
motion. The old answer was returned. The treasury was empty,
and all the money which could be immediately sent amounted
only to 10,000 rupees (£1,000). The roving expeditions in the
Carnatic had not paid their own expenses, the power of borrow-
ing was exhausted; and Lally saw no alternative but to abandon
his design, place his troops in cantonments, and return to
Pondicherry, where, as usual, he vented his indignation in
sarcasms against its officials.
The siege of Madras being now regarded as a certainty, the presidency continued to increase their means of defence. They recalled Captain Calliaud with all the Europeans in garrison at Trichinopoly; and when Admiral Pococke, who was anchored in the road, found it necessary on the approach of the northern monsoon to sail for Bombay, obtained from him 100 men, forming the marines of the squadron. They had previously received a reinforcement by the Company’s ship Pitt, of fifty guns, which had left England with six others under convoy of two ships of the line, intended to join the admiral’s squadron. On board these ships was a regiment of the king’s troops, but of these the Pitt brought only 100 men, with their commanders, Colonel Draper and Major Brereton. Admiral Pococke had sailed on the 11th October with the full sanction of the presidency, who felt confident that no movement of importance would be made by the enemy till the rains should cease, and that they would at all events be able to make good the defence till the expected reinforcement of troops should arrive, or the change of monsoon should enable the squadron to return. Only a week after its departure, an unexpected arrival of treasure from the Mauritius, and of 100,000 rupees brought by M. Moracin, who had been left in charge of Bussy’s detachment, inspired Lally with new hopes. Accordingly, as the arrival of the rainy season was unusually delayed, he put his troops in motion. Chingleput was supposed to be his object; and as both parties were now fully alive to its importance, the presidency, alarmed for the safety of a supply of provisions which was then on the way to it, and on the arrival of which its ability to make a successful defence would greatly depend, resolved immediately to take the field, with 1,200 Europeans and 1,800 sepoys—forming by far the larger part of the Madras garrison. One-half of these troops, under Colonel Draper, advanced to Vandalur, about half-way between Madras and Chingleput; the other half, under command of Colonel Lawrence, halted at St. Thome, in a position which both covered Madras and kept open a communication with Draper. These movements defeated the enemy’s design on the convoy of provisions, and the safety of Chingleput was effectually secured. Lally’s disappointment was great. The danger of leaving such a place in his rear
was sufficiently obvious, but he determined to run the risk, as he had only a choice of difficulties, and might, in attempting to take Chingleput, lose the only opportunity which he might have to lay siege to Madras.

On the 7th of December, Lally, now advancing with his whole army, halted at Vandalur. All the British troops which had taken the field were still stationed at St. Thome, under Colonel Lawrence. This able and cautious officer had no intention to risk a general action; and therefore, on penetrating the object of a feint which Lally employed with some dexterity, in the hope of placing himself between the city and the camp, he struck his tents and moved with his whole force to the Choultry Plain, lying about a mile and a half south-west of Fort St. George. Lally halted at St. Thome till the morning of the 12th, when he again moved and continued his approach. A smart cannonade was meanwhile kept up by both sides; but as Colonel Lawrence had no other object in removing without the walls than to gain time, he retired as the enemy approached, and marched with his main body into the fort, leaving only some detachments of Europeans and sepoys to guard the passes of the Black Town. As soon as the fort was thus occupied, the council of the presidency assembled and committed the defence of the siege to the governor, Mr. Pigott, with a recommendation to take the advice of Colonel Lawrence on all occasions. After all the outposts were called in, the whole force available for the defence of Madras amounted to 1,758 Europeans and 2,220 sepoys. Besides these, 300 horse, on whom little dependence could be placed, accompanied the nabob, who took refuge in the fort when the encampment at St. Thome was abandoned. The besiegers numbered 2,700 Europeans and 4,000 native troops. Of the former, 300 were cavalry, excellently mounted and disciplined, and, according to Orme, "the greatest number which had hitherto appeared together in India."

The details of the siege possess little interest. The Black Town not admitting of effectual defence, the French gained easy possession of it, and immediately began to pillage. Among other things they discovered a large quantity of arrack, in which the common soldiers indulged so freely; that, according to the
report of some spies, most of them were unfit for duty. This report suggested to Colonel Draper the probable success of a sally. He was authorized to attempt it, and about midnight marched out of the western ravelin at the head of 500 picked men. So careless were the enemy, that they reached a main street of the Black Town without being discovered, and would probably have gained a decided advantage had not the drummers of the detachment, who were mostly black boys, suddenly, of their own accord, beat the grenadiers' march, and been followed by a general huzza from the whole line. Thus put upon their guard, the enemy succeeded, after a short struggle, in repairing the effects of the surprise, and very nearly cut off the retreat of the attacking party. Several blunders, perhaps unavoidable in the darkness, were committed on both sides, but the result on the whole was to give the besiegers an unfavourable impression of the courage and discipline of the garrison—an impression, indeed, so unfavourable, that one of the most experienced of the French officers proposed a general assault, and volunteered to lead the principal attack himself. The proposal, in which there was probably more bravado than seriousness, was not entertained, and the erection of batteries was immediately commenced. A few days' experience within the fort satisfied the nabob, and he was at his own request, and greatly to the relief of the garrison, shipped with his family on board a Dutch vessel which was lying in the roads, and engaged to land him at Nagapatam, whence he might easily proceed to Trichinopoly.

The operations of the besiegers were much retarded by obstacles, partly the result of their own improvidence. For some time after they had invested the fort, the greater part of their artillery, which had been shipped at Alamparva, was at sea detained by contrary winds, and they were unable to open their fire before the 2nd of January, 1759. Meanwhile they were kept constantly on the alert both by sallies from the garrison and by detached parties, headed chiefly by Mahmud Yusuf, an excellent sepoy commander of Clive's training, who intercepted several of their convoys, and devastated the country from which they derived their principal supplies. When the fire did open it was very ineffective. It proceeded only from two batteries,
and was more than answered by the fort, the works of which remained uninjured, though the shells did considerable damage to the most conspicuous public buildings. So little were the besiegers satisfied with their first fire that they desisted, and allowed several days to elapse before they ventured to resume it. By this time the number of their guns had been increased, and the effect produced was proportionally greater. Not a few of the guns of the fort were disabled, and the trenches which had been commenced at a breastwork thrown up close to the sea, 580 yards from the covered way, had been gradually advanced by zigzags to the distance of fifty yards. On the 23rd of January, the fire of the besiegers began to slacken. The cause proved to be a want of ammunition, and they were waiting for a supply by a brigantine which had sailed from Pondicherry on the 14th, when intelligence was received which completely changed the prospects of besiegers and besieged. Admiral Pococke had arrived at Bombay on the 10th of December, where he had been joined by the two ships of the line from England; and on the 31st, six of the Company's ships, having on board 600 men belonging to Colonel Draper's regiment, had sailed under convoy of two frigates, and were on their way to Madras.

Lally was now aware that the assault, if it was to be made at all, could not be much longer delayed. Indeed, a general rumour prevailed that it was to take place on the very night when the intelligence was received, and in this belief the whole garrison remained at their posts under arms till morning. The rumour was groundless; and another fortnight was to elapse before a breach which had any appearance of being practicable could be effected. Meanwhile the siege continued, though the hopes of the besiegers were becoming fainter and fainter. On the 30th, a vessel was descried to the southward. She proved to be the Company's ship Shaftesbury, and was one of those expected from Bombay. As the worst sailer among them, she had been made the hospital ship, and left behind on the 7th of the month off the south of Ceylon. Shortly after, both wind and current began to favour her, and she was the first to reach the destined port. She added nothing to the strength of the garrison, for the only soldiers on board were thirty-six men, all sick; but she brought what was become even more necessary than men—
The French in the Deccan  775

thirty-seven chests of silver, and a large quantity of military stores. On the 7th of February a breach was made, which Lally, who was naturally sanguine and had become very impatient, thought practicable. His engineers and artillery officers on being consulted, were not only of a different opinion, but volunteered, though unasked, to add, that the continuance of the siege seemed to them only a sacrifice of the lives of men without any probability of success. Lally, though he combated this depending view with much vivacity, could hardly avoid perceiving that there was only too great a probability of its eventually proving correct. During the first weeks of the siege, the soldiers had received only half-pay; latterly, their pay had been stopped altogether; and while the native troops were gradually thinning away by desertion, the Europeans were threatening to become mutinous. The gunpowder was nearly, and the bomb-shells wholly expended, and it was only with the utmost difficulty that a precarious and very inadequate supply of provisions could be procured. Amid all these discouraging circumstances, the garrison, already strong enough to make a successful defence, was in daily expectation of a powerful reinforcement. Nothing more was necessary than its arrival to compel an instant abandonment of the siege. The ships, long detained by contrary winds and currents, which had obliged them to make their voyage by proceeding along the east coast of the Bay of Bengal, at length, on the 16th of February, made their appearance in the north-east, steering directly for the road. "No words," says Lally, "are adequate to describe the effect which they produced." His resolution was at once taken, but as a cloak to it, he kept up his fire with more vivacity than before. The rumour again spread that the assault was about to be made, and the garrison were once more kept a whole night under arms. This apparent activity and resolution was only a feint; and when morning dawned the besiegers were seen in full march towards the Choultry Plain. So hurried was their departure, that Lally was unable to execute the resolution which he had formed from the first to reduce the Black Town to ashes, in the event of being compelled to raise the siege, and besides leaving cannon amounting in all to fifty-two pieces, he did not even attempt to transport his sick and wounded. It was not an oversight; for in the
hospital where forty-two Europeans were lying, a letter was found, in which he recommended them to the governor’s care. It is needless to say that no such recommendation was required in order to secure the performance of a simple act of humanity. The whole loss of men by the garrison during the siege, including those who deserted or were taken prisoners, amounted to 579 Europeans and 762 sepoys; the loss of the besiegers is not accurately known, but it has been inferred from an intercepted letter of Lally, that it must have amounted in Europeans alone to at least 700. Considering the length of the siege—exactly two months from the day of breaking ground—the casualties were fewer than might have been expected; but both besiegers and besieged, while displaying abundance of skill and courage, were cautious not to expose themselves unnecessarily, and avoided serious loss by fighting for the most part under cover. Lally was permitted to continue his retreat with little interruption, and retired upon Arcot. There we must for the present leave him, and turn to another quarter which had become the scene of important events.

Shortly after Bussy had, by withdrawing with his troops from the Deccan, relinquished the fruit of all his distinguished achievements, the intrigues which had long been carried on at the court of Salabat Jung, and had repeatedly threatened to overthrow the French ascendancy, broke out afresh, and even proceeded to open violence. The subahdar, who was a man of a feeble and indolent character, became a mere pageant in the hands of his brother Nizam Ali and Basalat Jung, who, though pursuing separate and opposite schemes of ambition, deemed it politic for a time to combine their interests. When Bussy announced his determination to depart, Salabat Jung could scarcely believe him serious; and when he went to take his leave, the timorous old subahdar, throwing aside all restraint, expressed himself in terms bordering on despair. He called Bussy the guardian angel of his life and fortune, and distinctly intimated that the day he lost him he would consider his own unhappy fate as sealed. He had good cause for his forebodings, for Nizam Ali, at first contented to use him as his tool, was bent on seizing his throne. In the course of nature he would have reached it without a crime, as he had been recognized as
his heir to the subahship, but he was too impatient to wait, and secured the object of his ambition by first imprisoning and then murdering his brother. These, however, were only the ultimate results of Bussy's recall; the more immediate results were manifested in the Northern Circars, where the French had for some time ruled as absolute masters. The importance of their possessions in this quarter was too well known to be overlooked even by Lally, with all his rashness, and therefore, in the letter by which Bussy was recalled, he enjoined him to leave, under an officer of the name of Conflans, as many troops as might be deemed necessary to insure their safety. Under ordinary circumstances the number left would have sufficed, but a danger not apprehended was at hand, and Conflans, whose military talents were of the lowest possible order, was totally unfit to contend against it.

Bussy, in answer to an earnest application from Siraj-ud-daulah, had determined to lead a force into Bengal by way of Orissa, and with that view had marched north to the sea-port town of Ganjam, where he was deterred from proceeding farther by intelligence of the capture of Chandernagore. In retracing his steps he was bent on retaliating the injury which French commerce had thus sustained, and led his troops against Vizagapatam, and the other factories which the English Company possessed within the limits of the Circars. They were devoid of any means of effectual resistance, and were all captured towards the end of 1757. The loss to the Company was serious, for in addition to the goods and other property pillaged from them, they were forcibly excluded from a profitable branch of trade, those of the factories situated on arms of the Godavari having been accustomed annually to provide 700 bales of excellent cloths at a cheap rate for the home market. The recovery of the factories wrested from them was of course earnestly desired by the Company; and a raja of the name of Anandaraj, whose territory lay in the provinces of Rajahmundry and Cicacole, doubtless aware of this desire, offered them his assistance. Deeply offended at some arrangements which Bussy had made, he no sooner heard of his recall than he took up arms, and by a sudden dash made himself master of Vizagapatam. His ambition now was to expel the French from all
the provinces which had been ceded to them. The attempt was too formidable to be undertaken by himself single-handed, and he therefore made overtures to the presidency of Madras, offering to reinstate them in Vizagapatam as the first pledge of his sincere desire for their alliance. When, in consequence of the threatening aspect of affairs in the Carnatic, his offers were declined, he made the same proposal to the presidency of Bengal. It was voted delusive and chimerical by all the members except Clive, to whom, independent of its other merits, it had the special recommendation of promising to do good service to his former employers at Madras. He must have regretted his inability to return the troops which had only been temporarily intrusted to him for the expedition to Bengal, but some compensation might now be given by creating a diversion in their favour. The French, seeing their ceded provinces in danger, would be obliged either to submit to the loss of them, or to succour them by weakening themselves in the Carnatic. In either case a most important object would be gained. A delay of some months, however, was necessary. The proposal of Anandaraj was made in July, 1758, and no action could be taken upon it till the change of the monsoon in September or October. In the interval the question was naturally asked,—Why, if troops could be spared for an expedition to the Circars, should they not be sent at once to Madras, when the certainty of an approaching siege would enable them to give the direct aid so urgently required, instead of being employed merely to make a diversion? The question did not admit of a full, or at least of an ingenuous answer; and there is ground to suspect that the preference given to the Circars was dictated, not so much by a conviction of its being the best, as of its being the safest and most politic course. In the Circars the troops would still be subject to the authority of the Bengal presidency, and might be recalled should any emergency render it necessary; whereas, if they were sent to Madras, the authorities there might imitate the example which Clive himself had set, and easily find pretexts for refusing to allow them to return.

On these and similar prudential considerations, an expedition to the Circars to act in concert with Anandaraj having been determined, the command of it was given to Colonel Forde.
This officer, originally attached to Adlcrcon's regiment in the king's service, had quitted it on the invitation of the Bengal presidency to take the command of their army in the event of Clive's departure. It will be seen that the wisdom of this choice was fully justified by the event. The expedition, consisting of 500 Europeans, 2,000 sepoys, and 100 lascars, with six brass six-pounders as field-pieces, six twenty-four pounders for battery, a howitzer, and an eight-inch mortar, left the river in the end of September, but owing to tempestuous weather did not reach Vizagapatam till the 20th of October. Anandaraj, who was encamped with his troops at the fort of Kassimcotah, about twenty miles to the westward, had already fulfilled his promise by delivering up Vizagapatam to a servant of the Company, who had been sent from Calcutta for that purpose, but at the same time declined to furnish any money. Forde's military chest had been supplied with rupees and gold mohurs to an aggregate amount of about £14,000. It was evident that this sum would be speedily exhausted, and some time was spent in adjusting the terms on which the raja's and Company's forces were to co-operate. At length a regular treaty was drawn up, stipulating that all plunder should be equally divided—that the countries conquered should belong to the raja, the sea-ports and towns at the mouths of rivers, with the revenues of the districts annexed to them, being, however, reserved to the Company—that no proposal for the alienation or restitution of the territory and towns acquired should be entertained without the consent of both parties—and that the raja should furnish 50,000 rupees a month for the expenses of the army. Before this treaty was concluded, the united army moved so slowly that nearly a month was spent in advancing thirty miles beyond Kassimcotah. At length, however, the march was commenced in earnest, and on the 3rd of December Conflans, who had collected the French troops from all parts, was seen strongly posted about forty miles from Rajahmundry, on the highroad leading to it from Vizagapatam. His force consisted of 500 Europeans, with more cannon than they could use at once, and a large number of native troops, including 500 horse and 6,000, sepoys. Forde's original force gained much in numbers but little in effective strength from his junction with the raja, whose whole army consisted of
500 paltry horse and 5,000 foot, most of them armed with pikes and bows. In fact, the only things of value which he furnished were four field-pieces, managed by forty Europeans whom he had collected.

Forde, having advanced to within four miles of the French camp, endeavoured to bring them to action by threatening to place himself in their rear, and thus cut off their communication with Rajahmundry. At last, by a series of manoeuvres, he succeeded in convincing Conflans that he was afraid of him, and was preparing to retreat. Nothing more was necessary to induce this incompetent commander to forego all the advantages of his position. Suddenly forming his line, he advanced to the attack in much haste and little order. The native troops on either side were quickly routed, and the decision of the day was left almost entirely to the Europeans. The confused manner in which Conflans had formed his line gave Forde a decided advantage. After a murderous fire which broke the French ranks, he drove them back in disorder, and before they had time to rally ordered a charge, which resulted in the capture of all their guns. After the flight had become general, a stand might still have been made at the camp, but those within it only waited till an assault was threatened, and then hastened off in the utmost confusion. Among the fugitives none was more conspicuous than Conflans, who rode with such speed that he measured the distance of forty miles before midnight, and sought refuge in Rajahmundry. Here he was joined by the wrecks of his army, but his fears still pursued him, and Forde, on arriving next day, found the place evacuated. In the fort a large quantity of ammunition and military stores was found.

This victory was gained on the 9th of December, and, had Anandaraj been less tardy in his movements, might have been immediately followed by more brilliant successes. He did not make his appearance till the 16th, and even then only employed himself in endeavouring to evade the payments to which he had bound himself by express stipulation. To meet his wishes the treaty was modified to the effect that all the money furnished by him should be considered as a loan, and that all the countries which might be conquered beyond the Godavari, with the exception of those belonging to the French, should be equally
divided between him and the British. In the altercations caused by his shuffling conduct, more time was wasted than might have sufficed to accomplish all the objects of the expedition. The army could not be again put in motion till the 28th of January, 1759. Its destination was Masulipatam. The first town of importance on the road was Yalore, or more properly Ellore, the capital of a province of the same name, one of the four ceded to the French. The British reached it on the 6th of February; Anandaraj, who had been levying contributions on the right and left, did not make his appearance till the 18th, and after his arrival wove so many pretexts for delay, that a new start could not be made before the 1st of March. Colonel Forde had now more cause than ever to regret the interminable delays to which he had been subject, for intelligence arrived that a new enemy was about to enter the field.

Conflans, after his defeat, had sent letters to Salabat Jung earnestly urging him to march with his army from Hyderabad to Masulipatam. There, by uniting their forces, they might both destroy the British troops and punish Anandaraj for his revolt. When the subahdar received these letters, he had begun to reap the bitter fruits of Bussy's departure, and, indolent as he was, would gladly have made any exertion that might have the effect of inducing him to return. Such an event would have been most distasteful to Nizam Ali and the intriguers who were leagued with him. At the same time, they were anxious to take advantage of any change which might facilitate their recovery of the ceded provinces; and hence, after wavering as to the course to be pursued, became convinced that Salabat Jung might be allowed to march with his army to Masulipatam. Basalat Jung, entertaining views which made the friendship of the French desirable, brought a body of troops from his government of Adoni. After joining, near the Krishna, the united force mustered 15,000 horse and 20,000 foot. Forde had thus the alarming prospect of encountering, instead of one, three armies. A soldier of less nerve would have paused before committing himself to a contest with such fearful odds. His courage and decision, on the contrary, rose with the danger, and he determined to proceed. On the 6th of March, he came in sight of Masulipatam, and on the same day received the gratifying
intelligence that Lally had been compelled to raise the siege of Madras.

Masulipatam consisted of a town and a fort. The town, a place of great extent, occupied a rising ground between two morasses, and was separated from the sea by a narrow belt of sandhills. The fort, situated south-east of the town, and communicating with it across one of the morasses by a broad causeway 2,000 yards in length, formed an irregular parallelogram 800 yards long from north to south, and about 600 yards broad. On the west, north, and east it was inclosed by the morass, and on the south by a sound partly formed by the discharge of an arm of the Krishna. The only hard ground within a mile of the fort, on the north and west, was formed by a few patches of sand which rose above the morass, but on the east the belt of sandhills was only about 800 yards distant.

Confians with his troops was encamped in the town, and might easily, by throwing up an entrenchment on the hard ground between the morasses, have placed an insuperable barrier in the way of Forde's approach. Instead of this he only waited till the invading force appeared, and then retreated by the causeway into the fort. Thus unobstructed, Forde took up his station on the sands to the north-east, while Anandaraj and the Zamindar of Narsipur, whom he had induced to join him, took possession of the town. The defences of the fort, though modernized by the French after they took possession of it in 1751, could not be considered strong. There was a ditch but no glacis; and the walls, composed of mud faced with brick, were on the west, north, and east flanked with eleven bastions. The south side was considered to be sufficiently defended by its position in the sound. The gateway was at the north-west angle, facing the causeway, 120 yards of which was converted into a caponiere, terminating in a strong ravelin.

The besiegers were far too few in number to make regular approaches to the fort, and determined to attack it by batteries erected on the sands on the east. This position, besides being the nearest to the walls, had the advantage of giving ready access to the shore, on which the battering artillery which had been brought by sea was to be landed. Ultimately the whole artillery employed in the attack consisted of four twenty-four, four eighteen, and two
twelve-pounders, mounted on three detached batteries, without the communication of trenches. It was certainly a very bold, not to say a rash attempt, to take such a place by such feeble means. Not only should the fire of the fort have been able to overpower that which was brought against it, but the garrison outnumbered the attacking force. Conflans, however, was too ignorant and timid to turn his advantage to account, and remained cooped up within the walls, employing his means of defence so imperfectly, that during the eighteen days employed by the besiegers in erecting their batteries, the incessant fire from the fort killed only five men. While thus favoured by the pusillanimity of the garrison, Forde was beset with dangers. On the 19th of March, six days before the batteries were completed, the whole of his Europeans broke out in mutiny and threatened to march away if they were not immediately paid the prize money already due, and assured that if they took Masulipatam the whole of the booty would be delivered up to them. The former demand could not be complied with as the military chest was empty, and the latter was in direct opposition to the Company's regulations, which gave only the half of the booty to the captors. No sooner was this disgraceful mutiny overcome by good temper and firmness, and the batteries opened, than news arrived that Basalat Jung with his army was only forty miles distant, Anandaraj and the zamindars with him were so alarmed, that in the course of the night, without a note of warning, they marched off with their whole forces, and could not be induced to return till it was made palpable to them that by their flight they were only rushing to destruction instead of escaping from it.

The batteries had kept up a hot fire from the 25th of March to the 6th April. On the evening of this day engineers reported that it could only be continued for two days more, as by that time the ammunition would be expended. What was now to be done? Salabat Jung, and a body of French troops who had been scouring the surrounding country, were now so near that the retreat by land was absolutely cut off. An escape by sea was still possible, but Forde rejected it as disgraceful, and determined to storm. With this view the fire was maintained with double vivacity on the 7th, and with so much effect, that three bastions, one near the centre, and the other two at the extremi-
ities of the eastern wall, were sufficiently ruined to admit of mounting. As the attack might thus be made from more places than one, the attention of the garrison was distracted; and hence, while two feints were practised, the real attack made at the bastion of the north-east angle met with comparatively little obstruction. It was committed to the European battalion, mustering in all, with the artillermen, and thirty sailors taken from the Hardwicke, 346 rank and file, and 1,400 sepoys. One would willingly tell of the heroism of the assailants, but unfortunately very little was displayed, and success was not so much extorted by them as yielded by their opponents. When the storming party was about to move, Captain Callendar, appointed to lead them, was nowhere to be found. He afterwards appeared when the assault was understood to have succeeded, and met from a stray shot the death which he had in vain endeavoured to escape by cowardice. Even after the breach was mounted, and an advance made along the rampart, the cry of "A mine!" produced such a panic, that Captain Yorke, who was gallantly heading the storming party, found himself suddenly left with only two drummers; and on hastening back to the breach, found all his men in confusion, some even proposing to make their escape. Partly by threats, and partly by persuasion, having induced a small band to follow, the others regained their courage, and the capture was achieved. Conflans, indeed, gave little further trouble. Seated in his own house, he continued receiving and sending contradictory messages, and was no sooner summoned than he hastened to surrender. To his disgrace it must be added, that when the prisoners were counted they considerably outnumbered the captors. Among them were 500 Europeans. Within the fort were found 120 pieces of cannon, abundance of military stores, and much valuable plunder. The improbability of the assault is said to have been the principal cause of its success. The garrison had, from the first treated the siege as a mockery; and being in expectation of a reinforcement from Pondicherry, were only waiting its arrival to sally out, and, in concert with the native army now at hand, inflict signal punishment on the British for their presumption. The overweening confidence of the French was better deserving of punishment, and received it.
The expedition to the Northern Circars produced more brilliant results than the most sanguine could have anticipated. Salabat Jung and his advisers, though surprised and vexed at the capture of Masulipatam, were not without the hopes of being able to recover it. With this view they advanced within nine miles, in hopes of meeting with the expected Pondicherry reinforcement. It did arrive; but the ships which brought it hastened away without landing the troops, on finding that the place had fallen. After this new disappointment Salabat Jung’s politics underwent a sudden change. Nizam Ali was openly plotting his overthrow; and as the French, on whom he had previously leaned, seemed now unable to assist him, he became anxious to provide for his own safety by exchanging the French for a British alliance. A negotiation opened with this view was speedily followed by a regular treaty, by which Salabat Jung ceded to the Company, in absolute property, Masulipatam and other districts in the Northern Circars, forming a continuous tract of territory which extended eighty miles along the coast, and twenty miles inland, and yielded an annual revenue of 400,000 rupees. He engaged, moreover, not to allow the French to have either troops or factories north of the Krishna, nor to seek or accept of assistance from them. In return for these important concessions the Company only promised not to assist or give protection to any of the subahdar’s enemies. He appears, however, to have expected more; and on finding that no direct assistance was to be given him against Nizam Ali, marched off in great displeasure.

Reverse after reverse had thus followed the French arms, and the Indian empire, which they at one time seemed on the point of establishing, was vanishing like a dream. After raising the siege of Madras, Lally, who had retired upon Arcot, endeavoured to maintain his ground by a kind of desultory warfare, in which little advantage was gained by either side. The number of troops still under his command might have justified active operations on a larger scale; but their spirit was bad, and his funds being again exhausted, he abruptly concluded the campaign by withdrawing from the field, and disposing his army in different cantonments. The main body, consisting of 1,100 Europeans, accompanied him to
Pondicherry, where he determined to wait till a long expected reinforcement and squadron should arrive. The Madras presidency were also expecting reinforcements, and hence, though the season would have allowed the campaign to be protracted a little longer, they willingly availed themselves of the interval of repose which Lally had offered; and imitated his example by distributing their troops in a series of forts, which, commencing with Chingleput, near the Paliar, continued northwards, so as to form a kind of curve, having Madras for its centre. While both armies were thus in cantonments, the only activity displayed was in sending out small parties to make predatory incursions. In these the Company's troops were particularly expert, and succeeded in driving off about 6,000 head of cattle.

On the 28th of April, 1759, Admiral Pococke arrived with his squadron from Bombay; but, in order to keep to the windward of Pondicherry, and watch the expected squadron of the French, did not come farther north than Nagapatam. In the end of June, three of the Company's usual ships arrived from England. They brought 200 recruits, and the promise of a much more important reinforcement by other ships. This was the 84th regiment of 1,000 men, commanded by Coote, who was now its lieutenant-colonel, and had been appointed to the command of the Company's troops in Bengal, with the option, however, of remaining with his regiment in the Carnatic, should his presence there seem more necessary. While general joy was diffused throughout the settlement by this intelligence, the governor and council were in possession of a secret which filled them with gloomy forebodings. The court of directors, dazzled by the brilliant prospects which had been opened in Bengal, imagined that from it alone sufficient funds might be obtained to supply the wants of all the presidencies; and under that impression had resolved to send no more treasure till 1760. Thus at the very time when everything announced an approaching campaign, from which the most decisive results were anticipated, the presidency, already almost overwhelmed with debt, were to be left to struggle unaided against a new and incalculable demand on their resources.

Admiral Pococke, misled by a Danish vessel which reported that a French fleet of twelve sail had arrived at Trincomali
in Ceylon, immediately sailed for that port, and reached it on the 3rd of July without obtaining any tidings of French ships. In returning, he cruised for a short time off the north extremity of the island, and had the good fortune to meet with four of the Company's ships having the first division of Coote's regiment on board, as well as provisions and stores for the use of his own squadron. He therefore proceeded with the newly arrived ships to Nagapatam, and after transhipping the supplies, allowed them to continue their voyage to Madras, where the troops were landed and detained for the use of the presidency. On the 20th of August he again sailed for Trincomali, and on the 2nd of September descried the French fleet. It was commanded, as before, by Count d'Ache, and, having obtained a large reinforcement both of ships and men, numbered eleven sail of the line and three frigates. The British squadron consisted of nine sail of the line, a frigate, two Company ships, and a fire-ship. Both fleets immediately prepared for action; but their relative positions and the state of the weather did not allow them to come to close quarters till the 10th, when an engagement commenced which lasted two hours without producing any decisive result. The French, by retiring as they had done on the previous occasions, acknowledged themselves defeated, but sailed so much better than the British as to have no difficulty in eluding pursuit. The day after the battle Admiral Pococke returned to Nagapatam, and Count d'Ache made the best of his way to Pondicherry. His arrival did little to improve the position of affairs. The whole troops he had brought with him were no more than 180 men; and the money, though doubled by the capture of an English East Indiaman, amounted in all to only £33,000. How was such a reinforcement to supply the serious loss of men sustained by recent reverses? and how was such a paltry sum to meet either past arrears of pay or current expenses? Count d'Ache, instead of troubling himself with such questions, had anxieties of a different kind which he thought sufficient to occupy his attention. He had heard that Admiral Pococke's squadron was about to be reinforced by four men-of-war, and as it was already too strong for him, what could he expect but destruction if he should be forced to a new encounter? So determined, therefore, was he
to depart that he refused to go ashore, and gave orders to prepare for sailing in the course of twenty-four hours. This announcement was received with universal alarm and indignation. All the civil and military authorities, together with the principal inhabitants, assembled at the governor's, and assuming the character of a national council, unanimously resolved that the precipitate departure of the squadron would be ruinous to the public interests. Count d'Ache remaining inflexible, a protest was drawn up, declaring that if he departed he would be held responsible for the loss of the settlement, and compelled to answer for his conduct to the king and the ministry. He had actually departed, and was some leagues out at sea when one of the ships which had been accidentally detained reached him and delivered the protest, together with a copy for each of his captains. Staggered at this proceeding, he immediately summoned a council, and, after a short delay, anchored again in the road of Pondicherry. The hopes thus raised were soon disappointed; for a few days after, when he had an opportunity to engage the British squadron, he declined it, and finally departed on the 30th of September, leaving behind him, however, as a kind of compromise, 900 men, of whom 500 were European sailors or marines.

When the campaign again opened, the presidency, in expectation of the arrival of Colonel Coote with the remaining division of his regiment, were averse to undertake any operation of importance. Major Brereton, on the contrary, having only an interim command of the troops, was anxious to signalize himself before he should be superseded, and by great urgency obtained a consent to attempt the capture of Wandiwash. His whole force, consisting of 4,030 infantry and 800 horse, 1,500 of the former and 100 of the latter European, marched from Conjeveram on the 26th of September, and arrived with little interruption in the vicinity of Wandiwash on the 28th. The French having obtained intelligence of his motions, had considerably augmented their force; but he was not aware of the fact, and in the belief that they were only expecting, and had not received reinforcements, thought it good generalship to advance to the attack with the least possible delay. Their Europeans he believed to be only 900, whereas they were in fact
1,300. Confident in his supposed superiority, he deemed caution unnecessary, and the very next day after his arrival prepared to attack the enemy at midnight. Not only were their numbers greater, but their position within the forts and inclosures of a large town, and under the protection of the guns of the fort, was far more formidable than he imagined. In these circumstances failure was almost inevitable, and a severe repulse, which the enemy magnified into a great victory, was sustained. Major Brereton maintained his position at Wandiwash till the 4th of October, and then retired upon Conjeeveram. Bussy, who arrived the day after and took the command of the French forces, now amounting to 1,500 European foot and 300 cavalry, besides native troops, advanced to Conjeeveram to offer battle, but Brereton, now as dispirited as he had previously been confident, had no inclination to risk a new disaster. Bussy, thus unopposed, sent back the main body of the army to Wandiwash, and proceeded with an European detachment of 400 horse and 150 foot to Arcot.

Basalat Jung, Salabat Jung's brother, who held the government of Adoni, had arrived on the northern frontier of the Carnatic, and made overtures which the French deemed so hopeful, that Bussy was on the way to join him and concert an alliance. With this view he had proceeded to Arcot, and continuing his journey had left it a day's march behind him, when his further progress was arrested by the intelligence that the army at Wandiwash had broken out in open mutiny. More than a year's pay was due to them, and they had a belief, well or ill founded, that much money which ought to have been employed in discharging their arrears had been intercepted and embezzled. The mutiny, at first only partial, increased by the discipline employed to suppress it; and the whole troops, leaving their officers behind, marched out and encamped on the height which Major Brereton occupied before he made his ill-fated attack. The soldiers eventually carried their point; and did not return to duty till they received half a year's pay in hand, a promise of the rest in a month, and a general pardon. Bussy, by halting till the mutiny was suppressed, lost some precious time, and, on reaching Basalat Jung, had the mortification to discover that he had changed his views and risen
in his demands. The fact of the mutiny had not been lost upon him; and he became doubtful whether he might not by an alliance with the French be only involving himself in a falling cause. His proposals—obviously dictated by a belief that the French were no longer in a condition to refuse anything—were:—That on receiving a present sum of four lacs of rupees for the pay of his troops, he would return with Bussy to Arcot, provided he were forthwith recognized as nabob of the province, and of Trichinopoly and its dependencies;—as the first step in this agreement, the French should at once surrender to his authority all the countries of which they had actual possession, he drawing the revenues by his own diwan, but accounting to them for a third of the amount;—other countries which might be conquered by their united armies were to be his absolutely, without being subject to the deduction of a third;—ultimately, when peace should be made by conquering the British, or reducing them to terms, he should become absolute lord of the whole Carnatic according to ancient usages, and the French cease to have any claim whatever to any part of the revenues. These proposals, accompanied with others in which Basalat Jung’s present and future advantage was alone consulted, were too extravagant to be seriously entertained, and Bussy began to retrace his steps. He had been obliged to proceed as far as Kurpa, to which Basalat Jung had retreated; and had thus, without securing any advantage of the least moment, performed a march of 100 miles in a direct line, and of not less than 300 miles by road, much of it over barren tracts and through the windings of mountain valleys. Before he returned new disasters had befallen his countrymen.

Lally’s greatest difficulty had all along been the want of funds. The revenues obtained from the lands ceded to them, or in their possession, had never sufficed in the days of their greatest prosperity to meet the expenses in the field; and, now that a series of reverses had made it doubtful whether they would be able to maintain their ground, the zamindars and other parties liable in rent found many plausible excuses for withholding it. It was necessary, therefore, in opening a new campaign, to make some decided effort to procure funds. After various projects had been discussed, Lally became satisfied that
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The south was the most hopeful quarter. The country beyond Utatur had for some time suffered little from the ravages of war, and the island of Seringham in particular, which was still in French possession, would shortly reap a harvest, of which the share belonging to the government of Pondicherry was estimated at 600,000 rupees. Situated as Lally was, this seemed to him an object well worth fighting for; and in order to secure it, he determined to hazard the very dangerous step of dividing his army. He accordingly despatched M. Crillon to the south with a force consisting of 900 Europeans and 1,200 native troops, with ten pieces of cannon, and concentrated the remainder of the army in the vicinity of Arcot, from which it might be moved on any place that was threatened.

The Madras presidency were no sooner made aware how Lally had voluntarily weakened himself than they resolved to lose no time in commencing the campaign. This they were able to do under the most favourable auspices. Colonel Coote, with the remainder of his regiment, had arrived at Madras on the 27th of October, and, in the exercise of the discretionary power with which he had been intrusted, decided to remain in the Carnatic. On the 21st of November he set out for Conjeveram, where the larger part of the troops of the presidency were in cantonment; and, immediately after assuming the command, assembled a council of war, at which it was decided that, in the divided state of Lally's forces, an attempt should be made to capture Wandiwash. To conceal this intention, and leave the enemy in doubt as to the place on which the blow was about to fall, Coote sent Captain Preston with a detachment to remain at Chingleput, and Major Brevet with another to attack Trivatore, while he himself moved with the main body on Arcot. He expected to find the enemy encamped there, and learned with surprise that they had removed to Chittapet. His future course had not been determined, when an express arrived from Major Brereton with the gratifying intelligence that, besides taking Trivatore, he had marched on Wandiwash, and made himself master of its suburbs. Coote at once determined to follow up this success by a forced march. On arriving he found that Brereton had almost completed a battery for two eighteen-pounders, erected so as to bear on the south-west angle of the fort. In the course
of the night another battery to bear on the same angle was commenced. On the following day, the 29th of November, both batteries opened their fire, and before noon had made a practicable breach. The fort was commanded by a native officer, who had 500 horsemen and foot under him, but he had accepted the assistance of a body of French troops, consisting of 68 Europeans and 100 sepoys. When the garrison was summoned to surrender, two answers were returned—one by the French officer, who declared his determination to hold out to the last, and the other by the native governor or killedar, who sent to ask what terms would be given him. Coote promised to continue him as a dependant of the Company in the government of the fort and the rent of the districts, but required an answer by a specified hour. Shortly after the expiry of the time, the French appeared on the wall and called out that they were ready to surrender. This change of mind on their part was doubtless produced by the known intention of the killedar to accept the terms which had been offered. It is admitted, indeed, that he had signed his acceptance just as the British troops entered the fort, and yet, on the pretext that he was too late, all the stipulations made with him were shamefully violated. He was related to the family of Chanda Sahib, had long been connected with the French, and was held by Muhammed Ali to be so inveterate an enemy that he set more value on the possession of him as a prisoner than the reduction of the fort. On such irrelevant and unworthy grounds the Madras presidency became parties to an act of gross treachery, and the killedar, after refusing to disclose his treasures, or pay ten lacs of rupees for his ransom, was confined in a fort on one of the highest hills of Vellore.

Lally now discovered, when too late, that he had committed a fatal error in dividing his army. Not only was he unable to relieve Wandiwash, but he could not conceal from himself that other forts were destined to share the same fate. Carangoly, a large fort situated twenty-five miles E.N.E. of Wandiwash, was next attacked, and fell like it, though not without making a better defence and obtaining better terms. Coote's attention was next called to Arcot. Considered as the capital of the nabobship, the possession of it was naturally regarded as an
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object of primary moment, though in itself it was comparatively unimportant. Preparatory to the siege of the fort, Coote ordered a detachment to move from Kaveripak and take post in the city. This was accomplished without opposition—the garrison of the fort, which was only half a mile distant, looking on as unconcerned spectators, while possession was taken of the nabob's palace and the adjoining streets. It was not, however, to be supposed that Lally would allow the capital to be wrested from him without a struggle. The moment he saw it seriously threatened, he sent a peremptory order recalling Crillon with his force from Seringham. Bussy, too, arrived most opportunely from his long and fruitless visit to Basalat Jung, bringing with him not only all the troops he had taken away, but a considerable body of good horse whom he had induced to join him. The aspect of affairs was thus somewhat changed. The British detachment, after they had collected fascines and other materials, and even commenced the erection of a battery, were obliged suddenly to decamp; and Bussy's horse taking advantage of his departure for Pondicherry, spread themselves over the country, and committed every species of devastation. At the same time a body of Marathas, who had been hovering on the western frontiers, prepared to descend into the low country to sell themselves to the highest bidder. The Madras presidency deeming their terms too high, tried to lower them; the French agent gave a sum of 20,000 rupees in hand, and thus obtained a body of 1,000 horse who, without joining their camp, made their appearance between Arcot and Conjeveram.

Coote with his army quitted Wandiwash on the 13th of December, and next evening took up a position which enabled him to intercept the enemy's troops when moving towards each other, whether from Arcot or from Chittapet. On the 16th he advanced six miles nearer the former town. Meantime Bussy's horse and the Marathas continued their course of plunder to such an extent, that the inhabitants took refuge in the forts and woods, and ceased to bring in any supplies of provisions to the British camp, which was in consequence threatened with starvation. To increase their difficulties, the rain began to fall in torrents. As the best alternative that now remained, Coote quitted his position and placed his army in cantonments in
Kaveripak and the adjacent villages. Shortly after Coote’s retirement, Lally, who had been exerting himself to the utmost, quitted Chittapet with a largely augmented force, and advanced to Arcot. This movement compelled Coote again to take the field, and he took up a strong position at a point nearly equi-distant from Arcot and Kaveripak. Here, with a large tank in front, a morass on each flank, and a rear accessible only along a causeway, he remained on the defensive, both because the enemy was far superior to him in cavalry, and he was waiting the result of a negotiation by which it was hoped that the Marathas might he gained over to his side. Lally, too, waiting for the return of the reinforcement which had arrived too late to save Masulipatam, and mistrusting the spirit of his European troops after their late mutiny, had good reasons for not assuming the offensive. Both armies consequently remained within their encampments.

In the beginning of January, 1760, the negotiation with the Marathas again terminated in favour of the French. The Madras presidency offered 60,000 rupees, but proposed to pay in conditional bills; the French sent the same sum in ready money, and were of course preferred. On the 8th of January, Innis Khan, Murari Rao’s general, joined their camp with a new body of 3,000 mounted, and a greater number of foot plunderers. Lally’s star seemed once more in the ascendant, and he quitted his encampment to commence active operations. Coote suspected that the recovery of Wandiwash was his object, and sent orders to the officer whom he had left in command to defend it to the last extremity. At the same time, sending off his baggage to Kaveripak, he began to move eastward along the north bank of the Paliar. Lally kept moving at some distance from the southern bank at a very slow pace. He had an object in view, and was preparing to gain it by a stratagem. He had been told that the British army derived its supplies of rice from large magazines of it stored at Conjeeveram. In this belief he executed a series of dexterous manoeuvres to cover his design, and as soon as it was dark set out, taking nearly all the cavalry of his army and a body of 300 sepoys, with the utmost expedition crossed the Paliar, and after a march of fifteen miles, pounced suddenly. upon that town at eight o’clock in the morn-
ing. He had no difficulty in entering it, but it was only to meet disappointment. His information had been false. The stores of rice were imaginary, and the plunder found within the town was almost worthless. The pagoda, indeed, contained a stock of military stores; but it was a place of some strength, occupied by two companies of sepoys under an English lieutenant; and as he had no means of forcing it, it only remained for him to make a hasty retreat, after revenging himself on the inoffensive inhabitants by setting fire to their houses.

Lally, after this disappointment, was more anxious than ever to perform some exploit, which might revive the spirits and raise him in the estimation of his troops. He could not but know that the failure of most of his recent measures had suggested grave doubts of his capacity; and that the reputation of Bussy, of whom he had always entertained an unworthy jealousy, had risen in proportion as his own had sunk. These facts galled him to the quick, and made him so impatient that he was almost ready for any attempt, however rash. Bussy exerted himself to check this wild spirit; and, when it was proposed forthwith to attempt the capture of Wandiwash, suggested a far more judicious course. The English, he said, would not lose Wandiwash without risking a battle to save it. That battle the French would be obliged to fight under great disadvantage. A large part of their force would necessarily be employed in the siege, and the main body thus weakened, being obliged to remain where they could cover the siege, would have no choice of position. The better plan, therefore, would be not to engage in operations which might make it necessary to risk a general action, but to keep together on the banks of the Paliar, and employ the Marathas in ravaging the country and cutting off all sources of supply, so as to leave the enemy no alternative but either to fight when he would rather decline it, or be forced to seek subsistence under the walls of Madras. This advice, which Lally would not have relished from any one, was most unpalatable from Bussy, who, he was uncharitable enough to think, had given it from unworthy motives. His determination, therefore, was to attempt the siege of Wandiwash at all hazards. Coote, who had
hastened off to Conjeveram on hearing of the unexpected attack upon it, left it on the 14th of January, and having crossed the Paliar, encamped on the 17th near Outramalur—a position which, besides being equidistant from Trivatore, where Bussy had been left with the main body of the French army, and Wandiwash, at which Lally had now arrived in person with a considerable detachment, had the additional advantage of securing the communication with Chingleput, and through it with Madras. Lally, after taking possession of the suburbs of Wandiwash, threw entrenchments across the openings of the streets leading to the fort, and commenced a battery which, erected near the same spot which Goote had selected, was intended to fire upon the same angle which he succeeded in breaching. He was shortly after joined by Bussy from Trivatore with the main body. Coote, though suffering from want of provisions, kept his position, watching his opportunity, which he knew must arrive, when the enemy prepared to assault, as he would then have an option of attacking the besiegers, or the division encamped in the plain to cover them. Bussy, thus confirmed in the view he had taken of Coote’s probable tactics, reiterated the advice to keep the whole army together by desisting from the siege till a better opportunity; but Lally, who had formerly rejected the advice, was now less inclined than ever to listen to it.

Coote, on learning that the battery had opened its fire, and breached the main rampart, quitted his encampment at Outramalur, and advanced to Tirimboung, within seven miles of Wandiwash. In the vicinity of the latter a mountain of same name stretches above a league from north-east to southwest. The French army was encamped opposite to the eastern end of this mountain, about two miles from the fort. On the 22nd of January Coote hastened forward at the head of two troops of European and 1,000 native cavalry, together with two companies of sepoys. He was first descried by the Marathas, who were lying with their plunder along the north-east foot of the mountain; and some skirmishing took place between the cavalry. It was on the whole to his advantage, for he took possession of the ground which the enemy quitted, and saw the whole plain clear up to their camp. Shortly after, observing,
about half a mile to the right, some gardens and other inclosures which might be used for shelter on necessity, while the ground beyond was well adapted for the display and action of the whole army, he ordered the division he had brought with him to form upon it, and went back to the line of infantry, to whom he announced his intention to lead them on to a general engagement. The announcement was received with acclamations by the whole troops; and he led them on in battle array to the ground which the cavalry were already occupying. Here they stood in full view of the French camp, without perceiving any motion in it, or even hearing the sound of firing against the fort.

The day began to wear, and Coote proceeded with his army, still drawn up, towards the south side of the mountain, till he reached a tract of ground at its foot so covered with stones and fragments of rocks, that cavalry, in which the enemy's main superiority consisted, could not act upon it. Here he halted opposite to the French camp, at the distance of about a mile and a half, expecting that the defiance which he thus threw out would be accepted. After some time, perceiving that the enemy still remained quiet, he again moved, intending to skirt the mountain till he should arrive opposite to the fort, and then turn so as to have it on the right. The effect of this movement would have been to give him one of the strongest possible positions. While the tract of mountain debris secured his left flank, he not only would have the protection of the fire of the fort on his right, but could not be prevented from throwing into it any number of troops that might be deemed advisable. He might then, if necessary, by a sally of the garrison, when sufficiently reinforced, drive the enemy from their batteries in the town, and attack them with the whole army, either on the flank or in the rear, thus rendering all the entrenchments and other defences which they had thrown up in front of their position entirely useless. Lally, though he had failed to anticipate this movement, no sooner saw it commenced than he penetrated the object of it; and, as the only effectual means of now preventing it, determined no longer to delay the encounter. The camp, as if it had been suddenly aroused from a state of lethargy, beat to arms, and the troops were seen issuing forth to occupy the
ground in front, which had previously been marked out as a battle-field.

The whole French force drawn out consisted of 2,250 Europeans, of whom 300 were cavalry and 1,300 sepoys. Besides these, 150 Europeans and 300 sepoys continued at the batteries against the fort. The Marathas numbered 3,000 horse; but instead of taking part in the action, they considered it sufficient service to guard their own camp, and remain on the watch for an opportunity of pillaging the British baggage. The French order of battle was as follows:—On the right the European cavalry; next, the regiment of Lorraine, mustering 400 men; next again, the Indian battalion, 700; and lastly, Lally’s regiment, 400, whose left were under a tank, which had been retrenched, and in which were posted 300 men, chiefly marines from Count d’Ache’s squadron, or soldiers who had returned after failing to relieve Masulipatam. Another tank, in the rear of the retrenched one, was occupied by 400 sepoys, whom Bussy had brought from Kurpa. The rest of the sepoys, 900 in number, were ranged behind a ridge which ran along the front of the camp. At each extremity of this ridge was a retrenchment, guarded by fifty Europeans. Of the artillery, in all sixteen field-pieces, four were placed in the retrenched tank, and the remainder in sections of three each between the different bodies of troops forming the line.

The British army consisted of 1,900 Europeans, including eighty cavalry, 1,250 black horse, and 2,100 sepoys, and was ranged in three distinct lines. In the first were Coote’s regiment on the right, the Company’s two battalions in the centre, and Draper’s regiment on the left; all these without their grenadiers. On the flanks of this line were 1,800 sepoys, 900 on each. In the second line were all the grenadiers of the army, amounting to 300, and having on each flank 100 sepoys. The third line was formed by the cavalry, the eighty Europeans occupying the centre. Two companies of sepoys stood apart, with two field-pieces, a little in advance of the left of the first line. The artillery consisted of twenty-six field-pieces.

The action was commenced by Lally in person. While the British were marching up, and before they were within cannon-shot, he put himself at the head of the European cavalry, and,
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after a large sweep of the plain, made a dash at the third line. As soon as his intention was perceived, the sepoys of the separate detachment, with their two guns, were ordered to fall back at an angle which would enable them to take the attacking cavalry in flank as they were approaching. At the same time the black horse, thus threatened to be attacked in rear, made a show of wheeling round to face the enemy, but only, and apparently of set purpose, threw themselves into confusion that they might have a pretext for flight. The eighty Europeans, thus left alone, prepared notwithstanding to receive the charge. Fortunately for them it was unnecessary. The two guns of the sepoys, admirably managed by Captain Barker, opened with such effect on the attacking party, that they galloped off without having accomplished or even attempted anything: Lally, thus left alone, had no choice but to follow the fugitives. A cannonade had in the meantime commenced. The superiority was decidedly with the British; and Lally, on returning to his infantry, found them impatient under the loss which they were sustaining without being brought to close quarters. Their impatience was seconded by his own impetuosity, and he gave the order to advance. The engagement was soon general along the whole line.

The regiment of Lorraine, formed in a column twelve in front, advanced almost at a run against Coote's regiment, who by his orders reserved their fire till their assailants were within fifty yards, when they fired a volley with deadly effect both on the front and flanks. The column though staggered did not stop, and in an instant the two regiments were mingled in dreadful conflict at the point of the bayonet. It did not last long, for the column, unable to sustain the shock, gave way and fled in disorder. About the same time a tumbril in the retrenched tank struck by a shot exploded, killing or wounding eighty men. Such was the consternation produced, that a large number of those posted in the tank immediately abandoned it. Their example was followed by the 400 sepoys. To take advantage of this confusion, Coote ordered Major Brereton to advance with the whole of Draper's regiment and seize the retrenched tank. He had just carried it with great gallantry when he fell mortally wounded. The possession of the tank
exposed the left flank of Lally's regiment, which, as soon as two field-pieces were brought to play upon it, began to waver. The day was now all but lost to the French, and Bussy, in making a gallant effort to retrieve it, was taken prisoner. The other wing and centre of the enemy's line offered little resistance, and the sepoys who were posted behind the ridge, on being ordered to advance, refused to obey. Lally, now convinced that further resistance was useless, abandoned his camp, which the victors immediately entered without opposition. Had Coote's black horse been worth anything the French army must have been utterly dispersed; but instead of charging they kept cautiously aloof, overawed by the steady front of the European cavalry, who anxious to redeem the disgrace of their early flight, enabled Lally to effect the retreat in tolerable order. On passing the fort he was joined by the party left in charge of the batteries, and hastened off in the direction on Chittapet. The whole loss of the French, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, was computed at 600 Europeans. The killed and wounded of the British amounted only to 190.

Lally, continuing his retreat, committed the serious blunder of quitting Chittapet without reinforcing it; and Coote, on whom no advantage was ever thrown away, determined to capture it. In the meantime Captain Wood, who commanded at Kaveripak, was ordered to advance with his garrison and invest the fort of Arcot; and 1,000 of the black horse were sent south to ravage the country between Alamparva and Pondicherry, in retaliation for the previous devastations committed by the French and their Maratha allies in the districts of the English Company. Both expeditions were successful. The black horse in particular, though they had proved worthless on the field of battle, were excellent marauders, and returned with 8,000 head of cattle, after having burned eighty-four villages. In giving such details one naturally thinks of the fearful amount of misery which must have been endured by the native peasantry, while thus involuntarily made parties to a war in the issue of which they had no interest. Chittapet was invested by a detachment on the 26th of January, 1760, and made only a show of resistance. On the 29th, when the whole army encamped within cannon-shot, a battery of two eighteen-pounders was commenced and
completed in the course of the night. At five the next morning the fire opened, and proved so effective that the breach was nearly practicable by eleven. The garrison, consisting of only fifty-six Europeans and 300 sepoys, had no idea of standing an assault, and surrendered at discretion. The same day Innis Khan, deterred at the course of events, quitted the Carnatic with all his Marathas.

On the 1st of February Coote arrived before Arcot. Since the celebrated defence by Clive the works of the fort had been much improved. The ditch, mostly in the solid rock, had been dug to an uniform depth of six feet; a glacis and covered way had been carried entirely round; and from the middle of the north side of the covered way, a strong revelin, mounting six guns and communicating with the fort by a gate with a drawbridge, projected. The siege immediately commenced, and the fire of three batteries was opened on the 5th. Owing to a want both of artillery and ammunition not much progress was made. The approaches, however, were pushed on, and by the 9th not only had the sap reached very near the glacis, but two breaches had been made to within six feet of the bottom of the rampart. Still much remained to be done; and the means of defence were still unexhausted, when Coote was greatly but agreeably surprised at receiving a voluntary offer of surrender. The terms were soon arranged, and the grenadiers of the army were allowed next morning to take possession of the gates. The garrison, consisting of 247 Europeans, and nearly as many sepoys, had not lost three men, and might have held out for ten days longer before the assault could have been risked.

The prospects of the French were now gloomy in the extreme. Their resources were almost exhausted, and the schemes suggested for replenishing the treasury did little more than revive bitter quarrels and recriminations between the civil and military authorities. Coote meanwhile continued to reap the fruits of his victory. Mortaz Ali, in Vellore, on hearing that the British army had, after the capture of Arcot, encamped in that direction, feared that he might be called to account for the suspicious, if not hostile course which he had for some time pursued, and sent Coote a sum of 30,000 rupees. He refused it, stating that he was not authorized either by the nabob or the presidency
to levy tribute. Mortaz Ali replying that it was a present to himself, as a mark of homage to a great commander, according to the custom of the country, the money was accepted, but only to be added to the general stock of the prize-money of the army. The honourable contrast which Coote’s conduct on this occasion presents to that of the civil and military authorities in Bengal, when similarly tempted, will not be overlooked.

Coote marched from Chittapet on the 26th of February, and arrived on the 29th at Tindivanam, a place of large resort, situated at the junction of several roads leading to Pondicherry, from which it is only twenty-five miles distant. The object of this march could not be misunderstood; and the French, who had commenced the war in the full confidence of establishing an undisputed supremacy, became aware that their next struggle must be for existence. To prepare for the worst, they endeavoured to obtain possession of all the commanding posts in the vicinity. One of the most important of these was the fort of Permacoil, situated about eighteen miles north-west of Pondicherry, and capable both from its position and its strength of protecting the intervening territory. It had previously been in a great measure overlooked; but immediately after the defeat at Wandiwash, Lally saw the use which might be made of it, and induced the native governor to admit a party of French with some cannon into it. After the capture of Chittapet and Arcot, suspecting that he had committed himself to the losing party, he wrote Coote, pretending that the French had gained admittance by surprise, and offering to assist him in ousting them. It seemed worth while to put his sincerity to the test; and hence, when the rest of the army was on the way to Tindivanam, Coote had preceded them with most of the cavalry, and two companies of sepoys, and advanced as far as Permacoil. It consisted, as usual, of a pettah or town, and a fort; the former surrounded with mud walls, and the latter crowning the summit of a precipitous rock, rising to the height of 300 feet at its narrow end, and gradually lowering to 200 feet at the other. The governor gave all the assistance he had promised; but it would have been of little avail had the garrison, though small, been properly provided for a siege. Shortly after the attack began their fire slackened from want of ammunition.
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Still, however, they maintained the defence manfully at a considerable loss of life to the besiegers, and six days elapsed before they surrendered. Lally on this, as on many other occasions, was only a little too late. A large detachment was actually on the way to throw a considerable reinforcement of men and stores into the fort, when intelligence of Coote's approach frustrated the design.

The reduction of the places still in possession of the French might now be considered as merely a work of time, and the British proceeded to attack fort after fort with almost unvarying success. It is affirmed, indeed, by Lally, that had they, instead of directing their attention to subordinate objects, marched direct upon Pondicherry, they might have made themselves masters of it in eight days. On such a subject he ought to be a good authority; but as he makes this statement when his object was to show how shamefully the authorities had acted in not providing better for its defence, it may be presumed that there was some exaggeration in it. Coote thought differently, and therefore acted more cautiously by not attempting to take Pondicherry till it was rendered in a manner defenceless, by the capture of all the places from which it might have drawn assistance. Though the French squadron had long been withdrawn from the coast, and that of the British been reinforced to a strength which it had never before possessed, it was not impossible that, as a last resource, Count d'Ache, or some more enterprising naval commander, might make his appearance from the Mauritius, or directly from France, and by throwing in supplies enable Pondicherry to maintain a protracted defence. It was desirable, therefore, that all the places where such ships could rendezvous, and enjoy even a temporary protection, should be reduced. These places on the Coromandel coast were now only two: Alamparva to the north of Pondicherry, and Carrical to the south. Coote, still suffering from a wound which he had received at Permacoil, intrusted the siege of Alamparva to Major Monson. It was invested on the 10th of March, and though a place of some strength, having a fort solidly built of stone, and inclosed by a wet ditch, surrendered at discretion on the third day. Carrical being considered a place of more consequence, the preparations made for besieging it were on a greater scale. As it
was intended at the same time to maintain as large an army as possible near Pondicherry, in order to intercept all supplies from the surrounded country, some difficulty was found in procuring such a force as was judged adequate. To supply the deficiency 300 marines were obtained from the fleet, 100 European firelocks, forty artillermen, 1,000 sepoys, and six field-pieces were brought from Trichinopoly, and the King of Tanjore was requested to send his army, and every kind of assistance. Major Monson, who was again to command, having embarked with a party of troops from Alamparva, anchored in the road of Carrical on the 28th of March, and was joined, in the course of the same evening, by a squadron which had sailed from Madras with the artillery and stores. Considerable disappointment was felt when it was discovered that the King of Tanjore had paid no attention to the request made to him, and that none of the expected reinforcements had yet arrived. It was determined, notwithstanding, to effect a landing, and commence the necessary works. It soon appeared that the means of defence had been greatly overrated. The fort, in the form of a parallelogram, was regularly constructed, but was of such limited dimensions as to be rather a fort in miniature than one for actual service. Its whole length was 100, and its breadth only 50 yards. This, indeed, was exclusive of the bastions, one at each angle, but these admitted only three guns in their faces. To compensate this defect each of the four curtains was covered by a ravelin mounting six guns. On the 5th of April, ten days after the landing, a considerable breach had been effected; and though much remained to be done before access to it could be obtained, the governor was summoned to surrender. Contrary to expectation he expressed his readiness to do so, provided he were allowed to march out with the honours of war. When this was refused he made no further objection, and resigned the place without firing another shot. The besiegers could scarcely credit their success. Only three men had been killed in the attack, and five in the defence. “Never, perhaps,” says Orme, “was so great an armament prepared to succeed with so little loss, excepting when De Labourdonnais took Madras in 1746.”

The capture of these maritime places was followed by that of Valdore and others, so that Pondicherry was in a manner
hemmed in on every side; and no places of any consequence, not in its immediate vicinity, remained in the French possession, except the forts of Gingi and Thiagur. These, however, could not be any obstacle to the siege of Pondicherry; and this task, which if accomplished would give the finishing blow to French power in India, was now to be commenced in earnest. Lally on his part was not idle, and turned his attention to every quarter from which it seemed possible that aid could be drawn. Among other quarters, he thought of Mysore. Hyder Ali, destined to make an important figure in Indian warfare, had succeeded in usurping the whole power of the government. With him Lally opened a communication through the intervention of a Portuguese monk, who bore the title of Bishop of Halicarnassus, and was not unwilling to employ the influence which he acquired in his religious character for political purposes. Through him the bargain which enlisted the Marathas in the French service had been concluded, and it was therefore not unlikely that he would be able to conclude a similar bargain with the Mysoreans. Hyder Ali, though virtual ruler of Mysore, did not feel perfectly secure, and was therefore anxious to possess some place of strength on the frontiers, in which he might always be certain of finding an impregnable asylum. Thiagur was just such a place; and he was therefore easily induced to enter into a treaty by which he agreed that, in return for the cession of the forts of Thiagur and Elvanasore, which, with their dependencies, "were to remain the property of the Mysoreans in perpetuity, as long as the flag of France existed in India," he would immediately furnish a body of 2,000 horse and 3,000 sepoys, to be employed in the French service, and paid at the rate of 100,000 rupees a month. After the delivery of Thiagur he was to supply an additional 1,000 horse and 2,000 sepoys. All these forces, united with those of the French, were to be first employed in clearing the Carnatic, and afterwards in conquering Madura and Tinnevelly. These countries when conquered were to belong absolutely to Hyder Ali, who was, moreover, to receive nearly a half of all the Carnatic conquests.

The secret of this negotiation had been so well kept, that the Madras presidency heard of it for the first time on the 24th of
May, while they were busy with the preparations for the complete blockade of Pondicherry. At first it was believed to be an idle rumour, which Lally had set afloat for some concealed purpose; but all doubt on the subject was set at rest by the actual arrival of the first division of the Mysore troops at Thiagur on the 4th of June. Meanwhile, small parties had passed undiscovered from Pondicherry to Gingi, and thence to Thiagur. In this way 200 Europeans had been assembled for the purpose of accompanying the Mysoreans in their future march to Pondicherry. Attempts were made to interrupt their progress, but they dexterously avoided an encounter by changing their course, and on the 23rd of June arrived safely at Ariancupan. They had been cumbered with an immense convoy of cattle, and succeeded in bringing 2,000 head as far as Trivadi. In order to hasten on, the greater part of them were here left behind, and ultimately not more than 300 arrived at Pondicherry.

The Mysoreans who had arrived were only 1,500 cavalry, and had been sent forward by Hyder Ali, not so much in fulfilment of the treaty, as to obtain a formal ratification of it. Lally had carried on the negotiation on his own responsibility; but as a rumour of his recall had become prevalent, Hyder Ali insisted that the treaty should be signed not only by him, but by Deleyrit the governor, and all the members of council. This placed them in a kind of dilemma. They professed to disapprove of the terms of the treaty, and yet were unwilling to lose the benefit of it. They therefore signed; but at the same time had recourse to the mean subterfuge of endeavouring to throw the whole responsibility on Lally, by drawing up a secret document, in which they protested against their own signature, and embodied all their objections. As soon as the treaty was signed, all the Mysoreans went away, promising a speedy return with their whole force and abundance of provisions. They were even better than their word; for they not only arrived, but gained a victory by the way. Their force, consisting of 4,000 horse, 1,000 sepoys, and 200 Europeans or topasses of the French army, with eight pieces of cannon, had arrived within sight of Trivadi, when they were encountered by Major Moore, who had gone to intercept them at the head of 180 European infantry,
50 hussars, 1,600 black horse, and 1,100 sepoys. The manifest inferiority of numbers should have made Moore pause before risking a battle; but either because he was not in a condition to refuse it, or from over-confidence, he attempted to stand his ground, and owing to some unexplained mishap or misconduct, sustained a disgraceful and total defeat. The Mysoreans were afterwards allowed to proceed without interruption, and on their arrival at Pondicherry were received with a long salute of cannon. They deserved it; for, besides the troops, they brought, what was justly deemed not less important, 3,000 bullocks, carrying their baggage and drawing their artillery, and 3,000 more laden with rice and other provisions.

When Moore met with the above disaster, Coote was encamped with his army at the foot of the hill of Perimbe, preparing for the siege of Villenore, a fort about five miles W.S.W. of Pondicherry, and now the only serious obstacle to the complete investment of it. Believing that Lally, as soon as the Mysoreans arrived, would make every effort to save this fort, he proceeded, with that happy union of enterprise and caution which characterized all his movements, to strengthen his position by a redoubt and several retrenchments judiciously selected, so as both to protect his army in the event of an attack by superior numbers, and furnish a basis for offensive operations. His precautions were not unnecessary; for after the Mysoreans arrived, Lally, determined to lose no time in relieving Villenore, set out for that purpose at the head of the whole forces he could muster. His numbers were far superior to the British, and he had every prospect of compelling Coote either to raise the siege of the fort, or risk an action under unfavourable circumstances in order to maintain it. Lally's bad fortune still attended him. The garrison, though few in numbers, and threatened every moment with assault, might easily have stood out for two days. The commandant thought otherwise, and hung out a flag of truce, which was instantly followed by surrender. The event took both armies equally by surprise, but of course produced very different sensations. Coote, successful at the very moment when he least expected it, declared that during the whole course of his career he had never been so fortunate. Lally, who had arrived within cannon-shot, was horror-struck when he saw the British flag
flying on the ramparts, and hastened back to seek the protection of the guns of Ariancupan. Coote, shortly after the capture of Villenore, having been reinforced by 700 of the nabob's force, and 500 of his cavalry, marched up to the bound hedge with almost all his native troops, but without any Europeans. His object was to try the temper and courage of the Mysoreans by defying them to an encounter with their own countrymen. Previous events had discouraged them, and they declined the challenge.

The junction of the Mysoreans with the French was not so formidable in its direct as in its indirect consequences. The nabob's revenues could not be collected in the face of marauding parties, and yet there was no other source from which the funds necessary to carry on the war could be obtained, as the directors at home had intimated their resolution not to supply them, and the Bengal presidency, instead of being able, as the directors imagined, to meet the wants of the other presidencies, had been obliged to borrow largely for its own necessities. Pecuniary embarrassments, however, was now the only danger to be feared, for reinforcements were arriving from different quarters, and in particular, towards the beginning of August, six Company ships arrived, having on board 600 men drafted from regiments in England. The French, on the contrary, were rapidly becoming weakened. The Mysoreans, increased to about 10,000, were unable to render any service equal to the monthly pay for which they had stipulated; and, notwithstanding their dexterity as marauders, failed to bring in provisions sufficient for their own consumption. No sooner was the pressure of want felt than they began to repent of their French alliance. Desertions in consequence became so numerous, particularly among the sepoys, as greatly to thin their ranks. The horse, possessing better means of regaining their homes when they should deem it expedient, remained more steadily at their posts, but at last, when they found their communications with the open country gradually narrowed, the greatest part of the whole body suddenly decamped in one night from the glacis of Pondicherry. They were hotly pursued, and suffered much from British detachments before they made their escape. A few nights after, those who had remained, as well as a division of 500 who had
retraced their steps in order to elude pursuit, moved off, and in a short time not one Mysorean remained.

The time seemed now arrived for establishing complete blockade of Pondicherry both by sea and land. It was necessary for this purpose that the bound hedge, with its redoubts, should be in possession of the British army, and that the squadron should remain on the coast even during the approaching monsoon. Coote thought it, moreover, necessary that the fort of Ariancupan should be captured. The force necessary for this purpose was estimated at 800 Europeans; but it seemed doubtful whether such a number could be safely withdrawn from the camp, which mustered in all, inclusive of garrison and detachments, only 2,000 Europeans and 6,000 native troops. It was therefore determined, in order to prevent the army from being too much weakened, to employ the marines of the squadron on shore. They amounted in all to 422 Europeans, and were landed at Cuddalore on the 27th of August. Another seasonable reinforcement was obtained on the 2nd of September, by the arrival of several Company ships, having on board part of a Highland regiment. They were under convoy of three ships of war, two of them of sixty guns each. These joined to the other ships increased the whole squadron now before Pondicherry, under the command of Admiral Stevens, to seventeen sail of the line.

The joy caused by the arrival of these ships and troops was much damped by the commissions which they brought from the War Office, appointing Majors Brereton and Monson lieutenant-colonels, with prior date to the commission of Colonel Coote. This distinguished officer was thus virtually superseded at the very moment when he was preparing to crown all his exploits by a final triumph. The injustice done him was, however, rather accidental than premeditated. Coote had been originally appointed to Bengal, and the commissions had been issued under the belief that he was actually serving, or at least about to serve there, as the new colonels were expressly ordered not to assert their commissions while he remained on the coast. Major Brereton had, as we have seen, met a soldier's death at Wandiwash. Monson was still at his post, and might have done himself honour by continuing to serve under Coote as before. This temporary obscurcation of rank, however, was too great a sacri-
fice, and the utmost which he could bring himself to propose was to retire to Madras. This could not be listened to, and Coote, immediately giving over the command of the army to him, prepared to sail for Bengal. As a matter of course he meant to take his regiment along with him, but generously consented to leave it behind, when the presidency alleged that it could not be wanted, and Monson even declared that on its departure the blockade of Pondicherry would be raised. He may have made this declaration the more readily in consequence of a bold attempt which Lally made to take the British camp by surprise. Being perfectly aware that he was in no condition to stand a siege, he mustered all his forces for an expiring effort. It was concerted with some skill and so much secrecy, that Coote, though he had many spies in Pondicherry, was totally unaware till the attack actually commenced. On the 4th of September the whole of Lally's disposable troops, amounting to 1,400 European infantry, 100 European horse, and 900 sepoys, having marched out of the town, and passed the boundary hedge, approached the British camp in four divisions, to take possession of the post which had been previously assigned them. By some mistake, the division which ought to have been the most effective of all, as it was in the rear of the camp, did not arrive in time to commence the attack when the concerted signal was given; and the other divisions, disappointed when the expected diversion was not made in their favour, were obliged, after a partial success, to retire.

The intended attempt on Ariancupan had been abandoned in deference to the objections of Monson, who was now able to carry on the siege according to his own plans. His first object was to seize the four redoubts which were placed in the openings of the bound hedge, and commanded the leading avenues to the town. With this view a night attack was resolved, and would have completely succeeded but for a blunder similar to that to which Lally had owed his failure. The rear of one of the leading divisions becoming separated by mismanagement from the van, caused so much delay that daylight began to appear, and enabled the defenders of one of the redoubts to open a murderous fire. The very first shot from a twenty-four pounder, double loaded with langrage, killed eleven men and
wounded twenty-six. Among the latter was Colonel Monson. himself, struck with a piece of iron which broke both the bones of his leg. Notwithstanding this disaster two of the redoubts were carried.

Colonel Monson’s wound might have been followed by fatal results to the besiegers. The officer next in command was a Major Robert Gordon, who had more than once absented himself from his post in the hour of danger, and was in other respects incompetent. Fortunately Coote had not yet sailed for Bengal, and readily consented, at the request both of Monson and the presidency, to resume the command, and finish the work which he had so well begun. He arrived only in time. Gordon, as obstinate as ignorant, had risked the recapture of the redoubts, by refusing to take the advice of a wiser officer than himself. General discontent also, produced by a deficient supply of provisions and sickness, had begun to prevail. Under Coote’s skill and vigorous command the gathering clouds disappeared. Of the two remaining redoubts in the bound hedge one was voluntarily abandoned by the enemy without a struggle, and the other forced, though not without some loss to the assailants. In consequence of these successes the whole of the bound hedge was in possession of the besiegers, who were thus enabled to convert one of the main defences of the town into a new means of annoyance.

October had now arrived, and active operations were necessarily postponed in the prospect of the approaching monsoon. This temporary cessation of hostilities, however, afforded no real relief to Pondicherry. Its worst enemy was within. Provisions had begun to fail, and unless new supplies could be obtained, famine must soon compel a surrender. To diminish the consumption, Lally proposed the immediate expulsion of the black inhabitants, but the general council which he assembled to consider the subject did not see the necessity of the case so strongly as he did, and broke up without a decision. Many of the European families, however, obtained Coote’s permission to pass without interruption to the Danish or Dutch settlements on the coast.

The attempts made by Lally to obtain provisions generally failed. As a last resource he entered into a negotiation with the
Marathas, who had again made their appearance, in the hope of turning the course of events to their own profit. Gingi, which had once belonged to them, was the great object on which their hearts were set, and Balaji Rao must have been strongly tempted when he was offered 500,000 rupees in hand the moment he should appear with his army, and the cession of Gingi as soon as the siege of Pondicherry should be raised. The Maratha chief was too cautious and wily to commit himself at once, and protracted the negotiation till the opportunity was lost.

Preparations were now made to convert the blockade of Pondicherry into a regular siege, and on the 16th of November a vessel laden with all the necessary stores arrived from Madras. Lally, seeing these preparations, could no longer consent to postpone the execution of the proposal he had made more than a month before, and turned out of the gates the whole of the natives, with the exception of a few retained as domestics, to the number of 1,400, of both sexes and all ages. They made their way to the boundary hedge, hoping they would be permitted to pass, but it was only to meet with treatment more ruthless than that of their expulsion. The British outposts drove them back; and they gathered in despair at the foot of the glacis, imploring re-admission. When it was refused, some attempted to clamber over into the covered way, and were fired upon and killed. Seven days the wretched survivors kept wandering between the town and the British posts without shelter, and with no food except the roots of grass which they picked up. The guilt of this horrid inhumanity was shared both by besiegers and besieged, but by no means in an equal degree. Lally could plead necessity for what he had done; Coote could plead nothing but the advantage which he might gain by an act of horrid inhumanity.

Four ricochet batteries, intended only to harass the garrison by a cross fire of ricochet shot along the streets and ramparts, were opened near midnight of the 8th of December, and continued their fire at intervals during the six following days. It did very little execution, and was scarcely worth the ammunition expended upon it, though it certainly had the effect of increasing the fatigue of the garrison when very little able to bear it. They had been put on an allowance of a pound of rice a day, with
a little meat at intervals; but even this limited consumption so much exceeded some casual supplies by sea, that by the end of December the public store did not contain provision for more than three days. At this time, however, they derived some relief from an unexpected quarter. On the very last day of the year 1760, while the British squadron, in all twelve sail, were riding in Pondicherry Road, a sudden hurricane arose. Six of the vessels foundered, or were driven ashore, and no fewer than 1,000 Europeans belonging to them perished. The disasters were not confined to the sea. All the tents and temporary caserns of the camp were blown to pieces; the ammunition brought out for immediate use was destroyed; and the sea breaking over the beach, and overflowing the whole tract as far as the boundary hedge, ruined all the batteries and redoubts which the army had raised.

The inhabitants of Pondicherry, when the sun rose clear the next morning and showed them the general devastation, regarded it as a deliverance from Heaven. Had only 300 men been able to march out three hours after daylight, they would not have found 100 of the besiegers together to resist them. This, however, was impossible. Though the garrison had suffered little, they could not carry their ammunition dry, nor drag the artillery over inundated fields. They could, therefore, do little more than give utterance to earnest wishes that ships expected with supplies from Madagascar might arrive while the British squadron was dispersed or driven from the coast. Even these wishes soon failed them, and with renewed despondency they saw their road again blockaded by eleven sail of the line, consisting chiefly of those which had weathered the storm, and others which had escaped it by being at the time at sea beyond its reach. The damaged works of the besiegers also were repaired, while the garrison were so pressed by want that, when they had by a well conceived and executed attack carried a redoubt and taken a considerable number of prisoners, Lally, to save the additional drain on his store of provisions, was obliged to make an open confession of approaching famine by sending them back on their parole.

On the 10th of January a battery of ten guns and three mortars opened its fire, and trenches were begun on the north
side, just within the skirt of the Blancherie, or Bleaching Town, the houses of which afforded good cover; shortly after a battery was completed within 450 yards of the walls. The garrison scarcely attempted to interrupt these works. They saw their approaching fate, and seem to have thought it useless to attempt either to ward it off or to postpone it. Another battery was about to be commenced about 150 yards nearer the walls. It proved unnecessary. On the 15th, as the sun was setting, a flag was seen approaching from the town. It preceded a deputation, consisting of Colonel Durre, commandant of the royal artillery, Father Lavaur, superior of the Jesuits, and Moracin and Courtin, members of the council, with an interpreter. They were the bearers of two memorials, one signed by Lally, and the other by the governor and council. The one by Lally was very characteristic, both in its style and substance. As if he had been about to dictate terms, not to receive them, he set out with a long and irrelevant preamble, in which he asserted that the "English had taken Chandernagore against the faith of the treaties of neutrality which had always subsisted between the European nations in Bengal, and especially between the English and French;" and that "the government of Madras had refused to fulfil the conditions of a cartel concluded between the two crowns." Owing to this conduct it was "out of his power, as responsible to the court of France, to propose any capitulation for the city of Pondicherry;" but "the troops of the king and company surrender themselves, for want of provisions, prisoners of war to his Britannic majesty, conformably to the terms of the cartel." In consequence of this surrender "Mr. Coote may tomorrow morning at eight o'clock take possession of the Villenore gate; and on the same hour the next day of the gates of the citadel; and, as he has the force in his own hands, he may dictate such further conditions as he may think proper." This, strictly speaking, finished Lally's part in the surrender; but he continued as follows:—"From a principle of justice and humanity alone, I demand that the mother and sisters of Raja Sahib be permitted to seek an asylum wheresoever they shall think proper, or that they remain prisoners with the English, and be not delivered into the hands of Muhammed Ali Khan, still tinged with the blood of the
father and husband, which he shed, to the shame indeed of those who delivered up Chanda Sahib to him, but to the shame likewise of the commander of the English army, who ought not to have suffered such a barbarity to be committed in his camp." Lally's memorial concluded with his consent "that the members of the council of Pondicherry make their own representations on what may more immediately concern their particular interests, and those of the colony."

The governor and council seem to have determined that if they did not obtain all they wished it would not be because they had omitted to ask for it. The requisitions of their memorial, accordingly, were of the following purport:—That the houses of the inhabitants be preserved, and "their effects and mercantile goods left to their own disposal;" that "in their favour the Roman Catholic religion was to be maintained; the churches, the houses of the ecclesiastics, and the religious orders, whether within or without the city, be preserved, with everything belonging to them; the missionaries be free to go and come, and receive under the English flag the same protection as they had under the French;" and that "no buildings or edifices, and no part of the fortifications be destroyed till the decision of their respective sovereigns." Coote returned a written answer to Lally's memorial, declining discussion on the subject of Chandernagore as irrelevant, or to be bound by a cartel which was still the subject of dispute, but offering to accept of the surrender at the time stated; the troops becoming prisoners of war, "to be treated at his discretion, which should not be without humanity." As to the mother and sisters of Raja Sahib, they "should be escorted to Madras, where proper care should be taken for their safety, and they should not on any account be delivered into the hands of the Nabob Muhammed Ali."

On the 16th of January the grenadiers of Coote's regiment took possession of the Villenore gate; and in the evening Lally, who was apprehensive of tumult, anticipated the period fixed by delivering up the citadel. On the following morning the British flag was hoisted, and saluted by a thousand pieces of cannon, being those of every ship in the road, of all the posts and batteries, of the field artillery, and of the ramparts and
defences of Pondicherry. There cannot be a doubt that the surrender was inevitable, as the provisions would not have sufficed for two days more. No fault could therefore be found with M. Lally for not protracting an impossible defence, and yet it was too evident that the inhabitants generally regarded him as the prime cause of their disaster, and would willingly have wreaked their vengeance upon him. On the third day after the surrender, when he was about to depart for Madras, about 100 persons, mostly officers, and also two members of council, assembled at the gate, and the moment he came out in his palanquin, assailed him with hisses, threats, and opprobrious epithets. Dubois, the king's commissary, on coming out an hour after, was attacked in the same way. Stung at this reception, he stopped and said that he was ready to answer any one. The rash challenge was instantly accepted by a man of the name of Defer, who at the second pass laid him dead at his feet. It was a barbarous assassination, for Dubois was an old man and short-sighted; and yet such was the feeling of the bystanders that his death was regarded as a meritorious act, and not one of them would assist his servants in burying him. There is reason to believe that this inhumanity was, at least in some of those who manifested it, the result not merely of personal hatred. Dubois was known to have taken formal protests against the abuses and irregularities which he had detected in the leading officials, and meant to submit them to the home government. That the knowledge of this fact had something to do with his assassination may, without any want of charity, be inferred from the conduct of the registrar, who, the moment the old man fell, came forward and seized his papers. They were never heard of afterwards.

The total number of European military taken in the town amounted to 2,072; the civil inhabitants were 381; the artillery fit for service were 500 pieces of cannon and 100 mortars and howitzers. The arms, ammunition, and military stores were in equal abundance. Great were the rejoicings at Madras on account of this most important capture; but amid all these rejoicings a delicate question arose, and threatened to mar the harmony between the civil and the military authorities. To whom did Pondicherry belong? It was surrendered by Lally to his
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Britannic majesty, and so accepted by Coote. Mr. Pigott understood the matter differently; and on the fourth day after the surrender demanded that Pondicherry should be delivered over to the Madras presidency, as having become the property of the English East India Company. Coote demurred, and submitted the demand to a council of war, composed of the leading officers of the army and navy engaged in the capture. Their opinion was that the demand could not be maintained; but Mr. Pigott, when he found argument unavailing, cut the matter short, by intimating that if Pondicherry were not delivered the presidency would not furnish money for the pay of the king's troops, or the subsistence of the French prisoners. As there was no other source from which the necessary funds could be drawn, the council of war had no alternative but to yield the point under protest.

The war which the British and French carried on in India had from the first been truly a war of extermination. The existence of the two nations there as independent rival powers was deemed impossible, and both therefore saw that one or other must perish. Accordingly, when Lally sailed from France at the head of an expedition which anticipated nothing but a series of triumphs, he was instructed by his government to destroy any British maritime possession in India that should fall into his hands. These instructions were intercepted, and furnished a plausible ground for retaliating the barbarous policy which they enjoined. The presidency of Madras, therefore; as soon as Pondicherry was delivered over to them, issued orders for the demolition of its fortifications. They were speedily obeyed, and the citadel and all the other defences were converted into heaps of ruins.

With the fall of Pondicherry the French power in India was to all intents annihilated; but three places of some importance still remained to be reduced—the settlement of Mahe, on the Malabar coast, and the forts of Gingi and Thiagur in the Carnatic. Mahe, situated seven miles south-east of Tellicherry, occupied a height at the mouth of a stream which descends from the Western Ghats. In its immediate vicinity are several hills. Two of them, like itself on the south bank of the stream, were crowned with small forts, but its chief
defence was Fort St. George, occupying a larger hill on the other bank. The only dependencies of Mahe were five small forts situated at some distance to the north, and a factory at Calicut. In the beginning of January, 1761, several vessels from England had landed troops at Tellicherry, to be employed in the reduction of Mahe; but as it lies within the limits of the Bombay presidency, it was necessary to have their authority before attacking it, and this authority did not arrive before the beginning of February. The interval was diligently employed by the governor in forming alliances with the neighbouring chiefs. Their assistance was absolutely necessary, for the whole European military available for defence did not exceed 100, while their assailants, under Major Hector Monro, amounted to 900 European and 700 native troops. Though the chiefs had promised liberally, when the push came not a single man appeared; and the governor counted himself fortunate when, instead of being obliged to surrender at discretion, he effected a capitulation, which in addition to other advantages secured to the garrison the full honours of war, and their conveyance at British expense to the Isle of Bourbon or to Europe. Gini had been previously invested by Captain Stephen Smith with eight companies of sepoys. It was commanded by one of Lally’s officers of the name of Macgregor, who, on being summoned, answered, that even if besieged by 100,000 men the forts could not be reduced in three years. His garrison consisted only of 150 Europeans, 600 sepoys, and 1,000 Colleries, or natives of the adjoining hills; but he believed the mountains to be impregnable, and displayed a security which would not have been justifiable even if they were really so. He paid the penalty, and one of his impregnable forts was scaled and taken by surprise. This, however, was only a partial success, for the two strongest forts still held out, and had a powerful auxiliary in the deadly nature of the climate, under which the sepoys, though 1,000 had been added to their number, were rapidly melting away. Macgregor, however, after all his blustering, lost heart, and offered to capitulate. The terms, though somewhat extravagant, were readily conceded, and on the 5th of April he marched out with all the honours of war. Thiagur, which had returned to the French after their alliance with the Mysoreans was broken
up, shared the same fate, after a blockade and bombardment of sixty-five days by Major Preston. Though there was little prospect of reducing it except by famine, the governor capitulated, with two months' provisions still in store; and as if unconscious of the advantages of his position, only asked to receive the same treatment as the troops taken in Pondicherry.

The fate of Lally deserves to be recorded. His unpopularity in India preceded his arrival in France; and though with the consciousness of injured innocence he took the initiative, and brought formal accusations against the leading officials to whose negligence and misconduct he attributed the disasters in which his command had terminated, he soon found himself put upon his own defence. The arrogance of his manner and the intemperance of his language had raised up a host of enemies, who assailed him with venomous tongues, and brought all sorts of railing accusations against him. These were received by the government with willing ears. The loss of India, after all the sanguine hopes which had been entertained, had filled the public mind with astonishment and indignation; and ministers behoved either to bear the responsibility or transfer it from their own to some other shoulders. There was no difficulty in selecting the victim, and Lally was confined in the Bastile. Father Lavaur, the Jesuit, whom we have seen forming part of a deputation at the surrender of Pondicherry, had returned to France and died. Among his papers were found two documents, the one a fulsome panegyric, the other a defamatory libel on Lally. Considered as evidence, the documents could only neutralize each other; but there were circumstances in Lavaur's conduct which ought to have thrown the balance in Lally's favour. Not only was the Jesuit known to be a bitter hater, but also an unscrupulous liar. As if ruined by the capture of Pondicherry, he had petitioned the government for a small pension as a means of subsistence, and yet he had died worth £60,000, in gold, diamonds, and bills of exchange. The evidence of such a man was worthless; and yet it was shamelessly paraded before the public, doubtless with the view of exciting antipathy if it could not establish guilt. After lying eighteen months in the Bastile, Lally was confronted with his accusers, but betrayed his old haughty and intractable spirit to
such a degree as not only to exasperate the witnesses, but to prejudice the judge appointed to report on the case. Under such circumstances the result could not be doubtful. Then, as now, a trial in despotick France, when political ends were to be gained by a conviction, was a mere mockery. After the lapse of other eighteen months, the case was ripe for decision, and the parliament of Paris were subservient enough to do what the court expected of them. They found the accused guilty of having betrayed the interests of the king, the state, and the East India Company, and condemned him to be attainted and beheaded. Before the sentence was made known he was taken before the court, degraded from his military rank, stripped of his military orders, and then removed, not to the Bastile, which was now considered too honourable a place for him, but to the common criminal jail. When the sentence was read to him he threw up his hands to heaven, and exclaimed, “Is this the reward of forty-five years’ service!” and snatching up a pair of compasses which lay with some maps on a table, he made an attempt to pierce his heart. He failed, and was doomed to drink the bitter cup to the dregs. That very afternoon he was taken out of prison with a large gag in his mouth, to prevent him from addressing the spectators, carried in a common cart to the Place de Greve, and there beheaded. He was in the sixty-fifth year of his age. Three men of note—Labourdonnais, Dupleix, and Lally—had thus been judicially murdered in order to divert the public hatred from the incompetent and corrupt officials of the French East India Company. Can it be doubted that an institution which called for such monstrous sacrifices more than deserved all the calamities which had fallen upon it?

In following out the course of events in the Carnatic, we have been led away from the not less important events which, during the same period, had occurred in Bengal, and were beginning, after the first excitement was over, to unfold their true character.
Robert Clive

CLIVE had found it a comparatively easy task to put Siraj-ud-daulah to flight and place Mir Jafar on the masnad. To keep him there, and induce him to govern with wisdom and vigour, was a task of greater difficulty. This was partly owing to the indifferent character and very moderate abilities of the new nabob, but still more to the circumstances in which he was placed. His fellow-conspirators naturally expected to share largely in the fruits of his success, and took offence when the rewards which they received fell short of the extravagant value which they attached to their services. The distribution of large sums of money had been anticipated; but in the very first days of the government, the greater part of what had been found in Siraj-ud-daulah’s treasury had been required to meet the first instalments due to the Company, and pay the enormous sums granted or extorted under the name of presents to their servants. Thus, at the outset, when nothing but a liberality approaching to lavishness could have gratified the selfishness of the nabob’s courtiers, and conciliated the good-will of the population generally, he was compelled either to practise a niggardliness which made him contemptible, or to have recourse to measures of extortion which made him detested. When pursuing the object of his ambition, Mir Jafar had readily promised everything that was asked of him. The performance was then both distant and conditional, and many things might occur before it could either be asked or enforced; and he had imagined, as Orme expressly states,¹ that “his liberalities to individuals, who were the heads of the English nation, would relax their strictness in the public terms.” In plainer words, he thought that the large sums which

he had given as presents would have operated as bribes, and disposed the recipients to overlook defalcations where the interests of the Company only were concerned. Great, therefore, was his disappointment, not unmixed with indignation, when he found Clive sternly insisting “on the payments of the treaty monies as they became due.”

There was another kind of interference which touched the nabob more nearly, and is said to have been regarded by him with abomination. The authority of a nabob within his own province was absolute, and Mir Jafar, when seated on the masnad, was not disposed to relinquish any of the powers which had been exercised by his predecessors. He had partialities and hatreds, and did not choose that commands in the army, or the administration of the government, should be intrusted to any but his own favourites. He accordingly meditated many changes; but when he would have carried them into effect, he was mortified above measure to find that another consent beside his own was necessary. Some of these changes would have been violations of promises made and even sworn to; others of them would have been contrary to sound policy; and on these and similar grounds Clive did not hesitate to tell him bluntly that he would not permit them. Who then is master? was the question which the nabob put to himself; and from that moment his resolution was taken to emancipate himself from British ascendancy. He was careful, however, to do nothing which could excite the least suspicion of a change in his feelings; and therefore, while Clive continued at Murshidabad, nothing could exceed the deference paid to all his wishes and opinions, and both the nabob and his son lived with him on terms of intimacy and familiarity.

On the 14th of September, 1757, Clive having set out for Calcutta, leaving Watts, Manningham, and Scrafton at Murshidabad, to transact the Company’s affairs, Mir Jafar lost no time in endeavouring to carry out his own views. The leading agents in the conspiracy which overthrew Siraj-ud-daulah were Hindus. Through them chiefly the previous negotiation with Clive and the other servants of the Company had been carried on; and it was therefore probable that through them also their future influence in the government would be exercised. Reason-
ing thus, the nabob’s first object was to curtail, and, if possible, extinguish the power of the Hindus. At the head of them stood Raidurlabh the diwan. With him, therefore, it was proposed to begin, but with the greatest caution, for Raidurlabh, aware of the feeling with which he was regarded at court, not only stood upon his guard, but had obtained from Clive a guarantee of personal safety. The first step taken against him was indirect, and was important only as an indication of what might be expected to follow. Ramram Singh, who, besides being head of the spies, was Raja of Midnapore, was summoned to Murshidabad to settle the accounts of his district. Being considerably in arrear, and suspicious of what was intended, he did not go in person, but sent his brother and nephew, who were immediately thrown into prison. Raidurlabh, with whom Ramram Singh had always been closely connected, believed that this violent proceeding was the precursor of a similar requisition to himself, and established connections in different quarters, determined, if necessary, to repel force by force. He was even suspected of having stirred up two rebellions—one by Ramram Singh, who, on hearing how his brother and nephew had been treated, assembled 2,000 horse and 5,000 foot, with which he threatened to retire into the jungles with which his country abounded; and the other by Ogul Singh, whom Siraj-ud-daulah had appointed governor of Purnea.

These revolts, both headed by Hindus, and presumed to have been instigated by Raidurlabh, drove Mir Jafar from his course of dissimulation, and made him avow his determination to treat Raidurlabh as a rebel. A kind of open hostilities were accordingly declared; and the diwan, while still continuing to hold his office, not only refused to visit the nabob, but assembled a force of 1,000 men to set him at defiance. Through the influence of Clive an apparent reconciliation was effected, and an interview took place, at which the nabob and his diwan swore “oblivion of former distrusts and future friendship.” Nothing could be more false and hollow; and Raidurlabh, while he evinced suspicion by keeping his house under pretence of sickness, gave a decided proof of hostility by refusing to allow the troops under his own control to take part in the expedition to Purnea.
While peace was thus maintained with difficulty in the very centre of Bengal, the frontiers were assuming a threatening aspect. In Dacca a conspiracy to seize the fort was headed by Ammānī Khan, a son of Sarfaraz Khan, the nabob who preceded Ali Vardi; and though prematurely discovered, was not put down without the aid of troops furnished by the Company. In the opposite direction, in Bihar, a formidable rebellion seemed so imminent that Clive left Calcutta and put himself at the head of his troops to march directly for Patna. The rumour which prevailed was that Ramnarain, to whom a strong suspicion of disaffection still attached, had formed an alliance with Suja-ud-daulah, the Nabob of Oudh, and that they were preparing to unite their forces with the view of marching into Bengal. Another rumour was, that the elevation of Mir Jafar to the masnad was disapproved at Delhi, and that an intrigue was on foot to proclaim Mirza Mundi, the infant son of Siraj-ud-daulah’s brother, as nabob. This latter rumour was traced to Miran, Mir Jafar’s eldest son, and with what wicked intention soon appeared; for on the morning of the 10th November, 1757, Murshidabad was thrown into consternation by the announcement that a band of ruffians, hired by Miran, had broken into the palace of Ali Vardi’s widow, where the infant was living under the charge of his grandmother, the widow of Zaindi Ahmed, and murdered him. It was added that both the widows had shared the same fate. They had only been seized and sent off in boats to Dacca, the rumour of their murder having been circulated, and even their fictitious funeral performed, to prevent any attempt that might have been made for their rescue, had it been known that they were still alive. The one murder, however, was barbarity enough to make both the nabob and his son generally detested, though the former declared that he neither sanctioned it nor knew of it till it was perpetrated. If credit was given to this declaration, it was surely a dismal reflection for the inhabitants of Bengal that they were already under a government which connived at such crimes, and had the prospect of being, sooner or later, subjected to the government of the very wretch who perpetrated them. Happily, however, as will be seen, this prospect was never realized.

On the 25th of November, 1757, Clive arrived with his troops at Murshidabad, and on the 30th set out at the head
of 550 Europeans and 1,500 sepoys to join the nabob's army which had advanced on the expedition to Purnea, as far as Rajamahal. Clive's presence alone sufficed to put down the rebellion. In less than a week after his arrival Ogul Singh was taken prisoner, and all the chiefs in league with him submitted or fled the country. The threatened rebellion in Bihar still remained; and the nabob, who was bent on removing Ramnarain, urged an immediate advance on Patna. Clive saw his advantage, and refused to move until all the pecuniary claims and stipulations of the treaty should be satisfactorily arranged. This was impossible without the assistance of Raidurlabh, through whose office as diwan all money bills and patents behoved to pass. The nabob was thus in a dilemma. He must either forego the expedition to Patna, or effect a reconciliation with Raidurlabh under such conditions as would not allow him afterwards to recede. The latter course, which was indeed the only rational one, was strongly advocated by Clive. Through his mediation, and with the security of his guarantee, Raidurlabh, who had previously refused to quit Murshidabad, arrived in the camp, and the nabob and diwan once more made a solemn renunciation of their suspicions and animosities. The preliminary obstacle being thus removed, the parts of the treaty still remaining unfulfilled were easily arranged. The payment of twenty-three lacs of rupees, actually due, was provided for by order on the treasury at Murshidabad for one-half of the amount, and by tuncaws or orders, payable as the revenues should be realized, by the Phoujdar of Hughli and the Rajas of Burdwan and Krishnagar, for the other half. Other nineteen lacs, payable in April, were secured by other tuncaws on the same districts. Patents were also executed, empowering the Company to take possession of the ceded lands south of Calcutta, with the authority of zamindari, but subject to a reserved annual payment to the nabob of 222,958 rupees. The revenue of these lands, like that of many others in the province, was allowed by the Mughul government to the actual nabob as jaghir, or a pension for his expenses. We shall hear of it again.

Clive was now ready to accompany the nabob to Patna, but naturally required to be informed, before starting, as to the precise object of the expedition. The nabob, seeing it useless to
dissemble, avowed his intention to remove Ramnarain, and give
the government to some one of his more immediate dependants.
The nabob, in forming this resolution, had overlooked the
difficulties which might be anticipated in executing it. Clive
was more discerning; and after pointing out the possible alli-
ances which Ramnarain might form, and then raise the standard
of independence, suggested that it would be better to conciliate
than to oust him. This suggestion must have been made under
a conviction that Ramnarain did not entertain the treasonable
designs imputed to him; but nothing could be more distasteful
to the nabob, as it both interfered with his design of giving the
government of Bihar to his own brother, and would contribute
to strengthen, whereas he was now intent on diminishing
British influence. An opinion of Clive, distinctly stated and
enforced by sound argument, could not, however, be lightly set
aside; and it was therefore arranged, after much irresolution and
tergiversation on the part of the nabob and his counsellors, that
Clive should write a letter to Ramnarain, inviting an interview
and assuring him of safety and favour. Meantime the army con-
tinued its march on Patna in three divisions, Clive with his troops
leading the van, Raidurlabh with his force of 10,000 men follow-
ing, and the nabob with the main body bringing up the rear.
By the way letters arrived from Delhi, advising that patents, con-
firming Mir Jafar in the nabobship, had been made out. They had
been delayed merely because the exhausted treasury at Murshid-
abad could not furnish the money expected at the Mughul
court, where all things had become venal. In granting titles on
the occasion Clive had not been forgotten, for he was informed
through the Seths that he had been created a munsubdar of 6,000
horse, under several pompous names. Ramnarain, as the army ad-
vanced, continued taking measures for his defence. Clive's letter
had not yet reached him; but as soon as he received it he gave
proof of the full confidence which it inspired by complying with
its invitation, and embarking in his boats on the Ganges to pay
Clive a visit. He arrived on the 25th of January, and the next
day proceeded, in company with Mr. Watts, to wait upon the
nabob, who received him with all the honours due to his rank, yet
not refraining from certain slight indicaive of his real feelings.
So equivocal, indeed, was his conduct, that Clive's suspicions
were roused, and Ramnarain and Raidurlabh, who had previously been at variance, resolved to make common cause.

Matters were in this unsatisfactory state when startling intelligence arrived. The Nabob of Oudh, it was said, had resumed his aggressive designs, and was about to advance from Lucknow, accompanied by a large body of Maratha horse, and the European troops of M. Law who had been living under his protection at Allahabad. Mir Jafar was filled with alarm, more especially after a Maratha chief arrived to demand twenty-four lacs of rupees as the arrears of tribute due from Bengal. He was now as submissive as he had previously been disposed to be insolent; and in order to conciliate Clive, whose services had again become indispensable to him, he fulfilled the obligations which he had undertaken in regard to Ramnarain, by formally confirming him in his office of deputy-governor of Bihar. Clive was not slow to take advantage of the nabob's altered feelings, and requested for the Company a monopoly of all the saltpetre made within his dominions. The nabob made many objections, and ultimately consented with great reluctance. The terms offered were indeed the highest at which the saltpetre monopoly had ever been farmed, but he knew that the stipulated rent was the utmost he could receive from the Company; whereas in the case of a native renter, he had an unlimited power of exaction in the shape of presents. On obtaining this rather questionable monopoly, Clive proceeded to enforce another claim, the justice of which could not be denied. The stipulated monthly pay of his troops in the nabob's service was a lac a month, and though nearly four months had already been consumed in the campaign, only two lacs had been received. The demand of the arrears, both under this head and others which had accumulated, in consequence of the difficulty of realizing anything from the tuncaws, was not arranged without difficulty, because the alarms from Oudh and the Marathas having died away, the nabob had returned to his tortuous policy, and was again intriguing for the removal of Ramnarain. Clive's sagacity and firmness disconcerted his schemes, and Ramnarain remained in possession of his dignity, while the whole army returned by slow marches towards Murshidabad.

Clive's opinion of Mir Jafar had undergone considerable modification. His first communications with him when the
conspiracy was planned, had impressed him favourably, and he speaks of him in one of his letters as a man of sense. When he placed him on the masnad, he congratulated the courtiers present on their good fortune in having received so excellent a sovereign. His language was now different. In a letter to the select committee of directors he says:—"I am concerned to mention that the present nabob is a prince of little capacity, and not at all blessed with the talent of gaining the love and confidence of his principal officers. His mismanagement threw the country into great confusion in the space of a few months, and might have proved of fatal consequence to himself, but for our known attachment to him. No less than three rebellions were on foot at one time." In a letter to Mr. Pigott, written from Patna, his language is still plainer and more significant:—"The nabob's conduct is weak beyond conception; and you may be assured, whenever we are wanting in a force to overawe and protect him, ruin will ensue. You cannot imagine the trouble I have had these three weeks past in our march to this place; and since his arrival, he has been wanting to make his brother, who is a greater fool than himself, Nabob of Bihar, in prejudice of Ramnarain, a Gentoo, universally beloved and respected, and that in breach of his promises to me, whom he desired to write to him, to engage him to come down and pay his respects. Not one of his rajas would come to, or treat with him, without letters of assurance from me." He had no reason, however, to repent of his march to Patna. "Before we took the field," he observes, "it was with the greatest difficulty the nabob could be prevailed upon to issue out of his treasury 10,000 rupees; and since my joining him, he has already paid twenty-five lacs, and given security for the payment of ten more." A subsequent letter to the directors is in still more hopeful terms. Referring to the tuncaws or assignments on the revenues of certain districts, he says, that through them "the discharge of the debt is now become independent of the nabob, which precaution is become absolutely necessary, as his calls for money are greater than he can answer. Nothing but a total revolution in the government can well interrupt your payments." He afterwards adds:—"All domestic troubles are now happily ended; and the nabob seems so well fixed in his government, as to be able, with a small
degree of prudence, to maintain himself quietly in it. For ourselves, we have been so fortunate in these transactions, as to attach to us the most considerable persons in the kingdom; and, by the constancy with which we successively supported Ramram Singh, Raidurlabh, and Ramnarain, to acquire the general confidence and make our friendship be solicited on all sides. On the whole we may pronounce, that this expedition, without bloodshed, has been crowned with all the advantages that could be expected or wished to the nabob and the Company."

On the march from Patna, the nabob halted to amuse himself with hunting, and pay a pilgrimage to a celebrated tomb in the vicinity of Rajamahal. Clive continuing to proceed, accompanied by Raidurlabh, reached Murshidabad on the 15th of May, 1758. The state of the city astonished him. The markets were deserted, the shops shut, many of the principal families were preparing to send away their effects, and signs of trepidation were everywhere apparent. On inquiry, he learned that Miran, who was still more impatient than his father for the removal of Ramnarain and Raidurlabh, had no sooner learned that the latter was accompanying Clive in his return to the capital, than he quitted it with great precipitation, giving out that he had reason to suspect designs against his own life, and had therefore resolved to join his father. His conduct struck terror into the inhabitants, who saw nothing before them but the devastation and bloodshed of a new revolution. Clive might well be angry, for the charge of treasonable designs was levelled at him as well as Raidurlabh, and he therefore wrote the nabob, complaining in the sharpest terms of Miran's conduct, and declaring that he would no longer remain in Bengal sacrificing zeal to distrust. This decided course brought both the nabob and Miran to their senses, and they both apologized in the most submissive terms. The nabob, even abandoning his sports and intended pilgrimage, hastened home; but Clive, still too much offended to desire an interview, had previously set out for Calcutta, ordering 2,000 of the sepoys to follow, and the rest, together with all the Europeans, to remain at Kassinibazar.

On the 20th of June, the Company's ship Hardwicke arrived from England, bringing accounts of the arrangements which the directors had made in consequence of the loss of Calcutta.
By their first arrangement, made in August, 1757, they committed the government to a select committee of five, of whom Clive was to be president; but in the following November, they appointed a council of ten, in which the four senior members were to preside alternately each for three months. Intelligence of both arrangements reached Calcutta for the first time by the Hardwicke, another vessel, though previously despatched with the August arrangement, not having yet arrived. The directors had been legislating in the dark, and far from wisely. A rotatory government would have been, under any circumstances, a clumsy device, and the revolution which had recently taken place, but of which the directors were not cognizant, made it wholly impracticable. In this new and strangely constituted council, Clive had no place. It has been said that no slight was intended, as the directors had assumed, on what must have appeared good grounds, that he had returned to Madras. It would, however, have been at least more courteous to have acted on the supposition that circumstances might have occurred to prevent his departure, and to have assigned him the place to which his past services entitled him. The appointment might have been made conditionally, on his being still in Bengal; and hence, even if his previous departure should have rendered the appointment ineffectual, it would still have been gratifying as a public testimony to his merit. It is certain that Clive himself felt aggrieved, and made no secret of it.

If Clive was indignant, the new members of council were above measure perplexed. They were naturally proud of their new dignity, but felt that any attempt to conduct the government without him would be worse than futile. They were aware that nothing but fear could induce the nabob to remain faithful to the obligations he had undertaken; and that the moment he was set free from the commanding influence which Clive alone had over him, the large sums of money still remaining due under the treaty never would be paid, and all its other stipulations would either be violated or indirectly evaded. Influenced by such considerations, they took the only course which seemed open to them, and addressed a letter to Clive, in which, after stating the objections to the rotatory governorship, and their readiness "at this juncture of affairs to waive all
personal honours and advantages," they made him "an offer of being president of the Company's affairs in Bengal, till a person is appointed by the Honourable Company." He had previously been sounded on the subject by Mr. Watts, whose name stood first in the rotation, and declared his determination not to accept. He was above being influenced by spiteful feelings, and gave strong reasons for his intended refusal, when he said:—

"Both the public and my private advices, I think, plainly discover that the presidency of Bengal was by no means intended for me by the court of directors; and a temporary acceptance can only expose me, upon the further alterations which may arrive from Europe, to circumstances of disgrace in the eyes of the country government, which, I believe, it is unnecessary for me to remark, might be prejudicial to the Company's affairs."

If the directors had, as he here supposes, deliberately resolved to exclude him from the office of president, this objection was unanswerable; but further consideration, and especially the very friendly tenor of a letter from Mr. Payne, their chairman, convinced him that their omission of his name might be explained without construing it into an intended slight; and he accepted the offer in a letter, in which he says:—

"Though I think I have cause to be dissatisfied with the court of directors, for laying me aside in their new form of government, without any reason assigned, after having named me as head of the general committee in the letter of the 3rd of August last, yet, animated by the noble example of public spirit which you have set me, I have determined to waive all private considerations, where the general good is concerned; and as there is no doubt but the government of a single person, involved as we are now with the country powers, must have infinite advantage over that complicated form of government established from home, I shall, from that motive (though both my health and private concerns strongly require my returning to Europe), accept the offer you have done me the honour to make me, till such time as our employers have appointed a president in the usual form." This was a manly as well as fortunate decision, for it eventually proved, instead of contradicting, to have only anticipated the final wishes of the directors, who no sooner heard of the victory of Plassey, than they abandoned there new-
fangled rotatory scheme, and formally appointed Clive governor of Bengal.

The Company’s affairs were certainly in a critical state, and required all Clive’s wisdom and energy. The successes of the French on the Coromandel coast could not be concealed from the nabob, and the natural consequence was to make him hopeful that he might yet be able to carry out all his favourite schemes, though it should be in defiance of Clive and the Company. The British troops in Bengal had also suffered a serious diminution by the expedition to the Northern Circars. In these circumstances, Clive felt it necessary to slacken the rein which he had hitherto held on the nabob’s movements, and overlook many things which, at a more favourable time, he would have peremptorily interdicted. As an additional means of conciliating his goodwill, he invited him to Calcutta. His own instalment as governor furnished an appropriate occasion; and Mir Jafar, with all his train, descending the Hughli in a splendid fleet of boats, was entertained for several days with pomp and festivity.

The mere love of pleasure, though always strong in Mir Jafar, was not his only inducement to pay this visit. He deemed it prudent to be absent from his capital during certain changes which he was most anxious to accomplish, but the responsibility of which he was unwilling to incur. Raidurlabh had been maintained in his place as diwan, contrary to his avowed determination to eject him. Miran had suggested a means of getting rid of him, and the father, well aware of the savage nature of his son, left him to accomplish his object in his own way. In this he obtained important aid from Nanda Kumar, a Hindu, who, after having long been in the confidence of Raidurlabh, had conceived the idea of elevating himself upon his ruin. When the tuncaus granted for the payment of the treaty monies proved unproductive, Nanda Kumar artfully insinuated that the fault lay with Raidurlabh; and volunteered, that if full authority were given him, he would make the amount forthcoming. The offer was too welcome not to be accepted, and Nanda Kumar thus became an ostensible agent of the Company, while Raidurlabh lost his interest with them, and could no longer calculate on their protection. This change
of feeling was soon made known to the nabob and his son, who lost no time in turning it to account. Raidurlabh, aware of the extent of his danger, requested leave to retire with his family and effects to Calcutta. Even this was refused him, unless he previously furnished money for the payment of the troops, who were clamouring for their arrears. While matters were in this state, the nabob set out on his Calcutta visit. Only two days after he was gone, Miran surrounded Raidurlabh's house with a body of troops, and was preparing to seize his person, when the Company's agents came to the rescue, just in time to save his life, by sending him off to Calcutta under escort. Miran, enraged at the escape of his principal victim, vented his spite on the members of his family, and detained them as prisoners, till Warren Hastings, who had succeeded Scrafton as the Company's resident at Murshidabad, was able to send them also to Calcutta. It would be useless to detail the series of intrigues which followed, and in which the nabob and his son, still bent on the destruction of Raidurlabh, showed that there were no means too base for them to employ in order to accomplish it.

The nabob, while thus occupied with despicable intrigues, received startling intelligence from the west. Shah Alam, the eldest son of the Mughul emperor, Alamgir II, and then better known by the title of Shahzada, belonging to him as heir apparent to the throne, had arrived at Benares in the beginning of 1759, at the head of an army of 8,000 men. His father was virtually a prisoner in the hands of the vizir Ghazi-ud-din, and he himself had only escaped similar thraldom by suddenly quitting Delhi. This step appears to have been taken with the sanction of his father, who had previously conferred upon him the government of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. This sanction, however, was not avowed, and hence the shahzada appeared in a double character. According to one view, he was his father's representative, and carried all the weight which, notwithstanding the low condition to which the empire had fallen, was still attached to the name of the Mughul. According to another view, he was a rebellious son, who had quitted his father's court without permission, and was engaged in treasonable designs. This double character put it in the power of the differ-
ent governors to adopt the view which was most accordant with their inclination or their interest, and hence many stood aloof while others flocked to his standard. The most powerful chief who had openly espoused his cause was Muhammed Kuli Khan, the governor of Allahabad; but it was understood that Suja-ud-daulah, Nabob of Oudh, though he kept artfully in the background, was disposed to join him as soon as he saw any probability of success, and would bring with him an important auxiliary, in the person of M. Law with his French party.

The object of the shahzada was not concealed. Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa belonged to him as viceroy, and he was coming to claim his rights. It thus appeared that Mir Jafar was about to be treated as an usurper, and could only maintain possession by defying the heir apparent of the Mughul empire. How durst he engage in such a warfare, which appeared to him almost sacrilegious? How could he hope to succeed in it with troops which were constantly mutinying, and would in all probability be no sooner brought in sight of the enemy than they would desert to him? In this emergency, everything depended upon Clive, who immediately saw the part he had to act, and entered into it with his accustomed ardour and decision. In a letter to Hastings, directing him to give confidence to the court of Murshidabad, he says:—“The dissensions between the nabob and his people give me much more concern than the news, of the shahzada’s motions, as there would be little fear from the latter, did the former take the proper measures to secure his being well served.” The nabob, in his perplexity, had thoughts of purchasing the shahzada’s retreat. Clive, hearing of it, wrote as follows:—“I have just heard a piece of intelligence which I can scarce give credit to; it is, that your excellency is going to offer a sum of money to the king’s son. If you do this, you will have Suja-ud-daulah, the Marathas, and many more, come from all parts to the confines of your country, who will bully you out of money till you have none left in your treasury. If your excellency should pursue this method, it will be furnishing the king’s son with the means to raise forces, which, indeed, may endanger the loss of your country. What will be said if the great Jafar Ali Khan, subah of this province, who commands an army of 60,000 men, should offer money to a boy who has
scarcely a soldier with him? I beg your excellency will rely on the fidelity of the English, and of those troops which are attached to you."

Clive, while thus pledging himself to Mir Jafar, was well aware that he might have made most advantageous terms with the opposite party. The shahzada sent agents to him, who made him, to use his own language, "offers of provinces upon provinces, with whatever my heart could desire;" and delivered him a letter from their master, who addressed him as "The Most High and Mighty, Protector of the Great, Colonel Sabat Jung Bahadur," and concluded thus:—"In this happy time, with a view of making the tour of Patna and Bengal, I have erected my standard of glory at this place. It is my pure intention to bestow favour upon you, the high and mighty, and all faithful servants, agreeable to their conduct. This world is like a garden of flowers, interspersed with weeds and thorns. I shall therefore root out the bad, that the faithful and good ryots (God willing) may rest in peace and quietness. Know you, who are great, that it is proper you should pay a due obedience to this my firman, and make it your business to pay your respects to me like a faithful servant, which will be great and happy for you. It is proper you should be earnest in doing thus, when, by the blessing of God, you stand high in my favour. Know this must be done."

Clive dismissed the agents with a warning not to come near him again, for if they did, he would "take their heads for their pains." The letter he answered as follows:—"I have had the honour to receive your highness's firman. It gives me great concern to find that this country must become a scene of troubles. I beg leave to inform you, that I have been favoured with a sanad from the emperor, appointing me a munsubdar of the rank of 6,000 foot and 5,000 horse, which constitutes me a servant of his; and as I have not received any orders, either from the emperor or vizir, acquainting me of your coming

1 The title "Sabut Jung," by which Clive is still known in India, means "firm or daring in war," and was first given him by Muhammed Ali, in allusion to his defence of Arcot. Though Muhammed Ali had no right to grant titles, Clive was pleased with it, and had it engraved on his Persian seal.
down here, I cannot pay that due regard to your highness's orders I would otherwise wish to do. I must further beg leave to inform you, that I am under the strictest engagements with the present subahdar of these provinces to assist him at all times, and it is not the custom of the English nation to be guilty of insincerity." In declining the interview which the shahzada's letter obviously invited, on the ground that he had not "received any orders" from the court of Delhi, Clive took stronger ground than he was probably aware of at the time, as afterwards appeared when Mir Jafar sent him an imperial edict which he had received. It was in the following terms:—"Know that you are under the shadow of my favour. Some ill-designing people have turned the brain of my beloved son, Muhammed Ali Gohur (the shahzada), and are carrying him to the eastern part of the empire, which must be the cause of much trouble and ruin to my country. I therefore order you, who are my servant, to proceed immediately to Patna, and secure the person of my son and keep him there. You are likewise to punish his attendants, that other people may take warning thereby. In doing this you will gain my favour and have a good name."

Though Clive spoke and wrote slightly of the shahzada and his invasion, there was grave cause for alarm. Ramnarain, the governor of Bihar, was suspected of being in league with the enemy, whose forces had rapidly increased to 30,000 or 40,000, while the whole force which the presidency could muster amounted only to about 450 Europeans and 2,500 sepoys. At the head of these Clive set out, and after a short halt at Murshidabad—where he lectured the nabob on his misconduct, which, by forfeiting the confidence of all classes of his subjects, had the natural consequence of inviting foreign invasion, and at the same time "complied with the nabob's solicitation to ride on the same elephant with him, and adopted any measure that could support him in his administration"—he hastened on for Patna, which was now actually besieged and in imminent danger of being taken. Ramnarain at first endeavoured to make friends of both parties; and actually paid a visit to the shahzada's camp, apparently for the purpose of ascertaining what terms he could obtain from him. Ultimately, however, on ascertaining that Clive had taken the field, he had no doubt that he would prove
victor, and therefore bestirred himself to do away with the suspicions raised by his previous tampering with the enemy. His defence was valiant, and repeated assaults were successfully repulsed, though two bastions were at one time carried. The result, however, was still doubtful, when the appearance of a detachment which Clive had sent forward under Ensign Matthews threw the besiegers into despair, and they abandoned the siege with the utmost precipitation. The confederates who had joined the shahzada had been using him merely as an instrument to accomplish their own ends. The Nabob of Oudh, in particular, though he had been the chief instigator to the invasion, only turned it to account by seizing upon Allahabad while the governor was absent, and then, to shake himself free of all responsibility, would not even allow the shahzada to seek an asylum in his territories. The unhappy prince, thus almost deserted by his followers, proposed to throw himself on British protection; but Clive, who saw how dangerous a guest he might prove, refused to receive him. As a mere act of humanity, however, he sent him a sum of money to relieve his present necessities.

The nabob's joy at this deliverance was great in proportion to his fears, and he manifested his obligation to Clive by a grant which was equal in value to all that he had previously bestowed upon him, and which was destined to become the subject of much unpleasant discussion. Shortly after Clive obtained his dignities from Delhi, he wrote to Jagat Seth, to say "that the nabob had made him an omrah of the empire without a jaghir." The answer was, that "the nabob never granted jaghirs in Bengal; that Orissa was too poor, but that he might have one in Bihar." Nothing more appears to have been done in the matter till the expulsion of the shahzada, when the nabob, either recollecting Clive's application or having been reminded of it, declared his intention to use every means in his power to obtain an order from Delhi for a jaghir, because, as Mr. Hastings expresses it in a letter to Clive, he was "ashamed that you should do so much for him without the prospect of reaping any advantage to yourself by it." On a subsequent occasion, when Mr. Sykes was acting temporarily for Mr. Hastings at Murshidabad, the nabob returned to the
subject, and, after observing that "he had frequently had it in his thoughts but never entered seriously upon it till now," stated that Jagat Seth had fallen upon a method of obviating all difficulties by giving for the jaghir "the quit-rent arising from the lands ceded to the Company to the southward of Calcutta." This, he thought, "would interfere the least with his government, and stood the clearest in relation to the Company's affairs."

It is impossible to doubt that the nabob was right when he said that the quit-rent was the jaghir which would least interfere with his government. In fact Jagat Seth, when he suggested it, must have had a shrewd suspicion that no part of the quit-rent would ever be brought into the Murshidabad treasury. The nabob was already owing the Company far more than he was able to pay; and therefore, had he retained the right to it, it would only have been to see it mentioned as a sum which the Company had retained in their own hands as a reduction *pro tanto* of their debt. To him, therefore, it was utterly worthless as a source of revenue, and he lost nothing by parting with it. The case of the Company was so very different, that it is difficult to understand what the nabob meant when he said that it was the jaghir which "stood the clearest in relation to the Company's affairs. On the contrary, it would be easy to show that the transference of the quit-rent to one of their servants placed them in a far worse position than before. So long as the quit-rent was payable to the nabob, they could always use it as a set-off against him. It was of the nature of a security, which they could always make available for the repayment of their advances. But the moment it was validly transferred to Clive, or any other British subject, the payment of it could be enforced in the British courts of law, like any other debt. Its character was thus entirely changed, and its value as a security was entirely lost. On this ground alone the Company might well object to the conversion of the quit-rent into what was called Clive's jaghir. But there were other considerations which, without affecting the legality of the jaghir, showed it to be at the least unseemly and inexpedient. The Company might, without any loss of dignity, consent to hold their ceded lands under the Nabob of Bengal, but was it fair or becoming to set a new landlord over their heads, and make
them the tenants of one of their own servants? It ought always to have been recollected, that however great Clive's services might have been, they were really the services of those who had employed him, and that therefore, if the nabob was in a position to renounce the quit-rent, the renunciation ought to have been made in the Company's favour. It deserves also to be observed, that at the time when the jaghir was granted the government of Bengal could not be considered as settled. One great revolution had already taken place, and others to all appearance could not be distant. Was it not more than probable that ere long the country which was already virtually ruled by the Company would be actually transferred to them? In that case the quit-rent would necessarily fall. With what decency or justice, then, could any one attempt during this interval of transition to bind it down upon them as a permanent burden, to be made effectual if necessary by a decree of the Court of Chancery? The estimated annual value of the jaghir was about £30,000. This, at ten years' purchase, is £300,000; and thus, for the services of less than three years in Bengal, Clive had received, in addition to his ordinary pay and emoluments, considerably more than £500,000 sterling.

The invasion of the shahzada had scarcely been defeated, when an alarm of an unexpected, though not less threatening description arose from a very different quarter. The Dutch had beheld the British successes in Bengal with envy and apprehension. The French factories had been annihilated. Was it not possible that theirs might share a similar fate? It is true that while the British and Dutch were at peace, this could hardly happen by open violence; but the same thing might be accomplished by underhand means. The danger to which an important branch of the Dutch trade had recently been exposed by the establishment of a saltpetre monopoly in favour of the English Company, was a case in point. Others of a similar nature might be expected to follow, and therefore the true policy was to place their settlement on a footing which would command respect, or if necessary enforce it. There is some inconsistency in the motives by which the Dutch are said to have been actuated. According to one account, they had refused to recognize the revolution which had given the
nabobship of Bengal to Mir Jafar, and, fearing his vengeance, determined to prepare a force, which would enable them to defy it. According to another account, they had come to an understanding with Mir Jafar, and with his sanction fitted out an armament which, arriving at a time when the English Company's troops had been diminished by the expedition to the Northern Circars, would enable him to shake himself free of the yoke which they had imposed upon him. It is impossible to decide between the conflicting motives thus attributed to the Dutch. The only important question for Clive, was to decide on the course which ought to be pursued when the armament should make its appearance. He had early made up his mind to repel it at all hazards, though he was well aware how difficult it would be to justify the proceeding. When remonstrated with by some of his friends on the responsibility he would incur by opposing the passage of the armament of a friendly power up the Ganges, he answered that "a public man may occasionally be called upon to act with a halter round his neck." On this principle he was prepared to act, but he was careful at the same time not to omit any precaution which might, ostensibly at least, place him in the right and the Dutch in the wrong.

The nabob, even if he had given his sanction to the Dutch armament, was not prepared to avow it, and Clive therefore had little difficulty in procuring from him an order "to oppose and prevent any foreign troops being brought into his country." This order the treaty made with the nabob bound him to obey; and hence, in opposing the Dutch, he could now assert that he was acting, not in his own name, but in that of the Bengal government. This was an important point gained, for it had the effect of depriving the Dutch of the character of allies, in which they desired to appear, and exhibiting them in that of aggressors. Accordingly, when their first ship carrying a body of troops arrived, they were obliged to pretend that Nagapatam was her destined port, and that having been driven from it by stress of weather, she would again leave the Hughli as soon as she had obtained a supply of water and provisions. Clive refused to give any credit to this pretence, and a detachment, composed partly of the nabob's and partly of the Company's
troops, took possession of the fort of Tanna and the battery opposite to it, with orders to search all boats and vessels passing up the river. This proceeding called forth strong remonstrances from the representatives of the Dutch company at Chinsura, but Clive persisted, asserting that he was acting in obedience to the nabob's orders, and in fulfilment of obligations to which he was solemnly bound by treaty.

In October, 1759, the Dutch armament, consisting of six or seven capital ships crowded with soldiers, arrived at Fulta. When the intelligence was received, Mir Jafar was living in Calcutta as Clive's guest. His evident confusion left little doubt that he had been playing a deceitful part; but he made light of the matter, and on leaving Calcutta boasted that he would soon chastise the insolence and disobedience of the Dutch. How he meant to fulfil this boast appeared a few days after, when a letter was received from him stating that he had granted the Dutch some indulgence in their trade, and that "they had engaged to leave the river with their ships and troops as soon as the season would permit." The season could never be more favourable for their departure than at that very time, and this fact, joined to other suspicious circumstances, made it certain that the nabob either had had an understanding with the Dutch from the very first, or had been convinced by them that his own tortuous policy would be best promoted by allowing them to bring up their troops if they could. Clive was thus once more in a dilemma; but as the nabob had not withdrawn his previous orders, he was still able to assert that he was acting under them. Hence, when the Dutch, deeming themselves ripe for action, sent a kind of manifesto, in which they recapitulated their alleged grievances, and vowed vengeance and reprisals if their boats were searched and their passage up the river obstructed, he answered in name of the Company, that "we had given no insult to their colours, or attacked or touched their property, or infringed their privileges; that with respect to their bringing troops into Bengal, the nabob knew best how far it was incumbent on him to preserve the peace and tranquillity of his country; that their boats had been stopped and searched, and the advance of their troops opposed by orders from the viceroy, and under the emperor his master's colours,
and by his troops; that they must therefore apply to him, and that we were ready to interpose our friendly offices to mitigate his resentment." After giving this answer, which under the circumstances may be thought, as he himself admits, to have "savoured somewhat of audacity," he lost no time in preparing to follow out the decisive course which he had resolved to adopt. His means, however, were not very adequate. There were only three British ships in the river to oppose the Dutch squadron of seven. The troops, also, were far fewer in number, and instead of being concentrated, were obliged to be arranged in two separate detachments—the larger one being stationed under Captain Knox at Tanna, where the passage of the river could be best disputed; while the other, under Colonel Forde, now returned from the Circars, proceeded northward to intercept the Dutch troops should any attempt be made to march them to Chinsura by land.

Amid these preparations, what Clive's feelings were will be best explained in his own words. "We found our sentiments a good deal embarrassed, doubting whether we should stand justified to our country and employers in commencing hostilities against an ally of England, supposing they should persist in passing the batteries below with their ships and troops. In this situation, we anxiously wished the next hour would bring us news of a declaration of war with Holland; which we had indeed some reason to expect by our last advices from England." Fortunately, the Dutch themselves removed all scruples by being the first to commence hostilities. Having seized a number of the grain boats and other vessels belonging to the Company, they tore down their colours, transferred the stores to their own ships, and treated their crews as prisoners. Hostilities being thus openly declared, they proceeded up the river, while the three British vessels, under command of Commodore Wilson, followed at a short distance in their wake. The orders given to the commodore were to pass the Dutch and anchor above the batteries. Before he had time to execute them, the commencement of hostilities had changed the position of affairs and caused the transmission of a new order, "to demand immediate restitution of our ships, subjects, and property, or to fight, sink, burn, and destroy the Dutch ships on their
refusal.” On the 23rd of November, when this order was sent, the Dutch landed 700 European and about 800 native troops; the very next day Commodore Wilson obeyed the order, and after an engagement of two hours gained a complete victory. All the vessels of the Dutch squadron struck their flag except one, which endeavoured to escape, and was also taken. On hearing of the landing of the Dutch troops, the detachment stationed at Tanna under Captain Knox quitted it, and marched to reinforce that under Colonel Forde, who had previously repulsed an attack made upon him at Chandernagore, and pursued the fugitives with some slaughter to the very barriers of Chinsura. Having been joined by Captain Knox, he was preparing to invest it, when he learned that the Dutch troops which had been landed from the ships had arrived on the plain of Bedara, and been there joined by part of the Chinsura garrison, which had eluded his vigilance. It is said that he had not then received authority to fight, but seeing the advantage of his position, wrote a note, stating that “if he had the order in council, he could attack the Dutch with a fair prospect of destroying them.” Clive received the note while playing at cards, and, without quitting the table, answered in pencil, “Dear Forde, fight them immediately. I will send you the order of council tomorrow.” He obeyed, and was as successful as he had anticipated. His force, consisting of only 330 Europeans and about 800 sepoys, after a short and bloody engagement, put to total rout an enemy consisting of 700 Europeans, and a still larger number of native troops. The Dutch, now completely humbled, asked submissively for terms, and on acknowledging themselves the aggressors and agreeing to pay costs and damages, obtained the restitution of their ships.

The affair, however, was not yet over. Miran, the nabob’s son, arrived in the neighbourhood of Chinsura at the head of about 7000 horse. Aware of the suspicions which attached to his father and himself, as having instigated, or at least connived at the Dutch expedition, he would have endeavoured to wipe them off by the severity of his proceedings, had not Clive, after being written to in the most supplicating terms, interposed his mediation, and obtained peace for the Dutch on the following conditions:—That they should never negotiate
war, introduce or enlist troops, or raise fortifications in the
country; that they should be allowed to keep 125 European
soldiers, and no more, for the service of their factories of
Chinsura, Kassimbazar, and Patna; and that they should forth-
with send away all their other troops with the ships which had
brought them.

The defeat of the Dutch armament was the last service of
importance which Clive rendered before he took his departure
for England. He had for some time been preparing for this
event, but when he announced it as determined, all classes in
Bengal concurred in regarding it as a public calamity. Mir Jafar
had often winced under his reproofs, and deeply resented his
interference as often as he was thwarted in some favourite
object. He was aware, however, that in cases of real difficulty
he could calculate on receiving effectual assistance from him,
and he was therefore filled with alarm when he thought of the
difficulties to which he might be reduced after he was left to
his own resources, and the uncertain support of the individual
who might be called to occupy without being able to fill Clive's
place. The shahzada was again on the frontier meditating a new
invasion. How would he be able to repel it? Nor was this all.
The ascendency which the Company had acquired had opened
a door to innumerable abuses; and the revenues of the govern-
ment, as well as the general prosperity of the population, had
been seriously diminished by the preposterous exemptions
claimed and the gross oppression often practised by the officials
of the Company in carrying on trade, and giving permits to
others to carry on trade, for their own individual profit. All such
abuses Clive had ever shown a willingness to keep within bounds.
Would his successor be similarly disposed? and if he were,
would he be equal to the task? Under the influence of such
considerations, Mir Jafar would gladly have purchased Clive's
continued residence in Bengal at almost any price. The leading
civil servants of the Company were equally urgent in pressing
him to postpone his departure. Warren Hastings, in particular,
addressed to him a long letter, in which, while expressing his
belief that the nabob was "both by interest and inclination
heartily attached to the English," he argued that the people
about him would use every possible means to alienate his affec-
tions, and that as he was "but of an irresolute and unsettled temper, it would be impossible for him, after Clive’s absence emboldened them to throw off the mask, to hold out against the united influence of so many evil counsellors." Next he reminded him of "the dangers we are threatened with from our natural enemies the French, which, by your resignation of the service, will be doubled upon us, and in which it is very probable the nabob will stand neuter." After mentioning a fact confirmatory of this view, he adds, "I do not advance this as an argument that the nabob is inclinable to the French; but I think it would not be difficult to persuade him that it would be for his interest to suffer the French to come into this country again, both for the increase of his revenues (a very prevailing argument) and to balance the power of the English." The last argument is drawn from the state of matters at the Mughul court. "I know not," he says, "in what light you may regard the proposal lately made from Delhi, or whether the consideration of the further advantages that may result from a nearer connection with that court (in which your intervention appears of indispensable necessity) deserve to be thrown into the scale; though I must own it is my opinion that nothing can contribute so much to establish the power of the English in this country on the most solid and lasting foundation as an interest properly established at that court."

None of these arguments had sufficient weight to change Clive’s resolution. Some of them, indeed, rather tended to confirm it, as they satisfied him that some of the most important objects pointed at might be more effectually secured by his presence in England than by his continued residence in Bengal. In the beginning of 1759 he addressed a letter to the celebrated British minister William Pitt, afterwards Earl of Chatham, in which he unfolded his views as to the future of India. After referring to the great revolution which had been effected, he goes on to say, "Much more may yet in time be done if the Company will exert themselves in the manner the importance of their present possessions and future prospects deserves. I have represented to them in the strongest terms the expediency of sending out, and keeping up constantly, such a force as will enable them to embrace the first opportunity of further aggran-
dizing themselves; and I dare pronounce, from a thorough knowledge of this country’s government, and of the genius of the people, acquired by two years’ application and experience, that such an opportunity will soon offer.” The reigning subah-
dar, he adds, still “retains his attachment to us, and probably while he has no other support will continue to do so; but Mussulmans are so little influenced by gratitude, that should he ever think it his interest to break with us, the obligations he owes us would prove no restraint.” Moreover, “he is advanced in years, and his son is so cruel, worthless a young fellow, and so apparently an enemy to the English, that it will be almost unsafe trusting him with the succession. So small a body as 2,000 Europeans will secure us against any apprehensions from either the one or the other; and, in case of their daring to be troublesome, enable the Company to take the sovereignty upon themselves.” In taking this step there would be no opposition on the part of the people, who “would rejoice in so happy an exchange as that of a mild for a despotic government;” nor on the part of the Mughul, whose sanction might easily be obtained “provided we agreed to pay him the stipulated allotment out of the revenues, viz. fifty lacs yearly.” Indeed, adds Clive, “application has been made to me from the court of Delhi to take charge of collecting this payment, the person intrusted with which is styled the king’s diwan, and is the next person both in dignity and power to the subah. But this high office I have been obliged to decline for the present, as I am unwilling to occasion any jealousy on the part of the subah; especially as I see no likelihood of the Company’s providing us with a sufficient force to support properly so considerable an employ, and which would open a way for our securing the subahship to ourselves.”

An obvious objection to the accomplishment of these views could not escape the notice of Clive, and he therefore continues thus: “So large a sovereignty may possibly be an object too extensive for a mercantile company; and it is to be feared they are not of themselves able, without the nation’s assistance, to maintain so wide a dominion. I have therefore presumed, sir, to represent this matter to you, and submit it to your consideration, whether the execution of a design, that may hereafter be carried to still greater lengths, be worthy of the government’s
taking it in hand. I flatter myself I have made it pretty clear to you that there will be little or no difficulty in obtaining the absolute possession of these rich kingdoms; and that with the Mughul's own consent, on condition of paying him less than a fifth of the revenues thereof.” Dwelling on this argument, which he justly believed to be the most potent of all, he continues thus: “Now I leave you to judge, whether an income yearly of upwards of £2,000,000 sterling, with the possession of three provinces abounding in the most valuable productions of nature and art, be an object deserving the public attention; and whether it be worth the nation’s while to take the proper measures to secure such an acquisition—an acquisition which, under the management of so able and disinterested a minister, would prove a source of immense wealth to the kingdom, and might in time be appropriated in part as a fund towards diminishing the heavy load of debt under which we at present labour.”

This letter was delivered by Mr. Walsh, who had been Clive’s secretary, and was mentioned in it as one who was “a thorough master of the subject;” and “able to explain the whole design, and the facility with which it may be executed.” After some delay he was admitted to an interview with the minister, who spoke of the matter darkly, acknowledging that the affair was “very practicable,” but, at the same time, “of a very nice nature,” and left him with the impression that the Company would be allowed to do what they pleased. The account of this interview did not reach Clive till he had sailed for England. The absence of any information as to the effect of his letter may have been one of the reasons for hastening his departure, but the immediate occasion of it was the disgust produced by a letter from the directors. In answer to an address from the European inhabitants of Calcutta, he did not scruple to say that the ill-treatment received in that letter had fully determined him “in throwing up the service;” and, in common with Messrs. Holwell, Playdell, Sumner, and M’Guire, members of council, he commented upon it in the plainest terms, characterizing the diction of it “as most unworthy yourselves and us, in whatever relation considered, either as masters to servants, or gentlemen to gentlemen.” He would have been able, however, to overcome this passing disgust and remain at his post, had he not felt convinc-
ed that he might be more usefully employed at home in awakening the Company to their true interests, and exerting his influence to control the violent factions into which the court of directors was at this time divided.

Clive sailed from India on the 25th of February, 1760. Before leaving he had secured the appointment of Mr. Vansittart as his successor in the government, and of Colonel Calliaud as commander of the army. The latter appointment took effect immediately; but the former, as Mr. Vansittart had been previously attached to the presidency of Madras, was deferred for a time, and Mr. Holwell, by virtue of seniority, became temporary governor. During his short tenure of office Mr. Holwell laboured hard, and was successful in convincing his colleagues that another revolution in Bengal was necessary. Hence, when Mr. Vansittart arrived in July to assume the government, the whole scheme was laid before him. Mir Jafar was to be persuaded, or if necessary forced into a resignation of all executive authority, and to rest satisfied with a merely nominal sovereignty, while the reality was to be exercised by Mir Kasim, his son-in-law. Mr. Vansittart, as a stranger, was naturally disposed to be guided by the local experience of his council, and on their representations, much more than his own independent convictions, concurred in the proposed revolution. Before proceeding to explain its nature and results, it will be necessary to turn for a little to some important military operations.

Calliaud had arrived from Madras with a reinforcement of troops, toward the end of November, 1759. As the reappearance of the shahzada on the frontier had spread general alarm, he set out for Murshidabad with 350 Europeans, 1,000 sepoys, and six pieces of cannon. He was there joined by 15,000 horse and twenty-five pieces of cannon, under the command of Miran, and proceeded in the direction of Patna. During the march, intelligence arrived that the Emperor Alamgir II, during the confusion produced by a new invasion of the Abdalis, had been murdered by his vizir, Ghazi-ud-din, and consequently that the shahzada had become the legal possessor of the imperial throne. His former title was therefore exchanged for that of Shah Alam, and it was now impossible to resist him on the same grounds as formerly. He could no longer be regarded as a fugitive from
his father's court, but as invested with all the rights of the Mughul. The empire, however, was completely dismembered, and the different nabobs and governors, though still to some degree overawed by the name, continued to pursue any course which seemed most conducive to their own interest, as if totally unaffected by the change in succession which had taken place. The only individual of political importance who espoused the cause of the new emperor was the Nabob of Oudh. He had been invested with the office of vizir of the empire, and behoved at least to make some show of espousing his cause. He did it, however, with so much lukewarmness, that Shah Alam was little benefited, and soon found his resources totally inadequate to any great enterprise. He was able, with some difficulty, to make his appearance once more before Patna. Ramnarain, the governor, whose fidelity to Mir Jafar had been suspected during the previous attack, seemed now to be animated with a superabundant zeal, and, contrary to the express injunctions of Calliaud, who had warned him against risking an engagement till he himself should arrive, marched out, in the hope of gaining glory, and only sustained a disgraceful defeat. Patna itself would probably have fallen had not Calliaud hastened forward, and completely repaired the disaster. The emperor in his flight reached the town of Bihar, and there took the bold step of marching directly into Bengal. Calliaud, thus left behind, no sooner became aware of his movements, than he hastened back as fast as the perverse delays of Miran would allow; and by the aid of boats, which carried his infantry rapidly down the Ganges, while the horse followed by land, came up with the enemy on the 7th of March. The emperor, thus brought to bay, dexterously avoided an engagement by striking into a mountainous tract; and, after many hardships, made his appearance on the plains only thirty miles west of Murshidabad. Had he executed his plan with the same boldness with which he had conceived it, he might have made a successful dash at the capital, and even taken Mir Jafar himself prisoner. But he lingered till Calliaud, who had been following on his track, was again within reach of him. Thus frustrated in his object, he profited by the obstructions which Calliaud experienced from the refusal of the nabob to furnish him with cavalry, and retraced his steps to Patna. Here he was
joined by M. Law, with his French party; and though repulsed in two assaults, was preparing for a third, which promised to be successful, when the arrival of a detachment sent forward by Calliaud, under Captain Knox, proved the death-blow to all his hopes. This officer, who had made a flying march, remarkable for its rapidity, arrived unseen by the enemy, took them by surprise, and compelled them precipitately to raise the siege.

The only chief who now remained zealous in Shah Alam’s service was the governor of Purnea, who had collected an army and was on the march to join him. Calliaud, accompanied as before by Miran, set out from Rajamahal to give him battle; and while on the march received intelligence that it had been fought and won by Captain Knox. This gallant officer having been ordered to harass the enemy’s rear, crossed from Patna to the other side of the Ganges with only 200 Europeans, a battalion of sepoys, and about 300 horse. He had determined to surprise the enemy’s camp during the night, but missed his way, and when morning dawned, found himself in presence of a force of 12,000. Being nearly surrounded, he could scarcely have made his escape. Nor did he attempt it. With his mere handful of troops, he boldly risked the encounter, and after a conflict of six hours proved victorious. The governor of Purnea, thus unable to cope with a small detachment, had no inclination to face the main army under Calliaud and Miran; who, following up the pursuit, overtook him and captured his heavy baggage and artillery. In the hope of gaining the large treasures which he was reported to have with him, he was still pursued, though the rains had set in with unusual violence. This pursuit proved fatal to Miran. After it had continued four days, his tent was struck by lightning on the 2nd of July, 1760. It contained, beside himself, a story-teller, and a servant employed in patting his feet. They all perished. Miran, who by his crimes had merited this awful end, left none to regret him; but to prevent the confusion and probable disbanding of his army, the fatality was concealed for several days, and Calliaud succeeded in reaching Patna in safety.

When Miran’s death became known at Murshidabad, the troops broke out in mutiny, and surrounding the palace threatened the nabob with instant death, if he did not immediately
satisfy their arrears of pay. His treasury was empty, and peace was only restored by the interposition of Mir Kasim, the nabob's son-in-law, who advanced a present sum of three lacs of rupees, and became security for the payment of the rest of the arrears within a specified time. Mir Kasim, in granting this assistance, had stipulated that he should be regarded as the next in succession to the nabobship. At this very time he was aspiring to the possession of it without waiting for succession; and when sounded on the subject by Mr. Holwell, had signified his readiness in a manner which ought to have satisfied that gentleman how unworthy he was of the least countenance. His proposal was to seat himself on the masnad, by causing his father-in-law to be assassinated. Mr. Holwell says that "he expressed much astonishment and abhorrence at the overture," and distinctly told Mir Kasim "that unless he dropped all mention, as well as every intention and attempt of the measure he had intimated, the conference must end there." Mir Kasim, so far from being abashed, could not even understand Mr. Holwell's scruples, which only made him fear that he "was not so much his friend as he hoped and expected." Strange to say, the negotiation with this would-be assassin was still continued, and issued in a formal treaty, by which Mir Jafar was to be stripped of everything but the name of sovereign, and Mir Kasim was forthwith to be invested with the whole executive authority. On the part of the Company, it was stipulated that the sum due to them should be paid, that the districts of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong should be assigned to them for the maintenance of a sufficient force in Bengal, and that five lacs of rupees should be given as a present for the war in the Carnatic.

The pretexts for this treaty were the contempt and detestation which Mir Jafar had provoked by his misgovernment, his inability to contend with the difficulties with which he was surrounded, and the state of the Company's finances, which made it absolutely necessary that their existing claims on the government should be satisfied, and those which could not fail to arise in future be secured beforehand by some material guarantee. When all these things are admitted, the gross injustice and impolicy of the new revolution are still manifest.
Whatever the demerits of Mir Jafar might be, they could scarcely be greater than those of the man who, though bound to him by the closest affinity, would have carved a way to the throne by assassinating him. The pecuniary difficulties could not be diminished by the substitution of a new nabob, who brought no new resources of his own, nor could the general confusion of the government be diminished by abrupt revolutionary changes. Besides, the Company stood bound by solemn treaty to maintain Mir Jafar on the throne, and there could not be a greater breach of faith than the arbitrary determination to depose him. But it is unnecessary to examine the ostensible pretext for this dishonourable and iniquitous proceeding, since the real motive, though carefully concealed at the time, was soon disclosed, and proved that the leaders in the new revolution, while pleading public principle, had only been consulting their avarice. On the very night when the agreement with Mir Kasim was signed, he made a tender to twenty lacs of rupees to the members of the select committee. They were not refused; but it was deemed decent to decline acceptance till the affairs of the country were settled, and the finances were flourishing. They might have waited long for such a period; and as Mir Kasim seemed in no hurry to renew his offer, they refreshed his memory, and demanded payment. Of the money thus shamefully extorted, £30,000 went into the pocket of Mr. Holwell. Mr. Vansittart, after refusing to concur in the demand of payment, surmounted his scruples, and accepted £58,000 as his share.

All these arrangements had been made without the knowledge of Mir Jafar, who became acquainted with them for the first time when a deputation of the council of Calcutta waited upon him, for the purpose of conferring with him generally upon matters of government. Mr. Vansittart, who headed the deputation, laboured to impress the nabob with the abuses of his administration, and having thus wrung from him an expression of his willingness to be guided by the advice of his English friends, suggested the propriety of employing some one among “the nabob’s children” to set affairs in order. The old nabob was thus gradually led to confess that old age and grief for the death of Miran had incapacitated him for struggling with difficulties, and that none of his relations seemed so cap-
able as Mir Kasim of giving him aid. The point which had all along been cunningly aimed at, was now gained; and it was proposed that Mir Kasim should be sent for. This proposal, and the haste with which it was urged, aroused the nabob's suspicions, and he withdrew, complaining of fatigue. It was expected that the business would be resumed next day; but as the nabob made no communication, the deputies threw off the mask, and sent a letter acquainting him that all their measures were taken, and that Colonel Calliaud was ready to execute them if necessary by force. The information threw him into a transport of rage, and he complained bitterly of the treachery of which he had been the dupe. Ultimately disdaining to accept of a nominal sovereignty, or to trust his life in the hands of a son-in-law, of whose blood-thirsty character he was too well aware, he accepted of the pension offered to him, and took up his residence in Calcutta.

It was impossible that a transaction marked by so much duplicity and injustice could prosper. The inhabitants, indeed, looked on with comparative indifference to a change of masters which, if it promised little amelioration of their condition, could scarcely make it worse than it was. The first bitter fruits were reaped in Calcutta itself, where the council became divided into two parties—the one cordially approving, and the other decidedly condemning the revolution which had been effected. To the former, of course, belonged those whose pecuniary circumstances had been greatly improved by it; while the other consisted, not indeed exclusively, but mainly of those who, not having been members of the select committee, did not share in the extorted money, and could consequently boast of being actuated by pure and disinterested motives. Even had Mr Vansittart not furnished too good a handle for the vituperation of this party, there were circumstances in his nomination which made it anything but acceptable. He had been brought from a different presidency, and was thus viewed by several members of the council as an intruder, who, without any better qualification than the recommendation of Clive, had broken in upon the rotation which must, sooner or later, have put them in possession of the highest object of their ambition. Thus at the very time when the unsettled state of Mir
Jafar's government was held a sufficient ground for dethroning him, the council chamber of Calcutta was itself the scene of acrimonious discussions and violent dissensions. The governor from the very first had a bare majority, and was ere long left in a minority by the dismissal of his principal supporters. They had signed the remonstrance which Clive drew up before he sailed, and in which he complained in no measured terms of the language employed in the general letter of the directors. They in their turn were equally offended with the remonstrance, and vindicated their dignity by ordering that any one of the subscribers still in their service should forthwith be dismissed, and not only dismissed, but sent home to England. In this way some of the most experienced members of council were lost to it, at the time when they could least be spared, and were supplied in some instances by men equally devoid of experience and temper.

The kind of internal administration which Mir Kasim, now installed as nabob, was about to pursue, remained for a short time uncertain. Shah Alam was again hovering on the frontier, and it was necessary, before settling the home government, to be relieved from the expense and alarm of a foreign war. Accordingly, Major Carnac, who had assumed the command of the British army in India, fixed his headquarters at Patna in the beginning of January, 1761, and as soon as the rains ceased, commenced the campaign. Shah Alam was only at a short distance to the west, and being overtaken before he could muster an adequate force, was easily defeated. Law had joined him with his Frenchmen, and was taken prisoner. Carnac's instructions were rather to negotiate than fight. An offer of the diwani had, as we have already seen, been made to Clive; and Mr. Vansittart, following out his views, was disposed to think that the time when it would no longer be advisable to decline it, might soon arrive. But, even apart from this consideration, it seemed important to form such a connection with the emperor as would secure the sanction of his name to whatever measures it might be thought necessary to adopt. Carnac accordingly, instead of following up his victory, solicited an interview, and after some demur was permitted to visit Shah Alam in his camp. A friendly understanding was easily
formed, and they returned together to Patna. Here, Mir Kasim, after betraying great jealousy of the new connection which the Company had thus formed, was induced to acknowledge Shah Alam as emperor, and received formal investiture from him of the provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, on an engagement to pay an annual revenue of twenty-four lacs of rupees. Shah Alam shortly after took his departure for the west, intending to endeavour to obtain possession of his capital. Carnac escorted him to the confines of Bihar, and, on parting, received a new offer of the diwani for the Company.

Mir Kasim being thus relieved from all apprehension of a foreign invader, was able to give his undivided attention to domestic affairs, and displayed abundance of vigour, though of a more than questionable description. The greatest difficulty of his predecessor had been an empty treasury. It was this which kept his army constantly in a state of mutiny, and furnished the council of Calcutta with the only plausible ground for deposing him. Mir Kasim's first object therefore was to supply himself with money, both to meet present demands and supply funds for future emergencies. With this view he was rigid in calling the collectors and farmers of the public revenue to account. When balances were due, he was undoubtedly entitled to exact them, but the mere wealth of the parties was often held to be sufficient evidence of their guilt, and large sums were extorted by cruelty and terror. Of all the subordinate governors none was supposed to have accumulated so much wealth as the Hindu Ramnarain; and Mir Kasim, who hated him as cordially as Mir Jafar had done, was determined at once to gratify his hatred and his avarice by destroying him. It was necessary, however, to proceed with caution. Ramnarain had obtained a guarantee of his personal safety from Clive, and had subsequently rendered important service by resisting the attempts of Shah Alam and his confederates to obtain a permanent footing in the province. He was thus under the special protection of the Company, and seemed consequently secure from direct personal violence. Still he was liable to account. Mir Kasim called upon him to do so, and was met by delays and evasions. This was just as he had anticipated; and he had little difficulty in making out a plausible
case of complaint to the governor and council of Calcutta. How could he carry on the government, and how, moreover, could he discharge the obligations he had undertaken to the Company, if, through their interference, one of the largest collectors of the revenue was emboldened to withhold payment, and even set him at defiance? Unfortunately the civil and military authorities took opposite views on the subject. Major Carnac and Colonel Coote, who had superseded him on his arrival from Madras, believed that Mir Kasim, in calling for accounts, was merely employing a subterfuge to further his designs on Ramnarain's life. They had too good grounds for this belief; for they were not only aware of the nabob's anxiety to get the Hindu into his power, but had been offered large bribes to connive at it. Mr. Vansittart, on the other hand, seeing nothing but what was reasonable in Mir Kasim's demand, insisted that every facility should be given him. Coote and Carnac still refusing to abandon the course which they had taken, and which they held to be the only one consistent with honour and equity, a violent quarrel ensued; and Mr. Vansittart, with the sanction of a majority of his council, took the extraordinary step of recalling both these officers to Calcutta. The remainder of the plot was easily carried out. Ramnarain, deprived of the protection which had been solemnly pledged to him, was seized by his remorseless enemy, pillaged, and thrown into prison.

If Mr. Vansittart's object in thus shamefully sacrificing Ramnarain, was to bind Mir Kasim to British interests, the result must have miserably disappointed him. A quarrel of a much more serious nature immediately arose. Mr. Ellis, a violent and arrogant man, had been appointed head-factor at Patna, and acted, from the first day he entered upon office, as if his object had been not to conciliate, but to exasperate the native government. His folly soon produced its proper fruits; and Mir Kasim, stung to the quick by repeated insults which disgraced him in the eyes of his subjects, began to meditate revenge. The abuses practised under the name of private trade had long been a subject of bitter complaint. Mir Jafar had not been a month on the masnad when he remonstrated against the loss sustained by the public revenue by claims of exemption
from custom on the part of European officials of the Company, or natives professing to be authorized by them. The trade of the Company was wholly foreign, and was consequently confined to imports and exports. By express treaty, neither of these were liable to customs or transit duties. This exemption was perfectly understood, and could not be challenged. But besides the foreign trade there was a most important inland trade, for which no such exemption could be claimed. The Company, in fact, had no concern with it. Their servants, however, very indifferently paid by fixed salaries, were allowed to engage in it, and derived from it the better part of their incomes. This was in itself a great abuse, and ultimately became a crying injustice. Not satisfied with being placed on a footing with native traders, the European officials not only availed themselves of the dastaks or passports of their employers, to smuggle goods which they were never designed to cover, but boldly asserted that they were entitled to carry on private trade for their own behoof duty free. The native traders were thus virtually excluded from their own markets, since it was impossible for them, while burdened with duties, to compete with those who paid none. They were hence reduced to the alternative of either becoming commercial agents to the British officials, or of paying large sums to them for the privilege of being permitted to trade in their name. In either case the public revenue was grossly defrauded. Mir Kasim had previously complained of the abuse, and after the insults of Mr. Ellis had exasperated him, was determined no longer to tolerate it. There cannot be a doubt that in this he had justice on his side, and did not draw an exaggerated picture when, in a letter addressed to the governor, in March, 1762, he said, “From the factory of Calcutta to Kassimbazar, Patna, and Dacca, all the English chiefs, with their gomastaks, officers, and agents in every district of the government, act as collectors, renters, and magistrates, and setting up the Company’s colours, allow no power to my officers. And besides this, the gomastaks and other servants in every district, in every market and village, carry on a trade in oil, fish, straw, bamboo, rice, paddy, betel-nut, and other things; and every man with a Company’s dastak in his hand regards himself as not less than the Company.” This statement
is fully borne out by Mr. Hastings, who, in a letter to Mr. Vansittart, dated only a month later, describes the evil complained of as "a grievance which calls loudly for redress; and will, unless duly attended to, render ineffectual any endeavours to create a firm and lasting harmony between the nabob and the Company."

The course which ought to have been pursued is obvious. The private trade of the Company's servants ought to have been absolutely interdicted, or at all events subjected to such regulations as would at once protect the revenue and the native trader. But by whom were these regulations to be made? The members of council in Calcutta were themselves the worst offenders, and having the power of legislation in their hands, were determined that, happen what might, they would never allow it to be used for the purpose of curtailing their emoluments. Mr. Vansittart, feeling himself powerless, was not bold enough to lay the axe to the root of the evil, and proposed, as a compromise, that the trade should be open to the Company's servants as before, but subject to the payment of the regular duties. After much keen debate, he obtained, or thought he had obtained, full powers from the council to make an amicable settlement. With this view he had an interview with the nabob, and obtained his reluctant consent to an arrangement by which, to prevent the inconvenience of repeated stoppages, the goods of the Company's servants engaged in private trade were to pay a duty of nine per cent on the prime cost in one slump sum. This was far less than was exacted from the native traders, and Mr. Vansittart returned, in the belief that if he had erred in any part of the bargain, it was only in having exacted too favourable terms for the Company's servants. It must hence have been with some surprise and indignation that, when the terms were divulged, he found them bitterly assailed by all the members of his council except Mr. Hastings. At a full meeting of council, specially called to consider the subject, ten members voted that the private trade of the Company's servants was like the public trade of their masters, duty free, and that the only article on which they ought to pay anything, and that more from courtesy than legal obligation, was a duty of 2½ per cent on salt. Not satisfied with passing the disgraceful resolution, they caused it to be forthwith notified to the nabob.
It is probable that the nabob, though he expressed disappointment at this notification, was not wholly dissatisfied with it. He saw that the grievances of which he complained could not be effectually remedied by the arrangement concluded with Mr. Vansittart, and he was therefore not unwilling that the whole question should once more be thrown open. He was thus at liberty to take the course which seemed to him most expedient. As the servants of the Company, backed by the council at Calcutta, insisted on trading free, he would no longer offer any opposition, but on the contrary would extend the privilege to all classes of the population, by announcing that in future no duties whatever would be levied on the inland trade. He had repeatedly threatened to take this step, but it was so obviously destructive of one of the main sources of the public revenue, that it was taken for granted he would never carry it into effect. Great then was the disappointment and consternation at Calcutta when it was known that the private trade monopoly under which so many fortunes had been made, and so much extortion practised, was cut up by the roots. The council showed on this occasion that there was no amount of extravagance and iniquity which they were not prepared to commit. No fewer than eight of the members, under the false and hypocritical pretext that the interests of their employers would be injuriously affected, recorded it as their opinion that the nabob was bound to exact duties from his own subjects and leave the Company’s servants free. Mr. Vansittart and Mr. Hastings again stood alone in resisting this monstrous decision. After adopting it, they actually sent a deputation to the nobob in the hope of being able to persuade or terrify him into acquiescence. But the quarrel was now irreconcilable, and nothing but the sword could decide it.

While the deputies. Messrs Amyatt and Hay, were vainly endeavouring to accomplish the object of their extraordinary mission, some boats loaded with arms for the British troops at Patna were stopped by native officers. The deputies demanded their instant release, but the nabob positively refused unless Mr. Ellis was removed from his office as head-factor, or the troops of which in that capacity he had the control were withdrawn. This step was followed by another still more decided.
When the deputies proposed to depart, Mr. Hay was told that he must remain as an hostage for the safety of some of the nabob’s servants who had been imprisoned at Calcutta. It was vain to dream any longer of amicable accommodation, and both sides began to prepare for open war. The rashness of Mr. Ellis precipitated the event. He had for some time been alarming the presidency with accounts of the dangers with which he conceived himself to be surrounded, and urging them to invest him with discretionary powers, in order that he might be able to act on any emergency without waiting for specific instructions from Calcutta. His request was unfortunately granted, and he no sooner learned the reception which the deputies had met with, than regarding it as an open declaration of war, he ordered out the troops, and by a sudden onset made himself master of the town of Patna. The citadel, however, stood out; and the troops, who had fled on the first surprise, having returned, regained the town almost as easily as they had lost it. It was now the turn of the British to act on the defensive, and they retired to their factory for that purpose. After a short resistance, they found their position untenable, and betaking themselves to boats, hastened up the Ganges towards Chhapra. Here the commander of the district attacked them, and they were obliged to surrender. The factory of Kassimbazar was taken and plundered at the same time; and all who had been taken at both places were sent off prisoners to the strong fort of Monghyr. When Mr. Ellis attacked Patna Mr. Amyatt had only begun to journey homeward. A party sent after him by the nabob endeavoured to detain him. He resisted, and in the scuffle which ensued lost his life.

As soon as hostilities were thus commenced, the presidency, as if they were absolute lords of the country, issued a proclamation on the 7th of July, 1763, deposing Mir Kasim, and replacing Mir Jafar on the masnad. The old nabob had continued to reside in Calcutta, and though now more unfitted than ever for government, by age and disease, had ambition enough to aspire to it. As a matter of course he accepted whatever conditions were proposed to him, and undertook in particular to re-establish the monopoly of private trade in favour of the Company’s servants, by allowing their goods to pass duty
free, while those of the natives were heavily burdened. These proceedings placed Mr. Vansittart in a very awkward predicament, but he attached his signature to all the documents, subject, however, to the salvo, that he did it without prejudice to his former declarations and opinions. The Company’s army, consisting of 750 Europeans, together with a considerable number of sepoys and native cavalry, had previously started, under the command of Major Adams, from the neighbourhood of Chandernagore, and proceeded northward to Augadeep, not far from Katwa, where they were joined by Mir Jafar, now on the way to resume possession of the capital. Mir Kasim, determined not to yield it without a struggle, had thrown up entrenchments, and occupied them with an army, formidable not only from its numbers, but from containing a considerable number of sepoys, regularly trained in European discipline, and commanded by an European adventurer of the name of Sumru, who was of Swiss origin, and had been a sergeant in the French army. After a short but decisive action, fought on the 24th of July, Mir Kasim’s entrenchments were stormed, and Murshidabad was entered without opposition. The victors, after a short delay, continued their march up the banks of the Hughli, and on reaching Suty, on the 2nd of August, found the enemy encamped on the plain of Gheriah, and prepared to offer battle. It was much more keenly contested than before, but, after a conflict of four hours, at one time with doubtful issue, British valour again prevailed, and gained a complete victory.

Mir Kasim, while his troops were thus fighting, had kept aloof from danger within the fort of Monghyr, venting his rage and gratifying his savage nature by several atrocious murders. Among his victims were Ramnarain, who had never been released from the prison to which he was consigned when Mr. Vansittart shamefully abandoned him, and two members of the famous banking family of the Seths. As if these murders had inspired him with courage, he made bold to quit his fort and joined his army, which had now taken up a strong position at Oudanulla or Oondwah Nullah, a strong fort situated near the right bank of the Ganges, eight miles south of Rajamahal. Mir Kasim is said to have had 60,000 men within the entrenchment, which was defended by 100 pieces of cannon. The British
barely mustered in all 3,000, and yet with these succeeded in both capturing the fort and storming the entrenchment. After this defeat Mir Kasim’s temporary courage forsook him, and he hastened back to Monghyr, followed by the wreck of his army. The British pursued, invested the fort, and after a short siege compelled, or, as it has been alleged, bribed it to surrender. Mir Kasim had previously placed himself beyond the reach of danger, and was residing at Patna when he learned that Monghyr had fallen. He had for some time been meditating a horrid massacre; for Major Adams, when advancing upon that fort, had received a letter from him, in which, after an ominous allusion to his prisoners, he concluded thus: “Exult not upon the success which you have gained, merely by treachery and night assaults, in two or three places, over a few jamidars sent by me. By the will of God you shall see in what manner this shall be revenged and retaliated.” The only answer that could be returned was to denounce his brutality, and threaten it with signal vengeance. He cared not, for the fall of Monghyr had made him desperate, and he issued the inhuman order to butcher all the prisoners. It was at once executed to the very letter by Sumru, who, by his own hand and that of his emissaries, slaughtered every one of the prisoners except Dr. Fullarton, whose professional services had caused Mir Kasim to except him. The number of Englishmen thus murdered in cold blood exceeded 200. Among them were Mr. Ellis, who almost merited his fate, and Mr. Hay, a member of council, and the fellow-deputy of Mr. Amyatt on the absurd mission about private trade.

Mir Kasim, aware that he had placed himself beyond the pale of mercy, did not await the arrival of the British at Patna, but hastened to cross the Karamnasa, which formed part of the boundary between Bihar and the territories of the Nabob of Oudh. The garrison he left made a spirited but unavailing defence, and the town was taken by storm on the 6th of November. Though there was now little hope of overtaking the blood-stained fugitive, the pursuit was continued; and the British army, early in December, encamped on the banks of the Karamnasa in order to watch the motions of Mir Kasim, who had assumed a more formidable appearance than ever in consequence of
having formed a junction with the Emperor Shah Alam and Suja-ud-daulah, the Nabob of Oudh, who, as has been already mentioned, had been appointed his vizir. When he crossed the river they were both at Allahabad preparing for an expedition against Bundelkhand. They received him with all the respect due to his rank as nabob, and promised him their assistance to recover the provinces from which he represented himself as most unjustly expelled. To show that he was not undeserving of their assistance, he volunteered to head the expedition against Bundelkhand with his own troops, and was so successful that his new confederates were impressed with a favourable opinion of his cause, and declared their determination to unite as soon as the season would admit in a common invasion of Bengal.

The presidency, notwithstanding the successes which had attended their arms, were by no means free from apprehension. Mir Jafar’s name carried no weight with it, and they found themselves involved in a war which mere distance made difficult and expensive, and which, if permitted to spread, might soon extend over the greater part of Northern India. They were therefore extremely urgent that Major Carnac, who had again been appointed to the chief command, should at once assume the aggressive, or at all events maintain the advanced position which had been taken up. Unfortunately, it seemed to him impracticable to do either. His troops were disaffected. They thought that their previous services had not been sufficiently rewarded, and had been worked upon by emissaries of the enemy, who succeeded in convincing not a few that the most effectual way of bettering their circumstances would be by changing masters. Desertion, accordingly, became alarmingly frequent; and when the enemy began to advance, Carnac, afraid to risk the encounter, retired upon Patna. The enemy followed, in hope of interposing between him and the town; and when they failed, came up boldly in front of the walls under which he was encamped, and offered him battle. However unwilling he might be, it was scarcely in his power to decline it. On the morning of the 13th of May, the enemy commenced with a cannonade, and under cover of it made a general attack, which was kept up with great spirit, and was not finally repulsed till evening began to close. The British, thus far victorious, were unable to
derive any advantage from their victory; while the enemy, instead of retiring, kept hovering about, watching an opportunity to repeat their attack.

During the continuance of this unsatisfactory state of matters, negotiations were repeatedly attempted. Carnac, as a preliminary, demanded the delivery of Mir Kasim and Sumru. The vizir not only refused, but demanded the cession of the whole province of Bihar. Between parties entertaining such opposite views, there could be no agreement, and yet the semblance of negotiating was kept up for several weeks. The only thing gained was time, and this was of considerable importance, for in the interval the difficulty of maintaining an army in the field had greatly increased; and the emperor and his vizir becoming suspicious of each other's good faith, betrayed a willingness to treat separately. The emperor, in particular, offered to enter into regular alliance with the Company. It became unnecessary to make a final choice between these overtures before the confederacy was broken up, by the sudden departure of the vizir, who, alarmed for the safety of his own territories, threatened by a strong detachment which Carnac had sent across the Ganges, hastened off to defend them.

Major Carnac was succeeded by Major Hector Monro, who arrived with a reinforcement which he brought by sea from Bombay. He found the mutinous spirit which had crippled his predecessor's operations still prevalent. On the very day of his arrival, a whole battalion of sepoys set off with their arms and accoutrements to join the enemy. A body of troops sent in pursuit, came upon them while asleep, and brought them back as prisoners. It was absolutely necessary to make an example, and Monro was determined that it should be of a kind sufficient to strike terror. Having picked out twenty-four who were understood to be the most criminal of the mutineers, he brought them before a court-martial of native officers, who found them guilty, and sentenced them to any kind of death the commander should appoint. He immediately ordered that four of them should be blown away from guns. When they were tied up for this purpose, four grenadiers who had been condemned, stepped forward and requested that, as they had always had the post of honour, they should be the first to suffer. This extraordinary
precedence was allowed them. After they had suffered, the sepoys intimated through their European officers that they would not allow any more to be executed. Monro was not to be thus deterred. After loading the field-pieces with grape, and placing them at intervals in the line of Europeans, he ordered the sepoys to ground their arms, intimating that, on the least symptom of refusal, he would order the artillery to fire upon them. They were completely overawed, and looked on without a murmur, while sixteen more were blown from the guns. Four remained, but with no intention to repulse them, for they were immediately sent off to another cantonment, where, from the frequency of desertion from it, it appeared that the example of an execution was particularly required.

The mutinous spirit being thus quelled, Monro brought the troops out of cantonments as soon as the cessation of the rains permitted, and on the 15th of September commenced his march westward at the head of any army consisting of 857 Europeans, 5,297 sepoys, and 918 native cavalry, in all 7,072 men, with twenty field-pieces. After encountering some resistance at the passage of the Sone, where some breastworks had been thrown up, and suffering considerable annoyance from cavalry which hung on his line of march, he arrived on the 22nd of October at the town and fort of Buxar, situated on the right bank of the Ganges, nearly equidistant between Patna and Benares. Here the Vizir Suja-ud-daulah and Mir Kasim were occupying an entrenched camp, with an army estimated variously from 40,000 to 60,000 men. Their position, having the Ganges on the left and Buxar in the rear, was strong, but confident in their numbers they disdained to act on the defensive, and on the morning of the 23rd were seen advancing to the attack. Monro’s intention to surprise the camp during the previous night had been frustrated by the failure of the spies whom he had sent out to return with the necessary information, and he had now no option but to fight in open day on ground which the enemy had chosen. The battle lasted three hours, and appears to have been stoutly contested, for even after the enemy saw themselves defeated they retired slowly instead of breaking into a tumultuous flight. Their greatest loss was sustained at the crossing of a stream, over which there was a bridge of boats. The vizir
seeing the British in close pursuit ordered the bridge to be broken down. About 2,000 of his troops thus left behind were drowned or slain. This order to destroy the bridge was, in the opinion of Major Monro, the best piece of generalship which Suja-ud-daulah showed that day. But for it, he said, “I would either have taken or drowned his whole army in the Karamnasa, and come up with his treasure and jewels, and Kasim Ali Khan’s jewels, which, I was informed, amounted to between £2,000,000 and £3,000,000”. Besides the 2,000 who perished at the bridge, the enemy lost other 2,000 in the field of battle, together with 130 pieces of cannon. The British loss was also severe, amounting in killed and wounded to 847, or rather more than a ninth of their whole force.

The victory of Buxar was immediately followed by overtures of peace both from the emperor and Suja-ud-daulah. The former, indeed, was so far reduced in his fortunes that he scarcely ventured to assume the character of an independent prince, and offered to submit to any terms that might be dictated to him. The only return he asked was protection against his own vizir, who, he complained, was treating him as a state prisoner. The British commander having no authority to treat, wrote to Calcutta for instructions, but so determined was the emperor to escape from the thraldom in which he was held, that in the interval before the instructions arrived he kept close to the British army, and every night encamped for safety as near them as he could. At last, when a favourable answer arrived from Calcutta, the protection which he had previously enjoyed on mere sufferance was regularly granted, and he was recognized as no longer the enemy but the ally of the Company.

Suja-ud-daulah was equally anxious for the cessation of hostilities, and offered to purchase it by paying twenty-five lacs of rupees as the expenses of the war, twenty-five lacs to the army, and eight lacs to the commander. One indispensable requisite was still wanting—the delivery of Mir Kasim and Sumru. To this Suja-ud-daulah still refused his assent. He seemed to be influenced in his refusal by a feeling of honour, and yet this could hardly be, for at this very time, Mir Kasim, so far from being treated with the hospitality due to a guest, was suffering the greatest indignity, and had almost been reduced to beggary by
extortion and the violent seizure of his treasures. In regard to Sumru, scruples of honour were not even pretended. The reason assigned for not delivering him was, that being at the head of the battalions of sepoys he was his own master, and would resist any attempt to make him a prisoner. The true reason was different. Sumru, on finding that Mir Kasim was no longer able to be his paymaster, had abandoned him, and was now with his sepoys enlisted in the vizir's service. He was, therefore, unwilling to part with him. At length, however, on finding that the delivery of him was still insisted on as an indispensable preliminary to the conclusion of a treaty, he endeavoured to effect a singular compromise by proposing that, instead of being delivered up, he should be assassinated. The plan was to give an entertainment, and murder him in the midst of its festivities. To make sure of the right man, deputies from the English camp who knew Sumru's person were to be present and witness the death. It is almost unnecessary to say that the proposed compromise was at once rejected, and the negotiation was broken off.

At the commencement of the negotiation, the British army had advanced to Benares. On its termination it resumed its march in the direction of Allahabad. At the same time a strong detachment was sent into the territories of Oudh proper, and succeeded in effecting the capture of Lucknow, the capital. Another enterprise undertaken by the main army was less successful. The strong fort of Chunar, or Chunargarh, situated on the right bank of the Ganges, lay so near the line of march that it was deemed imprudent to leave it behind in the enemy's possession. Its site was a sandstone rock, rising abruptly from the river to the height of 104 feet, and continuing to ascend till it reached the height of 146 feet. The whole area, inclosed by a rampart, measured 750 yards in length by 300 in breadth. It was supposed that, notwithstanding the strength of its position and its fortifications, it might be carried by a night attack. The attempt was made and failed; but the place was subsequently carried after a regular breach had been effected. A still more important success was obtained by the capture of Allahabad, which, though strongly fortified, made only a feeble resistance. The emperor, still excluded from Delhi, immediately took up his residence in Allahabad, which, with a considerable tract of
surrounding country, had been guaranteed to him by a treaty which the presidency had concluded with him in name of the Company. This was only a first instalment of a much more extensive guarantee, for he was ultimately to be put in possession of the whole territories of Suja-ud-daulah, his late vizir, with whom he was now openly at war. The presidency, however, had, in giving this guarantee, undertaken more than their superiors would allow them to perform, and the part of the treaty relating to the other territories was destined, as will be seen, to become a dead letter.

During these transactions, another event, fraught with more important consequences, had taken place. Mir Jafar, after his restoration to the masnad, had accompanied the army, and remained the reluctant spectator of a war which he would willingly have terminated by a cession of territory or any other sacrifice. His treasury was as empty as ever, and in addition to war expenses at the rate of five lacs a month, he had not only heavy arrears to the Company to discharge, but was pestered by their servants with indefinite demands of compensation for losses. In his eagerness to resume a throne which it would have been his wisdom to decline, he had agreed to this so-called compensation, which consisted for the most part of imaginary claims of damage for the stoppage of private trade. This compensation, when he agreed to it, was estimated at ten lacs, but continued mounting up, till at last it exceeded more than five times the original estimate. In the hope of more readily obtaining payment, the council brought the old nabob down to Calcutta, where the constant irritation in which he was kept brought on a serious illness. It proved fatal; for, after languishing a few weeks, he was with difficulty removed to Murshidabad, and died there in the beginning of February, 1765.

The question of succession remained to be settled, and was immediately taken up by the presidency, who, having the power of nomination completely in their hands, saw many reasons for proceeding without delay to exercise it. The only individuals who could be regarded as rival claimants were Mir Jafar's eldest surviving son, Najm-ud-daulah, and a grandson by his eldest son Miran. Both of them were illegitimate, and therefore without any valid legal title. Had they been legitimate, the better
title was in Najm-ud-daulah according to the Muhammedan law, which, instead of continuing the succession by representation, always prefers a surviving son to a grandson. In another respect Najm-ud-daulah was preferable. He was about twenty, while Miran’s son was only a boy of about six years of age. This difference, indeed, was of little consequence, as the nabob was in future to be a mere puppet, while all power was to centre in the Company. Such being the real object, something might have been gained by appointing a nabob who was incapable of acting from nonage. This, however, was counterbalanced by a serious disadvantage. An infant nabob could hardly be supposed capable of making presents, and yet it may be affirmed, without any breach of charity, that on these presents the nabob-makers of Calcutta were far more intent than on the interests of their employers. The fact is undeniable; for at the very time when Mr. Spencer, who had succeeded Mr. Vansittart as governor, and his council shared among them so-called presents to the amount of £139,357 for raising Najm-ud-daulah to the masnad, new covenants interdicting the servants of the Company from receiving presents had been sent out by the court of directors, and were lying unexecuted on the council table. Private trade also had been interdicted; but in regard to it the authority of the directors was in like manner defied, and the new nabob was expressly taken bound to leave the private trade on its old footing. In the other arrangements, the interests of the Company not running counter to those of their servants were more carefully attended to, and the whole powers of government, civil and military, were transferred to them. They were to undertake the whole defence of the country, employing for that purpose the revenues of the assigned districts of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong, together with five lacs of rupees to be paid monthly by the nabob from other sources; and were to have a complete control over the whole civil administration by means of a deputy nabob, or naib-subah, whom the nabob bound himself to appoint by their advice, and not to dismiss without their sanction. This deputy, invested with the whole executive authority, was in fact the real nabob. Najm-ud-daulah, aware of this, was extremely anxious to appoint Nanda Kumar, a Hindu, whom we have already seen supplanting his patron Raidurlabh by a series of
intrigues. He had possessed and abused the confidence of Mir Jafar, and acquired an unbounded influence over Najm-ud-daulah, whom he hoped to employ as the instrument of his villainy; but the presidency, thoroughly acquainted with his character, refused to ratify his appointment, and succeeded in securing it for Muhammed Reza Khan, who was in every respect far better entitled to it.

The leading events which took place after Clive's departure from India having been traced, it will now be necessary to follow him to England, and attend to the transactions in which he was there taking a prominent part. The time of his arrival was most opportune for his fame. Disaster had everywhere been following the British arms, and India was the only quarter in which the national pride could find any gratification. His achievements there were consequently magnified even beyond their deserts, and all classes vied in doing him honour. He was not indisposed to turn this tide of favour to account, but an attack of illness so severe that "for twelve months," to use his own language, "it was difficult to pronounce whether he was to live or die," frustrated many of his intentions, and even deprived him of a part of the reward which he thought due to his merit. In a letter to Major Carnac he says, "If health had not deserted me on my first arrival in England, in all probability I had been an English peer, instead of an Irish one, with the promise of a red ribbon. I know I could have bought the title (which is usual), but that I was above, and the honours I have obtained are free and voluntary. My wishes may hereafter be accomplished." His ambition, it thus appears, was not satisfied; and he had the mortification to see the ministry through whom he anticipated higher advancement displaced. He was the more disconcerted because his interest at court and in parliament, which he had sedulously laboured to establish, failed him at the very time when he was confidently calculating upon it to defeat an attack which had been darkly threatened by the court of directors. Though the proceeds of his jaghir had been regularly paid by the Bengal presidency to his agents in India, the directors, who were suffering under great pecuniary embarrassment, felt much dissatisfied, and Mr. Sullivan, the chairman, gave him to understand that the secret committee would communicate with him on the
subject. He himself seems not to have been without misgivings, and for some time pursued a course which displayed none of his characteristic fearlessness, and was in fact more prudential than chivalrous. In a letter to Mr. Amyatt he says, "My friends advise me to do nothing to exasperate them (the directors), if they are silent as to my jaghir. Indeed, it is an object of such importance that I should be inexcusable if I did not make every other consideration give way to it; and this is one of the reasons why I cannot join openly with the Bengal gentlemen in their resentments. It depends upon you, my friend, to make me a free man, by getting this grant confirmed from Delhi, and getting such an acknowledgment from under the hands of the old nabob and the new nabob, as may enable me to put all our enemies at defiance."

It is painful to see such a man as Clive reduced to the necessity of gagging himself, and confessing that he could not act as a "free man," because he was afraid of giving offence which might prove injurious to his pecuniary interests. The worst of it is, that he seems unconscious of the degradation which he was thus voluntarily imposing upon himself, and hence again and again brings it under the notice of his correspondents as if it were a matter of which he had not the least cause to be ashamed. In a letter to Mr. Pybus, of Madras, after describing Sullivan as "the reigning director," and as "keeping every one out of the direction who is endowed with more knowledge, or would be likely to have more weight and influence than himself," he continues thus: "This kind of political behaviour has exasperated most of the gentlemen who are lately come from India, particularly those from Bengal. They are surprised I do not join in their resentments; and I should think it very surprising if I did, considering I have such an immense stake in India. My future power, my future grandeur, all depend upon the receipt of the jaghir money. I should be a madman to set at defiance those who at present show no inclination to hurt me." He was thus, according to his own confession, acting in a public matter from a selfish and sordid motive. Peace on such terms was at best a hollow truce; and accordingly, no sooner was Clive convinced that the dominant party in the court of directors might be turned out, than he declared open war against it. In order to influence the election
of 1763 he manufactured an enormous number of votes. The qualification was then £500, and he employed £100,000 in this very discreditable manoeuvre. The other party, backed by the Bute ministry, to which Clive was opposed, were equally unscrupulous, and scenes of the most scandalous nature were exhibited. At the meetings of the general courts of proprietors Clive's party had so decided a majority that he considered the victory as gained. He had entirely miscalculated. Sullivan, supported by all the influence of government, and by the great body of proprietors, who had established an influence with the existing directors, and were eagerly waiting for the fulfilment of promises which had been made to them, carried his list by a triumphant majority.

Clive, being thus defeated in a contest in which he ought never to have engaged, was not left long in doubt as to the course which his opponents meant to pursue. One of the first uses which they made of their victory was to transmit orders to the Bengal presidency to stop all further payments on account of Lord Clive's jaghir, and furnish an account of all the payments previously made. There was much indecent haste and vindictiveness in this proceeding; but what else was to be expected from the victors in a contest in which the combatants on both sides had from the first shown that they were not to be restrained by any ordinary scruples? Clive felt, or affected to feel astonishment at the harsh measure dealt out to him by the directors, and immediately took the only remedy which seemed open to him, by instituting a suit in Chancery. It would be painful to dwell on the proceedings, and fortunately it is not necessary, as the merits of the case were never judicially investigated, and it was taken out of court by a compromise. The intelligence of the massacre at Patna, of the violent dissensions in the council at Calcutta, and of the commencement of a war, of which it was impossible to foretell the issue, put a sudden end to all the petty squabblings among the directors, and was followed by a loud and general call for Clive's return to India. As he had founded the British empire there, so he was regarded as the only man capable of saving it from the destruction with which it was threatened. Clive had it now in his power to make his own terms; and, though he cannot be charged with
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taking an undue advantage of his position, he certainly showed his determination not to yield a single point which he deemed of importance.

The first question which called for settlement was that of the jaghir. The general court of proprietors would at once have set it at rest, by deciding it entirely in his favour; but he thought it unbecoming to dispose of a grave question of law by a resolution proposed and carried in a moment of excitement, and he therefore begged delay, that he might be able to submit a proposal which he trusted would lead to an amicable adjustment. The question of appointment was not settled without a keen and even doubtful contest. No fewer than four general courts were held on the subject. The two first were principally occupied with preliminary matters. At the third the subject was brought formally under discussion by a motion that the nomination of Mr. Spencer as governor of Bengal should be referred back to the court of directors for their re-consideration. The object of the motion, of course, was to cancel the nomination, and thus prepare the way for Lord Clive's appointment. But, after a warm debate, it was lost by a majority of 184 to 141. The Clive party, thus defeated, prepared for a new struggle by a wholesale manufacture of votes; and at a subsequent meeting, held on the 12th of March, 1764, carried the following resolution:—"That it was the desire of the general court that Lord Clive be requested to take upon him the station of president of Bengal and the command of the Company's military forces, upon his arrival at that presidency."

The directors having no alternative but to make an appointment which they would most willingly have resisted, contented themselves with instructing their secretary to send Clive a letter inclosing a copy of the above resolution, and informing him of their readiness to provide for his passage in the manner that might be most convenient for him. His answer was equally laconic. "I have received your letter inclosing copy of the last resolution of the general court. I must desire you will return the directors my thanks for their offers of preparing every convenience for my passage." While such feelings existed, cordial co-operation was impossible; and therefore Clive was right when, at a subsequent general court, held on the 21st of March, he declined to declare
his acceptance of the appointment till the issue of the approaching election of directors was known. He made no secret of his motives. It was his positive determination not again to enter the service of the Company while Mr. Sullivan filled the chair, for "it would be in vain for him to exert himself as he ought in the office of governor and commander-in-chief of their forces, if his measures were to be thwarted and condemned at home, as they probably would be, by a court of directors, under the influence of a chairman, whose conduct upon many occasions had evinced his ignorance of East India affairs, and who was also known to be his personal and inveterate enemy." The election which was thus to decide the whole matter proved favourable to Clive's supporters. Both the chairman and deputy were his friends; and Sullivan was run so closely, that he carried his seat in the direction by only a single vote. All obstacles were now removed, and Clive's acceptance was immediately declared. The lawsuit as to the jaghir was also arranged in terms of a compromise which Clive himself proposed, and by which the Company engaged to pay him the quit-rent for ten years, or during his life, if he should not live so long. What was to become of it afterwards does not appear to have been openly declared, but the understanding was, that the Company, who had previously farmed out the lands included under the jaghir at £100,000, while their quit-rent fell short of £30,000, were, in the event of Clive's death, to be absolute proprietors.

At the time of Clive's reappointment, affairs in Bengal were understood to have fallen into such disorder, that it would be necessary to make his powers almost absolute. His own suggestion was, that he should be intrusted with "a dispensing power in the civil and political affairs," that is, as he himself explains it, "that whenever I may think proper to take any resolution entirely upon myself, that resolution is to take place." The directors did not confer these absolute powers, at least in the form in which he asked them; but they did what was almost equivalent to it, by making him the head of a select committee, consisting, besides himself, of four individuals, appointed on his recommendation, and made so far independent of the council, as to be empowered to act whenever they judged proper without consulting it. Two of the members of the committee, Messrs.
Sumner and Sykes, accompanied Clive from England; the others, General Carnac and Mr. Verelst, were already in India. Among other arrangements to which an understanding was come, the most important related to the private trade, and to the receiving of presents. In February, 1764, while the old directors were still in office, they had taken up the former subject and disposed of it greatly to their credit, by the following passage in their general letter to the Bengal presidency:—"One grand source of the disputes, misunderstandings, and difficulties, which have occurred with the country government, appears evidently to have taken its rise from the unwarrantable and licentious manner of carrying on the private trade by the Company's servants, their gomastaks, agents, and others, to the prejudice of the subah, both with respect to his authority and the revenues justly due to him; the diverting and taking from his natural subjects, the trade in the inland part of the country, to which neither we, nor any other persons whatsoever dependent upon us, or under our protection, have any manner of right. In order, therefore, to remedy all these disorders, we do hereby positively order and direct, that, from the receipt of this letter, a final and effectual end be forthwith put to the inland trade in salt, betelnut, tobacco, and all other articles whatsoever, produced and consumed in the country." This interdict on private trade was fully approved by Clive, who, in a letter addressed to the directors, 27th April, 1764, thus expressed himself:—"Strict and impartial justice should ever be observed; but let that justice come from ourselves. The trade, therefore, of salt, betel, and tobacco having been one cause of the present disputes, I hope these articles will be restored to the nabob, and your servants absolutely forbid to trade in them. This will be striking at the root of the evil." Unfortunately, these enlightened and disinterested views did not find favour with the general court of proprietors, who, in a meeting held 18th May, adopted the following resolution:—"That it be recommended to the court of directors to reconsider the orders sent to Bengal, relative to the trade of the Company's servants in the articles of salt, betel, and tobacco, and that they do give such directions for regulating the same, agreeable to the interests of the Company and the subah, as to them may appear most prudent, either by settling here at home
the restrictions under which this trade ought to be carried on, or by referring it to the governor and council of Fort William, to regulate this important point in such a manner as may prevent all further disputes between the subah and the Company." In consequence of this recommendation, the previous orders of the directors were modified, and it was left to the governor and council, after "consulting the nabob, to form a proper and equitable plan for carrying on the inland trade." On the subject of presents the orders of the directors were more peremptory, and new covenants, dated May, 1764, were sent out to be executed by all servants, civil and military, of the Company, binding them to pay to the Company all presents received from natives, if the amount exceeded 4,000 rupees, and not to accept of any present exceeding 1,000 rupees in value without the consent of the presidency.

Clive sailed from England on the 4th of June, 1764, and had so tedious a passage that he did not reach Madras till the 10th of April, 1765. Here he learned, for the first time, that the war in Bengal had been brought to a conclusion, and that the terms of peace were so completely in the power of the Company, that it was "scarcely hyperbole to say, Tomorrow the whole Mughul empire is in our power." In the same letter, written privately to Mr. Rous, chairman of the court, seven days after his arrival at Madras, he added, "We must become nabobs ourselves in fact, if not in name, perhaps totally so without disguise, but on this subject I cannot be certain till my arrival in Bengal." At this time, though he knew of Mir Jafar's death, he was not aware of the steps which had been taken to appoint a successor; but he was so satisfied that the Company was about to enter on a new course of prosperity, which would greatly advance the value of its stock, that he wrote on the same day to his agent in London, desiring that whatever money he had in the public funds, or anywhere else, and as much as could be borrowed in his name, should be, "without loss of a minute, invested in East India stock."

Clive arrived in Calcutta on the 3rd of May, and lost no time in commencing the exercise of his extraordinary powers. Some of the members of council, conscious of the awkward position in which they stood, were disposed to take advantage
of some ambiguous expressions which occurred in the commission to the select committee, and to put their own interpretation upon them; but Clive denied their right even to inquire, and gave them to understand that it would be full time to give their opinion when the select committee judged it necessary to ask it. By taking this high ground he intimidated the boldest of his opponents, though he at the same time provoked a hostility which afterwards followed him to England, and subjected him to imputations and insults which his proud spirit proved unable to endure. Difficulties, however, so far from deterring him, only stimulated him to exertion. "I was determined," as he afterwards expressed it, "to do my duty to the public, though I should incur the odium of the whole settlement. The welfare of the Company required a vigorous exertion, and I took the resolution of cleansing the Augean stable." This opprobrious epithet is by no means inappropriate; for in every class of the Company's servants, from the highest to the lowest, the great actuating principle was avarice, manifested without any regard to decency, and in the form most insulting and oppressive to the native population. It is impossible, however, to forget how much of the corruption might have been traced to the bad example which Clive himself had set, and there is therefore something painfully incongruous in the high-flown style which he sometimes employs. Thus, in a letter written to General Carnac, three days after he had entered upon office, he says, "Tomorrow we sit in committee, when I make no doubt of discovering such a scene as will be shocking to human nature. The council," he adds, "have all received immense sums for this new appointment (of a nabob), and are so shameless as to own it publicly. Hence we can account for the motive of paying so little respect to me and the committee;" and then, warming as he proceeds, breaks out into the following exclamation:— "Alas! how is the English name sunk! I could not avoid paying the tribute of a few tears to the departed and lost fame of the British nation (irrecoverably so, I fear). However, I do declare, by that Great Being who is the searcher of all hearts, and to whom we must be accountable, if there must be an hereafter, that I am come out with a mind superior to all corruption, and that I am determined to destroy those great and growing
evils, or perish in the attempt. The cutting retort to which he laid himself open in using this language seems never to have occurred to him.

The covenants which interdicted all the servants of the Company from accepting presents had arrived in the previous January, some weeks before the death of Mir Jafar, and consequently were in possession of the council when they set them at defiance, by taking presents on the succession of Najm-ud-daulah. They had endeavoured to evade the obligation by the very bold but flimsy device of allowing the covenants to remain unexecuted. When questioned on the subject, they hypocritically pretended that their apparent contempt of authority was, in fact, an act of deference to it, for the signing of the covenants was a matter of so much consequence that they could not think of settling anything final about them till Lord Clive’s arrival. That this ludicrous excuse might no longer avail, one of the first resolutions of the select committee was that “the covenants be executed immediately.” When this resolution was read to the council they argued strenuously for delay, and only yielded on being told that the only alternative was to sign or be suspended the service. It is not unworthy of notice that when the covenants were afterwards transmitted to the army for signature, General Carnac, though commander-in-chief, and a member of the select committee, refused. It was, however, on special grounds. He had received a present of 80,000 rupees from Balwant Singh, Raja of Benares. The covenants bore a date antecedent to that of the present; but, as he was not aware of their existence, he refused to sign till the date was altered, so as not to lay him open to the charge of having violated them. Another present to a much larger amount, given him by Shah Alam, whose necessitous circumstances must have made it very inconvenient, was bestowed after he had received notice of the covenants. The sum was two lacs of rupees, equal, according to the rate of exchange at the time, to £23,333; making, with the previous present from Balwant Singh, a total of £32,666. The latter present was so clearly illegal that Carnac accepted it, subject to the approval of the directors, and in the meantime lodged it in the treasury of the presidency. To sanction such a present, at the very time
when the signature of the covenants was enforced under the penalty of suspension from the service, was to establish a very extraordinary precedent; and yet, in such different lights does the same thing appear, according as personal predilections are affected by it, that Clive strenuously supported the present in the following terms:—"I shall only say that Carnac has acted with such moderation and honour in the service of the Company, and with such good deference and attention towards his majesty the Great Mughul, that the directors must be the most ungrateful of men, if they do not by the return of this ship, or the first conveyance, order him this money, with a due encomium on his services, disinterestedness, and modesty." Truly, if Carnac, after pocketing one present, which was only saved from illegality by an accident, and hankering after another which was clearly illegal, and which the directors could not sanction without stultifying themselves, deserved such an encomium, Clive should not have boasted much of "cleansing the Augean stable." In regard to the private trade, the regulations adopted were by no means such as might have been anticipated from the views which Clive had expressed before leaving England. At that time he considered the abolition of it necessary in order "to strike at the root of the evil," whereas he fully sanctioned, if he did not actually originate a scheme by which the present trade, instead of being thrown open to all the inhabitants on equal terms, was converted, at least in three of its leading articles, into a rigorous monopoly in favour of the Company's servants. The scheme is said to have been rendered expedient in consequence of a most important change which took place at this time in the circumstances of the Company, and it is therefore only fair before judging of it to have this change fully in view.

The Emperor Shah Alam had, as we have seen, thrown himself on British protection, and entered into a treaty, in which the most important stipulations in his favour were that he should immediately be put in possession of Allahabad, and assisted in conquering all the territories which belonged to the Nabob of Oudh. This was a very serious undertaking, though there seemed little reason to doubt that the army which had already achieved so many successes would be able to accomplish it. The
nabob, however, was determined not to yield without a struggle, and endeavoured to repair the disaster at Buxar, by forming alliances with Ghazi-ud-din, the vizir (who, after murdering Alamgir, usurped possession of the districts around Delhi), with certain of the Rohilla chiefs, and with a body of Marathas. This confederacy was far more formidable in appearance than in reality. The members, pursuing separate ends, had no common interest, and rendered their promised aid so tardily and so feebly that the nabob’s affairs became desperate. As a last resource he recurred to negotiation, and was delighted to find that he could obtain liberal terms. The impolicy of the treaty which had been made with the emperor had become apparent, and it was determined to modify, or if necessary set aside its most important provisions. At last, after long hesitation, it had been resolved to accept of the diwani of the three provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, and thus by transferring the collection of the revenues as well as the military defence of the country to the Company, put an end to the possibility of future collision with the nabob.

The accomplishment of this important work was reserved for Clive, who was the first to suggest it, and had repeatedly explained the grounds on which he was convinced that it must sooner or later become absolutely necessary. On the 24th of June, Clive left Calcutta on this important mission, and proceeded first to Murshidabad, where he obtained the consent of Najm-ud-daulah to several important modifications in the treaty made with him when he was raised to the masnad. He would fain have placed himself under the guidance of Nanda Kumar, and was greatly dissatisfied that Muhammed Reza Khan had been forced upon him as deputy or naib-subah. Without yielding to his complaints, advantage was taken of them to limit the exorbitant power of Reza Khan, by associating with him as colleagues the old diwan Raidurlabh, and the banker Jagat Seth, and at the same time exercising a vigilant superintendence over all the three, by means of a British resident. This, however, was only preliminary to a still greater change. Under the treaty the military defence of the country was undertaken by the Company, who obtained for that purpose a permanent assignment of the districts of Burdwan, Midnapore,
and Chittagong. With this important exception, all the other revenues belonged to the nabob, who levied them in his own name, and for his own behoof, under deduction of the annual tribute payable to the Mughul. By the new arrangement the nabob was converted into a mere pensionary, and, instead of drawing an indefinite revenue, was restricted to an annual pension of fifty lacs of rupees. In future this was to be his only interest in the revenue, and he was to receive it not directly from the collectors, but at second-hand from the Company, who in consequence became his paymasters. There cannot be a doubt that the nabob would gladly have escaped from the degrading conditions thus imposed upon him. Resistance, however, was out of the question, and unreserved compliance was his only alternative. The transaction which made the Company absolute masters of the three provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa was now completed, but a ratification was still deemed necessary.

Low as the fortunes of the Mughul had fallen he was still nominally supreme, and continued to be appealed to as the valid disposer of kingdoms, long after he had ceased to have any real authority within them. It was desirable, therefore, that the Company, in appropriating the whole civil and military power of the three provinces, should obtain his sanction. In this there was little difficulty, as he had voluntarily offered, when he threw himself on their protection, to comply with any terms which they might be pleased to dictate. Clive accordingly after accomplishing his object at Murshidabad, by reducing the nabob to the condition of a pensioner, pursued his tour in the direction of Allahabad, that he might there, in conjunction with General Carnac, obtain from Shah Alam a formal sanction of the new revolution which he had just accomplished. It is not to be denied that Shah Alam had good cause to complain of the treatment he received on this occasion. When he entered on possession of Allahabad and the adjoining districts, it was under a treaty which promised him the ultimate possession of all the territories which belonged to Suja-ud-daulah. Instead of this he was now informed that he must rest satisfied with the small extent of territory already conferred upon him, and with the annual payment of twenty-
six lacs of rupees from Bengal. Besides this tribute he had right to a jaghir in that country which yielded several lacs, and to a large amount of arrears, but when he claimed them, was simply told that he must look on all past arrangements as cancelled. In future he, too, was to be nothing more than a mere pensioner of the Company. There is something almost ludicrous in the double character which Shah Alam was thus made to assume. In the one he is seen haggling with the representatives of the Company, and vainly endeavouring to increase the amount which they had allotted for his maintenance; in the other, he assumes all the airs of an absolute sovereign, and gives away vast and populous provinces by a mere stroke of the pen. It is not unworthy of notice that, at the time when the grant of the diwani of the three provinces, yielding a revenue estimated at from £30,00,000 to £4,000,000 sterling, was obtained, Clive's jaghir was not forgotten, the reversion of it after he should have enjoyed it for ten years, or on his death, if it should sooner happen, being expressly bestowed on the Company. This reversion, it is almost unnecessary to observe, was previously included in the grant of the diwani, and hence the only thing gained by granting it specially, was to give legal effect to the arrangement respecting the jaghir, which had previously been made between Clive and the directors.

The only person who had reason to congratulate himself on the liberal treatment which he received was Suja-ud-daulah. He had been the most formidable and inveterate enemy of the Company, and had not only taken Mir Kasim and Sumru under his protection, though perfectly cognizant of the horrid massacres which they had perpetrated, but had placed himself at the head of a confederacy avowedly leagued for the purpose of expelling the British altogether from the country. There would, therefore, have been no injustice in carrying out the treaty which engaged to deprive him altogether of his territories, and transfer them to Shah Alam. Indeed, it was not justice, but policy, that dictated the more favourable terms which he received after a series of disastrous defeats had compelled him to throw himself unconditionally on the mercy of his conquerors. The Company had never been ambitious of territorial aggrandizement; and after repeatedly declining the diwani of the three provinces,
had at last accepted it, more from necessity than choice. So long as the revenues were payable to the nabob, his interests were at variance with those of the Company and their agents, and misunderstandings and collisions were constantly occurring. The acceptance of the diwani by the Company seemed the only effectual remedy, and on this ground alone it was recommended by the select committee, and at last sanctioned with some degree of reluctance by the court. The great object now was to make possession safe and permanent by the formation of such a frontier as would give the best security against foreign invasion, and afford the necessary leisure for the introduction of important internal improvements. In the treaty with Shah Alam, this object had been overlooked. The only effect of putting him in possession of the territories of Suja-ud-daulah would have been to protract hostilities indefinitely. Too feeble to provide for his own defence within the country, he never could have made head against the Afghans and Marathas, who were watching an opportunity to extend their conquests.

It was to such considerations as these that Suja-ud-daulah owed the favour which was shown him. He was the hereditary prince, and both from his position and his talents was supposed most capable of interposing an effectual barrier between the possessions of the Company and the foreign invaders who had long been intent on gaining a footing in them. To fit him for the part thus assigned him, it was necessary not only to leave his strength unimpaired, but to convince him, by generous treatment, that he could not advance his interest more effectually than by linking his own fortunes with those of the Company, and entering into close alliance with them. Accordingly, when Clive set out to conclude the treaty with Suja-ud-daulah, the select committee, doubtless echoing his own sentiments, furnished him with a paper of instructions, in which they say, "Experience having shown that an influence maintained by force of arms, is destructive of that commercial spirit which we ought to promote, ruinous to the Company, and oppressive to the country, we earnestly recommend to your lordship, that you will exert your utmost endeavours to conciliate the affections of the country powers, to remove any jealousy they may entertain of our unbounded ambition, and to convince them we aim not at
conquest and dominion, but security in carrying on a free trade equally beneficial to them and to us. With this view policy requires that our demands be moderate and equitable, and that we avoid every appearance of an inclination to enlarge our territorial possessions. The sacrifice of conquest, which we must hold on a very precarious tenure, and at an expense more than equivalent to their revenues, is of little consequence to us; yet will such restitutions impress them with a high opinion of our generosity and justice. For these reasons we think Suja-ud-daulah should be reinstated in the full possession of all his dominions, with such limitations only as he must see are evidently calculated for our mutual benefit. We would decline insisting upon any terms that must prove irksome to his high spirit, and imply a suspicion of his sincerity."

A treaty in which the party able to dictate terms felt disposed to act so generously was easily arranged, and Suja-ud-daulah gladly consented to pay fifty lacs of rupees as the expense of the war, in return for the restitution of his whole territories, except the districts of Kora and Allahabad previously ceded to Shah Alam, and for a mutual alliance by which the contracting parties became bound to assist each other against all foreign invaders. The difficulty in regard to Mir Kasim and Sumru no longer existed. The former had taken refuge among the Rohillas, the latter had entered the service of the Jats, and Suja-ud-daulah did all that could be required of him, when he engaged never to give any countenance or protection to either. The only point as to which he ventured to demur was a proposal that the Company should be empowered to establish factories within his territories. In this he probably suspected a repetition of the same process by which Bengal had been wrested from its original rulers, and therefore objected so strongly that the point was not pressed, and it was merely stipulated that the Company should have liberty to trade duty free. This liberty, however, was scarcely regarded as a boon, for at this time the three provinces were supposed to be the proper limits both of trade and of conquest. In regard to the former, the presidency could foresee no benefit to the Company from maintaining settlements at so vast a distance; while in regard to the latter, even Clive declared in a letter to the directors, shortly after
concluding the treaty, "My resolution was, and my hopes will always be to confine our assistance, our conquest, and our possessions to Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. To go further is, in my opinion, a scheme so extravagantly ambitious and absurd, that no governor and council in their senses can ever adopt it, unless the whole scheme of the Company's interest be first entirely new modelled."

When Clive returned to Calcutta in September, a series of irksome duties lay before him. He had enforced the signature of the covenants interdicting presents, but as large sums had been received after the covenants had arrived, and were therefore, though unexecuted, legally binding, it was judged necessary to institute a strict inquiry in regard to them. This inquiry was, indeed, unavoidable, for Najm-ud-daulah, dissatisfied with the arrangement which had forced Muhammed Reza Khan upon him as naib-subah, no sooner heard of Clive's arrival than he hastened to Calcutta, and made it a formal complaint that the naib had emptied his treasury by paying away twenty lacs of rupees in presents to the members of council. Muhammed Reza Khan's defence was that he was not a voluntary agent, but on receiving intimation of the sums which the members of council expected had no option but to pay them. The recipients of the so-called presents denied that they had used either force or terror. This was perhaps true, but the inquiry proved that they had intimated their expectations in a way which made it impossible to refuse them, and the sentence therefore was not unjust, which, on the ground of this misconduct, dismissed Mr. Spencer, the governor, and nine other leading officials from the Company's service.

The question of private trade still remained. The directors had, as we have seen, endeavoured to strike at the root of the evil, by sending out an order, on the 8th of February, 1764, prohibiting the servants of the Company from engaging in it. This judicious order they had been obliged to recall, in consequence of the interference of the general court of proprietors; and accordingly, in a letter sent out in the same ship in which Clive sailed from England, while they still expressed their conviction that the existing regulations as to the private inland trade were "so injurious to the nabob and the natives that they
could not, in the very nature of them, tend to anything but the producing general heartburning and dissatisfaction,” and required that their order of the 8th of February should in the meantime be enforced, they told the committee “to consult the nabob as to the manner of carrying on the inland trade, and thereupon to form a proper and equitable plan for that purpose, and transmit the same to the directors, accompanied by such explanations, observations, and remarks, as might enable them to give their sentiments and directions thereupon, in a full and explicit manner.” This letter contained the only special instructions which Clive and the select committee had received on the subject; and it was therefore to have been expected that in any arrangement subsequently adopted, the spirit at least, if not the letter of these instructions would be carefully observed. This, however, was not the case. On the contrary, a scheme was framed by which the three leading articles of the inland trade—salt, betel, and tobacco—were converted into a strict monopoly for the exclusive behoof of the servants of the Company. This scheme, which was diametrically opposed to the instructions of the directors, could only be justified by the great change of circumstances which had taken place. When the directors wrote, they understood that the nabob was still in actual possession of the revenues, and consequently had a special interest in suppressing the abuses by which their amount had been so seriously diminished. The case was now completely altered. By the grant of the diwani, the whole revenues of the country had been transferred to the Company, and the nabob was only to receive a pension of a definite amount. It was therefore no longer of any consequence to him how the revenues were managed, so long as he was sure of receiving payment of his fifty lacs. So far was the existing nabob from feeling the degrading position to which he was thus reduced, that Clive says:—“He received the proposal of having a sum of money for himself and household at his will with infinite pleasure;” and, on retiring from the interview, exclaimed, “Thank God, I shall now have as many dancing girls as I please.” There was thus no occasion to pay any regard to the nabob in the new arrangement, all modes of carrying on the inland trade being now to him equally indifferent. The only interests to be
protected were those of the Company and of the natives, and Clive thought that the plan which the select committee had devised would at once secure this protection and accomplish another object of vital importance. The salaries of the Company's servants were totally inadequate, and the private inland trade was the chief source from which they had been accustomed to make fortunes or to obtain maintenance. Now therefore, when this source was at once peremptorily cut off, they saw nothing before them but a sudden descent from affluence to beggary. The salary of a member of council was only £350, and it was perfectly notorious that the establishment which his position in society rendered necessary could not be kept up at less than £3,000. The directors, in abolishing the inland trade, ought to have given due weight to this consideration, and been prepared when they suppressed an obnoxious source of income to provide another. This they entirely failed to do; and hence Clive considered himself entitled to supply the omission by the least objectionable means at his disposal.

The plan adopted was as follows:—A society or partnership was formed, and vested with the exclusive rights to carry on the trade in salt, betel-nut, and tobacco. The partners consisted of the Company's servants, arranged in three classes, and the stock was divided among them in certain definite shares. To the first class were allotted thirty-five shares, distributed thus—the governor, five shares, the general or commander-in-chief, three shares; the second in council, three shares; the other ten members of council and two colonels, two shares each. To the second class were allotted twelve shares, or two-thirds of a share each to eighteen persons—namely, one chaplain, three lieutenant-colonels, and fourteen senior merchants. To the third class were allotted nine shares, being one-third of a share each to twenty-seven persons—namely, four majors, four first surgeons at the presidency, two first surgeons at the army, one secretary in council, one sub-accountant, one Persian translator, and one sub-export-warehouse keeper. To compensate the Company, who in their new position as diwan were entitled to draw a considerable revenue from the monopolized articles, an ad valorem duty of 35 per cent, estimated to produce £100,000 per annum, was paid, and as a security to the natives some pre-
cautions were taken to prevent the enhanced price naturally produced by a monopoly. Though nothing can be more objectionable in principle than the payment of public officers by the profit of a monopoly of the articles which, next to rice, formed in Bengal the principal necessaries of life, there cannot be a doubt that the sums realized were sufficient to furnish ample salaries to all who had the privilege of sharing in it. Clive’s calculation was that from the partnership a colonel would draw £7,000 per annum. This being the profit on two shares, each share must have yielded £3,500; and hence, the five reserved to himself as governor, must have given an income of £17,500. As he had declared his determination not to derive any pecuniary advantage from his re-appointment, he appropriated the whole of the profits thus received to the members of his household, and more especially to his brother-in-law, his secretary, and his surgeon, all of whom had accompanied him from England. The court of directors, on being made acquainted with the plan, adhered to their former views, and in their general letter to the select committee wrote as follows:—“Much has been urged by our servants at different times in favour of the right to this trade, which we have always treated as a most absurd claim. The words of the phirmaund are, “Whatever goods the English Company shall bring or carry, &c., are duty free.” To suppose that the court of Delhi could mean by these words, a monopoly of the necessaries of life over their own subjects, is such an absurdity that we shall not lose time or words in trying to refute it. With respect to the Company, it is neither consistent with their honour nor their dignity to promote such an exclusive trade, as it is now more immediately our interest and duty to protect and cherish the inhabitants, and to give them no occasion to look on every Englishman as their national enemy, a sentiment we think such a monopoly would necessarily suggest. We cannot, therefore, approve the plan you have sent us, for trading in salt, betel-nut, and tobacco, or admit of this trade in any shape whatever, and do hereby confirm our orders for its entire abolition.” These orders were too explicit to be directly disobeyed; but the execution of them was suspended on the ground, that before they were received the contract for the second year had been formed, and it was therefore impossible, “without ruin to individu-
als and confusion to the public," to fix an earlier date for the abolition than the 1st of September, 1767. Even this date was extended to enable the society to collect their debts and realize their capital, and their operations did not cease till September, 1768.

Another arrangement which Clive made at this time was deserving of more praise, though it subjected him to a larger amount of obloquy. Owing to the resignations, voluntary or compulsory, which had taken place in the council of Calcutta, and the bad spirit manifested by some of those who remained, it became necessary in supplying vacancies to deviate from the ordinary routine and appoint those only who, from character and experience, might be both able and willing to carry out the reforms which had already been introduced or were still contemplated. It seemed vain to look for such persons within the Bengal presidency. The most eligible had perished in the Patna massacre, and the select committee did not hesitate to declare that the whole list of junior merchants within the presidency, did not contain the names of more than three or four individuals whom they "could possibly recommend to higher stations at present". They therefore, on their own responsibility, subject of course to the approval of the directors, applied to the Madras presidency for four of their ablest civil servants, and on their arrival gave them seats in the council. It was not to be expected that a measure which not only broke in upon the established rule of seniority, but virtually charged those who would have succeeded under that rule with incompetency, would escape severe animadversion and violent opposition. The whole settlement was thrown into a ferment, and the individuals who conceived their interests to be injuriously affected, not contented with subscribing a formal memorial of complaint, took the less justifiable step of attempting to effect their object by means of private associations, which Clive denounced as "destructive of that subordination without which no government can stand." Failing to obtain their main object, the members engaged to persist in a series of petty and insulting annoyances. No visits were to be paid to the president; no invitations from him or any other member of the select committee were to be accepted; and the new counsellors from
Madras were to be treated with neglect and contempt. In pursuing this course they were abetted by some of the highest officials. Two members of council signed their memorial "in testimony of their sense of the injustice done to the younger servants," and the secretary of the council took such a prominent part in the association that he was deprived of his office and suspended from the service. Clive had not much difficulty in dealing with the insubordination of the civil servants, but a much more serious task was awaiting him. The greater part of the European officers in the army had become disaffected and were on the point of mutinying.

According to a plan framed by Clive the army had been formed into three brigades, each consisting of a regiment of European infantry, a company of artillery, six battalions of sepoys, and a troop of native cavalry. The first brigade, under Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher, was stationed at Monghyr; the second, under Colonel Smith, at Allahabad; and the third, under Colonel Sir Robert Barker, at Bankipur, about four miles west of Patna. From the earliest time the officers, serving in India had, while on active service, received in addition to their ordinary pay an allowance known by the name of batta. After the battle of Plassey, Mir Jafar, on whom the payment of the troops devolved, doubled this allowance, and from that period accordingly double batta had been paid. So long as the nabob drew the revenues and paid the army out of them, the Company did not share the burden. The case was altered first when certain districts were assigned for payment of the troops, and still more when the Company obtained the grant of the whole diwani. Thereafter, the maintenance of the troops was borne entirely by the Company, and every deduction that could be made was so much added to their income. Influenced by this consideration and the financial difficulties with which they were struggling, the directors were desirous to enforce economy wherever practicable, and among other measures resolved to abolish the allowance of double batta. At the time when it was first granted, Clive had distinctly warned the army to regard it as an indulgence which they owed entirely to the personal feelings of the nabob, and which the Company would not be disposed to continue. The directors accordingly no sooner felt the burden than they began
to complain of it, and sent out positive orders that double batta should be abolished. The very proposal was received with so much indignation, and called forth such strong remonstrances from the officers, that the governor and council were intimidated, and chose rather to disobey the orders than incur the obloquy and risk the danger of carrying them into execution.

The directors, determined not to be thus defeated, called Clive's attention particularly to the subject, and in the instructions which he took out with him on his re-appointment, repeated their orders for the abolition of double batta in the most peremptory form. He was determined to execute them; and had no sooner brought the war to a termination by the treaties concluded with Shah Alam and Suja-ud-daulah, than an intimation was given by the select committee that double batta should cease on the 1st of January, 1766. An exception was made in favour of the second brigade, both because its station at Allahabad was beyond the limits of the Company's territory, and it might be considered while watching the threatened invasion of a large body of Marathas to be actually in the field. On returning into cantonments it was to be reduced to single batta, while the brigades at Bankipur and Monghyr were to draw half batta only. Within the presidency, except during marching or actual service, no batta at all was allowed.

The abolition took place at the time appointed, and with the supposed acquiescence of the officers, who appeared to have abandoned the opposition which they had often threatened. Clive, delighted with the result, left Calcutta in the end of March, 1766, and proceeded northward with General Carnac, for the purpose of regulating the collections of revenue for the ensuing year. He was thus employed at Murshidabad, when he was startled by a letter from the council at Calcutta, dated 19th April, inclosing a remonstrance against the reduction of batta, signed by nine captains, twelve lieutenants, and twenty ensigns of the third brigade, stationed, as we have seen, at Bankipur, in the neighbourhood of Patna. This was alarming: but the extent of the danger was not suspected till the 28th of April, when a letter was received from Sir Robert Fletcher, in command of the first brigade, stationed at Monghyr. He stated that the officers seemed determined to make another attempt for the
recovery of batta, and had intimated their intention to resign their commissions at the end of the month, though they would continue to serve in May as volunteers. This letter inclosed another from Sir Robert Barker, which mentioned in more explicit terms his discovery of a serious combination, which there was reason to apprehend was not confined to his own brigade. On further inquiry, it appeared that the combination extended to the whole army, and had originated at Monghyr, as early as December, 1765. It was, in fact, a regularly organized plot. The officers belonging to it took an oath binding them to secrecy, and to preserve, at the hazard of their own lives, the life of any one of their associates whom a court-martial might condemn to death. Each, moreover, engaged under a penalty of £500, not only to resign his commission, but not again to accept of it till double batta was restored. As an additional security, a fund was formed for the indemnification of those who might be cashiered, or the purchase of commissions for them in the king’s service. To this fund civilians were said to have subscribed to the amount of £16,000. At first the second brigade, stationed at Allahabad, refused to join in the plot. As they were actually in the field, an exception had been made in their favour, and the reduction of batta was not to take place in their case till they should be placed in cantonments. On this ground they stood aloof for a time, but ultimately the influence of the officers in the other brigades prevailed, and they made common cause with them. The number of commissions collected for resignation amounted to nearly 200.

Clive was just the man to deal with such a crisis. The only case in which he appears to have ever thought of concession was in that of the second brigade. A large body of the Marathas was in motion, and a battle was daily expected. In these circumstances Colonel Smith was instructed, in the event of being reduced to the utmost extremity, to make peace with the malcontents. In regard to the other brigades the most decisive steps were taken. Besides sending forward all the officers in whom he could confide, Clive caused urgent letters to be written to Madras, requesting that all officers who could possibly be spared should be forthwith despatched for Bengal. The free merchants at Calcutta were also urged to accept of commissions,
temporarily or permanently, while all the officers who resigned were ordered to be sent down to Calcutta to be there tried by court-martial. These measures completely disconcerted the malcontents. They had made sure of victory without providing against defeat, and no sooner saw the probability of failure than all their confidence forsook them. Either because they feared to take so bold a step or deemed it unnecessary, they had not attempted to enlist the sympathies of the common soldiers; and when the struggle came found that they had grossly miscalculated. By their resignations they had simply excluded themselves from the service, and made way for others who were ready to supply their place. On the 15th of May, when Clive arrived at Monghyr, the confederacy was already broken up. Two days before, when the officers who had resigned were ordered to quit the garrison, the European soldiers got under arms intending to follow them. The sepoy battalion was immediately called out, and order was without much difficulty restored. It seemed, indeed, that the European soldiers were acting under misapprehension. They had imagined that Sir Robert Fletcher was himself one of the malcontents, and were astonished when they found him taking part against them instead of putting himself at their head. On being thus undeceived they at once returned to their duty. It soon appeared that the opinion which they had formed of their commander was not unfounded. The very day of Clive’s arrival Sir Robert Fletcher acknowledged that he had known of the combination of the officers since January, though he had not mentioned it in any official communication till late in April. His excuse was, that he had seemed to approve of the scheme in order that nothing might be done without his knowledge. This was too flimsy to be received, and further inquiry having left little room to doubt that he was an abettor, if not the actual originator of the mutiny, he was at a later period brought to a court-martial and dismissed the service.

From Monghyr Clive proceeded without loss of time to Bankipur, where he arrived on the 20th of May. Though most of the officers of the third brigade stationed here had resigned their commissions, only a few had insisted on their immediate acceptance, and been accordingly sent off for Calcutta. The rest
had only resigned prospectively against a given day, and were still continuing to do duty. The moment Clive arrived, all idea of further contumacy was abandoned, and they were glad to be permitted to retract their resignations under the somewhat humiliating condition of engaging to serve for three years, and not to resign at any time without giving a year's notice. The second brigade, though the last to join the combination, appears to have been the most reluctant to abandon it. The greater part of the troops composing it had been marched above 100 miles beyond Allahabad, and were watching the movements of 60,000 Marathas who had arrived at Kalpi, under the command of Balaji Rao. The enemy being thus in sight, the British officers were bound for the time at least to have reserved their grievances. Instead of this honourable course, they took advantage of their position, and sought to extort a compliance with their demands, by tendering their resignations in a body with only two exceptions. Those who resigned immediately were sent off to Calcutta; the others who resigned prospectively were glad before the arrival of the period which they had fixed to be permitted to retrace their steps. The officers of the European regiment in garrison at Allahabad were not so easily intimidated, and did not yield till a battalion of sepoys arrived from the camp, having performed a march of 104 miles in fifty-four hours.

The mutiny was now suppressed mainly through the indomitable firmness which Clive manifested in his own person, and was able to transfuse into all who acted immediately under him. It only remained to inflict punishment on those who, from their rank or their violence, were regarded as the most criminal. From the very first Clive had declared that the law must take its course, and that the ringleaders at least would suffer death. Lenient measures, however, prevailed. Only six officers were tried, and though they were all found guilty of mutiny no capital sentence was pronounced. Clive's sense of discipline was thus very imperfectly satisfied; but a defect had been discovered in the mutiny act for the Company's service, making it doubtful if the proceedings under it were legally valid, and it was therefore wisely resolved to lean to the side of mercy. On this ground the mildness of the sentences pronounced by
the court-martial can be easily justified. It is more difficult to justify the conduct of the directors in refusing, in several instances, to give effect even to these sentences, and more especially in reinstating Sir Robert Fletcher, whom we shall again see installed as commander-in-chief at Madras, and taking a prominent part in a transaction only less discreditable than that for which he had been previously cashiered.

At the very time when Clive was thus called to maintain the discipline of the army against the great body of its officers, he had announced his determination to confer upon it the very liberal donation which, largely augmented first by the nabob and afterwards by the Company, constitutes what is still known by the name of "Clive's Fund." Mir Jafar, on his death-bed, had expressed a wish to leave Clive a legacy of five lacs of rupees. It has been insinuated that this sum was a legacy only in name, and was in fact a present by which the members of Mir Jafar's family not only wished to manifest their gratitude for the elevation which they owed to the victor of Plassey, but hoped to conciliate his future favour. If it was only a present, it was evidently struck at by the new covenants, and nothing could have been more preposterous than that the governor specially appointed to enforce these covenants should set an example of violating them; if it was truly a legacy, the propriety of accepting it was still more than doubtful, because, although not contrary to the letter, it was evidently at variance with the spirit of the covenants, and furnished an easy method of perpetuating the abuses which they were meant to suppress. Clive felt the difficulty, and was conscious that, whatever became of the money, he could not appropriate it to himself without incurring the obnoxious charge of breaking the promise he had repeatedly made, not to derive any pecuniary benefit from his re-appointment. In these circumstances it occurred to him that as the abolition of double batta was about to be enforced, it would be at once a graceful and appropriate compensation to employ the legacy in establishing a fund out of which not only officers and soldiers disabled by wounds, disease, or length of service, but also their widows might be pensioned. The announcement of this determination set at rest the questions which the bequest would naturally have raised; and the court
of directors, wisely abstaining from giving any opinion as to its true character or legal validity, unanimously resolved, that "his lordship be empowered to accept of the said legacy or donation, and they do highly approve of his lordship's generosity in bestowing the said legacy of five lacs in so useful a charity; and they hereby consent and agree to accept of the trust of the said fund, and will give directions that the same be carried into execution in legal and proper form." The five lacs of rupees produced, according to the rate of exchange at the time, £62,833, 6s. 8d. To this Saif-ul-daulah, the brother and successor of Najm-ud-daulah, who died at Murshidabad, in May, a few days after Clive set out to quell the mutiny, added three lacs of rupees, equivalent to £37,000. On the 6th of April, 1770, when the deed establishing the fund was formally executed, the accumulated interest amounted to £24,128. The whole capital of the fund thus amounted to £123,961, 6s. 8d.; and at 8 per cent, the rate of interest which the Company agreed to pay, produced an annual income of £9,912, to be expended in pensions.

After suppressing the mutiny Clive proceeded with General Carnac to Chhapra, where a kind of congress was held. It was attended by Suja-ud-daulah, Shah Alam's minister, and deputies from the Marathas. Shah Alam, hitherto excluded from Delhi, was bent on gaining possession of it, and had engaged the assistance of the Marathas for that purpose, by assuring them that the Company's troops would form part of the expedition. Clive at once declared against this proposal, in which he saw only ruin to Shah Alam himself, and a warfare which might throw the whole empire into confusion. Instead of an alliance with the Marathas, whom he regarded as the only enemies from whom serious danger was now to be apprehended, he was desirous of forming a confederacy against them, and laid the foundations of a treaty by which the Company, the Nabob of Oudh, the Jat, and the Rohilla chiefs, were mutually to assist each other in resisting the demands and repelling the incursions of the Marathas. Before the terms were finally arranged, Clive, attaching little importance to the assistance to be derived from such distant allies, took his departure and arrived at Calcutta on the 30th of July. The disagreeable service in which he had been engaged;
the exertion he had been obliged to make, and a climate to which his constitution was ill adapted, had seriously affected his health. He had previously intimated his determination to return to Europe, and in answer to a letter from the directors earnestly requesting him to continue in the government for another year, replied, "It is now a month since I have been in so deplorable a state of health as to be wholly unable to attend to business, and it is past a doubt I cannot survive the malignity of this climate another year." The directors, in urging their request, had said, "When we consider the penetration with which your lordship at once discerned our true interest in every branch, the rapidity with which you restored peace, order, and tranquillity, and the unbiased integrity that has governed all your actions, we must congratulate your lordship on being the happy instrument of such extensive blessings to those countries; and you have our sincerest thanks for the great and important advantages thereby obtained for the Company." Nor did they confine themselves to thanks. After arguing that "another year's experience and peaceful enjoyment of our acquisitions might fix them on a basis that might give great hopes they may be as lasting as they are great," they continued thus—"We are very sensible of the sacrifice we ask your lordship to make in desiring your continuance another year in Bengal, after the great service you have rendered the Company, and the difficulties you have passed through in accomplishing them, under circumstances in which your own example has been the principal means of restraining the general rapaciousness and corruption which had brought our affairs to the brink of ruin. These services, my lord, deserve more than verbal acknowledgments; and we have no doubt that the proprietors will concur with us in opinion, that some solid and permanent retribution, adequate to your great merits, should crown your lordship's labours and success."

Clive was not insensible to the high encomium pronounced on his services, nor indifferent to the reward which, though only vaguely described as "some solid and permanent retribution," was understood to be nothing less than a grant of his jaghir in perpetuity; but the state of his health admitted of no answer, and he was moreover convinced that every material
object contemplated in his re-appointment having been accomplished, the evils apprehended from his departure were in a great measure imaginary. The army, again brought into due subordination, was more than a match for any foreign power which might be tempted to provoke hostilities; the double batta and other expenses which bore most heavily on the treasury had been subjected to due retrenchment; Mr. Verelst, for whom the governorship was destined, as well as the select committee, who were to continue in office, was disposed to give full effect to the improvements which had been introduced; and the Company, now in possession of an independent revenue, which the least sanguine estimated at not less than £1,000,000 sterling, seemed about to enter on a career of unprecedented prosperity.

Clive sat in the select committee for the last time on the 16th of January, 1767, and on the 29th finally quitted Bengal for England in the Britannia. His measures had encountered much opposition, and excited in many of those who considered their interests to be injuriously affected by them a vindictive spirit, which they afterwards took an opportunity of gratifying. The general feeling of the presidency was, however, decidedly in his favour, and was not inaccurately expressed by the select committee in a letter addressed to the directors shortly after his departure. Comparing the state of Bengal as he found it and as he left it, they observed, "We beheld a presidency divided, headstrong, and licentious; a government without nerves; a treasury without money; and a service without subordination, discipline, or public spirit. We may add, that amidst a general stagnation of useful industry and of licensed commerce, individuals were accumulating immense riches, which they had ravished from the insulted prince and his helpless people, who groaned under the united pressure of discontent, poverty, and oppression. Such was the condition of this presidency and these provinces. Your present situation need not be described. The liberal supplies to China, the state of your treasury, of your investment, of the service, and of the whole country, declare it to be the strongest contrast to what it was." His reception in England was flattering. In other quarters of the world disaster had generally attended the British arms. Their triumphs in India thus
presented a striking contrast, which brought Clive more prominently into view, and obliged even those who would have detracted from his merits to keep a prudent silence. Nor was applause the only reward which he received. The proprietors of the Company, instead of requiring to be prompted by the directors, took the initiative in recommending that the possession of the jaghir should be extended to him and his representative, ten years beyond the period which had been previously fixed, and a resolution to this effect was ultimately carried by the unanimous vote of a general court.

It is necessary to add, that this magnificent grant was accompanied with circumstances which diminished the gratification derived from it. Clive had left India in miserable health, and had very imperfectly recovered on the homeward voyage. While he was thus suffering, fame and emolument were comparatively indifferent to him, and he appears to have been more offended at the hostility or lukewarmness of some on whose friendship he had calculated, than delighted at the universal recognition of his merit. The grant of the diwani had raised extravagant hopes in the proprietors, who had begun in consequence to clamour for a largely increased dividend. The directors, better acquainted with the actual position of the Company's affairs, were anxious for delay. The additional revenue confidently predicted had not yet been realized; and extraordinary expenses had been incurred which would more than absorb it for some time to come. The directors being thus opposed to the wishes of the proprietors, naturally endeavoured to justify their opposition by giving an unfavourable view of their finances. Some of them even, in order to justify this view, spoke somewhat disparagingly of their new territorial acquisitions, and objected to the extended grant of the jaghir as extravagant. Clive felt indignant, and hesitated not to say that the directors in thus acting were endeavouring to gain their own ends at his expense. This misunderstanding cooled some of his supporters, and made it more easy for his enemies to mature their meditated attack upon him. Not a few of those whose malversations he had punished in Bengal had returned to England with their ill-gotten gains, and become large purchasers of India stock. The influence which they acquired in this way was so great, that after an action had been raised for the purpose of obliging
some of the greatest delinquents to disgorge the sums which they had illegally received in the name of presents, they succeeded in inducing the general court to recommend the withdrawal of the action, and guarantee them from future proceedings by a vote of indemnity. The sympathy with notorious delinquency manifested by this vote was ominous, and Clive, shattered in health and depressed in spirits, retired into the country, not without a strong presentiment of the harsh scrutiny to which, through the relentlessness of enemies and the lukewarmness of friends, his whole public life was soon to be subjected.

In consequence of the revolution effected by Clive's achievements in Bengal, a new era in the history of India commenced. On their original character of merchants the Company had engrafted that of conquerors, and were henceforth to rule with absolute sway over myriads who had previously known or heard of them only as traders. Hitherto, while the relation with the natives was of a less intimate and more precarious nature, they have occupied a very subordinate place in the narrative, and any reference made to their manners and customs has only been incidental. A more intimate acquaintance with them must now be formed. The country though it has changed its rulers still remains theirs, and the policy of the measures adopted by government depends on the manner in which their interests are affected by them. But how can this be understood without a previous knowledge of their social position? No people can be governed on abstract principles. Their peculiarities, including even their most irrational prejudices, must be consulted, since the very same laws under which one nation would be prosperous and happy might produce universal discontent and wretchedness in another. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, both that those who rule and those who confine themselves to the humbler task of reviewing the policy of rulers, should first of all acquaint themselves with the leading features of the population. In the case of India the remarkable forms under which society presents itself make the knowledge of them as interesting as it is indispensable, and the temporary suspension of the narrative will be fully compensated by the insertion of a detail, as ample as our limited space will allow, of whatever is most singular in the opinions and practices of Hindus. To this, accordingly, the next book of our history will be devoted.
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